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
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
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THE
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,
AND
LITERARY MAGAZINE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."



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PREFACE.

It is not uncommon, we are told, when our friends have occasion to mention the existence of the *British Controversialist* to those who interest themselves in the advocacy of great questions, in the stirring up of men's minds to progress and improvement, and in the diffusion of an interest in the higher concerns of life, to be met with the bland but condemnatory remark—"We dislike controversy; it unsettles opinions; it excites quarrelsomeness and jarring contention; we seek to instil truth, and to promote morality, religion, and intellectuality." The inference underlying this observation is, of course, that controversy is disastrous to the better interests of mankind, and that we are aiding and abetting those who wish to cultivate scepticism and induce acrimonious dissension. To those who examine the efforts we have made during the twenty-two years our labours have been devoted to this work; no denial of ours can be required regarding any such implied impeachment; to those who, acting upon a foregone conclusion, decry all controversy as mischievous, we suppose no plea of innocence from us would give any satisfaction. But we affirm, and we refer in proof to the thirty-six volumes which we now complete, that controversy may be employed without contentiousness, and may be made conducive to mental progress, the culture of a love of truth, and an observance of all the nobler pieties of the spirit. On a survey of the contents of the present volume we venture to assert that it may take its place in the library of any person who feels the responsibility of reflective reading, and admits the duty of seeking the truth in the love of it. Though we think, with all honesty, that this is the case, we should like to say here two or three words in justification of ourselves and our serial.

Firstly, controversy is *unavoidable*. Men differ in opinion, and this difference they will emphasize and assert. It is a good thing, therefore, to have brought before us the reasons, candidly stated, which can be given in support of those opinions which men entertain. Then only can we justly hold our own opinions to be impregnable when we have exposed them to trial and assay. Again, controversy is *necessary*. No man possesses the power of so thoroughly exhausting the whole of the considerations relating to the more important questions in which the soul takes interest as to make it possible, or even probable, that he has attained to "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" upon each topic. Controversy supplements inquiry with criticism, and is the experimental test of right reasoning. It transfigures dogma into doctrine, and justifies our trust in truth. Controversy is growing in power; and is acquiring the same position in the regions of thought as experiment has long wielded in the realms of science. Parliament and Convocation, May meetings and recess-assemblies of constituencies, are all made arenas of discussion and agitation; newspapers and pamphlets, even novels and poems, have become the vehicles of advocacy or denunciation; conversation and correspondence are engrossed with controversial topics; and, as we have before observed, Government by party is controversy systematized, diplomacy is controversy by artifice, and war is only the controversy of force.

We hold that educative training in controversy is one of the greatest

necessities of an age like ours, in which public opinion is enfranchised and made the ultimate force in Church and State; and the decision of the most vital questions regarding statesmanship—Education, Public Morality, and Personal Faith—is claimed, as we think justly, for the people and by the people. Discrimination as to the incidence of argument is surely an indispensable condition of deciding a right on the topics that arise in social, industrial, political, literary and ecclesiastical life; and if so, controversy is the safeguard, not the betrayer, of truth.

So much in general defence of controversy. Let us now turn to our special share in the stir and strife of thought. Our leading papers have had their usual aim of being informing, substantial, and trustworthy additions to the literature of self-culture and progress, and amply sustain their place among contemporary productions of their class and purpose. In the *Essayist* practical aid has been given in storing of the mind with facts, and stimulating it by high motives. Our *Reviewer* has supplied estimates and summaries of valuable and excellent works, as well as notices of smaller appeals to public opinion and general readers. Our controversies have been serious, keenly contested, important, and such as are concerned with topics of high import in their respective fields of thought. Our minor, though not therefore less valuable departments, have merits which must commend them to the reader, while we confess that in all of them we see scope for improvement, and have made arrangements in that behalf.

More and more as we compare our aims and the results of our endeavours we feel how imperfectly we have accomplished our desires. Yet, liable to many criticisms as our volumes may be, the bringing together of so large an amount of original matter, voluntarily devoted to the progress of truth and researchful thought, to the personal culture of our readers, and through them the stimulation, among the reflective, of careful study and eagerness in the pursuit of true knowledge, has been attended with great labour, anxiety, thought, endeavour, and responsibility. During long years this pleasure of self-imposed duty, undertaken and pursued "all for love and nothing for reward," has been borne because we have been cheered again and again by notices of the effectiveness of our efforts in inducing to self-help, the culture of character, and the attainment of higher heights in life by those who have taken advantage of our serial for its true uses. We regret that the restrictedness of our circulation acts as a limit to our aggressive aims against the ignorance and thoughtlessness of the age. We have reconsidered our plans, and have in course of arrangement several changes which are intended to make our pages more attractive and useful to student-thinkers, who seek aid in preparations for examinations, for collegiate work, for life-advancement; and we ask the aid of our readers to make our efforts more widely known, in order that they may have a better chance of being as successful as we desire and they require.

Again we close a volume with thanks to our contributors, our subscribers and our friends, glad that opportunity has been given us to do so, and that under favour of both we are led to "take courage" to continue our efforts to equal our aspirations and our hopes.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.:

Modern Logicians.

THE LATE AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN, B.A., F.R.A.S.,
F.C.P.S., &c.

By C. M. INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D, FOR. SEC. R.S.L.

(SECOND NOTICE.)

It is one thing to write biographical notices of a man while he is alive, and sensibly alive to criticism, and quite another thing to do his memory that service when he eternally rests from his labours, and his works live after him. The subject of this sketch survived by only four years and a quarter the account of his life and writings which appeared in our number for January, 1867. He died on March 18 last, at his residence, No. 6, Merton Road, one of the five "thwarts" that connect Adelaide Road (where he formerly lived) with King Henry's Road, Regent's Park, the two latter roads enclosing a boat-shaped area, of which the bow touches Finchley Road and the stern Haverstock Hill. He had hardly completed his sixty-fifth year, when this distinguished genius succumbed to a complication of paralysis and kidney disease. The ancients pronounced that man supremely wretched who survived his children. It is still a debated question whether the adjective *superstitious* was originally intended to mark the rites which were performed generally in honour of the dead, or those which had more special reference to the grief of parents who survive their

children. De Morgan was not, in the opinion of the writer, a *sensitive* man. "The loss of a dear friend, wife, brother," though to him "unpaid loss and unpayable" (the words are Emerson's), would not strike him down or disable him as it would many another son of frailty. But such demonstrations of grief as hysterics and dementia, or at least weeping and tears, are affairs of organization; and with persons of robust *physique*, the domestic affections may be as "deep almost as life," and so "lie too deep for tears." Such, in the writer's belief, was the case with De Morgan. For the last four years of his life that social intercourse in which he delighted was interrupted by poignant anxiety and sorrow, on account of the illness and death of a son and a daughter. The son was George Campbell De Morgan, one of the projectors and, as long as he lived, one of the secretaries of the London Mathematical Society; a man of the utmost purity of life and gentleness of character, and withal a mathematician of great promise. After this son's death De Morgan appeared in his old place at the society's meetings, with his old exterior, suggestive of perfect self-possession and acute observation. But, despite appearances, these four years' anxiety and sorrow had done their work and set their seal upon that once vigorous constitution, just as a woodman notches an old tree for felling. Death was even then calling to him from afar. He was present at only one meeting of the London Mathematical Society after they had removed from University College to Burlington House. The writer will never forget the affectionate respect and sympathy with which the Council welcomed him then.

In resuming the consideration of a man's life and writings after he has passed away, it must happen that in making up the account the *per contra* will be more heavy than formerly, and this for two reasons. 1. While he is alive respect for his feelings is sure to keep his foibles and frailties for the most part out of sight. 2. Until he has been some-while dead, and his reputation has been canvassed and verified, it is impossible to strike a fair balance. The account is, therefore, cannot be properly made up and balanced in his lifetime. Accordingly, it will be found that in the following sketch De Morgan figures not only as an eminent mathematician, logician, and man of letters, but as a man whose perception and judgment had suffered from too exclusive a pursuit of formal and exact science. The prominence which in the cause of education will be given to this *item per contra*, must not be taken in the light

of an ill-natured detraction from the intellect on which it is attempted to pass an *objective* judgment.

In the account of De Morgan which has already appeared in our pages, it was wisely determined by the editor to confine his comments and extracts to a few of De Morgan's more important publications on logic, his minor writings being passed over with a bare mention. In this sketch we shall endeavour to redress the omission, and purpose to give special prominence to his periodical and occasional pieces. To consult these we have had to undergo a somewhat troublesome ordeal, viz., to overhaul the volumes of the *British Almanack*, to ransack the files of the *Athenæum* and *Notes and Queries*, as well as to consult, and in considerable part to re-peruse, De Morgan's quarto memoirs, printed in the "Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society," and his various isolated monographs. The opulent resources thus unfolded could not fail to be at first bewildering, and, in reference to the intended sketch, to fill the writer with despair. So voluminous are De Morgan's minor writings, that the obituarist of the *Athenæum* of March 25, 1871 asserts that "if they were gathered together, the articles which he contributed anonymously or in epistolary forms to periodicals and encyclopædias would be found to be such a mass of literary achievement as seldom comes from the pen of a man whose sole business it is to write for journals."

In the account of De Morgan's boyhood which will be found on in a previous volume, a quotation was given (in the character of "semi-autobiographic Glimpses"), of which it is but fair to say that the latter half only was written by himself, and that is in these words :—

"I remember when I first opened Euclid at thirteen years of age, I am sure that I had no bias to admit anything which should make mathematics 'exist as a science;' for I should have been better pleased if it had not existed at all. Science or no science, I thought I had studies enough, and Walkingame, who I understood was a cousin of Euclid, had given me no prejudice in favour of the family."

To this De Morgan subsequently added the following account of his education :—

"At sixteen and a half I had read Euclid I.—VI., XI., and XII., Robertson's "Conic Sections," Hutton's "Mensuration,"—had

done *all* Bland's "Equations," had used logarithms without a master, and was fond of settling the angles of triangles to make 180° within 1" (not 1'), and had had a touch at the binomial theorem, &c. In classics I had read largely Virgil, Horace, Juvenal, Cicero ("Orations," "De Officiis," "De Oratore," &c.), some of Persius, Tacitus, Livy, &c., and largely Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Euripides, with some out of the other tragedians—Aristophanes, Anacreon, Theocritus, &c., &c. I could read—say Cicero—with ease, and could write a hand of Latin."

Some further particulars were contributed by him to the late Henry Crabb Robinson's "Diary and Correspondence," vol. iii., pp. 540—542. It should be premised that De Morgan here speaks of himself in the third person. In order to avoid the possibility of confusion, we have taken the liberty to banish the words "the writer," in favour of the first personal pronoun, and *mutare mutanda* in consequence. De Morgan was under the same preceptor as was Mr. H. C. Robinson, but thirty years later. Of this time he writes as follows:—

"I was, in truth, a pupil of the Rev. John Ludd Fenner [a Unitarian minister?], who had subsided from his school at Devizes into a petty day-school in a different part of the country, and from him I learnt my first—fortunately not my last—notions of Latin and of Greek, with some writing, summing, how to mend a pen, and the first four verses of Gray's 'Elegy,' with a wonderful emphasis upon the 'moping owl.' I think, too, that I pitied the sorrows of a poor old man; but on this my memory is not so clear. . . . Mrs. F.'s name was *Uty* or *Utie*; which was more than I knew [at the time taking it merely for a nickname given her by her husband]; for the boys had settled amongst themselves that it was a corruption of *Beauty*, and had circulated the account in their homes to the great amusement of many. [Possibly she may have been as straight and slim as Zechariah's staff, and deserved the *sobriquet* on that account.] Poor lady! the only amends I can make to her memory is to declare my full conviction that, let what may be said about her husband's Latin and Greek, there was no lack of good feeling and motherly care. . . . But Mrs. F., who was as good a soul as ever took snuff—and not a little of it,—was very much impressed with the idea that boys must eat, and men too. Mr. F., who was as worthy as his wife, was a painstaking scholar of the humblest class of acquirement, and of solemn and somewhat pompous utterance. When I had picked up a trifle of Latin, I was promoted to Greek. I asked for a dictionary, and was assured that there were no such things as Greek dictionaries, but that I must have a *lexicon*. So I was soon put to easy sentences out of the Testament; one was 1 John v. 7. I got on fairly until

I had mastered *πατήρ*, and then taking the rest for granted, concluded that *λόγος* must be the *Son*. When I came up to my lesson I was set right thus,—‘No! learned men must translate *λόγος* by the *Word*.’* . . . The worthy minister had in Greek a kind of scholarship not at all uncommon even among the established clergy of the end of the last century; the New Testament was picked up word for word, and phrase for phrase, without any knowledge of the grammatical forms; *νέος οἶνος* was *new wine*; but which word was meant for *new* and which for *wine* was an open question. There was a dictionary—no! lexicon, it was the one above mentioned—for those readers, in which every inflexion of every word was entered; thus *λογος, λογου, &c.*, so far as they occur, were separately set down, translated, and described. I forget the name of the lexicographer; it was the Hamiltonian system, interspersed with exercise in turning over leaves. The book went through several editions. But its very existence was unknown in the higher regions. When I afterwards came under a teacher who had been a Fellow of Oriel, my master one day took up this lexicon from his desk, and turning it over, as if he hardly believed his eyes, threw it down with ‘Well! I could not have supposed it; but it will not do you much harm.’”

The account which De Morgan gives of his early mathematical reading must not be taken as an assertion, nor would it be an evidence, of extraordinary precocity. Few men take a high place in the *Tripes* who have not done as much early reading as De Morgan, and many have done twice as much, and done it pretty thoroughly, at as early an age. If we wish to form an adequate notion of mathematical precocity, we have only to consider the cases of Gauss, Abel, Murphy, and Hamilton; the first of whom, at the age of eighteen, had, by his own original research, sounded depths in the Theory of Numbers which have never been explored by any one since. The amount and kind of De Morgan's early mathematical reading does not appear to us to be any index of the very

* It would be a pity to lose any opportunity of calling attention to this mistranslation so current among theologians. Of course it is not and could not be accepted by Greek scholars, who know very well that *λόγος* *never* does mean *word* in Greek, though in certain idiomatic phrases our *word* does almost obtain the sense of *λόγος*. De Morgan translates Euclid's *λόγος* not by *ratio* but by “*communication*,” and therefore “*communicating instrument*.” Of course *λόγος* in the text is meant to represent the schoolmaster's pronunciation, *lō-gos*. The word *λόγος* is rendered by *verbum* in the Vulgate. *Verbum* will serve, but only so far as the usage of *verbum* does not agree with that of *vocabulum*.

remarkable genius he possessed as a mathematician and logician. None of the published accounts of his Cambridge career is strictly accurate. According to the *Cambridge University Calendar*, De Morgan was fourth in the Wranglers of 1827. The writer of the former notice in these pages errs in associating Herschel with Hare, Peacock, and Whewell in the establishment of the Classical Tripos in 1822, and in counting classics among De Morgan's favourite pursuits at Cambridge. The *Athenaeum* obituarist assigns an unknown senior wrangler to De Morgan's year. The senior wrangler was Gordon; then came Turner, then Cleasby (at present a Baron of the Court of Exchequer), and then De Morgan. Canon Jarrett was the only double first in that year. The same writer adds, "But Augustus De Morgan's circumstances were exceptional, in that he had a nicely scrupulous conscience, and an intellect that forbade him to subscribe the customary tests." The implication is all too absurd, that only De Morgan of all the honour men (or candidates for fellowships, if that be the meaning) had the combination of a subtle intellect and a tender conscience! But in the sentence quoted the words "conscience" and "intellect" should change places; for it was his intellect that all his life long was nicely scrupulous (and that without the hyphen), and it must have been his conscience that forbade him (if anything did) to subscribe the customary declaration of *bonâ fide* Churchmanship. We say "if anything did," for it is most probable that nothing did, at least we trust his conscience did not, since he duly proceeded to the B.A. degree, and he could not have done that without subscription.

We have no intention of pursuing De Morgan through the various events of his life, which have been set out with great accuracy in the biography which has already appeared in our pages. A word or two must be said on his character and appearance.

In our judgment De Morgan had far greater power as a logician than as a mathematician. His friends said that his logic spoiled his mathematics, and his opponents that his mathematics spoiled his logic. In our opinion, if his mathematics did him any substantial disservice, it was in respect to the faculty of dealing with the common affairs of every-day life, and not to his power of reasoning. He had a large share of domestic and social qualities, yet his mind was decidedly self-contained. He lived in a world of his own, if not of his own making, which had few points of contact with the world that surrounded him. In consequence, he was no authority

in matters political or religious, and was not qualified for active public life. In religion he called himself a "Christian unattached," and it would describe him intellectually to say that he was a *subjectivity* of great resource and range.

As a teacher of mathematics his success was great and his repute high; but as a mathematician he did not take, what some think he deserved, the first rank. It is said that his name is even now hardly known in Germany, and that apart from his "Double Algebra," which has not made way, his works contain no capital achievement in mathematics. In a review of Professor Fraser's edition of Berkeley's works in the *Fortnightly Review* of last October, Mr. J. S. Mill, *à propos* of Berkeley's "Analyst" and the Newtonian theory of fluxions, credits De Morgan with what is wholly due to Cauchy. The mistake consists in an assertion that "the true theory of the differential calculus was not (so far as we are aware) worked out completely, in language open to no philosophical objection, by any one who preceded the late Professor De Morgan, who combined the attainments of a mathematician with those of a philosophic logician and psychologist." Now De Morgan was no psychologist, and what he did for the calculus was merely to expound in the clearest language the theory which had been "worked out completely," and with philosophical accuracy, by the great Cauchy. In making this correction it is far from my intention to deny to De Morgan the credit of restating that theory with the perspicuity of a practised logician; but his merit was purely that of the exponent: Cauchy's was that of the philosopher and mathematician of a very high order.

On the other hand, it is but fair to add that De Morgan's successor in the Chair of Mathematics at University College maintains (what we have no doubt is the simple truth) that there are many original things in De Morgan's treatise on the "Differential and Integral Calculus," of which its author is entitled to the sole and undivided credit; but it is most unsatisfactory to learn that, owing to his self-forgetting modesty, we cannot now determine what these are.

De Morgan's presence was not imposing. His stature was below the average, and his face, though thoughtful and pleasing, had no pretensions to beauty or dignity. His voice was deep and clear, and his delivery slow and deliberate. His oratory, like his writing and conversation, was full of humour.

and had the inestimable merit of being genuine and to the purpose, but had none of the graces of style. His head was of enormous girth and extraordinary volume. One night, after a meeting of the London Mathematical Society, Professor Sylvester, whose head is remarkable for size, as well as for its peculiar form, asked De Morgan for permission to try on his hat. The result was that the hat easily passed over Sylvester's ears. The writer was present, and witnessed the experiment with surprise. These two mathematicians had one cerebral peculiarity in common: in De Morgan the organ of "comparison" was a large prominence of unparalleled relief; and that organ in Sylvester is a remarkable elevation. Let phrenology have the credit, for what they are worth, of these facts. Certain it is that De Morgan's labours have involved more laborious and refined comparison than those of almost any other mathematician of our times. The logical calculus which evolved such results as his famous "K theorem," a theorem which hardly one mathematician alive can thoroughly realize—the mere fruitage of the closest and most elaborate comparison of forms, is some evidence of the *cranial* pretensions of phrenology. In De Morgan that prominence, like the "little horn" of the fourth beast in Daniel, had a dominion with which no other horn could compete.

In this world of inaccuracy, where Mr. Caxton's project of a History of Human Error would be identical with a History of the Human Mind, it is matter for triumphal rejoicing that one has at length found an absolutely accurate man. Whatever may have been his defects, De Morgan was the very embodiment of accuracy. In his case this rare quality ran to the vicious extreme of pedantry, and occasionally became a source of positive error. From his minor writings we have selected seven examples of that pedantry of preciseness which, as some believe, it is the tendency of mathematical study to foster and promote.

I. In the "Companion" to the *Almanack* [*British Almanack*] for 1850, in a note to page 7, we read,—

"The following will show that a palpable absurdity will pass before the eyes of generations of men of letters without notice. In Boswell's 'Life of Johnson,' chap. viii. of the edition with chapters, there is given a conversation between Drs. Adams and Johnson, in which the latter asserts that he could finish his dictionary in three years:—

"ADAMS. But the French Academy, which consists of forty members, took forty years to compile their dictionary.

“JOHNSON. Sir, thus it is. This is the proportion. Let me see—forty times forty is sixteen hundred, so is the proportion of an Englishman to a Frenchman.”

“No one of the numerous editors of ‘Boswell’ have made a note upon this, although many things as slight have been commented upon. It was certainly not Johnson’s mistake, for he was a clear-headed arithmetician. How many of our readers will stare and wonder what we are talking about, and what the mistake is!”

And well they may; for a certainty there is no mistake in the remark imputed to Johnson. Though a clear-headed arithmetician, he was not a pedant; and the phraseology he uses is perfectly intelligible, though it is suggestive rather than technically expressive. De Morgan censures it as if Johnson had said, $3 : 1,600 :: \text{Englishman} : \text{Frenchman}$ —which would undoubtedly have been wrong if we are to understand him as referring to power (not time). But Johnson says no such thing; he simply multiplies, and leaves his hearers to state the proportion for themselves.

The foregoing criticism seems to have set De Morgan on the search for similar mare’s-nests in that most entertaining of all biographies.

II. In the tenth volume of the first series of *Notes and Queries*, p. 363, is a note of De Morgan’s, which he calls a query, wherein he points out what he designates as “another mistake” of Boswell’s:—

“BOSWELL. I wish to have a good walled garden.

“JOHNSON. I don’t think it will be worth the expense to you. You can build in England a park wall for a thousand pounds a mile. Now a garden wall must cost at least as much. You intend your trees should grow higher than a deer will leap. Now let us see; for a hundred pounds you could only have forty-four square yards, which is very little; for two hundred pounds you may have eighty-four [eighty-eight] square yards, which is very well.” (Vol. viii., p. 195, Croker’s Edition.)”

“On this,” says De Morgan, “there is one commentator according to Mr. Croker, namely, the Bishop of Ferns [Dr. Elvington, the editor of “Euclid,” I suppose]. The bishop says that Boswell makes Johnson talk nonsense, and that it ought to be forty-four yards square instead of forty-four square yards. This makes the matter worse.”

Now, at p. 471 of the same volume of *Notes and Queries*, Mr. Bolton Corney is down upon the Professor, and we think justly so. He rightly explains that if a garden wall cost a thousand pounds

a mile, one hundred and seventy-six yards, which would cost one hundred pounds, would form a square having forty-four yards to the side; and similarly three hundred and fifty-two yards, which would cost two hundred pounds, would form a square having eighty-eight yards to the side. And as the latter square would contain four times as much as the former, while it cost only twice as much, the expenditure would in fact be reduced one-half, which, as Johnson said, is very well. Accordingly, the bishop's emendation vindicates both the arithmetic and judgment of Dr. Johnson. But De Morgan says that this emendation only makes the matter worse. Now we cannot undertake to inform our readers what he really meant by this, but having regard to his habit of refining upon everything that has to do with number or quantity, we think it not impossible that the error he was desirous of signalizing consisted in Johnson or his biographer having ignored the breadth of the wall—say nine inches,—the actual side of the square being in the one case forty-four yards and nine inches, and in the other eighty-eight yards and nine inches. If this be not the alleged blunder, we must do as De Morgan did—leave his note as a query.

III. One of the next writers that he falls foul of in the pages of *Notes and Queries* is Mr. Samuel Warren. Our readers all know the story of "The Martyr Philosopher" in the "Diary of a Late Physician." They will remember that the hero tells the physician and his friend that he had suspected an error in Laplace, and then says,—

"Only look at the quantity of evidence that was necessary to convince me that I was a simpleton by the side of Laplace" (pointing to two or three sheets of paper crammed with small algebraical characters in pencil—a fearful array of symbols):—

$$\sqrt{-3a^2}, \square \frac{y}{x^2} + 9 - n = 9, n \times \log. e,$$

and sines, cosines, and series, &c., without end.

"Certainly," remarks De Morgan, "a philosopher who needed pages of these symbols to convince himself that he was a simpleton by the side of Laplace would really be a simpleton by the side of any junior optime. For a parody without caricature, on the supposition that it is a scholar who speaks, suppose he says that he has been looking into Niebuhr's citations, and making a few notes—pointing to some sheets of paper crammed with Latin extracts in dreadfully learned words—*propria quæ maribus, botherum, tempus.. fugi', hic, hæc, hoc, nominativo.*

"There are too many persons in the country who have some

idea of Laplace's symbols to make such a travestie bearable. Perhaps Mr. Warren will allow me to suggest for future editions (of which I doubt not there will be many) the following:—

$$\lambda^2 = \frac{1}{2} \cdot b_1^{(2)} \cdot \cos. \theta + b_2^{(2)} \cdot \cos. 2\theta + \&c. ;$$

and then every one who can read these symbols will see that they are Laplace's, and that the philosopher understood them."—*Notes and Queries*, Second Series, vol. xii., p. 237.

Now we must emphatically deny that there is any just analogy between the two cases. Assuming in the first case that the narrator is *not* a mathematician, the puerile and meaningless "array of Symbols" which might very well be the nearest approximation his meagre knowledge of algebra could afford in respect to the calculations of the martyr philosopher. But in the second case, assuming, by parity, that the narrator is not a scholar, the scanty Latinity which would enable him to carry in his mind such phrases as *propria quæ maribus* and *tempus fugit*, would be sufficient to tell him that those phrases were not from Niebuhr's citations. Now the fact is that we have no reason in the world for supposing that Mr. Warren intended to make the "late physician," who was telling the story, a mathematician, and in the absence of any such reason we may safely assume, on the strength of the above extract, that he was intended by the author to be innocent of any mathematical knowledge. To conceive such a person, or one of respectable mathematical knowledge, to have the faculty of taking in at a glance and retaining in his mind a complicated series of Laplace's, would be the height of absurdity, even if we had any reason (which we have not) for supposing that one of Laplace's series was *in extenso* on the philosopher's paper. It would be no greater absurdity to suppose that a person ignorant of all but the rudiments of Latin, or even one who could read that language, could take in at a glance and retain in his mind whole extracts from Niebuhr's notes.

IV. Passing over many cases worthy of comment, we come to a long and elaborate note of De Morgan's upon *Gulliver's Travels*. He evidently intends to make small hash of Dean Swift's mathematics; with what success the following extract will show:—

"Swift's technical knowledge is of a poor kind. According to him, beef and mutton were served up [in Laputa] in the shapes of equilateral triangles, rhomboids, and cycloids. This beats the

waiter who could cover Vauxhall gardens with a ham. These plane figures have no thickness; and I defy all your readers to produce a mathematician who will be content with mutton of two dimensions (*Notes and Queries*, Second Series, vol. vi., p. 125)."

Now let our readers only conceive what sort of stuff the Dean would have written had he eschewed all popular language for the sake of geometrical accuracy. For one of his readers who would have understood the exact meaning of *triangular prism*, and of *parallelopiped*, fifty would understand by *triangle* and *parallelogram* the very things signified by the other two; and no mistake could possibly arise from the circumstance of these last being technically employed to express figures of two dimensions only. We cannot conceive a more puerile cavil than that of De Morgan's; nor can we admit the point of his self-vindication, p. 251. He says, "In satirizing mathematicians, he (Swift) ought to have used strict terms to prevent their being able to show that he was out of his depth." This assumes that the satire was addressed to mathematicians only, which is the reverse of the fact. Swift's satire was *ad populum*; and even if he had paused to consider how the mathematicians might show him up, he would still have adhered to popular language for two reasons: first, that more readers would understand it than would comprehend exact technicalities; and secondly, that the mathematician could not show him up without using those very technicalities which so many would not understand. This is the great art of satire; and Swift was master of it.

V. In the 11th chapter of De Morgan's "Formal Logic" is a temperate and luminous discussion of Macaulay's views on the question of the novelty of the *Novum Organum*. Macaulay contended that every one naturally performed the inductive process, and that a study of Bacon's analysis of it would not tend to make them perform it better.

"A plain man," says Lord Macaulay, "finds his stomach out of order." He never heard Lord Bacon's name; but he proceeds in the strictest conformity with the rules laid down in the second book of the *Novum Organum*, and satisfies himself that mince pies have done the mischief. "I ate mince pies on Monday and Wednesday, and I was kept awake by indigestion all night." This is the *comparentia ad intellectum instantiarum convenientium*. 'I did not eat any on Tuesday and Friday, and I was quite well.' This is the *comparentia instantiarum in proximo qua natura data privantur*. I ate very sparingly of them on Sunday, and was slightly indisposed in the evening. But on Christmas day I almost dined on them,

and was so ill that I was in great danger.' This is the *comparentia instantiarum secundum magis et minus*. 'It cannot have been the brandy which I took with them, for I have drunk brandy daily for years without being the worse for it.' This is the *rejection naturarum*. Our invalid then proceeds to what is termed by Bacon the *vindemiatio*, and pronounces that mince pies do not agree with him.' Macaulay adds, 'The *comparentias* and *rejectiones*, of which we have given examples, will be found in the most unsound inductions.'

It is clear, then, that he never intended the example of the plain man and the mince pies as one of sound induction; nor did he ever pretend that ordinary mortals always perform the inductive process without error. He merely contended that the study of the logical form of induction could have no tendency to cure errors which do not exist in the form, but in the matter, for which no rules can be given.

De Morgan's reply to this argument falls far short of refuting Macaulay's views.

"The plain man," he says, "should have tried mince pies without the brandy;" and that "philosophy ought to bring him to the result that daily brandy has made that spirit cease to give the stimulus which, were its use only occasional, would enable his stomach to bear an unusually rich diet for a short time."—*Formal Logic*, 1847, p. 219.

That must be a curious "Philosophy" which could teach a man dietetic rules. Mathematicians use that and many other terms in peculiar senses. But after all, if the plain man has performed his induction incompletely, how does that affect Macaulay's argument—which is this, that the *Novum Organum* will not save a man, and did not save Bacon from such errors?

Such is the weakness of De Morgan's rejoinder. But that is not the only point to which we have to direct attention. Macaulay was writing *ad populum*. How would his readers have liked a lengthy example with a *vindemiatio prima, secunda, tertia, &c.*? If we mistake not, the great essayist owes his popular influence for good to his style, the charm of which to a great extent consists in its freedom from the slightest taint of that pedantry, for which De Morgan would have had him to barter all the graces of rhetoric.

VI. The mortal remains of the great logician of Edinburgh had rested but a few months in their long home, when De Morgan's guns once more opened upon the system which its author could no

longer defend. We hardly know whether on this occasion the attack was wholly due to the stimulus of an old grudge, or in part to the laudable desire to impose on Hamilton's successors the duty of revising and perfecting Hamilton's system. Be that as it may, the attack was not only ill-timed and in bad taste, but founded on a remarkable mistake. He begins by calling his old opponent's discussion on logical quantity "an attempt of his own to be mathematical," as if every discussion of *quantity* must be mathematical; and as if the quantity Hamilton was treating was that which entered into mathematics. Kant had long before said that mathematics had nothing to do with quantity (*quantitas*), but only quantities (*quanta*)—a remark which Hamilton *more suo* had appropriated without reference to Kant; and which, therefore, De Morgan could not profit by. Kant might have gone farther, and declared, as Sir William Rowan Hamilton did long afterwards, that mathematics is primarily concerned with *order*, and only by implication with *quanta*. The fact is, the Scotch Hamilton was discriminating and designating two *species* of logical quantity, "extension" and "comprehension," which could not therefore be quantities in the mathematical sense. But De Morgan goes on to say that Hamilton had asserted the identity of two quantities, viz., "extension" and "comprehension;" and also that the greater the one the less the other. (*Notes and Queries*, 2nd series, vol., vi., pp. 125 and 209; and *Athenæum*, November 24, 1860, p. 705, col. 3.)

Obviously, two mathematical quantities, say x and y , being variables, if the one depends upon the other and the dependence be one of *direct* variation, there is no contradiction in making $x=y$; but if the dependence were one of *inverse* variation, that equation would contradict the assumption, for it would make them constants.* This was the gist of De Morgan's criticism, in view of which he called Hamilton's discussion "an attempt of his own to be mathematical"!

That "extension" and "comprehension" in logic have that simple inverse relation is directly denied by De Morgan in his *Syllabus*; and the point may at least be declared debatable. But

* The matter is very simple. To satisfy the condition that the greater is x , the less is y , and *vice versa*, we must have the equation $xy=c^2$ a constant. If in addition we have $x=y$, we have $x=y=\pm c$, so that the supposition of their variation is contradicted.

be that as it may, there is surely no reason why the two species of quantity may not be fundamentally one. At any rate, Hegel teaches *that* they are, and shows *how* they are so.

VII. The last and seventh example I take from the *Athenæum* of July, August, and October, 1861. It is necessary to premise that Sir William Hamilton had in 1846 adopted a new "sign of quantity" in logic. Let not our readers be scared away by this technical term; the sign in question was nothing more terrible than our word *some*, in a new sense. There is a good deal of fun about the meaning of this word. The mathematician's *some* most assuredly may mean *none*; for his co-efficient may be zero. De Quincey, in his most entertaining portrait-gallery of Goethe's ladies in *Wilhelm Meister*, lays down that *some* is *three at least*. On the authority of Scripture we know (or ought to) that *few* means no more nor less than *eight*. One can imagine the opium-eater assigning the number of times *per diem* for taking his favourite drug in these lucid terms,—more than *some* but less than *few*. As to the mathematical usage, we have De Morgan's own example, for he justifies Milton's couplet,—

"Adam, the first of men since born
His sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve,"

y the consideration that each parent was a zero-term in that series (of sons or daughters) whereof the first term was their immediate offspring; so that Adam was *some* of his sons, Eve *some* of her daughters—to wit, *none*. I strongly suspect that De Morgan not only systematically regarded *some* as a possible *none*, but was naturally disposed to believe that other men might think so too.

Now Sir William Hamilton proposed to employ the word *some* in a more definite sense than Aristotle did, or we do. With Aristotle and us *some* may mean indefinitely a part or the whole—always does mean such a part, not excluding the whole. But Hamilton assigned to it the sense of a *part only*, not the whole. These words, *part not all*, being ambiguous and equivocal, are too indefinite even for logical usage; for such a syllogism as this,—

"All lawyers are men;
No lawyer is stone;
Therefore some men are not stone,"

is perfectly valid, whether we speak of *some perhaps all* in the conclusion, or of *some only*, but is invalid and a Gorgon (as it is designated by De Morgan) if we speak of *some only*, to the

exclusion of the rest, being "not stone;" for then we get for a conclusion,—

"Some men are stone,"

which is not authorized by the premises. It was quite fair for De Morgan to point out this absurdity (as he did in his second letter, August 17th, 1861); and we must own that he made his case good, that Hamilton had not carried into his Tables of Syllogism one meaning of *some*, which he had expressly adopted in treating of propositions.

But in his first letter, July 13th, 1861, he endeavours to fix on Hamilton that he used *some* in the sense of *none*. Hamilton's words, though not free from ambiguity, and even inaccuracy, ought to have satisfied De Morgan that he meant to say that Aristotle included the meaning *none* in *not-some*, just as he included the meaning *all* in *some*. His words are, "that '*some*' is to mean only '*some at least*' (probably, therefore, *all* or *none*), thus constituting both in affirmation and negation, virtually a double proposition—a proposition involving in effect two contraries:" of course the propositions are in affirmation *some only is, all is*; and in negation, *some only is not, none is*. But Hamilton should have added to his parenthesis the words, "according as *some* enters into an affirmative or a negative proposition." Allowing this, however, it is really amazing to any one who does not know the peculiar bent of De Morgan's mind, that he should have fancied Hamilton was foisting on Aristotle, or defending on his own hook, a new sense of *some*, viz., *some perhaps all, or perhaps none*. It is the pedantry of the mathematician which accounts for the mistake, and the persistency with which he clung to it (see "On the Syllogism," No. 8, pp. 4 and 54). Otherwise one might be disposed to point to this as an evidence of his dishonest dealing with his opponent's language. Of such conduct I believe De Morgan to have been incapable; though on occasions, to suit his purpose, he made ample use both of irony and special pleading. One instance will suffice, though several occur to me. When Mr. Mansel concluded, on internal evidence, that De Morgan was the author of the review of Hamilton's *Lectures* which appeared in the *Athenæum* of December 8, 1860, and which De Morgan afterwards acknowledged to have been written by him ("On the Syllogism," No. iv., p. 17, note), he made this rejoinder:—

"Mr. Mansel seems to attribute to me the article on Sir W.

Hamilton's Lectures. The authorship I am sure you will not permit me in your columns either to affirm or deny. No editorial article in any journal can safely be attributed, in its totality, to any single writer; for it may have been suggested by one person, founded on hints, or matter furnished by a second or third, written by yet one or more others, and after all must have passed through the hands of an editor who is at liberty to add and at liberty to omit. And omission, were it only to save room, may be addition: even as in algebra the omission of a subtraction may amount to an addition."

What book in the world is there which has not profited by suggestions, hints, or matter, derived from others besides the reputed author? On De Morgan's argument, no book could be attributed, in its totality, to a single author. Then again, there are few writers who would allow their contributions to a periodical to be tampered with by the editor; few editors who would dare to take such a liberty.

It would be an omission of note if, while our attention is called to these three letters on Hamiltonian logic, we failed to remark upon the little controversy between Mr. Thomas Spencer Baynes and Professor De Morgan, to which those letters gave rise. Mr. Baynes certainly got an easy victory on the first *count*, as might have been expected; yet he made so little use of his advantageous position, that he retired from the dispute with the air of a crest-fallen foe. He certainly had a very poor case on the second *count*; yet it is easy to see that something might have been made of it by a judicious advocate. Unfortunately he was so rash and unwary as to assert in his first letter (in the *Athenæum* of November 22nd, 1862) that Sir William Hamilton introduced the new "*Some*,—not all, and the rest the other way, in particular cases, and for special objects," and "contended for its partial use." No one knew better than Mr. Baynes that Sir William Hamilton had done no such thing *explicitly*; and that it was just explicit statement that De Morgan would require. In his letter in the *Athenæum* of November 29th, 1862, De Morgan did ask that the assertions of limitation might be supported by references to Hamilton's writings. This was the *coup de grace*. Mr. Baynes, of course, could not do that; but a judicious advocate would never have allowed matters to come to that pass. We are not at all sure that there is not a valid and substantial answer to be found.

Mr. Baynes, having made a false move, took refuge in what De 1872.

Morgan calls—perhaps somewhat spitefully—*bluster*, but what we may call *chaff*; indeed, the style of his letter in the *Athenæum* of Dec. 6, 1860, is in the worst taste. De Morgan clenched his advantage by a retort at once perfectly just and exceedingly clever. He writes, in the *Athenæum* of Dec. 13, 1860, in reference to the “bluster”: “I will read as much as he likes of it in time to come, if he will but accompany it by reference from [P to] Hamilton’s works, in support of his assertions about Hamilton’s system. But for his own sake I should be better pleased if he would consult some judicious friend upon the remark with which I now close my part of this correspondence. His tone is rich in the defects which are generally admitted to disfigure the controversial writings of his great teacher. The air of immeasurable superiority in judgment upon fact or inference should be left to the *ripieno** paragraphs of a newspaper, or at highest, to second-fiddle leaders. *It may have a smack of awe from out of the gloom of anonymous plurality; but when assumed over signature its grandeur is the grandeur of a stage property by daylight.*” We are certain there is no better rhetoric than that to be found in all De Morgan’s writings.

Our adverse criticism is now at an end. We do not say we might not have extended our list of examples of what we cannot but regard as an over-refinement of preciseness. After all, the defect in De Morgan’s case is amply countervailed by the substantial advantages of unexampled accuracy. On the other hand, viewed in relation to the great question of the utility of an assiduous cultivation of mathematics as a means of invigorating the mind, these mistakes have a peculiar significance, and teach an important lesson. It is a matter of little consequence if a man who is not called upon to exhibit athletic graces should walk with a roll and a straddle; but those defects would indicate at once that the man had spent much of his time aboard ship; and in the course of pointing out the best means for acquiring a graceful carriage, we should be justified in deprecating the naval service. Similarly, in determining the best means of promoting not only vigorous but judicious habits of thought, we must take into account the fact that the study of mathematics have at least the tendency to foster and promote pedantry, hypercriticism, and literalism—more than any other exercise of mind. All mathematical students have not De Morgan’s

* We venture to doubt the correctness of *ripieno* as applied to the lucubrations of the penny-a-liner.

varied powers and wide reading; and it is justly to be inferred that a practice which produced blemishes in a mind so many-sided and productive as his, may well be expected to mar and deform the intellects of less gifted men. This was the germ of truth in Hamilton's famous Edinburgh polemic. The rest of his bill of indictment seems to me indictable nonsense.

The practical had a charm for De Morgan. Many projects he viewed with favour, to which, however, he would give no support because he regarded them as impracticable. The decimal system of coinage received his advocacy because he believed it was feasible, as well as theoretically good. To duodecimals he gave no encouragement, because he believed that they could never be made to supersede decimals, notwithstanding his conviction that, if adopted, they would prove more convenient than the prevalent numerical system. Though strongly given to the archæological parts of literature, he was no blind opponent to the system of phonetic spelling, inaugurated by the *Phonetic News*. As a practical man he recognised but one objection, viz., the existence of the present system. His way of explaining himself was that on the theoretical side of the question there were no objections; if the thing could be got it should be got. He not only looked with favour on the scheme of *visible speech* put forth by Mr. A. Melville Bell, but joined with Sir David Brewster and Mr. Alex. J. Ellis in recommending its adoption. He was not imposed upon by the extremely shallow objection to any phonetic scheme, that its adoption would endanger the historical continuity of the language it is employed to represent. De Morgan saw plainly that the English language is undergoing a revolution of the worst kind; not so much from the introduction of vulgarisms, Americanisms, or neologisms, but from pedantic orthoepisms. Every child who is taught to read augments the prevailing tendency to pronounce strictly according to the spelling in vogue, i. e., to introduce arbitrary sounds never heard before in any stage of development of the language. Such sounds are not determined by the laws of speech, but by a remote chain of causes, acting through the laws of combination of certain written symbols, and therefore not adapted for the purposes of speech. The only two courses by which this mischievous tendency can be arrested are these—to prevent children from learning to read; or to give them a phonetic literature.

I am told that in one of his latest letters to the editor of the

British Controversialist De Morgan pointed out that the traditional birthday of Shakspeare (April 23, 1564) fell on a Sunday, and his baptism on the following Wednesday. The former fact is remarkable; for in the German "Hamlet," called "Der bestrafte Brudersmord" (the "Punished Fratricide"), act i., sc. 1, one of the soldiers on guard tells the other that he has seen a ghost, and has been in a great fright, on which the other exclaims, "Perhaps you were born on a Sunday." That means, "Perhaps you are a seer" (or one possessed of second sight), it being an old tradition that the faculty is bestowed on persons who have the good fortune to be born on a Sunday.

De Morgan, like every other man of science, letters, or business, living in London, felt the inconvenience of looking after a coal-fire. Accordingly, he was accustomed in frosty weather to study till past midnight without a fire, with special and appropriate wrappings. He would say, "If a man has to think about keeping up his fire, he won't do much close work in mathematics." The writer has heard the same remark from Dr. Sylvester. The moral is that mathematicians should use South Staffordshire coal, which will burn a whole night without tendance. On the other hand, the late Prof. Donkin, of Oxford, was accustomed to burn dips, because, as he said, he found an enforced relaxation from mathematical study in occasionally snuffing them.

De Morgan, as we have already stated, had a fund of humour, which, in social intercourse, was wont to break out in puns and repartees. We regret so few of these have been preserved. The following (which occur in H. C. Robinson's "Diary," vol. iii.) are all we have to offer:—

H. Crabbe Robinson told how at school he accidentally found the translation from which his teacher used to prepare to hear him construe. De Morgan said it was curious that it was by *knowing his master's crib* that he was saved from being taken for an ass.

De Morgan writes of H. Crabb Robinson, that "he was eighty when he began to have that suspicion of personal attentions being a tribute to increasing years, which susceptible men take up at sixty. He had completed the extra score when the writer [De M.] proposed to help him on with his great-coat after a dinner. Waving him off, he said, 'I look upon every man who offers to help me with my coat as my deadly enemy.' 'You mean (said De Morgan) that a true joke is no joke.'"

Mr. Robinson himself records the following:—"While I was

turning over my papers, endeavouring to set them straight, I was called away to see De Morgan and Dr. Procter. At my late party Mr. Tayler asked the former how he distinguished a *wise* from a *good* man. 'A wise man,' said the professor, 'is one who does not trouble himself about matters of speculation. A good man does not trouble other people.'"

All these anecdotes are recorded in the third volume of Mr. Robinson's "Diary and Correspondence."

In bringing this rambling and inadequate sketch to a conclusion we wish to record our conviction of the enormous value of De Morgan's five dissertations on logic contributed to the "Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society." The judgment of the writer on this question is not only a mature judgment, but one which has been arrived at by the most laborious process in the very teeth of his foregone conclusions. He now believes that a collection of these papers would outweigh in lasting worth all the logical literature of the world since Aristotle and his commentators; and that, in comparison of this collection, Sir William S. Hamilton's dissertations and lectures have a very subordinate value, for the most part, as masterpieces of style, and as necessary links in the *catena* of logical development. De Morgan's was by far the greater intellect.

Among the valuable series of essays contributed by De Morgan to the "British Almanack," one of the most important is that on the Leibnitz-Newton Controversy, in the "Companion to the Almanack, 1852." It is just twenty years since he annihilated the last vestige of seeming evidence that Leibnitz stole the hints for his "Differential and Integral Calculus" from Newton. The charge was renewed in the most offensive terms by Professor Tait, in *Nature*, for Nov. 30th last, and has now to be formally refuted by the publication of the relevant papers which have lain for upwards of 160 years in the secret archives of the Royal Society.

De Morgan was an accomplished man in the best sense. He understood music, and played creditably on one instrument. Besides the tongues of Greece and Rome, he read with ease at least two modern languages. In 1859 he contributed to the London Philological Society an important paper on the Greek word *ἀριθμός*. Of German he owned that he knew little or nothing, and had a prejudice against German modes of thought. This, doubtless, argued some insufficiency or defect: for beyond question the Germans have attained to a higher range of thought than any

other nation, which is especially noticeable in their mathematics. Few can climb after and track the sublime footsteps of Gauss, Jacobi, Riemann, and Helmholtz. Still fewer are masters of Kant and Hegel. To quote a saying of Mr. G. H. Lewes, "the German language is a calculus;" and a man neglects its acquirement at his peril or to his great loss.

We now dismiss the subject of our sketch in the firm belief, that if not as a mathematician, yet as a logician, the name of Augustus De Morgan is reserved for an enduring and splendid renown.

ON INTEREST.—No blister draws sharper than the interest does. Of all industries none is comparable to that of interest. It works all day and night, in fair weather and foul. It has no sound in its footsteps, but travels fast. It gnaws at a man's substance with invisible teeth. It binds industry with its films, as a fly is bound in a spider's web. Debts roll a man over, binding him hand and foot, letting him hang upon the fatal mesh until the long-legged interest devours him. There is but one thing on a farm like it, and that is the Canada thistle, which swarms new plants every time you break its roots, whose blossoms are prolific, and every flower the father of a million seeds—every leaf is an awl and every branch a spear, and every plant like a platoon of bayonets, and a field of them like an armed host. The whole plant is a torment and a vegetable curse—and yet a farmer had better make his bed upon Canada thistles than attempt to lie at ease upon interest.—*Henry Ward Beecher.*

"CONFESSORS OF THE MESSAGE OF TRUTH, LIBERTY, AND LOVE."—A new religious sect has made its appearance in Vienna, and has notified its existence and programme to the Ministerial authorities. The new community will bear the names of "Confessors of the Message of Truth, Liberty, and Love," and their creed is as follows:—"1. We acknowledge the world to be a unity of infinite space and time, the creative energy of which we call 'Weltgeist.' 2. We acknowledge that humanity is one of the innumerable forms in which the 'Weltgeist' manifests Himself in the series of His developments. We acknowledge that humanity is progressing in all ways, and we declare it to be every man's task to assist in this improvement with all his powers. 3. We acknowledge the indestructibility of the Essence in all the phenomena of the 'Weltgeist,' and, consequently, also in men, and we therefore consider death to be only the transition into a new form of temporal existence. 4. We acknowledge that there must be a retribution for all actions, but this is only of a temporal nature. 5. We acknowledge that all those actions are good which are in harmony with the principle of the Essence, equality of all men, and which tend to the progress of humanity. All actions not in accordance with this are objectionable. 6. We acknowledge the notion of 'God,' as the idea of absolute perfection, to be a postulate of human reason." The ethics of the "Message" are:—"1. The commands of liberty—Be moderate, be calm, be true, be clean, be industrious, be economical. 2. The commands of justice are—Offend not, illtreat not, kill not, cheat not, steal not, rob not. 3. The commands of love are—Be courteous to all, be compassionate with the unhappy, be cheerful with the happy, assist the poor, tend the sick, protect the weak."

Religion.

IS CHRISTIANITY OPPOSED TO HUMAN PROGRESS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WE must prepare our readers at the outset of this debate against a fallacy which is almost certain to be indulged in consciously or unconsciously by contributors on the negative side. They will define Christianity as the religion of Christ; they will quote Scripture to show that it supports their views, and they will then suppose or affirm that they have quite upset those who gainsay the idea that Christianity is a favourer of human progress. This is no debate regarding the life of Christ or the tenets of Christ. It is a discussion on the merits of Christianity—of the embodiment and form which has resulted from the teaching and life of Christ, but which differs as distinctly from the intents of Christ as Neo-Platonism differs from the philosophy of Plato, or Epicureanism from the doctrines of Epicurus. Christianity is not Christliness. It is that creed-bound, form-swathed, church-and-sect thing, which taking advantages of the pure doctrine and holy life of Jesus has transformed into the fiercest tyranny the articles of faith and the ceremonious practices which have been deduced from the Scriptures, although the Scriptures do not contain them. No question could have arisen upon this point in regard to the faith and morality of the gospel. It is concerning that consubstantial entity which claims jurisdiction in formal sects and embodied churches over the faith and practices of men under the name of Christianity that the warfare of opinion is waged.

Christianity has become an embodied fact, and holds a definite position among the forces on which human happiness, prosperity, and progress depend. It concerns us to know if this conglomerate of rival and pretending sects, of rival and antagonist churches, of emulous if not envious conclaves of officials dependent upon the maintenance of the various forms of faith which they uphold, is advantageous to man, or if it really hinders human progress. It is therefore not with any series of expository discourses proceeding from a Divine source; nor with any noble and harmonious Exemplar of life that we have to do. It is with a historic result, a patent

and known power. This incorporate set of interests which assume to themselves the collective name of Christianity, is the topic of the present discussion. The debatability of the subject has been greatly pressed on public notice by the fact that for the last half-century at least the disputes of sectaries had impeded the possibility of a national system of education, had largely hindered the due and proper administration of the Poor-law, and had in a considerable degree spread rancour, disaffection, and sectarian hatreds among the people, keeping men ignorant, making them riotous resisters of authority, and inclining them to look at every proposal in morals, politics, or social life from a sectarian point of view ; so making Christianity an impediment to human progress.

Those who strive to turn against us the sympathy of the reader by representing the holders of this opinion as disbelievers in the doctrines of Christ, or rebels against the authority of Scripture, will do wrong alike to their opponents and this debate. It does not necessarily require those who assert that that ecclesiastical power in which Christianity has become historically embodied has been injurious to mankind, to affirm as well that the life and doctrine of Jesus Christ have not been beneficial to humanity. The antagonists of ecclesiasticism in all its forms and phases may more truly and earnestly contend for the faith once delivered to the Saints than even those who scout him as a sceptic, and yet they may most righteously believe that that aggregation of interests arrogating to itself the designation of Christianity has been most inimical to the free development of human thought, to the full growth of man's moral nature, and to the fair exertion of social reform. It has undoubtedly fettered the spirit of man, made the prosperity of sects more important than the progress of individuals or of society, and set men by the ears on speculative points of no great importance compared with the hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness which they evoked. It is much to be deplored that such a name should have been usurped by ecclesiasticism ; but names, unfortunately—like men—are prone to desecration.

Taking up the question from this point of view, I have no hesitation in asserting that Christianity has been opposed to the progress of humanity by—

First, the introduction of the inveterate hates of sectarianism into social life.

Starting with the idea that the Church was superior to the world,

and had a duty to perform in subduing the world, clerics have always been found exalting the Church not only in but over the State. In doing this they have unwisely set in opposition the Church and the State, and brought into antagonism two elements of human life which ought to have been worked as friendly and co-operative means for man's improvement and happiness. There has thus been introduced into history a long series of struggles and stratagems in which the Church has striven to undermine or overcome the State, and the State has attempted to control or outwit the Church. How much of the history of every nation is taken up with the intrigues of churchmen and the counter intrigues of statesmen, the reader does not need to be informed here. In the history of Greece, Rome, the Byzantine Empire, Italy (medieval and modern), Germany, France, Britain, &c., it is written in legible characters, so plain that he who runs may read, and reading may understand how Church and State have in all ages been at variance, and how Churchmen have had the craft to creep and intrude and climb into the confidence of the people and the sovereign, and make profit from all sources to the Church. But greater woe even has been occasioned by the sectarianism which has been scattered broadcast among the people of all lands. What an amount of sorrow has been wrought by the persecutions which have been inflicted by sect on sect in every quarter of the globe! And all this has been occasioned by dogma rather than doctrine, and by opposing opinions rather than truths. Not only are all the evils of persecution due to Christianity, but all the grief and pain endured by those who have suffered from the contentions of conflicting sects, either in their bodies or their feelings, in their relations or in their experience. If to this we add the extraordinary amount of thought, speculation, energy, pecuniary contribution, and personal labour which has been expended on the promotion of sectarian interests which have thus been diverted from the promotion of human progress, it will easily be seen how sadly Christianity, as a sectarian agency, has interfered with the progress of man.

Christianity, however, as an embodied set of interests, has exerted a great influence for evil by—

Secondly, leading men to withdraw their thoughts from the cause of true progress to expend their efforts on the promotion of sectional and sectarian interests, to the neglect of those which belong to the general advantage of the race.

Every effort drawn off from being exerted on behalf of the interests of the whole race, and more especially everything which has had the tendency to divide and dispart men into opposing and hostile communities, by which their forces have been expended, not in aiding the progress of humanity, but in counteracting the forces one of the other; by which, so far as progress is concerned, the power of both for good was neutralized. Besides this, the sectarian agencies which have been set on foot have been often crowded together offensively in every sense, while other districts of the various territories in which they have been started and kept up have been neglected. Thus it has happened that by overplus in one portion the cause of progress has been hindered by competition; while in others, by paucity and want, there has been occasioned an absence of the means of grace. Want in one place and waste in another is too frequently the consequence of sectarian Christianity, that is of Christianity as it is.

Christianity as it is has unquestionably opposed human progress by insisting on creeds and articles and confessions of faith such as were not thought necessary by Jesus Christ. Not only communion of Christian with Christian and sect with sect, has been thus hindered, but hatred has been intensified, and man has been set against man. Nay, so far has this been carried, that by the quarrels of sects education has been impeded for centuries, and even now, when law has bestowed on children the right of education, the sects are quarrelling in regard to the tenets in which children shall be brought up.

In another way Christianity has interfered with and disturbed the progress of man, that is by insisting on corporate authorization before professing Christians can be allowed to attempt to do good. Though the Scriptures aver that every Christian is a priest, the churches interfere in their organized confederacies, and interdict the employment of any power to influence or convert which a man may possess unless by the laying on of hands, by recognition, by dedication, or corporate setting apart, the person has received the licence or authorization of some body of professed believers. There has been thus introduced into Christianity a professionalism and traditionalism which interferes with the exertion of Christian effort to promote the progress of man. Among the things which had hindered the progress of man we cannot hesitate to include the casuistry of creeds and of their defenders, the Judaizing tendencies of all

sacerdotalism, the importance attached to times, places, ceremonies, officials, forms of worship, and the gewgaws of religion.

Christianity, as an established form of worship, has too greatly gone with the great and the wealthy, and has, like most corporations, sought its own perpetuity in preference to the progress of man. How sadly and grievously have the masses declined while churches have been wrangling about ritualism and creeds, conformity and non-conformity !

Then how much have the questions of the Christianity of the day — baptismal regeneration, apostolical succession, papal infallibility, final assurance, the immaculation of the Virgin, the perseverance of the Saints, the duration of the agonies of the wicked, the necessity of sacraments and sacrifices—hindered the progress of man, not only individually but collectively ! To this add the almost numberless evils which have arisen by the conflicts of men of mark in the several sections of Christendom, and still more by the constant preaching of fair things while unfair practices have been going on.

Look at the Christianity which has been preached for more than eighteen centuries, and see how little it has done for the lessening of the love of luxury, for the elevation of the poor, for the purity of life, for the trustworthiness of trade, for the increase of knowledge and truth, love and virtue, happiness, and the peace of nations ; and for the diminution of crime and suffering, disease and ignorance, self-will and greed, or for the inducing of man to live for others and for God in preference to seeking his own purposes, and striving after the gratification of personal aims and desires. This too we must consider has resulted in the face of the wealthiest, the most favoured, and the most fully granted privileges to which any church could aspire. With the largest possible means and the widest possible opportunity Christianity has done the smallest possible amount of good.

It must be admitted on all hands that our Christianity is not the Christianity of Christ. As has been stated by an eminent thinker, preacher, and philosopher of our day, "There seems to be a great discrepancy between the religion of Christ and the actual church of Christ ; between the lives and even the teaching of Christians and the example and teaching of Christ, to which, as to a fountain of light, we repair, purging away the mists of eighteen centuries which have insensibly gathered over the Christian world, yea, and over our own hearts also." It is quite evident that the Christianity to

which our attention is directed in this debate is the actually existing Christianity, that form, or rather series and conglomerate of forms of church life which the professors of the religion of Christ have arranged and aggregated themselves into. Whatever may have been the condition of affairs immediately after the advent of Christianity among the forces of the world, it cannot now be maintained that the concrete Christianity which comes within our experience has been otherwise than antagonistic to the progress of man. It may be that Christianity has betrayed its Lord and Master, and bartered for worldliness the favour of God; but it is certain that Christianity as it is in many ways destroys love, paralyzes effort, opposes good movements, holds men's hearts enmeshed in formalities and creeds, and lessens the individual and collective energy of man, and therefore, as we maintain, is unfavourable to human progress.

T. O. J.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

Is Christianity opposed to human progress? First let us consider these two entities, Christianity and progress, separately. What is Christianity? Man in the beginning was created by God and placed on this earth to govern and subdue it, having supreme power given him, limited, however, in so far as being confined by certain natural laws over all living animals and products of its surface, internal and external. The world was created for man, and man to rule it; but the world does not satisfy him. Made in the form of his Creator, having a spiritual as well as a material being, he is conscious of another and far better life than the present one he lives here below—one glorious, peaceful and spiritual, in constant communion with his Father, in a palace not made with hands, far away from this dark, material world. But to attain to this final happiness, this joy, a greater than which he cannot conceive, one condition must be fulfilled—he must be worthy. He must live a life of obedience to the wishes of God revealed by his own conscience, and the moral laws enjoined by Him in His own Book; he must love and trust Him with his whole heart; he must ever be ready to give up everything for His sake, and find his greatest joy in working for His glory here, and the welfare, both bodily and spiritual, of all his creatures, indiscriminately; and contemplating a future existence in His bosom when the heavens and earth shall have passed away, and time is swallowed up in eternity.

Such is a Christian. Such is the condition of soul and body which Christ preached to the erring Jews during His sojourn here.

Next comes progress. Progress is the gradual development of the resources contained in the world and in man. Progress may be likened to a plant, the seed of which, sown at the commencement of the world, springs forth from the soil a simple, tender shoot. Day by day it grows on, imperceptibly yet surely. Leaf by leaf unfolding, and discovering new beauties, stem by stem, shooting in every direction, till a small bud appearing, heralds the bursting of a glorious flower, resplendent with colour. But here it does not end. Winter may come, that flower may change and drop colourless and faded to the ground; those leaves may wither and fall blasted by the cold winds, those stems may droop sapless and apparently dead, but life remains; seeds have been wafted into congenial soil, the root still lives down in the cold earth, and when the warming influence of the sunshine strikes to its tendrils, will spring up again stronger and more beautiful than ever. Progress is the gradual unfolding of God's glorious work of creation; its onward march to an end, the nature of which it is totally beyond our power to fathom.

Here we have the two—Christianity, as the following of God's laws and love of himself, which shall bring us everlasting joy and peace; and progress, the continual development, through all ages until the end, of the natural laws affecting the earth and its inhabitants.

The question, then, is, are these in any manner opposed or antagonistic to each other? I think not. Christianity is a divine ordinance brought by the Christ from heaven, and progress was ordained in the beginning as a necessary, unalterable law by the almighty Creator. Can, then, these two, both wonderful emanations from the same divine source, be in any way opposed?

And the time is gone when Christianity need fear the daily discoveries of science. Every new disclosure by progress of what has laid hidden for thousands of years only adds strength to the ramparts of Religion, and destroys some obstruction to the free shedding of its glorious light around upon the whole earth. Hear what the late Sir John Herschel says on the subject of scientific researches: "Science brings to light truths which shall ennoble the age and the country in which they are divulged, and by dilating the intellect react on the moral character of mankind."

Is science able to bring forward any tenable reasons for us not regarding God with love, honour, and obedience? Can it prove that He did not send His only begotten son down here, in mortal form, to suffer death for us? And can it offer any valid excuse to our consciences for being without the feelings such an act—and not this one alone, but the countless evidences of His unboundless mercy and kindness showered upon us daily—should give rise to in our hearts? No, never; both are conceptions of the Divine mind, both designed for the good of erring man, both deep-rooted laws in his nature; having grown side by side for centuries, imparting strength and power to each other, they cannot be opposed.

R. W. C.

IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH?

SPIRITUAL.—III.

"If you examine them carefully, I think you will find that all the theories of the Lord's return, which involve the idea of His personal reign on the earth, rest upon, and are allied to, very limited views of God's power and purpose in creation; that they localize and limit the presence of Jesus, which should be universal; and are inconsistent with the idea of equal nearness to the Saviour, which it is now the privilege of every believer, wherever he may live, to feel; that they chiefly rest upon the hasty interpretation of prophecies which are doubtful in their meaning, mysterious in their wording, and for the right understanding of which the time has not yet come: that they are inconsistent with the general tenor of the plain teaching of God's word; and, incongruous and contradictory in their details, are not consistent with the perfection and full happiness of the human race."—D. C. DAVIES.

We have been taught to pray, "Thy kingdom come." But to what kingdom does this prayer belong? Not to the exercise of the sovereignty of the universe, for that is everywhere, and always in full sway. The government of the Creator requires no praying for its progress or perpetuity. It is the dominion of God in the hearts and souls and lives of men—the reign of religion and virtue in the world—that we are asked here to pray for and to labour for. The kingdom of God cometh not with observation, it is within men. On the great day of parabolic teaching reported for us in the thirteenth chapter of Matthew the kingdom of heaven is likened

unto a sower, tares, mustard-seed, leaven, hid treasure, a pearl of great price, a net. These parables refer to the inward mental, moral, and spiritual nature of Christ's kingdom, its great worth, its quiet growth, its searching criticism as to character. The kingdom of Christ is a moral and spiritual combination of love to God and love to man, intended to make men good and happy, progressive, and ever maturing in righteousness.

The coming of the kingdom of heaven, as it is spoken about by God, has been often and much misunderstood, and this has led to great evils in many ways in the world and in the Church. Not only controversies, but quarrels have been raised about it, and difficulties have been thrown in the way of good pious Christians who have been confused about the millennial glory, and all the other matters of speculation which millennarians in general have heaped round the sayings of our Lord.

It would be a great matter if we could come to some definite understanding on this question; and it is a wise and judicious proceeding on the part of the conductors of this magazine to bring the topic up for discussion in the form that has been given to it, though in general it is not wise or judicious to raise a triangular duel of controversy.

I am of opinion that when the coming of Christ's kingdom is spoken of, we generally mingle different things together in our mind. The near and plain signification to which Jesus applies the term the coming of the kingdom of God, and the wider, vaster, and more divine meaning of the phrase. The latter implies the universal spread and prevalence of His pure and benevolent religion, the former refers to the termination of the Jewish economy as a theocracy—the departure of the sceptre from Judah, and the opening up of the highways of the world to the disciples of His Word. It is this latter coming of His kingdom that He speaks of when He says, "Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of man be come" (Matt. x. 23); and when He says, "Verily there be some standing here among you who shall not taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in His kingdom" (Matt. xvi. 28.) The Jewish city, including the Jewish polity and worship, would cease prior to the passing away of the then living generation, and on its cessation, free course would be possible to the gospel as contradistinguished from the law; for the end of the world referred to was the end of the world as then constituted—as

a Judaic dispensation. His personal advent did not then take place, but, the throne of the Mosaic dispensation being put aside, the Son of man then truly made His accession to that power which excels all principalities and powers that have been, are, or can be set up. Hence He says, "This generation shall not pass away till all be fulfilled" (that He spoke about the coming of the Son of man in glory); and thereafter emphatically adds, "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My Word shall not pass away." His word, as a word of power, shall abide for ever as a great spiritual influence upon all people.

His disciples, we must remember, wrote under a strong feeling of a Judaic Messiah. They could not comprehend a *power* which was not also a *person*, as they could not understand the sovereignty of Jesus, unless He should also declare Himself to be a King. They looked on Him as One who was about to restore the kingdom to Israel, not of Israel. He came as the anointed of God to establish the kingdom of God on a new, wider, even a universal basis; old things were to pass away, and all things were to become new. He was to put His Spirit within men. The truths He had taught men of the divine and eternal duration of God's will would work within the souls of men like good leaven until the whole was leavened. Men should then worship God as an omnipresent God, in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship Him; and He would call on all men, everywhere, to repent, that they might become His disciples.

That the kingdom of God was to be a spiritual one is intimated by Christ's promise, "Ye shall receive power after the Holy Spirit is come upon you;" but putting along with this the assurance of the angels that, as they had seen Jesus ascend into heaven, they should see Him "so come in like manner," the apostles were filled with their old Messianic fancies, and united in thought the coming of Christ in the power of His Spirit with the coming of Christ at the general judgment. Yet Peter recognised the Pentecostal outpouring as a proof of the resurrection and Messianic power of Jesus of Nazareth. The disciples preach, and preach as the doctrine of the kingdom of God, that Jesus is the Christ, that He rose from the dead, that repentance is necessary toward God, and faith is requisite toward our Lord Jesus Christ; the reason of faith, righteousness, and judgment to come, at which time the day of the Lord would be seen, and the holy should be Christ's at His coming.

It is true that many of the disciples but hardly escaped from their hide-bound Judaism, still entertained the hope of Christ's personal reappearance on the earth, to confound the gainsayer and to transform the mortal bodies of believers at once into that immortal state in which they should be able to dwell for ever on the earth, and so be ever with the Lord, who would then become the Sovereign of the whole earth. These beliefs, though natural enough, had no sanction in the teaching of Jesus; they were the interpretations of those who were longing, waiting for, hasting towards the coming of the Lord Jesus, as a temporal and earthly Sovereign, whose majesty would be specially shown in giving them the high places of glory, honour, and immortality.

It is a very remarkable fact in relation to this question, and one which we think has not received from the advocates of a Millennial reign of earthly glory for the Messiah the attention it deserves, that the most intelligent of the apostles of our Lord—St. Paul—gradually throws off from his soul the Judaic superstition of a Messianic reappearance of Christ. As the views of St. Paul widen, and his knowledge of the nature of the kingdom of God becomes deeper and truer, he loses his hold on the Messianic notion of the coming of Christ, and takes a more spiritual view of the teaching of his Lord.

Read in the most probable order of their production—Thessalonians, Corinthians, Galatians, Romans, Colossians, Ephesians, Philippians, Hebrews, &c., the Epistles usually attributed to St. Paul, and most of them without doubt correctly, grow less and less urgent in regard to the immediate coming of Christ's kingdom, and more and more anxious that the spirit of Christ should be manifest in the life and character of believers. Paul was an educated thinker, and as his knowledge of the sayings, doings, labours, influences, and prophecies of Jesus, matured with his experience, he emancipated himself from the superstitions of the personal Messianic reign, and became the advocate and teacher of the nobler form of the notion—the Spiritual dominion of Christ.

There was one of the apostles, however, to whom the words of Jesus,—“If I will that he tarry till I come”—seem to have given an exceptional position as an expectant of the outward personal reign of Christ upon the earth—John, the beloved disciple, the author not only of the fine spiritual gospel which stands fourth in our canon, but of the strange, poetical, mystic, and mysterious

Book of the Revelations which closes the authorized sum of the Holy Books. The Book of the Revelations is a glowing and glorious panorama of spiritual visions, but of visions, like all others, influenced by the prepossessions, associations, and ordinary ideas of the seer. He who had been the favoured and beloved apostle had for Jesus an intensely human love, and his feelings, thoughts, and aspirations were stirred by the prevailing power of his memory of the humanity of Christ. Though he looked on Jesus as divine, and held the most exalted notions of His Godhead, he could scarcely otherwise think of Him in His earthly relations but as a glorified and risen Saviour-Sovereign, who, as He had come to earth to save man, would come also to recreate the sin-stained globe, and give His elect the place beside Himself which, as the Messiah, he had promised,—that they should be kings and priests with Him. His visions are now intensely real and again intensely ideal, but he always finds himself, in despite of his realism, compelled to spiritualize and to rise to nobler conceptions of the Lord's power.

Considering these things, I cannot but think that the personal reign of Jesus on the earth is not at all justified by the true reading of the gospel records—that it is a lowering and a degradation of the high spirituality of the dominion of Christ, that it is a making void of the true purpose of God by the vain traditions of the Jews, and that it is the result of the Judaizing of the Scriptures. The priesthood of Jesus' disciples is a spiritual priesthood, and the eternal life to which humanity is called is a spiritual life. Our earth-bound souls have so close a hold upon the ideas and pleasures of the earth that we are loth to let it go, and hence we picture the future as a continuation into eternity of this earthly and merely apprenticeship life, and build up our schemes of the spiritual world out of conceptions that are the mere experiences of the earth. The spiritual reign of Christ is a sublime idea, and one which we see gradually becoming realized more and more and day by day, but the expectations men have entertained and cherished of the personal coming of the Lord have not only been disappointed, but have historically been proved to be disadvantageous to their holders. We think therefore that we are right in expressing our conviction that the reign of Jesus will be a spiritual one.

E. S. M.

Politics.

OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Two indispensable and irresistible requisites of human existence are food and shelter. There ought never to have arisen the possibility of a people being under the necessity of saying to any species of landlordry—

“ On my knees I beg
That you'll vouchsafe me raiment, bed, and food.”

But our present system of land tenure, as we propose to show, places the population of this country at the absolute mercy of the possessors of land for the possibility of sustaining life, either by the produce of the soil or by the shelter of a homestead.

“ All lands and tenements wherein a man hath a perpetual estate to him and his heirs, &c., are divided into *allodium* and *feodum*; *allodium* is every man's own land which he possesses merely in his own right, without acknowledgment of any services or payment of any rent to any other. *Feodum* or fee is that which we hold by the benefit of another and in his name, whereof we owe services or pay rent, or both, to a superior lord.” The payment of this fee or the rendering of this service ensures “ *jus perpetuum et utile dominium* ” upon the holder or possessor. Hence the term *fee* in English law, for the entire estate in land, whether as fee-simple or fee-tail. Hence also the terms feuds, fiefs, and feoffment, which signifies the conveyance of the rights of him who had the novel fee or first received it, to a new owner.

This disposing to individuals of the right and title to the land is that feudality which was in olden times stigmatized as “ the barbarism of tyranny,” and which now begins to be branded as an injustice and a crime. The tenure of land, or the system by which it is held by the feudatories for their own behoof and benefit, and by which there is conferred on them the right to employ the land

they thus hold in any manner they choose, is what is exclaimed against as a heinous wrong and a clamant evil.

We assert that the tenure of land should be so altered as to make a monopoly of the land which is required for the wants of the people an impossibility. At present the landlord holds it in his power to let or not to let his land—to let it preferentially for such purposes as he chooses or finds most profitable, whatever the requirements or necessities of the people may be—to lay it out in lawn or ornamental ground, or to let it remain rugged, barren, and untilled, at his pleasure. It is true that the general desire to gain the greatest amount of money possible from or for the land possessed counteracts practically the right to withhold land from culture; but if it does this on the one hand, it exercises a practically disastrous effect on another, by sometimes making it more profitable to the landlord, or more agreeable to have land employed in pasture or laid out for sport than in affording dwellings and food for men; so much so, that a famous poet has said—

“ Ill fares the land to wasting ill a prey,
Where wealth accumulates and men decay.”

We maintain that the interests of humanity should supersede and override any of the rights of landlordry. Do we not know how whole populations have been ousted from their native glens and vales, and hillsides? Do we not know how frequently the manor has impeded the progress of villages and the encouragement of manufactures? Do we not remember how persistently and to what a disadvantage to the country the landed interests opposed the progress of railways? Do we not experience even now how difficult it is to gain a little field for a God's-acre-burial-place in the outskirts of villages, where the confined space wherein “the rude forefathers of the hamlet lie,” has become deleterious to health and vitality? Do we not know how almost impossible it is to get recreation-grounds and breathing-spots near our large towns? Do we not daily feel how life is being cramped up into streets and lanes; how the ramble by the river-side is being restricted and the roaming among the woods or over the hills has been interdicted to us; how the very aspect of nature is being erased from the memory on account of the tightness of the law of trespass and the greed with which commons are subjected to enclosure? In all these ways an Englishman feels that the tenure of land now prevalent is exercising

on the very core of his existence a most deleterious and malign influence.

Take, for instance, the state of the agricultural labourers in many parts of the country. The houses, if so they may be called, in which the rural population huddle rather than dwell, and hive rather than live, are not only sadly inadequate in number, but grossly defective in, we shall not say the comforts, but the absolute requisites of a home. In many cases the law of entail prohibits the erection of labourer's dwellings; the law of settlement acts as a deterrent; and the landlords, to prevent the pressure of poor rates on their property, prohibit the erection of homes for the working classes. In consequence of this there results overcrowding, disease, immorality, and crime; then the bothy system is tried as a palliative, and the gang system, with all the evils resulting from both. The landlord insists on a minimum of housed labourers, and restricts in every possible way the building of accommodation for families. In addition to this, they now systematically arrange matters that after the day-labourer has worn himself out in the service of agriculture he shall be compelled to betake himself to a town where he may become a burden on industry and an occasion again, by overcrowding, of local disease and a high rate, not of taxation only, but of mortality. It is not to be wondered at that foreign political economists should think it unaccountable "that a people like the English, calling themselves free, should still be living under the feudal system, and submitting to a monopoly of land."

Take as another instance of the evil effects of the favour shown to landlords by the law, the mischievous results of land tenure, even in the favourable condition of leasehold farming. In the case of a farmer having a farm on lease, if he, by the introduction of drainage, the employment of manures, the use of labour diligently applied to improvement, lock up his means and seek to dispose of his interest in these improvements and the realization of the capital thus by him sunk in the farm, he can neither sell nor let it, he is at the landlord's mercy; if he fail the landlord gains all the improvements, and has a lien upon the whole effects and possessions of the farmer for his rent, and security for what is to run of the lease. If he resigns his lease, he forfeits the value of his improvements; and if he dies all that he has done for the land goes into the landlord's treasury. But even when this is not so, when the tenant can hold

out and hold on, can afford to bring up the farm to the very top of its tilth-power—every improvement he has made on the farm only forms an inducement to the landlord to lay a heavier rent on at the renewal of the lease, or a temptation to somebody else to offer a higher rent for the land, and so to lead to the eviction of the improving tenant-farmer from the enjoyment of the farther benefit of the very improvements he had made on the land.

Farmers may to a certain extent protect themselves against this by taking all they can out of and putting as little as they can into the farm, when their lease is drawing to a close; but even here the landlord has generally a good hold upon him for due culture. But if the farmer succeeds in saving himself the general public suffer; for during the seven earliest years, supposing that a nineteen years' lease has been granted, the tenant is likely to lay liberally into the ground, and so gain good crops; but he will then begin to retrench and the crops will be less, and so occasion dearth to the public; while the last five years will in general be as exhaustive as it can be made in accordance with the law of leasehold farming. This again requires a large expenditure to put the land in heart again at the commencement of a new lease. In this way the public suffer from the inadequacy of the crop realized from the ground, from the increased risk and expenditure of the farmer, and from the alternation of plenty and scarcity—which has a tendency to keep up prices, from the encouragement it gives to speculation in grain.

From these few statements and considerations, the reader will see that we think there is good reason for coming to the conclusion that the English law of land tenure ought to be radically changed, and that as soon as possible land should be free.

A. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THAT "property has its duties as well as its rights," was heralded forth as the *acmé* of political wisdom but a few years since. Already we have changed all that, and we are now proposing to decree that property has many duties, but no rights. Of course at present the proposition is only given forth in regard to property in land; but, that accomplished, what will hinder the extension of the same principle to all capital? Capital is property; the accumulated stock of the results of human labour, industry, and enterprise. By

capital and labour respectively the land is made productive—in so far as it is made to yield up stone for building, iron for smelting, and other mineral matters; and reproductive—in so far as grain and fruits are multiplied more and more. Thus the land, capital, and labour are inextricably interwoven. The first is unproductive without the two latter; the second is only valuable as it is employed to develop the land by labour, or by its exchangeability excites labour to exertion; while the last is entirely helpless without the second, and little, if at all, useful unless it has the land to work upon. Each being thus serviceable, and we would say indispensable, to the other, property takes the form of land, capital, and wages; and the several shares or divisions are allotted in the forms of rent, profits, and wages. If we are to have communism in land and capital, why may we not also proclaim a communism of labour? and if we are to abolish rent at pleasure and profits at will, why may we not also abolish wages, and introduce a millennium of everybody having everything, and nobody doing anything?

Land, in the sense of the question, is earth productive of something valuable, useful, or desirable to man. Land that is waste is not sought or desired; and if all land were waste, and men were fed and clothed by the direct gift of heaven, land would not be of any moment to any one, except as a place to plant a house upon, or to erect other places of manufacture. It is because land possesses in itself productibility that it is desired. Whenever it ceases to have that characteristic—unless it gains some other equivalent one—it ceases to be thought of value. When land is common, it is next to waste; for as no one has a special interest in its renewal of power, and each is anxious to gain as much as possible at as small a cost as possible, common lands soon cease to be productive and profitable. We see that land is only valuable when there is capital invested in it by the general decay of common lands throughout the country. We see that without capital land is regarded as of little value in our colonies and dependencies; and that labour on land, unless there be capital to supply the want of the labourer until the fruit of the labour is matured, we know to be impossible. Hence we argue that the universal experience of man as a social being in dividing the elements of exchange into land, labour, and capital, having as correlative, shares, rent, wages, and profits, is a beneficial intention which we ought now to regard as quite proving the advantages of property, not to the proprietor

only, but to all those who require to exchange labour for necessities.

The philosophy of property is very little understood. We all comprehend the advantages of having something we can call our own; and we all know that the gratification of our desires and the satisfaction of our wants depend on or possession of something which satisfies and gratifies, or that may be exchanged for that which will do so. Hence we all seek property. Some sorts of property are more readily exchangeable than others, and the patent apparent insecurity of its possession deceives men. Labour is not only a quickly exhausted property, but the putting of it out to usury is accompanied by visible hard toil. The toil of the lawyer, the professor, the man of genius, is less apparent, but neither less real nor less exhausting; and not the less does it require to be exerted that it may produce that which satisfies and gratifies, or may be exchanged for these. Money, again, is property, which is volatile. It must be parted with whenever we desire to gain anything we want; and the care of the capitalist in arranging for the regular replenishing of his coffers by the rapid exchange of those things which man desires is not apparent. Land appears to be a more stable and fixed thing, but it is not so in reality. It is as really undergoing a transmutation of ownership as the capital of the merchant or the labour of the artisan, and requires recuperative replacement of value as much as either. It is less easily exchanged, but it is not the less really subject to the law of exchangeability which reigns everywhere.

"In fact, the utility of any particular article to the possessors must vary according to their circumstances and situations, and exchanges serve the purpose of providing that the goods possessed by each individual shall, in proportion to their value, be of the greatest utility to him; that is, that they shall contribute more to his happiness, and to the satisfaction of his wants and the gratification of his desires, than any other possessions of equal value. The same cause that prevents a person giving anything for that which has not some power of satisfying his wants or gratifying his wishes—that is, which has not *some* utility—will also prevent him from making any exchange, unless what he receives will conduce at least as much to his happiness as what he gives."

Hence property of all kinds is undergoing regular exchange, and is only advantageous as it does so. Land absorbs capital, and

capital has a lien upon the land; hence the land, though nominally the owner's, is really the capitalist's. Land absorbs labour, and in so far as it does so it is really the possession of the labourer till his lien upon it is satisfied. The idea that the land laws should be changed arises from this apparently greater stability of land as property than money or labour; but this is really a fallacy of the senses and judgment—not a fact in any sense.

J. R. S. C. thinks that unless we desire to secure a revolution we must change our land laws. To put this into other words will be to reply sufficiently. To escape from a revolution, we must make one, and make it thoroughly. For to make a change in our land laws would be to make a revolution. In all civilized countries property has become an institution. "Thou shalt not steal" has been incorporated in every code of laws in the universe. To steal means to take and use as your own anything to which you have no right. If there are rights distinguishable as those of *meum* and *tuum* there must be property. If there is property there must be security insured for it, and this security must consist in restrictive laws. Property may consist either of labour, that is, the power of changing one form of value into another of an equal or of a more desirable sort,—this of course may be forcibly and irremuneratively confiscated in a greater or less degree by the State, as in slavery or in military or other service,—or it may be left free to bargain and exchangeability, and be productive of wages. Property, again, may consist of capital, or a store of those matters by which exchange is facilitated—money, food, houses, &c.; and this may either be free to make such terms as it can in the name of profits, or may be restricted in the amount attainable as profits, as was done in the case of the usury laws.

Property may also exist as land, and into this capital pretty frequently manages to transfer itself. Land may either be common, and be therefore of no special use to anybody, or it may be property in the ordinary acceptation of the term—taken from being common, and reserved to personal use. The advantages of property in land are frequently overlooked. When land becomes personal property, it becomes, as a general rule, the interest of the holder to bring it to its highest degree of cultivability. This the holder does either by investing his own capital in the purchase of manures, seeds, instruments of husbandry, &c., or by inviting the co-operation of some capitalist as tenant who will work the land,

paying the possessor on the one hand rent, and the labourers on the other hand wages. Without labour, which implies also capital expendible in wages, the land would soon grow unproductive, and hence the landlord's interest is to see that this labour should be employed upon it. If we take away property in land we have no other means of securing the highest pressure of personal interest to secure the largest possible productivity of the earth; we would lessen the usage of capital in the promotion of the productiveness of the earth, and we would obstruct and interrupt the tendency to employ labour on the land, and so lessen wages, or the remuneration of the worker upon the land.

Following out into their legitimate issues these foregoing remarks, we think we are entitled to apply them to the subject under debate with effectiveness as follows:—The tenure of land ought not to be radically changed; for first it is property, and it is not expedient that the laws relating to property, which the experiences of all ages and many countries shows to be necessary and beneficial, should be radically altered. Again, the ordinary notion of the exemption of land from the usual law of increase or diminution by spending, is a fallacy of appearance, and we ought to be very cautious as to allowing fallacies of appearance to lead us to make political changes. Still further, we think that the change of the laws now governing the possession and transfer of land, if radically changed, would lead to the introduction of interferences with the general rights of property which might even result in the infringement of the right to labour—the right to possess or employ capital—the right to receive wages. We cannot acquire communism in land without inaugurating communism in goods and labour. Communism has hitherto been able to accomplish nothing good upon the earth, for it is opposed to the very nature of many whose individuality is in fact the basis and the cause of property.

L. C.

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE?

"In the utterances of Science no cadence is heard with which the human mind can feel satisfied. Yet we cannot but go on listening for and expecting a satisfactory close. The notion of a cadence appears to be essential to our relish of the music. The idea of some closing strain seems to lurk among our thoughts, waiting to be articulated in the notes which flow from the knowledge of external nature. The idea of something ultimate to our philosophical researches, something in which the mind can acquiesce, and which will leave us no further questions to ask, of *whence*, and *why*, and *by what power*, seems as if it belonged to us; as if we could not have it withheld from us by any imperfection or incompleteness in the actual performances of science. What is the meaning of this conviction? What is the reality thus anticipated? Whither does the development of this idea conduct us? . . . A first cause in order of succession . . . a supreme cause in order of causation . . . as not only a creative, but a providential power; as not only a universal Father, but an ultimate Judge."—*William Whewell, D.D.*

CREATION.—I.

It has been well said by an old writer, that "to trace the outgoings of the Ancient of Days in the first instance, and of his creative power, is a research too great for mortal inquiry." Luckily for us we are not called upon to undertake any such impossibility as that of proving a creation. We are called upon to consider whether creation or evolution affords the better interpretation of nature. By *nature* we understand the vast whole of things visible, the universe in its utmost latitude of extent, as when Pope says,—

"*Nature* and nature's laws lay hid in night;
God said, let Newton be, and all was light."

On the various significations of *nature*, the famous Robert Boyle thus, in his "Free Inquiry into the received Notion of Nature," writes and moralizes:—

"Nature sometimes means the Authour of nature, or *natura naturans*; as *nature* hath made man partly corporeal and partly

immaterial. For *nature* in this sense may be used the word *creator*. *Nature* sometimes means that on whose account a thing is what it is, and is called, as when we define the nature of an angle. For nature in this sense may be used *essence* or *quality*. Nature sometimes means what belongs to a living creature at its nativity, or accrues to it by its birth, as when we say a man is noble by nature, or a child is naturally forward. This may be expressed by saying, the man was born so, or the thing was generated such. Nature sometimes means an internal principle of local motion, as we say the stone falls or the flame rises by *nature*; for this we may say that the motion up or down is spontaneous or produced by its proper cause. *Nature* sometimes means the established course of things corporeal, as nature makes the night succeed the day. This may be termed established order or settled course. *Nature* means sometimes the aggregate of the powers belonging to a body, especially a living one; as when physicians say that nature is strong, or nature left to herself will do the cure. For this may be used 'constitution,' 'temperament,' or 'structure of the body.' Nature is put likewise for the system of the corporeal works of God; as there is no phoenix or chimæra in *nature*. For nature thus applied we may use 'the world,' or 'the universe.' Nature is sometimes, indeed commonly, taken for a kind of semi-deity. In this sense it is best not to use it at all."

It will be seen from this valuable and instructive passage, that the term nature is one which expresses in ordinary language a great many different ideas, ranging from the indication of sort or species, up to—

" He which natureth every kynde,
The myghty Gode."

Having such varied uses and applications, it becomes requisite to be careful in regard to the sense in which we employ it, and to attend to what we refer when we use the term, especially in debate, wherein it is so desirable to have terms clearly defined and well understood.

Nature, in any sense in which we choose to use it, requires interpretation. Even though man knew indubitably *that* it is, he would still aspire to learn *what* it is, it would be to his interest to comprehend *how* it is, and he cannot restrain himself farther from endeavouring to glean a hint of *why* it is. The mystery of experience, in which

man finds himself, elicits restless inquiry, and he cannot content himself in ignorance of the nature which surrounds him, and of the changes which are possible upon or within it. Bacon's first axiom in Book II. of the "*Novum Organum*," affirms, that "to generate and superinduce a new nature or new natures upon a given body is the labour and aim of human power; whilst to discover the form or true difference of a given nature, or the essence to which that nature is owing, or source from which it emanates (for these terms approach nearest to an explanation of our meaning) is the labour and discovery of human knowledge;" while the first axiom of his first book lays it down as a principle that, "Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him; and neither knows nor is capable of more." The interpretation of nature, therefore, at least so far as interpretation signifies a satisfactory and complete explanation or solution of a difficulty, is no easy task, even though men set themselves ever so earnestly about it. As, however, it is a necessity of human thought to seek it, it must be undertaken.

To accomplish such a task, in any way satisfactorily, we must determine in some measure the aim and end of our inquiry. The interpretation of nature necessarily implies that we should know or have some ground for conceiving it as either self-existent or created, as a series which has taken its present form from an infinite regression out of the past and with an infinite progression possible in the future, or we must think it as having a starting-point and origination as self-evolving from eternity to eternity, or evolving by the will and according to a purpose of some being different from itself by whom its powers and forces were imparted. There seem to be only two methods of interpretation possible, Creation or Evolution, and the purpose of the present debate is to determine what will form to the human mind the more satisfactory interpretation of nature—the universe, including ourselves.

Of course we assume that *we* are, and have a real existence. Around ourselves, according to our everyday belief, there are other beings and things which affect and influence us, and whom as well as which we believe we affect. On either supposition nature requires to be accounted for; and the question submitted for our consideration is, how may we best interpret to our own minds the experience in us which we call nature, and which we are led to

believe exists around us in effective objective existence. Is it caused, or causeless? Is it, while a succession of causes itself, an uncaused cause of causes—or is it, in reality, an educt from, or a product of, some higher Source or Being?

Creation has its origin in the Greek word *kreō*, to command, and *kerairō*, to perform in obedience to a command. It thus signifies that which, taking origin and first form, issues into being at the behest of a power. It is a forthcome and outgrowth springing from the eternal energy of a will to which power is an adjunct and wisdom an accessory. Creation invariably implies that that which originates it is arbitrary and irresistible. A cause is a precedent in a natural and arranged sequence; an occasion is an incidental and contingent antecedent of an occurrence; but a creation is the inevitable outcome of an originating will whose decree being issued obedience is necessary. Of creation the immediate and efficient antecedent is the will of the all-powerful God. Creation is a beginning as a new and freshly originated form and firstling, to which circumstances gave not impulse, and over which they exercised no fashioning power. Nature in its entirety as an outward embodiment of characteristic things, having uses and qualities, capable of impressing and being impressed must, we think, have had a creator and is a creation. To our mind it is impossible to comprehend the experience to which we are subject, except by supposing that by a supreme act of creation the universe took form, fashion, and being, possessed of developable qualities, impressed with capacities which, on being duly excited, could change and produce change. To us such an act of willing on the part of a Supreme Power makes nature comprehensible; and we fail to understand how Evolution can interpret Nature.

If we ask what evolution is, we can only be told that it is the self-unfolding, the development and constant series of sequences which nature shows. Evolution is unwrapping and outcoming, and implies not only existence but pre-existence, and that pre-existence an eternal, beginningless state of genetic transformations! It involves an uncaused eternity of ever-acting causes, a beginningless series of continual beginnings, a wise and orderly issuing-forth of events, without a source or supply of wisdom or order being given in the conception. Unoriginated origination is difficult to think of; but an unoriginated origination in which there is no way of providing for order and progress, and yet order and progress

are seen in every result, is quite incapable of being conceived. Chance may as well become a sign of settled and predestined decree as evolution give the key to nature—

“Nature which condemns its origin
Cannot be bordered certain in itself.”

Evolution signifies, we presume, development, the successive and eventual reappearance by multiplication or reproduction of the forces of nature, or the equivalents of these forces in given recurrences governed by law, so that their course may be traced and their coequivalence may be marked. But evolution can only be comprehended by giving account of the cause by which the involved is evolved, and of the origin of the evolution which first changed the state of things. There can only be evolution from involution, there must be an upwrapping before there can be an unwrapping—a rolling before an unrolling.

Science can only tell us of things as they are, and of the inferences which may be made from these facts. But science is only possible when we grant to it, as explanatory postulates, law and order. Law and order, the necessary antecedents of science, imply a will and a wisdom by which law is ordained and order is adjusted. Science can carry us back through a long and varied series of phenomena, but it must assume or subsume cause. The reasons of the simplest operations of nature are beyond the explanatory power of man without the idea of causation. Not one of the sources of those occurrences on which we found and rest the invariable operations of our everyday life can be discovered without accepting as true something that the eye of man has never seen, an initiatory cause. Cause is one thing and course is another. Course is evolution, but it is an evolution so linked together by causation that each antecedent holds within it the sequence and the consequence of the course of things. But no observation, no chain of reasoning, no tracing of event from event as the result of the causative efficiency, the former of the latter, can account for the existence of the facts themselves. We form an idea of evolving force; force, in fact, is the Proteus of science; but no acquaintance with the conditions, the developments, the changes, the sequences, and the continuities of force, can put us in possession of the real knowledge which we crave—the knowledge of the primal necessary cause of all causation, the first among forces.

It has been significantly said that "until we can arrive at the idea of a force self-generated and of evidently independent origin," science is a deceiving snare. "To use words that seem to contain the idea that this knowledge has been arrived at, is to present a fallacious view of the results of science—is to substitute a well-veiled Leah for the Rachel confidently promised as the prize of the inquirer's toil."

"In a complicated machine the spectator sees, in the unity of purpose which subdues into harmony the workings of various forces, and compels them all to labour for one end—the embodiment and expression of the intellect of the inventor." Creation is the outward embodiment and expression of the intelligent will of the creator; and all the forces which stir the creation into action are only so many of the embodiments and expressions of the will and purposes of the creator as we have caught glimpse of. He who moulded all the forms and implanted all the faculties and properties which exist in and are evolved from them, made the whole not only exist but consist as so many outworkings and manifestations of his absolute will. Only by accepting the idea of creation and of a creator can the mystery of the origin of the present course and connection of material things be explained to man. No evolution but one full of purpose can interpret nature; and whence came the purpose—expressed in law, order, and sequence—if nature is to be interpreted by evolution, and nothing more?

The visible and phenomenal, even in science, can only be adequately explained when we pass from the visible fact of the phenomenon to the interpretation furnished by the invisible cause. The darkness of experience is only lighted up by the glory and glow of intuition and revelation. When science bows down before the majesty of the one true Sovereign of all being, all mysteries become plain; but if we require to set up the idol of evolution we are only erecting an altar to an unknown god, and instead of being free and free-thoughted, we are only being "in all things too superstitious." Such a form of thought will not satisfy or gratify the insatiable longings of the human spirit. Only in the clear conception of a personal, wise, and powerful God, separate from, neither confused nor intermingled with the operations, manifestations, and occurrences of creation, can humanity comprehend the perfection, variety, sequence, uniformity, and grandeur of creation. Beyond the region of the senses lies the region of science. But beyond the

region of science there lies also the region of religion—the region of causation. Sense can only observe appearances and call them facts; science can only observe sequences and call them effects. Effects are evolutions, but they are evolutions according to law and order: these are caused; causation necessarily implies creation, and it is undoubtedly true that creation supplies a better interpretation of nature than evolution.

M. F. S.

EVOLUTION.—I.

It is very probable that this question may not be understood in the form in which it is put. In the question as it stands some may be inclined to suppose that it leads us back to what may be called the beginning of things; and it may be supposed that the question refers to whether all things as they are had a creative commencement, or have they in their material reality existed from all eternity in uncreated being? This however, is a question of *interpretation*, not of *origination*; and in the sense it bears to our mind it seems as if it might have been better expressed had we been asked, Is the interpretation of nature simplified to the intellect and made clearer to the understanding by assuming that at the beginning (or from all eternity, if that phrase is liked better), there has been impressed on beings which are reproductive certain essentially unchangeable characteristics which they retain and manifest in all successive generations; or is there in existing beings such a power lodged and possessed as to lead to changes in the characteristics of things according to the conditions of circumstances under which they evolve? In other words, is the Darwinian theory of the development of species as correct and as easy an explanation of the phenomena of nature as that species are fixed and immutable by the fiat of the Creator?

The following passage will set the question before the mind of the reader simply:—

“Some hold that there are certain permanent and inherent features which distinguish animals, and which cannot be changed either by natural conditions or by the intervention and art of man. Others hold as strongly, that, strictly speaking, there are no such permanent features, but that, on the contrary, marks which have been held to be so, may be altered by circumstances, such as climatal influences, food, relations to other forms and the like. . . . According to the former theory, there is a life-originating power in nature whose first-fruits were animal or vegetable forms of
1872.

simplest kinds. These in the course of ages assumed new and varied modifications. Thus the origin of all the living creatures on the face of the earth. According to the latter, a Divine power animated certain primordial germ-cells, myriads of ages ago, and these in the lapse of time assumed the varied forms of animal life and vegetation now in the world. The charge of atheism has been urged against both; but Mr. Darwin replies to this by saying that 'it is just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe that He created a few organic forms capable of self-development into other needful forms, as to believe that he required a fresh act of creation to supply the void caused by the action of His laws.' *"

Some persons may be inclined to think that this is a question not admitting of discussion. It may seem to them that as we have a revelation of a Creator and of a creation, the whole matter is thereby put to rest. In science an explanation available to the reason is indispensable; in religion it is enough to have an explanation that suffices for faith. I do not think that in the end faith and reason will be found to be satisfied to hold their courses apart, but in a state of transition this may be useful and necessary. We can hold our old faith at least till our reason has proved its capacity to satisfy us better. That the opinion held upon this topic has been made the subject of investigation, and that a theory has been broached and has made many adherents, which explains the phenomena of nature by evolution, is known to most readers and thinkers; and in the following quotation has been very calmly and lucidly stated:—

"The separate creation and immutability of species are disputed; some naturalists maintaining that species undergo modification, and that existing forms of life have descended by true generation from pre-existing forms. Lamarck was the first to proclaim this doctrine, at least so as to attract much attention, about the beginning of the nineteenth century. He held that all species, even including man, are descended from species of inferior organization; whilst, to account for the existence of very simple forms at the present day, he had recourse to the supposition of their spontaneous generation. He was followed with greater caution by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, who regarded what we call species as various degenerations of the same type, but did not believe that the existing species are now undergoing modification. Similar views have since been stated by many authors. But the works which have most strongly directed attention to them, and in which they have been most fully advocated, are the 'Vestiges of the Natural

* "The National Encyclopædia," under the word *species*.

History of Creation,' by an anonymous author, originally published in 1844, and which has since passed through many editions; and Darwin's work 'On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection,' originally published in 1859. Of the other supporters of these views the most eminent is Professor Huxley, who, without fully adopting the views either of the author of the 'Vestiges,' or of Darwin, advocates 'the hypothesis which supposes the species living at any time to be the result of the gradual modification of pre-existing species,' and maintains that to suppose each species of plant and animal to have been formed and placed on the surface of the globe at long intervals by a distinct act of creative power, is an assumption 'as unsupported by tradition or revelation as it is opposed to the general analogy of nature.'**

It would probably be too much to attempt to argue at length on this question after having extended to such a length the statement of it. But we may suggest—I. That evolution does not necessarily imply no creation. II. That evolution seems to agree much better with the experiences of change to which men, animals, and plants are subject, than does a fixed typical creation. III. That even though creation is granted, evolution seems to be requisite to explain nature. IV. Hence, as the question is about the explanation of nature, evolution affords a better one than does creation. In fact, even at the best, creation requires evolution to make experience intelligible, while evolution *may* in itself afford an explanation of nature.

E. F. R.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.—It is certainly true that if a man's conscience dictates a particular action, he is morally bound to obey; but if that action is in itself wrong, he nevertheless commits sin when performing it. A person whose perceptions are blunted by having accepted a fundamental error is in a sad predicament, for, do what he may, he sins: if he disobey his conscience he *knowingly* sins, and if he obey conscience by performing an act which is in itself wrong, still does he commit sin. The question, then, at once arises—How can a man be responsible in such circumstances, when the fatal necessity of doing wrong oppresses him? To which the reply is clear:—A man is responsible for allowing himself to be brought into such a state; he is responsible for his ignorance of the truth. Although metaphysical reasoning does not elucidate such points as the above, the common-sense verdict of mankind, which nothing can invalidate, is that neither ignorance nor error ever excuse from blame if they could have been avoided; and the same reasoning is true of all evil habits which have been voluntarily or heedlessly contracted. If a person who has done wrong were honestly to consult his conscience, even though he had ignorantly done wrong, yet he would feel guilty, because he ought to have avoided the contingency of being in ignorance.

* Chambers' "Encyclopædia" under the word *species*.

Social Economy.

DOES THE COUNTRY SEEM TO BE RIPENING FOR REVOLUTION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE attempt to predict future events of grandeur and importance, if done with ever so much caution, is likely enough to prove a dangerous pursuit to the individual engaged upon it, though it has a strong fascination for certain minds. In an age so intensely practical, and so fearfully absorbing in its demands upon the majority of us, it is only here and there one who has time or inclination to devote himself to the discussion of the probabilities and possibilities of his country's future; and this individual is perhaps a Cumming or a Zadkiel. Nor is it easy to approach the question I propound and answer in the affirmative, devoid of feelings which, personally, give a bias to the judgment, and in discussing it we must free ourselves, if we can, from the pressure of prejudice and fear.

"Do the signs of the times indicate the approach of a revolution in Great Britain?" I reply that they do. The *near* approach it is not easy to determine, and the very significance of that word may be a question of comparison. Contrasted with thousands of years a space of twenty or thirty years seems close at hand—and the rapidity or tardiness of national movements and changes depend on a variety of circumstances which cannot be foreseen. "Revolutions," too, may seem difficult things. Our land, within the fifty years now past, has passed through minor, though extensive changes (such as the decrease of protection, Catholic emancipation, Reform Bills, and the like), which have some of the characteristics of revolutions. What I intend by the word "revolution" is such an "up-turning," or "rolling-round"—to take it literally—as we saw recently on the American continent, for such as has been witnessed in France within the last lustrum, or, still more strikingly, at the close of the eighteenth century. Or, to take an instance from our own country, we might point to the era of civil

Wars and internal convulsions which lies between the years 1640 and 1688. A revolution can scarcely pass over a country without altering the social and political position of a large proportion of its inhabitants; if it does not totally change the mode of government, it has a marked effect upon the relations subsisting between rulers and ruled; and it is rarely unaccompanied with civil war, and loss of life and destruction of property, as its concomitants. Let me say briefly, that, while unprepared to endorse all the assertions made by Carlyle in his well-known pamphlet, I anticipate that the key-note of the forthcoming commotion will be struck by Democracy; the long-deferred surging of the wave, which has threatened at intervals to rise and carry all before it, will swell with a strong impetus, because it has already been on the eve of sweeping over the land, and has been checked by apparently accidental causes rather than by a successful and deliberate opposition on the part of those who had most to fear from it.

A comparison of the present state of affairs in England with that recorded in history as existent in France before the Revolution, which, *par excellence*, is known as the *French Revolution*, will show us some singular and manifest resemblances. In instituting such a comparison it is, of course, needful to take into account, in the first place, the difference between the English and the French character, and in the second place, the widely altered circumstances of the times. Enough remains, when we have thus sifted events, to show that, if not politically at least socially, the tendency of our nation is just in a direction which may be considered indicative of great, if not of sudden, changes in the general aspect of society, and also in modes of government, both central and local. Though some prognostics, however, which in France heralded the approach of revolution, are not traceable here; yet, in their place, we have other omens, developing themselves out of the peculiar circumstances of the time, with a significance attaching to them which we ought not to overlook.

Prominently would I put forward this, as a notable characteristic of our nation, and one arguing an approaching change, that commerce, trade, business (as we may please to call it), absorbs our energies unduly, incapacitating us, as a people, from fulfilling satisfactorily that noblest of destinies which Providence assigns to Christian countries of wide-spread influence; namely, to be the means of the extension of justice, truth, and benevolence, in the

earth. From the merchant of fabulous wealth down to the lowest employé we find men infected with the passion for money-making and money-spending, with little care or thought to bestow upon anything beyond the circumstances of the passing hour. Work has become, as it is said, not that of men, but of a kind of human beavers. Its life, its impulse are gone, and in place of these we have only a series of automatic movements. A nation which has thus sunk its ideal in the actual is not far from a stern awakening, and this is likely enough to come by means of a revolution. And closely connected with this, and at the first glance apparently contradictory, is the fact that with all our application to all the multifarious branches of commerce, the articles we produce are acknowledged to be, in many instances, of a confessedly inferior quality to what, in former times, rendered the English stamp upon anything the guarantee of its worth. Now, it is stated by a recent writer, who knows well the estimate placed upon English goods in foreign countries, let an article be known as manufactured here, and, if it be not rejected, it is at least regarded with distrust. And when it comes to pass that "shoddy" and "sham" stand as the representatives of a great nation's doings, the offering which it thinks a fitting return for the many privileges it possesses, there must come a day when "varnish," lay it on as thickly as we may, will no longer avail; and all that is must tremble or fall; that out of the elements of the people there may be shaped new forms of life and new powers for good; and also that a fitting retribution may arrive upon the heads of individuals, as well as bodies corporate, guiltily concerned in the matter of national degeneracy.

And again, absorbed in business as we appear to be to an on-looker who walks on the Exchange, or amongst the restless factories or million-haunted streets, still, for all that, never was there a time in the history of our land when the passion for amusement had risen to such a height. I say, with emphasis, that this fact is not incompatible with the one already referred to; for this circumstance explains the seeming anomaly that our work is done with hurry and intensity, and compressed, too often, into such an unreasonable compass of time that, by a natural reaction, multitudes rush to pleasures which are criminal, or almost criminal, from the mere longing for excitement which is produced by hours spent in labour which is joyless and perfunctory; as must be the case where masses of men or women are congregated together for the

purpose of daily toil and the acquisition of a subsistence, but a meagre recompense, in many cases, for the expenditure of time and strength. The heartiness which should find its outgo in devotion to work—regarding it as no weariness, nor of itself disgusting—is now, by the circumstances into which we have been betrayed, expended on amusements which are not recreations; by no possibility can they be conceived of (at least the bulk of those most in popular favour) as at all *re-creating*, refreshing, or recruiting their eager devotees. Every daily or weekly paper one lays hold of, to say nothing of the sights around us, furnishes instances of this notable tendency of the time—take, for example, the “contents’ bill,” as it is called, of the *Daily Telegraph*, exposed for view everywhere this very day. There are nine particulars stated to attract the interest of the public; and no less than seven of these are connected with the amusements, or pseudo-amusements, of the hour, and only two concern graver matters—not a fourth—and at an epoch so eventful as this! A similar preponderance may be noticed daily. And closely connected with this mania for amusement, proving, it might be said, an integral portion of it, is the prevalent taste for betting, for gambling, which, disguising itself as an angel of light, makes its way at times even into our religious institutions; and is, assuredly, with large numbers of our people, almost a necessary of life. Most notable is it in its relation to horse-racing, and other kindred sports, which attract within their magic influence the prince and the peasant; and in spite of all professed love for the “sport,” considered *per se*, we believe few of them would be attractive, even to “muscular Christians,” unless this agreeable stimulus of the gambling risk was superadded. Horse-racing, in particular, has attained a position of importance in the eye of the public, which would be ludicrous were it not too plainly indicative of a natural degeneracy. Strangely enough, we find it recorded that in France, just before the great upturn, there had sprung up a taste for English customs, and amongst others for horse racing, and English jockeys were imported at that time, and by their performances greatly pleased the “noblesse.” Then came the crash, and sportive riding ended very often in a race for life as the cry began to echo around, “Down with the aristocrats!” This difference obtains certainly with us now—the passion for racing has infected all classes, more or less, while at that time in France the wretched peasant was too debased to be interested in aught beyond his daily and

pressing needs. From this, perhaps, accidental coincidence I argue nothing, but from the strong, the excessive liking for amusements which marks the present hour (evidenced strikingly, be it observed *inter alia*, by the rapid multiplication of theatres, music-halls, and the like resorts), I infer that it must inevitably work towards some climax. As a dangerous malady, when long continued, exhausts and wastes all the vital powers in their turn, so does the excessive pursuit of pleasure drain men of all that is generous and good, and leave a residuum which is ripe for revolution and eager for any excitement.

Not without reason has it been said, that the strength of Britain lies—or did lie—in the middle class, which has developed so many men of note in the country's history, and furnishes in reality the mainsprings of its life. Let this class decay or disappear, and what will be the position of Britain then? We find that but two classes would remain, as distinctly marked—the wealthy and the comparatively poor; that is, those that have much and strive to retain it, and those who, having little or nothing of their own, have all to win and hardly anything to lose in a general *émeute*. What is to save the middle class from the declension which has already made some progress? Upon that class falls the heaviest burden of the taxation, national and local; the "horseleech" with not two but many daughters, cries to him continually, "Give, give!" while his work is often the longest and the most fatiguing in its nature, and the worst paid. And the present system of aggregating business into extensive firms, of carrying out systems of organization and methodization of labour, tends to develop amongst those engaged in the actual pursuit of commerce, the wealthy manufacturer or merchant, with limited, necessarily very limited, power of supervision over those he employs; and working under him there may be hundreds or thousands whom he calls "hands," varying in position and in pay, but very slightly connected with him or with each other by any bond save self-interest. These may be, possibly, as well or better off in circumstances than many an individual who "holds his own" in the ranks of the middle class; yet they are not likely to be possessed of his independence of spirit, his power of patient endurance, and his deep though unostentatious love of his country. Your modern workman becomes shallow, though he thinks himself sapient, unreasonable in the demands he makes on the forbearance of others, though unwilling himself to yield even

the common courtesies of life to his equals or superiors; dissatisfied with what he has, full of vague notions that his "rights" are constantly in danger of being wrested from him; in fact, he only needs to continue to develop himself a little farther, as he will in a few years more, and then, let some sudden pressure or calamity deprive him of the needs of life, or some cunning enthusiast sting him with a sense of fancied injury, and he would cast off the slight restraints which habit or custom have laid upon him, and acting on the old maxim, "de'il tak' the hindmost," seize and secure what he can for himself, regardless of the consequences to others, or of aught save his own aggrandisement. It is needless to talk of the ameliorating effects of education in its bearings upon our future workers, for in this particular aspect it is doubtless favourable to revolution rather than to a continuance of the present system of things, for two reasons at least which stand forth conspicuously; namely, that education breaks down the distinction between class and class, so that the foot of the peasant treads on the robe of the peer, and that it places within a man's reach, if he is disposed to evil, additional ingenuity in perpetrating it. Your clown may be brutal and repulsive, but he is far less dangerous than your rogue, whose intellects have been sharpened while his "moral sense" has known no development.

When from the highest to the lowest, moreover, we find prevalent in a land a taste for sensual gratification, for display, and an extravagant mode of living unwarranted by the surrounding circumstances of the individual, and therefore tending unavoidably to some down-come, we may conjecture very plausibly that a revolutionary epoch is near. Commercial crises and other temporary checks may, for a time, work out a partial remedy; yet we have seen for years past that after all these interruptions—nay, in spite of them, English life has gone on in the same course. All that can be sacrificed for show and for personal vanity is unhesitatingly laid upon the altar; clouds of smoke roll skywards, ascending from offerings devoted to the "pride of life." In dress, in house ornamentation, in a thousand petty foibles, do we compete with each other, in order that we may add absurdity to absurdity; while at a period when many thousands have to subsist upon food of the very coarsest, and this hardly doled out to them or sorely earned, thousands, yet more in number, are squandering upon their appetites money too lightly got; wasting and needlessly consuming much of

earth's produce which, rightly applied, would advantage others around them, and not at all, in reality, impoverish themselves. So was it, in a still greater degree, in Imperial Rome, proud of her magnificence, the emporium, as is our modern London, whither arrived the choicest goods from every nation. Luxury ensnared them, patrician and plebeian alike; the day of reckoning was long deferred, but it came.

History tells us, that for some years preceding the French Revolution, both science and literature had quickened into unwonted activity. In the former, philosophers had made a variety of discoveries, some real, some only fancied, which excited much interest; and in the latter the diffusion of a multitude of cheap publications amongst the masses of the people was largely concerned in bringing about the remarkable events which followed. This is an age, too, of investigation, and an age when through the medium of a cheap newspaper press, and the enormous supply of current literature, there is a general diffusion of knowledge amongst those who can read, and indirectly also amongst those who cannot. The "tree of knowledge" still produces fruit which is both "good and evil;" and, as in all periods, the evil fruit, being the most pleasing, when abundant as well, must work a large amount of national mischief, so now, when the cost of printed matter is almost nominal, from its very excess there arises a deterioration of quality, especially in that which is most in demand. Hence there springs up also, as amongst the French at the time referred to, numerous unwholesome offshoots from the parent trunk devoted to the secret, or perhaps the unblushing, advocacy of infidelity. Infidelity in belief, in word, tending speedily to infidelity (*i. e.* want of faithfulness) in act also; until spreading, perhaps as a contagion, from man to man, it unhinges—as in France—the very foundations of society; until some calamity, or succession of calamities, falling with supernatural force upon the land thus deluded, proclaims with stentorian voice to all doubters and questioners: "Here at least is somewhat that you must believe, and must also feel, account for it as you will!"

A subordinate argument in support of the probabilities of the approach of a revolution might be drawn from the precocity and undue forwardness of what we sometimes call "the rising generation." Largely caused as this is by parental and tutorial neglect, and therefore a remedial evil if grappled with in time, it is yet a proof how

greatly the peculiar circumstances of this era influence our social life; tending, even from the very cradle, to develop a spirit of insubordination, of independence (unlawful, because manifested at a time of life when the nature of man, as divinely constituted, indicates that the guidance of others is salutary); a spirit also of frivolity mingling, strangely enough, with a premature longing to explore those mysteries of life which we wisely withhold from the very young mind; and, as the climax, a general lack of kindness and that simplicity which is not despicable, but suitable to certain stages of the progress from infancy to adolescence. From the children and youths of "the period," viewed *en masse*, what can we expect to see but a restless and uncultured race, prepared for any change, national or social?

Other arguments which suggest themselves I must pass by, such as the commingling of parties; the lack of high and well-defined principle in so many of our statesmen and legislators; the increasing complaints, year by year, of the burden of taxation, especially as occasioned by military expenditure and the pressure of the national debt; and the gradual, but progressive, disorganization of the army which is insidiously going on. I am contented, however, to rest my assertion on what I have already advanced, and believe, with Tennyson, that we shall see—

"More and more the people throng
The chairs and thrones of civil power."

J. R. S. C.

THE MORAL LESSON OF MEMOIRS.—The characters of various persons, as they pass away, are always spoken of, and freely discussed, by those who survive them. We recall the eccentric, and we are amused with their eccentricities. We admire the wise and dignified of the past. There are some recollected only to be detested for their vices—some to be pitied for their weaknesses and follies—some to be scorned for their mean and selfish conduct. But there are others whose memory is embalmed with tears of grateful remembrance. There are those whose generosity and whose kindness, whose winning sympathy and noble disinterested virtues, have called forth a blessing. Might it not, therefore, be good for all of us to ask ourselves how we are likely to be spoken of when the grave has closed our intercourse with friends whom we leave behind? The thought might, at any rate, be used as an additional motive for men's kind and honourable and generous conduct to each other.—DEAN RAMSAY.

The Essayist.

THE LIFE OF RENE DESCARTES: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SPIRIT.

MAN, as an intelligent being, desires to possess knowledge; and not satisfied with that, he seeks to know the principles upon which that knowledge is based. Philosophy supplies him with the means wherewith to pursue this intellectual research, and enables him to regulate and put in order the mixed and disordered phenomena which are presented by experience to his mind. He is thereby able to ascertain the laws and causes, the rules and principles of that knowledge which he has acquired, and is still further able to determine its value. But this science of philosophy is itself a study vast and intricate, in the end leading the student of it to a better knowledge of man as an intelligent being, and giving him a deeper insight into the mysteries of his own nature and of the busy world around him.

As an enterprise of the mind having for its high aim the ascertainment of truth by the way of reason, philosophy demands that we should approach its study cautiously and with prudence, cultivating the true philosophic spirit, *i. e.* seeking knowledge for its own sake, and aiming at the possession of truth. This philosophic spirit, the possession of which is so important to the successful study of the science, has three elements, *viz* :—

1. The spirit of Doubt. Doubting in the logical sense is a temporary suspension of the judgment till we have sufficient reason to believe. Not doubting to the extent of making the doubt final but tentative, doubting as a means to the cautious ascertainment of the true: not cautious because we would shun the trouble of solving doubt, but cautious lest we hastily pass judgment upon imperfect apprehension.

2. The spirit of Faith. This element implies a confiding temper—not a want of confidence; for, though the principles presented to the mind cannot at the time be reconciled to the understanding, yet we are to preserve a spirit of belief, a firm faith in the attainment of truth as an ultimate result.

3. Intellectual Humility—a tolerant spirit, a humble belief in our

own great ignorance of the contents of the world of mind, a sensibleness of the limited extent of our own knowledge, of our individual weakness and ignorance.

The philosophical career of Descartes, the great French philosopher (born 1596, died 1650), supplies us with an accurate and impressive illustration of this true philosophic spirit. Descartes was educated in one of the most celebrated schools in Europe in the 17th century, and had all the advantages of what was then considered to be a liberal education; but, notwithstanding this, the future philosopher was dissatisfied with the sciences professed to be taught by those who filled the places of instructors; and he early formed the resolution to spend his life in the study of the intellectual sciences with the avowed object of endeavouring to reconstruct them. He nobly followed out the resolution made in his early manhood, and after years of intellectual research he gave to the world his "Discourse upon Method," narrating in its pages the triumphant victory a great mind had achieved over itself. Descartes desired a reformation of his own opinions, and the intellectual power to distinguish the true from the false; and he thought the best way to arrive at this was to make himself an object of study—to understand himself first, and then "to conduct his thoughts in such order that, commenting with the simplest and the easiest to know, he might ascend step by step to the knowledge of the more complex." He began by doubting everything which he did not clearly know to be his as a means of reaching the elements of knowledge; nay, he doubted his own existence, but, to doubt necessitated an act of the mind—thinking; therefore there could be no doubt of his existence. *Cogito, ergo sum*, accordingly was the first principle of the philosophy of which he was in search.

Here then, in the opening career of this truly earnest philosopher we have an interesting, and in some respects wonderful example of the logical spirit of doubt, not sceptical doubt, but honest doubt of everything till to doubt became no longer possible, till belief possessed the mind, and doubt was expelled and discharged.

Again, we find that Descartes, in approaching the mighty work of reconstructing speculative science, did so, adhering firmly to the spirit of faith, hoping gradually to perfect his judgments. Though doubting everything presented to his mind till tested by inquiry, he, nevertheless, had faith in the ultimate result, the discernment of the true.

Lastly, his character was remarkable for the humility with which he entered upon his great intellectual task. Though a scholar not inferior in any respect to those by whom he was surrounded, he confesses that on leaving college he only discovered his own ignorance: though according a place in his estimation for the credited value of the arts and sciences taught in his time, he, nevertheless, doubted the extent of their truth, and, abandoning the study of letters, sought the knowledge of himself, and the foundation whereon to rear up a new and a true philosophy.

Such then was the object and end of Descartes' philosophical career, such the spirit in which he laboured. Doubting everything, lest the least particle of error should be sealed in his mind,—in faith looking forward to the possession of truth, and with humility acknowledging his ignorance while thirsting for knowledge; in one and in all, giving an almost perfect representation of the true philosophic spirit; great in the conception of his object, confident in its accomplishment, happy and contented in its complete realization.

R. A. S.

A SELF-TAUGHT MATHEMATICIAN.—Mr. Thomas Barker, a self-taught mathematician and practical engineer, in September, 1871, ended his days as a "poor brother" in the hospital of the Charterhouse. He was the son of a farmer at Old Park, Durham, and the solution of many of the most difficult problems in the earlier stages of railway surveying and construction was due to his genius. It was he who invented the celebrated method of laying down railway curves, and the *Durham Advertiser* says that he "laid out the Stockton and Darlington Railway, the first line in the kingdom." He also laid out the atmospheric line from Dublin to Kingstown; and in the infancy of the railroad system he was largely engaged in many parts of the kingdom. The last line which he surveyed was that projected by Mr. George Hudson for connecting Lowestoft with London, and for making that town on the eastern coast a second Liverpool, a project which the ruin of the "Railway King" extinguished. Mr. Barker was the author of several works on mathematics, both theoretical and practical: of these the best known are the "Elements and Practice of Mensuration," a "Treatise on Land and Engineering Surveying," the "Principles and Practice of Statics and Dynamics," a "Treatise on Subterranean Surveying," the "Mechanical Companion," and "An Original Method of Integration."

The Reviewer.

"The Christ for all the Ages, and other Lay Sermons." Preached on the North Wales Border. By D. C. DAVIES. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

NINE years of quickly formed but enduring friendship; fireside talks and hill-side wanderings, when the beauties of earth and air, the relics of ancient creations, revelations of the past phenomena of the globe, the condition and prospects of our race in its manifold sections and varieties, the relationships and apparent antagonisms between scientific and religious truth, with numberless similar topics of unfailing interest, have excited to earnest interchange of thought; nine years of associated intellectual and religious work, which seem to have passed as yesterday, but to have left a wealth of happy memories and beneficial influences behind, as possessions for life and evermore,—all are vividly recalled by the perusal of this book.

The author is a self-cultured man of mark—for mental power and spiritual effectiveness, as well as for his attainments and original researches in geology—the Hugh Miller of the North Wales border. While occupying the position of a working tradesman in the ancient but still busy and thriving little borough of Oswestry, his special form of Christian activity has been that of the "lay" ministry, in which much more than half of a life, which yet wants some years of reaching half a century, has been spent. Other departments of intellectual, social, and religious philanthropy have also found in him a wise and ready helper.

One testimony to the intelligence of his Christian work—to the earnest and ever-thoughtful manner in which it has been carried on—is to be found in the total absence of theologic or dogmatic form and conventionality in these discourses, which are the ripe results, as we learn from the manly and dignified preface to the book, of the observation, experience, reading, and devout meditation of twenty-five years. Discourses less doctrinal in form—to use the word in its ordinary sense,—less shaped to accord with dogmatic

formulas and systems, cannot easily be conceived; nor, on the other hand, teachings more vital with the spirit and presence of the divine Redeemer. To the author, God and Christ are personal factors in individual, social, and national history; as real as, and far more potent than, any human leaders or teachers; as present as the air we breathe, as quickening as the light of morn; redeeming, teaching, guiding—leading the world towards the true golden age, through sorrow-fraught experiences, it is true, yet ever in wisdom and love.

In all this Mr. Davies has neither been unmindful of nor influenced by the doubts and questions, speculations and theological movements, which have been rife around him; but he has found a firm centre from which to regard and comprehend them all, in the faith of "God manifest in the flesh, reconciling the world unto Himself." He says (Preface, p. xiv.):—

"This mention of a quarter of a century spent in teaching religious truth will show that, whatever judgment may be passed upon the opinions expressed in this book, those opinions have not been hastily formed. Neither have they been expressed in ignorance of the thought and questionings which have been seething and surging on every side during the greater portion of that period. On the contrary, I have followed each of the great avenues of that thought and speculation to what has appeared to me to be its land's end, its legitimate conclusion. I have found one leading by a swift but fascinating descent to blank unbelief, to dire and utter despair. I have found another leading through showy rites and gorgeous ceremonies, and through the worship of a sentimental symbolism, to an abject submission to priestly authority, and to an idolatry most debasing and mischievous. And I have seen yet another, which, in its efforts to preserve the gospel of the grace of God within its borders, has so made that to bristle with legal terms and logical definitions, as to cause poor souls seeking forgiveness and rest to turn away in disappointment and grief. I have come back from all these weary wanderings resolved more and more to preach—

'A simple Christ to simple men.'

His succeeding words express what seems to the writer to be the leading idea of the book, and the most dominant thought in the author's mind.

"I have sought to show that underneath most of the doctrines termed evangelical there lies a philosophical truth, which has its roots in the constitution and consciousness of our nature, and is firmly placed amidst that orderly law with which God governs the world."

Its constant and unstudied recognition of the continuity of earth and heaven, of religious and daily life, of body, intellect, and soul, of Christian and scientific teachings, of present endeavour and future glory—one being but the natural outcome and upward development of the other,—constitutes a main feature of the fifteen discourses which compose the volume, and gives to them much of their charm and value.

Similarity between Christianity and nature is the leading principle of Butler's masterly argumentation, and this has been thoroughly assimilated by Mr. Davies, until it has become, in fact, part of his mental constitution; but it has been expanded by modern ideas and requirements into the conviction and always-present consciousness of identity—the one being a continuation of the other, revealing the same laws, the same wisdom, love, and power, working on different levels by like processes to like results.

We see thus a truly scientific mind, accustomed to exact observation and analysis, yet finding full satisfaction in Christianity for all its questionings, longings, and needs. Its faith is, in short, "the united conviction of intellect and heart, leading to repose of the soul on the very bosom of the almighty Father."

The book thus appropriately opens with the sermon from which its primary title has been taken—"The Christ for all the Ages." From this we quote two paragraphs expository of its main teaching—Christ able to satisfy the varied wants of the most diverse conditions of men:—

"And where, my hearers, can men to-day, who are fast bound in sin, find deliverance and peace through pardon but in Jesus Christ? The dying thief prayed, saying, 'Lord, remember me when Thou comest to Thy kingdom;' and the gracious answer was, 'To-day thou shalt be with Me in paradise.' Hear the cry of a different man, the jailer at Philippi, as, in the midst of terror, he asks, 'What must I do to be saved?' He was directed to Christ. Whether his fears be few or many, he is directed to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ that he may be saved. Let us now skip the intervening centuries, and imagine yourselves standing with me by the side of the beautiful river Neckar, before it flows into the Rhine. We enter a house where a man lies dying. He is the Baron Bunsen, a man of great learning and much thought, a man justly esteemed for the breadth and height of his attainments throughout the whole of Europe. Listen to his dying utterance:—'I see Christ, and I see, through Christ, God.' 'Christ must become all in all.' 'Christ is the Son of God, and we are only then His sons if the spirit of love which was in Christ be also in us.'

Thus did these men, living so widely apart, and separated not more by time than by differences of moral condition and intellectual culture, all find rest in the hour of their need in the same Saviour." (Pp. 10, 11.)

"Multiply the vastest distance ever conceived by an astronomer ten thousand thousand times, and you do but increase the encircling circumference of space in which planets and systems all move. The Creator's wisdom, power, and love still surround and comprehend them all. In like manner, as human needs and conditions of society increase, alter, and diverge, they cannot outgrow the all-comprehending and ever-expanding provisions of Christianity. Let poets utter their deepest and grandest inspirations; the poetry which gathers around the life and death of Jesus Christ will never become obsolete, linked as it is with man's holiest and tenderest feelings and hopes. That story must ever inspire in the future, as it has done in the past, some of the most sublime and tender utterances of the best of men. Let human refinement grow as much as it may, Christian gentleness, courtesy, and self-denial must ever be its highest manifestations. Nay, with so many evidences as we have about us that human civilization, of itself, is but a very thin encrustation over the barbarity, and cruelty, and gross sensualism which lurk within our nature, do we not feel that human society, in its most advanced state, needs the Christian element as salt to preserve it from corruption? Human systems of morality can never go beyond the Christian summary of the law, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and strength, and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' Let science advance as much as it may, startling the world with its new discoveries—and I for one glory in all true progress which it makes,—still the Christ in whom we believe gathers into Himself and personifies the wondrous power and wisdom and love which each such discovery reveals." (Pp. 14, 15.)

The headings of the various sermons are well-chosen and suggestive, and their interest is fully sustained by the thoughts and language—the latter simple and graceful, often rising into poetic beauty and eloquence—of the discourses themselves. The second, on "The Mirrored Glory of the Lord," contains the following passage of fine illustrativeness, repicturing to our mind with singular distinctness vales, and crags, and heaths, and breezy uplands, by which the author and ourselves have often roamed in silent enjoyment, feeling in us and about us—

"A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things,"

or conversing of high themes befitting the glorious material forms around.

"We shall, therefore, as we start from the life of Jesus on the earth, and follow the stream of inspiration backwards through time, as we would a river to its source among the hills; following its threads amidst mountains of Jewish history, into still valleys of family life, around bold headlands of personal adventure, amidst weird regions where dwell seers and prophets, through apparently barren wastes of genealogical lists of names; expect at every step to find traces and intimations of that life; to discern in the longing of single human souls for deliverance from sin and rest from passion, to see in the religious rites and observances of nations, and in the expectant though often hazy and indistinct gaze of prophet and seer, foretellings of the great Deliverer, the Desired of all the nations: just as amidst the creatures which peopled the earth in the distant past we discover the rudimentary forms of beings which stand at the head of creation to-day." Pp. 21, 22.)

The third sermon is on "Rest in Christ for Weary Souls," full of human sympathy and earnest invitation to a rest known by happy experience to be secure. It is followed by "Love to an Unseen Saviour," in which confidence in the divine educational method in life and trial, as tending and intended to produce "the vigour of a strong Christian manhood," finds hearty expression and defence; and that by "The Master's Promise of Quick Return, and the Servant's Response," where the healthy belief in this life and its duties which prevents piety from degenerating into a maudlin or discontented sentiment, is thus set forth:—

"The servant's response is, further, the heartfelt wish of a soul ripe for glory. John was now an old man. His work and his friendships lay far back in the past. Time was when he had followed his Master in his journeyings, when, under the sad shadow of the cross, he had received into his care the mother of his Lord; when alternately (as from such natures there does) gushed forth tender love and flashed forth burning zeal, he had defended the early faith, he had warned the unwary, he had strengthened the weak, he had—as I, holding by the general faith of the Church believe—revealed the innermost soul of his Master to the brethren by the gospel he had written; but he had outlived all this. All he could do now was to abide a prisoner on Patmos for the testimony of Jesus Christ. He had been purified by trial. His conversation was already in heaven. What other wish could he have but to be with the Master he loved? And this is the wish to which he gives utterance in the text, 'Amen. Even so, come, Lord Jesus.'

"You see it is a wish that is not, in this aspect of it, to be shared by the young, the active, and the strong disciple. It would denote a morbid, unhealthy state of mind if such a one were desirous of being freed from the work and service of life. It is for such to work, and to find their happiness in the service of the Master, and in waiting His coming in the spirit of the words,—

If life be long I will be glad,
That I may long obey ;
If short, then why should I be sad
To soar to endless day ?

content if, when the day is over and the work is done, the Master will fulfil His promise as He says, 'Well done, good and faithful servant, enter into the joy of thy Lord.' " (Pp. 61-2.)

From VI.—on "Walking by Faith"—we cull the following on Faith and Reason:—

"Let me here correct the impression which is sometimes made by preachers, that Christian faith is contrary or opposed to natural reason. In my opinion there can be no greater mistake. True faith can never be contrary to true reason. It may be, and is often, above reason, and in advance of reason; but as an army follows its pioneers reason follows faith, though it may be afar off. The conceptions of men of genius, and the inventions which have benefited mankind, have been at first certainly above the sober understanding of men, nay, have often appeared contrary to it; but by and by the world comes up to and prizes them. Thus it is with Christian faith. The truths we are called to believe may seem shrouded with mystery; but through the mist, by the aid of past experience, we discern, even though it be but dimly, their shadowy outline; and we feel that though we possess only faint intimations of their nature, yet what we know of them, and what we believe of them, so far from being repugnant to our reason, meets our purest longings, strengthens our strivings for the right, and answers to the needs of the better side of our nature." (P. 69.)

"The Church Sleeping and Waking" is the theme of the seventh discourse, from which one short quotation must suffice, exemplifying what we have said respecting continuity between this life and the next, between temporal things and spiritual, as a principle underlying the whole teaching of the book.

"Is there not also in the face of the dead sometimes, that which is suggestive of the power of the departed spirit in the world whither it has gone? I have myself before now looked upon the portrait of the great musical composer, Mendelssohn, as he lay dead in his bed; and as I marked the broad expanse of forehead and those finely chiselled features, and thought of his wondrous gift of music and of his pure and simple life, I could not help

thinking how he would increase the volume and tone of heavenly music, as his spirit became conscious of its place in the heavenly choir." (P. 82.)

A sermon on "The Priesthood of Christians" comes next, ably treating a subject of abundant controversy and great importance at the present time. To all who are perplexed by the claims of Anglican or Romanist teachers to stand alone in a line of apostolical succession, on the strength of which claims the submission of intellect and heart is demanded, and would were it possible be enforced, we commend this clear, faithful, courteous examination of the question, and its vindication of the true priesthood of all believers, and of an inward spiritual as against an external official and materialistic succession to apostolic work and honour.

In "Christian Service and its Reward" we meet with a broad acknowledgment of the manifold ways in which the work of the Church is carried on, and of the existence of diversities of gifts, which may convey an unintentional but useful rebuke to enthusiastic minds of limited range and culture, who incline to cherish an exclusive or undue preference for their own modes and methods of Christian labour.

The "reward" is set forth to be, in its essential idea, that noblest which can be conceived—"promotion to higher service in the presence of the Lord."

"Why should it not be so? Shall there be no scope for the activities of the soul? May we not rather conceive that while revelation after revelation shall be made to the thoughtful mind, while the quiet loving heart may have its fill of joy as it sits like Mary at its Lord's feet, there will also be an outlet for the poetry of a Milton, for the music of a David, for the philosophy of a Newton, and for the benevolence of a Howard, if not in the precise form these took on earth, yet in others?" (P. 123.)

In the description of the possible work of heaven, there follows a fine recognition that all degrees of religious knowledge may find entrance there, each soul's attitude and disposition towards truth being right, though its ignorance may be great. None shall ever seek, however darkly, after God in vain.

"There are dear children in heaven who have need to be taught of the Saviour through whose love they have been delivered from the curse of sin before they knew its power. There are men like Apollos, who need to be instructed in the way of the Lord more perfectly. There are devout and just men, like Cornelius, from

every nation under heaven, who need to be told of the divine love for which on earth they yearned, but of which, unlike Cornelius, they were never told. There are souls like those of the Athenians, who had felt they must have a God, even though He be to them an unknown God, who will need to be led into His very presence. And there are also, let us willingly believe, myriads from among the nations who, in their striving to do the law, 'have shewn the work of the law written in their hearts,' who will have need to be told of Him who has fulfilled the righteousness of the law for them. Indeed, who can tell what work God, in the infinite fulness of His love, in the far-reachingness of His plans, and with all His mighty array of worlds, may not have for that Church to accomplish hereafter, which, redeemed from among men on the earth, is to be to Him a 'kind of firstfruits of His creatures'?"

After "The Terrestrial Glory and the Glory Celestial"—characterized by acute perception of the similitudes between earth and heaven, and of the lessons earthly sights and sounds may teach us of the better land—comes the cognate subject of "The Heavenly Song." We can give but a few lines on this.

"Then, perhaps, while the song was new in the perfection of the music to which it was set, and the richness of the voices of those who sung, the very music itself might only be the heavenly rendering of earthly strains, and amidst the voices of the singers you might have discovered a touch of the plaintiveness of earth. I am told that in the new Sunday school music which has lately come to us from America, there are many clusters of notes which remind a Lancashire man of the popular music of his native county. Years back, perhaps, these were borne across the sea in the hearts and on the lips of emigrants, and having solaced the latter for a while amidst the loneliness of their new life, they have taken a fresh form, and have come back to us to gladden the hearts of our children to-day. I do not take it upon me to say how vivid or how indistinct may be the remembrance which a soul entering heaven may retain of its earthly life; but I cannot think that it enters heaven empty-handed—shorn and bereft of all those gifts of the intellect and graces of the heart which found their highest glory in the service of God here. I love rather to think how age after age the 'glory and honour of the nations' are being gathered into that other world, to swell the fulness of its life and to increase the variety of its employments; how gifted fingers may strike from heavenly instruments the music which on earth they loved so well; how voices of richest tone and compass may weave new variations into the music of the old song." (Pp. 149, 150.)

Contrasted yet complementary to the foregoing is the discourse upon "The Heavenly Silence." That it is the tenderest, deepest, sweetest of the fifteen, is due in part to its revealing the most con-

templative and mystical side of the author's finely balanced nature but much also to the circumstances of its origin, as suggested by the desire of a dearly loved daughter for rest amidst the oppressive sounds of long and somewhat energetic devotion which reached her dying chamber from a neighbouring chapel. Rest is needed from the heavenly song—among other reasons for the sake of variety.

"To you, my hearers, who listen daily to a thousand notes of birds; whose eyes look upon the exquisite and diversified colours of the flowers which blossom around your homes; who note the ever-changing forms of the clouds which gather and flit across the sky; who look on the one hand to the bold outline of those grand old hills, and on the other over this rich and widely extended plain, I need scarcely say how much of the charm of the earth and of the life we live upon it is due to the almost infinite variety with which God has graciously diversified them. We can readily conceive, therefore, how, unless our natures undergo a radical change, the sameness of employment even in heaven would sicken and pall upon our souls. . . . Even if our natures on their translation to heaven were so altered as to be made capable of bearing, without weariness, sameness of employment, it is clear that such oneness of occupation—the excessive exercise of our musical powers, for instance—would be injustice to other parts of our nature, would check its spirit of inquiry, would shut up sources of knowledge, and would do dishonour to God our Father by leading us to honour one part of His nature and of His works while we trample with neglect on the others." (Pp. 159, 160.)

That pauses even in the glad notes of heavenly praise will be needed also to give opportunity for special access to the Creator Himself, is an idea set forth in a passage of thrilling beauty and rapt insight and adoration.

"Silence will be needed in heaven for converse. For converse with God our Father himself; for surely it is not presumptuous in me to suppose that there may come a time in my history when I, a single atom of matter, a tiny spark of the divine intelligence, shall at last have reached the very centre and source of my being, and of all being; shall feel myself happy within the close embrace of the loving arms, whose furthest reach is to the very ends of creation, and looking with undimmed and undazzled eye on the light from which all other light has sprung, and of which, on earth, cloud and fire and Shekinah flame were but faintest tokens, I may in the fulness of my bliss, in the perfection of my being, say, 'Lo, I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee.'" (P. 163.)

The remaining two sermons are on "The Foundations garnished with Precious Stones"—ingenious, yet not far-fetched, and full of quickening and elevating lessons; and "Jerusalem and Rome," preached on the morning of the opening of the Œcumenical Council—catholic-spirited, wise, and timely. With steadfast adherence to the Congregational polity, Mr. Davies has yet candour enough to see that sectarian and even church action may often be such as to retard rather than hasten the coming of God's kingdom in the world; and he closes the discourse, and his volume, with the words,—

"Unfortunately, there must always be some, even among ourselves, who will be obliged to take their religion upon trust from others. But our prayer should be that the number of these should be lessened daily, that God would give to His Church a constantly growing accession of reverent inquiry, of simple faith, of desire for unity, and an abundant zeal, that so, *unhindered at least by her*, His kingdom may come and His will be done on earth even as it is done in heaven."

Memory is still busy. Some of these sermons we recollect as they were first preached—they have all been spoken, not read—in a country chapel, and they bring back calm happy Sabbaths of rest spent, in a season of broken health, during a glorious summer away from the busy town, in communion only with God, nature, books, and our dear friend. So to us they come—to use his own words—"as old friends with familiar faces;" and we join with him in bespeaking for them "the consideration that is due to thought, redeemed from the midst of a busy life amongst men;" adding, however, as we well may, that they are thoughts to instruct, stimulate, ennoble, and comfort—thoughts consecrated to the highest good of man, the service of Christ, and the glory of the eternal Father.

The Societies' Section.

AN EW.

AN ADDRESS AT THE OPENING OF A NEW YEAR.

"HE only earns his Freedom and
Existence

Who conquers them *anew*—by stern
persistence."—*Goethe*.

AN EW, my friends, we assemble in our wonted places and take our accustomed seats again, to continue the efforts we have been making after self-improvement in knowledge, virtue, and power. As we meet anew on a new year—and this is the firstling of our associated gatherings in the circling seasons of another ring of months—you doubtless anticipate that I shall, as in years past, allude to the circumstance, and bring before your notice some thoughts having reference to "the notch and nick" in the world's life which has just been completed; and offer some suggestions to you before we begin anew the ordinary business of our assemblies. I am fully aware of your expectations, but I find that year by year the task becomes more difficult for any one who has so repeatedly addressed you as I have lately done to find a new subject to discourse upon, when we thus meet anew and open the services of the year with considerations appropriate to the season. Of "a word spoken in due season" we have all learnt to know the value. "How good it is" we have all in our own experience felt. But the very importance of its possible effects makes the choice not only important but difficult. To what word as a care-seed of life can we

direct attention at this time that will fitly suggest the past and its shortcomings, the present and its privileges, the future and the possibilities and responsibilities that lie wrapt up in it?

We cannot "let the dead past bury its dead;" the past has for us an immortal life—a vitality of present influence, of formative energy, of recurrence to memory—that strange emblem of resurrection!—and of pressure on the conscience; and the consciousness our present state is rooted in the past and the present—which is rapidly becoming the past—holds in it all the vital possibilities of the future. We cannot dispart ourselves from the past, nor dare we aimlessly disport ourselves in the present;—for all our life is *one*—one single solitary outstretch and line of mere moments linked together by a Will over which we have no control, and terminable at an instant of which we have no prescience, and over which we exercise no determinative agency. Not so disjointed and separable, as well as separated, are the moments of our being as "the sand-grains in the glass;"—for each is causatively and emulatively effect upon every one which succeeds. Each feels the sequence of the consequence which has preceded it, and the whole operates in combined antecedence upon the latest, even to the last. Our life is ever new, but it is also ever old. We never repeat our former selves, but we each become

a new factor every moment by the increment of experience, thought, activity, and emotion. With each separate moment the past as a possession dies, but with each moment, too, as an influence, it rises again to newness of life, and all its force is received into the present, that it may be developed to lighter issues, and so transformed anew.

Anew, then, may be a seasonable word which, being fitly spoken, may admit of suggestive application to our hearts, and happiness and lives. *Anew*! we meet anew, and so are the monuments of sparing mercy. How many have fallen beneath the stayless sickle of that "Reaper whose name is—Death" since last year dawned in its Sabbath freshness on the world! Age and accident, disease and disregard of health-measures, pestilence and pleasure, war and want and woe, have all co-operated to furnish grave-food; have all been busied in slitting "the thin-spun life" of man; and many who began the year anew have ceased to behold the light of

"Day, or the sweet approach of
Ev'n or Morn

Or sight of vernal bloom, or Summer's rose,

Or flocks or herds or human face
Divine,"

however lovely or beloved! But we have been spared. *Anew* the year opens to us; *anew* our opportunities are extended, *anew* life beats within our frame, and the pulses of the heart repeat their potent processes; *anew* the task of life is placed before us, and we are summoned to life's duties; *anew* the days allotted for the ripening of the fruit of intent and endeavour are extended, and the voice of the Divine Taskmaster calls us from the market-place to vineyard in which our labour is appointed to us; *anew* the hand of Death has

been averted from the sheaf of our deeds, and the light of Hope has been shed out on our path *anew*. If this is so, ought we not to endeavour to live anew: to devote ourselves anew to duty; to form anew the purpose of our lives?

I say *anew*; for I cannot imagine that any of you, of us, rather, have been aimless and unanxious about our life and its issues; I cannot believe that we have consentingly allowed ourselves to be

"Wind-piloted and moulded by the
wind,"

so as to form but atoms in the onrush and mixed motive-forces of some chance-drifting

"Wave of multitudinous life,
That with the general movement
rolls along
To shores where all must break."

I say *anew*, because I assume that we have all, in some way, however unconsciously or indirectly, formed some plan or, it may be, dream of life, whose issues and results we hoped to make conformable to a noble wholeness and wholesomeness of ideal worthiness, whose likelihoods would develop into a reality of some divine significance. I do not suppose, indeed I cannot entertain the thought, that we have looked on the day's duty and the day's destiny as one with the day's desire, and that while we have been told off to play the chief rôle in the drama of our existence, we have neither comprehended its nature nor concerned ourselves with its plot. I accept it as a fact that we have a scheme laid down whereby to shape as far as possible our lives; but I also regard this as a favourable moment for revising all such ideals, and for considering them *anew*. At such a time we may enlarge our conceptions, purify our

emotions, purge away the grossness of our desires, and quicken, exalt, and refine all that our souls regard as reliable. May I not even be permitted to regard it as possible that our high imaginings of life and its capacities, of days and their delights, have been doomed to disappointments, and have been dashed, with rude shock, against the stern realities of social circumstances not kindly disposed towards dreams or dreamers; and somewhat impatient indeed of those who appear more wrapt up in the dreams than active in the dramas of world-life. May there not be some in whom disappointment is inducing to look with disgust on men and things, and perhaps inclining towards despair of them. In such cases it is well to think anew: anew to criticise our aims in life, our method of working them out, our spiritual state in regard to them.

Anew is a word which is not only of time but of manner; it implies not merely once again, but also in a revised style: to make a fresh start in time and mode. There are few of us who have attained such perfection in our manner of looking at life, or in the management of it, that the poet's adroitly flattering compliment can be truthfully addressed to us;—

"Your art no other art can speak,
and you
To shew how well you play must
play anew."

It is well for us that we have before us another opportunity of reviewing our intentions, of revising our mode of action, of forming fresh plans, and of making resolutions for the future which may be better kept than those in the past. We may endeavour *anew*, and we may *anew* attain success, if in this new year we heartily resolve to re-attempt—

"To climb the ascent of being, and
approach
For ever nearer to the life divine."

To live a noble, self-contained, and yet unselfish life is a task not free from difficulty. The toil of soul required to sustain a high level of effort amidst all the down-dragging temptations, allurements, circumstances, and associations of the world is far from being slight. The heart is given to faint, the spirit is inclined to despondency, and the energies become laggard. It seems as if Fate had written Impossibility over the pathway of our progress, and announced "No Thoroughfare" over the course of our ambition; and our will is not unfrequently ready to succumb to the threatening opposition which fancy's phantoms raise around us. We regret the efforts we have made. We turn from the purpose we have formed, we hesitate to follow out the course on which we had entered. We begin to think that all the by-past portions of our life spent in the endeavour to realize our aspirations has been "time elaborately thrown away." It is well for us that there has been given us as a gift from heaven a chance of taking heart again, of giving our thoughts to considerate reflection, and of dedicating our efforts anew to the effecting of our object. In the great ever-recurring Debate of life we cannot forego, and we cannot forget, the past; we dare not neglect the present, and we must not suffer despair to rob the future of the faith by which fresh force is gathered for the putting forth of the fortitude of the spirit for the mastery of events.

The effective forces of the soul are such that we must look forward and move onward; the aspirations of a genuinely human spirit lead man upward and Godward, and thereby a living self-hood is at-

tained. Under the dominion of the active sympathies of existence we yearn to accomplish something worth living for; we feel ourselves impelled

"To urge bold virtue's unremitted nerve,

And make the strong divinity of soul

That conquers chance and fate."

And under the impulse of this impress of heaven in the heart of man we exert high hope, we plan with earnest thought the progress of the aims we have, "And fill each moment with a moment's task." But the success gained is not stimulating enough, and we begin to grudge our toil; the applause won is not sufficiently exciting, and we are inclined to balance the labour against the reward; the obstacles appear to multiply as we daily renew our exertions to remove them, and we grow impatient on seeing that

"The various lot of life

Oft from external circumstance assumes"

an aspect we had never calculated; or the desire of our heart changes, and then we condemn and condemn the old and seemingly heart-woven purpose of our life; so that not unfrequently even we

"Shall find

Caprice in solemn creeds; and gravest faith

Change with the scene and hour."

Still when despondency and hopelessness anew assail, let us give heed again to the inner monitions of the heart, and we may discover grounds for thinking that we may recommence our task and yet prevail. Hope may gild anew our pathway, and, as the sun renews to us the day, it may confer upon us encouragements to act anew in the faith which overcomes opposition,

and transforms even failure into a guide towards success: and even at the worst we know that it is certain as the heaven's light that

"They never fail

Who die in a great cause."

Anew then let us give the fresh hours of the firstlings of the year to new and noble self-communing and fellow-feeling; devote ourselves to the tasks of our life with a higher earnestness and a holier forth-look; and consecrate our own souls to grander and fuller manifestation of all that makes life precious to ourselves and to our co-mates and comrades in the common round of the world's duties; for we may be well assured that

"'Tis in the lofty hope, the daily toil,

'Tis in the gifted line

In each fair thought divine

That brings down Heaven to light our common toil,"

that man's noblest task is found. Anew let us resolve, anew aspire; anew let us struggle and toil; anew let us go forward on the path of duty, onward to the work that lies nearest us; let us press upward anew, and anew devote ourselves to Godward exertions. Anew let us seek to develop our self-hood to its noblest, and, as our names are enrolled anew in the book of a new year's life, let us anew endeavour not only to be created anew in Christ Jesus, but in Him be prepared to walk in newness of life; for (to quote again from Goethe)—

"Mighty are the world destroyers, conquering in warlike strife—

More noble are the sin-victors who subdue their souls in life.

Mighty are those fearless heroes who the world can overawe:—

Mightier still the soul-reformer who obeys each God-made law.

Mighty is the sceptre-wielder who
controls the world with art—
Mightier the passion-thwarter
who can govern his own heart!"

To this end put forth all your
soul's energies *anew*; and may the

God of all grace sanctify us each to
Himself—and this New Year to us.
I can only reiterate, Live anew; and
crave God's blessing on our aims
and efforts. So be it! and we say
anew—Adieu!

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

961. What are the best books conveying information regarding the nature, constitution, history, forms, peculiarities, and changes in the Houses of Legislature in this country?—G. S.

962. Can you inform me where a good impartial "history of political parties can be had?—G. S.

963. The Right Rev. J. W. Colenso, D.D., has acquired much note in recent times. Could you kindly supply an outline of the chief events of his life, &c.?—A. H. C.

964. Who was Henry Neele, the poet, &c.?—A. H. C.

965. What are the precise characteristics of the Lancasterian System of Education, and the Madras, or Bell's System?—S. J.

966. Who was the originator of Sunday schools?—J. W. P.

967. Who was the inventor of the Electric Telegraph?—J. W. P.

968. What does the phrase "Overland Route" mean?—M. M.

969. Can you tell me who is the author of these four lines, and could any of your readers supply the remainder?—

"My wife and my wee things are
treasures of pleasure,
With love, smiles, and prattle
we're happy as kings;

Though poor we have still the
best blessings of treasure,
Without the dull care its pos-
session aye brings."

—B. C. D.

970. What other plays beside "Alkestis" did Euripides write? Is there anybody likely to do for them what Browning has done in Balaustion's adventure—so beautifully criticised in the previous volume?—B. C. D.

971. Information desired on the following points, viz.:—

1. What are the duties of an actuary?

2. Does it take a long and severe course of study to become such?

3. I am in the office of an accountant at present, and have there learned (among other things) the ordinary rules of arithmetic. I wish to become an actuary, and desire to know what course of study you would advise me to take to become such. Please name books.

4. Are there any institutes which encourage young men to become actuaries by examinations, &c.?

5. Whether is the profession of an accountant or actuary of a higher pecuniary or social standing, or could both be followed out?

6. Which would you advise me to follow, or both?—JUVENIS.

Literary Notes.

Professor Mendelssohn is bringing out a book about the relations of his father to Goethe, in which several of Goethe's poems hitherto not printed will be published.

A "Lexicon Homericum," edited by Dr. H. Ebehr, with the co-operation of the chief Hellenists of Germany, is in process of issue from Berlin.

A "Dictionary of the Words contained in Luther's Writings," by Ph. Hietz, Vol. I., has just been published.

"A History of the Roman Stage," by Prof. O. Ribbeck, is in preparation.

A new French Quarterly—an organ of modern philology, to occupy itself with the language and literature of the Neo-Latin countries—has been commenced in France with the title *Romania*.

A complete and uniform series of the works of the Hon. Mrs. Norton is in the course of issue.

Renan has been restored to his chair in the College of France, and has renewed his political dispute with Dr. Strauss.

An official History of the late War between France and Germany has been undertaken by the Prussian general staff, and a translation of it has been undertaken by the English War Office.

A third volume of Dr. J. H. Newman's "Miscellanies" is in the press.

A new work on "The Sciences of Nature and the Science of Man," by Dr. Noah Porter, is to be published here shortly.

"Cobden Club Essays, Series Second," are in the press.

"Thoughts upon Government," by Arthur Helps, will probably be

accepted as the basis of a Liberal-Conservative coalition with Lord Derby as its chief.

"Selections from the MSS. of Hone" are in preparation.

Longfellow's "Divine Tragedy" has been accepted by the critics as not unworthy of its subject, and the Rev. P. H. Waddell, biographer of Burns, is about to issue a five-act drama, composed about twenty years ago, entitled "Behold the Man," as *passion-poets* are coming into vogue.

At Weimar, Shakspeare's "Measure for Measure" has been brought out on the German stage in a version by G. von Vincke.

The *Comptes Rendus* for Nov. gives an elegant eulogium, by M. Dumas, on the late illustrious Sir Roderick I. Murchison, who was one of the foreign associates of the Institute of France.

Dr. Henry Martyn Dexter, editor of the *Congregationalist*, Boston, U.S., is in England collecting materials for a history of the founding of the New England colonies, with reference to the religious ideas out of which the formation grew.

The Chaucer Society seek for volunteers to make a complete glossarial concordance to Chaucer's works, to be compiled from the Society's editions as they proceed, and to contain complete lists of the poet's rhymes.

Prof. F. J. Child, of Harvard, contemplates a new edition of the best old English ballads, with all their different versions, and with full introductions, giving an account of all like ballads in all the European languages.

The Dramatists of the Restoration are about to be reprinted.

The Philosophy of Politics.

THE POWER OF PARLIAMENT IN POLITICS.

"A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial magistracy; an anxious care of public money; an openness approaching towards facility to public complaint,—these seem to be the true characteristics of a House of Commons."—*Edmund Burke.*

"A RECONSTITUTION of the representative system on fixed and definite principles is not at present," as J. S. Mill remarks, "to be looked for." The reason why this is not to be expected the author of "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform" does not supply. We venture the opinion that it is because no fixed and definite principles have been reached by the people in regard to a right and proper representative system. Parliament, as it is at present constituted, is an historic embodiment of centuries of political change, challenge, compromise, and co-operation. Englishmen justly admire it for its workability, and the adaptive versatility of which it is capable, as well as for the noble traditions that cast their glory round it; for the heroic renown that belongs to it, and for the patriotic purposes it has fulfilled. "England," as John Bright has said, "is the ancient country of Parliaments. We have had here, with scarcely an intermission, parliaments meeting constantly for six hundred years; and doubtless there was something of a parliament even before the conquest. England is the mother of parliament." "Not only," as A. O. Rutson notices, "is our own the only nation in the world that possesses [historically consecrated] parliamentary institutions, but the whole course of our history and the social and other circumstances which have descended to us are exceptional." We have proceeded, in fact, on accident and precedent rather than on principle.

But in our day the haphazard plan of moving along somehow to right ends ought not to be that on which human happiness should depend. We ought, from an experience of parliamentary legislation extending over a period of seven centuries or so, to have been able to deduce before this time some more perfect method of managing the civic government of this land. Expedi-

ency should only be tolerated and submitted to until the proper principles of things have been discovered ; and continual pressure should be exercised upon those in power to displace the expedient by the just. It is a fortunate accident in our constitutional history that the expedient has generally been foreseen and adopted just at the latest moment at which the anomalies, confusions, delays, defects, and palpable errors of our parliamentary system were becoming unendurable ; and peace has been effected by a compromise which brought things nearer in practice to that form of political superintendence on which the people of Britain believe the prosperity of nations depends, an executive which wields power, and claims assent and obedience to its demands, as the agent of the final and irresponsible court of political appeal—the freely expressed opinion of the citizens of the land, and the concurrence of the entire nation, through rightly authorized representatives, in the principle and methods of government employed and enforced. This happy circumstance, however, does not justify, still less does it sanctify the parliamentary history of centuries. Were it to be regarded as doing so, it would justify and sanctify the maxim that reform ought rather to be conceded to interested agitators and an infuriated people than to honest theorists and patient philosophical investigation undertaken by the citizenry in their own behalf. To make sure that a state shall be self-sustained and self-sufficing, we must secure the general assent and consent of the governed to those measures which are undertaken for the promotion or the defence of the “common interest and concernment of all men in the well-being of the state.” Parliamentary privileges must not override popular rights ; and the administration must not attempt to usurp power or function to which the agreement and concurrence of the great body of the community has not been given in some form or other. The principle which lies at the root of parliamentary political power is self-government by the people. By parliamentary government is meant the choice of legislators by the citizens, in the free and unbiassed exercise of the suffrage ; and the responsibility to these legislators, so elected, of the executive and administrative departments of the official holders of ministerial power. Government derives its supremacy from the will of the Parliament, and possesses it so long as that will is given in its favour ; but Parliament delegates that power as the agent of the people.

"Public opinion is already, as every one now sees that it is, the ruling power in the last resort." The House of Commons is the grand tournament field in which the power of various opinions is tested; "the place where—to quote J. S. Mill again—the opinions which divide the public on great subjects of national interest meet in a common arena, do battle, and are victorious or vanquished." Hence, besides being an instrument of government, "Parliament is a grand institution of national education, having for one of its valuable offices to create and correct that public opinion whose mandates it is required to obey." Its educative efficiency is due to the freedom of discussion it employs and enjoys; and it would be still more valuable in the direction and correction of public opinion, if that opinion were so thoroughly organized, and so patently brought before this convention of superior minds, that every opinion of any weight or force would obtain an opportunity of engaging in equal conflict with its antagonists and rivals, with the right to utter all that could be said in its favour and in disfavour of opposite views, with full freedom of explanation and rejoinder. A great abridgment of the time spent by the Legislature in investigation might be made, if such a form of procedure could be adopted, as would enable the holders of definite opinions to secure that the best that could be said in their favour should be said, be duly considered, and either replied to or complied with.

According to Sir Edward Coke, the power of Parliament is transcendent and absolute. This opinion takes the form of the common phrase, "Parliament is omnipotent." It is, however, only so because opinion is an omnipotence over persons and causes, and this might it is on which the power of Parliament rests. Nothing is so productive of tyranny as the idea of the possession of irresistible power; and we fear that from an erroneous notion of the basis of its legislative might and administrative supremacy, Parliament is falling into the usual error of despots—over-rule,—

"Making obedience too indefinite,

As taxed with all the vanities of might."

It is of some importance, at this time, to fix and settle in our minds some definite idea of the power of Parliament in politics, not only in order that we may be prepared, as subjects, to obey all right and proper behests of the Legislature; but also that we may use means and influences to restrain within their right limits the decisions of the high courts of Parliament.

Parliament is the representative of opinion; opinion may be embodied as party or sect, association or institute, but it is as representing the opinion of the party or sect, not as merely being a partisan or a sectarian, that a member is chosen. The ideal, and the right and true ground of representative government, is that it is not "opinion's shadow," but opinion's potency. On this account it is that candidates put forth in their addresses a statement of their views, of the measures they are desirous of supporting, and of the course of legislation of which they are in favour. They all, ostensibly at least, ground their claims upon the suffrage of the electors, on the accordance of the opinions they profess with these which the voters are supposed to hold, and invite co-operation for their success from those who are favourable to the political confession of faith they have laid before their several constituencies. Ostensibly, too, each member is chosen because of the measures to which he is prepared to give legislative sanction, of the officers of the executive to whom he is willing to give a preference, and of the means he is desirous of seeing employed to maintain and increase the prosperity of the nation. It is certain that, in practice, other matters, in some cases, form the grounds of decision; but professedly and confessedly an appeal to public opinion is made at each election. And we may safely say that it is in proportion as this deference to public opinion is genuine, unfeigned, and acted on, that elections secure the benefits they are intended to insure. Only by this being felt as, in general, the true reason for the election of those who form the representative body of the people, can that sense of a community of interest and purpose which gives unity and strength to a state be secured, and only thus can the due sense of reciprocal responsibility of elector and representative be maintained; and when this fails to be generally the case, no appeal to privilege will uphold the influence of the Commons' legislature.

In order that the organs of our political life may be capable of giving adequate expression and effect to the national will, their operations must be brought into harmony with the true elements of political power. In the midst of divergence of interest and diversity of gift the common will of the common weal must be sought; and this will of the people, in its corporate form, must be so trained that no one shall seek his own special good, except as a partner in and a partaker of that which is for the good of all. A commonwealth must be aggregated by a sense of human fellow-

ship, and not by the coarse ties of selfishness and self-seeking. The political faith of modern nations has become more elevated than the political aims of the modern rulers of societies and governments. Men have now formed the idea that it should be the distinct purpose of the political schemes of statesmen not to aggrandize classes, or exceptionalize families, but to raise and ennoble, refine and unite the entire community; to weaken the feeling of class isolation, and to strengthen the concord of all by the creation of an aspiration in all, for a constitutional unity, in which the doing of one's life-duties, whatever they are, shall be sure of the rewards of well-doing, and the honours of a righteous appreciation,—in which labour shall bring no degradation and inherit no disrepute, and in which mere wealth shall receive no honour and possess no privilege—except that of devoting it all the more entirely and unreservedly to the accomplishment of beneficent ends by well-devised means.

It is not supposed that diversity of gifts shall cease, that diversity of effort shall be impeded, or that diversity of honour should be brought to an end. It is only supposed that in the State, and in all that concerns the State, the dominant aim shall be to secure the due exercise and the true reward of the worth of the worthiest; that personal worth shall prevail over pecuniary wealth; that self shall not override self; that the good of the commonwealth shall be the universal aim, and that all life as it tends to that end shall be guarded and cared for, provided not only with fitting protection, but secured in legitimate reward. The organic condition of modern civilization is not personal, social, or proprietary equality, but the civic equality of each citizen, not only in the eye of the law—which is the embodied will of the people, but in his right, under due qualifications, to be consulted in the making or the reforming of laws, and in the settlement of the purposes of government. Only so can the strife of party and the passions of self-interest be allayed; only so can the desire be fostered and cherished in a community that the greatness and the glory of their nation should be dearer than the triumph of any party, or the victory of any interest. Towards such a form of political aspiration the people of modern times have been making slow but progressive advances, but the rulers of states, hemmed in by the traditional policy of class and party have not yet risen to the height of this great argument—that the proper purpose of statecraft is to

provide for the proper development of individual life in such a way that all that promotes the citizen's interests shall also further the interests of the state.

The purport of our present paper is to endeavour to discover what are the rightful limits of the sovereignty of the Parliament over society ; where does the authority of Parliament begin, and how far does it extend ? How much of human life is amenable to civic law, and how much should be free from the domination of society, that therein the individual may be a law unto himself ? We can only determine the power of Parliament in politics by fixing in some way on a line of demarcation between that part of life in which the individual is chiefly interested, and over which his power should be supreme, and that portion of human existence in which society is chiefly interested, and over which its power should be exerted.

The state is the safeguard of social and co-operative life. Every one who receives the protection of the State for himself and his property is bound in return to observe towards the other members of the state the same or equivalent precautions against injuring them as they are compelled to use towards him as a subject of its laws, and a partner in its collective existence ; and in order that it may be effectively possible for the State to exist as a protective agency, each member ought, in proportion to the benefit derived, to be regarded as bound to bear a share of the labour, either directly or indirectly, requisite for the safety and prosperity of the state, as well as to take his share of the sacrifices which it may be necessary to make, that the defence of the several members of the state may be secured as far as possible, and that injury and molestation may be reduced to the lowest possible amount or extent. This the State ought to have full power to insist upon and enforce, in order that all who receive the advantages derivable from the protective organization of the state may be compelled to fulfil their duties and see to the observance of law and right. Thus far should the State extend the range of its dominion, but in civilized states it ought to possess no wider sway or more intensive action. If it arrogates more power by force and might the State is a despotism, whatever its external nominal form, and however it may shadow over its tyranny by the glowing and glosing phrase of paternalism. Parliament ought to protect us from an administrative and executive Government which could exert despotic power ; and it should

equally, by the exercise of critical and cautious legislation, secure us from laws which assume that the nation is in a state of tutelage, and therefore requires the extension over it of a wise and judicious paternal care. On neither hand should the State be allowed to make a serf of self, nor should humanity be sacrificed to urbanity, or individuality to civilization.

With Professor J. S. Blackie we believe that "the world is constructed on the principle of variety. Variety is the greatest possible wealth of the world; monotony is feebleness, weakness, and barrenness. Originality is a valuable element in human affairs." "The initiation of all wise or noble things comes, and must come, from individuals—generally at first from some one individual." "In proportion to the development of his individuality each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is greater fulness of life about his own existence, and where there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them." "The free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being." "It is only the cultivation of individuality which produces or can produce well-developed human beings;" "it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be." "To give fair play to the nature of each it is essential that different persons should live different lives." These disjointed phrases from J. S. Mill's splendid Areopagitical treatise "On Liberty," are brought together to show and to advocate "the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity." We maintain that fulness of life is only consistent with fulness of freedom to be original—to be, that is, one's self, rather than a *replica* in thousandfold of somebody else; and that the sphere of Government ought not to be extended further than nature intended, but should be sedulously restrained within the conditions of securing the order and progress of mankind in individuality and sociality.

There are three bases of political power which ought to meet in conjoint effectiveness in all who are to hold a share in the constitutional action of the community:—1, *knowledge*; 2, *self-respect*; and 3, *organized readiness*.

I. *Knowledge* is here employed in an extensive sense, as implying the possession of the accurate acquaintance with the facts on which opinions are formed, and the exercised capacity of deducing from

the facts which yield the premises the proper theoretical or practical conclusion. The power of ignorance must be guarded against, and it ought not to be incorporated amongst the forces legitimately available in bringing about political change. The class, the party, or the statesmen who employ the ignorance of the people to effect their purposes are traitors to the true interests of humanity, to genuine civilization, and to the ultimate prosperity of the nation in which such a power is used, in whatever form that power is used : as brute force in riot and disorder ; as prejudice, agitation, clamour, and rowdiness ; or as conspiracy, whether in secret clubs or organized confederacies, it is inimical to the civic interests of men. A consciousness of the power of truth, and a conviction of the safety of truth, are indispensable to statecraft. Nothing else will nerve a man to live his life hopefully, bravely, and nobly, like a faith in the indestructible supremacy of truth, and a determination to do its behests and to endure its results. Truth is only attainable through knowledge—knowledge of facts, and of the conclusions rightly to be drawn from these facts.

II. *Self-respect* is employed here to imply a high sense of the value of the individuality we are ; a noble feeling of the duty due by us as persons in the commonwealth, and of the right competent to be claimed by us as members of the community ; an honest disposition not only to act wisely and worthily in our own sphere, but also to maintain our right to considerateness and fairplay in the State action which concerns us. We do not believe that “ self-love and social is the same ; ” nor do we think that self-love is the prime mover of the nobler class of minds. We are ready to grant—What Milton affirms—that—

“ Ofttimes nothing profits more
Than self-esteem, grounded on just and right,
Well managed ; ”

but self-esteem too oft exalts itself into egotism, and results in rash self-sufficiency or stupid self-conceit, and those who are strongly under its power are often “ by the blast of self-opinion moved ” to wrong courses, both personal and political. No such overfulness with one’s own affairs, but a modest, decent, self-reliant confidence in the worth and dignity of our own nature, position, duty, and capacity, is what we advocate ; a feeling which will prevent men either from doing wrong to others or of enduring self-wrong when inflicted by others, and prevention is in our power.

This self-respect is honest in all the relations of life, and banishes the possibility of class interest or class cringing from civic existence. It regards dutifulness as the test of worth, and impresses on the man who performs his social duties the right to demand the recognition of the State in protection and in principle.

But though selfhood should be cultured, selfishness and self-will ought to be strictly and carefully restricted. The narrow theory of life, that it is self-development, must not be too readily granted, sound though it seems. We require to regulate self-development by self-control; and lest self-control should fail in its active efficiency, we must fortify it and protect the selfhood of others by civic government. Self-development claims that all human faculties should be unfolded and cultured; and that none should be rooted out, consumed, or neglected: but it does not, or at least ought not to demand that no restraint should be exercised, that no self-denial should be practised. Self-censorship is indispensable, and self-indulgence is reprehensible. It is only in matters which do not specially and primarily affect others that individuality should be permitted to assert itself. Men ought only to be free to carry out in their lives without hindrance those opinions and practices which do not injuriously affect their fellow men, those, that is, which they can pursue and act upon at their own risk and peril, and in the pursuance of which they either cannot or do not involve any others—at least, not without their own will and consent, given so guardedly as not to endanger or afflict any other directly or indirectly as an involuntary sufferer. Whosoever is permitted to choose his own plan of life for himself, must not only look to his own pleasure, but care also for the happiness of those who are or may be involved in his plans. "He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee; activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide; and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision," and to abide by all the consequences of his aforethought plan. He is bound not only to develop himself, but so to develop himself as to hinder or impede in no way or circumstance the self-development of any other. "To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object." Civic government is the means by which men endeavour to influence and compel men to respect the rights of each other, and to fulfil their respective re-

sponsibilities in a straightforward and honourable manner. "Over himself, over his own body and mind," as J. S. Mill remarks, "the individual is sovereign." But it is only over himself that he is sovereign; and so soon as he intrudes upon, interferes with, injures, or impedes the personality and selfhood of another, he is an offender against the first law of life—the inviolability of self. That the selfhood of each may be duly and truly respected, power must be given to decide, determine, arrange, and legalize all those forms of life which may permissibly be exercised without infringement of this canon of self-inviolability; and to adjudicate upon and proscribe all those forms of life which threaten, or are likely to lessen, impede, or render insecure the selfhood imperilled by the influences, activities, impulses, or determination of others. This must be done in order that socialism may not encroach on selfishism, and that selfishism may not destroy socialism.

III. *Organized readiness* is not employed to indicate approval of clubs, societies, confraternities, leagues, alliances, institutions, or associations of a secret character. We think that opinion, properly formed and legitimately expressed, is the very heart-core of representation. When we speak of representing the nation we really mean, or want to be understood as meaning, representing the opinions of the people of the nation. Members of Parliament do not go to the Houses of Legislation to represent—as the *sum*, in a question in addition, represents in a brief abstract the several units included in the figures put down—the persons who have their residence in the voting centres, from which they receive the majority which exalts them to that position. They do not in that sense represent their constituencies. It is not in that sense that constituencies require representation. No one pretends that personal representation is possible. Representation in all cases falls back from being that of persons to being that of opinions. Were things properly managed in regard to parliamentary representation, opinion would be the supreme influence in elections, and elections would give indubitable indication of the state of opinion. There would then be a true ratio between the opinions of the nation and the representatives of these opinions in the parliamentary parties in the House. Hence the absolute necessity of having the intelligently formed opinion of the community in organized readiness to declare itself.

Members of Parliament are not mere impersonal delegates; they

are not simply thinking, talking, and voting machines ; the census-takers, registrars, and statisticians of opinion. They ostensibly are elected as representatives of the opinions of their constituencies, but they are also elected to be the counsellors of the administrative and the controllers of the executive government. The application of the opinions of the constituency—or rather that party in the constituency from which he holds his rights and place,—is left to the honest discretion of the member. Every political opinion is based upon some fundamental fact or truth, or something which is accepted as such ; and each political opinion tends towards the accomplishment of some desirable end in legislation or civic life. Between the opinion held by, or rather let us say represented by members of Parliament, and the view they must take of civic and social questions, or the advice they should give in regard to civic and social proposals, there must be a certain relatedness, and the member who has been chosen as the representative of any given opinion or set of opinions, is bound in common honesty to give no vote which shall oppose or nullify the ends proposed, or the aims advocated by those, of whose opinions he became by implication and engagement the representative and the advocate. As a matter of compact, no less than as an affair of individual honour, any neglect to advance the interests or to advocate the tenets of those who choose a member—much less any opposition to them—is a breach of (implied) contract, which is censurable.

While we do not think that the Parliament of Britain—or indeed any legislative council elected as representative of the people—is or ought to be a set of delegates, deputies, or ambassadors, congregated together as the holders of substantial and definite commands, to vote for or against any given series of settled propositions ; we do certainly maintain that there is a rational and moral obligation incumbent on every representative to observe consistency in his political life by supporting and promoting those legislative enactments which promise best to secure the triumph of those opinions, of which, as a professed adherent, he has been elevated to his position as a member of the supreme council of the nation. Whenever a representative ceases to hold, uphold, and use every influence he can for the success of the opinions, by the profession of which he was chosen, he virtually ceases to be the representative of his constituents, and if he continue to hold his seat it is and can be only to the ultimate detriment of the purity and the power of

Parliament. For the power of Parliament depends on the purity and thoroughness with which it represents opinion. If by force of numbers it restrains the passage of a resolutely held opinion of the people from passing into law, it is a tyranny; and if through personal influence it loiters behind, and does not keep abreast of public opinion, it is ineffective, inasmuch as it supplies the State with a less good than it might and ought.

Four things Parliament exists to protect and promote the development of:—1, persons; 2, activities; 3, interests; and 4, opinions. Political logic refers only to the greater or less accuracy of the opinions held by the people, and certified to the nation as such by the representatives legally elected. Law embodies opinion when it has been duly ratified. If an opinion is passed into law which does not receive the sanction of the public conscience, it is likely to fall into disuse, or to induce connivance at the breach of it; and if laws are retained on the statute-book later than the convictions of the people sanction them, they must either be allowed to fall into desuetude, be covertly transgressed, or be resisted and rebelled against. Over-legislation and under-legislation are alike signs of a radically false notion of the power of Parliament in politics. Parliament is the agency by which opinion makes its transition into law, and by which the laws of the past are broken down before the prevailing opinion of the time. Opinion is the life-blood of the state, Parliament is the nutritive system by which the old is absorbed and dismissed, while the new is employed to build up and replace what has been taken away; so that opinion, which was at one time dynamic, becomes static as law, and thus, by keeping in constant equipoise the duplex forces, it maintains order while progress is secured.

As opinion, the public voice has no force to use, except that of evidence and reasoning; not until it is organized and fitly arranged in harmony with the past, and in such a way as to prepare for the proper progress of the future, does it possess legal force. Parliament is the final organizing agency of public opinion; but it cannot organize public opinion into a finality.

In regard to opinion, Parliament is neither expected to bear the initiative, not even should it be expository of it. It ought to be deliberative, adjudicative, organizing, and determinative. Were this recognised and acted upon, an immense amount of the time of Parliament would be saved. Under the misapprehension that the

House of Commons is a place for making an impression, several hundreds of men of few ideas, many words, and great self-esteem, resolute on making speeches, air their opinions—and sometimes only their vocabulary—in delivering harangues which do not tend to legislative action. This they do to the hindrance of the business of the nation, to the impeding of the due consideration of public questions, and to the encouraging of a false idea of the place of Parliament as a civic institution. Opinions ought to be initiated in social assemblies, in organs of thought, in vehicles of intelligence and speculation; but they ought only to make their appearance in Parliament as the main matter of discourse, when claiming parliamentary sanction and adjudication—deliberation! preliminary to legislation.

Three departments of government ought to be kept quite distinct in their purpose, though brought into close unity in their action,—deliberation, administration and execution.

Deliberation is the department which falls to Parliament. Its duty is to decide on what opinions are so specifically ripe for organized adoption as to be fit for being passed into law; to criticise the method and form in which it is proposed to give practical legalization to these determinate opinions; and to supervise the course taken by the administrative and the executive that a *bonâ fide* adoption of the determination of Parliament is made and carried out. But it is not the place of Parliament to administer. It may control, but it should not do the detailed work of administration. "Every branch of public administration is a skilled business, which has its own peculiar principles and traditional rules, many of them not even known in any effectual way except to those who have at some time had a hand in carrying on the business, and none of them likely to be duly appreciated by persons not practically acquainted with the department." The special acts of administration, therefore, unless in extreme cases, form no proper part of the duties to be undertaken or even reviewed by Parliament. It determines the purpose to be fulfilled; and those who exercise the ministerial functions of government require to see that it is done, or show that the best efforts have been made to accomplish it.

Hence Parliament has the power of passing a vote of want of confidence in the ministerial advisers of the Crown, and to withhold from the executive the means of carrying on the government, unless those whom it recognises as the proper parties are placed in office, or express and satisfactory guarantees have been given that

the party in power shall implement the requirements of the deliberative council of the commonwealth.

The executive power in the State ought to be distinct from and only representatively present in the halls of the Legislature. It should be jealously and zealously held aloof, either from unduly influencing or being unduly influenced by the national assemblies. It ought to be kept apart from faction and unstained by controversy. Its impartiality should be secured by making its duty be to accomplish the designs and carry into effect the laws as they are and have been determined to be. Parliament ought to insist on this, but it should not claim more. Indeed, when Parliament has done its duty effectively and fully, as the organizer of opinion into law, people and parliaments, magistracies and ministries, generals, ambassadors, and official agents of all kinds whatever, including the sovereign, should be brought into and kept under subordination to the law. Law should be the supreme sovereign of society, and Parliament should be the protector of the pact of the people which constitutes POLITY.

The true *polity* of the perfect State is cultured opinion perfectly represented, honestly deliberated upon, properly transmuted into law, impartially administered and fully carried out by an executive, controlled by and amenable to those who are sent to Parliament to determine on those politic grave counsels which should hold rule in the commonwealth. "The power of Parliament in politics" depends on its being a perfect reflex of the organized opinion of the people; a fairly, honourably, and impartially chosen body of men, who give effect, in the obvious and plain meaning in which it is held by the constituencies, to the opinions entertained by those who elect them. Then the laws which they sanction are received with favour and obeyed with readiness by the people, and no thought of tyranny or injustice enters their minds; then, too, over the administrative and the executive agencies of Government their power can be exercised with the direct irresistibility of the opinion of the people. Every instance of election which is marred by undue influence, bribery, or intimidation, lessens, not only the purity, but the power of Parliament. It occasions dissatisfaction among the people; it enables the Government, by a *tu quoque* argument, to set aside the decisions which have been carried by the votes of those who enter Parliament by false pretences. The power of Parliament is in the exact ratio of its purity as a representative assembly.

Religion.

IS CHRISTIANITY OPPOSED TO HUMAN PROGRESS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE time has come when the questions involved between believers and unbelievers in the Bible and in Christianity must be taken up. Those who know anything of the conditions of society in the large centres of population in our country must know that many have fallen away from faith in Christianity, in disappointment at the ineptitude of its truths to bring them comfort, and the powerlessness of its precepts to induce those who profess their faith in it to ameliorate their condition. They listen to fierce attacks upon the fundamental truths of the religion established by law; statements made in antagonism to, in disapproval of, or in disregard for the Bible and its teachings, are received with gladness, and doubts not only of the genuineness of the Bible, but of its authority over the life and conscience of man, are widely entertained. That those whose duty it is to teach, preach, and defend its doctrines, keep themselves rigidly to their pulpits and prayer meetings, where they are protected from opposition, and are afraid to meet the opponents of Christianity and the advocates of secularism face to face on public platform, or in controversy upon equal terms, appear to them pretty sure proof that they have little faith in the truthfulness of their creeds. And that professing Christians, church-goers and chapel men, grind their faces—being the faces of the poor,—and show so little sympathy for their sorrows and sufferings, they regard as evidence that they do not believe what they profess. They see in Christianity a set of dogmas on the right interpretation of which there are so many disputes, from the various interpretations of which so many sects have arisen, that the quarrels which have so arisen have embittered society; and it is hard for them to have faith in the truth of a religion ostensibly founded on love, which results in so much hatred. Accepting this opinion as well founded, we affirm that in either way this fact may be explained, Christianity is unfavourable to human progress.

For, *first*, if Christianity is so indefinite in its statements of doctrine, that age after age, as time rolls on, the difficulty of knowing what it teaches men to believe—and which if they do not believe, it affirms they must perish—grows greater and greater, it cannot have favoured, but it must have opposed the progress of men. It cannot be pretended that quarrels, contentions, persecutions, wars, struggles of sects, and enmities among the closest relations, are beneficial to man; and yet we learn from history, and know by experience, that such consequences have ensued. When we see and hear teachers of Christianity fired with zeal, raving, hating, and excommunicating each other, denouncing the holders of opposing creeds as children of perdition and aliens from God, how can it be believed that it is a gospel of peace that is come among us—if by the fruit a religion produces its worth is to be judged?

I. To Christianity is due the most sanguinary of all the wars that have been waged upon the earth—religious wars. We have had wars from many causes—wars of race, wars from historic enmities, wars in revindication of boundaries infringed, wars in retaliation for interferences with the private affairs of other nations, wars of ambition, wars about colonies, wars in regard to political institutions, wars in consequence of breaches of neutrality, wars arising through accident, and wars originating in political propaganda; but none of them have equalled in virulence and violence the wars of religion. If we think of the religious wars of the days of Constantine, those originating in the causes of the schism between the Greek and Latin Churches, the Crusades, the wars of the Reformation and the League, the wars of the Covenanters in Scotland, and the various wars in Italy and Spain, having a religious origin, down to the Crimean war in the East, and the Franco-German in the West, there is included a catalogue of woes primarily referrible to religion, and of course to the Christian religion as it is; that is, as the religion of creeds, confessions, forms and ceremonies, sects and parties. It is certain that these great crimes against humanity and social progress are due to the Christianity of the churches, and that in regard to this matter Christianity has been opposed to human progress.

II. Christianity has been so inimical to human progress as to have excited se'ism and sectarianism, to have introduced division and persecution, in all ages and in all countries.

It is indisputable that even in the earliest ages of the Church heresies and schisms were known. It is equally undeniable that these schisms—originating in difference, not of spirit, but of opinion—led to the most disastrous inhumanities and barbarities. It was bad enough when heathens persecuted the Christian church for the faith and love they practised and exercised: but it was beyond expression horrible when Christian sect persecuted Christian sect, and excelled in barbarous hard-heartedness—even those who had nothing, and professed to have nothing except the light of nature to guide them. There is no bloodier page in the record of human history than that on which the details are given of “how these Christians hate one another.” The annals of the Inquisition are the undying disgrace of Christendom, and the history of the Star Chamber in our own country is not less replete with horrors than that of the other lands in which Christianity held rule. Even till the hour of Catholic emancipation, how much required to be endured by professing Christians from professing Christians! and what hates even now are comparable to the hates of the sects?

III. Christianity is inimical to human progress by its basing salvation on creeds rather than deeds, and hence by inducing men to believe that if they give their assent and consent professedly to some shibboleth of the sects they are enrolled among the bands of the saved—the signal, “all right,” has been put up for them in their progress to “a better land.”

It is quite true that men are told in church that they ought to act as becomes their creed; but the main insistence is that they should be right in “the faith once delivered to the saints.” Yet the exposition of that faith—on which salvation depends—differs in every sect; and stranger than all, though so much depends on the possession of the true faith, each sect clamantly denounces every other as wrong and asserts its own rightness, while no honest steps are taken for the discovery of truth. There is undoubtedly caused by this a divorce between faith and practice, and it is very marvellous to observe how the Sabbath-day confessions or professions of the members of our churches contrast with their week-day lives and social practices. Men who go to the house of God to profess their love to God and their charity to men, seek high profits, demand rack-rents, pay low wages, claim long hours of service, and exercise all sorts of petty tyrannies and extortions wherever they can; they are keen creditors, and not at all averse either to

defrauding their neighbour, if it can be done with a fair face, or to distressing the widow and the fatherless. Their creed is perhaps good enough, their practices are vile. To give men hope of salvation who thus separate between their faith and their practice, and live or profess to live a life of doubleness—believing a creed with their intellect or their heart, and practising in their everyday conduct things which belie their creed, cannot but interfere with the progress of man; for man's whole nature is one, and it is an outrage on common sense to say that a man's heart is right with God while his actions, which proceed out of the heart, are disgraceful and discreditable. Yet the churches, which have a self-purging power, in their keenness after sectarian success retain men among their numbers who notably love Mammon a great deal better than God, and who are known to exhibit in their business transactions that "covetousness which is idolatry." Who are the money-lenders of the day? who are they who struggle after shares realizing high dividends? who are they who are proprietors of insanitary houses let at burdensome rents? who are they that evict tenantry and dismiss workmen for giving honest votes? who are they that use short measures and employ unequal balances? who are they that issue deceptive advertisements? who are they that manufacture and sell intoxicating drinks? who are they who profit from the vending of quack medicines? who are they who flourish upon the hypocrisies of life in false jewellery, in shoddy clothing, in sham religious books, and a thousand etceteras of dishonesty?—are they all numbered among the outcasts from the church as offenders against the Church, Christianity, and Christ? Verily no! They not unfrequently occupy high seats on the platforms of religious Societies, prominent places among the managers of churches and chapels; they frequently make their very profession of religion a source of personal profit. This is opposed to the true progress of man, 1st, by destroying in men the first principles of conscientiousness; 2nd, by creating a general feeling of the prevalence of hypocrisy; 3rd, by giving a quasi-Christian sanction to those practices which are not denounced in and expelled from the churches; 4th, by enthroning formalism among those who reckon themselves the salt of the earth.

It is in vain to say Christianity teaches otherwise. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Every religion makes the same claim, that it teaches better things. "By their fruits shall ye know

them." Does Christianity teach otherwise effectively? Under the Great Inspector of the School of Christ, how many professing disciples will be able to make a pass at the examination? C. W. P.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WE think that the question with which this paper is headed may be met with this other question, *Has Christianity promoted*, and does it still *promote* human progress? If it can be shown that Christianity has from its introduction to the present time promoted human progress, and that it still promotes it, that will be a sufficient answer in the negative to the question, *Is Christianity opposed to human progress?* To this we shall address ourselves, viz., to the showing that the effect of Christianity, from its introduction to the present time, has been, and still is, to advance the progress of the human race.

At the time of the introduction of Christianity the whole Gentile world was laying in a state of heathenish darkness. The disciples were commissioned by Christ to go and preach the gospel in all nations. An occurrence in itself calculated to hinder the gospel, and intended by men to have that effect, was made by God to be the means of spreading the gospel.

The occurrence to which we refer is that of the raising of persecution against the church at Jerusalem, the effect of that persecution being to scatter abroad the members of the Church, who wherever they went preached the word. Thus the persecution which was designed by Satan and by men to stop the preaching of the gospel was the means of its being preached where it had never been proclaimed before, and where it would not then have been preached but for that persecution (Acts viii. 1—9). The Scriptures inform us that those who were scattered abroad by that persecution travelled as far as Cyprus, preaching the word there (Acts xi. 19). After this, Paul and Barnabas preached at Antioch, where their preaching was received by many of the Gentiles (Acts xiii. 42, 48), as also at Lystra (Acts xiii. 42, 48; Acts xiv. 21, 22). At Athens, when Paul preached there, the city was wholly given to idolatry. It is related by Pausanias that the Athenians had an altar for Mercy, another for Shame, another for Fame, and another for Desire; also that they had an altar dedicated to twelve gods, and that they might be sure of all, they erected one to an unknown god. Indeed, they had so many gods that Petronius jestingly said, "Our

country is so full of deities that one may more easily find a god than a man." When Paul had addressed the Athenians, some of them believed his preaching and gave to him (Acts xvii. 16, 34). At Corinth Paul's preaching was greatly blessed, as also at Ephesus; the effect of the introduction of Christianity into that city being that many who had used magic arts, being convinced of the folly and evil of them, brought the books by which they had learned those arts and burned them. In the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, Paul draws an awful picture of the state of the Gentile world in his day. The vilest of practices then generally prevailed. Sodomy was prevalent amongst the greatest philosophers. Even those of them most noted for morality are charged with it. And this sin has generally been most prevalent where idolatry and infidelity have been rife, and has been more so in this nation when Christianity has been the least influential, and deism and infidelity have been most rank. Surely in these days of enlightenment, when superstitious observances are so justly held in contempt, it cannot be denied, even by those who are not in love with Christianity, that when Christianity had the effect of leading men from the worship of Diana and of other idols, and from the practices of soothsaying, necromancy, and conjuration, as well as from indulgence in the most abominable deeds, it was promotive of human progress, and therefore is not opposed thereto.

If we take a survey of the various religious systems which Christianity has been the means of delivering many nations from since the days of the apostles, it will be evident that instead of opposing it has greatly advanced human progress.

In the islands of the Pacific, Fetishism was once universal; in many of which it has been entirely rooted out, while in other quarters of the globe it is declining through the means of the diffusion of Christianity. In some countries where Fetishism has prevailed, serpents have been worshipped in temples by priests set apart for the purpose. Whenever any eatable article was made a fetish, nothing of that sort was consumed by the individual, who regarded that article with superstitious reverence, while he consumed without hesitation what others considered to be holy. The quality of the object which was invested with divinity was not considered to be of the slightest importance. It might be a piece of rag, or of bone, or of any other substance, yet it was believed to possess a power which, when evoked, was able to incline the deity

to comply with the wishes of the worshippers. Surely that which has delivered, and which still delivers from such degrading beliefs and practices, is not opposed to human progress, but is, on the contrary, highly promotive thereof!

The introduction of Christianity into the South Sea Islands in the early part of the present century has been the means of abolishing cannibalism, polygamy, and a variety of revengeful and savage usages. It has led to an observance of the Sabbath, which observance is *always* productive of beneficial effects, as its desecration is *ever* attended with many other evils, whether that desecration be perpetrated by youths or by adults. The introduction of Christianity always and everywhere has a civilizing effect. In various parts of the globe it has in recent times been attended with the introduction of the art of printing, with the translation of the Bible and other books into the languages of the natives of those parts, and with the establishment of schools for the teaching of many useful arts. The civil polity of heathens is intimately interwoven with their sanguinary idolatry, and when the latter is subverted by the introduction of Christianity, the other perishes in its ruins, while laws are made in accordance with the more merciful and righteous spirit of the purer faith. We believe these statements to be undeniable, and how can they be admitted without the acknowledgment that Christianity has greatly forwarded human progress ?

If we take a view of the religious system of Hindostan, into which part of the world Christianity has penetrated, and where it has obtained converts, we cannot see how it can be denied that a religion which delivers from such a system as Brahmaism is conducive, in a very high degree, to human progress. By the division of Hindoo society in castes, each caste being compelled to confine its attention to certain departments of knowledge and of business, it was impossible for any individual to rise in the scale of society ; all motives to exertion or to mental improvement were taken away, as the most noble and praiseworthy deeds would bring no honour to a person of low caste. Whatever the mental abilities of a Soodra might be, a Soodra he must remain. If a man were a snake-catcher, all his sons must be snake-catchers likewise. Under this system there was a total subversion of all moral distinctions in the classification of acts as offences ; those which are naturally indifferent being classed with heinous immoralities, the

eating of things forbidden being put on the same footing as murder. Under this system particular devotees have signalized their piety by enduring severe tortures with a firmness worthy of a better cause, roasting themselves before huge fires,—holding their hands above their head till the power of bringing them down again has been lost, clenching the fist till the nails penetrated the palms, and performing various suicidal acts. Surely the religion which has delivered from such a soul-abasing and soul-withering system has been promotive of human progress!

Christianity must be helpful to human progress, inasmuch as it enjoins love, forbearance, forgiveness, gentleness, benevolence, peace, uprightness, self-denial, and devotedness to the welfare of others. Its spirit may be seen in its undermentioned precepts. "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them" (Matt. vii. 12). "Recompense to no man evil for evil" (Rom. xii. 17). "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth" (1 Cor. x. 24). "Bear ye one another's burdens" (Gal. vi. 2). "As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men" (Gal. vi. 10). "Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour" (Ephes. iv. 25). "Let him that stole steal no more, but rather let him labour, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth" (Ephes. iv. 28). Christianity not only enjoins the practice of such beneficial precepts as these, but wherever it is received into the heart it leads to the performance of them, as may be seen in the lives of some of whose deeds we have a record in the Scriptures, *e.g.*, Paul, Dorcas, &c.; as also in the lives of Luther, Calvin, Whitfield, the Countess of Huntingdon, and many others. Wheresoever Christianity is received into the heart it controls evil passions, tempers, and dispositions, as wrath, malice, envy, hatred, revenge, intemperance, lying, and dishonesty: and the restraining of such evils, with the bringing into operation of their opposite virtues, must be promotive of human progress, therefore Christianity is promotive thereof.

Again, Christianity is not opposed to human progress, but is favourable thereto, by the circumstance of its being adapted to all mankind, as it knows no distinctions of nation, age, rank, colour, or any other external circumstance. Also it enjoins no observance that requires special localization, as Judaism did, which required periodic visitations to Jerusalem; and as Mohammedism does;

which requires pilgrimages to Arabia. Thus by enforcing no obligation which cannot be as well performed in one part of the globe as in another, it has a universal and permanent applicability.

Again, it appears to us that Christianity is still highly favourable to human progress in the fact that at the present time it has caused many to earnestly desire to endeavour to substitute arbitration for war in the settlement of the various differences which occur between nations. When it is considered how greatly human progress is hindered and thrown back by war, it surely must be conceded that whatever has a tendency to prevent the same is favourable to human progress, and consequently that Christianity is.

Again, when the stationary condition of the inhabitants of Hindostan, China, and Turkey is contrasted with the rapid progress made by the nations in which Christianity prevails, must it not be admitted that Christianity, so far from opposing human progress, greatly helps and forwards it?

The baneful influences of socialism, communism, and secularism, which are all contraries of Christianity, and their retarding effects on human progress, do by implication teach us that the peculiar genius of Christianity is conducive to human progress. The ruling passion of human nature is self-love, and self-love implies a hatred of all that opposes its interests. This self-love is fostered by socialism and communism. But Christianity enforces and leads to self-denial and the love of others. Which, then, is most promotive of human progress? Christianity enforces the practice of all things to others that we desire to have practised to ourselves, therefore it enforces deeds that are just and fair, and such only; for none certainly desire to have any injustice practised towards themselves. Christianity enjoins on husbands, wives, parents, children, masters, and servants, kind and just treatment of those to whom they stand in the relations here mentioned. It teaches to respect the property of others. It reprobates drunkenness, extortion, hypocrisy, and all uncleanness. It is of a civilizing and elevating tendency. Where it has most influence there charitable institutions of all kinds are the most abundant and flourishing. How can that which does what Christianity effects be opposed to human progress?

S. S.

IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH ?

TEMPORAL.—III.

It is a very pleasing task to be devoted to an inquiry regarding the future glorious reign of our Lord upon earth—a reign in which all adversaries to the truth shall be overpowered and dispelled, and when “the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.”

The literal fulfilment of many of the prophetical utterances in the Old Testament having been actually accomplished according to the primary signification of the prophecy, we discern more reasonableness in assuming that the future reign of Christ upon earth will be a temporal one. It is indeed difficult to understand why so many of the prophetical passages which so profusely abound in Scripture relating to the second coming of Christ, and also to other events remaining yet to be fulfilled, should be so unwarrantably interpreted in a purely spiritual sense, especially when so many prophecies stand in our Bible already fulfilled in perfect harmony with their literal signification. We have example upon example of prophecies being fulfilled coinciding with the literal import of the words. It was prophesied that Christ would be born in Bethlehem (Micah v. 2) ; that there would be a massacre at the time of His birth (Jer. xxxi. 15) ; that He should be forsaken by His disciples (Zech. xiii. 7) ; that He should be scourged, insulted, and spit upon (Isa. l. 6) ; and innumerable others, all which were fulfilled to the very letter. When such passages as the foregoing are literally fulfilled, I cannot understand why similar passages relating to a still more distant period should be twisted into a merely spiritual sense, converting the plain meaning of the words into a purely metaphorical implication. I do not comprehend why for any reason whatever such verses as the following should not be understood in their literal bearing :—“Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He will dwell with them, and they shall be His people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God” (Rev. xxi. 3). “Looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ” (Tit. ii. 13). “In His days shall the righteous flourish, and abundance

of peace so long as the moon endureth" (Ps. lxxii. 7). "He shall have dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth" (Ps. lxxii. 8). If these texts are to be spiritually and no otherwise understood, what reason can be adduced for God's adopting such a uniform metaphorical manner in revealing to man the nature of the kingdom of glory, which is portrayed throughout the whole of the inspired volume? The Bible was surely given to man to be understood by him, and not to be the means of obscuring and perplexing his mind and understanding. As all the prophetic sayings regarding Christ's *first* advent were literally fulfilled, it is surely in perfect accordance with reason to believe in the literal fulfilment of the prophecies relating to our Lord's *second* advent.

"Cris," in his paper supporting the spiritual reign of Christ, adverts to our Lord's words, "My kingdom is *not* of this world," but in arguments which are in no way effective against the position we maintain. The words of Christ, "My kingdom is not of this world," has express reference to the present economy—the kingdom of grace, which will eventually end in giving place to the kingdom of glory—"the *new* earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." The emphasis, accordingly, should be put on *this*, "My kingdom is not of *this* world," which makes the signification of the words, when taken into consideration in connection with other portions of Scripture, very apparent. The question we are discussing refers to a *future* dispensation, so that as these words of Christ's were specially directed to the *present*, they offer no obstacle to our entertaining a belief in the future reign of Christ upon earth.

S. S., in his remarks on G. J. C.'s second argument—the probability of the personal reign of Christ,—uses some rather hazy expressions. His comments upon G. J. C. in reference to the *purpose* of the first advent of Christ are scarcely correct. S. S. surely requires not to be informed that the "works of the devil" are *not* destroyed, and that it was *not* for this sole purpose "the Son of God was manifested." If that was the only purpose of Christ's first advent, why did God reject the excuse made at the fall, "The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat"? We cannot understand how S. S. arrives at the conclusion, that since Christ at His first coming had destroyed the works of the devil, "it is *not necessary* for him to reign personally for the destruction of those works, and therefore *not* probable He will ever do so." Now we know that Christ came personally into this world to ransom the sons of men

from sin and death, therefore it is probable He will reappear personally on earth for the purpose of consummating His infinite glory "to the uttermost ends of the earth." The "day of salvation" will have an end, and that "same Jesus shall so come, and in like manner as he went up into heaven."

This beautiful earth was once the radiant abode of man when in a state of innocence and bliss. It was admirably fitted to the constitution of his nature, and its influences and beauty were reflected in his unalloyed happiness, he being rendered still happier by the personal intercourse he was privileged to hold with his Maker. What reason is there for not believing that man will again regain this blessed state? Man is not a spiritual being—a purely spiritual being,—and, indeed, there is but little authority that can be drawn from the Bible to assume he will ever become so. Besides many allusions to the reunion of the soul and body, there is the sublime passage in Job, "Though worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God."

"There is a beautiful harmony existing throughout all the works of God—myriads of wonderful adaptations subsisting amongst sublunary things; so that from what is discernible in one quarter we infer, with unerring certainty, what must be the truth in another. Who, for example, that studies, in even the most cursory way, the physical structure of the fish, can doubt that it was made to be the inhabitant of a watery medium; or the fowl, and fail to perceive that it was so constituted that it might wing its flight through the atmosphere of heaven? Such adaptations are the commonest of all natural phenomena. They abound everywhere, and in incalculable profusion; and that not on the small scale only, but on a scale of the widest and most universal description. The very mass and gravitating power of the sun in the centre of our planetary system are exquisitely proportioned to the size, and distances, and motions of the surrounding retinue of worlds; and by that very adaptation, as astronomers well know, the framework of the universe is upheld in being. Nay, we are informed by those who know, that there is an adaptation subsisting betwixt the very mass of our planet and the various animals and vegetable productions that cover its surface, so that, were the former changed to aught else than it is, the latter would be completely disordered or destroyed. Thus, for instance, were the earth enlarged in size till it equalled the bulk of the planet Jupiter, not

a man or animal now on the face of our globe would be able to move a single step; and even vegetable life would be extinct, from the inability of the vital juices to rise within stem or tree. Now man, I maintain, both as a physical and moral being, is similarly adapted to that world of which we have been speaking. The glorified earth, and no other locality in the universe, so far as we know, is precisely that sphere wherein his powers have their appropriate means and opportunity for exercise. We have no reason for thinking that, as a physical being, he either would or could be happy anywhere else. And a world, too, such as we have been describing, tenanted by millions of glorified men like himself, and all living under the mild and blessed empire of Immanuel, our God and King, exhibits just that state of social existence which is best adapted to the aspirations and wants of our moral and intellectual nature. Happiness, permanent and unalloyed happiness, is the instinctive desire of the human heart, and surely the ultimate object of the economy of grace. Does that depend in any measure on the healthful and delighted exercise of bodily and mental functions? the fullest scope for this will be furnished amid the scenes and avocations of the world to come, whereof we speak. Is it usually sought at present amidst the interchanges of social existence, the friendships and companionships of those whom we love? and is there something within us that suggests the idea that this is an essential part of our moral nature? most abundant opportunity will there be for gratifying these holy feelings of our nature, in that goodly land where all are brethren, where feuds and animosity are unknown, and each inhabitant will feel his own blessedness enhanced by promoting the welfare and enjoyment of every other. . . . We thus argue, from the adaptation of man's physical and moral nature to the dispensation of glory, such as we have been describing it, that our description is substantially correct, Man is a physical being, and physically blessed he can be only in such a world. He has a moral constitution, and to that moral constitution the reign of Immanuel and His saints is fitted to administer the fullest amount of peace and joy. Admit that there is a future state at all, and a future state involving such particulars becomes a matter approaching to moral certainty. Strong, therefore, is the argument in behalf of our doctrine thus derived from the very nature of things. But it becomes still stronger if we superadd considerations drawn from the Scriptural account of man's original

creation and destiny. In the word of God we are informed of the deliberate manner in which the world was brought into that state which fitted it for man's habitation. By successive acts of creative power man's abode was erected, and richly stored with everything fitted to promote his comfort and happiness; and man himself established therein as its appropriate inhabitant and sovereign possessor. We cannot read the first chapters of Genesis without arriving at the conclusion that, by the ordinance of the Almighty, this world was created for man, and man for this world. A relation was then established betwixt the two, apparently of the closest and most lasting kind. Why should it be supposed that this relationship is destined ever to be dissolved? more especially, where is the probability of this occurring precisely at that time when, by a resurrection of the body, and a restoration of the physical arrangements of our mundane economy, provision appears to be made for its being perpetuated for ever? To be the sovereign possessor of this lower world, man was originally created; and most fully will this object be realized in fact when, at the dawn of the dispensation of glory, Christ and His redeemed shall take possession of the earth, and inhabit it for ever."*

Though many and greatly discordant are the interpretations of the allusions and prophetic utterances referring to our Lord's reign upon earth, I feel convinced, that when the words in the Bible are fairly interpreted with a careful consideration regarding the connection the prophecies sustain towards one another, the decision come to will be in favour of the doctrine of the personal reign of Christ, who shall come "in the clouds of heaven," and shall reign over His people for ever. "Then the wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad, and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose; and the ransomed of the Lord shall return and come into Zion with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads."

C. R.

* Cochrane's "World to Come," pp. 249—253.

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE?

CREATION.—II.

THE mighty mind of Herschel and the splendid spirit of Laplace almost simultaneously brought before men's minds the doctrine of evolution as an explanation of the celestial mechanism and of the architecture of the heavens. The nebular hypothesis excited great attention in its own day as a form for rendering comprehensible the genesis of stars, systems, suns, and spheres. Then men began to trace the "Vestiges of Creation," and to frame to themselves ideals of evolution explanatory of the changes of our world-system, and of our own special planet. Geological research had shown that change and progress according to systematic law had given its present appearance to the earth, and was preparing other changes in the slow-revolving course of ages, of which the signs were observable and might be noted. The idea of evolution, which had been first projected as an hypothesis explanatory of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and of the organization out of the thin mists of ether, of the brilliant luminaries of the sky, had thus been brought down from heaven to earth. Comte formed the further opinion that, if evolution explained the philosophy of matter, it might also explain the so-called philosophy of mind; and the phenomena of thought were made the subject of analysis, to see if a law of evolution could not also be found among them. He based his positive philosophy upon the idea that the notions of the human mind passed successively through a theological, then a metaphysical, and lastly a positive stage; so that thought also undergoes evolution.

Mill gave his adhesion to the laws of sociology, and Buckle applied these to the interpretation of history. Tyler employed the forms of Comtean philosophy to explain the "primitive culture" of the race; and Sir John Lubbock carried the hypothesis of evolution into the exposition of "savage life." Herbert Spencer holds that from the period when—if to talk of a period is not altogether a mistake, and we should not rather say in the infinite of ages—a

luminous mist formed all that was, there has been no pause or inter-space in the progress of evolution; that comets and star-systems have been whirled into shape and separatedness, to take their part in the eternal dances of the sky; that rock formations and ocean waters have had their places and forms assigned to them by the revolving of their world-masses; that plant cells have germinated and life cells have been brought into vital manifestation; that man and his co-tenants of the globe, that passion and poetry, and strength and science, and beauty and art, have had their origin from that forth-whirled luminous mist in which force dwelt—and dwelt fitted by its correlations to evolve power, poetry, and psychology. That the eternal on-spin of things has culminated in developing the co-geners of Herbert Spencer! Professor Huxley, Professor Tyndall, Dr. Darwin, Charles Bray, G. H. Lewes, &c., have all agreed to the development theory with more or less of variation; and so we have the school of the evolutionists as opposed to the creationists.

Among the latter we have no hesitation in enrolling ourselves. The universe appears to us as a cosmic whole, possessed of and displaying an architectonic unity and plan. Order and design, law and the intersubordination of creatures, appear to us to be present in all the morphological changes which occur in species. I cannot comprehend a wild and chance-directed whirl and dance of protoplasmic atoms drifting or driven along the amplitude of infinite space in luminous and voluminous immensity, yawning and dehiscing into number, weight, measure, order, organization, plant life, animal vitality, and disintegration of species. I cannot understand how that which was but a lifeless, formless force could evolve not only form but vitality, not only life but thought. I am quite able to form an idea of evolution if I can be allowed to conceive of creation as a giving of being and power and law to the things that are to be evolved. But an unevolved evolution, an unorganized organization, and a lawless obedience to law I cannot understand. Without creation nature cannot be explained. It must be, before it is evolved. It is beyond the power of the human faculties to attain to a living conception of an ever-evolving universe. We do not escape a difficulty by substituting an evolution for a creation. We still require to rise to a *first* evolution, and an originator of evolution.

The plan and system of the universe, the ordinary course of

nature, may be accepted as explicable by the idea of evolution; but the planning and the systematizing—the arrangement and the imparting of that course, require a designer and an arranger. To impersonalize the personality of the Creator, and to endeavour to atheize the universe by making life, personality, and thought owe their origin to a whirl of atoms rather than a thought of God, is to declare that dreams are facts, that insanity is rational; for what more contradictory are these things, one of the other, than the evolutionist's assertion, Mist becomes mind? We admit, nay, we maintain that cause and effect hold sequence throughout the globe; to the fact that it is so we owe our knowledge of nature and the possibility of fashioning our habits to the conditions of life. But because the universe of visibilities and of palpabilities is constructed on the principle that cause precedes and effects follow, and that these show us the bearings of the things of experience one towards another, it is not necessary to suppose; indeed, we think it impossible to believe that these have such an intrinsic and inherent invariability and immutability that they have gone on from everlasting to everlasting without any beginning, interference, creative power, or controlling might. The evolutionist denies the power and wisdom of God in creation; and yet the very science which he constructs to explain nature implies purpose and power, might and foresight.

Science is set forth by Professor Huxley as the record and the explanation of "nature's great progression from the formless to the formed, from the inorganic to the organic, from *blind* force to conscious intellect and will." "Strip," says Professor Tyndall, "the hypothesis of evolution naked, and you stand face to face with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the lion or the horse, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that of the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena,—were once *latent* in a fiery cloud." Science is the explanation of the phenomena of the universe. What explanation does science—the science of the evolutionists, give us? This only:—phenomena are inexplicable—the order of phenomena we can tell, their correlations we can note, describe, and in some measure affect; but how they came to be, why they are, wherefore they have made their appearance, we know and can know nothing. We cannot transcend experience, and all experience is of phenomena, and of nothing else. "Our life is a mystery surrounded by mysteries; we

live encompassed by wonders;" but we can see only phenomena, and with the mysteries that surround us we must not meddle. These are *latent*. Science has only to do with the *patent*. All that is beyond experience is beyond explanation. Call you this the unriddling of the universe? It is rather confusing the soul and sanctifying ignorance. Of course the very first thing seeking explanation in nature is its *origin*—whence came it? Then we wish to know its *plan*—how is it ordered? We desire to comprehend its purpose—wherefore is it so? and we are curious to learn something of who is its author, its ruler, and its changer. There is design, the evidence of a conscious and guiding intelligence, but we are told that all intelligence and design were *latent* in some fiery cloud myriads of ages ago; that the law of evolution began in it to shape the tissues of this mist to various morphological issues, and hence things are, and we are here to see them. Under the action of the forces of evolution working continuously under fixed laws, inanimate nature, plant organisms, all the species of animals possible in all their several sorts of development, came for their due season, maturing like the grain in the harvest-field—only without ploughshare or seedsman; and the great harvest of nature stands forth in phenomenal brilliancy. We do not deny evolution within limits, but we affirm that evolution by law does not make itself intelligible to us unless we have a Creator, who is the first force in evolution, and whose will is the supreme law of evolution. A primeval mist—if all things else be held to be developed from it—is not a satisfactory commencement to a universe of such manifestations of genius and power as the history of humanity reveals as that through which even the supremacy of science is made possible.

E. F. R. has most obligingly furnished a paper full of quoted description of the theory he advocates, but has supplied little or no argument. He surely cannot imagine that we are to take his *propositions* for *syllogisms*! In his very first statement he gives up the whole negation, p. 51, for if "evolution does not necessarily imply no creation," what are we arguing about? No one has ever denied evolution. Scripture expressly affirms it. God implanted evolutive power in plants and animals. He made "the herb-yielding seed," and the tree "yielding fruit whose seed is in itself;" the animal creation He formed to "increase and multiply." In his second statement he assumes "a fixed typical creation" to be that

which his opponents are to argue for ; but we are not to be held to his assumptions. A typical creation need not be fixed,—at least not so definitely fixed as not to allow of any development of species. That the types of creation were endowed with developable power is implied in their being intended to fill the earth and the air and the sea under all the changes that were necessary in them. In regard to his No. III., we only affirm that a creation is indispensable as an accounting for nature, unless he is prepared to prove the eternal duration of matter, and its continual and everlasting evolution ; for change must have had a beginning, or it would not be change, and that beginning must have been caused. Such change must either have proceeded from nature itself, so that it was self-created, or else it was created from without. In either case we have really a beginning—which is a creation, or else implies one. A beginning other than a creative one the human mind is incapable of thinking. It is therefore impossible, as he affirms in closing, that “*evolution may, in itself, afford an explanation of nature.*” That nature is we know, but that is not an explanation of it. Even though we knew what nature is, that would not be an explanation. We require to know how it came into being, why it is as it is, and to what purpose it tends. That a thing is, and undergoes change or evolution, never satisfies any thinker. The causes of change are always sought, and the laws of change are always investigated. The knowledge of these is indispensable. A science that merely sees is rightly regarded as of little worth ; it is the science that foresees that is valued. There is no foresight in mere vision, and unless there be law-governing evolution, nothing can be foreseen about it. Causeless and lawless evolution do not satisfy the conditions of science, and science to be of any value ought to yield an explanation of nature. If, then, it requires for its conditions and grounds cause and laws, it must think and accept a cause of causes, a beginning of causation, a creation and a creator,—must come to the conclusion that “*in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.*”

F. D. T.

EVOLUTION.—II.

PHENOMENA we know. Activity, change, force, we perceive and feel. Experience we possess, or can attain. The order of occurrence, concurrence, or recurrence, among phenomena, we can note, record, and classify. But we can know no more. The world is a

theatre in which we require to act our part without rehearsal, and take our share in working out the great drama without knowledge of the plot, or *cue* as to the course of the scenes and incidents. Above the Globe Theatre the motto stood—*Totus mundus agit histrionem*, which, as Shakspeare translated it, signifies that—

“All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.”

Ben Jonson, the good critical soul, who saw chiefly through the gross spectacles of a literal learning, is said to have brought out his objection to this motto in the following pertinent, or impertinent terms :—

“If but *stage actors* all the world displays,
Where shall we find *spectators* of their plays ? ”

Shakspeare, however, was not the man to allow even the critical Ben Jonson to congratulate himself upon shedding ridicule upon the inscription, which very probably had been chosen by the great dramatist of the Globe out of his “small Latin ;” he therefore rejoined in the following pithy fashion :—

“Little or much of what we say we do,
We’re all both *actors* and *spectators* too.”

We presume that Ben had enough of it, and that he would, at the “Mermaid,” make things up with “good Will.”

This little episode in our dramatic literature may help us a little to get over the difficulty of the question most probably puzzling the advocates of a creation. How came evolution into operation ? We cannot tell ; we come into the theatre of being, and take our part in the play of life as it goes on. We see what we can, and do what we must, and that is all that we have to do in the drama of history. We have had no rehearsal of parts ; we have had no exposition of the plot, no instructions regarding what to say or do. Here we are, and act we must. On goes the drama of being through all its scenes and transformations, its plots and counterplots, its mysteries and its *eclaircissements* ; and when our part is played out, we pass off from the stage of time. We have made no engagement with the managers. We have had no hand in the get-up of the joint-stock performance. We have not set nor changed the scenery ; all that we know is, here we are, with work to do, and life to live. What we must do is pretty well determined for us by the

place we find ourselves in as the play goes on. Some are cast for heroes' parts, and some look as if they had only a supernumerary's duty to attend to. Some do the processional, others the professional parts. Some act, some speak, some mourn, some are gay. A little of the meaning may begin to dawn upon us after we have gone through a scene or two; but before we have time to make it act, still less to forecast what is to be the upshot and *finale*, we are dismissed from the stage, and have no more concern in the plot or its progress.

As we have said, all we can know is phenomena. We may surmise and guess, suppose and make hypotheses; we can condense these into theories, and construct them into sciences; but we cannot transcend phenomenal life. That is our portion; that our position. It is not true that all that is known is nothing can be known; but it is true that beyond the known nothing can be known, however much may be *supposed*.

Having got so far, let us now proceed to another item of our argument. The best explanation is that which entirely accords with the facts to be explained, which accepts these facts as they are, states them without reserve or reservation, and goes no whit beyond what the facts contain. It may be possible to explain the facts more agreeably in some other way than this, but not in a better way. The beautiful mythology of Greece may lend grace to the philosophy of nature; the imaginary deities of Rome may gratify the fancy which regards their ideal influences as quite availing for the explanation of the changes seen in the world; "the cycles and epicycles" with which the old astronomers "scribbled o'er" the face of the sky may explain the mystic maze of the planetary systems among the fixed stars; but if we want to get at the explanation which is best, we must take that which comes nearest the truth, and that which comes nearest the truth in regard to nature is that evolution rather than creation is the law of the phenomena of the universe.

It is a caution and a precaution in science never to overload any exposition of phenomena with unnecessary assumptions of imaginary causative energies. The parsimony of principles is a law of science. Science sees, notes, records, compares, arranges, classifies, and organizes phenomena. When Science has proceeded thus far, she may start an hypothesis as an explanation. But this very term shows that it is no part of science. It is an imaginary element

placed under the facts. It is a supposition so happily conceived, it may be, as to express with fidelity a series of extremely complicated phenomena; but yet it is a supposition—it is the poetry, and not the prose of science. It may be granted that the hypothesis may seem to be verified by experiment and observation; but it must be maintained that an hypothesis, though it may be an agreeable explanation, is not nearly so reliable—that is, is not by any means so good—as an explanation in which no cause is assumed, and no agent is supposed to act, except such as is actually known to exist; such an explanation as in manner and amount best tallies with the entire amount of observation and experiment which has been expended on the phenomena: for every hypothesis that can be framed is liable to be overthrown and superseded as soon as any other imaginary explanation can be brought forward by which the mind is more gratified than by that which went before; and there is always a danger lest fancy deceives us in the supposed verifications, seeing it is the architect of our hypothesis.

From these observations it is plain that as we can only know phenomena, we had better keep within the limits of phenomena, and not go beyond them in search of imaginary and self-deceiving hypotheses:—hypotheses which, like the *vortices* of Descartes, or the nervous fluid of Mesmer, or the odic force of the spiritualists, put words into our mouths instead of wisdom into our brains. We see things evolve: the bud becomes a plant; the germ-cell becomes an animal; the vapours congregate into clouds, and discharge themselves in rain or lightning; the waters collect from the mountain sides, pour down the valleys into rivers, and swell onwards till they reach the sea; the winds gather in storms and swelter round sea-bound ships, sometimes driving them safely on their course, at other times dashing them into wreck and ruin. Ether contracts into comets; comets concrete into worlds; worlds cohere in systems, and in their revolutions evolve the life-germs they contain, so as to bud into plant-life, and burst into animation. These are the mere phenomena we see. But we never see things created. We never can know a Creator. He can never be comprehended by us, and we cannot superintend His work. We cannot see God, and cannot know Him. He is carefully concealed behind the thick veil of phenomena, and He has strictly limited our vision to these. If we are to *see* more, we must *be* more.

It is not at all necessary for a believer in evolution to deny that

a Creator is, or to disbelieve the assertion that there is a God. Science perceives, and does not believe; it knows, and nothing more. But a scientific man may believe what he pleases, and he may accept from religion any revelation that it may supply to his soul. Religion walks by faith, not by sight. Science walks by sight, not by faith. Science never applies faith to a locomotive engine instead of coals. Science never accepts faith as a measure for mountains, or a gauger of seas. A scientific man may be a religious man, as Faraday was, but he must keep his religion and his science apart; he must not confound one with the other, or he will confuse both. Religion cannot explain nature, or if it does so, it becomes science,—no longer a matter of belief, but of knowledge. Science neither derides nor decries religion. It only refuses to accept faith as knowledge, or to recognise in the explanation of nature that which—as being supernatural—cannot be included in it. There *may have been* creation: but Science cannot acknowledge, just because she can never see that. There *is* evolution; Science sees that, and accepts that as the explanation of nature to knowledge, to intellect. She does not offer evolution for the acceptance of faith. She demonstrates evolution, but creation can never be demonstrated; therefore evolution is a better explanation of nature than creation is. Faith asks no explanation; Science demands one.

It is a stupid thing to brand science as rationalism. Science would cease to be Science the moment she ceased to be rational. It is equally vain to call any religion rationalism, for no religion can be held except by faith. That faith may be a reasonable or an unreasonable one, but it must be a faith. Religion may be as rational as any one chooses, but it can never be rationalism. Science must be rational, or it is nothing. A rainbow is a reality of vision, but it is not a reality of things; yet this rainbow can be subjected to scientific analysis, and its being may be explained; it may also be made the topic of religious instruction, and it may be thus brought into the dominion of faith, although it is a phenomenon of science. Science explains it: religion raises it out of the region of the phenomena of faith. So science and religion may co-exist, and both be cultivated, if only men hold each in its own sphere. Science has no reason to regard the scoff of the religious world that she is "godless," as one that afflicts her. She only professes to explain phenomena; she only explains the visible; and as God is

not presented to her as a phenomenon, she cannot include Him in her programme. That a census-taker in London does not enumerate in his list a resident in Birmingham, does not make him amenable for denying the existence of the Birminghamite; as a census-taker, his existence or non-existence was no part of his business.

If then a statistician, following up the labours of the London census-taker, endeavours to explain the laws of life in London, he equally ignores the being of the Birminghamite as irrelevant to his inquiry. Similarly the man of science, as the interpreter of sense, ignores (for his immediate purpose) the questions which may arise concerning what lies below sense, or is in existence beyond it, or dwells in imperceptibility within it. Sufficient for him is it to explain what falls to his lot to do.

Nature is the domain of science. The supernatural is of course excluded from consideration therein. An explanation of nature is (or at least ought to be) confined to nature. When creation and a creator are talked about, the scientific man does not pretend to have subjected either the one or the other to observation and experiment. He cannot do so; they transcend his eyes, organs, and instruments—they are extra-scientific. The creation of all the complex forms of the organisms we see around us involves an absolute miracle, transcends experience, and so passes outside of any true investigation of nature. Nature may have had any genesis whatever, that genesis we can never know, whatever we may believe about it or suppose concerning it. Within nature we can only explain nature by the observation and the recording of its given evolutions. It is impossible for us to know, as explanation, that there has been creation, or even what has been created, if there were a creation; and hence we think evolution rather than creation gives the true explanation of the phenomena of nature.

M. F. S. certainly deserves the thanks of the reader for the beautiful quotation from Whewell which he has prefixed to his paper. But most of those who have learned the incidence of argument must have perceived its fallacy. We have only to follow out the analogy of the Master of Trinity—listening to an extract from the grand *oratorio* of the universe, and we may analyze that which comes within our experience; but out of that small portion of actuality in time and extent which we perceive it is impossible for us to reconstruct the entire *oratorio* in its fulness, determine

the period of its first issue, and fix upon the author. The elements are not given us that we may reach that knowledge by. Boyle's remarks on the term "nature" are informing, but they do not tend to the settlement of the question before us.

M. F. S. thinks he is not called on to *prove* a creation (p. 43). That, in our opinion, is just the "impossibility" to which he must task himself. Are we to assume and suppose a Creation, and call that an explanation of nature? An explanation applies to reason, and not to faith. If supposition supplied proper explanation, we need never have gone beyond the old mythologies. Science depends on observation tested by experiment and reasoning, and is satisfied only when it gets these into harmony; but we can neither observe nor test creation, while we can daily perceive and examine evolution. Why do we not hourly feel it in ourselves as changeable beings?

But has M. F. S. considered this, that even if a creation were granted, it would not explain nature? There are all the evolutions by which plants, animals, &c., increase and multiply, change and take on differences, to be explained. The creation, unless it was to be eternally the same, must have remained stationary, or soon have gone to ruin, unless the reproductive power of evolution was possessed by it. We know that this reproductive, change-evolving power is possessed and exercised by things; and we know that the things which we see around us are not created, but evolved. These evolutions we watch, and strive to understand; and when we understand them, nature is much plainer to our comprehension. If we required to believe in creation without evolution, our whole thoughts would be thrown into a muddle. It appears to us, therefore, that M. F. S., if he is not going to prove a creation—and a creation can't be renewed too—may just as well come over to our side at once; for without creation—a proved creation—what have we but evolution? With creation, evolution supplies an explanation of nature; and without creation, evolution explains nature; but with creation, without evolution, nature is inexplicable. Such is the dilemma into which M. F. S. has got; and such is the inextricable difficulty into which all must get who think that creation provides a better explanation of nature than evolution.

W. G. P.

Greek Days and Roman Nights.

NO. I.—PLATO'S PHÆDO.

A LIFE-ESSENCE THEORY AND THE PERORATION.

*(Continued from page 456, Vol. XXXIII.)**

TIME is the vestibule to an unknown vastness of being. It is the span of life, not of existence. In it we choose the kind of being that is dearest to us, and in it we educate and discipline our spirit. Beyond what we have become nothing goes with us to hades. For the Daimon, assigned to us in accordance with our choice, leads us somewhere for judgment, and then leads us to hades, there to get our deserts—for the fixed time, and according to the different destinies of our souls; another, after a long space, brings us again within the limits of the revolution of time. The journey to hades is not so [simple] as that which Æschylus ascribes to Telephus, but is winding, devious, and manifold. Hence our funeral rites are performed at the fork of the roadways. The wise, well-ordered soul finds in the gods fellow-travellers and guides to the fair places of hades (Elysium); but the passion-devoted soul strives to remain fast by its bodily garment near the grave till forced away among the impure, and endures the misery of contaminating communication with souls of a like sort till the cycles revolve.

There are many wondrous places in the earth, for it is, I have been persuaded by some one [Anaximander?], not of the sort nor of the size many suppose it to be. How so? exclaims Simmias; of these things I would gladly hear.

The art of Glaucus [divination?] is not required to do that. But even that could not prove them; besides, life is not left to me to tell you all. Of some I can. Simmias replied, That will suffice.

* The contributor of this series regrets that illness interrupted the completion of his analysis of the splendid Platonic treatise on the life of the soul, and has, he fears, somewhat marred the continuity of style. He hopes, in two other brief papers, to finish this theme, and to follow, thereafter, this Greek Day with a Roman Night, spent in the company of Cicero.

I believe, then, said Socrates, that if the earth is in mid-heaven and is a sphere, it must be at rest in equilibrium. It is, besides, very large; and we who dwell on a small part of it—from Phasis [in Colchis] to Gibraltar,—near the [Mediterranean] sea, crowd it as ants or frogs about a marsh. Now there are many such hollow sea-filled and well-peopled portions of the earth; but the earth itself is in the heavens among the stars, overarched by ether. We on the earth resemble, so far as regards the ether, those who dwell in the sea; as their life is inferior to that of our air, so ours is inferior to that of the ether, and we can no more escape from our air as we are and live there, than fish can spring from the sea and live in our air. As the beauty of our scenery would astonish the denizens of the sea, so would the grace of the regions of ether excel anything we now experience. Might we but tell a beautiful fable to illustrate this? We should be glad, Simmias observes, and Socrates proceeds: Ours is but a mid-world—a platform between the supernal and the infernal realms. To a beholder from above our earth is wondrously varied, but most of its beauty and value is derived from the upper world of ravishing beauty. Our precious stones, gold, &c., are but accidental fragments fallen from that world of glory, where everything is undecayed and pure. There the seasons are such that they never originate diseases, and everything is as far superior to what we have on the earth as ether is purer than the sea. They have glorious abodes; the gods dwell among them, and personally frequent the temples; they hear the voices, know the oracles, and see the persons of the gods—everything there is seen in the light of reality, and the felicity of the inhabitants is correspondently great and sure.

As these glorious abodes are above the earth, so below it—as Homer says, “very far off, where the most profound depths of the earth are”—is what he and the poets call Tartarus, through which flow the four rivers of hades;—Ocean, the more outwardly of these, with Acheron its opposite, which enters the Achernian lake. Midway between these flow the Pyriphlegethon and its opposite, Cocytus, falling into the Stygian lake. When the Daimon leads the spirit to be judged, those who have lived a passable sort of life are sent off to Acheron, and embarking in the skiffs they use there, pass on to the Achernian lake, and there abide till their souls are purified, whereupon they are set free, and each receives his due. But those who seem incurable are hurled into Tartarus, whence

they never issue. Those who seem curable in soul are subjected to penitentiary and purgatorial testing, being passed and repassed through the rivers and lakes of hades until, by their reformation and importunity, they secure the forgiveness of those whom they have injured; those, however, who sufficiently purify themselves by philosophy here, go bodilessly into the upper air, passing for ever into new scenes of being, habitations increasing in splendour, such as it would be difficult to describe, even were there, in my circumstances, time to do so.

Still, Simmias, for the sake of those things which we have described, we ought to employ every effort to acquire, now and here, virtue and wisdom, for the reward is noble, and the hope is transcendent.

It does not, I admit, become a man of sense to affirm that these things are positively as I have described them: however, either this or something of the same kind—since the soul is certainly immortal—must be believed, and is worthy, to one who believes in it, of the risk. The risk is noble, and it is advisable to encourage ourselves, as with enchanting allurements, to a noble life, and hence I have prolonged the fable thus far. On account of what I have said, a man who has denied himself to the delights of the body as being a foreigner, and who has sought knowledge and adorned his spirit with justice, temperance, fortitude, freedom, and truth, may entertain confidence of soul, and may wait for his passage to hades as one prepared to depart whensoever destiny may summon him. You, Simmias and Cebes—you also, gentlemen who surround me, must each and all of you take that departure. As for me now, as a tragic writer might say,—

“The voice of destiny doth call me hence!”

It is nearly time for me to go to the bath, for it seems to me better to take my hemlock after I have bathed, so that I may not trouble the women with the washing of my corpse.

So be it! O Socrates, said Crito, when he had spoken so; but what commands have you to give to these your friends or to me, either about your children or anything else in which we can oblige you?

Do what I have always said, Crito, he answered, it is nothing new; by taking care of your own Selves you will best oblige me, mine, and yourselves, whatever you do, though you may not now

promise it. But if you do not care for your own Selves, and go forward in the pathway of true life as I have now and formerly pointed it out, even though you should promise now ever so much, and ever so earnestly, you will do no real good at all.

Crito said, We shall, then, strive to do even so; but how shall we bury you?

Just as you please, said he, if you can but catch *me*, and *I*, in truth, elude you not! At the same time he gently smiled on us as he looked round us all, and said, I cannot, my friends, persuade this Crito here that *I* am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who arranges every part of this discourse in its fitness to the circumstances; but he *will* think that *I* am that which you shall shortly behold dead, and ask how he will bury me! I have argued in vain with him that when I have drunk the hemlock I shall not remain here, but shall depart to the state of the blessed; although I meant thereby to console both you and myself. Be ye therefore sureties to Crito—not as he was to the judges, that I should remain here,—but be ye sureties to him that, when I die, I shall not abide here, but shall assuredly depart; by that means Crito may more easily endure my change, and may not be afflicted when he sees my body burned, or buried as if I suffered some dreadful woe; nor say, when the funeral rites are performing, that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is interred; for be assured, O most excellent Crito! that to speak improperly is not only wrong in regard to the thing itself, but is also, in some measure, injurious to our own souls. Be of good courage, then; say you bury my body, and bury it as is most agreeable to you and most in harmony with the law.

THE CLOSING SCENE.

Hereupon Socrates uprose from the side of the prison bed and went into a chamber to bathe; Crito followed him, but (Phædo remarks) he directed us to wait for him. Conversing among ourselves regarding what he said, we waited, reconsidering what he had spoken, yet scarcely daring to speak of the coming calamity, which would make orphans of us of the worst sort, by taking from us the father of our thoughts. After he had bathed, his children were brought to him—for he had two young sons [Sophroniscus and Menexenus], and one grown up [Lamprocles?]; and when his female relatives had come he conversed with them in the presence

of Crito, and gave them such injunctions as he thought proper. Then he sent the women and the children away, and returned to us. By this time it was nearly sunset, for he had been a good while in the inner room. When he had returned he spoke little, but sat down as he was before. At length the officer of the Eleven entered, and going close up to Socrates said, "Socrates, I shall not require to find that fault with you which I have to find with others, who curse me in their anger when I—obeying the archons—bid them drink their potion. You know who are to blame for this sentence—not I, but they. Now, then—for you know what I have come to announce—adieu; strive to bear the inevitable as well as may be!" So saying, bursting into tears, he turned away and went out. Socrates, looking after him, replied, And thou, too, farewell! we shall do as you direct; then turning to us, he said, How courteous that man is! all the while I have been here he has visited me, conversed with me, and shown himself to be one of the worthiest of men; and now how kindly he weeps for me! But come, Crito, said he, let us obey; let some one bring the draught, if it is ready; and if not, let it be prepared. Crito said, The sun is still unset, and I know others have drunk the poison very late, supping freely, and even enjoying the physical delights of the flesh. Do not be in such haste. Socrates replied, These do so because they think they gain by so doing; I can gain nothing, except ridicule for being so fond of life, and sparing of it when none remains. Go, and resist not!

On this Crito nodded to the boy who stood by the entrance. He departed, stayed a little, and returned, bringing with him the executioner with the cup prepared. Well, friend, said Socrates, you are skilled in this matter. What must I do? "Nothing," said he, "except when you have drunk. Walk about till you feel a numbness in your limbs, then lie down; it will do its work." He held out the cup, and O Echecrates! Socrates untremblingly, never even changing colour, took it quietly, but looking the man right in the face, as he was wont to do to every one, said, What say you about this draught, as to making a libation? is it lawful, think you, or not? "We only make so much of it," he said, "as is enough to drink."

I see, said Socrates; but it is lawful and right to pray to the gods that my exit may be happy; that, therefore, I pray: so be it! He drank the whole off calmly. Scarcely could we the bystanders refrain from tears before, but when we saw him quaff off the potion

irresistible grief came on us, and hot tears fell like tempest-drops. I wept not for him, but for myself at losing such a friend. Crito before me, however, had arisen, was quite overcome by anguish, and Apollodorus, who had previously wept, now rent the air with his cries, piercing the heart of every one but Socrates. He said, "Beloved friends, what are you doing? I sent away the women, that we might be spared the folly of tears and a scene. It is right to die with lucky omens. Be still, cheer up, endure!" On this we, ashamed, hid our tears. He having walked about, when he felt his limbs benumbed, lay down on his back. The executioner felt his feet and legs, and so on found he was growing stiff and cold. Socrates, who was covered, touched himself, and said, When the poison affects the heart I shall go! The chill crept up. "Crito," said he, uncovering himself, "we owe a cock to Esculapius; pay it—neglect it not!" It shall be done, said Crito; aught else? He made no reply. A convulsive movement came, the executioner covered him; his gaze was glazed; Crito saw it, and closed his mouth and eyes. This, Echecrates, was the end! Then there went from among us the best of all the men of his time,—one, moreover, most wise and just.

PROPHET.—Primarily and Scripturally it means *interpreter of the divine purposes and thoughts*. If those purposes and thoughts should happen to lurk in mysterious doctrines of religion, then the prophet is simply an *exegetes*, or expounder. But it is true, if they lurk in the dark mazes of time and futurity unrolling itself from the central present, then the prophet means a seer or reader of the future, in our ordinary modern sense. But this modern sense is neither the Mahometan sense, nor that which prevails in the New Testament. Mahomet is the prophet of God—not in the sense of predieter from afar, but as the organ of communication between God and man, or revealer of the divine will. In St. Paul, again, gifts of prophecy mean uniformly any extraordinary qualifications for unfolding the meaning of Scripture doctrines, or introducing light and coherency amongst their elements, and perhaps *never* the qualifications for inspired foresight. In the true sense of the word, therefore, Newton was the prophet of Kepler—*i. e.*, the exegetic commentator on Kepler,—not Kepler of Newton. But the best policy in this world is to think with the wise, and (generally speaking) to talk with the vulgar.—DE QUINCEY.

The Essayist.

IN MEMORIAM 1871.

"I see, as in a map, the end of all."—*Shakspeare.*

"Oh! sweet refreshment to the wearied heart
This converse with th' unalterable dead."

Henry Alford, Dean of Canterbury.

LIFE is only a time-drop in the ocean of eternity. Time is not an entity; it is only a conceivable portion of the infinity of duration. To us life is time personalized, and so limited; and the aim of life should be the perfecting of our personal and individual nature. Life is but a leaflet of "Igdrasil, the ash tree of existence, every leaf of which is a biography, and whose boughs are histories of nations." "At the foot of it in the death kingdom sit three *Normas*, Fates—the past, present and future, watering its roots from the sacred well." "Ever and anon in its budding and disleafing, individuals come and go—the coming to abide for a little space, and the going departing to return no more." Among the dead leaves of the past we have often a mournful interest in picking up a few embalmed remembrances and treasures for the memory of the heart. What a strange quiver of the spirit flashes through one as he raises up the withered leaves of former lives, and tries to syllable in the terse form of a memorial note some suggestive phrase which shall, in brief symbolization, bring into our thoughts some shadowings of the reality which has passed away from the living life of living men! How the penurious terms one must employ chide the writer, and seem to him sadly to be but ashes to ashes, dust to dust—thought-dust rather than the outflow of the sympathy of the mortal forces, who dying has become immortal—with all the privileges Death confers on those whom he has enfranchised! Ay, enfranchised! set free,—free from the limitations of time and earth, of temptation and trial; set free from the environments of clay and passion, from the prison-house of bodily being, the gasp and groan of pain arising from "the throbbing breast, the burning brain," the cares, anxieties, vigils, and uncertainties; the strife, the

wavering, the taskwork, the toil, and the sorrow which operate so disastrously in bringing to the grave the children of the earth.

Eighteen seventy-one has been a year of war, famine, fire, disaster, storm, disease, and accident, with few parallels for destructiveness. It has witnessed a perfect carnival of death. It is not ours, however, to record the causes and the courses of the grim gloom which King Death spread over the earth. We are called on only to talk of his near doings upon the dear to thought and memory, and to tell over the list of the emigrants from the earth who have now become "co-heirs of immortality."

Alexander Munro, who in the chaste sculpture of his pure style has eternized the outward forms of Hippocrates, Galileo, Davy, and Watt, reproduced to vision Queen Mary, and given realization to the Dantean tale of Paolo and Francesca, after a long struggle with death, saw but the dawn of the earliest day of the year, when his deft and undefiable rival stiffened him into a statuesque form, from which "decay's effacing fingers" might easily sweep away the lines of beauty, though of his skill the memory may never cease to be held dear.

January's third day took from us one of our ablest English antiquarians, author of works in history and topography which cast light upon "the dark rereward" of past ages, and give the gleam of thought to the relics Time has left us of his forward march. Wm. Sidney Gibson, the historian of Tynemouth, &c., has been called away, aged fifty-five, from the annals of recorded time. On the seventh, Mrs. Edward Thomas, even while the domestic drama she had given to the stage as "The Wife's Tragedy" was set forth on the boards, herself passed away from the last scene of all in life's eventful history.

In the chill of the January air on the 8th, the Dean of Canterbury received the subtle arrows of death, and on the 12th he succumbed to the irresistible. Henry Alford was a man of various mind, a scholar, a thinker, a greatly wise theologian, a pure and undogmatic writer, a poet of sweet, graceful, pleasing, and elevating talent, and preacher of grave, earnest, and persuasive power. His was the true eirenical spirit—the spirit of love. He had sympathy which broadened as his years increased, and he was disciplined in "the school of the heart." His Hulsean lectures, his sermons, his efforts for the diffusion of a knowledge of the New Testament Scriptures in their purity, and his successful efforts for bringing

into practicality the long-cherished desire of many Christian-minded men to have a revised issue of the translation of the word of life, give him a right to a place among the benefactors of his race. In the serene spirituality of many of his poems he has entailed on many the gratitude of benefited and elevated spirits. Only sixty years of life amid the stir and labour of men! and then when the need for his life seemed greatest, to be called hence in an hour when all seemed serene and fair, in the midst of the hopes and toils of many years to come, there came forth the great invisible hand which gave "the fatal stroke," using his own words, "unlooked for, unaccountable, irremediable;" or shall we rather use other words of his, and say there fell upon him the "shadow of His Brightness whose name is love?" How God-like do the dead become! "Others may change, but *they* shall never change!"

Thomas Mayo, an English physician of eminence, who had held the presidency of the Royal College for fifteen years, a student of metaphysics and logic, who endeavoured to bring their teaching to the aid of the healing art by giving help to medical certitude in the appreciation of evidence, and imparting to the pathology of mind the result of his researches in psychology, under the power of the Great Physician passed into new birth of the spirit 13th January. Two days thereafter, Sir John Fife, a practitioner in medicine of high repute in Northumberland, and a cultivator of the sciences there, underwent the great change. Henry Harrod, an antiquary, who had devoted himself to the study of the churches and castles of Norfolk, received his call on the 24th, so that before the first month had passed away, the year had made some blanks in the familiar circles of many families, and closed the record of the deeds of not a few who had made a mark upon the mind of the age.

On January's closing day, a life of great interest came to an end, although for only forty-two years had it extended. Viscount Pierre-Alexis Ponson du Terrail, a native of Grenoble, had been destined for the French navy, but found himself altogether destitute of faculty for mathematics. He renounced his designed career and took part in the revolution of 1848. He was chosen captain of the Garde Mobile. In 1850 he became a contributor to the *Mode* and *Public Opinion*, and rose rapidly into repute. He acquired a foremost position as a feuilleton romancist, and composed a great number of sketchy and brilliant tales such as the French delight in, as well for the serial press as in independent volumes. So popular were some

of these, that at the request of the readers he required to continue them through several series. He took to the drama also, and supplied the theatres with several highly successful pieces. But the turmoil of life and the strain of faculty to which he was subjected brought upon him the end of the mystery of human life, and unveiled to him the secrets of a life too little recognised—one over which hangs an impenetrable veil till the moment comes when *change* is due.

February took from Hungary, on the 3rd, Baron Kotvos, Minister of Public Instruction. While but a youth he had given to the stage two successful plays. He became an ardent prison reformer; as a journalist he aided Kossuth, and with logical neatness and poetic ardour he advocated the doctrine of the Centralists in preference to those of the Municipalists. As a romancist he illustrated the closing periods of the Middle Ages. His most influential work, that on "The Power of Ideas in the Nineteenth Century," is about to be re-issued. His views have been discussed hotly by opponents and by partisans, and his political potency has been felt, not only in Hungary, but in Germany and France. His rôle in the drama of politics has been noble, and he has passed away amid the sorrow of Western Europe.

On the same day England lost a dramatist who was rapidly rising into repute and power. T. W. Robertson, though only forty-two, had been by the inheritance of generations prone to the stage, and in his youth had donned the sock and buskin. Feeling originaive as well as imitative power within him, he forsook acting for authorship. After engaging in dramatic criticism and in magazine writing, he saw an opening for realistic comedy on the stage. Adapting "David Garrick" from the French, he took his cue thence, and by combining the theory of Thackeray to the art of Dickens, contrived to acquire a sure celebrity. "Society," "Ours," "Caste," "Phiz," "School," "M.P.," &c., gave sign of a power of sketching modern social life which, had not the result of early difficulties and excessive overwork made too great a strain upon the life powers, might have provided for us a drama as witty as by far more pure, than Sheridan and Coleman. The Thomas Heywood of France, Augustus Anicet Bourgeois, who had either a little finger or else a whole hand in nearly three hundred plays also departed this life at Pau, in the early days of February, aged sixty-five.

By a fatal illness, contracted in attendance on the sick and
1872.

wounded while the siege of Paris was going on, France at least, if not the world, lost the mind which had devoted twenty studious years in preparing for the task of illustrating the history of Art by producing a complete "Dictionary of the French School of Artists," of which only a few of the earlier portions were ready. He possessed appreciative power, zeal for art, and a rare capacity for laborious research. Among the many blanks made among the bright spirits of the age, that of Emile Billier de la Chavignerie, on 6th February, deserves record, as he died in the midst of labours of mercy in war-time.

On the 9th of February died the Rev. Henry Melvill, Canon of St. Paul's, for many years one of the most popular and refined preachers in London as holder of the Golden Lectureship. He was one of the select preachers before the University of Cambridge, and his eloquence captivated the most choice auditories that could assemble. His style was grave, felicitous, earnest, modelled on that of Dr. Chalmers, but less ornate and more chastened. His views never brought him to wear the badge of any of the great parties in the Church. His high scholarship, severe taste, careful study, and persevering resolution to be a teacher of the truth of God, gave him claims on distinction which were fully realized in a well-earned and unfading popularity, and a long period of useful toil and recognised effectiveness. His speech will no more stir the soul to its depths, but there is an eloquence in his life of devoted dutifulness which should touch and teach us from his grave.

America lost her splendid Spanish scholar, whose knowledge of the literature of that land of *belles lettres* was more complete and thorough than any of the native students. George Ticknor was a marvel even among learned men, for variety of gift and versatility of spirit. Taste, knowledge, accomplishment, energy, and patience made him a delight as an author; sympathy, good nature, conversational ability, mobility of thought, and a width of acquaintance with the facts of life, made him fascinating as a man. The genial, judicious, brilliant, and many-gifted scholar of the West has won a reputation around which the historic Muse will ever keep an amaranthine flower in honour of his fadeless memory. A less brilliant but a very beautiful life—lonely in its romanticism and lovely in the sweet sisterhood which made dark lives acquire a lustre from an affection purer if less stirring than that which has

swept over the heart-strings of her young life—was lost to America too in the death of Alice Carey, a poetess of peculiar potency of imagination and singular selectness of phrase, and a story-teller of much grace, pathos, delicacy, and attractive instructiveness. May her name have a green "clovernook" in the history of American literature, and Phœbe be remembered beside her as a sister in life, in love, and in genius.

A thinker of power, an investigator of the problems of psychology, a meditator on morals and the theory of politics, Sir George Ramsay pursued his studies through love for the pursuit of them, though free, by fortune and position, from the need of following any pathway to prosperity. He had the energy of his race and the rare spirit of his ancestry; and full of the traditions of the duty of the rich to ameliorate and improve the condition of the people, he intelligently studied and practically tested forms of social kindness which might be efficaciously employed for the advantage of the people. Had he been minded so, he might have acquired a reputation as notable in psychology as that to which his brother attained in philology. He was a man of generous heart and noble public spirit. A meeting of the inhabitants of the district around his house was being held to arrange for some testimony of their gratitude felt towards him, at the very time when he was called suddenly to the great audit before the Master Judge. He passed beyond the reach of praise, but not of love (Feb. 22nd).

After upwards of half a century of toil in the service of the newspaper press, not as "the observed," but as the editorial observer "of all *Observers*," Louis Doxat, who had a large share of the difficulty and labour of the battle of freedom for intelligence to undergo, was brought under the "arrest of that fell sergeant death" into the presence of the Omniscient Observer on 4th March, ending a life of toil and thought, though scarcely known beyond the members of the press, in honour and esteem as an assiduous caterer for the information of men and the reformation of the times. Another distinguished and influential member of the brotherhood of literature, one of the cultivators of the serial diffusion of knowledge, and one of the earnest and painstaking of those who sought the improvement of the people, Robert Chambers died 17th March. He was a man of exquisite brain-balance, genial, thoughtful, persevering, versatile, full of acquired stores of knowledge, and gifted with that precious seeing which

adds a double value to facts by a proper setting. The brothers Chambers are perhaps the most remarkable instances of toiling upward this century has seen. From handicraft labour they have risen to be possessors of extensive literary repute, potent in the world of letters, science, and commerce; and as benefactors to the nation in the extension and development of its means of education they are all but unrivalled, if they have an equal. Not only fame, but fortune has become theirs; and besides being able to count their books in multitudes, they were able to count their landed acres. If William, who is still alive and labouring on, and who is engaged in preparing the story of the firm who employed the largest amount of brain-labour in Scotland, as well as erected the most extended mind-culture, had the keen and strict business power that moved cautiously onwards to success, Robert had the genius and the phantasy that brought him into sympathy with all sorts of men of all sorts of minds. How hearty was his greeting, and how constantly alive his intellect and his humour! His ready thoughtfulness and his steady friendship made him not less valued than his amazing acquisitions, his untiring industry, his manifold genius, and his successful achievements in many and various departments of intellectual research. He was himself a living "Encyclopædia," the "Journal" of his life would be a most varied one, "The Information for the People" he supplied, and the "Educational Course" to which he directed them, were highly esteemed; the "Essays" he made were suggestive and interesting; but from the "Book of Days" Death has taken away his name after sixty-nine years of toilsome progress and endeavour. On the world's memory he has left his imprint, his works form his monument, and his reputation is safe, for he has been a friend to the human race, of whom he was a choice specimen.

On the same day, Charles Victor Hugo, the eldest son of the dramatist, the historian, and novelist, himself a journalist, a poet, and an historian, but more particularly dear to British readers for a careful and refined translation of the sonnets of Shakspeare, to which is prefixed a thoughtful and elaborate introduction, which shows fine poetic sensibility and exquisite taste, although even by rearrangement he appears to have been as unsuccessful as most interpreters in extracting from them a consistent autobiographical signification. He possessed a fine glowing, energetic, style of expression, and had in him a great deal of the fire and passion, if he

had not the specific frenzy, of the fine old man who has been called to mourn not only the loss of wife and son, but the renown of France eclipsed in war under the imperial sway of that child of destiny—whose destiny he could never admit to be just. To his pious tears for his eldest born let us add the regrets of sympathy and recognition.

Few as the members of the Scriptures Revision Committee were, death did not leave their ranks unthinned. Alford was taken early in the year, but Professor McGill, of St. Andrews, was called early in years. He had not long completed the thirty-eighth year of his age, and yet he had acquired a reputation as a linguist which was not national, but Continental. He was regarded as one entitled to speak with authority by men of the eminence of Dr. Pusey, Professor Ewald, and Dr. Feurst. The profundity of his learning, the clearness of his mode of expression, the acuteness of his observation, and the wide extent of reading he had mastered, made him, as an expositor of the language and meaning of the sacred Scriptures, an acquisition even to the committee of the first scholars in Britain who assembled in King Henry's Chapel, Westminster, to give to the people a purer and more accurate mirror of the Books on which their faith is built. He had a rarely tenacious memory, a ready humour, and serene, sympathetic mind, as well as a capacity for condensed and striking expression and exposition, which made him dear to students and to friends. It was a large step in thirty years of an active life that he took, from the little side parish school of Dunragit to the professional halls of St. Andrews, and to a recognised place among the *élite* of the learned in the grand old chapel where printing first gave wings to the Bible, that the word of God might have free course, and that He might be glorified thereby. He has been (March 16th) called to "come up higher."

On the 18th of March the eminent mathematician, the originally minded logician, and the scientific thinker, Augustus De Morgan, demitted life. Of him, in these pages, there has been already, from two writers of note and talent, estimates laid before the reader. It would, perhaps, be wrong in us to add more; and yet we feel that, having been privileged to call him friend, De Morgan's name should not be omitted from our list of the memorable dead. His industry was immense, his painstaking accuracy was rare and subtle, his mastery of many subjects marvellous, his influence over others great, his mental energy almost inexhaustible, his

interest in lettered culture far greater than is usual in distinguished mathematicians. He had a gladiatorial spirit, a good controversy brought out the mightiest forces of his nature; and though dogmatic in the assertion of what he had thoroughly investigated, he was withal modestly receptive of new investigations. He had a bland, gay humour of his own, and was undoubtedly a man of power in his day. Even his sad illness could not daunt his might of mind. He thought on and fought on till the end came and brought him ease and peace.

One of Germany's staunchest patriots, most eminent thinkers, most prolific writers, and most admirable men, G. G. Gervinus, vanished on 20th March through the portals of death, from the land he had suffered and toiled and thought and written to elevate and enlighten. Bookseller and banker, student and professor, protester against the *coup d'état* by which Ernest Augustus of Cumberland attained the throne, propagator of nationalistic views, and advocate of constitutional government when Germany was bureaucratic overmuch, he did great work wisely and well; but he was besides, critic, poet, journalist, musician, and parliamentarian, and was active, able, and influential in them all. He was the prime agitator of those views of Germanic solidarity which were just gaining their success when he was brought face to face with the invincible behest of the resistless one. He never feared the face of human foe—whether seated on royal throne or bearing an imperial crown, whether occupying a judicial bench, or, what is often just as ill to bide, an editorial chair,—nor did he flinch before the great enemy. What a might of mind was overthrown when he who had done such work was wrenched from life! His "History of German Poetry" was enough to have immortalized one man, but he has added to this his "History of the Nineteenth Century," an "Account of the Anglo-Saxons," "Outlines of Historiography," and his "Correspondence of Goethe." His pen was busy, and when his compatriots sat down in despair, after the political failures of 1849, he enriched the world's literature with his "Studies on Shakspeare"—a work which glows with fine power and admirable insight, with a capacity for penetrating into the meaning of that author of authors. But the busy brain is stilled, and the active hand is chilled, and the spirit of energy has "gone hence."

Gustave Flourens, son of M. J. P. Flourens, the celebrated physiologist, Secretary of the Academy of Sciences, was, though a

Lecturer of the Academy of France, better known as an eager and enthusiastic revolutionist than as an able writer. Yet, in 1863, his "Lectures on Ethnography" were an attraction in Paris, and his volume on "The Science of Man," in 1864, drew on him the attention of the most eminent of the cultivators of that department of human thought. In the restless energy of his nature he went to Crete, and there for three years made common cause with the Cretans against the Turkish authorities. He had returned to the embroilments and troubles of his native land, and had taken his usual headlong interest in the stir and turmoil of the time. His "Paris Delivered" was scarcely dry from the press when its author—the courageous and honest though rash and restless revolutionary, who could think for others better than for himself—was killed at Nanterre, greatly to the regret of many who admired the thinker, though they did not consent to his visionary dreams of change—change which came in a more revolutionary form upon him than he votted of—clay-cold, not life-warm change!

On the 1st of "green-pied April" Mrs. Manning, one of the *Salonistes* whose influence is marked and felt in literature, science, and art, and who, as an author, gave interest to "Life in Ancient and Mediæval India," after but a short illness, gave submission to the hand that slits "the thin-spun life."

On the 3rd the Rev. Peter Steele, a man of no ordinary stamp, who spent his boyhood in the handling of the shuttle, yet became a distinguished student, a first-rate classical scholar, the possessor of such a knowledge of English literature as to receive the encomia of Dean Milman, Dr. Temple, and A. H. Clough, and a student of science of no mean attainment, resigned himself into the hands of the Master of Spirits at the age of seventy-four.

On the 11th a private sorrow of death came close to the heart of the writer, and the beat of the slowly ebbing pulse of a failing young life—hastening to the angel-world—in the April of existence, has left its impress on the nerves even yet, and brings a throbbing to the heart, a tear to the eye, a sigh to the lip, and a pang to the spirit. The chiselled-like, marvellous marble of the grave-clay, how calm amid the fret and sadness of the living; ay, and how passing wonderful the deep still peace that rests upon the moveless limbs of the loving, the loved, the lost, the heaven-taken!

"The vase of earth, the trembling clod,
Ordained to hold the breath of God."

Forgive the personal intrusion of this word, brought out of its corner in the heart by being called to note that date upon the mournful roll-list as that on which the great advocate of a socialistic reorganization of society, Pierre Leroux, passed away from France, in the midst of the dreadful time of trial to which political restlessness had brought it. He was a metaphysician rather than a politician, a speculative socialist, but a stirring, active, industrious literary man and thinker. He believed that sensation, feeling, and knowledge in man, corresponded with power, love, and wisdom in the Most High; and yet he thought that God had made man an orphan in the universe, whose breath is in his nostrils, and who has no home hereafter for his spirit. He was a great and good man, but to him life had no future, but a dreamy apotheosis into humanity. Let us hope he is even now richer in intellectuality and soul than he ever anticipated. France has been long endeavouring to construct its heaven on the earth, and contract its love to the ministrants of the State; but surely death does not close the whole volume of human being! and there is something else—

“Which happier those who pay the willing loan”!

Among our other April losses we have to enumerate Wilhelm Haidinger, the German geologist, one of the most authoritative minds, whose intelligence had been devoted to the critical study of the earth; Professor Rückert, of Jena, the exegetist; and Samuel Halket, a learned and amiable scholar, who though tied for long hours to the service of trade in his youth, yet self-taught, contrived to gain a knowledge, so as to be able to speak as well as read them, of not only the languages of Continental Europe, but of many of the tongues of the East. His memory was so strong, that a vocable once seen was irrevocably registered there. He was Keeper of the Advocates' Library, Edinburgh, and was preparing at the time of his death—20th April—a work on “Anonymous and Pseudonymous Authors,” a much-required addition to our literary handbooks. To these we have to add Emile Deschamps, one of the leaders of the Romantic School, and the originator of *La Muse Française*, for the popularization of the æsthetics of that school. He may be said to have squandered the wealth of a versatile mind on ephemeral critiques and papers; and though his labours have been manifold, this veteran of the press at eighty years of age has never redeemed the brilliant promise of his boyish

debut as the author of two successful plays, running with immense *eclat* before the fastidious experts of Paris.

While the May blossom was throwing forth its fragrance on and refreshing the air with hopefulness, and the month was but nine days old, the death-king stood suddenly before the Rev. Thomas Toke Lynch, and in the agony of *angina pectoris* closed a life over which little more than half a century had passed. He was a man of pure, fine, delicate, and holy genius, little fitted for the fretful world of religious squabbles into which his lot brought him, and of such genial, earnest sympathies and aspirations as should have saved him from the troubling of the waters of "The Rivulet" of his life by the big boulders of sectarian theology. He had made such a study of "Some of the Forms of Literature," as resulted in lectures which could fill the soul of A. J. Scott with joy; and his "Lectures in Aid of Self-improvement" contain matter of such value as is scarcely elsewhere to be found. His "Memorials of Theophilus Trinal, Student," if quaint, are telling; and if they do not altogether hold a first rank in didactic prose, possess many of the characteristics of the best books of the sort. His Poems are high, notable, heaven-touched—the issue of a fervent heart, the psalms of an ardent and devoted believer. His Sermons are Jacob-like wrestlings with the Spirit of God, and seldom indeed does he fail to gain the blessing, without which he was unwilling that the messenger should depart. A martyr, less to disease than to sect-hatred, his years ended in bodily pain; though spiritual ecstasy shone in on him from on high. In the sectless worship of his Father he has certainly found the joy of the beauty of holiness.

May's "rosy beauty" was overcast on the 11th by the demise of Sir John Herschel, one of the ablest and most influential minds of the age, at Collingwood, in quietude and sensible preparedness. He was an hereditary inquirer; his cultured power of investigation was given to the search for truth; he touched nothing with his genius without at once adorning it and making it give forth the wisdom with which it was fraught. His nature appears to have been almost imperial in its power over the secrets of science, and the balance of his faculties was peculiarly impartial, not only judicious, but judicial. He was one of those who, as the great circle of science widens into vastitude, do not feel that the Creator has been removed to a more immense distance from the spirit, but

who—in the splendid humility of genius—recognise the everlasting presence of a Deity amongst the visibilities of nature, and acknowledge the Lawgiver as apparent in His laws. He did not swell his self-importance as Science disclosed her secrets to him, but proved his sincere attachment by the reverence with which he sought truth, and the joy with which he found it. He was poet, scholar, critic, investigator, expositor, skilful analyst, practical manipulator; and in all he exhibited the power of a spirit of the highest order. When verging on fourscore, the many-sided old man, who had ever sought light to live in the light, closed his eyes upon the faint light of time to rejoice in the glorious light of eternity.

The Archbishopric of Paris has become a post of great danger, if not of high honour. Monseigneur Affre was shot at the Barricades of 1848; Monseigneur Sibour was assassinated in 1857, and now in May, 1871, Monseigneur Darboy perished under the hands of the Communists, when despair had settled in their hearts, on 24th May. George Darboy was an illustrious *élève* in the Seminary of Langres, and was afterwards advanced to hold the Chair of Philosophy therein. Then he was raised to the professoriate of Dogmatic Theology. Affre brought him to Paris as Almoner of the College of Henri Quatre. Sibour put the management of the *Catholic Moniteur* in his hands, and gave him the Inspectorate of Religious Instruction. The Pope, in 1854, invested him with the high honour of Apostolic Protonotary. He wrote "Holy Women," "The Women of Scripture," and translated the "Imitation of Jesus Christ," the "Works of Dionysius the Areopagite," &c. His sermons on the Birthday of St. Francis Xavier excited great attention, and as a special preacher he was noted and sought after. He was a man of brilliant character and heroic deportment, thoroughly master of the priestly function, and devoted to the hierarchy, though moderate in his views on the papal power as a temporal sovereignty. He was popular among his countrymen, and gave proof of his attachment to law and order when he offered himself as a hostage on behalf of peace. Alas that it should be written that the passions of men hurry them to such extremities! he became a martyr to the Commune and for social order, and He who wore the crown of thorns shall not forget the social martyr's merits, miseries, and mournful fate.

To the losses of the year, June 1st, add the name of a thoughtful politician who had given good heed to the relations of Economics and

Legislation, and as M.P. for Westmeath bore part in the practical work of law-making, William Pollard Urquhart. But by far the greatest name that has been written in the obituary of the year is that of George Grote, who even at the advanced age of seventy-six kept in the foremost file of thinkers as an expositor of Plato and a critic of Aristotle, after having illumined for all time the biography of Socrates. Of the career of the historian of Greece the readers of this serial have already had ample knowledge supplied in not only the first memoir that had appeared of him, but as yet the fullest that has been issued. A much more copious account will be furnished when his literary executors finish the work which they are so admirably able to do, of providing a complete biography of one of the most learned and industrious of historical writers, the most influential of Liberal political thinkers, and the most thoroughly read psychologist of his age. George Grote's name stands high on the rôle of those who through self-culture have risen to the high honour of being accepted as the guides of men to nobler aims, efforts, and services. At once profoundly learned in all ancient classical lore, and widely informed on all modern political questions, he infused into both the interpretative spirit of philosophy and imparted to their exposition the principles of art. He is one of the most memorable of modern thinkers, and has provided influences stretching far beyond his life, which closed June 18th.

The mention of philosophy reminds us that we should have noted the demise of the notable successor of Kant, whose knowledge of Aristotle and Plato made him the compeer of Grote. Of the life and life labours of Friedrich Ueberweg, the historian of philosophy and the critic of logic, whose name in Germany stood among the highest, our readers are promised an account, and it would ill become us here to enter into the details of the indefatigable labour, the thoughtfulness, and the scholarship of that distinguished young professor, whose demise threw as great a gloom over the minds of the thinkers of Germany as the death of Dickens on the same day a year before did over the hearts of Englishmen. This gifted and admired investigator of the mysteries of thought has passed into the region where all mysteries are made plain, and the glory of the Chief Thinker is thoroughly felt.

Under the pseudonym of Frederic Hahn, a most successful series of dramas illustrated the Viennese stage, and ran amid the plaudits of crowds a long career of enthusiastic representation in most of the

theatres of Germany. Beginning with "Griselda" in 1834, and "Camoens" in 1838, as a romanticist, he passed into the classic style in 1844 in "Sampiero," and in 1856 with the "Gladiator of Ravenna" achieved the highest place among the dramatists of his land. The author was a lyric poet, an admirer of Shakspeare and Lope de Vega. He was a statesman and thinker, and as Munch-Billinghausen (his real name) did good political service to his country. Early in June he died, leaving behind him a name and a fame that men will not willingly let die.

Nor ought we to omit from the record of the illustrious dead who fell during the June sunshine, Immanuel Bekker, one of the most famous of those scholars who gave such wonderful celebrity to the chief university of Germany in its early days. As a philologist few of the Hellenists of Germany had acquired so wide a reputation as editor of the great edition of Plato, and the superintending director of the Greek authors, the issue of which nearly monopolized the market for such classics. His learning was deep, minute, and varied, and the enthusiasm with which he pursued his studies during a long life made him as it were occupy by prescriptive right the patriarchate of Hellenic scholarship. But the place of his fame now knows him no more, and he is only a memory among the scholars of time.

July took from us, on the 9th, A. Keith-Johnstone, eminent as a geographer and a man of science, and of varied literary attainments, who held diplomas and orders from almost every country in Europe; but its last Sunday brought the severest loss of all in the unexpected and sudden death of Dean Mansel, a clear and vigorous thinker, a popular, earnest, influential preacher and theologian, a logician and metaphysician of considerable merit, a man of versatile powers, being able to wield as well the weapon of wit as the rapier of reason. Of him we understand a memoir is in preparation for this serial, and that it may be expected on an early date, and we forbear to enlarge on the personal, professorial, and professional merits of the logical successor of Hamilton in copious learning and acute distinctiveness, the Bampton Lecturer and the Dean of the University, where he was an able and tenacious leader of Conservative reaction in the matter of creeds and forms. In the midst of life death stood before him suddenly, and hurried him as it were from the church on earth to the general assembly of the wide and wondrous church of heaven.

Before the autumn moors had heard the sportsman's gun crack in the cold northern air, Sir Charles Buxton, M.P. for East Surrey, who had gone to Scotland to try the effect of its invigorating air, departed suddenly from this life of time. He was a liberal and thoughtful politician, who had formed ideas on "The Questions of the Day," who had noble tendencies, and powers of no inconsiderable effectiveness. On current public opinion he exercised a goodly amount of influence, and he was looked upon with hopefulness in the ranks of the party to which he was attached as a man of progressive mind and personal energy. In this, as in so many cases, "hope told a flattering tale." The name of Sowerby has been inscribed threefoldly on the annals of English botany—by James Sowerby, by George B. Sowerby, his younger son, and by James de C. Sowerby, his eldest son, who for many years edited the magazines devoted to botany, the transactions of the Geological Society, &c., who died on the 26th August.

On the 29th, the novelist, Charles Paul de Kock died, the fertile and fluent, who for sixty years held the libraries of France in thrall by the marvellous multitude of the imaginary complications of life and incident he brought before their readers in the hundreds of romances and tales to which he gave such ready conception and such rapid birth. Graphic power, racy descriptions, animated narrative, and an extraordinary capacity of adding interest to the incidents and events of ordinary life distinguish his better productions; but a tendency to extravagance, and to the treatment of themes scarcely proper to reproductive fiction, sometimes makes his novels more amusing than instructive, and more calculated to excite moral reprobation than approbation, when judged by the standard which has until lately been used in criticising works of imagination on this side of the Channel. While mentioning De Kock among the removed, we may also note the death of Deaddé St. Yves of Brussels, a prolific dramatist, to whose pen 150 light pieces were due, and nearly fifty volumes of tales and sketches; besides that of Spanish publicist and essayist, J. S. Ruano.

Canon Dr. G. F. W. Ferris, of St. Paul's, for upwards of a quarter of a century head master of the City of London School, famous for organizing power, wide and accurate scholarship, and effectiveness of mind, passed over to the majority Sept. 7th; and Canon Jelf of Christ Church, Bampton Lecturer (1844), Principal of King's College, opponent of Dr. Maurice, critic of the "Essays and

Reviews," and generally an adherent to the elder theology, yet a man of power and influence—a leader of men, and a possessor of many gifts, as well as much scholarship, demitted life 19th Sept.

On the 22nd, at the venerable age of eighty-two, Charlotte Elliot, the hymnist, after a long illness, passed through the dark valley and shadow of death. She has composed many verses that are strength-giving, comforting, and inspiring; as a voice for the Church she has uttered in music many strains of purity, piety, and peace, the expression of a true soul-trust in her Lord. Who does not recollect these lines, alike appropriate to the living and the dying?—

" My Lord and Father, while I stray
Far from my home on life's rough way,
O teach me from my heart to say,
Thy will be done!

* * * * *

" Then when on earth I breathe no more
The prayer oft mixed with tears before,
I'll sing upon a happier shore,
Thy will be done!"

To Thomas Roscoe we owe a great number of tales, tours, translations, papers, and poems. He was the son of William Roscoe, and he and his brothers Henry and Robert maintained the honourable place in literature which their father gave it. At eighty-two, on 24th Sept., he was translated. To this list we must add the eminent surgeon, Samuel Solly, whose writings on the nervous tissues of the human frame have given him a high place among those who have laboured in the exposition of the laws and means of health and utility of being.

The collection of folk-lore, proverbs and legends, conduces much to the illumination of the life of the past. Arird Auguste Afzelius was one of those who early saw the need of gathering, before they were lost for ever, the popular rhymes of his native land. Born in 1785 he became pastor of Enkioping half a century ago. He tried his hand at the Drama without attaining high success, but his "Legendary History of Sweden" has approved itself to be a work of value and note. On 29th September his collector of traditions was himself numbered among the traditions of the literature of Sweden.

" How surely after life's day comes death's to-morrow,
When we'll lie still and those who loved us sorrow!"

In October—like sheafs fully ripe for the reaper—Charles Babbage died on the 18th, and Sir Roderick Murchison on the 22nd. Both had dwelt long on the earth, and were men of indefatigable industry and prompt action, and both by reason of their mere strength neared the verge of fourscore years. Even to catalogue the papers contributed to societies, periodicals, and transactions by Charles Babbage would fill a larger space than that allotted to this whole paper. We have seen a list of titles extending to 151, and these are on the most multifarious subjects of scientific observation and mathematical investigation. His inventions occupied a large part of his life, and employed much of his energy, the vast scheme of mathematising machinery by his analytical engine, commonly spoken of as the calculating machine, was a singularly noble conception, and involved much subtle ingenuity. The Royal Society commended it to the attention of Government, and when the Treasury hesitated to undertake the responsibility of its cost, Lord Rosse protested in the name of science against the cowardice of cash in a matter of permanent importance, not only to science, but to the evidence of the might of the human mind over inanimate matter. His volunteer "Ninth Bridgewater Treatise" has been not unfrequently sneered at as an irrelevancy. It should be studied before it is sneered at; were it so, it would be seen to be the most profound and remarkable of that series of publications. Mr. Babbage had the rare peculiarity of individuality, an unsubduable determination to be himself, and he had a good right to have this resolve, for he was in many points a man of whom we may truly say, "Take him for all in all, we shall not look upon his like again."

Not less remarkable in his own sphere was the Nestor of geologists. Science, commerce, and civilization can never fail to honour his memory as a benefactor of the most munificent sort. For more than half a century the name of Murchison has been high in the records of geology and geography. His labours in these branches may be excelled, but they never can be eclipsed. We scarcely indeed see how they are to be equalled. What a vastness of experience was there contained in that keen-sighted brain of fourscore, and how vitally logical was the bond with which he united the facts of experience with the fancies of speculation to make them produce the fruits of scientific truth and social success! It seems as if he had concentrated twenty lives in his, so wide have been his explorations, so thorough his application, and so irresist-

ible has his determination been to do the duty that seemed laid upon him. No man could be more cautious in estimating probabilities and gaining the elements of a sound conclusion, but that having been found, no man was more tenacious in holding it, unless a vitiating element was pointed out to him. He acquired almost the character of having gained the old Highland privilege of second-sight in science—he certainly had in great measure the power of prevision. The volume must be large in which Professor Geikie shall write the biography of his friend and patron, but when it is written, there cannot fail to fall upon the memory of Murchison a noble and most resplendent halo of fame.

A leading actor in the great exodus of the Free Church of Scotland, and an acute and active if somewhat narrow propounder and defender of the theology of Calvinism, a man of prompt potency of thought and speech, and a stalwart advocate of unpopular but conscientiously held opinions in the church courts of his country, under the agency of paralysis suddenly died on 2nd Nov. From humble life Dr. James Gibson rose to be professor of divinity and church history in the branch of the church to which he belonged, and with great solidity—which sometimes his students thought savoured of stolidity—devoted the power of a strong mind to the exposition of dogmas and the justifying of the ways of God to man, in his own blunt logical fashion. Exceedingly influenced by the limitations of time and experience, he has now soared beyond these, and found wider and higher regions of God's love to explore, and in which to adore. On 10th Nov. Joseph Zedver, an erudite and accomplished scholar, to whose care the Hebrew treasures of the British Museum were entrusted, and who in accuracy and range of information had few equals, left the duties of the Hebraist to serve in the temple eternal. An almost equally ardent and powerfully moved naturalist, Dr. John Scouler, created mourning for his loss to science and to life 14th Nov. His ethnological information and researches approved themselves in the three islands, and won for him both fame and usefulness. To the scientific explorer of Nootka Sound we must add the discoverer of the sources of the Oxus, and the leader of an adventurous life in Scindh, Lieut. John Wood, whose earnest labours in the service of the Indian Flotilla Company brought to too early a term a brave career. On the same day one of the representative men of Russia, Nikolai Tourquénief, the younger brother of the historian, went the way of all mortals. He

was an honest, high-minded, and courageous, and hence an influential thinker. He was an early member of the "Union for Public Welfare," a reform association in Russia, and was, unheard, condemned to death. Though thus cut off from the cheerful ways of living men by the law, he was himself in person safe in the Scottish capital. He was the originator of almost all those reforms which have been rapidly making Russia an integral empire. He lived through the storm and fire of the Franco-German war and the civic revolutionary war, and when calm had settled on the world again, at the age of eighty-two, he passed quietly into rest.

An eminent and active Roman Catholic dignitary, distinguished for his rare knowledge of the illuminated manuscripts in which the monks of old enshrined so many of the treasures of the world's literature, notable for his intelligent acquaintance with archæology, remarkable as a learned theologian, and specially celebrated in his own communion for a singularly able "Exposition of the Sacrifice of the Mass" as a Hierurgia, while returning from the Archæological Congress at Cardiff, met with an accident at Gloucester, which disabled him, and from which he suffered much. To the effects of this severe affliction he succumbed, though rather unexpectedly, aged seventy-two, on December 5th. The Very Rev. Canon Rock was understood to be a learned and sincere Christian thinker, whose feet were surely planted on "the Rock of Ages." From the Nicaraguan Republic in Central America, so rich in interest to the naturalist, to add as it were dreariness to the dreary days of December, there came to his adopted land the news of the demise of the distinguished botanist, Dr. Berthold Sieman, F.L.S., who, though a Hanoverian by birth, was to all intents and purposes an English scientific investigator. He was but a young man, having been born in 1825. He had been educated at the University of Gottingen, but had applied for the position of Naturalist on board of H.M.S. *Herald* in 1846, and having been appointed, made a circumnavigatory voyage in her, an account of which he published. He wrote a popular "History of Palma," "Flora Vitiensis," "Jottings by the Road-side in Panama, Nicaragua, Mosquito," &c., as well as an account of a Government Commission to the Vite or Fiji Islands, which he had undertaken in 1860. He was editor of the *Journal of Botany*, and when we last saw him in the British Museum was rejoicing in the opportunity afforded him of bringing from the Rivas of the Filibusters a whole host of specimens and notes. Little did

he or we then think that his researches would be indeed a search for death; yet so has it proved, and Sieman's name is added to the list of the losses to science in the year that is gone. "We all do fade as a leaf!"

On 16th December Dr. W. Haering, who under the pseudonym of Willebad Alexis, had become the genuine Scott of Germany. Born at Breslau in 1798 of French extraction, he was educated at Berlin, and acted as a volunteer in the fortresses of Ardennes. He was a student of law, and was preparing for an administrative career; tempted into commerce, he was brought face to face with ruin. He used his pen to free himself from these difficulties, and in 1823 issued "Walladmoor" as a genuine, unpublished work of Sir Walter Scott, translated into German. The great unknown declared it to be a very successful mystification—though in De Quincey's pretended translation the sense of this is lost. It quite deceived Defau Compret, the translator of Scott in French, who issued it as Sir Walter's in 1825. He has succeeded in imparting interest, imagination, and grace to German life and history. He has visited many countries and almost rivalled the Magician of the North in the amount of his volumes, which include poems, plays, criminal records, political papers, reviews as well as novels, illustrative of Prussian History from the Middle Ages to the present time. He had been stricken with paralysis in 1858, and his Schiller *Fest* provided an income for the veteran who had toiled for it. This great photographic artist, who could reproduce the past with fascinating interest, passed away at Ainstadt in Thuringia, aged seventy-three.

Henry T. Tuckerman, one of the most able of the essayists of America, born 1813, in Boston, was at an early age brought under the literary influences of his native city. He has issued many graceful sketches of travel; but his "Thoughts on the Poets," his "Artist's Life," his "Characteristics of Genius," his "Studies of Character," and his "Spirit of Poetry" are his most finished works. Some of his review articles have recently been collected, and give a good idea of the fine taste, shrewd views, and generous culture of a man of letters in America. After a life made sweet by a passionate sense of beauty, and a taste that revelled in sublime and elevated sentiments, he has lived, loved, been loved, laboured and written, and has now, in the ordination of events, been called; he heard, answered, and departed on 17th December.

On 23rd Dec., only three days after a paralytic seizure, there passed away at Cork one of the modest but worthy students of science, to whom chemistry is indebted for its progress and its popularity. Queen's College, Cork, was favoured among academical institutions when on its first staff George Boole and James Blythe were placed; for the latter was scarcely less eminent in his department than the distinguished mathematico-logician whose associate and friend he was. Born in Jamaica, he had studied in Glasgow under Graham, in France under Pelonze, Dumas, Peligot, Guy-Lussac, and Orfila; in Germany under Liebig, Rose, and Magnus. He was but thirty years of age when he was appointed colleague to Dr. Hoffman at the Royal College of Chemistry; he passed thence to the Royal College of Cirencester, and thence to Cork. There he rapidly attained the eminence due to merit, and became known throughout Ireland as the most skilful analyst in the country. He was a zealous student, an ardent enthusiast in the toilful task of research, and a most attractive lecturer and experimentalist. Baron Liebig appointed him Editor of his works in succession to Professor Gregory of Edinburgh. After a life of honour, activity, and usefulness, extending to little more than fifty-seven years, in which an enormous amount of splendid labour and teaching was included, Dr. Blythe passed from the analysis of chemical substances here to become the subject of the alchemy of judgment on high.

Of how much of the choicest capacity of heart and brain does the overtoil and strain put upon good men deprive the world, to the world's great loss if to the eternal gain of those who work grudgelessly in the labours of love for which they are fitted. Stricken with paralysis at the early age of thirty-two from the overwork of editing three weekly papers, T. C. Tuberville toiled on for fourteen years longer with little abatement of labour or anxiety, and as little increase of pay, and after a terrible but successful struggle for the righting of Nonconformity at a crisis, he was called on 24th December to spend his Christmas eve at the Dwelling of his Lord.

Drearily—perhaps wearily, too!—we have thus trodden in the footsteps of death, noting here and there one or two of those supreme spirits which have exercised the power and pith of mind in intellectual pursuits. It is a sad task to rake among the grave-dust of the year, and trace the necrological records of the doings of the lean conqueror to whom all must yield. As we note the world's

losses, and think of the gain the earth got by the lives of those great and notable labourers in the fields of science and letters, can we avoid asking ourselves if the accessions to the world's story which the years bring round are likely to equal the grand traditional fame of those who have been leaving us? If we do so, must we not feel that it becomes us to see to it that, as far as in us lies, the progress of the world may be aided and added? Do not the achievements of those who have gone show the possibilities that exist in us, and ought we not to be stirred up to an endeavour to make the future more blessed even than the past? If it is lawful to hold the aspiration that "what man has done man may do," may we not aspire in and with our lives to do something by which the earth may be made happier and life more valuable to some, however few? In the cradle where the great dead spent the hours of infancy, there was no foreshadowing of what should be written on their coffin-lid or recorded on their tomb. In the interspace between cradle and coffin, womb and tomb, alone is there opportunity of earth-blessing. Here others have laboured, and we enter into their labours; so let us live that those who enter into our labours shall not grudge our life, or rejoice that in our death the useless have passed away. Did we each feel that in sleep—

"Once every day this death occurs to us,"

and labour daily that the duty of each day might be truly done as each day closed, how many regrets would we save ourselves! how many sorrows would we save others from feeling!

It is in days that our life is given; it is in duty that our lives should be passed. If we may equal the latter with the former, and find that with every day's duty our character grows more effective within us for well-doing, then the years will be safe, however few or many they may be. Life's true value is in the character it edifies within us; that not only gives us fitness for living, but for dying.

If the tracing of these "In Memoriam" pages has the effect of bringing before us the certain uncertainty of death; if it induce us to consider the record our lives might yield; if it lead us to renewed effort to make our existence worthy of our powers, it shall have holpen us so to tread the path of life as not to dread the oncome of death,—for it will show us that death may be swallowed up in victory—the threefold victory of self-desire, self-culture, and self-devotion to the Lord of life and the Sovereign of the spirit.

The Reviewer.

The Life of Charles Dickens, by JOHN FORSTER. Vol. I., 1812—1844. London: Chapman and Hall.

WE now have before us the history of the first thirty years of the life of one of the most eminent of modern novelists. It is written by his life-long bosom friend and confidant, in whose hands are all his correspondence and literary remains. The biographer is an author of great eminence, and has described to us in vivid language the lives and deaths of the great Englishmen who lived, and fought, and died in the most stirring times of bygone ages. His "Life of Sir John Eliot," his "History of the Grand Remonstrance," and his "Arrest of the Five Members"—along with the memoir of Oliver Goldsmith—rise to our recollection as we write, and lead us to expect that Mr. Forster's narrative of the life of Charles Dickens shall be one of a very high order.

The history of the life and works of so great a painter of human life in all its phases as Dickens was must necessarily engage the attention, and appeal to the best feelings of man; and Mr. Forster has in this book, notwithstanding certain defects which we shall presently point out, quite fulfilled all the anticipations we had formed with respect to this book.

The book is written in the first person, which in some respects may cause the objection that the biographer is egotistic; and as it is principally founded on the now published correspondence between Dickens and his friend the biographer, the contents and style of his letters may perhaps draw down upon Dickens himself a similar charge of egotism, not, as we think, altogether unfounded; while the fact that the biography is compiled by the author's closest and dearest friend might perhaps lay the work itself open to the charge of partiality.

But whatever may be said of its faults, we can afford to pardon them, for the sake of the real genuine article which the book contains. No one can dispute that one of the aims of Dickens was to drag into full light the hideousness of vice in whatever shape he found it; and to seek out among the poor, and tell to the world, the many virtues and beauties of their lives and actions.

Charles Dickens was born at Landport, on 7th February, 1812. His father was Mr. John Dickens, a clerk in the Navy Pay Office stationed at Portsmouth Dockyard. Charles's recollections of his younger days seem to have been very vivid; and he subsequently put into the mouth of David Copperfield his own feelings in these words,—“If it should appear from anything I may set down in this narrative that I was a child of close observation, or that as a man I have a strong memory of my childhood, I undoubtedly lay claim to both of these characteristics.” In 1814 his father's duties occasioned the removal of the family to London, where they remained till 1826, when John Dickens was placed on duty in Chatham Dockyard; and to Chatham, in consequence, Charles Dickens and the rest of the family were conveyed. There the family lived for about five years; in that place most of the early impressions of Charles were received; and it was during his residence in Kent that he made his first acquaintance with Gad's Hill Place, where he died in June, 1870.

His description at this time may be given in Mr. Forster's own words:—“He was a very little and a very sickly boy. He was subject to attacks of violent spasm, which disabled him for any active exertion. He was never a good little cricket-player. He was never a first-rate hand at marbles, or peg-top, or prisoner's base; but he had great pleasure in watching the other boys, officers' sons for the most part, at these games, reading while they played; and he had always the belief that this early sickness brought to himself one inestimable advantage, in the circumstance of his weak health having strongly inclined him to reading.”

In a letter to Washington Irving, written years afterwards, he describes himself at this period as a “very small and not over-particularly-taken-care-of boy.”

We think Mr. Dickens is a little hard upon his parents, at any rate at this period of his life, as they were by no means well to do, and their subsequent misfortunes were the cause of those hardships through which he had subsequently to struggle in his early life, and which he appears to us to attribute solely to the supposed indifference of his parents, not taking into account the fact that they had no power to do better for him.

It appears that it was from his mother he imbibed his early thirst for knowledge and his passion for reading; and that his mother also taught him the elements of his own language, and

later on, the elements of Latin. She taught him regularly every day, and, as he admits, very well.

From his mother's tuition he went, in the usual course, to the preparatory school, and thence to the school of a Mr. Giles, a Baptist minister in Chatham. "I have," says Mr. Forster, "the picture of him here very strongly in my mind, as a sensitive, thoughtful, feeble-bodied little boy, with an unusual sort of knowledge and fancy for such a child, and with a dangerous kind of wandering intelligence, that a teacher might turn to good or evil, happiness or misery, as he directed it." Fortunately, however, Mr. Giles seems to have exercised, if any, a beneficial influence over him, and later on he was one of his warm admirers.

Dickens has himself (through the mouth of David Copperfield) told us what his library at this time consisted of.

"My father had left a small collection of books in a little library upstairs, to which I had access (for it adjoined my own), and which nobody else in our house ever troubled. From that blessed little room, 'Roderick Random,' 'Peregrine Pickle,' 'Humphrey Clinker,' 'Tom Jones,' 'The Vicar of Wakefield,' 'Don Quixote,' 'Gil Blas,' and 'Robinson Crusoe' came out, a glorious host, to keep me company. They kept alive my fancy, and my hope of something beyond that place and time, they and the 'Arabian Nights' and the 'Tales of the Genii,' and did me no harm; for whatever harm was in some of them was not there for me; I knew nothing of it. It is astonishing to me now how I found time, in the midst of my porings and blunderings over heavier themes, to read those books as I did. It is curious to me how I could ever have consoled myself under my small troubles (which were great troubles to me) by impersonating my favourite characters in them. . . . I have been Tom Jones (a child's Tom Jones, a harmless creature) for a week together. I have sustained my own idea of Roderick Random for a month at a stretch, I verily believe. I had a greedy relish for a few volumes of voyages and travels, I forget what, now, that were on those shelves; and for days and days I can remember to have gone about my region of our house, armed with the centre-piece out of an old set of boot trees, the perfect realization of Captain Somebody, of the Royal British Navy, in danger of being beset by savages, and resolved to sell his life at a great price."

Mr. John Dickens's affairs occasioned his removal to a residence in Bayham Street, Camden Town, London. From this time his circumstances appear to have become so complicated, that at last he was arrested, and finally removed to the Marshalsea. His father's character, complications, arrest, and detention in prison, seem to

have been the foundation for that most amusing character in "David Copperfield"—Mr. Micawber.

During this most gloomy period of his life, his father in the Marshalsea and his mother struggling to maintain herself, Dickens was forced to undergo unusual sufferings for such a child. A cousin, James Lamert, had recently become interested in a blacking manufactory, in competition with the then great firm of Warren and Co., in the Strand; and in fine the youthful Dickens entered this blacking warehouse at a salary of six shillings per week, his work being "to cover the pots of paste blacking; first with a piece of oil paper, and then with a piece of blue paper, to tie them round with a string, and then to clip the paper close and neat all round, until it looked as smart as a pot of ointment from an apothecary's shop."

Limited space forbids us to detail the sufferings and want through which he had to force his way, the family income, meanwhile, becoming so reduced that at last Mrs. Dickens and her family, with the exception of Charles and a daughter who had been successful in having been elected a pupil in the Royal Academy of Music, were forced to take refuge in the Marshalsea with John Dickens. Charles and his sister spent their Sundays with the other part of the family in the Marshalsea,—a prison which, thank goodness, is now extinct, from his experiences and observations in which his vivid pictures of Mr. Micawber's straits, and the prison of the inimitable "Pickwick," were subsequently drawn.

He managed to eke out his meagre salary so as to support himself entirely during the week. He says, "I suppose my lodging was paid for by my father—I certainly did not pay it myself; and I certainly had no other assistance whatever (the making of my clothes, I think, excepted) from Monday morning until Saturday night,—no advice, no counsel, no encouragement, no consolation, no support, from any one that I can call to mind, so help me God!" And again, "I know that I have lounged about the streets insufficiently and unsatisfactorily fed. I know that, but for the mercy of God, I might easily have been, for any care that was taken of me, a little robber or a little vagabond."

At last Mr. John Dickens purged himself of his debts, and came out of gaol through the medium of the Insolvent Court; after which, a quarrel ensued between the elder Dickens and the cousin of the blacking warehouse about the treatment of young Dickens,

ending in Dickens quitting the warehouse at the age of twelve; and after this welcome result the boy was sent to school.

We pass over his schoolboy life, quoting only some remarks made by Mr. Forster as to the effects upon him of his previous hardships, which may probably account in some degree for certain otherwise unaccountable actions of his after life, with which Mr. Forster will, we presume, make us acquainted in his future volumes. Mr. Forster says,—

“He had derived great good from them” (his early trials), “but not without alloy. The fixed and eager determination, the restless and resistless energy, which opened to him opportunities of escape from many mean environments, not by turning off from any path of duty, but by resolutely rising to such excellence or distinction as might be attainable in it, brought with it some disadvantage among many noble advantages. Of this he was himself aware, but not to the full extent. What it was that in society made him often uneasy, shrinking, and over-sensitive, he knew; but the danger he ran in bearing down and over-mastering the feeling he did not know. A too great confidence in himself, a sense that everything was possible to the will that would make it so, laid occasionally upon him self-imposed burdens greater than might be borne by any one with safety. In that direction there was in him at such times something even hard and aggressive; in his determinations a something that had almost the tone of fierceness; something in his nature that made his resolves insuperable, however hasty the opinions on which they had been formed. So rare were these manifestations, however, and so little did they prejudice a character as entirely open and generous as it was at all times ardent and impetuous, that only very infrequently, towards the close of the middle term of a friendship without the interruption of a day for more than three-and-thirty years, were they ever unfavourably presented to me. But there they were; and when I have seen strangely present, at such chance intervals, a stern and even cold isolation of self-reliance side by side, susceptibility almost feminine, and the most eager craving for sympathy, it has seemed to me as though his habitual impulses for everything gentle had sunk, for the time, under a sudden, hard, and inexorable sense of what fate had dealt to him in those early years.”

On his leaving school he went into the employ of a solicitor of New Square, Lincoln's Inn; and subsequently into that of a Mr. Blackmore, of Gray's Inn; and it was probably during these employments that he received those impressions of the law courts which enabled him, subsequently, to caricature them so exquisitely.

But during this period he continued to educate himself; and

this self-education proved in his case, as it does in most, to be the best of all education. His father was at this time a reporter in the gallery of the House of Commons. Charles determined to make this his own employment, and the idea once taken was never allowed to drop until it was accomplished. During this time, also, he was an assiduous student in the British Museum reading-room. At this time he seems not only to have acquired shorthand, but to have made himself at once an expert in it. He first followed this occupation for an office in Doctors' Commons, where it appears he found his Dora, but he did not attain the end of those romantic wishes which he attributes to David Copperfield, for at forty-four we find him and his wife making a morning call at his Dora's house, and contemplating quite calmly the dead and stuffed favourite Jip.

Dickens became parliamentary reporter for the *True Sun*. At nineteen he was engaged on the *Mirror of Parliament*, and subsequently, in his twenty-third year, he became a reporter for the *Morning Chronicle*. In 1834 he made his first attempt at authorship, by dropping "Mrs. Joseph Porter over the Way" "stealthily, one evening at twilight, with fear and trembling, into a dark letter-box, in a dark office, up a dark court in Fleet Street," the dark office being that of the *Old Monthly Magazine*. The magazine duly appeared, and he purchased the number containing his paper, in the Strand, from a gentleman who was subsequently the younger member of his publishers' firm, and who waited on him in his dusky chambers in Furnival's Inn with the proposals that originated "Pickwick," and whom he then recognised. Dickens has himself described the effect upon him of his thus appearing in print:—"On which occasion I walked down to Westminster Hall, and turned into it for half an hour, because my eyes were so dimmed with joy and pride that they could not bear the street, and were not fit to be seen there." Was this a presentiment of the beginning of the end!

In a letter to his friend Mr. Forster, Dickens relates some of his experiences as a reporter, which would not be at all inviting to newspaper reporters of the present day, but were incidental to that life, when but few railways were in existence, and there were no telegraphs through which to transmit reports of speeches.

Part of these experiences he gave in a speech when presiding at the annual dinner of the Newspaper Press Fund in 1865:—"Returning home from exciting political meetings in the country to the waiting press in London, I do verily believe I have been upset

in almost every description of vehicle known in this country. I have been, in my time, belated on miry by-roads, towards the small hours, forty or fifty miles from London, in a wheelless carriage, with exhausted horses and drunken post-boys, and have got back in time for publication, to be received with never-forgotten compliments by the late Mr. Black, coming in the broadest of Scotch from the broadest of hearts I ever knew."

Passing away from this part of his life, we come now to the commencement of that career which made him famous.

We have already referred to his paper in the *Old Monthly*. Nine other sketches of the same character had since then appeared in that magazine, and had been signed "Boz." Mr. Forster gives us the origin of the name, which it appears was the nickname of his youngest brother Augustus, whom he had dubbed Moses, and which being pronounced as if with a cold became "Boses," and subsequently was shortened into "Boz." That magazine failing, the "Sketches by Boz" were resumed in an evening edition of the *Morning Chronicle*, in the course of which he became acquainted with his future father-in-law, Mr. George Hogarth.

In 1836 the "Sketches by Boz" were published in two volumes by a young publisher named Macrone, who agreed to, and did, make Dickens a payment of £150 for them; but afterwards, on this publisher threatening a new edition during the publication of "Pickwick," Dickens was forced to pay him £2,000 to re-purchase the copyright. "Pickwick" was also begun in March of 1836, and another important event also took place during that year, viz., Dickens's marriage to Miss Catherine Hogarth.

"Pickwick" was now advertised to appear in monthly parts at one shilling each, and according to Mr. Forster it was originated in the following manner:—

The firm of Chapman and Hall was then in its infancy, and Mr. Hall (the bookseller who had sold Dickens his first printed piece of authorship in the *Old Monthly*) made a proposition to him, which in Dickens's words was "that a monthly something should be a vehicle for certain plates to be executed by Mr. Seymour, and there was a notion, either on the part of that admirable humorous artist or of my visitor, that a NIMROD CLUB, the members of which were to go out shooting, fishing, and so forth, and getting themselves into difficulties through their want of dexterity, would be the best means of introducing these. I objected, on consideration, that although born, and partly bred in the country, I was no

great sportsman, except in regard to all kinds of locomotion; that the idea was not novel, and had already been much used; that it would be infinitely better for the plates to arise naturally out of the text; and that I would like to take my own way, with a freer range of English scenes and people, and was afraid that I should ultimately do so in any case, whatever course I might prescribe to myself at starting. My views being deferred to, I thought of Mr. Pickwick, and wrote the first number, from the proof-sheets of which Mr. Seymour made his drawing of the club and his happy portrait of its founder. I connected Mr. Pickwick with a club, because of the original suggestion; and I put in Mr. Wipple expressly for the use of Mr. Seymour."

Between the first and second numbers Mr. Seymour committed suicide, and ultimately Mr. Hablot Browne took his place, and filled it worthily.

Of Mr. Dickens's personal appearance at this time we only quote the descriptions given of him by Mrs. Carlyle (the wife of the great writer of that name), that his "face was as if made of steel," and that of Leigh Hunt, who said of it, "It has the life and soul in it of fifty human beings." The publication of the twelfth number of "Pickwick" was celebrated by a dinner, which we believe was kept up for some years.

Dickens seems to have had an intense affection for his wife's younger sister Mary, who died shortly after the "Pickwick" dinner, and as her epitaph he wrote of her, "Young, beautiful, and good, God numbered her among His angels at the early age of seventeen." The recollections of her purity, virtue, and goodness seem to have been present with him for years afterwards.

The success, well earned, of "Pickwick" was astounding, and apparently quite startling to its author, for of Part I. the binder prepared 400. and of Part XV., his order was for more than 40,000. Before the completion of "Pickwick," "Oliver Twist" began to make its appearance in *Bentley's Magazine*, and soon commanded attention from the public.

To attempt to criticise it now would be absurd. It is world famous, and will with its author always remain so. It electrified London, for we are told that after four or five parts appeared, it sprang into such popularity that tradesmen used it for the sale of their goods. Mr. Carlyle wrote of it in the following manner:—"An archdeacon with his own venerable lips repeated to me the other night a strange profane story of a solemn clergyman who had been administering ghostly consolation to a sick

person; having finished, satisfactorily as he thought, and got out of the room, he heard the sick person ejaculate, 'Well, thank God, "Pickwick" will be out in ten days anyway!' This is dreadful."

The characters in it were inimitably depicted; they were real, and the scenes in the debtors' gaol were true to the life, as the author well knew from his early experience during his father's imprisonment. The great trial of Bardwell *v.* Pickwick is a masterpiece. As Mr. Forster well observes, "it was not somebody talking humorously about them (the various characters), but they were there themselves."

And what can be said of Sam Weller, "the pre-eminent achievement" of the book? Mr. Forster is assuredly right when he says that Sam is—

"One of those people that take their place among the supreme successes of fiction, as one that nobody ever saw, but everybody recognises, at once perfectly natural and intensely original. Who is there that has ever thought him tedious? Who is so familiar with him as not still to be finding something new in him? Who is so amazed by his inexhaustible resources, or so amused by his inextinguishable laughter, as to doubt of his being as ordinary and perfect a reality, nevertheless, as anything in the London streets? When indeed the relish has been dulled that makes such humour natural and appreciable, and not his native fun only, his ready and rich illustration, his imperturbable self-possession, but his devotion to his master, his chivalry and his gallantry, are no longer discovered, or believed no longer to exist in the ranks of life to which he belongs, it will be worse for all of us than for the fame of his creator. Nor, when faith is lost in that possible combination of eccentricities and benevolences, shrewdness and simplicity, good sense and folly, all that suggests the ludicrous and nothing that suggests contempt for it, which form the delightful oddity of 'Pickwick,' will the mistake committed be one merely of critical misjudgment."

We have already mentioned that during the progress of "Pickwick" Dickens had been writing the tale of "Oliver Twist" for Mr. Bentley, and at the end of October, 1838, it was completed. It is a marvel that one man should be writing two such different stories at the same time, but Dickens was a man of unbounded spirits and energy, and he really lived in the characters he represented, as we shall presently see, more especially in one of his most remarkable and pathetic tales.

Like most of his tales, "Oliver Twist" is beyond criticism, and

no one who reads the history and career of Bill Sikes, and his dog and Nancy, Old Fagin, Bumble, and Oliver himself can do so without being much impressed by it. Its aim and purport are alike noble, and the book, although not so popular as some of his other literary performances, will ever hold the place which it has deservedly gained in the first class of his writings. We quite agree with Mr. Forster when he says,—

“It is indeed the primary purpose of the tale to show its little hero, jostled as he is in the miserable crowd, preserved everywhere from the vice of its pollution, by an exquisite delicacy of natural sentiment which clings to him under every disadvantage. There is not a more masterly touch in fiction, and it is by such that this delightful fancy is consistently worked out to the last, than Oliver’s agony of childish grief on being brought away from the branch workhouse, the wretched home associated only with suffering and starvation, and with no kind word or look, but containing still his little companions in misery. . . . It is the book’s pre-eminent merit that vice is nowhere made attractive in it. Crime is not more intensely odious all through than it is also most wretched and most unhappy;—not merely when its exposure comes, when the latent recesses of guilt are laid bare, and all the agonies of remorse are witnessed; not in the great scenes only, but in those lighter passages where no such aim might seem to have guided the apparently careless hand; this is emphatically so. Whether it be the tragedy of crime, terror and retribution dog closely at its heels, they are as plainly visible when Fagin is first shown in his den, boiling the coffee in the saucepan and stopping every now and then to listen when there is the least noise below, the villanous confidence of habit in him extinguishing in him the anxious watchings and listenings of crime,—as when we see him at last in the condemned cell, like a poisoned human rat in a hole. . . . The quack in morality will always call such writing immoral, and the impostors will continue to complain of its treatment of imposture; but for the rest of the world it will still teach the invaluable lesson of what men ought to be from what they are. We cannot learn it more than enough. We cannot too often be told that as the pride and grandeur of mere external circumstance is the falsest of earthly things, so is the truth of virtue in the heart the most lovely and lasting; and from the pages of ‘*Oliver Twist*’ this teaching is once again to be taken by all who will look for it there.”

Our limited space forces us to close the present notice at this point, but we hope in the next issue to conclude our review of this most interesting publication.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

961. For the history of the Houses of Legislature, Chap. VIII. of Hallam's "Europe during the Middle Ages," the whole of Hallam's Constitutional History, and Sir T. E. May's Constitutional History of England (1760—1860), should be read. On the constitutional powers and position of Parliament Blackstone's (Stephen's) "Commentaries"—allowance being made for the writer's Toryism—afford much useful information. Whilst on the forms observed by the Lords and Commons, May's "Parliament Practice" is the book. A short and useful account of our constitution and its history is given in Roland on "Our Constitution."

GEORGIUS.

962. In Sir T. E. May's Constitutional History 94 pp. are given exclusively to the history of party, and these seem to us, on the whole, fair. There is a history of party in 3 vols. by Cooke. Of its merits we cannot speak, for we have not read it. An impartial history of party is best obtained by a patient study of the letters and the lives of eminent politicians, of private journals, and the other materials used by historians.

GEORGIUS.

966. Robert Raikes is very generally regarded as the founder of Sunday schools; and he was probably the first who conceived the idea of extending them throughout the land. The theory of Sunday school instruction was suggested to Mr. Raikes by the Rev. Thomas Stock, of Gloucester. A marble monument records this fact in the church of St. John the Baptist in that town. It was in the year 1788 that he started, in conjunction with Mr. Raikes, four Sunday

schools, which, until his death, he helped to sustain. Still earlier, though isolated, efforts in this direction were made in Yorkshire. As early as 1763, the Rev. T. Lindsey, of Catterick, employed in this way a portion of each Sunday. His example set a Mrs. Cappe at work, and for some years she used to gather, every Sunday, classes of children in her own house; and she had a succession of these, which occupied nearly all the time which was not spent in church. The Church Catechism was read, and the Scriptures.—J. R. S. C.

Robert Raikes, of Gloucester, a printer by trade, originated Sunday schools in 1781. His idea was to pay the teachers, but the expense was so great that soon after his death this plan died out, and by 1800 teaching was generally gratuitous. For further information see Chambers' Encyclopædia and "The Sunday School World."

GEORGIUS.

967. As in other cases of physical discovery, the entire credit of the invention cannot be assigned to one person. The questionist will find the history of the invention traced out from fable to its perfection by Wheatstone and others, in an article by Dr. C. M. Ingleby, in the *Fortnightly Review*, vol. i. (? or ii.). The article is entitled "From Fable to Fact." The first practicable instrument was invented and constructed by Sir Francis Ronalds. His work, published in 1823, is entitled "Description of the Electric Telegraph." It has recently been reprinted. He employed frictional electricity, and his only signal was the divergence of a piece of Canton's pith balls. The invention is still alive.—O.

Literary Notes.

A NEW volume of poems, "Songs of Life and Death," by Mr. Payne, will appear shortly.

Prior Vaughan's "Life and Labours of St. Thomas of Aquina," vol. ii., is nearly ready.

The "Mr. Onslow Yorke" who has been reported to be writing the secret history of the International, is thought to be Mr. Hepworth Dixon.

Under the title of "South Sea Bubbles," the young Earl of Pembroke will shortly publish an account of his experiences in the Southern Ocean.

Messrs. Blackwood and Sons will shortly publish an Introduction to the Study of Biology, by Professor H. Alleyne Nicholson, and a monograph of the British Graptolitidae, by the same author.

The committee formed for the erection at Macon of the bronze statue of Lamartine, has selected the Place de la Barré for the site.

The subject for the Hulsean Prize at Cambridge for 1872 is "The Influence of Christianity on the Legislation of Constantine the Great."

Dr. F. Hitzig has published *Sprache und Sprachen Assyriens*, the results of his long investigation of the language of Assyria and Babylonia, which he takes to be a hybrid tongue, Sanscrit in the main, but containing Turkish, Egyptian, and even Semitic elements.

Between December, 1870, and November, 1871, 184 new pieces were produced at London theatres in that twelvemonth, while ninety were given to the world in the provincial theatres.

J. E. Harting has produced a richly illustrated work on "The Ornithology of Shakspeare."

"The Prevailing Ideas of the Nineteenth Century," a work issued nearly twenty years ago by the late Baron Lorand Eötvös, Minister of Public Instruction in Hungary, is to be re-issued by his son, revised by his friend Alaslar Molnar.

Bishop Dupanloup, distressed at the admission of M. E. Littré, the Comtist, as a member of the French Academy, has shown his displeasure by tendering his resignation.

The History of Philosophy by the late Dr. F. Ueberweg, translated from the 4th edition by G. S. Morris, and edited by N. Porter, President of Yale College, author of "The Sciences of Nature," is to be issued shortly in England and America.

The Rev. Henry Moseley, Canon of Bristol (born 1802), who had a high reputation as a mathematician and astronomer, died 20th January.

Moore's "Irish Melodies" in Irish has been added to the native literature by the Right Rev. Dr. McHale.

The Life and Works of Robertson, of Brighton, pass into new and cheaper editions.

Shakspeare's Dramatic Works translated into German by F. Bodenstedt, Nicolaus Delius, Otto Goldmeister, G. Herweg, P. Heyse, H. Kanz, A. Willbrandt, with introduction and annotations by the first named, have just been issued in nine vols.

A reissue in monthly vols. of Lord Brougham's Works is to be begun by A. and C. Black.

H. N. Burnet of *The Sunday Times*, died 6th January.

Modern Logicians.

THE LATE DR. FRIEDRICH UEBERWEG,

Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg; author of a "System of Logic and History of Logical Systems," "History of Philosophy," &c.

LOGIC, in Germany, holds a higher place in the estimation of thinkers, and plays a much more distinguished rôle among the sciences of mind, than it does in England. Here it is studied rather for its practical utility than for its philosophical value; as a formal art more than as a propaedeutic in thought. It is, by us, supposed to induce clearness rather than to impart fulness. In England it has been reduced to little more than a Mnemonic; in Germany it has been expanded into a Metaphysic. Though Kant maintained that "*Being* is not contained in *thinking*," he yet regarded thought as conditioning all our ideas of being. Fichte, however, showed the value, in metaphysic, of the regulative cognitions whose speculative importance Kant saw. It was from Hegel, however, that logic developed itself as the core-pith of all knowledge—as the very seminal, germinal axis of growth, downward through Experience into Science, upward through Reflection into Metaphysic. "Thought," he says, "proceeds, starts from thought, as what is certain in itself, not from something external, not from something given, not from an authority, but directly from this freedom that is contained in the [Cartesian] I think."

Hegel's logic is the system of pure reason—thought in its essence before it has been warped by, or been enwrapped in experience. It is thought in its self-evolving activity—as life, essence, and notion. "The primal forms of thought that interpenetrate both nature and spirit is logic proper—logic not as confined to the mere formal rules of reasoning, but logic that constitutes the very essence of thought." . . . "Logic, then, may be viewed as the way we come to think—the way in which thought grew till there was a

world for reflection, for understanding to turn upon" . . . "the deposit and crystallization *in* reason previous to reflection." By this logic "we are admitted to the ultimate and elementary fibres of the All-Being and Nothing as they interweave to becoming." "So it is that the understanding succeeds reason, and turns on the work of reason as on its material."

Such, according to the highest authority on Hegelianism in this country, James Hutchison Stirling, LL.D., is the universal logic or system of thought taught by the sovereign philosopher of this century; a logic such that "without it there is no thought and without it there is nothing," and "that resembles nothing which has ever yet appeared in France or England, or the world." This logic became an immense philosophic power--a Samson Agonistes in and to Germany; but its author's too early death in 1831 left it incomplete in its higher developments. Among his followers and disciples serious schisms have arisen. These have assumed dramatic positions on the stage of philosophy as the *left* and the *right*, while a small party of reintegrate metaphysicians, occupy the *centre*.

Schleiermacher, a man of great depth of thought and intense spirituality of nature, who not only succeeded in transfusing the mind of Plato into the forms of the German language, but in infusing the spirit of Christ into the philosophy of the Teutonic race, stood for a while as the connecting link between those who bisected, as it were, the Hegelian criticism. But he too, in 1834, passed away from among the personal intellectual forces of the earth, and left but the influence of his thoughts behind him. Among his "remains" was his "Dialectic," or art of scientific thinking, published from his manuscripts and lectures in 1839. Ritter and Vorländer accepted the logic of the dialectic as a science of the form and, as it were, the pure art of philosophy. Beneke, Trendelenburg, Lotze, and Dressler, took still farther reactionary steps, and made the logic of Germany less Hegelian and less Platonic, but much more Aristotelian. Ulrici and Friedrich have carried the reaction farther, and have striven to give to logic a scientific place, in and for itself, independently of its relationship to metaphysics. These logical speculations have had various fortunes, and have been pretty frequently judged, rather from a theological than from a logical standpoint.

Among the most learned, the most moderate, and the most effectively successful in constructing a logic which, while holding a

place as an independent science—opening connection impartially with physics and metaphysics, morality and theology—is Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, a man of intense industry, immense research, and extraordinary individuality of thought. His “System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines,” has just been translated by Thomas M. Lindsay, M.A., F.R.S.E., examiner in philosophy to the University of Edinburgh—a pupil of Professor Fraser’s, who has taken the highest honours available among students, and who, as gainer of the Hamilton Fellowship, has endeavoured worthily to fulfil the end of its institution, by studying philosophy in its headquarters, and by enriching the literature of logic with the most thorough and best elaborated epitome of that science which he could discover in Germany. His gift to philosophy in this work is very valuable, and we hope that the day of his reward will soon come round. Of the work and of the author we intend to give some serviceable account to our readers; and from the original materials in our hands, kindly supplied to us through Dr. Stirling, we hope to make our paper both informing and interesting.

In his preface to the first edition, Ueberweg affiliates his “logic” to the speculations of Schleiermacher, and gives a *vidimus* of the course of effort from that great master of thought and exposition to his own times:—

“Schleiermacher, whose philosophical significance has but too often been overlooked for his theological, in his lectures upon ‘*Dialektik*’ (ed. by Jonas, Berlin, 1839), sought to explain the forms of thinking from science, which is the end and aim of thinking, and to make good his opinion by proving their parallelism with the forms of real existence. This apprehension of the forms of thought holds a middle place between the subjectively-formal and the metaphysical logics, and is at one with the fundamental view of logic which Aristotle had. The subjectively-formal logic—that promulgated by the schools of *Kant* and *Herbart*—puts the forms of thought out of all relation to the forms of existence. Metaphysical logic, on the other hand, as *Hegel* constructed it, identifies the two kinds of forms, and thinks that it can recognise in the self-development of pure thought the self-production of existence. *Aristotle*, equally far from both extremes, sees thinking to be the picture of existence, a picture which is different from its real correlate, and yet related to it, which corresponds to it, and yet is not identical with it.

Ritter and *Vorländer* have worked at logic from the standpoint of Schleiermacher; the investigations into the theory of knowledge of the most modern logicians, who do not belong to any definite school, lie more or less in the same direction. *Trendelenburg*, who

has revived the Aristotelian logic, comes in contact, in many ways, with Schleiermacher's Platonizing theory of knowledge, without being dependent upon him, and has a basis of metaphysical categories acquired independently in a polemic against Hegel and Herbart. The view of Lotze is more distantly related. It approaches nearer to Kant's, and represents that in the laws and forms of thought only the necessary metaphysical presuppositions of the human mind upon nature and the universe mirror themselves. Essentially accepting Schleiermacher's fundamental axioms concerning the relation of thought to perception, and of perception to existence, *Beneke* has proceeded to blend these with his psychological theory, partly constructed after Herbart's, into a new whole.

"This present work on logic proceeds in the direction denoted by the labours of these men, while conscious of the right of complete independence in the mode of procedure. It sets before it both the scientific problem of aiding in developing logic, and the didactic one of assisting to its study."

It deals, he says again, with "the principal questions relating to the problem, sphere, and arrangement of logic, and to the standpoint from which logic is treated as a theory of knowledge." Asserting that it is an "independently thought-out work," he objects to its being labelled and "laid aside by classing it under this or that general formula—empiricism, rationalism, eclecticism, for this would falsely represent my work to be the mere exposition of a one-sided, antiquated, party standpoint, or since it is essentially related to the whole of the philosophical tendencies, would accuse it, mistaking its leading fundamental thought, of want of principle." "The author would least of all object to have his system entitled an Ideal Realism."

In the preface to the second edition he still further enlarges on his aim, and commends his work "to the attention of those engaged in the investigation of Nature, as a thorough-going attempt at a comparatively objective theory of knowledge in opposition to Kant's subjective criticism. It may serve to give a philosophic basis to their more special methodic." . . . "I seek more especially," says he, "to show how arrangement, according to time, space, and cause, on whose knowledge apodicticity rests, is not first of all imposed upon a chaotically given matter by the perceiving, thinking subject, but is formed in the subjective consciousness in accordance with the (natural and spiritual) reality, in which it originally is, successively by experience and thinking." In the third edition he endeavours "to increase its scientific value by a

more acute treatment of many problems, and by a thoroughgoing reconsideration of newly-risen difficulties." He was preparing a fourth edition, making additions to and alterations in the text, while the translation by Mr. Lindsay was in preparation. These he kindly allowed the translator to use, and he revised the proof-sheets with care. He had just completed this task, but had not finished the revisal of his own proof-sheets when he died; so that the work before us is virtually the fourth edition of the best work of this most gifted thinker.

The biography of Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg is one which possesses much intrinsic interest, and forms one of those examples of "Toiling Upward" which serve to show how much may be accomplished by ardour, perseverance, industry, and an indefatigable spirit. He was born at the little market-town of Leichlingen, not far from Solingen, in the ancient duchy of Berg, near by the right bank of the Rhine, 22nd January, 1826. His father was the Lutheran pastor of this small centre of Rhenish industry, and his mother was the daughter of pastor Boddenglaus, of the neighbouring town of Rousdorf. Friedrich was their only child; for while he was yet in his infancy Pastor Ueberweg passed away from earthly cares and duties, leaving his young widow and the child of the parsonage to bear with and struggle through the trials and changes of life very slenderly provided for. In the first onset of her grief the mother returned to the dwelling of her father, and brought up the living legacy of her dead husband with care through childhood's little troubles. She had a pension of £30 a year allowed her, and having this, she determined that her son should have, as far as in her power, the best up-bringing that could yield. When he had attained the proper age she removed to the stirring manufacturing town of Elberfeld, and placed him in the Gymnasium there, and subsequently she took him with her to Dusseldorf, on the Rhine, where higher culture could be gained. During his pupilage he was remarkable for diligence and perseverance, clearness of insight and thoroughness of study, aptitude and application. In his certificate at the close of the session, in 1845, special mention is made of his "unusual acuteness in formal thought, and also of his mathematical acquirements." From the Gymnasium of Dusseldorf he removed to the Hanoverian University of Gottingen—even then hardly recovered from the heavy blow and sad discouragement which ten years previously had been dealt to it by the expulsion from their pro-

fessorships of Albrecht, Dahlmann, Ewald, Gervinus, the brothers J. L. and W. K. Grimm, and W. Weber. Here he was brought under the influence of the school of metaphysics and psychology formed by J. F. Herbart (1776—1841), who, starting with Wolff and Kant, had been a pupil of Fichte but had become a realist of a refined type, endeavouring to explain the whole sum of the phenomena which pass through the human mind as a consilience of experience and reason.

On leaving Gottingen he proceeded to Berlin to continue his studies in classics and philosophy. Here the teacher who took possession of his enthusiasm was F. E. Beneke, the opponent of Hegel, as an adherent of the views of the British psychologists, that the only possible foundation for a sound philosophy is to be found in a strict investigation, analysis, and exposition of the facts of consciousness. His endeavour to construct "psychology as a natural science" delighted the realist mind of Ueberweg. Beneke's influence was for a long time dominant over him, and even after he had attained a wide philosophic reputation, one of the celebrated metaphysicians of Germany exclaimed, in words full of *naïve* astonishment, "I cannot conceive how a man of such acuteness as Ueberweg can be a *Bene-kianer*!" But in Berlin there was another notable influence in philosophy brought to bear upon him, that of the famous German Aristotelian, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, whose intensely critical intellect was enthusiastically employed in controverting the formal logic of Kant, the dialectic of Hegel, and the psychology of Herbart, and kept up a continued stir of criticism and attack in advocacy or in replication. The strong Platonic influence which Schleiermacher had imparted to the intellectual atmosphere of Berlin still continued to affect not only the professoriate, but the studenthood of its university. Ueberweg was a thorough Greek scholar; and besides a splendid mastery of Hellenic literature, history, and antiquities, he possessed a profound knowledge of the works of Plato and Aristotle, and was a consummate expositor of their philosophic teaching.

He held, for a short time, an appointment as rector of a Gymnasium, but his temper was too mild to exact the rigid discipline required in such a position; and feeling this to be the case he resigned the prosecution of practical pedagogy, and retired into studious seclusion.

Though unsuccessful in the disciplinary requirements of the

teacher's art, he was highly successful in all that relates to the intellectual duties of an educator. As a *privat-docent* he was exceedingly interesting and acceptable, and proved himself to be painstaking, capable, and ingenious, moving even to enthusiasm in learning many of those who were brought under his tuition. He considered education in its fulness to be the formation of an individual, capable of being successfully trained to the right performance of all human duty in accordance with virtue. Instruction he judged to be the intellectual and technical adaptation of the powers to the working out of some practical end. True pedagogy, according to him, forms principles, and transforms them into the habitude of the soul.

Everywhere that he went, to school, to college, to the various scenes of his various appointments, his loving and faithful mother accompanied him, and her widow's dole was carefully expended to aid him in his progress, and to support him in his need. How slight the share of the joy of luxury, or even of the calm carelessness of plenty was his, we may easily judge from the fact, that for more than a quarter of a century the widow and her son required to find a sufficing subsistence from the outlay of a pension of £30. So brought up, deprived of the enlivening charms of social life, retired by the stern necessities of poverty from converse with the world and men, devoted to books and study, he grew shy, and somewhat *gauche* in his reservedness, when he entered upon the scenes of intercourse and sociality; but he was naturally of a candid, open, amiable, and sensitive nature, and delighted greatly in companionship during the long walks which he took in the intervals of intermission from severe toil of mind. In congenial association his conversation was interesting and suggestive, lively and original, and impressed his intimate friends with a sense of his superiority in acuteness and information, to many who, in the circles of daily life, shine as clever conversationalists, men of ready mind and fluent speech.

One of the earliest of those papers in which Ueberweg gave expression to the ideas of an original philosophical thinker, of which we have knowledge, appeared in "The Archives of Philology and Pedagogy," 1851, "On the principles of geometry, scientifically explained." This treatise was republished with an introduction revised and altered by the author in a French translation in the "Prolégomenes Philosophiques de la Géométrie," by Joseph Delboeuf

(author of an "Essay on Scientific Logic") published at Liège, 1860, in which thoughtful work Ueberweg furnished a notice to J. H. Fichte's *Philosophical Journal*, in the same year. To the same serial he had, in 1854, contributed a very keen and informing critique of "The Moral Principle, as expounded by Aristotle, Kant, and Herbart," in which he propounded the idea, that the principle of ethics is to be sought neither in a mere formless material, nor yet in a form void of all content, but in the relations which subsist between various aims, or in the gradual series of their value. His view being—as expressed in the volume before us—that "ethics is the doctrine of the normative [rule-giving] laws of human volition and action, which rest on the idea (*i.e.*, on the type-notion) of the good." "A good is what makes those mental functions possible which are revealed by feelings of pleasure or approval." "The sum total of everything good belonging to the human race is the highest good." "The whole ethical problem for mankind is gradual approximation to the realization of the highest good." "The moral law takes the following formula:—'Act within the limits of your own sphere of duty, so as to solve the great problem of humanity as far as possible.'" "The harmony between inclination and duty is attained in its fullest measure in the exercise of the vocation corresponding to one's individual character."

In 1857 he produced a tract on "The Logical Theory of Perception, and of its relations to the Perception of Combined Conceptions;" and issued the first edition of his "System of Logic" at the commencement of the academical year. He had laboured long and painstakingly upon it, and felt that it was good, honest work. It not only attracted considerable attention, but excited considerable debate. In 1858 he contributed to Hemle and Pfeuffer's *Journal of Rational Medicine*, a paper on "Correctness of Vision;" and in 1859 to Fichte's *Philosophical Journal*, a paper on "Idealism, Realism, and Ideal-realism." In 1860 he gained the prize offered by the Academy of Vienna for the best "Essay on the Writings of Plato;" and this work, published in 1861, brought him prominently into notice as learned, judicious, and original. It was the means, too, of procuring him the offer of a chair at Königsberg as Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy in the university which Kant had made famous, the salary attached thereto being equivalent in English money to £75. This came to him in 1862, in which year he contributed a paper upon "Real-Idealism," to Fichte's

Philosophical Journal; and published a tract in Latin, "On the earlier and later form of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason." This treatise is a careful and elaborate notice of the changes made in the great theoretical work of the master-logician of Germany in the eighteenth century, showing all the alterations made by the author from the first edition in 1781, in the second, and substantially the final one, in 1787. This led him into a controversy with Michelet and Schwegler among others, which was carried on for years.

In 1863 he married, having found a devoted wife who consented to the co-dwelling of her able husband and her noble mother-in-law, whose small pension still helped to eke out the household comforts, in the same house with her. In the same year he communicated to Fichte's *Philosophical Journal* a paper "On the Conception of Philosophy,"—in which he maintains that "in all the sciences, without exception, speculation requires the empirically-given material, and empiricism requires the speculative quickening." In 1864 he contributed a learned and exhaustive paper to the "Year-book of Classical Philology," upon the Dialogue *Parmenides*, with the aim of showing that it was not a genuinely Platonic production; and while admitting that it brought out very clearly the relation between subject and object, and of notional knowledge to ideal existence, maintaining that it is the production of an interpreter of Plato, not of Plato himself.

During 1865 he was busied with the preparation of a "History of Philosophy," which on the recommendation of Trendelenburg he had been asked to furnish—a work which is full, accurate, and concise, clear in exposition, excellent in suggestion, and elaborately comprehensive. It was issued in 1866, and was immediately reproduced in America, translated by Professor G. O. Morris. This translation, which had the advantage of collation with the second edition of 1868, has been carefully revised, and is about to be issued, revised from the fourth edition, with all available improvements from the author's stores, and from the editor's special knowledge, simultaneously in America and in this country; so that, besides Lewes' lively and graphic history of philosophy, we shall be able to trace the progress of speculative thought, not only in the concise Hegelianized epitome of the history of Schwegler—for which we are indebted to Dr. J. H. Stirling,—but also in the brief scholastic compendium of Ueberweg, and be bettered by the perusal of all the three.

In 1867 Ueberweg was appointed Ordinary Professor of Philo-

sophy in the University of Königsberg, and in 1868 his salary was increased to £150, to which there fell to be added the augmentations by fees, academical appointments, &c.; and now also his works were beginning to be productive, not of mere reputation—valuable though that be—but also of solid and tangible results in cash, which meant, in this case too, comfort.

In 1868, however, just when the smiles of fortune seemed to be beaming, as if they were the rays of an unfolding star, the hand of death was laid gently, though coldly, on his faithful mother's heart, and she who had so lovingly and constantly stood by him in trial and in trouble, saw only the sun-gleam of prosperity, and departed hopefully into the higher light—leaving behind her, however, a great gloom in his affectionate heart. Life had come to his home, and little children had learned not only to lisp father and mother, but grandmother; and now death had come to darken the joy of the dutiful labourer in the earth, and lift his thoughts heavenwards. But though sorrow had come, duty was ever present, and he gave himself to that. In 1869 he issued a translation, with notes, of Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge," and brought the thoughts of the great Irish idealist for the first time in their philosophical aspect before Germany in the language of that land.

His "History of Philosophy" grew in popularity so rapidly, that he gave a diligent revisal to it, and in 1871 presented the fourth edition to the public. He was also engaged during the early part of the same year in most industriously and laboriously revising—by omissions, additions, and alterations—his great work on Logic, a work which had come to be regarded with such favour in Germany as to be indisputably without a rival, for scope, fulness, clearness, and consistent originality.

The severe privations of his youth, and the effects of the perilous persistency in philosophical pursuits under the pressure of poverty, began to make reprisals on him, who had gallantly fought to get and keep good foothold on the ladder of life. He had nobly and courageously conquered the difficulties of an intellectual career, but while he had been toiling on with the immense laboriousness of a true German student in the midst of low means and scant income, he had been making drafts on his constitution too heavy to be borne, and Disease literally had him on the hip. A sore, serious, and painful affliction it is, to have the hip-joint under morbid conditions. It so befell him; and though in the midst of the distress-

ing pain he maintained a true calmness, and pursued his researches with diligence, even up to the last, he suffered intensely, and had the great sorrow of hopelessness brought full before him, when it was found that the bones were so depraved as to yield no chance even of an anchylosed recovery. Hectic and exhaustion could scarcely, however, overcome his spirit, and though worn with restlessness and pain, he persevered in the task of perfecting the labours which he had been privileged to perform. At last, overcome by the acuteness of his malady, as he said about Schwegler—"too early lost to us by a premature death"—he expired, 9th June, 1871, having done all his work within the space of forty-five years and a half. A widow and four children remain and mourn.

While resident at Bonn, as we have said, Friedrich Ueberweg in 1857 presented to the students of the science of thought in Germany, his important, valuable, and erudite "System of Logic, and History of Logical Doctrines." It won its way slowly but surely into appreciation, so that it passed into a second edition in 1862, and in 1868 was issued in a third, and this had been so speedily exhausted that the author was preparing a fourth, which was passing through the press when the sudden death of its thoughtful author surprised and distressed the philosophic world, by whom so much was expected of a mind at once so thoroughly informed and so original. It is from the text of the third edition that the present translation is given; but with the rare generosity of a noble mind, the author communicated to the translator all the additions and alterations which he intended to make in the next edition; so that we have in this work virtually a version, in advance, of the fourth German edition of this popular and "really good logical textbook for advanced students," in such a way that they are all sanctioned by the author, who, as a German scholar thoroughly acquainted with English, revised the present text, and authorized its appearance. We have, therefore, in it the latest and best form of the work in its author's opinion, and may congratulate ourselves accordingly.

It is of this book that we intend now to present our readers with an abstract. But as the work consists of 141 paragraphs, extending to 555 pages, besides 45 pages of appendices, it is quite evident that we can only give a glimpse here and there of the spirit and matter of the volume; and that we must proceed on the principle of selection. We choose as most capable of being laid before the

reader in epitome, the matter referring to the "System of Logic;" and we leave unnoticed, in a great measure, the portion allotted to the history of logical doctrines—though in the work itself these are closely and intimately related to, and interwoven with, each other. Indeed, this is the special characteristic of the work, that of every doctrine enunciated the author gives an historical *résumé* so close and cogent, that one finds in it at once a history of thought and a critique of the nature and extent, the truth and the accuracy, of the opinions that have been held on all the main topics of interest in the science of thought. A high value is thus conferred on this treatise, and as a student's book it is almost priceless. We think, however, that if Mr. Lindsay would consider the matter, he might greatly aid the student of logic by issuing a well-arranged analysis of the System as a synopsis of logic, as a science of thought in the course of self-development, and in the development of knowledge.

Of such a synopsis we present the following shadow:—

"LOGIC is the science of the regulative laws of human knowledge. . . . Those universal conditions to which the activity of knowledge must conform, in order to attain to the end and aim of knowledge. . . . The act of knowing is conditioned in two ways: (a) *Subjectively*, by the essence and natural laws of the human mind—especially by those of the human powers of knowledge; (b) *Objectively*, by the nature of what is to be known. . . . Logic is a formal science; but since the forms which it treats of correspond to the forms of existence, they are conditioned by the objective reality. . . . The aim of knowledge is TRUTH. Knowledge arrived at the certainty of truth is SCIENCE. . . . With respect therefore to the aim and end of knowledge, *Logic is the scientific solution of the question relating to the criteria of truth; or, the doctrine of the regulative laws, on whose observance rests the realization of the idea of truth in the theoretical activity of man.* . . . *Logic, as science, rests on the previous exercise of the activity of knowledge.* On the other hand, the science of logic makes possible a conscious application of the laws of logic, and a conscious logical activity of thought. . . . In technical relation logic is a mere canon and purifier of thought, . . . but it is also a canon and organon of knowledge. . . . *Logic is an integral part of the system of philosophy.* . . . Pure logic teaches both the laws of immediate knowledge or perception, and those of mediate knowledge or thought; and since, speaking generally, knowledge mirrors the actual in its forms of existence, so more particularly—

Perception mirrors the outward order of things, or their existence in space or time; and represents, or copies, their real motion in an ideal way; and *Thought* mirrors their inner order, which is the foundation of the outer. The forms of thought separate into as

many divisions as there are forms of existence in which the inner order of things exists, and correspond to them in the following way:—

Intuition, or individual conception, to the objective individual existence. *Notion*, with content, and extent to the essence and genius of species; *Judgment*, to the fundamental relation of things; *Inference*, to the objective reign of law; and *System*, to the objective totality of things.

The division of *Applied* or *Particular* Logic depends upon the sciences to which the logical doctrines find application.

PERCEPTION is the immediate knowledge of things existing together and in succession. . . . The special question of logic as doctrine of knowledge, is, *whether in sense perception things appear to us as they actually exist, or as they are in themselves?* Sceptics assert the negative. . . . Perceptions are acts of our mind, and as such do not carry us beyond ourselves. . . . *Internal perception, or the immediate knowledge of mental (psychic) acts and constructions, can apprehend its objects as they are in themselves with material truth.* . . . Accordingly, in every form of internal perception directed to one's own mental life, and in every form of thought combining with it and working it up in *internal experience*, the phenomenon is in essential agreement with the mental (actual) existence. . . . *The knowledge of the outer world depends upon the combination of external with internal perception.* . . . Man recognises the *internal characters of other things*, chiefly by means of the related sides of his own inner existence. . . . The co-existence and co-operation of a multiplicity of powers necessarily involve some real order of coherence and succession, or some real *existence in space and in time.* . . . *Therefore the order in space and time belonging to real objects mirrors itself in the order in space and in time of external and internal perception.* Sense qualities, however, colours, sounds, &c., are, as such, subjective only. They are not copies of motion, but are regularly and connectedly related to determinate motions as their symbols.

The INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTION OR INTUITION (*representatio* or *conceptus singularis*) is the mental picture of the individual existence, which is (or at least is supposed to be) objective. . . . *Individual intuitions* gradually arise out of the original *blur* of perception when man first begins to recognise, himself, an *individual essence* in opposition to the outer world. . . . As the individual conception corresponds generally to the individual existence, so *its different kinds or forms* correspond to the *different kinds or forms of individual existence.* . . . On these relations are based the forms of the *substantially concrete*, the *substantially abstract*, and the *verbal, attributive, and relative conception.* . . . A conception is *clear* (*notio clara* in opposition to *notio obscura*) when it has sufficient strength of consciousness to enable us to distinguish its object from all other objects. It is *distinct* (*notio distincta* in opposition to *notio confusa*) when its individual elements are also

clear, and consequently when it suffices to distinguish the elements of its object from each other. . . . An *Attribute* (nota τεκμηρίου) of an object is everything in it by which it is distinguished from other objects. . . . The sum total of the part-conceptions is the *content* (complexus) of a conception. . . . When several objects agree in certain attributes and their conceptions in part of their content, there may result the *GENERAL CONCEPTION*. . . . The more general conception arises in the same way from several general conceptions which agree in part of their content. . . . *DETERMINATION* (προσθεσις) means the formation of less general conceptions out of the more general. . . . The *EXTENT* (ambitus, sphaera, sometimes extensio) of a conception is the totality of these conceptions whose similar elements of content make up its content. The enumeration of the parts of the extent of a general conception is called *DIVISION*. . . . The higher conception has a *narrower content*, but a *wider extent* than the lower. . . . The lower conception has a fuller content, but a narrower extent. . . . The sum total of all conceptions can be thought of as arranged according to the relation of extent and content in an organic *gradual succession*. The summit or upper limit is found by the most general conception *something*. Immediately under it lie the categories.

The *NOTION* is, that conception in which the sum total of the *essential attributes*, or the *essence* of the object under consideration, is conceived. . . . Attributes . . . include . . . all its parts, properties, activities, and relations—in short, whatever belongs in any way to the object. . . . In proportion, however, as the really essential characteristics are known, the conceptions acquire a scientific certainty, and an objective universal validity. In perfect knowledge, notions are valid only as they correspond to the types of the real groups of their (natural or mental) objects. . . . Those individuals which have the same essential properties make a *class*, or *genus*, in the universal sense. The genus is as much the real antitype of the extent as the essence is of the content of the notion. Objects are *generically* different when they belong to different genera; *specifically* different when they belong to different species of the same genus. . . . The individual notion is that individual conception whose content contains in itself the whole of the essential properties or attributes common and proper of an individual. . . . The *DEFINITION* or *determination of the notion* is the complete and orderly statement of its content. . . . Simple notions in which the totality of attributes is reduced to one attribute only, cannot have a regular definition.

DEFINITIONS are *DIVIDED* according to various points of view. 1. *Substantial and Genetic*. . . . 2. *Nominal and Real*. 3. The *Essential definition*, and the *Distinctive explanation*. 4. *Analytically-formed* and *Synthetically-formed* Definitions. 5. *Description*. 6. *Exposition*, and 7. *Explication*. The most noteworthy *FAULTS* of *DEFINITION*, are:—(1) Too great *width* or *narrowness*.

(2) *Redundancy*. (3) *Tautology*. (4) *The circle*. (5) *Definition by figurative expression*, by mere negation, by co-ordinate and subordinate notions.

DIVISION (divisio διαίρεσις) is the complete and orderly statement of the parts of the extent of a notion on the separation of the genus into its species. . . . The formal postulates of division are:—that the spheres of the members of division, taken together, exactly correspond to the sphere of the notion to be divided, and therefore fill it without *hiatus*; that they in no way overpass it; and that they do not cross, but completely exclude each other. . . . The most important DEFECTS in DIVISION, are:—(1) Too great *width* or *narrowness*. (2) The placing side by side species-notions, which do not *purely exclude* each other, whose spheres fall wholly or partly within each other. (3) *The confusion of different principles of division*.

THE JUDGMENT is the consciousness of the objective validity of a subjective union of conceptions, whose forms are different from, but belong to each other. A judgment expressed in words is an *assertion or proposition*. Judgments are both *simple* and *complex*; in *simple judgments* the following relations are to be distinguished:—

(1) *The predicative*, or the relation of subject and predicate, *i. e.*, the subjective representation of the real relation of *subsistence* and *inference*. It comprehends under it the following:—(a) The relation of the thing to the action or to the passion. (b) The relation of the thing to the property, which is, as it were, an action become permanent (*with this must be reckoned the relation of the thing to the sum total of those attributes which make the content of the super-ordinate notion*). (c) The relation of the action or property (thought as subject) to its nearer determination. . . . The kind of reference of the combination of judgment to actual existence furnishes a basis for the *division* of judgments according to *quality* and *modality*. . . . The quality of the judgment rests on the result of the decision; the modality on the degree and kind of its certainty. According to *quality*, judgments are affirmative or negative. . . . **QUANTITY** is the extent in which the predicate is affirmed or denied in the sphere of the subject notion.

Some logicians divide judgments according to quantity into *universal*, *particular*, and *singular*. . . . By combinations of the divisions of judgments according to **QUALITY** and **QUANTITY** four kinds arise:—1. Universal affirmative of the form—all S are P. 2. Universal negative of the form—no S is P. 3. Particular negative of the form—some S are not P. 4. Particular affirmative of the form—some S are P. Logicians have been accustomed to denote these forms by the letters *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, (of which *a* and *i* are taken from *affirmo*, *e* and *o* from *nego*). . . . **Contradiction** is the affirmation and denial of the same thing. Judgments are opposed to each other *diametrically*, or as **CONTRARIES**, which in reference to affirmation and negation are as different as possible from each other, and, as it were, stand furthest apart. In **SUBCON-**

TRARIES the one particularly affirms what the other agreeing with it in other respects particularly denies. . . . In **SUBALTERN**, the one affirmatively or negatively refers a predicate to the whole sphere of the subject-notion, while the other refers the same predicate in the same way to an indefinite part of the same sphere. . . . The *matter* or content of our judgments is obtained immediately through external and internal perception mediately by inference. In the act of judgment, the *forms*, which are designated by the *categories of relation*, are imposed upon this matter. . . . **INFERENCE** in the widest sense is the derivation of a judgment from any given elements. . . . The **PRINCIPLES OF INFERENCE** are the axioms of *identity* and *correspondence of contradictory disjunction* (or of contradiction and excluded third), and of *sufficient reason*. . . . The **AXIOM OF IDENTITY** should be thus expressed:—*A is A, (i. e., everything is what it is.)* . . . The axiom of identity may apply to the agreement of all knowledge with itself, as the (necessary, though insufficient) condition of its agreement with actual existence. . . . The **AXIOM OF THE** (avoidance of) **CONTRADICTION**, is, *Judgments opposed contradictorily to each other cannot both be true*. The one or the other must be false. From the truth of the one follows the falsehood of the other. . . . The **AXIOM OF EXCLUDED THIRD OR MIDDLE** is thus stated:—*Judgments opposed as contradictories can neither both be false nor can admit the truth of a third or middle judgment, but the one or other must be true, and the truth of the one follows from the falsehood of the other.* . . . The **AXIOM OF THE** (*determining or sufficient*) **REASON** is a judgment can be derived from another judgment (materially different from it), and finds in it its sufficient reason, only when the (logical) connection of thoughts corresponds to a (real) causal connection. . . .

The *Analytic Formation of Judgments* rests on the axiom that every attribute may be posited as a predicate. . . . *Contraposition* is that change of form according to which the parts of the judgment change places with reference to its relation, but at the same time one of them receives the negation and the quality of the judgment changes. . . . *Subalternation* is the passing over from the whole sphere of the subject-notion to a part of it, and conversely from a part to the whole. . . . *Opposition* exists between two judgments of different quality, and different sense with the same content. . . .

MEDIATE INFERENCE divides into two chief classes: *Syllogism*, in the stricter sense, and *Induction*. The syllogism is **SIMPLE** when from two judgments which are different, and have a common element, a third judgment is derived. It is **COMPOSITE** when more than three elements of judgments, or more than two judgments, serve to establish the conclusion. The *possibility of the syllogism* as a *form of knowledge* rests on the hypothesis, that a *real* conformability to law exists, and can be known according to the *axiom of sufficient reason*. The **SIMPLE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM** con-

sists of three categorical judgments, of which two form the premisses, and the third the conclusion. . . . Simple categorical syllogisms divide into *three chief classes*, which are called SYLLOGISTIC FIGURES. . . . Each of the two premisses of the categorical syllogism in reference to quantity and quality may be of four different forms. . . . Hence in each of the two divisions of the first class and in each of the other classes there are sixteen, in all sixty-four *forms of combining the premisses*. . . . All the modes of inference which are found in categorical judgments are repeated in the *subordinately complex*, and especially in the HYPOTHETICAL judgment. . . . MIXED INFERENCES are those whose premisses are judgments which have different relations. HYPOTHETICO-CATEGORICAL inferences belong to this class. . . . COMPOUND INFERENCES are combinations of simple inferences by means of common parts, through which a final judgment (mediately) is deduced from more than two given judgments. . . . An ENTHYME is a simple inference abbreviated in the expression by the omission of one of the two premisses. The premiss which remains unexpressed must be completed in thought; and thus the enthymeme is logically equivalent to a fully expressed syllogism. . . . An inference incorrect in its formal relation (*fallacia*) is a PARALOGISM if it leads the person reasoning into error. If there is the intention, it is called a Sophism.

Induction is the inference from the individual or special to the universal. . . . The inference of induction in its external form is somewhat like a *conjunctive syllogism of the third figure*, but is essentially distinguished from it by its endeavour to reach a universal conclusion. . . . PERFECT INDUCTION is that in which the sphere of the subject in the minor premiss falls wholly and completely within the sphere of the predicate. This takes place when by a perfect enumeration of all individuals or particulars the whole sphere of the universal is exhausted. . . . IMPERFECT INDUCTION warrants a particular conclusion only. . . . The conclusion is made universal with more or less probability, and the blank which remains over in the given relations of spheres is legitimately filled up, partly on the universal presupposition of a causal-nexus in the objects of knowledge, partly on the particular presupposition that in the case presented such a causal-nexus exists as connects the subject and predicate of the conclusion. . . . The most common FALLACY against the laws of induction is that of *false generalization*. . . . The INFERENCE OF ANALOGY is an inference from particulars or individuals to a co-ordinate particular or individual. . . . In every inference formally correct, and of strict universal validity, *the material truth of the conclusion follows from the material truth of the premisses*, but not conversely the latter from the former; and *the material falsehood of at least one of the premisses follows from the material falsehood of the conclusion*, but not conversely the latter from the former. A single premiss, or all of them, may be false, and yet the conclusion true; but it cannot happen that the premisses are all true while the conclusion,

correctly deduced, is false. Only truth can follow from what is true; but truth as well as falsehood from what is false. If inference from false premises is made conformably to the logical laws, it is not necessary that what follows must be true or must be false.

HYPOTHESIS is the preliminary admission of an uncertain premise, which states what is held to be a cause in order to test it by its consequences. . . . An hypothesis sufficiently confirmed, so far as it lies at the basis of a series of inferences as a common major premise, establishes a theory, *i. e.*, the explanation of phenomena from their universal laws. . . . **Proof** is the deduction of the material truth of one judgment from the material truth of other judgments. **Direct Proof** deduces the truth of the conclusion from premises whose truth is pre-supposed. . . .

INDIRECT OR APAGOGIC PROOF first shows the material falsehood a premise, which, the only one uncertain, has been combined with one or several undoubtedly true, from the material falsehood of the conclusion, and then shows the material truth of the contradictory opposite of that premise. . . . **REFUTATION** is the proof of the incorrectness of an assertion or of a demonstration. The refutation of an *assertion* is identical with the (direct or indirect) proof of its contradictory opposite. The refutation of a *demonstration* is accomplished either by weakening the deduction, *i. e.*, by showing that what was to be proved does not necessarily follow from the premises, or by proving the material falsehood of some premises. **INVESTIGATION** and *scientific disputation* consist in weighing the causes for and against an assertion. In any thorough-going contradiction of an opposed assertion, the refutation of the demonstration must be united with the demonstration of the contradictory opposite. Refutation is most complete when it shows the *cause* of the error, and so destroys the deceptive appearance of correctness.

The knowledge to be produced by a scientific investigation is called the **PROBLEM**. . . . **SYSTEM** is the orderly combination of mutually related knowledge into one relatively complete whole. **Science** is a whole of knowledge in the form of the system. Scientific knowledge finds its perfection in the combination of thoughts, one with the other, into a whole, which in its content and form represents the objective reality. . . . The unity of a system is determined by this: that all individuals contained in it depend on common principles. A *Principle* is an absolutely or relatively original element on which a series of other elements depends. . . . The principles of knowledge are of two kinds, according as the *individual* or particular, or the *universal*, serves as the starting-point of knowledge. . . . The empirical data, from which all scientific investigation must *start*, are given immediately by external and internal *perception*, and mediately by *testimony*. Perception when animated by a conscious aim becomes *Observation*, and, when the object admits of the investigation, *Experiment*. In experiment we ourselves change the conditions of what happens; we seek to know what conditions are influential, and the kind of influence they possess, expressly for the sake of observation; and the

answer to the question stated is given by Nature herself. The Trust-worthiness of testimony is settled by the general logical rules which govern the inference from the conditioned to the condition, and more particularly the construction and verification of the hypothesis—for this is only a special case of that more general class. . . . The means which method has at command for the *constructive* or *synthetic* construction of knowledge are definition, division, and deduction. *Definition* insures the permanence of the result of the process of abstraction, and serves as a foundation for division and deduction; and these processes again lead to new definitions. *Division* separates the sum total of the scientific material according to the relations of superordination, subordination, and co-ordination, in the belief that their regular arrangement ensures a true copy of the real relations. They are not reduced to a ready-made scheme; but the schematism, down to its last subdivisions, is to represent the essence of the content in the form of a natural organization. The (Kantian) principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity, are to be applied in definition according to the nature of the case, and not as subjective maxims. *Deduction* leading to the results of the processes of abstraction and induction establishes the particular and individual by means of the universal. . . . It can never deduce the reality of the particular and individual without the universal, but it can never deduce it from the universal alone."

Mr. Lindsay, the translator, contributes three Appendices, A, B, C; and adds a fourth, D, which is a translation of an exposition of the principles of Ethics, by Ueberweg, after the Hamiltonian fashion. Appendix A is a critical review of recent logical speculations in this country, and deals with Hamilton, Mansel, Thomson, Boole, Jevons, Mill, and Whewell. In a succinct, clear, and informing manner the next Appendix discusses the doctrine of the quantification of the predicate, and the third explains the German doctrine of Essence. These Appendices show Mr. Lindsay to be a careful, patient reader, and a clear thinker and writer, who takes a hard grip of his subject, who understands what he is writing about, and puts forth what he has to say without waste of words or effort at ornament.

Brief, disconnected, and fragmentary though our outline is, a thinker will see that the value is immense. It is a pleasure to us to introduce our readers to an acquaintance with this elaborate and erudite work, and to commend the translator's labour. It is a still greater delight to us to be able to bring the life-career of Dr. Ueberweg before the English reader, with original details for the first time published in this country, as one worthy of special admiration, appreciation, and imitation.

Religion.

IS CHRISTIANITY OPPOSED TO HUMAN PROGRESS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THAT it is almost impossible to state a question for debate in a form that shall admit of but one construction is a fact which the numerous debates in this magazine have often illustrated; but never has it been more plainly proved than in the course of the present debate. R. W. C. takes the word "Christianity" to mean "the following of God's laws and love of Himself;" whilst T. O. J. considers it as denoting "a historic result," an "incorporate set of interests which assume to themselves the collective name of Christianity." The former apparently looks at the distinctive abstract principles of Christianity, the latter at the history of the Christian Church. It appears to us that the meaning which R. W. C. has annexed to "Christianity" is the more correct one; and that the question discussed by T. O. J. is *not* whether Christianity is opposed to human progress, but (a very different question) whether what T. O. J. terms "the series and conglomerate of forms of church life" (by which, in plain English, we suppose he means the Christian Church historically considered) is so opposed. However, as T. O. J. distinctly declares that he does not discuss the question as understood by R. W. C., we should, so far as the former is concerned, be guilty of what logicians term *Ignoratio elenchi* were we to follow the example of R. W. C. We will therefore address ourselves to the question really discussed by T. O. J.—"Is the Christian Church opposed to human progress?"—and to this question we reply in the negative. We believe that, although much may be urged against the Church, it has been one of the greatest of the sources and means of human progress.

T. O. J. seems to be much exercised by the evils which sec-tarianism has wrought in the world. Indeed, since T. O. J. gives no other evidence in support of his views, unless a profusion of

what Bentham calls "question-begging appellatives" (see p. 23), may be deemed such, it appears from his article that these evils alone have led T. O. J. to take the affirmative side of this question. Now we sorrowfully, yet unhesitatingly, admit the injurious results of sectarianism among Christians to be great; but we cannot also forget that sectarianism is far from being an unmixed evil. One who has been termed in the pages of this magazine a "high and pure-minded thinker," has said that "partisanship in politics and sectarianism in religion have been made to serve important purposes in the prevention of evil, and the instigation of what is positively good. . . . The history of the Church shows how activity among the clergy, and a spirit of reading, inquiry, and reflection among the great mass of the people, have been produced and fostered by the clashing of opposing sects, when deeper principle and higher feeling might have proved utterly ineffectual."*

We are but having regard to a principle which the history of thought abundantly verifies, when we say that the discovery of truth is aided, and its progress promoted, by discussion,—the parent of sectarianism. From the continual jostling of opinion, from the interminable wrangling of thinkers, much that the world rightly holds good and true has been evolved. Could controversy be stopped, we might indeed rid ourselves of the evil feelings and the evil actions which flow from it, sectarianism might become extinct, but we should also lose that force which prevents the stagnation of thought and ever leads on in the path of progress. A mechanical monotony of opinion would be received in exchange for that intellectual activity to which civilization owes so much, and which is indeed essential to it.† Truly our last state would then be worse than our first.

Therefore, making every allowance for the evils upon which T. O. J. has dwelt so fully, we do not think that sectarianism merits the unqualified disapprobation which it has received at his hands. But even were T. O. J. justified in his views on this point, we fail to see that it necessarily follows that Christianity has been opposed to the progress of humanity. Still we would ask,—Are

* Dr. McCosh on "The Method of the Divine Government," 10th edition, p. 436.

† For proof on this point see a very interesting article by W. Bagehot in the *Fortnightly Review* for January last.

the evils of sectarianism alone sufficient to support the affirmative of this question?

"It must not be supposed," says M. Guizot, "that a bad principle radically vitiates an institution." T. O. J., however, seems to be of the opposite opinion; but it is scarcely necessary to remark that, adopting his canon of criticism, every great institution, every important fact, must be held to be opposed to human progress. The feudal system, the free cities of the middle ages, the crusades, monarchy, the French revolution, and many other institutions and events which have, *on the whole*, aided human progress, must, according to the principle followed by T. O. J., be absolutely condemned as evils. But, in truth, it is not in this way that these great historical problems are to be settled. We are not to condemn any great source of improvement because it does not bring with it unmixed advantages; but we must rather see whether, as it will generally be found, the good does not far outweigh the evil. Adopting this rule in judging as to the influence of Christianity on human progress, we affirm that influence to be for good.

T. O. J. bids us "look at the Christianity which has been preached for more than eighteen centuries, and see how little it has done for the lessening of the love of luxury, for the elevation of the poor, for the purity of life, for the trustworthiness of trade, for the increase of knowledge and truth, love and virtue, happiness, and the peace of nations." We have looked at this Christianity against which T. O. J. makes such grave but unproven charges, and we confess that the impression it has made upon us is of a very different kind. Did time and space permit, it would not be difficult to prove these charges unfounded; to show for example, both from political history and the progress of international law, that Christianity has done much to promote "the peace of nations." Perhaps, however, most of these charges will come under consideration if we ask what has been the effect of Christianity on the *actual life* of mankind? and what on *learning*? These two questions, therefore, we will endeavour to answer. But, even limiting our inquiries in this way, we are compelled to suppress all details, and to be content with such a statement of general results as the best authorities enable us to make.

What has Christianity done to increase the purity and the happiness of *life*? Let us consult history for a reply, and compare man under Christianity with man *before* its introduction.

It has been truly remarked, that "it is according to the ideas, the sentiments, the moral and intellectual dispositions of man himself, that the world is regulated and marches onward."* It is therefore of the first importance to examine into the influence of the Christian Church on the moral and intellectual dispositions of man. Now it so happens that it is precisely these which the Church sought to alter. Christianity aimed rather at improving individuals than in reforming the institutions of society. (Jesus and His disciples did not preach a new social system, a new form of Government, a new view of political philosophy, things which always depend on man's moral and mental condition. He rather denounced the abominable vices and sins of the time, against which from other sources scarcely a protest was ever heard.) It bade men follow a higher law than philosophy had ever taught them. It told of a God who could be loved as well as feared; of a God purer and nobler than the grandest conceptions of the sages of antiquity. It revealed moral rules, which, unlike many then obeyed, elevated the minds and strengthened the better sentiments of those who practised them. It enlarged man's views as to his future destiny, and gave stronger sanctions to morality than it had ever before possessed.

And truly there was need of a power capable of such great things. "There was a groan uttered from universal Humanity for something to save it from the utter exhaustion of sensuality, of moral, social, and political degradation." We will not weary and disgust our readers by proving what they know already,—that Christianity found the moral and mental condition of the mass of mankind very low, in spite of all that philosophy had taught. "Moral philosophy had done its best. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Seneca had done all that could be done, by reasoning and moral teaching, to win men from vice and to train them to virtue. And earth, for all that, was wearing the very semblance of hell."†

Such was the condition in which the Christian Church found mankind. Speedily did it alter this unhappy state of things. One who is by no means prone to favour Christianity says, that "its weight as a historic force is to be looked for in the high and

* Guizot's "History of Civilization in Europe," Section III.

† Bishop of Ely's Lecture on "Christ's Teaching and Influence on the World" (Christian Evidence Society).

generous types of character which it inspired."* In whatever phase of his existence man is viewed, on the introduction of Christianity he seems to have become a new creature. The old worship, the old social life, the old ideas of morality vanished away, and their places were supplied by institutions and principles infinitely superior. No more were men found bowing down to blocks of wood and stone, to abominable gods, who, as Rousseau says, "on earth would have been shunned or punished as monsters; and who offered, as a picture of supreme happiness, only crimes to commit or passions to satiate."† These were forsaken for the "King of kings and Lord of lords," the "only wise and true God." Public assemblies no longer found delight in witnessing men fighting with each other for their lives, or being torn asunder by wild beasts. Love for man ceased to be limited by political boundaries, and became cosmopolitan. Men learnt for the first time to regard all their fellows as brethren,—members of one family. The gross licentiousness of the greatest nations of antiquity almost ceased to exist. Time would fail to tell how the Christian Church has subdued the evil passions of mankind, infused more truth and charity, more brotherly kindness into social intercourse, and more justice into the social relations; how it led man to treat woman as she had never been treated before; to raise her from the position of a slave, or worse, to that of a helpmate and companion; how it lessened the frequency of war and mitigated its horrors; and repeated its attacks upon slavery until it was extinguished. Are not all these things written in the history of Europe, and indeed of the world, since the introduction of Christianity?‡

Having thus glanced at the influence of the Christian Church on actual life, we would now briefly consider its influence on *learning*. Without injuring our cause we may admit that the Christians of the earliest times were not given to literary and scientific pursuits. They lived in stern times, when persecution left them little opportunity for study. It is not surprising that in ages so very unfavourable to the cultivation of learning the Church did little in this respect. But if we come to rather later times, when, protected by

* Henry Morley, *Fortnightly Review*, September, 1871.

† Quoted in Wayland's "Elements of Moral Science," p. 35.

‡ A good summary of the beneficial influences of Christianity will be found in the Bishop of Ely's Lecture, quoted above.

Church flourished and grew stronger, we find that the promote learning was not lacking when outward circumstances permitted it. The dissolution of the mighty Empire of Rome followed, and Europe seemed to reel in throes which brought her back to times long before the Christian era. Then the Church we owe the preservation of learning. In troubled times the light of learning was well-nigh extinguished. We have to thank the Christian Church that its extinction did not take place. "If," says Hallam, "it be asked what cause it happened, that a few sparks of ancient civilization were preserved throughout this long winter, we can only ascribe the credit to the establishment of Christianity. Religion bridged, as it were, across the chaos, and has linked the ancient and modern civilization."*

Other times, Europe gradually recovered from its con-
founding no longer needed the fostering care of the Church, and the latter generally viewing the former with no
jealousy. It is true that occasionally the two have been
at odds, but this has only endured for a season. All save the
big party now deem Science the handmaid of Religion.
Every kind is welcomed, not dreaded; cultivated, not
rejected by the Christian Church; and wherever Christians spread
the Gospel there they take their learning with them.

Let us now remind our opponents of one fact, and ask
them to explain it. It is, we believe, true that there has been no
historical progress amongst nations where the
Church is an unknown institution.† How will T. O. J.
explain this? If we but take a survey of
the earth we find that the "Dynamic movement," as
it is called, has ceased in those countries where Christianity
prevails. "Static order" there prevails. Men seem unable to
break the bonds with which superstition and custom have bound
them. They know not the Truth which would make them free.
Even in China, as in India, a certain degree of civilization may
be seen, but there is not that constant advance which is essential to
civilization, and which we find amongst those nations
more or less influenced by the Christian Church. In the

Europe during the Middle Ages," c. 9, part I.

in Smith's "Lectures on the Study of History," Lect. II.

Old World no nations have ever made such progress, moral, mental, and material, as those of Western Europe; yet nowhere has the Church had a larger or a longer influence. And if, crossing the Atlantic, we turn our eyes from the Old World to the New, still more striking phenomena present themselves. There we find a more active Christian Church than in any other quarter of the globe, yet we find there also civilization making the most rapid strides which history records.

It is, too, significant that the Christian Church is one of the most enduring of institutions. Prejudice, selfishness, or ignorance may for a time retain that which is opposed to human progress, but sooner or later in the march of civilization it is swept away. Europe alone in its day has seen the rise and fall of many things which, in their time, were useful instruments of civilization, but which in the course of ages became obsolete, and even positive obstacles to progress. Europe, however, has never witnessed the fall of that Church to which it owes so much, and which existed centuries before modern civilization was known. The Church has passed through some terrible struggles, but it has ever come out of the furnace of affliction brightened, purified, and reinvigorated. The Church was victorious alike over the Roman Empire and the barbarians who overthrew it. It has been divided into several sections, but this has but added to its energy. Through the terrible social upheaving which followed the fall of the great Power of the West, whilst most traces of civilization disappeared, the Church, like a lighthouse in a stormy sea, stood firm. When peace and order were again restored, many institutions sprang into existence which have long since perished; but the Church survived, and is still flourishing. Yet it is hard to believe that if Christianity, as it has existed in the Christian Church, were not on the whole well adapted to the wants of man, and had not aided human progress, it would not have gone the way of that multitude of ideas and institutions which we now know only through history.

These are probably inconvenient facts for our opponents, but to those who take the negative side of this question they present no difficulty. We do not look upon Christianity as simply unopposed to human progress; but we see in it one of the greatest sources and means of human progress. We believe, also, that there never has been such great progress without it as with it, and to the highest and truest civilization, to that which fits man for the

ma yet blissful future which is offered to him, we
nity not only useful but essential. For the best
munity, then, it is desirable that the influence of the
rch may continue and extend. May its ennobling
d throughout the whole earth. May all nations both
actise its lofty morality. Then only will mankind
extent of the benign influences which the Church
Then will the noblest civilization be realized, the
ness attained.

GEORGIUS.

IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE--OR BOTH?

SPIRITUAL.—IV.

as have a wonderful tendency to be "of the earth,
the apostles of Christ and His early disciples could
t of their Judaic education, free themselves from the
us was about to take power to Himself as a temporal
are all too much, because of our ready cleaving of heart
inclined to think that this earth will be the scene of
en He comes to receive power from His Father and
put under His feet. We know of no thought which
ly entitled to the name of prejudice. Not only is the
f Scripture, as we think, against it, but all history and

teaching regarding the kingdom of God constantly
rituality, and we narrow and dwarf the word of God
e it speak the provincialisms of earthiness in which we
f this world could be the foreordained metropolis of
n Dan. vii. 13 and 14 the vision described is quite
Church, and not any special, earthly, visible kingdom.
3 and 4 God's fighting against the nations spoken of
fought previously, that is, spiritually, not personally.
the disciples on the point of the personal reign of
His life was a delusion, and equally so is the expect-
om their hopes and prognostications in Matt. xix.
30, Rev. xx. &c. I allude to these passages of
use they are usually quoted as irrefragable evidence

of the personal reign of Jesus on this earth. It is quite possible that I may not see their meaning, and so may be mistaken. But may I not ask the advocates of Christ's temporal reign to consider whether their liability to error is not quite as gross as mine? The Scriptures necessarily speak to us in symbol and figure, and its great mysteries are placed before us in allegory, metaphor, and parable. In most cases these are known to have a spiritual significance; why should those which they regard as proving the kingdom of the earth to be the Infinite God tabernacling literally among men, be taken literally and not spiritually. What did Christ mean when He said, "A little while, and the world seeth Me *no more*," if He was to reign personally on the earth? And does He not always spiritually reign, seeing He has assured us, "Lo, I am with you *always*, even to the end of the world"—when, if we believe in Him, and are accepted by Him, we shall be for ever with Him—not in this world, but in His glorious and everlasting kingdom?

These few remarks may show that we oppose Scripture when we advocate the personal reign of Jesus Christ upon the earth as a tenet of the word of God.

History, however, we affirm, is equally opposed to a personal reign. Jesus has appeared once among men; but if men now do not believe they shall have no farther unfoldings of His personal grace. His providence is now all that we have to look to, and by the prayer of faith this providence may be evoked in cases of extremity and need. The reign Jesus came to inaugurate is the reign of law, of the sovereign will of the Most High. In the earlier ages of the world this moral purpose was executed by His personal rule in a theocracy; then He instructed men by miracles and signs; but after the coming of Jesus, who revealed the way, the truth, and the life of heaven, God reverted to the principles of government which are natural to Him—impartial and inexorable law, and the dependence of men upon Him as the Lord God, Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, and Everlasting Father. God does not repeat Himself or His purpose, Paradism and Patriarchism, Theocratism and Christianization are developments of the same principle, but "the presence of God" in the earlier ages was fitted to the infancy of humanity. It was localized and gradually extended, but as gradually withdrawn; and now those who worship the Father must worship Him in Spirit and in truth, for so it is that His presence is now among the children of men.

is the seed-sowing of historic principle. The theocratic spring-season. Jesus came in the summer of being, the days of ripening and maturing are now with us. The harvest is come, and the ripened spirits of men shall be gathered in to the bosom of the Most High. The heart of the race has to be quickened by influences which shall enable it to bring forth the fruits of the Spirit.

We are to get out of the enwrapping mists of the material, and are to have a higher power and holier life. In the future there is to be written Holiness to the Lord. We are to be free from the self-seeking which belongs to the earth and to have God-seeking which lifts up and makes heavenly. Righteousness shall reign, but the perpetual reign of the Spirit; there He shall be made manifest to His people.

His spiritual reign began so soon as He was taken up into heaven. It was the condition of the coming of His Spirit that we should be separated from the world. We have His spiritual presence always with us, and are called upon to prepare ourselves for a more glorious future.

His presence in heaven. Is this promise not far more glorious, more inspiring and delightful, than the idea that we shall be confined to this region of the material, as we might become, "The Commoners of the Earth."

As we have said, exhibits the growth of spirituality. His presence is not now the means of educating men; His voice is not heard, nor does He even speak through inspired men. The education of the race is now entrusted to Nature and the Law of God as the Supreme Spirit is that which we are to recognise. We here only begin our education; we are to be perfected by our change from this present state of bodily existence to that of spirituality of life. To think that this earth is to be the only home of our spirits, and that all the wide immensity of the universe of God is never to be explored by us, is—dear friends—a dreary thought. We are to have in that which suggests to us an existence of everlasting life in the spiritual kingdom of God, having His presence with us, our souls being constantly conscious of all the mighty works and wonders that grow throughout the universe.

Considering the ideas suggested by a temporal reign of Christ upon earth with that of a spiritual reign—when the Kingdom of God will cover the whole earth, and all men shall know

God, and when those who are known as God's shall be called into the eternal kingdom of the Most High—seems to me to settle the question.

But I have said that the idea of Christ's temporal reign upon the earth is opposed to probability.

I have somewhere met with the calculation that during the 6,000 years of the earth's existence there have been so many people on its surface as to have made the whole of it a world of graves—each containing 128 persons. It has been "totted up" by experts in arithmetic that there have been 36,627,843,273,074,256 persons born into this world since its becoming a home for the human race; and if this were divided by the number of square feet on the surface of the globe it would only allow one square foot for each five persons. How all could exist in the comfort and happiness, the felicity and delight of Christ's reign, under such circumstances, puzzles me. I am aware that we must take into account the assertion, that many are called but few are chosen. However, this will little improve matters; for if earth is to be heaven, it must also be hell; and if the myriads are to be confined under the crust of the earth while the thousands occupy its surface, what will be the state of close proximity in which the righteous and the wicked shall be placed? Unless, therefore, some singular change is predicated regarding the spiritual bodies of the glorified, I am entitled to conclude that the idea that Christ's reign shall be a temporal one on earth is opposed to probability.

Having laid these views of the subject before the reader as a preliminary towards his apprehension of the arguments which weigh with the writer to incline him to adopt the idea of the spiritual reign of the Lord Jesus, we may refer briefly to some of the arguments of the opponent papers.

C. R. argues from the literal fulfilment of many of the prophecies of Scripture the probability of the prophecies relating to Christ's temporal reign. But surely C. R. is perspicacious enough to see that this is the very argument to which the Jews trusted for the Messianic reign of Jesus when He came; and as on His coming then He gave a fulfilment to prophecy which was spiritual, the probability is all on the side of those who believe that the prophecies which seem to us to relate to the temporal reign of Christ will be fulfilled spiritually.

Again, by emphasizing *this*, instead of not, in the sentence "My

of this world," he endeavours to show that *this* is the case. But why think that such an essential doctrine is based on the mere decision of an emphatic accentuation—the phrase is written, and written without sign of emphasis. Surely, this is giving an undue emphasis to a view which does not appear to be supported by the *litera scripta* of the

Scriptures speak to man of the spiritual kingdom they employ metaphorical language; but the use of metaphorical language does not imply the literal fulfilment of the metaphor, but is a metaphor simply because symbol is all that we have.

But he gives an argument in favour of Christ's reign by asserting that it is possible; but how many things are possible which are improbable—nay, that are morally impossible? It is possible that St. Paul "may be a castaway," but it is at all likely—equally unlikely is, as it appears to me, the earthly reign of Jesus. Even probability, however, does not decide as to certainty, and G. J. C.'s second argument is for its support a major premise to the effect that the probable is morally certain. This cannot be granted. But St. John's Patmos vision as a reality instead of as it is, a vision, a symbol of things to come. Can G. J. C. believe in a reign of Christ on earth without sea, or sun, or moon, with rivers of life, and of precious stones, and men living upon it as upon bread of life? I cannot. I think that the renewal is to be in the human soul; and that He is to reign spiritually on earth by the power of the Holy Spirit in the human soul; but that in heaven He will reign, over a ransomed and Holy Church.

L. M. D.

THE PROSE OF MILTON.—Milton works from the starting-point of the Christian religion, and his such ideas brought into being what he accomplished as a poet. His prose works, the outcome of his life of public life, are the outcome of his inner life, his life of artistic contemplation, and his life of religious contemplation. His renderings of one dominant idea—that the struggle for good and evil is the primary fact of life; and that a final righteous cause is assured by the existence of a divine order of the universe, which Milton knew by the name of 'Providence.'—E.

Politics.

OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

JOHN BRIGHT has said:—"I say that the system of legislation in regard to primogeniture and on entails and settlements, which is intended to keep vast estates in one hand through successive generations, to prevent that economical disposition and change of property which is found so advantageous in every other kind of property; I say this state of things is full of the most pernicious consequences, not only to the agricultural classes, but to all other classes of our countrymen, since all are affected by it." "The law which interferes with the free course of transactions in land, which multiplies and keeps up these vast estates, which gives to one man power over a whole territory, whereby he has at his disposal tenant and labourer alike, is not such a law as is consistent with that freedom to which the people of England and Scotland are entitled." "We are bound to apply these great principles of political economy, which are the gospel and charter of industry, as fully to property in land as we have already applied them to property engaged in trade."

These are weighty words, and contain great truths. Property engaged in trade is compelled to suffer exchange at the smallest possible profit, while land is allowed to be used only at the highest possible amount of usury named *rent*.

Land has been artificially created a perpetual monopoly; as population increases and the necessities of men become more urgent, the claims of the monopolist in land increases, until he has it in his power to double the natural price, not only of natural products but of the commodities of trade, by the exorbitant demands in the form of rent he makes. We have rent of farms and pastures, making the food of the people dear; we have ground-rent of houses put on at a rack-rate—sometimes altogether denied—making houses unhealthy, scarce, and dear; we have ground-

and towns, for shops and places of business, set so
 y impost upon goods must be paid to make up the
 merchant's profit comes on at all: and the consumer
 all this. The artificial restrictions laid upon the
 and not only make land a monopoly, but such a
 riches one class at the cost of the impoverishment of
 free trade in land, and the compulsory power to make
 with gardens and feus where they are urgently re-
 spread of population and the extension of commercial
 be insisted upon as changes in the tenure of land.
 e state," Mr. Bright again affirms, "in which the
 at capital cannot be employed upon it. You have
 material in such a manner—you have created such
 and by your laws and your mode of dealing with it,
 curse to the people [of Ireland] and to the owners
 equally true of England and Scotland.

orship of land has been held to as a monopoly
 its possessor the power almost of life and death
 y, and therefore secures political power to the class
 is now held. It is so held as to benefit the land-
 and not for behoof of the people. The ancient
 gave one-fourth to the sovereign, as the govern-
 h to the Church and education; one-fourth to the
 maintenance of the buildings required for the poor,
 and the ailing; the fourth part left, alone belonged to
 er. But now-a-days the land-taxes for war and
 e been thrown off the holders of land and put upon
 r-rates and the rates for gaols and law-courts have
 the whole community; even the road dues and the
 charged on an extended area; the Church has been
 of its share, and now education has been made a
 whole of the ratepayers. The land has released
 at every burden, but sedulously clings to every item
 As land has departed from its proper duty to the
 is bound to see that the rights of landholders are
 duties of landowners are neglected. The idea that
 and must not be touched" can only hold good so
 es incumbent upon its holders as the agents of the
 ly performed.

omogeniture is unnatural and unjust, and is only a

contrivance for keeping up the monopoly in land which is so injurious to the agricultural tenant and the cottageless labourer. The holders of land grasp and keep the earth as a possession; and though the poor require free air and roomy houses, they crowd and cabin them in the shamefullest fashion, and often interdict the erection of cottages on their estates, no matter what the requirements of the poor may be. Hence we hear of families living in houses of one apartment—often with only one window; hence we hear of the introduction of the bothy system—a practical prohibition of marriage and practical encouragement to licentiousness and illegitimacy. The land laws permeate the whole State with their evils, and they must be speedily rectified.

I admit the cleverness of L. C.'s article, but I think it is fallacious throughout. It confounds property and landed property together, and, arguing for the rights of property, winds up as if these justified the present condition of property in land. But it is not so. Landed property is held in monopoly surrounded by specific laws of primogeniture, entail, settlement, conveyancing, title, and registration, &c., which keep it independent of the law of supply and demand, while all other property is brought immediately under the influence of that powerful principle of political economy. Nobody wishes to communize land; it is only desired to bring it into fair exchangeability, so that land, like all other property, should be supplied on the demand rising for it on just terms and on equitable conditions; and with the farther provision that land, as it is of all things most precious for productiveness and for dwelling-space, should be used in such a way as most truly to accommodate the inhabitants and provide for their comfort. As it is, land is withheld from culture, and labour is debarred from reproductive industry, and capital is kept out of investment, and men are compelled to live in hovels and rookeries because the tenure of land is such as to impede all the good and wise social and civil reforms that are now become absolutely essential.

E. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is very difficult for those who have not, to be satisfied that those who have should retain possession. In former times possession was nine-tenths of the law; but in these days, when non-possessors make nine-tenths of the law, the maxim is likely soon to require inversion, and the law will not in a short time leave even a tenth in possession. What with one communistic idea and

seems to be very little likelihood of a sense of right in men's minds to keep them obedient to the precept of the Decalogue which reprehends the taking—text—of what does not belong to them. The communists are singularly ready to divide any other body's property; but he is specially unready, anything that he gets, to give any other body the same.

He proceeds on the principle that there should be no private property; but if there were no private property we must have a common property; for we could not steal—we could not even take what was in common, and the world were one great commonwealth. In fact, communism is the new disguise in which the communists got itself up; and the horseleech disposition of the communists, give but give all, that is, to all who have not. An example of the way in which, under the guise of communism, is carrying out agitation for what does not belong to it is seen in the agitation about land tenure.

It has become a grievance that land is a commonwealth of which men must pay, and that besides, the land on the soil, a *rent* requires to be paid for the occupation of the *solum*. Is it not rather singular that the very persons who are this agitation are those who in various ways seek to get their capital, so that they may get a good percentage of it. Now, what is the essential difference between a tenant bearing and receiving interest, and capital in land demanding rent? that the laws which secure justice to the tenant should be so altered from the laws which secure justice

to the lender, of any sort, asks *interest*, which is but another name for security, which is just another name for the lender's holding in his own hand the right to determine the terms of the loan, and reserves the power of calling up the prime interest in reality, only in a different form, either tenancy by lease. H. K. might just as well postulate that the property of the nation belongs to the people of the nation, and that the land of the nation belongs to the people of the nation,"

(*ante*, p. 190), and "that it exists for the national good, and not for the purpose of being monopolised by any class of persons." This is rank "divide with all as long as anything lasts," and cannot be held by any reasonable being, unless he can show that property quite alters its nature, character, and rights when it consists of land than when it is merchandise or money. Of course landlords only use, and money-lenders never employ, their capital and the position it gives "to swell their own dignity and pride."

Will the reader be so good as to look keenly over the following passages extracted from a series of papers on this question appearing in the *Edinburgh Courant*, and see if he can reasonably find any flaw in their argument. We think H. K. will find in them a few nuts to crack:—

"Land is the mere representative of wealth. It is the material voucher for the ownership of so many pounds sterling in the same way that the scrip is the voucher of so many shares owned, or the pound-note of so many shillings held at command. There is no land in this country that has not been passed from hand to hand for so much naked cash. That cash was as much a portion of the material wealth of the country before as after its transmutation into so many acres of ground; and it is no less so by its transmutation, any more than £1000 worth of consols remains material wealth of the nation as much as £1000 in bank-notes got for it and now in the owner's pocket. In common fairness the cash and its representative should occupy exactly the same place as regards national taxation and freedom of usage on the part of the owner.

"A merchant in disposing of his wares in this free country has the liberty of selecting his market and charging his price. Some, in place of selling, lend their goods, or wealth, on suitable terms, for return of capital and interest or usage. Others sell outright and bag the profit. All is legitimate in reference to that portion of accumulated wealth; and no one, even of the most advanced opinions, finds fault with it. It applies also to consols, stocks, and every other accumulation of property, and why not to land? If a merchant can hold his stocks or his wares till he finds a purchaser to his mind, why not the holder of land, which is just the wares and stock he trades in? Is he not entitled to say, Friend, thou shalt buy from me, or borrow the use from me, for nineteen years, of my acreage wealth on my terms, or thou shalt not have it? Why freedom to the trader in every other department of money-making and represented wealth but to the trader in land?

"It may frankly be admitted that no member of the community is entitled to use his wealth or any other property he may be possessed of to the injury of the community, and that it is the duty of the community by their representatives in Parliament to prevent by legislation any oppression of the subjects of the realm on the part of any member of it. That applies alike, however, to all accumu-

th, in whatever guise it kythes—whether lands, mills, or other forms. All alike are subject to laws, and to be subject to equitable laws. All alike represent wealth, and all alike should bear the burdens of the which they are owned in like proportions, and be equal restraints in use.

ment is right, then why all this clamour about land required to regulate its possession? If the mill-owner be restrained from selling his produce to the on the most favourable terms, why is the land trader from turning his trade to the best account, and only ng it to the highest bidder in the most favourable article? If the chapman is free to sell his pack advantage, then why not another to sell his also, simply ck is made up of acres while the pedlar's may be ddy? If an owner of stock can sell at the Exchange profit, why not the owner of land sell his acres with on equally suitable terms? The nature of the d is money's representative in the one case as much Either is a representative merely of so many pounds material wealth of the nation, and nothing more; and r utilization by the purchaser according to its nature."

at political economist may be to whom H. K. alludes singular argument, which assumes the exceedingly "I defy" (*ante*, p. 197) we know not. But this is valid against anything or anybody, is especially political economy and its propagators; for they assert r any commodity is largely in demand, and the supply a supply that demand, the price of the commodity K. and his authority, the great political economist, and the same breath assert and deny the imperative nd demand; and it is as impossible to maintain poli-as a science while denying this as to develop mathe-nying that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. with H. K. in one of his aphoristic phrases, "If the take a decided course, it will be thoroughly supported y" (p. 198). But the same reasoning as upholds will uphold mine—"that to divide your neighbours' ng those who want a slice of it, League will be ported by all the expectant and exigent neighbours," affirm that because it is so it should be so? I am hat the voice of the people on this point is the voice e a lurking idea that it is the voice of Selfishness.

O. S.

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE?

CREATION.—III.

MODERN discussions upon the theory of *evolution* lead us to think how very strange are the *revolutions* which pass over the world of philosophy. I say advisedly "revolutions," not in the generally accepted sense, but in that which is in accordance with its Latin derivation, implying thereby a "rolling" or "revolving" back again to positions which intellectual progress and advances in scientific knowledge might have been expected to render entirely untenable. Speculations which men laughed at in the grandfather, and cursorily dismissed as needing no refutation, because they were the fancies of a man who, in Scottish phrase, had "a bee in his bonnet"; these a later age has seen reproduced by the grandson, in different form and phrase, it is true, yet tending to the same issue; and men of the highest mental calibre can hardly venture to put these more recent Darwinian views aside with a sneer of indifference or contempt. Erasmus Darwin was certainly somewhat of a visionary, though not unlearned by any means in the natural science which was going in his day, yet he never thought of trying to demonstrate his suppositions, and only attempted to give explanations of the evolution theory he held in some such style as this:—"The first insects were the anthers or stigmas of flowers, which had by some means loosed themselves from their parent plant, and that many other insects had in long process of time been formed from these, some acquiring wings, others claws," &c. This was very poetical, and worthy of the man who could celebrate the loves of the flowers, and he cleared all intermediate spaces in his theoretical outline with a felicity which his successor must envy. The leading advocates of the theory of evolution or development in our time do not venture upon any of these daring flights of fancy; in their vision of the past they think that they behold species after species elaborated by successive steps as well as slow, and each from some

h which it was once in close connection, though they
at a certain proportion of the links which form part
e dropped out, nor is it at all clear what has become
y ever existed.

However, that I stated plainly my belief that, as we
organisms now, each seems to carry stamped upon it
of its individuality, and (humanly speaking) of its
nor do I, in so far as I have read the records of ge-
ologies in this direction, feel at all inclined to concede
past history, as it lies embalmed in stone and sand,
ent story to that which my fellow-habitants of earth
do not give credence to the new cry that the many
s of animals and plants which grace, and gladden,
planet, and, above all, subserve man, the "lord of
s I conceive, not the "lord of Evolution;" ever took
one common stock, nor even from a hundred different
e case put thus. That is, I hold there is not only
a distinct line of demarcation between species, but
en so since the multitudinous forms of life were first
istence by the fiat of the Supreme. Climate, food,
mstances have had, and still have, an influence in
tions from what we regard as the original type of
y, have even so largely affected a species that it is
nounce what it was in its primeval form. I am pre-
le still more than this, and admit that it is not im-
new species has in a few instances been formed
cies; but a demonstration of this fact would not, as
ve that such had been the way in which all species
rise. Nothing is more dangerous in argument than
eneralize from circumstances which are exceptional,
a natural law upon the basis of a few rare cases
oubtful proof; and to seek to support it by con-
ed by anatomical analogies and by outward affini-
ongly marked as they may be, show no tendency to
inctions, is unphilosophical. We know that by
adations we ascend through a long succession of
e lowest forms of life to the highest, without abrupt
tions; and therein is illustrated the astonishing har-
ists throughout Nature; yet I cannot see that this
proof of the evolution of species, even in the same

genus or family, still less that by any transformation a mollusc might become a fish, or a bird a quadruped.

The theory of development is not one on which we need pride ourselves in this nineteenth century, nor could our ancestors have done so in the eighteenth. Existing certainly in a different drape, the idea yet floated through the schools of Greece more than two thousand years ago, and it may be found of very considerable antiquity in the sacred records of India. Apart from the reception of the truth, that all things owed their origin to a Great First Cause, it would naturally occur to men as an easy method of accounting for the union of similarity with diversity so generally traceable in families or groups of species, and the question of how a starting-point was got being left unexplained, the production of animals of one type from those of another type did not seem more extraordinary than the development of a butterfly from a chrysalis, or a beetle from a grub. And those who believed in some unseen Creator, and rejected the mythic tales concerning the origin of man, and the kingdoms of Nature subordinated to him, judged of Him according to the standard of humanity, and thought it quite probable that He would proceed "after the manner of men," and advance by degrees improving and altering the structures which He produced from time to time. And it has been laid to the charge of modern advocates of the theory of evolution that if the opinions they hold do not tend directly to atheism, they present to us, under a feeble and distorted aspect, the Omnipotent God revealed in the Scriptures. In such assertions there is, perhaps, some injustice; and it may be that amongst those advocating what are spoken of as heterodox theories concerning the development of life, there are some who have as perfectly just and full conceptions of the Divine attributes as those who differ most from them. He who has chosen to continue animal and vegetable life by slow developments, starting with the egg or embryo, might have ordained that species should not only perpetuate themselves, but throw off, as it were, shoots in a new direction; and that these also should be fertile, through a long succession of ages, until, from a minute beginning, the hosts of species arose which now crowd earth. This might have been; but we have no revelation that such was the case, the evidence of Scripture tends, indeed, quite in an opposite direction. On the arguments deducible thence against the theory of evolution I shall not enter here.

strong arguments against the transmutation of development one from another, is, that we have no and indubitable examples amongst living animals changes have occurred. Thus, we have a very large varieties of the common dog, and yet, closely allied to wolf and the fox, they still preserve their specific dissolution, according to Huxley and Darwin, took place a series of minute variations, each so slight as to be imperceptible. Yet, however small and gradual taken separately must have produced an effect upon a species which perceptible repeatedly ere a new species was formed from it. How is it that no transitional examples, which are common, are recognisable either amongst the geologic records or amongst living species, so far as we can carry back their origin? It may be asserted without fear of contradiction that by the aid of the microscope or by pictorial representation we can ascertain what was the outward appearance and what were the characters of many animals, both wild and domestic, at least two or three thousand years since. Such a period as that does not seem to have witnessed any developments of new species from old, well-known ones, nor has it caused alterations, other than of the outward form, in the latter. "Ah, but!" cry the advocates of evolution, much longer periods are required—millions of years or tens of millions, if we accept the theory of evolution, it does not require the lapse of a succession of ages to bring about the changes we suppose, judging from the facts of natural history as they are now. The Egyptian cat of the days of the Pharaohs is perceptibly from the modern type of the domestic cat, and yet; nay, where in times comparatively recent, species, which have become extinct, they have not given birth to a new one, or, at least, have not given birth to another species closely resembling them. If, therefore, that all, or nearly all, the developments took place within the last few thousand years, we are still at a loss to find evidence proving any change amongst the fossilized animals. Who can show the transition from the plesiosaurs in a transitional condition? And even in the most recent geologic periods, recent observations certainly show that we shall have to reduce considerably the times which have been thought necessary to produce certain strata. It is not plausible to suppose that circumstances of climate and of the habits of animals could have had an influence upon the animal and

plant-life so diverse from what they manifest at present, as to transmute forms and totally alter the habits and economy of species. The earth and the atmosphere were both in a very different state to that in which we now find them, and subject, possibly, to different natural laws. These conditions were, however, suited to the transitory dwellers upon the planet, and prepared it for the advent of the monarch of the Creation.

It is rather remarkable, and tells forcibly against the theory of the development of the higher from the lower, that, in many notable instances which pass under our own eyes, we find species exhibit a tendency, not to elevation, but to depression. The neglected flowers of the garden left to themselves do not rise to something superior; they lose their beauty and fall to the rank of weeds, though not actually passing into other species. So is it with the cereals, which, when man deserts them, show a tendency to degrade. The choicest breeds of domesticated animals need constant care and attention, or they cannot be kept up to the standard of perfection. It cannot be said certainly that, viewing broadly the various species of animals and plants, we find amongst them a general tendency to degrade; yet in unmistakeable instances such a tendency does show itself, which, though not furnishing any absolute proof that, in the past, species have not improved themselves, shows that it is not at present a law of life that a change in a species (unassisted by man) should be in an upward direction. Nor can those who are believers in evolution show conclusive reasons why, at a particular point, it should have ceased, and a different law begin to prevail. On the production of hybrids in the plant world, I must not here enter, but only observe, in passing, that these phenomena are each explainable without resorting to the theory of gradual development.

Entomology, with which I have made some acquaintance, affords, to my mind, a variety of examples amongst its diversity of species, showing that creation and not evolution brought its subjects into being. The boundaries of each species appear to be, if not always clearly defined by our existing scientific knowledge, yet at least capable of being so had we more insight. We find varieties are very frequent in some orders; and, in addition to what are called casual varieties, there are permanent ones, which show little tendency to revert to the original type of the species, and just as little tendency to branch off in a new direction. We have also what are

peculiar forms caused by circumstances of locality. The tortoiseshell butterfly is dwarfed in the island of the Shetlands the common moth, known as the *Arctia*, in a colouring very different from that presented in more southern regions. Among some of the species will occasionally show as many as a dozen forms, once isolated from each other by entomologists as distinct, but now by breeding discovered to belong to the same species.

In many species of insects the closest similarity is observed. A naturalist (and he not always) can distinguish butterflies called the dark green and the high brown which nearly resemble each other. The females of the *Adonis* and the *Adonis* blue are so much alike that even the most experienced Newman declares that he cannot give good distinction. No one who has studied insect life can doubt that they are distinct, and are not likely to unite with each other when their distances. Then again, in other species some of which look more unlike the type-specimens to which they belong than do other nearly allied species, we know that one is a species and the other but a variety. I am quite aware that Mr. Wallace quotes several instances in the American butterflies, in which he conceives a change has taken place, but the evidence is, I think, insufficient to still hold to the belief that creation and not evolution means by which species are produced.

J. R. S. C.

CREATION.—IV.

In intending to enter fully into the question of the origin of nature, I should like to give a short consideration to the views with which E. F. R. concludes his paper in last issue of this magazine.

He says "that evolution does not necessarily imply no creation. Creation is the right interpretation of Nature. I am not aware of any changes which have taken place in human species, except such as have been brought about by capacities by civilization; neither am I aware that any way changed, either in form or habits, both of which of their existence are wisely and wonderfully adapted to each other by an all-wise, all-wonderful Creator,

during the last thousands of years. Plants also, unless brought under cultivation by man, under whom everything in the world was put in subjection, only reproduce themselves by their own fixed, inherent properties, season after season; and, therefore, evolution is *not* "requisite to explain nature." As regards the fourth suggestion, I presume the question is about the *original* explanation of nature, and I hold, on the grounds of the non-existence of these changes, that a "fixed typical creation" is a better original interpretation or explanation of it, than a posterior evolution from primordial germ-cells, or pre-existing species, which are the effects of creation, as E. F. R. would argue.

Whatever arguments may be adduced in support of a system of evolution from certain pre-existing natural forms, there still remains the origin of these pre-existences themselves to account for, and it is impossible to do so in any other manner than by the theory of creation.

R. W. C.

EVOLUTION.—III.

CREATION is, and must be, an imagination or a revelation. It never can be an experience. Explanation signifies making plain—bringing before the understanding so that we may comprehend. Man cannot transcend experience, and hence creation can never to man explain anything. "A phenomenon is," says Prof. Huxley, "*explained* when it is shown to be a case of some general law of Nature; but the supernatural interposition of the Creator can by the nature of the case exemplify no law." We never can experience, however frequently we may imagine, creation. We see nature in existence, but we never can see it coming into existence. That it *evolves* we know; what it *involves* we try to discover. All that we see is the sequence of cause and effect: we never can get before the antecedence whence effects spring. Life is derivable; but is nature a derivative? We have got into the idea of speaking about Spirit and matter, of Creator and creation, but have we ever rightly considered the subject? Goethe called nature the living garment of God. If we were to think of God as Nature in the spiritual aspect, and of Nature as God in His material aspect, might we not get much nearer the truth? God as a constant Evolution manifested in Nature, a potent activity ever and ever going forth in correlation of life and death, cause and effect, change and progress.

Creation is quite a human idea : it signifies commencement. We talk of creative intellects, and creating a sensation. It is a weak idea of the Deity to maintain that He must have created—started on a new course, brought about a sudden explosion into life of the beings in the universe. It quite upsets the true and reverential notion of God as the Unchangeable. Creation is change : Evolution is merely change in appearance : the development of the correlations of things. The one great force : the all-powerful one in, and of, the universe, is ever present and ever active in a distinct self-evolving oneness. From Him we are, to Him we return. We are only the ideas of God given form to, and then called to pass away. The everlasting continuity of the Being of God is a truth more and more necessary for us to entertain. The true thinker sees God everywhere, and in everything. He does not need to excite a factitious idea of the infinite power of God by asserting a creation, because he feels that in the constancy of His self-evolution, the Deity is manifesting a far more exceeding even an eternal glow of glory. Every fresh evolution is a higher and more definite evidence of an everlasting God than the noblest creation, and the grandest universe ; creation is a time-limited and small idea. The kaleidoscope of nature at every revolution reveals a new creation in reality. We live in "the star-domed city of God—through every star, through every grass-blade, and most through every living soul, the glory of the present God still beams. But nature, which is the time-vesture of God, reveals Him to the wise, and hides Him from the foolish." So Carlyle says, and so all science now affirms.

But our fastidious friend F. D. T. cannot abide this idea of Deity. He must have a God formed after his own fancy, and will have a creative God. He will not admit—

"Through the ages an increasing purpose runs ;"

He insists that what God did was done at once, and that development is derogatory to the Deity. Could God, we ask F. D. T., have exhausted Himself in a creative act ? and does it not impart a far higher view of the Deity and of His universe to think of Him as bestowing the power of continual and ever new manifestations through the successively interchanged correlations of force than that He shut up each thing and creature to one single form in one single type ? We regard evolution as a far nobler as well as a far more easily comprehended idea than creation. S. E. A.

The Essayist.

"THE ECLIPSE OF FAITH."

"Oh, dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon,
Irrecoverably dark, total eclipse
Without all hope of day!"—MILTON, "*Samson Agonistes*."

SUCH are the words, "the bitter language of the heart," put by a great poet into the mouth of the Israelitish champion, struggling, captive and blind, in the hands of his relentless foes. But if the deprivation of material light were so deplorable an affliction, forcing from the sufferer that cry of despairing anguish, how much more deplorable is the condition of one in spiritual darkness wrestling with the fell demon of doubt, his eyes sealed the while to that light of the Gospel which in supernal effulgence is shining all around him—a picture, alas! too truly descriptive of the condition of many a one in this our day—a day of wide-spread change and revolution, as witnessed in the sifting and examination of even the first principles of morals and religion; and when, of Christianity in particular, it can no longer be said, as in Bishop Butler's day, that it has come to be generally regarded as a subject not even worthy of inquiry, though, in truth, everything depends upon how and in what spirit that inquiry is conducted.

Of that intellectual state denoted by the word *scepticism*, a state, properly speaking, of doubt or inquiry,* many and various are the phases and degrees.

* "In the first place, then, let us define what we mean by *Scepticism*. A Sceptic, in the original meaning of the word, is a searcher—one who is looking round him for something that he wishes to find. The name is therefore properly given to one who is looking for his creed—who has his convictions yet to find; and Scepticism is the state of mind in which such inquiry is made—a state of suspended belief—a state between belief and disbelief. The Sceptic is not yet convinced that what he is inquiring about either is or is not: either of these convictions implies certainty. I need not remind you, students, I hope, all of you, of Whately, that to disbelieve is to be-

and most desolate phase, the most extreme degree, a dub-tossed spirit, on the verge of despair, begins to ask, "Can this universal frame be indeed without a mind, the chance, or bound in the adamant chain of an necessity?—whether man be immortal, or but the mortal, doomed, once that brief day is o'er, to droop from the abyss of nothingness—the heart-chilling doctrine of a Deistic creed. Such is scepticism of the extreme*—earnest in its mood, and as such it finds its representative character who figures as chief disputant in that work, "The Eclipse of Faith," which we now propose as the subject of our consideration. The design and scope are thus indicated by the *Quarterly Review* :—

"The main design is to apply (Bishop) Butler's great and recent modifications of *Deism*. He has thrown the whole, for the most part, into the form of dialogue; and we find that Socratic weapons have never, since the time of Plato, been wielded with more grace and spirit. Various talkers come upon the stage, who state fairly the opinions of the various schools, and are successively foiled by a sceptical antagonist who throws them in succession by the very objections which they advance against Christianity. This task is accomplished with every great power of logic, but also with unusual brilliancy, seasoned with a plentiful mixture of sarcasm, the latter being never intruded needlessly into the argument, springing naturally out of it. The principal representative in the dialogue is a disciple of Mr. Francis Bacon, whose writings are made to supply a large contribution to the amusement."

Quarterly Review. A word as to the principal character in the dialogue. First, then, we have the sceptic

is convinced that the proposition we disbelieve is *not* true, and he has as much faith or credulity in believing this, as in believing the contrary. But a Sceptic has not arrived at either decision; he is absolutely 'Yes' or 'No:' his verdict is simply, 'Not true.' "Scepticism:" *A Lecture by the Rev. William C. Magee, D.D.* This is a species of philosophic Atheism—that system of abstraction, which supposes a future state, under the conception of *Nirvāna*, or nothingness.

par excellence, a young man of the highly refined and intellectual class, of an inquisitive and speculative, but withal somewhat morbid temperament—one who, rejecting or doubting Christianity, doubts with equal impartiality of all other religious systems, and not least so of those flimsy forms of Deism proposed to be substituted in its stead—those forms especially which, under various high-sounding names, are so rife in the present day. These, logically tested, he finds, each in turn, to be liable to the same objections as are usually brought against Christianity—the same, only increased a thousandfold, with the addition of others peculiar to themselves. So, unable to take up with any of these, he at last abandons the search for truth in despair, and remains in a state of utter doubt and incertitude—in the truest, because the original, sense of the words, a *sceptic*. His scepticism is represented as having been due principally to the impressions derived from a residence of some years in Germany, the scene of speculative strife. To employ his own words, "It was the very spectacle of their interminable disputes and distractions in philosophy and theology—ever darker and darker, deeper and deeper, as system after system chased each other away, like the clouds they resemble through a winter sky; it was, I say, the very spectacle of their distractions which first made me a *sceptic*." Such is this youth, the reflective, melancholy "Harrington," whose *beclouded* faith gives its title to the volume "*The Eclipse of Faith*."

Secondly, there is the Deist before-mentioned, a disciple of Mr. Newman, and, like his master, a devout believer in the theory of "spiritual insight," a something which is to anticipate and supersede the necessity of all external revelation, which is declared to be, in fact, an *impossibility*. Thirdly, there is a Christian of the good old-fashioned orthodox type, yet as far as possible removed from any narrow-minded bigotry or intolerance, willing to make all due allowances for, while at the same time deprecating, error. Thus the Christian acts as a sort of arbiter between the two contending parties, the Deist and Sceptic, and ends by making a close and personal appeal to the latter, an appeal directed both to his intellect and his heart, strongly urging upon him the unreasonableness of persevering in a course of scepticism and its moral culpability, if only on the ground that no one would so act in regard to the affairs of this life. Bishop Butler's great argument—a craving for *demonstration* where such cannot be had—is shown to lie at the

icism. To quote here the words of Dr. M'Cosh:—
 shown . . . that, in every age of the Church of
 evidence has been furnished to the candid mind of
 a supernatural power. It should be added that in
 of such a character been furnished as to preclude
 of doubt. I believe that the very existence of God
 of so intuitive or demonstrative a character, as to
 ble for 'the fool' to say 'in his heart' that 'there
 a regard to the Bible revelation, God has given
 to convince every truth-seeking mind, but not
 ent cavilling. There is thus a sort of moral proba-
 in which the evidence is presented."

re the three principal characters who appear on the
 w subordinate ones being also, as occasion requires,
 ne whole tendency of the work is to show that there
 ing-place—though some may and do find a halting-
 deism, fairly carrying out its principles, and atheism,
 otal scepticism. To quote on this point the words
 e Taylor,—“Educated men should not wait to be
 those who, after abandoning a peremptory historic
 r to retain faith and piety for their comfort, stand
 at has no ledges; atheism, in its simplest form,
 e those who there stand; and they know themselves
 g towards it.” “It would be far more reasonable,”
 for a man to die as a martyr for atheism—a stage
 o further progress is possible—than to do so at any
 hat terminus, knowing as he does that every day is
 earer to the gulph. The stronger the mind is, and
 of intellectual massiveness, the more rapid will be
 a this declivity. Minds of little density and of much
 may stay long where they are, just as gnats and
 upon the slimy sides of a china vase—they do not
 ever again will they fly.” For this condition of
 er goes on to assign several reasons, amongst these
 mportant, though often least regarded, being the
 y advance of the modern physical sciences, whose
 to shake and displace any creed or system which
 n a fixed and solid basis—that those very sciences
 ntly boasted nowadays are to sweep away Chris-
 quated and obsolete will, on the contrary, sweep

away all those forms of deism, those hollow phantasms, which are attempted to be substituted in its stead—forms which owe any substance or vitality they have to the fact—a fact which cannot be too strongly insisted on—of their being for the most part mere plagiarisms of the said Christianity. Hear Isaac Taylor again:—“But whatever damage Science may do to Christianity, its operation . . . will be not to *damage*, but to put quite out of existence every phase of those vague pietistic notions which it may have been thought possible to retain when Christianity is gone. The fate of all those varieties of speculative doctrine is already sealed, and it is sealed by the hand of our modern physical sciences!” And again:—“As to any of those theosophic abstractions which we may wish to cling to after we have thrown away the Bible, we might as well suppose that they will resist the impact of the mathematical and physical sciences as imagine that the lichens of an Alpine gorge will stay the slow descent of a glacier.”

But to return to our immediate subject, the “Eclipse of Faith.” With irresistible force of logic the Deist is driven out of one position after another, as at the point of the bayonet, till at last he finds himself standing on the dizzy brink of that awful gulf aforesaid, and trembling at the prospect. But here the question may be asked, “Why thus, by hard dint of logic, force men into Atheism or Scepticism? Were it not better, surely, that they should have *some* religion, even Deism, vague and unsatisfactory as it is, than none?” To this we may reply much in the same way as the author *does* reply,—that let men once become convinced of the difficulty, nay, the *impossibility* of finding the *via media* between Christianity and Atheism or Scepticism, and they will, if earnest seekers after truth, take refuge in the Bible—that if it be the Book of God indeed, this is the issue to which the great controversy *will* and should come. As to the former alternative proposed (Atheism or Scepticism) few, on the one hand, will be satisfied to rest in such a creed, or rather no creed, as Atheism; few, save the most brutish and degraded of mankind, the profane and the sensual,—even that class typified by “the fool” of the Psalmist, who “saith in his heart, there is no God;” or, it may be, those cold, heartless beings represented in the person of the “philosopher” upon whom the poet pours his indignant scorn—those grovelling materialists who, as he expresses it, can—

"Botanize upon their mother's grave;" *

and, on the other hand, fewer still will endure, with the Sceptic, to be for ever tossing on the restless waves of doubt, or can be willing to become

"Wanderers o'er Eternity,
Whose bark drives on and on, and anchor'd ne'er shall be." †

To follow in detail all the lines of argument traced out in the present work would of course be impossible within the limits of a single essay—would, in fact, be almost equivalent to a work in itself. A few brief remarks, then, on some of the principal heads must suffice. And first to touch upon that main section denoted by the title of *The Via Media of Deism*. The author here enters into a minute and elaborate investigation of the theories of Mr. Francis Newman and Mr. Theodore Parker, writers who both alike deny the possibility or necessity of an external revelation, or a "book-revelation," as they contemptuously call it—the one asserting the sufficiency of that internal oracle, the "spiritual faculty," to guide man into all truth; the other maintaining that there is a common principle underlying all religions, known by the name of the "Absolute Religion," which hallows and sanctifies them all; that, by virtue of the said principle, if but sincerely believed and acted on, all men have an equal claim to the Divine favour and reward—from the meek Christian martyr, like Stephen perishing with a prayer on his lips for his persecutors, to the grim savage reeking with the blood of human sacrifice.

To quote the words of Theodore Parker, "He that worships truly, by whatever form,"—that is, who is sincere in his fetichism, his idolatry, his sacrifices, though they may be human—"worships the only God; He hears the prayer, whether called Brahma, Pan, or Lord, or called by no name at all. Each people has its prophets and its saints, and many a swarthy Indian who bowed down to wood and stone; many a grim-faced Calmuck who worshipped the great god of storms; many a Grecian peasant, who did homage to Phœbus Apollo when the sun rose or went down; yes, many a savage, his hands smeared all over with human sacrifice, shall come from the East and the West, and sit down in the kingdom of God

* Wordsworth. "A Poet's Epitaph."

† Byron. "Childe Harold."

with Moses and Zoroaster, with Socrates and Jesus." Such theories are severally examined at length and refuted. The author shows, for example, how the "spiritual faculty," instead of guiding men into all truth, has, on the contrary, invariably guided them into all error, leaving them, in spite of its boasted aid and illumination, to wallow helplessly in the mire of the most degrading and abominable superstitions—fetichism, polytheism, and idolatry of every kind. And again, that the so-called "absolute religion," inasmuch as it is consistent with, and indeed *involves*, acts and practices that contradict the first intuitions of our moral nature,—instance in the case of the savage just mentioned—must therefore be utterly and *absolutely* false. He goes on yet further to show that the difficulties, insoluble as they confessedly are, attendant on the Scripture doctrine of the Fall, viz., that evil should have been permitted by a Being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness—that these very difficulties are indefinitely increased and aggravated on the infidel hypothesis; for what is that hypothesis? What but this: man is now just what he was at first by the original constitution of his nature, or rather—thanks to himself though—a little more favourably circumstanced; that he came forth from his Creator's hand in a condition worse than that of the beasts which perish, and was left unaided to work his way up, through ages of darkness, crime, and ignorance, from the lowest depths of savagery to a state of comparative civilization and enlightenment.* Such is the theory, no less dishonouring to God than degrading to man,

* "Is it not strange to observe how carefully some philosophers, who deplore the condition of the world and profess to expect its amelioration, keep their speculations clear of every idea of Divine interposition? No builders of houses or cities were ever more attentive to guard against the access of flood or fire. If *He* should but touch their prospective theories of improvement, they would renounce them, as defiled and fit only for vulgar fanaticism. Their system of providence would be profaned by the intrusion of the Almighty. Man is to effect an apotheosis for himself by the hopeful process of exhausting his corruption. And should it take a long series of ages, vices, and woes, to reach this glorious attainment, patience may sustain itself the while by the thought that, when it is realized, it will be burdened with no duty of religious gratitude. No time is too long to wait, no cost too deep to incur, for the triumph of proving that we have no need of a Divinity, regarded as possessing that one attribute which makes it delightful to acknowledge such a Being, the benevolence

ty is obliged to resort to in order to evade the Scrip-
 of the Fall and its consequences—a theory which in
 s God himself as the Prime Author of all the evil and
 the universe; for, according to this theory, man was
 m and necessitated to develop himself, through a
 ful course of sin and suffering, into a higher state in
 being! Well, then, may a sceptic exclaim, "Such a
 d by the 'spiritual faculties' of Mr. Newman and Mr.
 be imagined to be a more worthy object of worship
 d of the Bible; 'he shall never receive mine. If I
 the Bible because it gives me unworthy conceptions
 I must with more reason abjure, on similar grounds,
 ble theory of man's creation, destination and history."
 to a "book-revelation," which the infidel so affects to
 hown that he of all men is the one least entitled to
 t, in fact, he has from time immemorial given to the
 re *his* "book-revelations," and nothing else. Why,
 be argued, should it be *impossible*, as he asserts, for
 a book, and do in a much better manner, what man,
 s already done? That, further, this despised "book-
 perfectly in accordance with His ordinary mode of
 dealing, for He has made the whole progress and
 of the human race depend on the art of writing,
 art and its products man remains irredeemably a
 e of his sublime intellect, and an idolater, in spite of
 itual faculties," and what not; "in fact, not much
 e beasts, in spite of all those noble capacities which,
 are *in* him, are, as it were, hopelessly locked up till
 d this key to their treasures."

one more of the principal heads of argument—that,
 antithetic title, "That Miracles are Impossible, but
 ossible to Prove It,"—Strauss, Renan, and that whole
 rs, lay it down as an incontrovertible axiom, that

e us happy. But even if this noble sufficiency cannot be
 dependence of spirit which has laboured for it must not
 piety. This afflicted world, 'this poor terrestrial citadel of
 k its gates, and keep its miseries, rather than admit the
 receiving help from God."—*John Foster's "Essays,"* p. 177,

miracles are impossible, arguing on the ground that they are contrary to uniform experience, that is to say, arbitrarily making the experience of the present age a test and criterion of that of all past ages of the world. Assuming this principle, the author, or the Sceptic his spokesman, proceeds to show that, if fairly carried out to its results, it would inevitably lead to the denial of a creation, and the introduction, for the first time, of man upon the scene, such an event—call it miraculous or not—being, to say the least, as contrary to our present experience as any of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, as, for instance, the raising of the dead. He goes on further to show that, on the same principle, the Eastern prince of the story was justified in his incredulity as to the existence of ice, such a natural phenomenon being contrary to his own uniform experience and that of all his countrymen. But the most subtle and dexterous stroke of logic, perhaps, is that dealt at the close of the argument, in the piece of reasoning by which it is shown, that were it possible for the infidel impugner to convince mankind of the impossibility of miracles, this would in itself be tantamount to a miracle, inasmuch as a belief in the miraculous has widely prevailed in all ages of the world, and is likely still to prevail, uniform experience to the contrary notwithstanding. The reasoning may be thrown into the form of a syllogism, as thus:—Uniform experience has declared a miracle to be impossible. But the same experience has also shown that mankind generally have always believed and, in all probability, will continue to believe, in the miraculous. Convince them of this their error, and you will thereby have contradicted uniform experience; and, *ergo*, wrought a moral miracle in the very act of disproving a physical one, all miracles being supposed equally impossible. Thus is the uniform-experience test, that trust and stay of unbelief, made, like a broken reed, to pierce the hand that leaned upon it! The chapter on “The Dilemmas of an Infidel Neophyte,” or, “How it was that Infidelity prevented my becoming an Infidel,” is one to which we would desire, above all, to direct special attention. The author there sets forth and examines at considerable length all the various theories of infidelity to account for Christianity exclusive of its supernatural origin. The inherent improbability of these theories, and their hopeless discrepancy and discordancy one with another, are ably pointed out and exposed.

Similarly deserving of notice is a chapter to which, as bearing

theme, we would also desire in this connection to see a more serious and characteristic one, entitled "The Paradise of the Sinner," under the form of a dream or vision are set forth a series of schemes, devised and imagined by the perverse ingenuity of the author, for the purpose of transmitting to the world a revelation of the truth in a more effective manner than, in the case of the gospel, has actually been done, man's moral liberty being still preserved, such being an indispensable condition of the process, and the words, that the evidence should not be so overborne, that the evidence should not be so overborne to bear down all possibility of offering resistance, should be the case—to use the author's own illustration, the author is placed upon the edge of a precipice, and told that he is immediately thrown over it if he transgressed the limits of reason or temperance." These schemes are successively exposed to utter and ignominious failure and discomfiture. The author has said enough to indicate the general character of the work, "Faith." It is, in our opinion, one of the best, if not the best, on the Christian Evidences that has appeared since the time of Bishop Butler's in the last century; and we think it worthy of that highly gifted divine, Dr. Magee, whose *Christian Evidences*, before referred to,* is a masterpiece of argument, for saying that it is a book which ought to be in the hands of every young man; perhaps it might even be added, that it is no longer young. We would, for our part, be glad to see its counterpart, "Reason and Faith," by the same author, introduced into the theological studies of our colleges. It is true indeed that Butler and Paley, especially the former—writers whom it is now the fashion to decry,—are still great bulwarks of defence against all the attacks of infidelity, let it do its worst; but then, we think, they are still further strengthened and fortified by the new works as these of the book in question, or others of the same mode of attack having varied, *formally* at least, but the substance should correspond. The plan of the work so far as it differs from that of most other works of the kind in this, that the author does not content himself with merely standing on the defensive, but carries the war into the enemy's camp, and attacks

* Bishop of Peterborough, 1868.

† As, e.g., Pearson on Infidelity.

and routs infidelity with those very weapons which it has forged against Christianity, thus in a manner verifying the prophetic saying of old, "No weapon that is formed against thee shall prosper."* Yet is the author no mere man of logic, "an intellectual All-in-all,"† but, as has been already intimated, makes his appeal to the heart too, and that in a very moving and eloquent way, where he deals personally with the Sceptic towards the close of the book. He thus, for instance, addresses him at the end of a long disquisition, wherein he points out, with singular force and logical acumen, the monstrous paradoxes of Scepticism:—"Yes, it is on the side of feeling I would also address you! You will say, feeling is not argument. No, but is man all reason? I firmly believe, indeed, that man is not called upon to do anything for which his reason tells him he has not sufficient evidence; but a part of that very evidence is the dictate of feeling, and *genuine* reason will listen to the heart as not *always*, nor perhaps more frequently than otherwise, a suspicious pleader. If, as Pascal says so truly, it sometimes has its reasons, which the reason cannot comprehend, it has also its reasons which the reason thoroughly understands." With what fairness, then, we ask, can the writer, after this, be stigmatised by the *National Review*‡ as the most slashing and merciless of the captains of what it is pleased to call the "Hard School of Theology"?

To state briefly, before concluding, our principal object in thus bringing forward a subject like the present—one of a character apparently so little inviting or attractive. It was not, then, so much in the hope of being able to do justice to the work,—an arduous task indeed,—as with the purpose of commending it to the notice of our readers, that they might be thereby induced, if possible, to study it for themselves at their leisure; for the train of reasoning there pursued is subtle and intricate, requiring, on the reader's part, a constant effort of attention to take in and apprehend, and so could not easily be presented in a clear and intelligible form in a mere cursory review. If this slight and imperfect sketch, however, shall prove the humble means of exciting an interest in the work, and thereby inducing any of our readers to study it for themselves, we shall deem ourselves amply rewarded.

* Isa. liv. 17. † Wordsworth, "A Poet's Epitaph."

‡ Now for some years discontinued.

To conclude in the words of the author himself:—"If the discussions in the preceding pages shall in any instance convince the youthful reader of the precarious nature of those book-revelations which are somewhat inconsistently given us in books which tell us that all book-revelations of religious truth are superfluous or even impossible; if they shall convince him how easily an *impartial* doubter can retort with interest the Deistical arguments against Christianity, or how little merely insoluble objections can avail against anything; if they shall convince him that the differences with which the assailants of the Bible taunt its advocates are neither so numerous nor half so appalling as those which divide its enemies; or, lastly, if they shall, *par avance*, in any degree protect those who, like Harrington D——, are being made, or are in danger of being made, *sceptical* as to all religious truth by the religious distractions of the present day, I shall be well content to bear the charge of having spoiled a fiction, or even of having mutilated a biography." For a picture, drawn in vivid colours, of the blighting, withering, desolating effects of scepticism upon the soul, we would refer to a fine passage in the poet Campbell, that beginning,—

"Oh! lives there, heaven, beneath thy dread expanse,
One hopeless, dark idolater of chance,
Content to feed, with pleasures unrefined,
The lukewarm passions of a lowly mind;
Who, mouldering earthward, rest of every trust,
In joyless union wedded to the dust,
Could all his parting energy dismiss,
And call this barren world sufficient bliss?" *

B. C. H.

ON THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

In every question, it is most necessary that first of all the meaning of the terms employed should be clearly comprehended, and rightly understood; and much more is this the case when the subject in hand relates to the sphere of mind, where everything seems plunged in triple darkness, and every attempt to cast away the shroud that envelops it seems only to make the darkness more visible. We shall, therefore, at once proceed to define what we

* "Pleasures of Hope."

mean by the term Consciousness, and thus mark out the limits and design of this paper.

"Consciousness is the knowledge which the mind has of itself, as engaged in some exercise of power, or passing under the experience of some impression."

It is the knowledge which the mind has of *itself*, and not of the *matter* with which the mind is occupied.

Thus, when it is objected that consciousness deceives us by attributing the presence of a certain object, in consequence of the presence of certain impressions, no such object being present, we answer that such a conclusion is beyond the sphere of consciousness. For instance, when I see the shadow of a man, and mistake this shadow for the original, consciousness testifies that my mind was subjected to certain modifications, and my mind, having previously been subjected to similar modifications, on seeing a man, I assume that nothing but a man could produce such modifications, and I therefore at once conclude that I see a man. Here the mistake arises, not from an error in the impressions which consciousness made me aware of, but in the assumption which I made, that nothing else but a man could cause such impressions.*

We therefore confine the sphere of consciousness to that knowledge which we have of the mere phenomena of mind, and exclude therefrom all questions concerning those things, external to the mind, which were the causes of these impressions.

The question then to be solved is, Can we, or can we not, place implicit confidence in the facts revealed by consciousness?

Is the testimony of consciousness capable of being supported by clear and demonstrative proof? or if not, what evidence is there one way or the other, for or against?

To this then we answer: It is impossible to prove by clear and demonstrative reasoning, either, on the one hand, that consciousness is reliable, or, on the other, that it is unworthy of credit.

* "We take to ourselves only an uncertain picture of material external things. We picture within ourselves in a more adequate form the thoughts, feelings, and volitions of others. Still more memory may be true to my own earlier received thoughts, to my own feelings and volitions. The immediate apprehension of the mental images presented to me is necessarily true. Error is possible only when they are subserved under a general notion. In this case internal perception, more trustworthy than external, is the foundation of all philosophical knowledge."—*Dr. F. Ueberweg's "System of Logic,"* p. 88.

ny that all men do believe that facts of consciousness of all credit, but we do object to their being as that can be proved and demonstrated beyond all doubt.

id by Sir William Hamilton and others, that it is possible to doubt the truth of the evidence of consciousness if one fact of consciousness, they say, is unworthy of consciousness must be open to the same suspicion. We select certain facts of consciousness, some as unworthy of credence, since such an act would destroy that very consciousness whose credibility we are therefore, they say, impossible to doubt the truth of consciousness, since doubt, being in itself an act of consciousness could not doubt any fact of consciousness without that we doubted, and thus destroying the first principle in regard to the testimony of consciousness say, annihilate and destroy itself.

that to doubt facts of consciousness necessitates a doubt, we contend that it is still possible to suppose consciousness is unreliable. It proves only that our faculties cannot doubt that it is logically impossible to doubt consciousness; prove that consciousness is incapable of deceit, since logical impossibility may in itself be only an effect of unreliability of consciousness.

is annihilation of doubt by doubt is the only way the testimony of consciousness can be upheld, it follows that the question of the reliability, or unreliability, of consciousness is, in so far as logical proof is concerned.

maintained in answer to this that I am unable to give any proof of my own existence, but do not, therefore, doubt my existence.

question whether in that particular instance logical proof cannot be given, we maintain that wherever logical proof is required there must be doubt.

he question transcends our powers of thought, it is impossible to examine consciousness by consciousness, for consciousness we have nothing higher.

J. T. CUNINGHAME.

The Reviewer.

The Life of Charles Dickens, by JOHN FORSTER. Vol. I., 1812—1844. London: Chapman and Hall. SECOND NOTICE.

MR. DICKENS'S books were generally directed against some great abuse, or social mischief, which he attacked without mercy. Thus we find that "Oliver Twist" was intended as an assault upon the pauperizing system of the Poor Law of that day, while "Nicholas Nickleby" vigorously fell upon another, viz., the Yorkshire cheap school system, some of the horrors of which had recently been brought to light in a law trial of the time.

"Nicholas Nickleby" succeeded "Pickwick" as a serial story, and was received with delight by the public. Generous critics had kindly suggested that the humour of its author had been worked out, and that he would not be able longer to maintain his popularity. "Nicholas Nickleby" soon falsified this prediction. Its success was enormous, and deservedly so. Before writing it, Dickens and his friend, Hablot Browne, had visited Yorkshire, and made themselves acquainted with the kind of life they were about to depict; the one with his pen, and the other with his pencil. No one will forget its characters—Smike, Newman Noggs, Miss Bates, Mrs. Nickleby, Kate, and Mrs. Gamp. The incomparable letter of Miss Squeers to Ralph Nickleby, after Nicholas had inflicted his well-deserved chastisement on the proprietor of Dotheboys Hall, we cannot forbear transcribing: "My pa requests me to write to you, the doctors considering it doubtful whether he will ever recuver the use of his legs, which prevents his holding a pen. We are in a state of mind beyond everything, and my pa is one mask of brooses both blue and green, likewise two forms are steeped in his Goar. . . . Me and my brother were then the victims of his feury, since which we have suffered very much, which leads us to the arrowing belief that we have received some injury in our insides, especially as no marks of violence are visible externally. I am screaming out loud all the time I write, and so is my

brother, which takes off my attention rather, and I hope will excuse mistakes." The style of the book is no doubt superior to "Pickwick," besides which it is a compact and connected story. Sydney Smith said that it conquered him, and that he could no longer stand out against Dickens, of whom he had not previously, it appears, thought overmuch. "In 'Nickleby' the old city" (London) "reappears under every aspect, and whether warmth and light are playing over what is good and cheerful in it, or the veil is uplifted from its darker scenes, it is at all times our privilege to see and feel it as it absolutely is. Its interior hidden life becomes familiar as its commonest outward forms, and we discover that we hardly knew anything of the places we supposed that we knew best." "Nickleby" was commenced in February, 1838, and concluded in October, 1839.

Among Dickens's friends at this time were Talfourd, MacIise the painter, Macready the tragedian, Sir David Wilkie, and many other well-known men. During the time he was occupied on "Nickleby," Dickens entered at the Middle Temple, but so far as the present volume goes, he does not appear to have done more than that. During this year also an idea was originated by Dickens, which was ultimately fully developed and put before the public as "Master Humphrey's Clock," and is no doubt well known to all our readers. Whenever a great venture was made, it was characteristic of Dickens that his habit was to be away from town on the day of publication, and in this instance it was at Birmingham he received the welcome news that seventy thousand copies of the first number were disposed of. It was not originally intended that a continuous story should run through the "Clock," but as it was evident that this was required by the public, it ultimately assumed the form of a serial story, rather than that of a weekly magazine. Through this medium were written some of Dickens's best and most successful stories, and in especial the "Old Curiosity Shop."

This great masterpiece of his genius seems to have disclosed itself half unconsciously in his mind, and gradually settled down into the form in which we have it; and who would wish for any other? Little Nell appears to have taken entire possession of him. When the tale was getting towards its close, and consequently when Nell's life was fast ebbing away, Mr. Forster says, "Fast shortening as the life of Little Nell was now, the dying year might have seen it pass away; but I never knew him wind up any tale

with such a sorrowful reluctance as this. He caught at any excuse to hold his hand from it, and stretched to the utmost limit the time left to complete it in. Christmas interposed its delays too, so that Twelfth-night had come and gone when I wrote to him in the belief that he was nearly done." His reply, as given by Mr. Forster, was—"Done! Done!!! Why, bless you, I shall not be done till Wednesday night. I only began yesterday, and this part of the story is not to be galloped over, I can tell you. I think it will come out famously—but I am the wretchedest of the wretched. It casts the most horrible shadow upon me, and it is as much as I can do to keep moving at all. I tremble to approach the place a great deal more than Kit; a great deal more than Mr. Garland; a great deal more than the Single Gentlemen." (Our readers will know these, and will appreciate the allusions.) "I shan't recover it for a long time. No one will miss her" (Little Nell) "like I shall. It is such a very painful thing to me, that I really cannot express my sorrow. Old wounds bleed afresh when I only think of the way of doing it; what the actual doing it will be God knows. I can't preach to myself the schoolmaster's consolation, though I try. Dear Mary" (his sister-in-law, who, as we have seen, died some years before) "died yesterday when I think of this sad story." And again afterwards, "It makes me very melancholy to think that all these people are lost to me for ever, and I feel as if I never could become attached to any new set of characters."

Well may he have felt so; and who after reading the book does not sympathize with him, in this tale of surpassing interest? In thinking of it the whole of the characters rush back upon us. The pure and simple child leading her grandfather away from the wretched city, with no definite notion except simple reliance and trust, her manifold adventures on their journey, her careful watching over the old man, their comparative security in the wax-works until she finds that gaming, in order to secure to her wealth and comfort, has taken such entire possession of him, that under the auspices of the two rascals who plunder him, he is about to prey upon the resources of their kind benefactress, Mrs. Jarley, when the child with almost superhuman strength of purpose flies with the old man, and is again cast upon the cold world unprotected, except by her purity; their subsequent encounter with their former friend the schoolmaster, their ultimate settling down with him on a small sinecure he obtains for them, and their attainment of that peace

child has all along sighed for her grandfather, he is edged out of the way of his fatal temptation; the gradual and subsequent beautiful death of the child, just before the eyes of those who were in fond pursuit of them; these incidents, in the touching and truly pathetic manner in which they are related, can resist the charm of their fascination, or would do so? Worn out by her long journey, and the cruel fate to which she had been subject, her purpose accomplished, she dies unspotted by all she has passed through, and all the scenes and incidents of her life, were not separated from her death, as the old man speedily follows his grandfather to the grave. And could any critic ever be so cruel as to say that the child's life should have been prolonged? Taken as a work of art, surely the death of the child is the natural conclusion to the tale. Dickens has told us in one of his novels that he had hundreds of letters begging him not to do it, but he was forced to do it. Is such a child possible? I would say yes, and we cannot but concur in his verdict when we consider that he has received from different parts, and even from the most distant, letters written by fond hands recounting the lives of children equally pure and self-sacrificing as Little Nell. And it is to be said of that incarnation in bodily deformity, and mental defects of man? Some would fain have brought him to the bar of public justice like his colleague in crime, John Brass; but who can doubt the propriety of the sentence, which, while the officers of justice are at his heels, sends him from his favourite den into the cold Thames, and thus sends him once before the tribunal of Supreme Justice? The story of his drowning is thrilling. Of the indomitable and cruel John Brass, the Marchioness, Dick Swiveller, and the others we must say nothing. The aim of the writer is to point out that truth and virtue must in the end triumph, however prosperous and flourishing vice may appear to be. There is always a cankerworm eating at its roots, and it must end in a terrible fall, however prolonged the result may be, as in the case of the Brasses and Quilp. This book was an extraordinary success, and we are told that in America especially it secured the writer's fame. Mr. Forster says,—

The vein it had opened was perhaps mainly the cause of the opinion at home continued still to turn on the old

characteristics; the freshness of humour of which the pathos was but another form and product, the grasp of reality with which character had again been seized, the discernment of good under its least attractive forms, and of evil in its most captivating disguises, the cordial wisdom and sound heart, the enjoyment and fun, luxurious, yet under proper control. No falling off was found in these, and I doubt if any of his people have been more widely liked than Dick Swiveller and the Marchioness. . . . Many an over-suspicious person will find advantage in remembering what a too liberal application of Foxey's principle of suspecting everybody brought Mr. Sampson Brass to; and many an over-hasty judgment of poor human nature will unconsciously be checked when it is remembered that Mr. Christopher Nubbles *did* come back to work out that shilling."

Dickens was at this time (1840) living in Devonshire Terrace, Regent's Park, and his biographer favours us with a pleasant instance of his kindly nature. We may as well give it in Mr. Forster's own words:—

"He was obliged to sit as juryman at an inquest on the body of a little child alleged to have been murdered by its mother: of which the result was, that by his persevering exertion, seconded by the humane help of the coroner, Mr. Wakley, the verdict of himself and his fellow-jurymen charged her only with concealment of the birth. Dickens says, 'The poor desolate creature dropped upon her knees before us with protestations that we were right (protestations among the most affecting that I have ever heard in my life), and was carried away insensible. I caused some extra care to be taken of her in prison, and counsel to be retained for her defence when she was tried at the Old Bailey; and her sentence was lenient, and her history and conduct proved that it was right.'"

The Regent's Park and Broadstairs formed his regular places of residence at this time. He was very fond of physical exercise, and especially that of riding on horseback, and his rides were frequent, and sometimes very long, as his friend and biographer testifies; and during his walking exercises he is said, in the end of the year 1841, to have thoroughly explored the ballad literature of Seven Dials, which he reproduced with great effect.

The principles on which to judge men he has laid down in a letter to his biographer, wherein he recounts his having effected the reconciliation of two friends:—

"For the first—'In the midst of this child's death, I, over whom something of the bitterness of death has passed, not lightly perhaps, was reminded of many old kindnesses, and was sorry in my heart

no really liked each other should waste life at arms the last—"I have laid it down as a rule in my judgment to observe narrowly whether some (of whom we are inclined to think badly) don't carry all their faults upon the surface, and some (of whom one is disposed to think well) don't carry many upon it. I have long made sure that our friend is in the right, and when I know all the foibles a man has, with little more discovery, I begin to think he is worth liking."

"Rudge" was the next tale which issued from "Master Clock." It was commenced in February, 1841, and continued to October of the same year. It is, as our readers are aware, of the time of the Gordon riots, and is, perhaps, the most faithful to the historical novel which its author ever wrote. It has a clear and distinct aim. It is one of his most successful books, and displays considerable thoughtfulness and manly type. It is an earnest protest against the harshness of the law of that time, and a satire upon the social state of the age. The poor idiot Barnaby and his raven, his household, Sir John Chester, and the other characters are well drawn, and afford matter for profitable reading and study, as indeed do all his books. The burning of Newgate is described in especially graphic terms.

Mr. Forster was attacked by a serious illness during or near the end of the year, "but," says Mr. Forster, "he bore up gallantly, and on a better occasion than now to observe his quiet endurance. Little he thought of himself where the sense of self is so supreme, and the manful duty with which everything is connected, ailing as he was, he felt it necessary to do."

The proof of his kind-heartedness here presents itself. It is related that in order to regain possession of the copyrights of sketches by Boz, Mr. Maerone had extorted from him a sum of upwards of £2,000. About this time Mr. Forster, leaving his widow in very straitened circumstances; to assist her turned a farce he had previously written, "The Lamplighter," into a comic tale, and by this and other means, which he gathered from his literary friends, and "the Picnic Papers," he was able to raise for the widow £1,000.

In the middle of 1841 he started out on a visit to Scotland, taking with him.

His friends at Edinburgh determined to give him a dinner,

and to show the feelings entertained for him there we introduce a portion of a letter written to his friend on 23rd June, 1841. "I have been this morning to the Parliament House, and am now introduced (I hope) to everybody in Edinburgh. The hotel is perfectly besieged, and I have been forced to take refuge in a sequestered apartment at the end of a long passage, wherein I write this letter. They talk of three hundred at the dinner. . . . The castle is in front of the windows, and the view noble. There was a supper ready last night, which would have been a dinner anywhere."

He sketches the eminent persons who are to take part in the dinner, and says, "I am glad to find that they propose to give me for a toast on Friday" (the day of the dinner), "'The Memory of Wilkie'" (who had just died very suddenly). "I should have liked it better than anything if I could have made my choice. Communicate all particulars to Mac[ilise]. I would to God you were both here. Do dine together at Gray's Inn on Friday, and think of me." On the morning after the dinner he writes:—

"The great event is over, and being gone I am a man again. It was the most brilliant affair you can conceive; the completest success possible from first to last. The room was crammed, and more than seventy applicants for tickets were of necessity refused yesterday. Wilson was ill, but plucked up like a lion and spoke famously. I send you a paper herewith, but the report is dismal in the extreme. They say there will be a better one—I don't know where or when. Should there be, I will send it to you. I *think* (ahem!) that I spoke rather well. It was an excellent room, and both the subjects (Wilson and Scottish literature, and the memory of Wilkie) were good to go upon. There were nearly two hundred ladies present. The place is so contrived that the cross-table is raised enormously, much above the heads of the people sitting below; and the effect on first coming in (on me I mean) was rather tremendous. I was quite self-possessed, however, and, notwithstanding the enthoosemoosy, which was very startling, as cool as a cucumber."

After this Dickens and his wife, accompanied by a good friend, Mr. Angus Fletcher, made a tour through the Highlands, and the impression made upon Dickens's mind by the grand scenery which he there witnessed appears to have been great and lasting, for during his subsequent visit to America he still regarded the Highland scenery as far superior to the American. Writing to his friend, he says,—

"I don't bore you with accounts of Ben this and that, and Lochs

f names, but this is a wonderful region. The way the talking about to-day, and the clouds lying down upon deep glens, the high rocks, the rushing waterfalls, and rivers down in deep gulfs below, were all stupendous. wedged round by great heights that are lost in the the loch twelve miles long stretches out its dreary the windows."

d some six miles with Fletcher after we got there" (called Killin), "to see a waterfall; and truly it was sight, foaming and crashing down three great steps; leaping over the first, and rumbling and foaming dizzy pool below you with a deafening roar."

that terrible pass of Glencoe, the scene of the infamous a part of the clan of the Macdonalds, described by his History, with all the power of his pen. Of his road the pass itself, Dickens says,—

e of ten miles, over a place called the Black Mount, hours and a half to do; and when we came to a lone the 'King's House,' at the entrance to Glencoe—this ree o'clock—we were well-nigh frozen. . . . All the had been among moors and mountains with huge k, which fell down God knows where, sprinkling the very direction, and giving it the aspect of the burial-ce of giants. Now and then we passed a hut or two window nor chimney, and the smoke of the peat-fires the doors. But there were not six of these dwellings iles; and anything so bleak and wild, and mighty in , as the whole country, it is impossible to conceive. tself perfectly terrible. The pass is an awful place. on each side by enormous rocks, from which great e rushing down in all directions. In amongst these on e pass (the left as we came) there are scores of glens, ch form such haunts as you might imagine yourself , in the very madness of a fever. They will live in my ears—I was going to say as long as I live, and I nk so. The very recollection of them makes me . . . Well, I will not bore you with my impressions mndous wilds, but they really are fearful in their d amazing solitude. Wales is a mere toy compared

vented from continuing their intended route to Oban, rendering it unsafe for them to cross some ferries on the travellers had to return through Glencoe. Dickens

"Accordingly we turned back, and in a great storm of wind and rain began to retrace the dreary road we had come the day before. . . . I was not at all ill pleased to have to come again through that awful Glencoe. If it had been tremendous on the previous day, yesterday it was perfectly horrific. It had rained all night—and was raining then as it only does in these parts. Through the whole glen, which is ten miles long, torrents were boiling and foaming, and sending up in every direction spray like the smoke of great fires. They were rushing down every hill and mountain side, and tearing like devils across the path, and down into the depths of the rocks. Some of the hills looked as if they were full of silver, and had cracked in a hundred places. Others as if they were frightened, and had broken out into a deadly sweat. In others there was no compromise or division of streams, but one great torrent came roaring down with a deafening noise, and a rushing of water that was quite appalling. Such a *spaet*, in short (that's the country word), has not been known for many years, and the sights and sounds were beyond description. The postboy was not at all at his ease, and the horses were very much frightened (as well they might be) by the perpetual raging and roaring; one of them started as we came down a steep place, and we were within that much (—) of tumbling over a precipice; just then, too, the drag broke, and we were obliged to go on as we best could without it; getting out every now and then, and hanging on at the back of the carriage to prevent its rolling down too fast, and going Heaven knows where."

Space forbids us further to follow these travels in Scotland. Mr. and Mrs. Dickens returned to London in August, 1841.

Mr. Dickens displayed an ardent interest in Dr. Elliotson's mesmeric discoveries, which he seems to have followed up. His sympathies were also at this time enlisted on the subject of prison improvement.

With the publication of "Barnaby Rudge" "Master Humphrey's Clock" stopped, and Dickens thereupon entered into another agreement with his publishers to write a new serial tale in the same manner as "Pickwick" and "Nickleby," but he was to have an interval of twelve months before commencing it. The present volume does not disclose what the book was.

This interval afforded Dickens the opportunity of putting into operation a plan which he seems long to have cherished, viz., of a visit to America. Washington Irving had expressed to him by letter his delight with his writings, and Dickens had replied to him in an equally warm tone. Before he started it was arranged that he should take notes of his journeys in the United States for a sub-

publication on America. He first proposed to take his wife en, but subsequently it was resolved that only his wife accompany him.

, however, intervened between the making of the resolve ne for putting it into execution. First, a serious illness and then the death of his wife's youngest brother sud- the death of the sister. This seems to have revived in e grief he felt on the death of his wife's sister Mary. in relation to the funeral of the brother, "I cannot ought of being excluded from her dust, and yet I feel others and sisters, and her mother, have a better right e placed beside her. It is but an idea. I neither think (God forbid!) that our spirits would ever mingle *there*. get the better of it, but it is very hard. I never con- this—and coming so suddenly, and after being ill, it e more than it ought. It seems like losing her a second e wrote next morning, "No, I tried that. No, there is on either side to be had. I must give it up. I shall there, please God, on Thursday morning, before they nd look at her coffin."

rted for America on the 3rd January, 1842, and arrived towards the end of the month, where an ovation awaited

he proceeded to Boston, and of his arrival he has given a ous description to his friend the biographer, which we but dare not, introduce here. His triumph was unpre- Dinners, balls, assemblies, streets crowded, his residence ith people all anxious to do homage to the great writer.

"he says, "had deputations from the Far West who from more than 2,000 miles distance; from the lakes, the backwoods, the log houses, the cities, factories, villages,

Authorities from nearly all the States have written to ve heard from the universities, congress, senate, and ic and private, of every sort and kind. 'It is no non- o common feeling,' wrote Dr. Channing to me yesterday. art. There never was and never will be such a triumph.' good thing, is it not, . . . to find those fancies it ae and you the greatest satisfaction to think of, at the ll? It makes my heart quieter, and me a more retiring, quil man, to watch the effect of those thoughts in all this urry, even than if I sat pen in hand to put them down t time. I feel, in the best aspects of this welcome, some-

thing of the presence and influence of that spirit which directs my life, and through a heavy sorrow has pointed upwards with unchanging finger for more than four years past."

From Boston he writes :—

"The American poor, the American factories, the institutions of all kinds,—I have a book already. There is no man in this town, or in this State of New England, who has not a blazing fire and a meat dinner every day of his life. A flaming sword in the air would not attract so much attention as a beggar in the streets. There are no charity uniforms, no wearisome repetition of the same dull, ugly dress, in that blind school. All are attired after their own tastes, and every boy and girl has his or her individuality as distinct and unimpaired as you would find it in their own homes."

What a picture for the struggling poor of *Old England* !

From Boston Dickens proceeded to New York, stopping at various places by the way, at one and all of which he was enthusiastically received, the homage thus paid being paid to genius and well-directed talent, not to a useless king, or a world-renowned murderer.

At New York he was entertained at a public ball and a public dinner, and in everything was cordiality manifested. He ventured to do that which no American author dared to do, viz., to advocate a system of international copyright, thus paralyzing his friends, as he himself says; for although all the great American writers thought with him on the subject, yet no one had ventured to protest against the atrocious state of the copyright law.

In aid of Dickens's agitation of the international copyright question came a letter from Carlyle, which we cannot forbear transcribing, as the topic is on for discussion again between the nations :—

"We learn by the newspapers that you everywhere in America stir up the question of international copyright, and thereby awaken huge dissonance where all else were triumphant unison for you. I am asked my opinion of the matter, and requested to write it down in words.

"Several years ago, if memory err not, I was one of many English writers who, under the auspices of Miss Martineau, did already sign a petition to Congress praying for an international copyright between the two nations,—which properly are not two nations, but one; *indivisible* by parliament, congress, or any kind of human law or diplomacy, being already *united* by Heaven's Act of Parliament, and the everlasting law of nature and fact. To that opinion I still adhere, and am like to continue adhering.

session of the matter before any congress or parliament considerations and argumentations will necessarily arise, are not interesting, nor essential for helping me to a they respect the time and manner in which the thing not at all whether the thing should be or not. In an , revered I should hope on both sides of the ocean, and of years ago written down in the most decisive manner, 'Thou *shalt not* steal.' That thou belongest at 'nation,' and canst steal without being certainly , gives thee no permission to steal! Thou shalt *not* in , at all! So it is written down, for nations and for law-book of the Maker of this universe. Nay, poor them and others step in here, and will demonstrate ally our true convenience and expediency not to steal, my share, on the great scale and on the small, and in le scales and shapes, do also firmly believe it to be. if nations abstained from stealing, what need there with its butcherings and burnings, decidedly the most ing in this world? How much more two nations said, are but one nation, knit in a thousand ways and practical intercourse, indivisible brother elements great SAXONDOM, to which in all honourable ways

Mr. Robert Roy McGregor lived in the district of the Highland border, two centuries ago, he, for d it more convenient to supply himself with beef by ve from the adjacent glens than by buying it killed in butchers' market. It was Mr. Roy's plan of supplying beef in those days, this of stealing it. In many a ss' in the district of Menteith there was debating, and much specious argumentation this way and that, ould ascertain that, really and truly, buying was the et your beef, which, however, in the long run, they did nt find it indisputably to be; and, accordingly, they this day."

t name the places Dickens visited. From New York ia, thence to Washington, Richmond, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and the Far West. The incidents and his various land and water journeys are all pointed at humour. It was a continual triumph through the author holding daily levees like a prince, and at the collecting materials for his subsequent publication. is journey by canal boat to Pittsburgh, he says:— , before you reach the mountains, and when you are after you have left them, is very grand and fine; and ada its way through some deep sullen gorges which,

seen by moonlight, are very impressive, though immeasurably inferior to Glencoe, to whose terrors I have not seen the *smallest approach*." At last he reached Niagara Falls, of which we give his own description:—

"At last, when the train stopped, I saw two great white clouds rising up from the depths of the earth—nothing more. They rose up slowly, gently, majestically in the air. I dragged Kate down a deep and slippery path leading to the ferry-boat; bullied Anne for not coming fast enough; perspired at every pore, and felt, it is impossible to say how, as the sound grew louder and louder in my ears, and yet nothing could be seen for the mist.

"There were two English officers with us (ah! what *gentlemen*, what noblemen of nature they seemed!), and they hurried off with me, leaving Kate and Anne on a crag of ice, and clambered after me over the rocks at the foot of the small Fall, while the ferryman was getting the boat ready. I was not disappointed—but I could make out nothing. In an instant I was blinded by the spray, and wet to the skin. I saw the water tearing madly down from some immense height, but could get no idea of shape, or situation, or anything but vague immensity. But when we were seated in the boat, and crossing at the very foot of the cataract, then I began to feel what it was. Directly I had changed my clothes at the inn I went out again, taking Kate with me, and hurried to the Horse-shoe Fall. I went down alone into the very basin. It would be hard for a man to stand nearer God than he does there. There was a bright rainbow at my feet, and from that I looked up to—great Heaven! to *what* a fall of bright green water! The broad, deep, mighty stream seems to die in the act of falling, and from its unfathomable grave arises that tremendous ghost of spray and mist which is never laid, and has been haunting this place with the same dread solemnity,—perhaps from the creation of the world. . . . I can only say that the first effect of this tremendous spectacle on me was peace of mind, tranquillity, great thoughts of eternal rest and happiness, nothing of terror. I can shudder at the recollection of Glencoe—(dear friend, with Heaven's leave we must see Glencoe together),—but whenever I think of Niagara I shall think of its beauty."

From Niagara they went to Montreal, after staying at Toronto and Kingston on the route, where they experienced equal kindness and cordiality.

Private theatricals were here performed with great success; and here, at Montreal, the book leaves Mr. and Mrs. Dickens, getting, as Dickens in his last American letter says, "*FEVERED* with anxiety for home."

The Topic.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TO BE ABOLISHED?

On an announcement made, and by desire of numerous readers on the question, we collect here, in epitome, as many of the papers as can be conveniently so expressed. Those are the former form abstracts of papers on the topic which appeared in 1850. The remainder are fresh contributions and which make the *vidimus* of the *pros* and *cons.* more com-

AFFIRMATIVE.

1. Is it your will, Claudio shall die to-morrow?
Did not I tell thee? Hadst thou not order?
Why dost thou ask again?
Lest I might be too rash.
Under your good correction, I have seen
When, after execution, Judgment hath repented
O'er his doom."

"*Measure for Measure*," ii., 2.

of punishment is prevention. Capital is not reform; and prevent it ought to be true that who commit murder are effectually preventing to exercise; but it prevents the crime, by the very crime said by the punishment. powerful than precept of the law is, kill;" the example "Thou shalt kill." prophesied, "Whoso shed blood, by man shall shed," it was never And even if it not been repeated by which superseded the Judaism by the law to force now.

ent should aim at offenders, restitution and prevention of —(1) the same par-

ties; (2) others. Reformation is impossible by execution, so also is restitution. But both might be managed if capital punishment was abolished.

That death punishment is not so deterrent as its advocates think is seen in the facts—(1) Crime has not increased since George III.'s time, when there were 160 offences punishable by death. In the cases of horse-stealing, burglary, and house-breaking, robbery, arson, forgery, crime diminished *after* the death punishment was abolished. Even in regard to murder this was the case, the number of those charged with the crime being in almost inverse ratio of those executed—the rarer executions the rarer murders; and this shows that it is not deterrent, for often murders follow rapidly upon executions, and are committed by those, too, who have witnessed executions. Besides, the growing uncertainty of conviction also makes the claim for abolition more imperative as it grows inoperative. Judg-

ments may err, and death makes an irreparable end of a person accused of being a malefactor. Cases have frequently happened in which the innocent have suffered.

III. It is unjustifiable, (1) because there is no human *right* to take away human life; and (2) no divine authority for doing so. Right must be either (1) inherent, or (2) assumed as expedient. No inherent claim is made except in the extreme case of self-defence, and expediency must justify itself by policy or utility, but cannot in the face of justice. Hence no assumed right can exceed in power an inherent right. If there is no inherent right, then it is unlawful to enforce obedience to law by unlawful means. As to divine authority, every passage in Scripture fails its advocates. Cain was not slain, and the Noachic "Whoso," &c., may be otherwise explained. Besides, the Jews were a theocracy, in which God ruled and overruled. If we claim the Jewish right to inflict capital punishment, we must take it in its Bible extent, and use it against Sabbath-breaking, adultery, idolatry, man-stealing, disobedience to parents, blasphemy, &c. We have no more right to make a partial than an entire repeal. Christ himself denounces the *lex talionis*, "An eye for an eye," &c. The gallows is unworthy of England as a Christian nation.

IV. "We are not under the law, but under grace," in regard to Jewish legislation. If the law of "Whoso," &c., were followed out, the race would become extinct by mutual obedience to the law, for each hangman would need a hangman *ad infinitum*; but our law is, Do as you would be done by. Besides, God says, "Vengeance is Mine, I will repay." Capital punishments of all sorts have been tried, and have not succeeded in righting wrong.

The assertion that it is *just* to repay murder by retaliative death is only admissible when we can affirm of ourselves that our sense of and our determination regarding justice are infallible. God is the Lord of justice, and we have no right to—

"Snatch from His hand the balance and the rod,
And judge His justice as the God of God."

How frequently have men's moral judgments been mistaken! What have crusades, persecutions, witch-burnings, trials for heresy and treason been, but perversions of moral judgment? Is the momentary pang of death on the scaffold a just moral satisfaction for the crime of murder? Or have we been appointed assessors of justice for the moral universe of Jehovah? If crime could be expiated on the earth, wherefore the revelation of a judgment to come? And the advocates of the law "Thou shalt not suffer a murderer to live" speak of repentance too! Now, if a man has repented truly, is he still to be the subject of punishment? God offers pardon to the repentant. But if a man has not repented, are we prepared to assert that we have a right so to lengthen the period of the torture which he must endure if unrepentant by shortening the period of his probation here and cutting off his chance of repentance? This needs to be pondered, too, lest we do wrong while claiming to do right. E. A.

Before we admit the necessity of death punishments for crimes it ought to be proved that other punishments have been tried and have failed; whereas we know that in regard to other offences in which it was thought indispensable to have capital punishment inflicted crimes have lessened. We do not now think it

hang for "theft from a amount of forty shillings is the plea of weakness. The fear of death at as men think; nor wise to cultivate the so much as a love of death did not restrain does not restrain the can it restrain the How do we teach the life by destroying it? hanging days become holidays that the Legislature abolish them? Had wise enough to abolish they had done better. the taking of life as a ill done justify the his own eyes for the takes? If he braves by his sin, is he likely ed by the temporal ch man dooms him? on-urged criminal it g, to the calculating and besides, every has taken place is a mutated in the total is of capital punishments. shment ought to be use it is an *irremediable* case of a miscarriage is no possibility of cancelling it; it is an one. There are no It is the same for unate whose tempta—to the vilest whose as slight. It is as variable for the one or. It is *momentary*, forgotten. Nothing s the slightness with ght of death touches as soon as a murderer scaffold his memory is fate is buried with s not a *reforming* and therefore is im- cates antagonism to to much evasion of

it, inclines men to connive at means for letting the criminal off, and introduces uncertainty into trials. Besides, the State has no right to take what it can neither give nor restore. It does not give life, and when it is taken the State cannot relume its light. It brutalizes the spirit, and keeps the death by force constantly before men's minds as a possibility. In so far as it does so it encourages rather than lessens the crime against which it is employed. —P. R.

Theft of life is in many instances far less criminal than theft of property—which leaves the widow and orphan to penury, ignorance, and the temptations that come from want; or than the theft of reputation, which leaves a man a wreck upon the sea of life, often without knowing the source of the slanders which whispered away his fair fame, prospects, and position; or than the theft of chastity in woman—which brings upon her woe, shame, want, and life-long misery. Unless it can be proved that murder, which is the theft only of bodily life, is a more heinous sin and crime in itself than these, I refuse to think that, while these are so often left unpunished, and even when discovered punished slightly, we must wreak upon the murderer's head alone the supreme penalty, as if it were the worst of crimes.

Man has no infallible test of justice. He cannot weigh or assay motive.

"What's done we partly may compute,
We know not what's resisted."

Punishment ought not to increase but to decrease the amount of woe in the world; and if we execute, we necessarily aggrieve more, while we cannot mitigate the woe already endured. God does not require us to execute vengeance; *that* He has kept in His own hand.

NEGATIVE.

"*Angelo.* We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to scare the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape, till custom make it
Their perch, and not their terror."

"*Measure for Measure,*" ii.

I. Capital punishment is necessary, just, and consistent with the divine will. 1. God commands it: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." It was given to Noah as the supreme and universal law of mankind, and has never been repealed. 2. It accords with justice. Punishment should equal, if it does not exceed, the crime. It must at least be measured by it, and as nothing can exceed in heinousness the crime of murder, it ought to be punished by an unparalleled infliction. It would not do to restore the murderers to society. With what criminals would it be just to make them herd? What cage of unclean birds or wild beasts could equal the place in which they were confined together? In a country where the law is jealous of life and every man is used to temper justice with mercy, it is doubly necessary. Hence—3. It is essential to the suppression of crime. It acts as a constant restraint on passion, and as a preventive to the formation of murderous plans. It is a painful necessity.

II. Justice demands its continuance, for reparation is impossible, and no other just sentence can be passed. From the very God of justice we derive this law,—“If a man comes presumptuously upon his neighbour to slay him with guile, thou shalt take him from my altar that he may die” (Exod. xxi. 14). “The land *cannot* be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it” (Numb. xxxv. 38). The security of society demands it. Unless more

severe punishment is inflicted for murder than for other crimes, murder would become more common; confined, murderers would probably try the same crime on their keepers with the hope of escape. Men measure criminality by severity of punishment, as we may see by comparing privateering and piracy.

III. The natural law of punishment is *retribution*. This is shown to be the case throughout nature and God, by revealing the fall of angels and their punishment and the fall of man and his punishment only escapable by a substitutionary shows that inflexible justice is retributive. Death is the fate most feared by such criminals; as they inflict, so they merit the severest fate. Ratios of influence can only be safely calculated on when all the circumstances are known; and in regard to statistics of criminality we must always know the changes that have concurrently taken place if we would comprehend the true cause. If the fear of the jury to inflict death is so great, must not also the fear of the criminal population to suffer death be also great? Fear as an agent in the argument cannot be allowed to have weight in both scales alternately, or logic is slippery. One uncertainty cannot be cured by creating another. The greatest crime should have the greatest punishment.

IV. We are not called upon to relinquish our opinion that capital punishments are enjoined by a distinct, impressive, and enduring command, by interpretations that may, might, or have been given. There

stand the plain words in plain language, and the appeal is "to the law and to the testimony." The principle contended for is, "with what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you again," not in vindictiveness, but in justice. Because there is no comparison between the crime of murder and any other, we are compelled to employ an incomparable punishment. How much of the statistics of decrease is due to improvement in police regulations and to difficulty of commission? Because death punishments have not prevented *all*, we cannot infer that they have not prevented *many* murders. It would be terribly revolting surely to have to eat bread from the hand of a husband's or a father's murderer as restitution! Convinced of the justice of capital punishment, it would be gratifying to know and see that they are unnecessary.

In no case but that of murder should this most grave of punishments be inflicted, yet its relinquishment as a penalty for that crime would lead to grave and lamentable results. We see indications of this fact already in the consequences which are manifesting themselves in the British Islands through the, as I must call it, frequent miscarriage of justice in this direction. Year by year we find the number of executions gradually decrease, and it is only occasionally that we find a cold-blooded and most desperate murderer, like Miller of Chelsea, is brought to the death-doom. Some may exclaim, "Then the murders are much fewer in number!" but, alas! such is not the case. Loopholes of escape continually increase; through various causes many deliberate murderers are never put upon their trial for this crime at all; juries become more and more reluctant to convict, and, even then,

the probabilities of a reprieve are so great, that few criminals under sentence of death need feel downhearted. The tendency of public feeling, there is no question, is getting strongly, and very mistakenly, in favour of abolition; and the after consequence may probably be a return to it with even some extreme of severity, as has proved the case in a kindred instance. For, after our petting and pampering prisoners to a ludicrous extent, we are coming back to the vulgar and inhuman punishment of the lash, that we may qualify our kindness a little, and deter, if possible, some of the more hardened from committing offences against the person by the fear of physical suffering.

It can hardly be asserted too warmly that what appears like severity is indeed such in one sense as regards the individual, if he is viewed as in a state of isolation, but not severity, when the interests of the commonwealth are considered. "Dreadful, is it not, for a human being, in full health, to be hurried into the unseen state?" No doubt; yet was it less dreadful for the person whose life was taken by the murderer? and will it not be equally dreadful for another sufferer in the future, whose death is brought about by the hands of one who is emboldened to the act by the consideration that, even if convicted of the crime, his punishment will not be grievous? Tenderness to an offender is unmerciful conduct to the innocent. There is a wholesome surgery in government, just as to amputate a limb is sometimes to rescue the life. And these assertions rest upon a basis, I believe, unquestionably firm, namely, that no punishment is so feared by all (with rare exceptions) as that of death. Yet this fact alone would not justify us in inflicting it merely in *terrorem*, as might be done, for instance, if such

a crime as arson became exceedingly common. The greatest punishment man can inflict should be sacredly reserved as a penalty for the greatest crime—a crime which stands apart from all others. It is indeed odd that an age like the present, which shows itself so fearfully reckless regarding the sacredness of human life, should yet be so morbidly sensitive on the subject of capital punishment.

J. R. S. C.

Why all the outcry about the right to take away the life of a murderer? Has not the criminal in the very act which he has committed taken away from himself the plea arising from the sanctity of life? And can society utter a plea on his behalf from which he has debarred himself? In defence of such a one as has arrogated to himself the right to take away life, can we bring forth the maxim, "Human life is sacred and can on no account be taken away"? How, then, is it that the criminal is here, if life is so sacred? as this pleading made for him implies, "With what measure ye mete it shall be measured unto you." We cannot permit you to hide behind a fastness the inviolability of human life which you have yourself dismantled and been treacherous to. The law on which exemption from capital punishment is now sought for you and by you is just the law which *a priori* was binding upon you, and for the breach of which you are here. If the law could not restrain you from murder for your paltry motive or vile passion, why should it restrain us when we employ not for evil but for good, for the protection of society, that power which you took to accomplish private ends? It surely cannot be seriously argued that the sacredness of life should cast its shield over a murderer.

J. M.

Man has a right to defend him-

self unto the death. He possesses the instinct of self-preservation, and he only parts with this right as he consents to abandon his right of self-defence when he enters society, because society professes to do for him better for him than he can do for himself. A man is less in danger of being murdered under civil law than he would be in the natural state of man, and obviously when he ceases to exist his power to punish is gone; but society endures and endures not only to avenge his death, but to prevent the increase of the passion for slaying. The State is the administrator of the natural rights of man in his condition of independence, and is bound to exercise these to the highest stretch. Two grounds for the murderer's destruction exist:—(1) That the murderer may not have opportunity of doing so again; and (2) that he may be a warning to others to avoid his crime. Self-defence makes both of these lawful and necessary. Punishment is the penalty of guilt, and the highest offence must be visited by the most severe penalty. Prevention is here our cure. We place the safety of society, from the same criminal, before us, and manage that, while we also denounce the crime in an unmistakeable form to all others who are inclined in any way to violate the sanctity of human life.

C. C.

That capital punishments are necessary is evident, if we reflect that even with it human life is frequently taken; how much more likely would it be to be so if there was a tendency in society to deal a light penalty to offenders. Leniency does not affect the class of minds capable of murder so much as force. He who makes himself the arbiter of death and life must find society ready to be the arbiter to him of speedy retributory judgment. We must keep up the awe

must impress the
 upon those who are
 passionate. We re-
 of the last terrible,
 into eternity, of
 tion of life, to be
 those who are only
 national horror. The
 the striking fact
 sion recoil and go
 ag wild beast into
 gument of life for
 ic which even the
 understand. The

temptation to murder usually arises
 from a desire to enjoy life more by
 increasing riches, gaining a new
 pleasure, or getting rid of an en-
 cumbrance. To suggest the un-
 likelihood of enjoying any life at all
 is the mission of the gallows, and
 its teaching is such that even strong
 men have swooned at the sight of
 the launching of the soul into
 eternity. It is well known and
 generally felt, that it is a fearful
 thing to die with all the powers of
 enjoyment ripe in one.

Literary Notes.

W. BENHARDI has
 on "Popular Tales
 " which is of great
 ing the essential
 heroic lays and the
 ends of the people.
 which might aptly
 imitators, entitled
Speechwatch, to
 age from deprava-
 blished.

f Munich, whose
 Martin Schleich,
 Dr. Sigle, editor of
 et *Die Bremse* (the
 ing.

again to be put on
 W. G. Davies is
 n essay, which he
 Dean Mansel for
 d "Knowing con-
 ource of First Prin-

"The Thistle" is
 highways of Lon-

ap edition, in ten
 of "The Earthly
 en commenced.

The Duke of Arpino has written a
 drama on "Savonarola," for the
 Fondo, Naples.

Dr. William Baird, F.R.S., &c.,
 the naturalist, died 27th January.

Franz Grillparzer, the Austrian
 dramatist, died 21st January, aged
 81. It is said that a posthumous
 edition of his plays, containing
 many unpublished pieces, will shortly
 be issued.

Edwin Atherstone, author of
 "The Fall of Nineveh," "The Sea-
 kings of England, &c., died 25th
 January, aged 84.

"Measure for Measure" has been
 adapted to the German stage by
 Gisbert Von Vincke.

Père Gratry, Professor of Moral
 Philosophy at the Sorbonne, died in
 February, aged 67.

Mr. Ezra Abbot's wonderful cata-
 logue of books and tracts, in all lan-
 guages, on the immortality of the
 soul, heaven, hell, purgatory, &c.,
 has been published by Mr. Middle-
 ton, of New York, under the title
 of "The Literature of the Doctrine
 of a Future Life."

F. A. Trendelenburg, the Aristotelian and Anti-Hegelian logician of Germany—learned, laborious, original, and painstaking,—died 24th January, aged 70.

A translation of Professor Theodore Ribati's "Contemporary English Psychology," containing sketches of James Mill, J. S. Mill, A. Bain, G. H. Lewes, Herbert Spencer, and Samuel Bailey, is announced.

To the already obituary of February there falls to be added the names of Joseph Poole, author of "Paul Pry," aged 80; H. F. Chorley, historian of music; and Dr. Patterson, the zoologist.

The Civil Service Commissioners announce that for the Indian Civil Engineering College in July, 1872, the examination in English Literature will be limited to the following authors:—Shakspeare, "King John;" Bacon, "Essays;" Milton, "Liberty of Printing;" Dryden, "Absalom and Achitophel;" Scott, "Fortunes of Nigel;" and that in English History will be the period A.D. 1600 to A.D. 1688.

Great as has been the acceptance and success of "The Life of Charles Dickens," the family, not being satisfied with Mr. John Forster's memoir, is, through Charles Dickens, jun., to provide a fresh biography in the pages of *All the Year Round*.

Signor Meli is said to have produced a sublime statue of *Christ*, upon which he has spent seven years' labour.

"A theological translation fund" for the reproduction, under a competent paid editor, of some of the works of the more advanced school of German critics of the Gospels, Dogmatics, &c., has been initiated, and is likely to attain success.

The astronomical allusions in Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales" are to be made the topic of exposition in Mr. Skeat's edition of Chaucer's "Treatise on the Astrolabe."

The Historical Musical Society of Holland has issued to its subscribers nineteen national songs composed (1626) by Adrian Valerius.

"Ethics for Undenominational Schools,"—by a pupil of Herbart under the editorship of the conductor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, the *School Board Chronicle* &c., formerly a South Wales teacher, a newspaper writer, and now a novelist of considerable repute,—is about to be brought before the public soon.

Hamilton Hume, biographer of Governor Eyre, editor of *Will-o'-the-Wisp*, &c., died 19th February.

Professor Werder has been delivering splendid lectures on Shakspeare in the University of Berlin.

Professor Hettner has just completed his History of German Literature, and has included in it an epitome of the literature of France and England.

Edwin Atherstone (born 1788), author of "The Fall of Nineveh," "Israel in Egypt," &c., died 29th January, aged 84.

Professor and Mrs. Fawcett will shortly issue a conjoint volume of essays on social and political subjects.

"Malthus on Population" is to be republished. It should be accompanied by Thomas Doubleday's "True Theory of Population."

Of Littré's great French Dictionary, Part 26th, reaching *Souscrire*, has been issued.

Adaptations from Molière are being given on the Turkish stage.

The "Life of Charles Dickens" has been translated into German.

A series of text-books, theological and philosophical, original or translated, is announced as in course of production, edited by Dr. H. Smith, and Dr. P. Schuff.

Mr. Turberville, editor of *The English Independent*, died 31st December.

Many-sided Minds.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE,

THE POET.*

M. INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D., FOR. SEC. R. S. F.

(*First Notice.*)

A very epic of tragic defeat."—*Mrs. Oliphant.*

of the distinguished family of Coleridge was John
son of a woollen trader at South Molton, Devon.

ay be thought of the outcome embodied in the above pages,
nce it has been drawn are numerous and voluminous; in
red no pains to discover all that has been written *about*
with very few exceptions I have made myself acquainted
recorded in the subjoined bibliography. In addition to
sources of knowledge (some of which, however, as 5 and
inaccurate), I have had the benefit of personal communi-
Rev. Derwent Coleridge (the poet's second and only sur-
late Herbert Coleridge (grandson of the poet), and Mr.
Coleridge. I am also indebted for some facts to the
University of Cambridge, the University Librarian, and
of King's College, Cambridge.

mas.—"Letters, Conversations, and Recollections of S. T.

"(extending over the period 1818—1832), 2 vols., 1836.

s Writings relating to S. T. Coleridge,

Reminiscences," *Gentleman's Magazine*, December, 1834.

tions from Cambridge," 1836. (There is a section relating
Coleridge at Trinity.")

teachers, and Politicians" [*circa* 1847,] (describing a conver-
th Coleridge).

Notice, *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. ii., N.S., p. 544.

Notice, *Quarterly Review*, vol. lii., August, 1834, p. 291.

'Christabel,' 'Kubla Khan,' and the 'Pains of Sleep.'—

h Review, vol. xxvii., September, 1816, p. 58.

Statesman Manual, and Lay Sermons;—*ibid.* p. 444.

Table-Talk,' *Edinburgh Review*, vol. lxi. April, 1835, p. 129

John Coleridge was born in 1719. Nothing is known of his early life. He matriculated at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, on

10. Review of Cottle's Early Recollections, *Quarterly Review*, vol. lii. July, 1837, p. 25.
 11. Review of Poetical Works, *ibid.*, vol. lii., August, 1834, p. 1.
 12. "A Century of Great Poets. No. IV.—Samuel Taylor Coleridge."—*Blackwood's Magazine*, November, 1871, p. 552 (said to be by Mrs. Oliphant).
- The list of reviews might have been almost indefinitely augmented: the foregoing appear to me to be the most noteworthy. The last is the most recent contribution to Coleridgeana, and is a most interesting sketch of Coleridge's life and poetry. It contains, however, eight lines of unmitigated nonsense, p. 553, col. 2. I postponed the perusal of the larger and biographical portion till I had written my own biographical sketch.
13. Carlyle, Thomas.—"Life of Sterling" (with account of Coleridge at Highgate, chap. viii., pp. 46—54 of People's Edition).
 14. Carlyon, Dr.—"Early Years and Late Reflections."
 15. Coleridge, Henry Nelson.—"Biographical Supplement to the 'Biographia Literaria,'" 1847, vol. ii., pp. 311—447. See under Stuart Letter in *Gentleman's Magazine*.
 16. Coleridge, John Taylor.—Letter appended to Coleridge's "Table-Talk."
 17. Coleridge, Sara.—Introduction to the "Biographia Literaria," 1847.
 18. " Chapters V. and VII. added to the "Biographia Literaria," 1847.
 19. Coleridge, Samuel Taylor.—Satyrane's Letters appended to the "Biographia Literaria," 1847, vol. ii., pp. 187—254.
 20. Cottle, Joseph.—"Early Recollections, chiefly relating to the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge," 2 vols., 1837.
 21. De Quincey, Thomas. "Coleridge and Opium-Eating." *Tait's Magazine*, September, October, and November, 1834.
 22. " "Autobiographic Sketches." Samuel Taylor Coleridge—Grave and Gay, vol. ii., chap. 1854.
 23. Dibdin, Thomas Frogden.—"Reminiscences of a Literary Life" vol. i., p. 253; and *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. vi., N.S., p. 255.
 24. Emerson, Ralph Waldo.—"English Traits" (with account of a visit to Coleridge at Highgate).
 25. Ferrier, Prof.—"The Plagiarisms of S. T. Coleridge," *Blackwood's Magazine*, March, 1840, p. 287.
 26. Gillman, James.—"Life of Coleridge," 1838. (Only one volume published: this stops at 1819.)

b, 1748; and having graduated there became Vicar of . Mary, Devon, and Master of the Free Grammar School there, founded by Henry VIII. He was the three works, viz., "Miscellaneous Dissertations on the

n, Sir William [Stirling].—Edition of Reid's Works, Appendix O, *note*.

Julius Charles.—"S. T. Coleridge and the English Opium-," *British Magazine*, January, 1835, No. 37, p. 15.

William.—"Spirit of the Age; or, Contemporary Portraits," ("Mr. Coleridge," p. 55.)

enton John Anthony.—"Cambridge Essays," 1858.

William.—"Northern Heights of London," 1869, "Cole-," p. 300 (*circa*).

Clement Mansfield.—On the "Unpublished Manuscripts of Samuel Taylor Coleridge," "Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature," vol. ix., New Series, 1867.

" "On Some Points connected with the Philosophy of Coleridge," "Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature," vol. x., New Series, 1869.

William.—"Men I have known," 1866, "Coleridge," p. 119.

Charles.—"Recollections of Christ's Hospital," 118.

"Essays of Elia," 1823. Essay entitled "Christ's Hospital Five-and-thirty Years ago."

n, Henry Crabb.—"Diary and Correspondence," *passim*.

James Hutchison.—"De Quincey and Coleridge upon Kant," *Highly Review*, July 1, 1867.

Daniel.—"Anecdotes of the Poet Coleridge," *Gentleman's Magazine*, May, 1838, p. 485.

"Newspaper Writings of the Poet Coleridge," *ibid.*, June, 1838, p. 577.

Copies of Letters from Mr. Coleridge to Mr. Stuart, *ibid.* p. 580.

Letter of Mr. H. N. Coleridge to, and Mr. Stuart's Reply, *ibid.*, July, 1838, pp. 22 and 23.

"The Late Mr. Coleridge, the Poet," *ibid.*, August, 1838, p. 124.

Seventeenth and Eighteenth Chapters of the Book of Judges, 1768; "A Critical Latin Grammar," 1772; and a Latin exercise book, entitled "Sententiæ Excerptæ." He also printed a sermon, and contributed many papers to the *Gentleman's Magazine* from 1745 to 1780. He was said by the poet (his youngest child) to have been reputed "a profound Hebraist," and in life and character to have been "a perfect Parson Adams." He married (secondly) Ann Bowdon, and by all accounts had ten children, of whom the subject of this sketch was the tenth. He died at Plymouth, October 4th, 1781.

Henry Nelson Coleridge mentions ten children of John Coleridge but names only nine.* According to Coleridge himself, the omitted child was one named William, who died in infancy;† and the tablet at Ottery St. Mary follows Coleridge. John Coleridge's children, then, were—

1. John : a captain in H.E.I.C.S. ; died in India in 1786, aged 31.
 2. William : died an infant. .
 3. James : a colonel of Militia ; married a Miss Duke, and was the founder of a distinguished branch of the family ; died 1836, aged seventy-five.
 4. William : said to have been of Pembroke College, Oxford, certainly of Wadham College, graduated B.A. 17th March, 1779 ; died 1780, aged twenty-three.
 5. Edward : a notable wit, of Pembroke College, Oxford ; graduated B.A. 25th May, 1780 ; a clergyman ; died March 15, 1843, aged eighty-two.
 6. George : a most learned divine, of Pembroke College, Oxford ; graduated B.A. 9th June, 1784, and succeeded his father as Vicar of Ottery St. Mary, Devon ; died 1828, aged sixty-four.
 7. Luke Herman : a surgeon ; died 1790.
 8. Ann : died at the age of twenty-three, in 1790.
 9. Francis Syndercombe : a midshipman, afterwards an officer in H.E.I.C.S. died in 1792, at the age of twenty-two, a lieutenant, after the siege of Seringapatam. He was called "the handsome Coleridge."
 10. Samuel Taylor.
- A word or two as to the next generation.
The children of Colonel James Coleridge were—

1. James Duke, D.D.: Prebendary of Exeter.
2. Frederic Bernard: a midshipman; killed by a fall from the top to the deck.
3. John Taylor: now the Right Hon. Sir John Taylor Coleridge, late Justice of the Q.B. He is the father of Sir John Duke Coleridge, the present Attorney-General.
4. Francis George, a solicitor at Ottery: he was the father of Arthur Duke Coleridge, Barrister-at-law, translator of Goethe's "Egmont," and author of a "Life of Franz Schubert."
5. Henry Nelson Coleridge: late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. He married Sara Coleridge, the Poet's only daughter. The late Herbert Coleridge was their only son.
6. Edward: Fellow of Eton College.
7. Frances Duke: she is the relict of Sir John Patteson, late Justice of the Q.B., and mother of the unfortunate Bishop of Melanesia.

George Coleridge, the Vicar of Ottery, had only one son, the Rev. George May Coleridge, M.A., Vicar of St. Mary Church, Devon.

Luke Herman Coleridge had one son, the Right Rev. William Hart Coleridge, late Bishop of Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands, and subsequently Warden of St. Augustine's College, Canterbury.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge was born at Ottery St. Mary on October 21, 1772, "about eleven o'clock in the forenoon." He was christened Samuel Taylor after a godfather of that name. At two years old he went to an infants' school kept by a woman of the name of Key, who was said to be nearly related to Sir Joshua Reynolds.* At six, or soon after, he entered his father's school, but his pupilage was cut short in 1781 by the old man's death; and in the spring of the following year he removed to London, where he lived for ten weeks with his uncle Bowdon.† Mr. Justice Buller, who had been educated by old John Coleridge, obtained for Samuel Taylor Coleridge a presentation to Christ's Hospital.‡ He was entered on the books on July 8th, 1782, and at once went to reside in the junior school at Hertford. In the following September he returned to London, and was placed in the second ward of the Under Grammar School.

These ten years of his childhood had borne witness to that abnormal and precocious sensibility which was repeated many years

* 15, pp. 311—318. † 15, p. 352. ‡ 23, p. 11.

after in his eldest son. Coleridge relates that shortly before the death of his father, through the jealousies infused into his brother Francis's mind by Molly, the nurse, he was driven to isolation, and his mind was forced in upon itself. Let me quote from his own touching narrative:—

"I never played except by myself, and then only acting over what I had been reading or fancying, or half one, half the other, with a stick cutting down weeds and nettles as one of the seven champions of Christendom. Alas! I had all the simplicity, all the docility of the little child, but none of the child's habits. I never thought as a child, never had the language of a child. I forget whether it was in my fifth or sixth year, but I believe the latter, in consequence of some quarrel between me and my brother, in the first week in October, I ran away from fear of being whipped, and passed the whole night, a night of rain and storm, on the bleak side of a hill on the Otter, and was there found at daybreak, without the power of using my limbs, about six yards from the naked bank of the river."*

Another account—which, however, presents ample evidence of inaccuracy and embellishment—contains the very natural incident that "a waggoner, proceeding along at four in the morning, thought he heard a child's voice. He stopped and listened. He now heard the voice cry out, 'Betty, Betty, I can't pull up the clothes.'"† For "four" we may read *six*; and for "Betty," *Molly*: while many of the recorded incidents are utterly at variance with the poet's own narrative. This anecdote is significant, if we bear in mind that fourteen years later he once more turned himself adrift, and was discovered by accident, not asleep on the banks of the Otter, but on duty in a military hospital.

One's heart sickens when one reflects on the sufferings of this poor child, endowed by nature with such exquisite sensibility, when he found himself face to face with the unsympathetic and Procrustean world of a public school. What Coleridge might have achieved under the plastic power of a more kindly culture we may imagine, but we shall never know. In my view, the case of Coleridge is that of a man of rare and priceless genius, marred and ruined by an insane and monstrous system of education. Let us fancy what a Samson or a Hercules would turn out if forced to grow awry in a dark and pestilential dungeon, or in the *res angusta* of what our ancestors called a "Little-Ease," and we shall be able to

* 26, pp. 10, 11.

† 20, vol. i., p. 248.

degree how much of Coleridge's errors and failures are the perverse and inappropriate machinery by which his ideas were directed and trained.

To which I am referring, Christ's Hospital was pre-eminently the name of James Boyer (or Bowyer), a man of the Parr type, who professed but one principle of education of a boy,—“Flog him!” Lamb* has given us a full and particular account” of the proceedings of the school under the iron sway and remorseless discipline

of the school, had his likes and dislikes; and among other things which he particularly disliked ugliness and awkwardness, for which I do not hold him to be very blameless. The *gravamen* of the charge against Boyer is that he inflicted punishments, to a great extent, by his likes and dislikes. I can record one instance which speaks volumes, and which is a striking and disproportionate illustration (no small sin in a school) will adduce with some severity of abbreviation. There was a certain long, dark, ugly boy; but forasmuch as he was industrious and well-conducted, he could find no objection to any extraordinary punishment. On every day of his life, and many times a day, but his punishments were wholly inadequate to allay the Boyer rage. To restore his peace of mind, the class in which was his *bête noire* resorted to him for some breach of rules. The master of the class, and pulling out his watch, said, “Gentlemen, you must flog all the class; you must draw lots for two.” The lot fell on the intended victim. Thereupon Boyer balked of his prey, once more took out his watch, and said, “Gentlemen, I find I have time to flog the class, but not to flog you, *gin with you, sir.*” The ugly boy was forthwith dismissed to the retirement of Boyer's *sanctum*. In a quarter of an hour the master and boy returned into school—the former in abject misery, the latter appeased and radiant. Once more taking to the miserable ogre addressing the class said, “Gentlemen, I have not time to flog the rest of the class; you are the only one who has time. Such was the fiend under whose ferule an ill-fated child in the land was doomed for years to suffer. At eight or nine years of age when one of the “Deputy

* 35 and 35.

Grecians," named Middleton (afterwards Bishop of Calcutta), found him in playtime, with his points untrussed and his shoes down at heel, reading Virgil for amusement. Middleton reported the fact to Boyer, and Boyer at once sent for the master of the lower school, from whom he learnt that Coleridge was a dunce, who could not be got to repeat a single rule of syntax. This report brought the boy before the dreaded head-master; who, on being found sufficiently advanced in Latin, was promoted to the upper school. Coleridge, who was the kindest of beings, was always ready in after life to make the best of his old master's character and scholarship; but even he was obliged to allow that when he was flogged, Boyer gave him an extra cut, saying, "You are such an ugly fellow!"* We have Samuel Johnson's *coup d'essai* in versification, in his "Epitaph on a Duck." I will not take upon myself to omit Coleridge's first attempt, which seems to have been made while he was suffering under an irritating application to his skin. It runs thus:—

"O, Lord, have mercy on me!

For I am very sad;

For why, good Lord? I've got the itch,

And eke I've got the tad,"

tad being the school-name for ringworm.† The verse for humour promises much, but it is remarkable that Coleridge's serious poetical efforts in early life contain no prophecy of that wondrous poetic power which broke forth into song in his twenty-fifth year.

It was about the same time that he was made free of a circulating library. What a redeeming "touch of nature" is that quality which we self-flatteringly call *humanity*! How many men walking the Strand at that or any other time would have turned to so good an account the accident of a boy catching at his coat? Coleridge was acting one of his day-dreams in the Strand—just as he used to play the Seven Champions of Christendom in the fields of Ottery. He fancied himself Leander swimming the Hellespont, when his hand committed the alleged offence. The story, as told by Gillman, is simply incredible, by which assertion it is not very strongly differentiated from the majority of stories in his book.† No gentleman would suspect a Blue-coat boy of picking his pocket.

* 26, p. 20.

† 26, p. 17.

as it may, the gentleman with whom Coleridge came in was both kind and discerning. God bless him! say I, for both, since his kindness and discernment concurred in placing Boyer's disposal a very treasury of book-lore.

Forth, barring a little mechanical drudgery at Greek, the reading library in King Street, Cheapside, was Coleridge's

His own account runs thus:—

and *through* the catalogue, folios and all, whether I understood them, or did not understand them, running all risks in going out to get the two volumes which I was entitled to have. I can conceive what I must have been at fourteen. I was in a low fever. My whole being was, with eyes closed to the object of present sense, to crumple myself up in a sunny room and read, read, read: fancy myself on Robinson Crusoe's island, finding a mountain of plum cake, and eating a room for a room, and then eating it into the shapes of tables and chairs—and fancy!"

A course of life was fatal to his bodily health. Just as in the case of De Quincey, Coleridge contracted at school a morbid affection of the stomach—partly caused by want of bodily exercise, partly by want of food—which became the bane of his mature life. He himself tells us that, "what with jaundice, and what with pneumatic fever, full half the time from seventeen to twenty was passed in the sick ward of Christ's Hospital."

Incidents of his youth, many of them so significant of his life, seem to grow upon me as I write; and it is with great eagerness that, in view of that future life, and the limits of this life, I pass over so much that ought to be taken into account in writing his character. I have already forestalled one romantic incident in his after-life, viz., that the Cambridge student abandoned the academic shades of Jesus College for a barrack. Just so did the red-coat boy of fifteen deliberately resolve, with as little regard to position and scholarship, as for the judgment of his masters and friends, to be apprenticed to a shoemaker! He, and a friend, keeping shop hard by, conspired to carry this resolve into effect, and Coleridge instructed the old man how to broach the matter to Boyer, preparing him for the head-master's inevitable rebuke. It is told by Gillman that Boyer once threatened to flog a girl

who had come to beg a half-holiday for her brother. On the occasion of the shoemaker's application, Boyer held out threats, but followed up the exclamation of "Od's my life, man! what d'ye mean?" by so furious a demonstration of physical force, that the old shoemaker found discretion the wiser part of valour.* So the shoemaking was abandoned, and Coleridge remained at school till he had attained the dignity of a Grecian. He left Christ's Hospital in September, 1790, and was entered at Jesus College, Cambridge, on the 5th of the following February. He was then nineteen years of age.†

We must hurry over his Cambridge career. In the following year he gained Sir William Browne's medal for a Greek ode on "the Slave Trade." It is a specimen of average scholarship, but in no way remarkable. He wrote for the Porson prize what he called his "finest Greek poem," but was unsuccessful. He continued in residence at Jesus College till November, 1793, when moved by some disappointment, academical or other, he left Cambridge without an *exeat*, for London, where on December 3rd he enlisted in the 15th Light Dragoons under the name of Silas Titus Comberbacke (Cottle gives the name as Silas Tomken Comberbatch, but he blunders after his fashion). It is said that the surname was taken from a shop in Lincoln's Inn Fields or the Temple; and it is not impossible (though I have never met with the suggestion) that the first Christian name was suggested to Coleridge by Aubrey's "Captain Silas Taylor." The story of his life in barracks is too well known to need repetition here; let it suffice to say that his Latin and Greek betrayed his grade. He was at length discovered by some of his family or friends as he was doing duty in the infirmary of the barracks at Hounslow, and was bought off and discharged on April 10, 1794. He seems to have returned to Cambridge the same month, and to have become a Unitarian in religion. In the following June Coleridge visited Oxford, where he made the acquaintance of Robert Southey, who was then at Balliol College. The friendship thus formed between these two poets and men of letters lasted till Coleridge's death, with one brief interruption arising from some act or default of Southey's as editor of the *Quarterly Review*. In August or September Coleridge went by appointment to meet Southey at Bristol. Southey's mother lived at Bath, but it does not appear that Coleridge stayed there. The

* 26, p. 21.

† 26, p. 38.

‡ 17, vol. i. p. 253.

meeting was to organize a society whose members
 to embark for America, and to found a Communist
 banks of the Susquehannah. This society at the
 consisted of four male members, and was called a
 , one in which all had common rights and equal
 ge was the founder; the rest were Southey, Robert
 g Quaker poet), and George Burnet, son of a
 rmer, and, like Southey, an Oxonian.* To Burnet
 e agricultural department, and on the requisite
 ed he was to purchase the implements. What the
 o it is hard to say, unless they were to write poetry
 ne another. I suppose, too, that Burnet was to be
 nbrance;" for Lovell was already committed to
 ng married Mary Fricker, one of three sisters who
 eir mother at Bristol; which was on the whole a
 eeding, as it left one sister for each of his brother
 ge, indeed, once more returned to Cambridge in
 re he published a poem called "The Fall of Robes-
 n February, 1795, he was again with Southey in
 th gave themselves to public lecturing, and Cole-
 an preaching; and at private gatherings Pantisocracy
 tible theme of conversation and dispute.

, Coleridge married Sarah Fricker, and six weeks
 e sister Edith became the wife of Southey.†
 iage was in a sort a condition of colonial success;
 f the necessary capital it was an absolute bar to the
 he project; and so it fell out that Pantisocracy was
 ed, though it was all the more eagerly pursued in
 ey was the first seceder; his nuptial knot had no
 l than he sailed for Portugal to earn the means of

Doubtless it would have been more regular (and
 that more prudent also) if he had done the earning
 marrying afterwards. But he was the very soul of
 redeemed his promise out of hand, and he extended
 er the protection of a husband's name while he began
 ourable toil in a distant land. Coleridge, on the
 "love in a cottage" at Clevedon; and after enjoy-
 noon, and celebrating it in very sweet verses, set forth
 about July 1795; and Burnet, at the age of thirty-two,
 s Gillman.

† 15, p 347.

alone on a visit to friends in Worcester, Birmingham, Derby, Sheffield, Manchester, and Liverpool. His ostensible object was to obtain subscribers to a periodical to be written by himself, and entitled *The Watchman*. On this tour he made acquaintance with Joseph Strutt, the father of Lord Belper, Dr. Darwin (who from the testimony of Mrs. Schimmelpenninck seemed to have combined the four characteristics of naturalist, poet, atheist, and glutton), Charles Lloyd, a brainsick young poet; James Montgomery, the poet, and others. During his absence his forgotten bride found the *ennui* of the cottage insupportable, and returned to her mother's house on Redcliff Hill, Bristol, and there fell sick. Coleridge was summoned from Liverpool to her bedside. The double misery of sickness and poverty which was thenceforth to poison their matrimonial life had now commenced with a vengeance; and the biographer, who is determined to do his duty by his hero's wife and children, as well as by the hero himself, finds himself obliged to allow that the peculiar training of the juvenile poet had proved a very insufficient discipline for the correction of the bosom vice of selfishness. It is very hard to hold the balance fairly between Coleridge and his wife. It always is hard to be just to both parties in an ill-assorted marriage. For myself I decline the task, believing that the time has not yet arrived—if arrive it ever will—for passing an objective judgment on this remarkable being.

"Then at the balance let's be mute,
We never can adjust it;
What's *done* we partly may compute,
But know not what's *resisted*."

However, once for all, let me say that, except for brief and uncertain intervals, Coleridge never did maintain either wife or children. At one time Southey, poor as a church-rat, but industrious as a bee, with a wife and children of his own to provide for, kept Coleridge's wife and children too. The story is pitiable; perhaps of all the parties involved in Coleridge's seeming self-indulgent life, Southey and his poor wife are most to be pitied and most to be loved. How matters could have turned out better it is hard to say: for assuredly Coleridge was wholly unfit for any other kind of work than that he actually accomplished; and with that work posterity seemed to be very well satisfied; so we may allow that in some inscrutable way "it's all for the best."

man, like almost everything Coleridge attempted, a miserable failure. The first number was published on 1st March, and it expired with the tenth number, viz., that of 1st March. Mr. and Mrs. Coleridge removed from Redford Street, Kingsdown. He drew his maintenance from the Bristol bookseller, doing, it must be owned, very much for a very liberal pay. Cottle published Coleridge's first number early in April. According to the poet's own view, "Musings" were a certificate of high merit. In each number, to a friend, Mr. Thomas Poole, of Nether Stowey (10th and 11th), he says, "I rest all my poetical credit on these Musings."

Coleridge bethought him of the necessity of keeping the door by his own personal exertions. Three schemes he had in view, of which the one entailing the least exertion on his part was actually realized. In July Mr. and Mrs. Coleridge removed to Derby, where a negotiation was opened for Coleridge to undertake the education of the sons of a Mrs. Evans. After visiting Oakover, Ilam, and Dove Dale, Coleridge went to stay at the house of a Mr. Thomas Hawkes, of Birmingham, at which town Coleridge preached on a Unitarian congregation. Here he again met Charles

Coleridge, leaving his wife at Kingsdown, once more to Birmingham. He seems to have stayed with the Rev. Mr. Glegg Hall, with a view to Charles Lloyd—who was a fine poetic genius, but in extremely delicate health—connected with him at Kingsdown.

When the news arrived that Mrs. Coleridge had, on September 1st, presented him with a son. He hurried back to Derby with Charles Lloyd with him. Matters had changed in the meantime. Southey had returned from Portugal to claim his share of the ideal pantisocratic colony had received the addition of a son to inherit no little of Coleridge's poetic genius, and of his weakness. This child was christened David, after the famous author of the "Observations on Man," at the same time, jointly with Bishop Berkeley and the poet, and the bulk of Coleridge's hero-worship.*

Other children, whose names occur seldom or never in the biographies, were Sara, born at Bristol; and Derwent, born at

Soon after we find Mr. and Mrs. Coleridge, with their child and Charles Lloyd, residing at a cottage taken for them at Nether Stowey, by Mr. Thomas Poole of that place.* As Coleridge rarely dated a letter, and when he did do so contented himself with the year or the week-day only, it is difficult to fix with nicety the time of his entering on this new residence. However, he was there in November, 1796, preparing a second edition of his poems, which was published by Cottle in the summer of 1797.

The more distressing effects of Coleridge's life at Christ's Hospital seem to have become chronic before his marriage. Early in 1795 (if I may infer a date for an undated note to Cottle †) he complains that "a very devil has got possession of my left temple, eye, cheek, jaw, throat, and shoulder." It is unquestionable that it was about this time that he first had recourse to opium to allay his sufferings. On the 1st November, 1796, he was seized with violent neuralgia, ‡ and took laudanum, evidently not for the first time. Assuredly he had not the slightest suspicion that he was contracting a habit of body which would render a periodical supply of the narcotic a positive necessity. He records, under date 1826, "I wrote a few stanzas three-and-twenty years ago, soon after my eyes had been opened to the true nature of the habit into which I had been ignorantly deluded by the seeming magic effects of opium," &c., which is to say that his eyes were not opened till about 1803, *i.e.*, seven or eight years after he first took laudanum. In the same paper his bondage to opium is attributed to Kendal's Black Drop, which he took experimentally on the recommendation of a medical review, and which "worked miracles; the swellings [in the knees] disappeared, the pains vanished." But here was a mistake, or a self-delusion, for the habit had been already formed from the occasional use of laudanum. He continues, "Alas! it is with a bitter smile, a laugh of gall and bitterness, that I recall this period of unus-

Keswick. The former married Henry Nelson Coleridge, and was the accomplished author of "Phantasmion," Pickering, 1837. The latter alone survives. He was Principal of St. Mark's Training College, and is now Rector of Hanwell; and he has been for many years one of H. M.'s Inspectors of Schools. He edited his brother Hartley's "Remains" with a short biography, and has contributed important papers to the London Philological Society.

* 20, vol. i., p. 187; 15, p. 391.

† 20, vol. i., p. 54

‡ 15, p. 330.

tion, and how I first became aware of the maelström, whirlpool to which I was drawing just when the current was strong enough to stem. . . . God knows that from the first I was the victim of pain and terror, nor had I at any time the flattering poison as a stimulus, or for any craving of agreeable sensations. I needed none; and oh! with what sorrow did I read the 'Confessions of an Opium-Eater,' by a writer, with morbid vanity, makes a boast of what good fortune, for he had been faithfully and with an agony of mind of the gulf, and yet wilfully struck into the current! Merciful to him!—April, 1826."* De Quincey amply atones himself for this;† and Sara Coleridge gently replied to him;‡ but I have no space for the consideration of any more of this story now. I note *en passant* that William Wilberforce, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, De Quincey, and J. P. Nichol, the astrologers, were all consumers of opium. All of these, except poor De Quincey, took it inordinately; and for them that drug had fatal consequences. With Wilberforce, Coleridge, and Nichol, great mental mischief was found to be so serious as to render a lengthened residence in the house of a medical man, and the discontinuance of the habit. In all these cases, with De Quincey, it was found impossible to permanently subvert the nervous system to the enforced abstinence; and in the end the narcotic resumed, if it ever relaxed, its baneful sway.

Stowey Coleridge wrote his tragedy of "Osorio," afterwards altered and printed under the name of "The Rival," which was completed up to the middle of Act V. by September, 1797,§ and was brought out at Drury Lane (by favour of the manager) nineteen years after it was composed, when Rae acted the chief part. This year (1797) has been called Coleridge's *mirabilis*; for in the course of it he produced an extraordinary number of poems; among which we count the first "Christabel," "Genevieve," and the "Hymn before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni," and a considerable part of "The Rival." This famous ballad was completed in February, 1798, and published with Wordsworth's "Lyrical Ballads" in June. At this time, too, he met at Mr. Poole's, Josiah Wedgwood, || who introduced him by letter to

246—248.

† 18.

‡ 17.

i., p. 234.

|| 20, vol. i., pp. 250, 305, and 307.

Mr. Daniel Stuart, and he began to contribute to the *Morning Post*. He must have returned with the Wedgewoods to Cote House, and stayed there till the end of the year.* In that month of February he made another attempt to obtain a preachiership. His success in Birmingham had been small; the Unitarians, fresh from the school of Priestley, found Coleridge's doctrines too pronouncedly metaphysical, and also probably tinged with orthodoxy. He had not succeeded better at Sheffield. At the chapel of Mr. Jardine, Bristol, Coleridge had made a lamentable failure. He now went to Shrewsbury, as candidate in succession to the Rev. Mr. Rowland. Whatever may have been his design, he withdrew his candidature on learning that the Messrs. Wedgewood had settled on him a pension of £150 a year.†

On September 16th, 1798, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Miss Wordsworth sailed from Yarmouth for Hamburg. They landed on the 19th, at four o'clock p.m., and the following day the two poets were introduced to the brother of the poet Klopstock, and to Ebeling. A few days later they made the acquaintance of the greater Klopstock, with whom, however, they were much disappointed. Doubtless Klopstock had a reputation vastly in excess of his merits; but much of the disappointment must have been owing to the want of an adequate medium of communication. Wordsworth left for England on September 27; but Coleridge remained in Germany for the purpose of acquiring the language, and of extending his acquaintance with German celebrities.

In my opinion De Quincey has exaggerated Coleridge's acquaintance with German. During the year and two months of his residence in Germany a hard-working student might have obtained a passable acquaintance with the language; but Coleridge, at his first year at college, was never a hard-working student; and at this time he was physically incapable of the exertion necessary to so vast an acquirement. His version of Schiller's "Wallenstein" teems with mistakes of translation, though it is a treasury of fine original poetry. I suspect he knew no foreign language so well as Latin; but he had acquired sufficient French and Italian to read (doubtless with more or less difficulty) the classics of France and Italy.

Coleridge returned to England on November 27, 1799.‡ The

* 39, p. 486.

† 15, p. 389; 20, vol. i., p. 308.

‡ 19, *passim*, and 15, p. 230.

y and October, 1800, he passed at Keswick as the
 ey, who then resided at Greta Hall.* In this year
 his fine but inaccurate version of the "Piccolomini,"
 uth of Wallenstein," which it is said he wrote in six
 s published immediately, but few copies were ever
 ngth the large remainder was disposed of as waste
 now composed the second part of "Christabel."
 period he discontinued writing poetry.

se to the second part of "Christabel," written early
 serves, "Till very lately my poetic powers have been
 uspended animation." I cannot make out that he
 ry after this time: but "Zapolya," "Kubla Khan,"
 s of Sleep," whensoever written, were published in
 ne with "Christabel," in 1816. "Sibylline Leaves"
 " appeared in that year also.

1803, Coleridge, in company with Wordsworth,
 ghlands. The scenery of Scotland, which inspired
 nd made his genius productive, had but little effect
 In truth, the poetical period of his life was rapidly
 close. We may consider it closed by 1804, when
 Malta. We may well credit the assertion that
 poet died there, but Gillman's assertion has no such

He says, "He seemed at this time [*i. e.*, while in
 ition to his rheumatism, to have been oppressed in
 which oppression crept on him imperceptibly to
 at suspicion of its cause: yet so obvious was it, that
 by others 'as laborious;' and continuing to increase,
 ttle apparent advancement, at length terminated in

however, he came to life again in England—not indeed
 as a religious philosopher. As I have recorded that
 ame a Unitarian in religion about the spring or
 4, let me add that he had outgrown his Unitarianism
 e left Malta, and was an outspoken defender of the
 y the year 1807. It is the more important to note
 r. Wm. Howitt§ appears to attribute Coleridge's
 to his study of the German philosophers, and dis-

393; and (39), p. 480.

‡ 26, p. 167.

† 26 p. 281.

§ 31, p. 315.

tinently states that "towards the close of his life he even disclaimed them, and returned a strict Trinitarian to the bosom of the Church of England." This extraordinary perversion I have elsewhere exposed.*

We learn from Lamb that Coleridge's talk, while at Christ's Hospital, acted like a spell on chance visitors. "How have I seen the casual passer through the cloisters stand still, entranced with admiration!" &c.† It was just the same at Jesus' College and at Hounslow Barracks. Students and soldiers alike could not resist the fascination, but on the cessation of his diatribe, like Adam after the angel's discourse ("Paradise Lost," xii.), must often have—

"Thought him still speaking, still stood fixed to hear."

This gift of speech was in full perfection in 1797, and we are indebted to Mr. D. Stuart for the fact that it did Coleridge disservice in the Christmas of that year. He was an inmate of Cote House, where a large party, including James Mackintosh, were assembled, and "so riveted by his discourse the attention of the gentlemen, particularly of Mr. Thomas Wedgewood," and "so prevented general conversation, that several of the party wished him out of the house." The result was that "Mackintosh, at the instance of some of the inmates, attacked Coleridge on all subjects—politics, poetry, religion, ethics, &c. Mackintosh was by far the most [*i. e.*, more] dexterous disputer. Coleridge . . . was speedily confused and subdued. He felt himself lowered in the eyes of the Wedgewoods," and incontinently left the house, sadder, if not a wiser man!‡

Of Coleridge's extraordinary gift of consecutive talking, which Madame De Stael called *le monologue*, as distinguished from *dialogue*, we have several trustworthy accounts. I take Dr. Dibdin's, which is certainly *not* overcharged:—

"The orator rolled himself up in his chair, and gave the most unrestrained indulgence to his speech; and how fraught with acuteness and originality was that speech, and in what copious and eloquent periods did it flow! . . . For nearly two hours he spoke with unhesitating and uninterrupted fluency. . . . The manner of Coleridge was rather emphatic than dogmatic, and though he was generally and satisfactorily listened to. It might be said of Coleridge, as Cowper has so happily said of Sir Philip Sidney

* 33, pp. 27—30.

† 36.

‡ 39, p. 485.

Coleridge's early poetical efforts gave, as I have said, little or no promise of his future excellence. Perhaps the earliest examples of his marvellous poetic genius are found in the lines "To Sara," and those "To a friend who had declared his intention of writing no more poetry." From the latter I select a dozen lines which might have been written by the author of "A Midsummer Night's Dream," or the author of "Comus:"—

"On a bleak rock, midway the Aonian Mount,
There stands a lone and melancholy tree,
Whose aged branches to the midnight blast
Make solemn music: pluck its darkest bough,
Ere yet the unwholesome night dew be exhaled,
And weeping, wreath it round thy poet's tomb:
Then, in the outskirts where pollutions grow,
Pick stinking henbane, and the dusky flowers
Of nightshade, or its red and tempting fruit;
These with stopped nostril and glove-guarded hand
Knit in nice intertexture, so to twine
The illustrious brow of Scotch nobility!"—

i. e., the brow of that nobility which, with so exquisite a sense of propriety, made an exciseman of their national poet. Of course these lines, like all worthy poetry, must be read aloud: the anastomosis, which is here so masterly, would otherwise be lost. The writer of the able critique in *Blackwood** quotes from Coleridge the following remarks:—"The sudden charm which accidents of light and shade, which moonlight or sunlight, diffused over a familiar landscape, appeared to represent the practicability of combining both powers;" viz., "the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature, and the power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colours of imagination." "These are the poetry of nature. The thought suggested itself (to which of us I do not recollect, [*i. e.*, himself or Wordsworth] that a series of poems might be composed of two sorts. In the one, the incidents and agents were to be, in part at least, supernatural; for the second class subjects were to be chosen from ordinary life." He was thus led to make the experiment of a poem belonging to the former class. The first result was "The Ancient Mariner," the second was "Christabel."

These two master pieces belong to the same class as the immortal

La Motte Fouqué. "The Ancient Mariner" and are to poetry exactly what "Undine" and "Sintram" literature. If it be allowed that neither of those poems, as a romance, to "Undine," Coleridge must never-doubted with having clothed his thoughts in a far nobler words.

would attribute the production of such poems to the opium, or laudanum, should consider that of the o have habitually eaten opium or drunk laudanum, given us an "Ancient Mariner" and a "Christabel." two poems, and on "Genevieve," rests the splendid Coleridge as a poet. His own claim to originality, of rhythm, must be disallowed. In the Preface to he enumerates his "new principle, namely, that of accents, not the syllables. Though the latter may en to twelve, yet in each line the accents will be found ar." Thus—

"Is the night chilly and dark?
The night is chilly, but not dark."

uld claim for the seven syllables of the one, and the other line, but four accents. All the same, it can bted that both lines are indistinguishable from prose, ect they may be likened to many in the "Paradise

ivers himself of this brief but emphatic praise of —"In 'Christabel' there is one splendid passage on ship."* As if a great poem could be judged by its s a carcanet by its gems! However, speaking of s, Hazlitt is right. The passage is singularly

"Alas! they had been friends in youth;
But whispering tongues can poison truth;
And constancy lives in realms above;
And life is thorny; and youth is vain;
And to be wroth with one we love
Doth work like madness in the brain.
And thus it chanced, as I divine,
With Roland and Sir Leoline.

Each spake words of high disdain
 And insult to his heart's best brother :
 They parted—ne'er to meet again !
 But never either found another
 To free the hollow heart from paining—
 They stood aloof, the scars remaining,
 Like cliffs which had been rent asunder.
 A dreary sea now flows between ;
 But neither heat, nor frost, nor thunder,
 Shall wholly do away, I ween,
 The marks of that which once hath been."

To understand the nature (not at all the secret) of Coleridge's poetry we must picture him to our minds as a *seer*, one who has inward vision of the inner world, the vision of which is simply provoked by the outward sight of outer objects. Unhappily, this aphorism is all I have to say in the nature of criticism: *To every seer the outer is but a means of suggesting the inner.* To the simple-hearted and profound-souled Böhme, the auroral redness was fraught with spiritual regeneration; to Tennyson (in the "Vision of Sin"), it was instinct with divine vengeance.

William Blake used to say that when he looked at the sun he saw angels and archangels around the throne of God. Tennyson, with appropriate insight, assigns to Merlin (in "Vivien") a similar confession respecting the nebula in the sword of Orion:—

"A single misty star,
 Which is the second in a line of stars
 That seem a sword beneath a belt of three;
 I never gazed upon it but I dreamt
 Of some vast charm concluded in that star
 To make fame nothing."

Coleridge was fully conscious of his seership. He says, "In looking at objects of nature, while I am thinking, as at yonder moon dim glimmering through the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were *asking*, a symbolical language for something within me that already and for ever exists, than observing anything new. Even when that latter is the case, yet still I have always an obscure feeling, as if that new phenomenon were the dim awakening of a forgotten or hidden truth of my inner nature."* *The greatness of Coleridge as a poet consisted in his possession of*

his fidelity to it, and his extraordinary wealth of language in its utterance. It is just such an inner vision, inseparable or mingled with the world of sense, that he strove to express in "The Ancient Mariner" and in "Christabel;" neither of which, in their real end, and the latter, by its very nature, is a fragment. Both poems are criticised in a genial and appreciative spirit in the paper of "A Century of Great Poets, No. IV." Especially am I struck in that paper a corroboration of my own judgment of "Christabel." "For our own part, we are afraid to say all that we think of its perfection, lest our words should seem inflated and untrue." I, too, hold it to be the most perfect poem in English language. It is a lesson and a warning to young poets. The brevity of a poem precludes all excuse for shortcoming or defect. A brief poem should be faultless and perfect, or it had better have remained unwritten. The faults we tolerate in a statue are intolerable in a statue. "Genevieve" is brief; but it attains a paralleled perfection of structure and language, of story and of imagery (just a tale within a tale, as *Kubla Khan* is a poem within a dream), that its author, had he written nothing else, would ever have taken his place in the roll of great poets. I am sometimes about Coleridge being incapable of sustained effort, but his ability to accomplish a voluminous poem like "Paradise Regained" reminds me of what Henry Taylor, in one of his "Essays" has said so well, that a long poem is always, in truth, a series of short poems, and that Coleridge, if he wrote little, wrote that little with consummate excellence.

(*End of the First Notice*).

The slab in the church of Ottery St. Mary, commemorating the family:—

IN MEMORY OF

OF John Coleridge, who died A.D. 1781, aged 63.

OF Ann, his wife, who died A.D. 1809, aged 83.

And of their children.

John died in the East Indies, A.D. 1786, aged 31.

William an infant.

William, at Hackney, A.D. 1780, aged 23.

Luke Herman, at Thorverton, A.D. 1790, aged 24.

Ann, at Ottery, A.D. 1791, aged 23.

Francis, in the East Indies, A.D. 1792, aged 22.

George, at Ottery, A.D. 1828, aged 64.

Samuel Taylor, at Highgate, A.D. 1834, aged 62.

James, at Ottery, A.D. 1836, aged 75.

And Coleridge, B.A., who died March 15th, 1833, in the 83rd year of his age.

Religion.

IS CHRISTIANITY OPPOSED TO HUMAN PROGRESS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I HAVE already, in a previous paper, given a few reasons why Christianity is *not* opposed to human progress, and now purpose reviewing a few of the arguments brought forward by those who have taken the opposite side of the question.

T. O. J. contends for the question being considered only in relation to Christianity as being a "form, or rather series and conglomerate of forms of church life which the professors of the religion of Christ have arranged and aggregated themselves into," leaving "Christliness" out altogether: and then asks what Christianity has done for the increase of love, virtue, peace, happiness, and truth. The *form* nothing, but the *Christliness* does, and has done, all this. And it is the Christliness filling the hearts of true Christians which is the only means of bringing about human progress. T. O. J. is right when he says that the form of Christianity accomplishes all this evil, not the true Christianity; and the cause of this is that so many members of the Christian Church only look upon it as a mere form, instead of a sanctified bond uniting a loving and merciful God, and sinful striving man. Real Christians cannot be charged with destroying love, paralyzing effort, and opposing good movements. Far contrary, these are the very ends their Christianity is most calculated to bring about.

As for C. W. P., I deny that *any*, not being formal Christians with no godliness in their hearts, "have fallen away from faith in Christianity, in disappointment at the ineptitude of its truths to bring them comfort, and the powerlessness of its precepts to induce those who profess their faith in it to ameliorate their condition." Question any truly religious man or woman from whence they derive their comfort and fortitude under many trials and sufferings, and they will answer from Christianity, from the feelings with which the service of a Saviour who has promised to bear all their burdens, and washed away all their sins upon the cross, fills their breasts.

The objection of C. W. P. on the grounds of the religious wars occasioned by Christianity may be combated by the rightness of

h they were meant to accomplish, and by the doctrine His plans makes use of what agencies He pleases for nt.

have taken the affirmative side of the question chiefly antagonism of Christianity to human progress from and the misdoings of professing Christians. T. O. J. e sectarian disputes have "been occasioned by dogma doctrine, and by opposing opinions rather than truths. he fault of Christianity? A real Christian, I think, ed with the doctrines and truths which are revealed ve according to the charity they teach.

inks that had Christianity been more definite in its doctrine, sectarian disputes and quarrels would be ed. We have doctrines sufficiently definite for the lvation, which is the end of the religion of all sects, leave the rest to faith, and put his whole strength ing of these, or at least not lose sight of the funda- ts whilst indulging in a little research and speculation minor concern.

uman race suffered and was retarded in its progress ce of the Roman Catholic Church of the Middle Ages how soon was that influence cast off, the bright light ation breaking through and dispelling the gloom that 's mental powers and prevented their proper exercise! argument that "a chain is only as strong as its ' is unable to prove that Christianity is opposed to s, because those who only *profess* it are the chief means g in men the first principles of conscientiousness," general feeling of the prevalence of hypocrisy," and quasi-Christian sanction to those practices which are in and expelled from the churches." For they are of Christianity in one, and the least, of its relations, orm; and is the whole system—in itself good—to be antagonistic to human progress because a majority even s, professing only its form, act contrary to the pre- ed by it, and which none can deny are most conducive being?

he main law of the Christian religion. Charity to ty to man are the two fundamental commandments. he comforter of the afflicted, the protector of the reconciler of differences, the intercession for offenders.

In a word, it is the soul of social life. It is the sun that enlivens and cheers the abodes of men."*

Can then a faith which has such a law as this for the guidance of its believers, which has for its aim the spiritual, moral, intellectual, and physical welfare of man, be opposed to human progress?

R. W. C.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

PROGRESS depends upon a proper conception of the end and purpose of life. It is not mere motion, but a going forward in the right way towards the best effecting of the object. He who runs in a wrong direction will go farther from an object than he who walks however lamely towards it. The latter by holding on in his course will come nearer to his end, the former departs further from it the faster he proceeds. If, then, we intend to comprehend the right issue of the question now before us, we should determine what is meant by human progress.

Human life is an endowment of sentiency and intelligence aggregated in an individual for a special purpose, and that purpose is the attainment of the greatest possible amount of happiness. The end, therefore, the supreme purpose of life, is happiness or welfare. Anything that leads to happiness is an aid to life, and every infringement of life lessens or weakens the capacity for happiness. To attain to the largest amount and the finest quality of happiness possible to us is the end or aim of our life. Failing to achieve this, we so far lose our life, and destroying the possibilities of healthy happiness, make a bad exchange. The self-loving and self-protecting faculties prove plainly that life is not to be regarded as a light, slight, valueless thing, but as a great, precious, and good gift.

Christianity gives us false conceptions of life and of the purposes of life. It preaches the intrinsic worthlessness of human life or happiness, and it affirms the incompatibility of a due regard to personal welfare and the common delights of the world with the life to which believers in Christianity should devote themselves. Hence people are found morbidly repining even over the innocent joy which their hearts feel when health is high with them and life is in its heyday. They mourn over their love of the world and the things of the world as if the only blessedness that the soul should

* Hugh Blair, D.D.

be grief and sorrow—the chastisements of God for
are filled with discontent regarding their state, because
to the imitation of Christ they feel that they do not
without a place to lay their heads, but that they love
and the comforts of home, and delight in the glow of
placency with which they sit down to the household
which their strength is nourished and their palate de-
they feel that they are in danger of selling their eternal
for a mess of earth's pottage; and they are tortured
which they cannot get rid of, lest their love of the
should destroy their chance of the life that is to come.
Christianity, by darkening the mind with false views of
the horizon of hope and weakens while it distresses the
a human being is so constituted that he cannot but
health and in his attainment of position, influence, and
while Christianity proclaims a warfare against this love
and of self, and keeps up a continual fight between
and contentment. Men are so anxious to be able to say,
"the good fight of faith," that they impede their
destroy their opportunity of living—as human beings
—with a sense of joy in their hearts, and with a proper
into our natures the whole sum of joy possible in our
s. No disposition is so unfriendly to human happiness
as irksome fault-finding with one's self. It takes the
petite, poisons every good gift of God, distresses the
imaginary woes, and not unfrequently drives men into
madness, and madness.

It sets up a false model for life. The character of
noble and glorious one, and one which justly demands
of the soul on account of its purity, patience, and self-
holiness and its fervour. But it is altogether an ex-
ample, and not an exemplary one. The frequent fastings
night wrestlings in prayer, the exposure to hunger and
vicinity of weather, and distress of spirit, the homelessness
of the unstained existence, the entrancement of holding
ourselves bound to us, the regardlessness of men and of law,
of meeting accusations against us, the dedication of
sorrow and suffering, are all points in which we cannot
without directly violating the direct intimations of the
as written in our constitution and intended to be obeyed

by us, that our life may be healthful and useful. The true mission of man is not to hang loose to all ties of home, kindred, and friends; is not to set at nought the customs and laws, the associations and sympathies of our age and time; not to live an unresisting life whatever may assail us, and not to part with life or happiness or influence without a struggle. We have neither the office, the aim, nor the sustainment He had; and when we set such a model before us, we are willingly though stupidly, setting before us the impossible. This is folly at any time, but above all is it folly in connection with human conduct and under the common conditions of human life.

Christianity is opposed to human progress, too, by its distracting influence upon the mind and character. It condemns all the interests of life and earth as worthless; sometimes decries them as wicked. It represents life as a mere trifle, and all that can be done or endured on earth as quite a matter of indifference when compared with the life to which it points as the inheritance of those who have endured tribulation and affliction—nay, chosen them. This is a great evil. It misleads men, and makes them the easy dupes of those who profess to pave the way to heaven with prayers and gifts. I cannot subscribe to the gospel according to Guizot, to which "Georgius" claims assent—"that a bad principle does not vitiate radically an institution" (p. 180). We believe exactly the opposite; nay, we go further, and affirm that even a good principle wrongly applied does great evil, and exercises an immensely vitiating influence. For example, "Georgius" defends sectarianism, and persecution has been defended as an evidence of love of God and human souls. Christianity has been used for much evil in the world, and claims credit for much good attained by other means. As history and experience testify, it has been adverse in its influences to human progress.

G. M.

IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH?

TEMPORAL.—IV.

YOUR correspondent L. M. D. is entitled to great praise, both for the fairness of spirit which he displays and for the ability with which he has conducted his argument. He is nevertheless wrong, in my opinion, both in his conclusions and in his method of arriving

is wrong, I conceive, in his method, because the plan of his article is taken up with considerations of history and from probability. This is precisely one of the reasons upon which neither history nor probability can be relied upon for argument. The thing to be determined is an event of the present, and belonging to the far future for its accomplishment. Can history say about the destruction of the world by the advent of new heavens and a new earth? You may bring it to the bar, but it cannot be otherwise than a dumb witness in this class of subjects. The promise of the second advent is essentially in the nature of a prophecy; and a prophecy, mainly a simple record of facts, can neither accredit nor discredit the interpretation which we put upon the terms in connection associated to us.

The argument is stated in three paragraphs; and that the M. D. no injustice, we will take them in their order. The first contains a series of propositions which are independent of each other; and they are also independent of the subject in hand. L. M. D. is, in my opinion, the subject of some confusion of thought in this article. The terms of the question assume the *fact* that Christ reigns upon earth; and we are invited to determine by argument whether that reign is to be a purely spiritual one, a purely temporal one, or both combined. Each of the two hypotheses pre-supposes the fact that the reign will be a personal one, since an impersonal reign is simply nonsense. This M. D. makes use of the term "personal" reign in his paper as if it were synonymous with "temporal." In § 6, "When we advocate the personal reign of Jesus Christ, we are equally opposed to a personal reign." We do L. M. D. therefore, in assuming that it is the *temporal* reign of Christ which he opposes; and this is how he does it:—

However, we affirm, is equally opposed to a personal reign. Jesus has appeared once among men; but if we do not believe, they shall have no further unfoldings of His grace." Therefore we are invited to believe that since Jesus has appeared once upon earth it is impossible that He should appear upon it again. If language has a meaning, that is a logical deduction we are asked to accept, and the statement refutes its own refutation.

Passing by a series of truisms, which in this connection it is not worth while either to quote or to refute, we come to the assertion that "God does not repeat Himself or His purpose; paradism, &c., &c., are developments of the same principle." We are not informed what "the same principle" is, but we do no injustice to the argument by assuming that it is, or that it comprehends, the divine plan of man's redemption. I do not admit that "God does not repeat Himself," &c.; but assuming such to be the case, then I say that nothing has been stated by L. M. D. to invalidate the assumption that the temporal reign of Christ upon earth is but a further development of the same divine plan. The sacred "historical documents" undoubtedly teach us that Christ's work will not be fully accomplished until the final consummation of all things.

In spite of a tendency to be complimentary in the treatment of an opponent, which I can seldom wholly subdue, I must confess that the second paragraph appears to me to be utter nonsense. It commences, "Paradise was the seed-sowing of historic principle." This, now, conveys no intelligible idea to my mind. The fault, however, may be mine; and, therefore, assuming that the meaning may be clear to others, we go on to read, "The theocracy was the spring season." Of what? Of the "historic principle" evidently. Then, "Jesus came in the summer of being," which can only mean, that Jesus came in the summer season of "historic principle." Then, "And the months of ripening and maturing, &c., are now with us." That is, this is the autumn season of "historic principle;" and the subsequent sentences convey the important information that "the harvest is to come, and the ripened spirits of men shall be gathered into the garner of the Most High." Now if anything in the above quotation, or in the unquoted remainder of the paragraph, contains an argument against the doctrine of the temporal reign of Christ upon earth, I confess I cannot see it.

The third paragraph contains what is, I think, a misconception of the doctrine of the temporal reign; and I am anxious to notice it, so that if I am wrong myself I may be corrected: and in such a case I am willing to receive precisely such measure as I have meted out to my friend L. M. D. "To think that this earth is to be the prison-house of our spirits, and that all the wide immensity of the universe of God is never to be explored by us is," &c., &c.

If L. M. D., or any one else who adopts his views, can show me that such a dreary assumption is necessarily involved in the doctrine

I reign, I'll give it up at once. I, on the contrary, conviction that as a child of God the whole universe is and that eternity will be spent in the realization of reality of this thought. But eternity certainly furnishes to use an Irishism, for this employment, even after and with Christ a thousand years upon earth. s to say a word upon the testimony of Scripture to the doctrine, and cannot therefore say anything to the m probability."

disciples stood gazing up into heaven after the Saviour, by angels that "this same Jesus, which is taken up heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen heaven." The force of language cannot farther go; we say that Christ will certainly again appear upon s one step. In the passage in Zech. xiv. 4 which is t not answered by L. M. D., it is expressly declared shall descend upon Mount Olivet; and the natural which shall accompany His descent are minutely de- prophecy is yet to be fulfilled, and will receive its ment in the second coming of our Lord. The passages and Luke xxii. 29, 30, possess an undoubted value ion. We quote one only, Luke xxii. 29, 30: "And you a kingdom, as My Father hath appointed unto may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom, and judging the twelve tribes of Israel." This language eaning or it has not; it was either intended by Christ ilment or it was not. Its fulfilment is yet future; manner of it stated in vision in Rev. xx. 4?—"And I and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto d they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand must suffice for quotation. I see nothing in the honouring to God. destructive in any degree of the ality of living—nothing contrary to the teaching of see in it, on the contrary, a bright and beautiful link of God's providential government; the vindication s of men, angels, and devils, of the glory of Christ, e very seat of His ignomin; and I derive these views n, not through any preconceived idea in their favour, reading of the Word, and from L. M. D.'s "argu-

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IN answering the question, as a *political* rather than a *religious* one, "Ought the Church to be Disestablished?" it is assumed that disestablishment carries with it disendowment.

That the Church as by law established ought to be disestablished needs, I think, little to prove its propriety.

The Established Churches of England and Scotland represent but a small proportion of the entire population. The funds, church rates, and grants which uphold the Establishment are drawn directly or indirectly from the purses of the people, who consequently uphold the State Church, while only a fraction of their number enjoy the benefit of its ministrations. The law thus makes a large section of the people pay for a thing which they not only do not enjoy, but do not want. This is a state of things so unfair, impolitic, and opposed to the principles of modern legislation, that it is a matter of wonder that at this day we have such a thing in our midst as a State Church. The sooner it is disestablished it will be the better, not only on the principles of equity and justice, but for the cause of religion itself.

Disestablishment of the Church will give a fresh stimulus to religious thought and action. It is an observable fact that, as a general rule, ministers of Nonconforming bodies show a much greater degree of zeal and devotion in their calling than their brethren who sit beneath the fig tree of the Establishment. The cause of this is not far to seek. The Established minister knows that his stipend is sure, whether his pews are filled or not. On the other hand, the Dissenting minister knows that on the faithful, patient, and acceptable discharge of his duties the numerical and pecuniary position of his church in a large measure depends. The former knows he is independent he preaches his sermon, and his congregation seldom see him from one Sunday to another: the latter aims at attaining an individual acquaintance with his flock, and fostering its religious thought by week-day meetings and other

one, religious activity and exertion is stunted and in the other it is quickened and fanned to daily and hours. It has been urged against the voluntary minister may be induced to gloss over the sins and people in his attempts to gain their favour and good-purposes. But this is an objection as speculative as it

disestablishment of the Church, would, in some to a better feeling of love, peace, and unity among masses of society. It is a lamentable fact in Christ-little of that mind which was in Christ is to be sible Church of Christ has divided and subdivided ous sects, which regard each other as rivals, hating the love they bear to God. By this means society with a spirit of opposition, hatred, and uncharitable-prejudicial to its best interests, and gives the scorner reason for regarding Christianity as a farce. established Church does not generally identify itself animosities, yet it is a standing object for their uch is too often the indirect cause of jealousies and nly in society but in families, and its disestablish-as it removes its objectionable character, would be a desired end.

on which I condemn the Established Churches of otland are, I think, amply sufficient to urge their t.

of a church established by law I do not altogether re it possible to find a country where the inhabitants igion, where the first great command of love your ourself had an abode in every heart, and where the ous discernment of our day between church and t and sect, were entirely unknown,—then a church tected, and assisted, in some degree, by the State, r prove a blessing to all. But Christianity, as time en diverted into so many sectarian channels, each oo often manifesting a spirit of antagonism to the establishment and endowment of one sect over and of the rest is an anomaly which I think cannot be as it in reality exists, ought to be swept away at sible time.

A. K. D.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

CHRISTIANITY is not a thing separate and apart from human life ; it is an integral portion of it. The State is not something different from the Church ; it is the Church as a moral and religious confederacy or brotherhood acting for the good and progress of the people. Every man who has a vote, and moral or intellectual influence, is a member of the State—and almost every member of the State is also a member of the Church in its highest and truest sense—children of the heavenly Father, seeking salvation through His Son, and depending on the Holy Spirit for the influences of a holy life. The Church and the State are not really separate agencies, but only co-operative ones. They are the same and indivisible. What the highest Christian sentiment of the State becomes, that the Church may be made through the representatives of the people in Parliament. In our day it is nonsensical to talk of the disestablishment of the Church as a State machine. It is the State in its Christian development, just as any individual's personally preferred Church is, so far, the manifestation of his Christian life, and all his contributions to it are so much endowment given to and bestowed on it for its establishment. Now that the State is all but coincident with the whole body of the Christian people of the country, there need be no disconformity between Church and State ; and there is no necessity at all for political or religious Nonconformity. The Church is as requisite an outgrowth of the Christian responsibility of the people as are the offerings, the charities, the missionary money, and the personal attendance on ordinances, are the outgrowths of personal Christianity ; and since every person of worth, intelligence, and Christian principle is a member of the State as well as of the Church, each is bound to bring both State and Church into a higher harmony with the divine life, of which the Head alike of Church and State is our example.

"The powers that be are ordained of God" in so far as they are the chosen representatives of the people, who claim to be moved by the Spirit of God in what they do and approve of. If we are to "fear God, honour the sovereign, and love the brotherhood," how can we better do all three than by securing, as much as in us lies, that the brotherhood shall be members of the Church in which the fear of God is taught and practised ; and that the sovereign may

this brotherhood, but also hold fast and manifest the love of the brotherhood? If we are all of another in the State, are we not also co-members? and is it not our duty as such to maintain the spirit in the bond of peace in righteousness of life, union and communion rather than agitating for confusion?

is the symbol of the nation's faith, and it is a memorial of the nation's responsibility to God. It is a higher aspiration and a holier duty than concerns this. I contend, therefore, that the Church ought not to be—far less disendowed.

I think it is as much the duty of a State as of an individual to uphold and maintain a church, to express, and show, its dependence on God; to hold up a testimony of its higher life of godliness, and to give of its substance to the support of moral, religious, and holy life.

The highest and best specimen of a Government we have is the system of Government superintended and upheld, amidst dissent and schism, formalism and the faithlessness of kings, the backsliding of the remissness of prophets; because it is prophesied that the nursing fathers and queens be nursing mothers.

Because Christianity appeals to a theocracy as the basis of national government; and because heaven itself is being represented from nations, peoples, kindreds, all these showing that the nation as a unit is regarded as having duties relative to God in that respect, and as requiring a national church.

God has appointed a church, and has given that outward form an internal unity. God can be the author of confusion. Disestablishment would be the denial of God, would give rise to contentions and among sects, would lead to a scramble for power and could only change the mode of doing the same thing, which seeks, and must seek, *establishment*,—that is, itself. Thus, even if we disestablished it to-day, we would find some way or another to re-establish it to-morrow, with the difference that we could not establish a church, but only establish churches. The Church is comprehensive, but

if it were disestablished, it would be shivered into fragments, and confusion would ensue.

I am not much concerned about the voluntary principle, because I hold that the endowments of the Church are really voluntary gifts bestowed by the zealous and good of ages past, and only left in the hands of successive generations as trustees and administrators; and I am quite sure that it would be as certain a malversation of trusteeship to disendow the Church as it would be to denude any of the churches of Dissenters of their rights of property in their buildings and funds, their benefactions and legacies, voluntary gifts of the people put under administration for their behalf.

The Church, as established, is but the Church enriched by the gifts, benefactions, and devisements of the pious of the past, for the purpose of securing and maintaining the usefulness, permanency, and effective home-missionariness of the Christian ministry; and the laws which govern it are only the accretion of provisions made for the better, purer, and more effectual accomplishment of the duties of the Church.

Any provision made by voluntary effort, by offertory, gift, subscription, bequest, &c., for the erection, maintenance, or upholding of any church, is liable to every objection that can be brought against the endowments of the Church; and every time that a will is referred to, the terms of subscription are appealed to, or the law is invoked, the State is just as much involved in the affairs of that church on whose behalf the interpretation or application of a document is pleaded as it is in regard to the Church as established by law.

IV. When the Church was actually overthrown by the great Rebellion, in which such good and pious men as Milton, Cromwell, Pym, Hampden, Falkland, &c., had power and influence, its downfall did not secure unity and peace. It was only the signal for renewed division, contention, dissension, and hatred and malice, and all uncharitableness, which lasted till Dissent itself was destroyed by the multitude of its sects and the fury of its internecine persecutions.

V. The Church is not only the oldest voluntary institution, but it is also a home-mission institution. Its establishment provided a place of worship in each parish, and gave religion a home-centre for diffusion. Its establishment made it possible for the poor to give attendance to the ordinances of God, and supplied for them a

and a friend. To disestablish the Church would be to rob the poor, and to take the hands on what has been consecrated to holy uses by the liberality of previous times.

Some point or standard requires to be fixed, which we are to start, to reckon, or to compare with. Of faith and practice, of ministerial duty and of worship and of social influence, the Church has and therefore it ought to be retained in its position, its efforts, maintained in its integrity, and brought as nearly as possible to the spirit of Christianity. It is as wrong to disestablish the Church as it would be to disregard the will and testament of those who had left it to pious purposes and holy designs. E. C. M.

BOOKS OF GREAT MEN.—Sir Henry Lawrence prized above all other compositions Wordsworth's "Character of the Happy Man;" and he carried his passion for literature to reading Plutarch's "Lives;" and he carried this same work to church with her, and read it during the service; Milton's favourite books were Homer, Virgil, and the Greek and Latin poets; while Pitt's favourite work was Milton's "Paradise Lost;" his favourites were Demosthenes, Milton, Bolingbroke, and Burke; his favourite was Homer, which he read through once a week; his favourite was Virgil; Corneille's was Lucan; Schiller's was the "Wallenstein;" his favourite was Spenser; Coleridge's were Collins and Bowles; his favourite was Virgil; Brougham, Byron, Tennyson, have alike admired Homer; Hall and Sydney Smith also revered the great Italian. His favourite volume was Spinoza's "Ethics;" Marshal Blucher's favourite was Klopstock's "Messiah;" Napoleon's were Ossian, "The Idylls of Werther," Homer, Virgil, and Tasso; Wellington's were the "Poems of Bishop Butler, Smith's "Wealth of Nations;" Hume's "History of England;" and Keats and Cowley favoured the "Fæerie

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE?

CREATION.—V.

"**ETHER** contracts into comets, comets concrete into worlds, worlds cohere in systems, and in their revolutions evolve the life-germs they contain, so as to bud into plant-life and burst into animation." Thus writes "W. G. P.," in the February number of the *British Controversialist*. Herbert Spencer maintains that man and other animals had their origin in and have sprung from a luminous mist. Mr. Darwin affirms his belief "that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator," and Professor Tyndall tells us that "not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that of the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena,—were once *latent* in a fiery cloud." To those who believe in that doctrine of evolution which is set forth in the above statements we wish to propose a few queries, and to remind them of a few facts, with the object of leading them to inquire how such facts can be reconciled with the doctrine they maintain. If—as the advocates of evolution maintain—all existing genera and species of organisms have been derived from previously existing organisms of a *simpler* character than themselves, these *simpler* organisms being in like manner derived from others *still more simple*, and so on till we arrive at either a few exceedingly simple forms which were the progenitors of all the rest, or at one simple form which was the progenitor of all other organisms, how are the following facts to be accounted for?

In the lower classes of organisms increase takes place by cell-multiplication. Supposing, then, the primary form to have been an organic cell, multiplying itself by spontaneous fission, we must further suppose that, amongst the multitudes which underwent this process, a pair continued to adhere after division, till a case

occurred in which two pairs adhered, this process continuing till many pairs cling together, the adhering cells having their walls thinned and their contents thickened, till, after the lapse of a multitude of generations, the cell-walls became atrophied, and the thickened mass formed sarcode, or rudimental flesh, being a jelly-like substance, of which the simplest animals are entirely composed, the amœba amongst them. We thus get the amœba. But if all organisms have been evolved from one primordial form, other cells proceeding from the same original cell have become merely attached together in long strings, retaining the cell-walls of their primary thickness, and becoming at the end of a multitude of generations developed into one of the confervoid algæ, manifesting no evidence of either volition or voluntary motion, of both which the amœba manifests decided evidences. How is it that the mere obliteration of the cell-walls and the conversion of the cell-contents into jelly should develop in the creature a will?

Again, according to the evolution theory, the amœbæ must have become in the course of time converted into foraminifera and polycystinae, by becoming encrusted with either carbonate of lime or silica; yet, at the present time, naked amœbæ are produced, and when placed in water containing either silica or carbonate of lime, never attempt to form for themselves a shell which, according to the evolution theory, the ancient naked amœbæ must have done.

According to the evolution theory we ought to find in the course of long ages some very decided improvement in the breed of the foraminifera and polycystinae. Yet, so far from this being the case, the foraminifera discovered in the oldest of the sedimentary rocks constructed a dwelling much larger and more elaborate than any of those formed by the present race of foraminifera. So the fossil species of polycystinae are more perfect in their forms than the species now living, giving no evidence of that improvement which the evolution theory would lead us to expect.

So with reptiles. In past ages this class of animals attained an extraordinary development. Yet the stronger reptiles have perished and the weaker survive. So with the megatherium, the mastodon, and other gigantic quadrupeds. These have perished, while other species of the most delicate constitution have kept their race alive to the present time. The simplest and feeblest of organisms are still produced in abundance without exhibiting the slightest tendency to improvement; whereas, according to the evolution theory,

we should have expected such to have long ago vanished from the face of the earth.

According to the evolution theory the solitary wasps and bees, and the social wasps and bees, descended from the same progenitors. How then is the great diversity of their habits and instincts to be accounted for while there are no corresponding differences in their form and structure? If all ants sprang from the same original ants, how are we to explain the peculiarity of the Amazon ants, which produce no workers themselves, but are guided by instinct to invade the nests of other species that produce workers in abundance, and which they steal in the pupa state, cherishing them till their emergence into the insect state, when they perform the duties of workers to their captors, while the agricultural ants are prompted to clear a space of ground around the mouth of their nest, in which they sow the seeds of a peculiar kind of grass which constitutes their favourite food. All these phenomena are explicable if each species had a distinct origin, specially endowed with specific faculties and instincts. And as many of the instincts of the various species are directly opposed the one to the other, it is not in the least degree probable that they were all originally imparted to one and the same insect. It is a postulate in the evolution theory that all variations arise by slow degrees. Now the *gradual* transfer of both eyes to the same side of the head in flat fishes is exceedingly improbable, especially as there is no example in which the transit is only accomplished halfway. Another forcible argument against the doctrine of evolution, and in favour of that of creation, is the fact that it has never yet been shown that there is such a thing in nature as the actual origination of organic beings from inorganic materials, though various attempts have from time to time been made to ascertain it.

All water, and even the lower strata of the atmosphere, contain in large quantity the rudiments of organisms capable of further development. It has also been proved that all surfaces, whether solid or liquid, exert a power of attracting to them a highly compressed film of atmospheric air, which it is difficult to remove. Therefore the very vessels employed, or the materials used in experimenting, may have adhering to their surfaces a film of air containing the already formed rudiments of organic bodies. It has also been experimentally found that some of the lower forms of living organisms, or their germs, are capable of standing the tem-

of boiling water. The rotatoria, while in the encysted state, be revived after exposure to a temperature even exceeding boiling water, provided the heat be not too suddenly applied. Again, it being proved that the atmosphere, in its ordinary state, contains multitudes of eggs or germs diffused throughout its volume, it follows that, in the processes both of animal and vegetable respiration, those eggs or germs must enter the respiratory organs of living organisms, and thence pass into their circulation and be deposited in their tissues. The fact noticed by Professor Tyndall, that air expired from the lungs is free from any trace of dust or germs, shows that the germs retained in the inspired air have all been absorbed into the system.

As adduced in this paper we have met with in the course of our reading, and now present them to the readers of the *Controversialist*, believing as we do that they clearly show that evolution cannot furnish us with any interpretation of nature, and that specific creation fully accounts for the phenomena which we observe.

S. S.

EVOLUTION.--IV.

People think light the most glorious and splendid matter, material or intellectual. They seek light, and they expect it to be made sun-clear. Do such people ever reflect that if the sun were always beamed upon the earth, and sunshine illumined the world day for ever, what we would have lost by the supposed loss of night is the alternation of light and darkness, sunshine and shadow, that makes the glory and the grandeur of the scenery of the world so remarkable. But the very sun in its blazing brilliancy seen from the eye the bright and star-set firmament wherein the constellations in their myriadfold diversity reveal the infinity of the universe and make known not only so many marvels of existence, but also so many of the speculations of science. If we can see the clusters of suns and systems in the sphere of the firmament by millions multiplied by millions, it is because the night sky is visible at once the phenomena and the suggestions by which they are explained. The inquiries elicited by the results of the observations have their origin in the darkness; and who can tell that the variety of singular mixture of light and darkness in which the world being is spent has not a compensating influence in the

activity of speculation to which it stirs men? In the same way the difficulties concerning moral questions, which occasion such controversy, and are often regarded as such a plague to humanity, by causing them to think and reason upon them, bring out into clearer demonstration the essential nobleness of man's nature, and the wide relationships he holds to other existences. Just as the all-prevailing power of sunshine would isolate the earth, and cut us off from a perception of the infinite beyond; so would a perfect and settled view of human nature, its duty and its destiny, if imposed upon us by an irresistible necessity, hinder self-inquisition and philosophical investigation, and really impede the growth and progress as well as the enjoyment of intellectuality. It is not only the possession, but the exercise of muscular power, for instance, that gives health, joy, and usefulness; in like manner it is the warfare of mind against the mysteries of the universe to reduce them to submissiveness to science that imparts wisdom, delight, and beneficiality to our mental capacity. Controversy is not a moral evil, but a moral blessing, if rightly employed. It is the great investigative process by which we pierce into the darkness of moral, social, political, and religious questions, as the astronomer interrogates the darkness of material night. It is a means of gaining explanations, and we are now very properly engaged in asking whether creation or evolution supplies the better explanation of nature.

All the writers on the side of creation as an explanation of nature appear to have the old notions of Paley and the so-called natural philosophers of the last century, and have not learned to raise their thoughts to the higher conception of a Deity made possible by the philosophical speculations of Plato, Spinoza, Clarke, Hegel, and others, who have striven to gain light for us on the great questions of the Deity as the grand mover of all things according to His divine pre-ordinations. If the firmament of heaven reveals system beyond system, circling on in the solemn law-abiding regularity ascribed to them by astronomers; and from the far-distant light which these orbs emit we are justified in regarding these realities as the orbs from which that light flows, how much more are we justified in regarding as an infinite reality the divine Source from which all these are developed! We have no right to be reproached on account of the remoteness and impracticability of our research. If we seek in the light of stars for explanation of their light, why

should we not seek from the stars an explanation of themselves, and, looking beyond them, discover traces of an all-bountiful Providence, in whose rule all things are included; and if we are led to conclude that all nature is a thought of God, a realizing of the infinite Reality whence all other realities issue, shall we not rejoice that investigation shows us that?

Experience makes known to us certain sensations; these sensations group themselves by natural processes into ideas in us; these ideas we generalize; and from these generalizations we deduce science,—an orderly arrangement of facts, and a reasonable explanation of them. Experience is the painting or writing which consciousness reads, reflects on, and comprehends in science. Experience is the message of God to the Spirit, the cipher of which we require to learn and interpret. If it is proper to pass from circle of interpretation to circle of interpretation, from the innermost circle of consciousness outward to experience as the outer correspondent of our internal impressions, to ideas, to generalizations, to laws, arrangements, and science, why should we stay there, and not take the further step which seems requisite to bring the consciousness of man into connected relationship with the consciousness of God,—from physics to metaphysics?

We seem to be justified, then, in seeking an explanation of nature, and in striving to look through nature up to nature's God. But there arises thereupon the question whether we should seek God in nature, or nature in God. The creationists think that they spiritualize Deity more by supposing God in, yet apart from nature, and stigmatise as infidels, pantheists, or atheists, even those who regard God as realizing Himself in nature as the Lord "in whom we live, and move, and have our being;" whose very offspring and issue we are, 'being the very ideas of God made real by His essential power as the life of all. The theory of the school of philosophers who feel themselves able to reconcile their faith with the facts of science may perhaps, in this form, be intelligible to those who despise the evolutionary theory as necessarily infidel. God is at once the one sole essence and source of all life. He manifests His being by the continuous realization of His ideas. As He is an infinite Being, and infinite in His activities, an infinity of possibilities arise and are in His nature; these realized constitute what we call nature, which is the ideas of the Deity evolved from possibility into reality, passed by His intense and singular

omnipotence from His nature as thought into nature as fact. From this it follows that nature is the evolution of God; is, indeed, God's being in its everlasting activity, proceeding from ideality to reality. Nature is the respondent in actuality, of which Deity is the correspondent in purpose,—the *effluence* of His *affluence*, His thinkings taking form as things.

This view of things, though it does not imply *creation*, but regards *evolution* as the secret of their being, conserves a God to faith, and science as the interpreter of facts, and seems to us to give great likelihood that evolution rather than creation affords the true explanation of nature.

Perhaps if this view were adopted it would bring the opponent thinkers into nearer relation, if the definition of creation given by M. F. S. (p. 48) as "the outward embodiment and expression of the intelligent will of the Creator" were not by him and his coadjutors considered to imply the forming and placing, by a distinct act of origina^tive power, of fixed and definite beings in certain provinces of nature, so that they cannot alter or be altered by any power short of that by which they had been first formed. This seems to be the real difficulty, and, in fact, the discussion has rather tended to drift into an argument upon the Darwinian hypothesis on the origin of species, than on the question of creation as an absolute arbitrary act of origination, exercised at once and brought to ultimate perfection in an access of, rather than by an exercise of will. Accepting the definition of creation as an isolated act once for all wrought by Deity at some fixed and definite season or period, and rested from thereafter, and since as that which is most commonly meant by the advocates of the Paleyan philosophy, we are compelled into dissent upon the showing of its advocates them-selves, for if "God is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever," such an access of will as creation would have been impossible to Him, while evolution would be quite possible, and would give ample scope to the exercise of creative power, as power commanding, regulating, and affecting all things by His will.

F. D. T. affirms this proposition, "That a thing *is* and undergoes change or evolution never satisfies any thinker" (p. 111); and he thinks we must account for nature. He may see at once that if nature requires accounting for, much more must God. Nature we experience, and God we infer from our experience, either through nature or through spiritual contact.

The Essayist.

BOOKS.

virtue, in the qualities of which man is capable, comes knowledge. I should say of this world and its arrangement, that virtue itself is wisdom, the knowledge of good. An old proverbial saw tells us "knowledge is power;" and it has been one of many late movements to place this power in the hands of the masses. In our own country one of these is the steps of the Government to provide for the education of every child in the kingdom; and another, viewing knowledge in a broader and more elementary manner in which it is treated in schools, is the literature by which it is placed within the reach of all. Knowledge is the father of knowledge, whose mother is time. As knowledge passes from one generation to another, knowledge is added to knowledge, and the ever-recurring requirements of civilization, the discoveries of science, which lead on one to another. To the extent that man has this risen, man has been enabled to call in the force of his labour to such a degree (and the more of this force the more he will desire, and finally obtain), that it is in the nature of everything to tend to hurry, and superficialism is the result of the present age. This shows itself in the current literature by the prevalence of a light, ephemeral class of works, and a smattering of general knowledge, the spirit of the age tending to sciolism rather than true wisdom. Knowledge is the most precious thing a man can bequeath to his children, or one generation to another; and on those who are young, on the middle-aged and old, depend their country's future and position: they form the storehouse from which the future will be drawn when peopled by their children. And it is a right to keep any acquired knowledge to himself; it is his property, though here we have another great fault of the current literature, arising from the facilities for supplying the market for it. Everybody writes, whether he has anything to say; and amidst a sea of books it is difficult to find which shells contain pearls of any worth.

Books may be divided into two general divisions,—the books for the reason, and those for the imagination. The former class includes histories, accounts of the world under its different conditions, and those containing general knowledge upon all subjects in science and art. It is the duty of these to assist and strengthen man in the operations of his mental faculties of arranging, comparing, and forming judgments from ideas received through the senses. To fully accomplish this, they must necessarily contain the truth—for in his knowledge does a man act, and if it be not correct, how can his actions?—and express it in a clear, full, yet concise form. They must contain the truth, not only as in contradistinction to the false as the wrong interpretation, whether wilfully or no, of the matter in hand, but in that it is good, worthy, honourable, *true*. And a great deal depends upon the manner of treating any subject,—the way it is put before the reader. Some clothe the idea in such pedantic terms, twisting and turning it that scarcely any but logicians can comprehend the meaning; while others, flying to an opposite extreme, use words and sentences which, containing no beauty in themselves, form nothing more than a bare statement of facts. Frequently, books of this class, especially those of travel, accounts of other lands, &c., though containing the truth, it is so exaggerated, or perhaps underrated, as to give the reader altogether a wrong conception; and nothing is so misleading as the truth only partially adhered to, the rest being false. For in such a case the portion of truth is seized upon, and forms grounds for the same reception of the remaining ideas or arguments, though they may be untrue.

Memoirs of great, good, and noble men, not of obscure individuals who with the exception of some one merit have been ordinary minded men, are amongst the best books of this division of literature that can be read. Common sense places example before precept; and in biographies, models are to be found for the young and inexperienced, shewing the characters of great men, and the means taken by them of traversing the path of life in honour, beset with difficulties as it is on every side; and, by laying bare before the reader those weak points in their characters out of which their mistakes have arisen, warn him to guard against falling into similar errors.

Next we have the books of the imagination. In these matter-of-fact days there is little left on which to employ the mind in the

of fancy, so fully is it taken up with business and
 concerns. The lives of most being spent in a
 race for wealth, adventure is but a dream to them ;
 the faculty of imagination, like others, requires support
 and, the enormous proportion of fictional works is one of
 the characteristics of modern times. And besides being a character-
 istic of evil. So much is the craving for excitement pandered
 to, that these works take the place of those containing useful
 knowledge. The reason is pushed aside by the imagination, pro-
 duced by the morbid, sickly state of mind. The sensational novels of
 the day, from the fashionable three volumes to the penny
 trash, produce the worst possible effects on our youth of both sexes
 by exciting all their evil passions, and lowering the
 level of their minds.

It should be the aim of every book to elevate and refine the
 mind by high, pure, and noble ideas ; and in works of fiction
 this does not so much consist in any moral which they may
 contain, as that they should have this great merit.
 Bacon, in his essay on "Studies," says, "Reading maketh
 a full man," and gives the following advice :—"Read not to con-
 fuse, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find
 fault, but to weigh and consider." No matter how
 good a book may be, it fails in the great purpose of its
 being, if not used in a proper manner by the student. As a
 physician would recommend food to be eaten slowly and carefully
 for the health of the body, so is the slow, careful consideration of
 books valuable and necessary for the healthy state of the mind.
 Books are just glanced hastily over, without any thought
 of the subject or the manner in which it is introduced,
 and are only half understood, instead of supporting and
 adding strength to the mental powers, as the wrongly chosen and
 indigested food has an evil effect on the internal chambers
 of the body, they will only clog and render the mental powers
 incapable of a right discharge of their duties.

We conclude with Mr. Carlyle's definition of a book :—

"A book is indeed is the virtue of a true book. Not like a dead
 thing, yearly crumbling, yearly needing repair ; more like
 a tree, but then a spiritual field, like a spiritual tree, let me
 it stands from year to year, and from age to age (we
 find that already number some hundred and fifty human

ages); and yearly comes its new produce of leaves (commentaries, deductions, philosophical, political systems; or were it only sermons, pamphlets, journalistic essays), every one of which is talismanic and thaumaturgic, for it can persuade men. O thou who art able to write a book, which once in the two centuries, or oftener, there is a man gifted to do, envy not him whom they name city-builder, and inexpressibly with him whom they name conqueror or City burner! Thou, too, art a conqueror and victor; but of the true sort, namely, over the devil: thou, too, hast built what will outlast all marble and metal, and be a wonder-bringing city of the mind, a temple, and æminary, and prophetic mount, whereunto all kindreds of the earth will pilgrim."

R. W. C.

ON THE STUDY OF HISTORY.—METHOD.

THE study of history must ever be attractive as well as profitable to the thoughtful mind. All who desire to be deeply acquainted with human nature, all who feel an interest in morals, in politics, in religion; all who admit, to any extent, the truth of that saying, "The proper study of mankind is man," must needs desire to know what in the past ages man has done, and also what man has experienced,—to be well informed about human conduct and human destiny. This knowledge cannot be won without an earnest and careful study of the past. Every man, if he would obtain a just reputation for culture and intelligence, must be an historical student, even if history be not his favourite study. But the field of history is a very wide one, and it presents to the inquirer's view an amount of variety and intricacy which is apt to leave on the mind the impression of confusion. Even well-read persons, whose faculty of judgment is not equal to their intellectual acquisitiveness, are sometimes driven to look on history as "a mighty maze" indeed, which to them is without any discoverable plan. Sometimes this feeling of perplexity arises in connection with questions about the most prominent historical characters, such as those which concern Henry VIII., or Mary, queen of Scotland. But these are not the deeper questions of history. Whether Henry was a hero or a monster, whether Mary did or did not blow up Darnley,—these are questions which will always excite interest and exercise the ingenuity of research; but there are far greater questions, not entirely separable from those relating to character, yet reaching deeper and spreading wider, regarding which historians are still divided; and their strife too much reminds us of the din of party

contemporary agitation. To the candid, earnest student of unanimity presents difficulty and discouragement. The student will never abandon his inquiries; if he is earnest and perseverant, and his perseverance will not be unrewarded. Of course, such a way of regarding the past as marks the mere chronicler; the person who registers events in their succession, without troubling himself greatly about the "growth and decay of ideas," but that character-painting and moralizing which the old "teaching by examples." The author of a mere chronicle is scarcely entitled to the name of historian, although his works must be regarded as the heralds and forerunners of history, and their services in every period are indispensable in gathering the materials of history. Nor are their works in any way uninteresting. From the half-mythical Sagas and Sagas, down to the registers," and even the newspapers of later days, these facts and occurrences, however crude and wearisome, claim on our attention. Sometimes their very simplicity, more clearly than intentional exposition would, the age which the author describes, and the chief traits of heroes or villains whose deeds he relates. Sometimes the artistic form and colouring to narrative and incidental and thus have a charm and also a value which the philosopher fails to reproduce. There are, besides, amongst historians which show a keener appetite for the collecting of facts, for the correction of errors, than for the tracing of causes or the evolution of ideas, and such minds may contribute greatly, to the study of history, as well as profit by the investigation of the materials. Nay, there are persons whose arithmetical bent leads them to find pleasure in a chronological table, and deep interest in the arrangement of names and dates. It is said that in this tendency meets over-encouragement, to the "cram" and superficial display. Yet chronology is an essential element of history, and as a series of important events, or appears to depend, on the action of an individual, of great moral character, so any mistake as to the exact succession of events, though in itself a still more subordinate consideration, may affect our judgments regarding a great public movement, or our estimate of an important period. Illustration of this

statement may be found in the period which saw the beginning of the English Reformation. The reign of Henry VIII. has been recorded by historians equally able, but with judgments the most diverse; and these judgments often turn on the exact order, as well as interpretation of events, on which more light may yet be thrown by contemporary investigation. Even the taste for chronology, therefore, may be utilized, so as to benefit alike the student and the historian; and the dry table of names and facts, when viewed in this light, acquires a life and an interest unrecognised before.

If there exists in some quarters too great a tendency to lead the mind with dates and facts, there is a temptation leading in the opposite direction, which ought also to be guarded against. The deeper questions of history, to which we have already referred, engaged, in the early part of this century, the attention of some of the greatest minds in Germany and France, and since then we have heard much, even in our own less speculative land, about the "philosophy of history." Undoubtedly this is a noble study, and we have no sympathy with those who, disgusted with its abuse, would decry or undervalue it. Yet it can scarcely be denied that a number of minds, disposed towards reflection or speculation, rather than calm investigation and criticism, display a boldness in forming or adopting systems which is utterly disproportionate to their acquaintance with facts. As has been well said, they have proceeded far with the erection of the structure before they have begun to test the quality of the materials. Even eminent historians seem to have yielded to this temptation; or else why should we have one school of writers with whom "heroes," in whose mind and actions some divine principle incarnates itself, constitute the great factors of history, while another school would subject all human genius and human freedom to certain inflexible "natural laws,"—thus giving us "the play of 'Hamlet' without the part of Hamlet"? We are apt to think that philosophies so entirely opposed to each other, must be founded on imperfect data or rash generalizations, though each may contain important elements of truth. Evidently the "philosophy of history" stands greatly in need of correction, and in such correction the investigation of facts and exact dates, as well as the elucidations of mental and metaphysical science, must play no unimportant part.

We have referred to two very different kinds of difficulties which seem to meet the student of history,—those which attend the

patient search after exactitude as regards facts and have to be remembered as well as ascertained,—and attend the higher but more perilous pursuit of philosophy. We have not dwelt on the intermediate more popular kind of treatment, which has been given by the Danish writer (Schjern) * the pragmatist, and which is based on the recognition of human characters and human motives, the sources of events and changes,—the real factors of history proceeding on such maxims as those which assure us, in our observations, that human nature is ever the same, that like causes produce like effects, or which remind us more didactically of the fate of nations must fall when it is opposed to healthy principles, or that “increase of population makes a state more susceptible of war,” such historians endeavour to connect, by the human motives and influences, the multiform and perplexed events of the past, so as to reduce them, with more or less success, to something like system. Such was the view of history adopted by the great classics of antiquity, by Livy, and Tacitus. Such also was essentially the method of Gibbon and Hume, Robertson and Ferriar, whose works, on account of their pure style and methodical arrangement, will continue to live when the views of their authors become of small account. The conclusions of these writers were, in truth, narrowed, as their aims were restricted to the critical and mechanical philosophy of the age in which they lived, which boasted of its indifference to all that is exalted in our human aspirations, but expatiated with complacency on the plain, familiar walk of observation and experience. Their works, though they still afford interest and convey much useful information, will not satisfy thinkers in the present age. Since those times, the world has been convulsed by mighty moral earthquakes, and the sciences, like every other science and art which deals with human experiences, must needs seek for a foundation below the empirical and superficial, and rest on the belief that the study of its recurring yet ever-varying cycles, can reveal the plan and progression, the manifestations of eternal truth. The dawning of such a conception found beautiful

* An interesting article entitled “Historiography” in the *British and Foreign Review*, 1866.

expression in these words of Herder,—“If there be a God in nature, He is also to be found in history.”

In the mind of the sincere historical inquirer, then, we desire the presence, in some degree at least, of three elements. We desire the conscientious exactitude of the chronicler, combined with the observant and reflective sagacity of the psychologist, and crowned by the contemplative reverence and penetrating insight of the true philosopher. *Facts* might thus lead the inquirer through the investigation of *causes* to the recognition of the great *principles* or ideas which underlie and pervade them all.

Of course we cannot expect in all inquirers the equal proportion or complete harmony of these elements, but as Providence has bestowed on men “a diversity of gifts,” it seems probable that harmony might be obtained, if not by their combination in each historical student, yet at least by their respective presence in many.

The demand for close scrutiny of the primary sources of historical science is on the increase. The study of human nature and the love of literature will ever produce both writers and students of the didactic or psychological class. As for the treatment of such subjects as the Crusades, the Reformation, the French Revolution, we can only say that it requires, along with other qualifications, the possession of that rarer genius which can at once sweep, with bold and untiring wing, over the wide and varied world of the past, and pierce, with the eagle glance of philosophic, if not poetic insight, into those depths of ideal evolution which, with mighty and mysterious, yet not lawless movement, have ever been surging beneath. Some, indeed, have approached to the comprehension of history in this its deepest import, in virtue of the high moral perception or the deep spirit of piety to which their natures have attained. But some deficiencies will ever cleave to the work of him who ventures on this grand and perilous task, unless he be possessed of some sparks at least of that noble fire which we term genius, and which shines in diverse colours alike in the works of the supreme poet, in the discoveries of the scientific explorer, and in the thoughts of the real philosopher.

Unfortunately, in some of the foremost of those minds, inspired by some measure of true genius, whose strength has been given, in late years, to historical studies, we have to note a deficiency of the philosophical spirit in its truest and purest form. We have had,

scientific historians," but their science is essentially and physical. They have sought at least to regulate the of man by the "inexorable laws" of nature; and, judging satisfactory and paradoxical conclusions which have from their labours, we cannot think highly of their method. On the other hand, we have had poetical historians,—noble spirits, against the materialism and utilitarianism of their time,—whose works have a value of their own. Yet we must not confound the functions of the poet with those of the philosopher, even if the former be the chosen field for philosophical study. The poet's creations of the former, true and valid in their own right, are apt to dazzle rather than brighten the page of history; and, substituted for philosophy, assumes the less healthy and mysticism and pantheism,—tendencies of which the philosopher had much experience, but which the world ever refuses to recognize. The union of lively narrative and vivid portraiture and shrewd intuition, renders the works of Carlyle almost unapproachable as they are charming and thoughtful; yet in his conclusions, too, we often find great deficiency. The recognition of many results, and also the study of the past, greatly affect, though they do not rule, human destiny. These influences pronounced, though weighty and suggestive, seem partial, if not capricious; they depend, in short, on the less accuracy of the picture which the poet-historian has presented. The whole historic procession has mingled in its wild march much of the phantom-like character of the epic poet's. As a whole we refuse to accept it, either as complete or comprehensive philosophy.

We return now to the humbler yet more practical inquiry. What can we apply any aids to the study of history in any or all of the ways in which we have viewed it? An answer to this question will be applied in a future article.

W. B.

It may interest some of your readers to know that the Erfurt library has not destroyed the only copy of Luther's own Bible. There exist still five Bibles with his autograph and holograph preceding the title-page—one in the Queen's library at Windsor, another in the Berlin Library, a third in that at Cambridge, the fourth in the British Museum, the fifth in the library of G. Thorpe, of Gloucester House, Larkhall Rise.

Toiling Upward.

JAMES ORCHARD HALLIWELL, F.R.S., &c.,
SHAKSPERIAN, LITERARY ANTIQUARY, LEXICOGRAPHER, CRITIC,
BIBLIOPOLIST, &c.

LITERARY research and bibliographical investigation require far more pith of mind and ingenuity of intellect than most people imagine; while the exceeding value of the facts now and again brought to light, by the prying eye of the curious in regard to books and their writers, is apt to be overlooked by the mere general reader. Yet to those gropers in the hidden nooks of ancient libraries, those anxious searchers through moth-eaten manuscripts, or age-o'er-dusted tomes, those eager inquisitors of old editions and mouldy scraps of letters, of despised note-books and huddled-up corporation papers, these critics of phrases and entries, inscriptions and water-marks, caligraphy and binding, typography and annotations, literature has often been indebted for the discovery of facts which enable a life to be interpreted, a problem in history to be solved, a character of importance to be identified, or the missing link which connects epoch with epoch to be supplied. If the astronomer is glad when a new far-distant star sweeps into his ken, why should not the antiquary delight his soul when some notable life-fact, concerning one of earth's worthies is revealed to him out of the dim darkness of the hazy, mazy past? Pearl-divers in the ocean, diamond-diggers on the land, botanical explorers, and geological surveyors have their toil appreciated and rewarded, but the delver in the mines of knowledge, the inquirer into the records of the life of the men of the bygone ages are too often twitted—when they are not absolutely outwitted—by those who observe with greater persistency than he, the new, though undivine commandment, of the present time, "Put money in thy purse." The sneers with which the men of the world re-echo the old cuckoo-cry of "dry as dust," while themselves are but giving utterance to a cry which for its age might well be thoroughly outworn, supply a lamentable testimony to the imbecility with which they look on things, and

ally their easy-going forgetfulness that they too and their
besides, must shortly be dry as dust; and "when the earth
then be shovelled on them," the antiquarian worm will test
worth of their body with more success than the investigator of
intellectual records of the past shall acquire evidence of their
worth.

One who in this our day has done good service by his
shes among "confused paper masses," and who "out of old
new writings, and much meditation, not of yesterday," has
ble to "select a thing or two," we know of few who deserve
of the gratitude of the reading public than James Orchard
ell, the most patient, diligent, and intelligent collector of old
and rare manuscripts, the most laborious collator of early
s and ancient writings; the painstaking decipherer of
s and notes, themost enthusiastic and cultured of the seekers
rarities of archæological and antiquarian literature, and the
distinguished of the students of the Elizabethan drama in
nd. It is, in fact, however, as a Shaksperian that he outshines
contemporaries. He has illustrated our star of poets with
nt activity and a prolific pen. His researches have been
and effective; his collections of facts, illustrations, docu-
and books have been indefatigably pursued and ably em-
It is true that he has done little as a popular literary
that having a keen sense of the ineffable charm of rarity in
nds of many of his contemporaries, he has for the most part
ted his republications and productions to a few, but these
enerally been so disposed of as, by and by, to come into the
mind in their substance, while they have acted as preservers
y of the olden treasures for which the general public supply
ing demand. Few literary men have wrought more enthusi-
ly, less from personal motives or love of gain, and his praise-
y labours deserve notice among our records of toiling upward.
es Orchard Halliwell was born at Chelsea, 21st June, 1820.
ther was the late Thomas Halliwell, Esq., of Sutton, in Surrey.
ceived his early education under Charles Butler, author of
Introduction to Mathematics," and was subsequently entered
udent at Cambridge in 1837. He did not, however, continue
udies there, as he had, even at so early an age, determined to
y himself in antiquarian researches, directing his special
ion to the literary history and antiquities of his native country,

as these are found embodied in or illustrated by the early poets and prose writers of England. His earliest effort in this direction was the issue in 1839 of an edition of the works of the earliest notable English traveller, and the first known writer of a prose work in our present mixed English—Sir John Mandeville, whose voyages and travels are such a singular repertory of the marvellous legends of the Middle Ages. The work mentioned is a reprint of the London edition of 1725, "with an introduction, additional notes, and a glossary by J. O. Halliwell, Esq., F.S.A., F.R.A.S." Mandeville wrote his book first in Latin, then in French, and thereafter in vulgar English—"that every man of his nation might understand it." In the same year (1839) he issued "Two Essays on Numerical Calculation," and "Rara Mathematica, or a collection of treatises on the Mathematics and subjects connected therewith, from eminent inedited MSS." These tracts are very curious, and there are some remarkable notes on early almanacks, appended by the editor. In 1810 he supplied a "Catalogue of the Code Holbrookianus," a scientific MS. written by Dr. John Holbrook, Master of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, 1418-1431; an edition of the "Merry Tales of the Wise Men of Gotham," supposed to have been composed in the early part of the sixteenth century by Dr. Andrew Borde, a physician in the reign of Henry VIII., who seems to have, with great good sense, believed that mirth is the best medicine, and has been handed down to posterity as the first and original "merry Andrew;" "An Account of the Vernon Manuscript"—a volume of early English poetry preserved in the Bodleian, Oxford; and a quarto issue of "Morte d'Arthur," from the Lincoln MS. In 1841 he published his "Essay on the Original Character of Falstaff;" a "Catalogue of the Early Editions of Shakspeare's Plays, and of the Commentaries and other publications illustrative of his works;" an "Introduction to 'Midsummer Night's Dream,'" with an appendix from a curious old tract on Robin Goodfellow. This is one of his contributions to the publications of the Shakspeare Society, established 1840. Of this society he was one of the most enthusiastic members. Besides miscellaneous contributions to "The Shakspeare Society's Papers," he edited for this society "The Coventry Mysteries," 1841; "The First Sketch of the 'Merry Wives of Windsor,'" 1842; "The First Sketches of the Second and Third Parts of 'Henry VI.,'" 1843; "Tarleton's Jests and News out of Purgatory," 1844; "Illustrations of the Fairy Mythology of

" and "The First Part and a Portion of the Second Part VI.," from a unique contemporary MS., 1845; "The of Wit and Wisdom," an interlude, 1846; "The Moral t and Science," 1848; "Simrock's Remarks on the Plots re's Plays," 1850, &c. He was an almost equally pro-
 -utor to the Percy Society, which was established in the (1840). Among the works issued by this association the following contributions by J. O. Halliwell:—
 -or Poems of Dan John Lydgate;" "The Early Naval f England;" "The Boke of Courtisie"—a poem the domestic manners of the fifteenth century;
 -ting of Gallants at an Ordinarie, or the Walks in 604; "The Nursery Rhymes of England"—collected oral tradition; "The Pleasant Conceits of Old Hudson, Londoner, 1607;" "The Poems of John Audeley—in hire dialect, fifteenth century;" "The Romance of the etavian"—from MSS. at Lincoln and Cambridge; "Friar ophesie"—a Satire on the "Degeneracy of the Times," etical Miscellanies, from a MS. of the times of James ichard Burnesfield's Affectionate Shepherd;" "The Sir Tryamour;" "The Most Pleasant Song of Lady how she married King Henry VII.;" "An Interlude Elements;" "An Interlude of the Disobedient Child;" d for Smelts"—a curious collection of tales, which lots for our Dramatists; "Popular English Histories;" Fugitive Tracts and Chap books;" "The Man in the The Interlude of the Trial of Treasure;" "A Manifest of Dice Play;" "The Loyal Garland," &c. The ociety was instituted in 1838; of it Mr. Halliwell was n a member; and for it he edited "Warkworth's from 1461 to 1474;" "Chronicle of William de Rish-The Thornton Romances of Sir Perceval, Sir Isambas, ur, and Sir Deyrevant," &c. To the Historical Society n 1841 he contributed "Letters illustrative of the Pro-
 -ence in England from Queen Elizabeth to Charles II.'s is work contains the autobiography of Sir S. Moreland, Mechanics to Charles II., letters of Digges, Dee, Tycho es, Harriot, Lydyatt, Sir W. Petty, Cavendish, &c., &c. g from noting some of J. O. Halliwell's labours in with those associations, which about thirty years ago ce of our Early English Text Society, Chaucer Society,

&c., we remark that so early as 1842, when he had only attained his majority, Mr. Halliwell was appointed English correspondent of the Royal Historical Commission of France, and could append as large a collection of *lettered* titles to his name as most men of his day. In 1842 he was appointed to examine and report upon the MSS. contained in the library of the college, founded there by the will of Humphrey Cheetham (1580—1653). His account of the MSS. in this Library led to the establishment of the Cheetham Society, 1843, for the publication of archæological, biographical, and historical books connected with the counties palatine of Lancaster and Chester.

In 1843 "An Account of the only known Manuscript of Shakespeare's Plays," comprising some important variations and corrections in "The Merry Wives of Windsor," appeared from the pen of J. O. Halliwell; as did also "A Collection of Pieces in the Dialect of Zummerzet;" "Early Contributions to English Literature;" "The Harrowing of Hell," a miracle play of the time of Edward II.; "The Torrent of Portugal," a poem of the fifteenth century; and an "Early History of Freemasonry in England," illustrated by a poem of the fourteenth century. To 1844 belong an issue of an edition of "The Foundation Document of Merton College, Oxford;" "Nugæ Poeticæ;" "Old English Popular Poetry of fifteenth century," containing "Colyn Blowhol's Testament," "Debate of the Carpenter's Tools," "The Merchant and his Son," "The Maid and the Magpie," "Elegy of Henry VIII's Fool," "Robert of Sicily," &c., &c.

A great and valuable work was next presented to the public—"A Dictionary of Archaic and Provincial Words, Obsolete Phrases, Proverbs, and Ancient Customs," &c.—a work forming a key to the difficulties to be met with in our old poets, dramatists, theologians, and other authors, and giving by its explanations, allusions, and references a curious insight into the habits of thought and speech in the early days of our language. This dictionary was preceded by an "Historical Sketch of the Provincial Dialects of England," which has been published separately.

"Letters of the Kings of England," from the originals in royal archives, &c., edited with historical introduction and notes, came out in 1846, and contain Henry VIII.'s Letters to Anne Boleyn; Edward VI.'s Letters; some by James I., seeming to implicate him in Overbury's murder; and some to the Duke of Bucking-

all as from him, supply information about the journey into Charles I., and give great interest to these two handsome As a companion to Harborne's "Book Rarities," too, Halliwell brought out "MS. Rarities of the University of . . ." He also edited J. Sherman's "Historia Collegii Jesu, ensis," and "Jokes of the Cambridge Coffee-houses in the Seventeenth Century."

ities illustrating the Plays of Shakspeare," and "Illustrations of the History of Prices," belong to 1847; but 1848 was memorable by the publication of "A New Life of Shakspeare," which contains forty documents about Shakspeare and his family never before collected, and a great quantity of illustrative matter regarding his life and his relations, friends, circumstances, and times. A volume of new information regarding the dramatist has never been collected in this volume than in any biography previously published. It is skillessly written, the author having been induced to publish his collections in a continuous narrative, which bears traces of having been hurriedly and perhaps unwillingly compiled. It is, however, a mine of information, which if properly worked might yield a biography of far higher mark than any we have yet seen. He finds none of the "Shakspeare Forgeries at the Inner Temple" but rejects all of them in this New Life. No allusion will be found to the clumsy and disgraceful misprints of Shaksperian documents which have so frequently deceived the public for short periods." The work is drily antiquarian in tone, but is so livingly reproductive; but it has merits which deserve recognition.

the "Nursery Rhymes of England" having reached a second edition, Halliwell produced a sequel to that book under the title of "The Popular Rhymes and Nursery Tales," supplying quite a new store of lore for and about children. He also issued "Some of the Popular Tracts in the Library of Captain Cox, 1555," and became editor of "The Archaeologist and the Antiquarian Science," which extended to ten parts, each of a volume of 420 pages. "A New Boke about Shakspeare" was published in 1850, and there followed that, a copy of Shakspeare's will, &c., in *fac-simile*, with a few preliminary observations. He then commenced for the publishing house of Tallis an edition of "Shakspeare's Dramatic Works," revised from the original text, with historical and analytical introductions to each play,

also notes explanatory and critical, with a life of the poet; this was completed in four volumes in 1853, and was reprinted in one volume royal octavo in 1856 in London and New York.

Much as Mr. Halliwell has done for the illustration of our early literature, his chief claim to distinction and remembrance will be his study of Shakspeare and his works and times, and the extraordinary collection of illustrative matter which he has gathered from all quarters in regard to the life, works, age, and literature of Shakspeare and his contemporaries. In 1852 he issued the prospectus of the greatest and most enduring monument to the genius of the "star of poets." This was his edition *de luxe* of "The Works of William Shakspeare"; the text formed from a new collection of the early editions, to which are added the original novels and tales on which the plays are founded; copious archæological annotations on each play, an essay on the formation of the text, and a life of the poet, in fifteen volumes folio, subscription price £63, India paper, copies £84, illustrated by F. W. Fairholt; 150 copies to be printed, each being numbered and autographed, the plates to be destroyed, so as to secure the limitation of the copies." Of this edition vol. i. appeared in 1853, and the edition was brought to a close in 1865. It is his *chef d'œuvre*.

In 1852 J. P. Collier's "Notes and Emendations to the Text of Shakspeare's Plays," the "Old Corrector's," MSS. *variorum lectiones* was put upon the Shakspeare Society's list of publications; but on account of a storm of opposition was withdrawn. An extraordinary literary controversy ensued, and Mr. Halliwell, of course, took part in the fray. In "A Few Remarks on the Emendation," who "smothers her with painting;" he objects to the Collier revisions. He next republished observations on the "Shaksperian Forgeries at Bridgewater House," sharply criticising the letter signed H. S. the Emendations, &c. Collier criticised and replied in the *Athenæum*.

A very caustic review of Halliwell's first volume in folio, 2ad July, 1853, has been attributed to Mr. Collier. More observations followed, and in the turmoil most of the Shaksperians of the day crossed swords.

"A Garland of Shaksperiana," added to the library and museum of J. O. Halliwell, Esq., Brixton Hill, appeared in 1854; so likewise did "Sydneyan Literature in the Library of J. O. Halliwell," giving account of rare materials in the life and works of Sir Philip Sydney, supplemented afterwards by a pamphlet on "A Unique

of Sir Philip Sydney's 'Arcadia.'" To this year also is quarto on "Ancient Systems of Notation."

19 Mr. Halliwell lodged a bill of complaint in Chancery regarding Mr. Shakspeare's legacy to the birthplace in Henley which had been purchased by the nation in 1848, and which Shakspeare, Esq., of Langley Priory, had endowed by will to the effect of £3,000. His heirs disputed this portion of the will, and Mr. Halliwell's "Bill of Complaint." In the same year he published "Dorastus and Fawnia," the foundation story of Shakspeare's "Winter's Tale;" an "Essay on the Authorship of the Three Henry VI.;" and a hand-list of books collected 1842—1859, the collection of Shakspeare. From the Chiswick press he sent forth "Shaksperian Drolls," from a rare book; "The Droll of the Knight;" and in 1860 "A Dictionary of Old English Words," and a "Skeleton Hand-list of the Early Quartos of Shakspeare's Plays," with notices of the old impressions of the poems.

1861 he was engaged in getting up the Shakspeare Fund, and on the 1st of October, 1861, for the purchase of the gardens of the birthplace at New Place, the remainder of the birthplace estate; the site of Hathaway's cottage, Getley's copyhold, the calendering and the collection of the Stratford records of the poet's time, and the establishment of a public library and museum of Shakspeare at Stratford. He succeeded in purchasing, by conveyance dated February, 1862, the New Place estate from the trustees of Mrs. Loggin, the money having been raised by public subscription; and it has been reconveyed to the corporation, to be held by them for ever for public use as the birthplace of Shakspeare's native town.

1862 he issued "A Brief Hand-list of the Records belonging to the Corporation of Stratford-on-Avon, with notes on the Shaksperian documents in the collection," which has since been expanded into a folio entitled "Descriptive Calendar of the Ancient Manuscripts and Records in the possession of the Corporation of Stratford-on-Avon;" he also published a list of a thousand additions made to his Shaksperian library since 1859. To him we owe "Shaksperian Facsimiles of Manuscripts illustrative of the Biography of Shakspeare and the History of his Family," and "Stratford-on-Avon in the Times of Shakspeare, specially relative to the History of the Poet's Father." 1863 we had from him "The Last Days of Shakspeare," and a "Guide to the Gardens of Shakspeare."

1864 Mr. Halliwell took an active part in the proceedings of

the Tercentenary, especially in regard to the restoration of New Place and the establishment of the library and museum there, for which nearly £5,000 have been subscribed, and to which he has been a liberal donor. Besides much labour, and several money contributions, Mr. Halliwell's donations to the library and museum in 1868 had amounted to 500 distinct books and articles, and they have since been increased. Indeed, this library is to be a co-beneficiary of his with the university of the metropolis of Scotland which is to receive his valuable collection of early Shaksperian rarities, while the more modern works, together with some volumes of unpublished notes on the text, are to be given to Stratford. The literary labours of 1864 consist of "The Historical Account of New Place," from 1497 to the present time, a splendid folio, ranging with his magnificent edition of Shakspeare, the issue of a prospectus of a people's tercentenary edition of Shakspeare for a shilling, since brought out by Routledge, and the planning of a reprint in fac-simile of all the old quartos, duly collated, annotated, and compared. In 1868 he issued a "Handbook Index to the Works of Shakspeare," including references to the phrases, manners, customs, proverbs, songs, &c., used or alluded to by the dramatist. Along with Thomas Wright he edited Archdeacon Nare's "Glossary of Shakspeare" and his contemporaries; and published selected notes on "Anthony and Cleopatra," and on "The Tempest." Numerous as are the works we have already named as having been collected and edited by Mr. Halliwell, we could quote nearly a hundred other reprints of Early English Literature brought out at his expense, as well as some pleasant volumes of "Rambles in Cornwall," "Family Excursions in North Wales," "Roundabout Notes on the Isle of Man;" and, in quite a different field, "An Introduction to the Evidences of Christianity," which has reached a second edition.

"The Dramatic and Poetical Works of John Marston" were edited by J. O. Halliwell for the Library of Old Authors—a work which has been on the one hand highly lauded and on the other harshly criticised. The latest literary Shaksperian project of Mr. Halliwell is a series of folio volumes containing "Illustrations of the Life and Writings of William Shakspeare," interpreting by the aid of contemporary documents and books, and by truthful artistic reproductions of places and visible objects, fac-similes, &c., wherever required, for the elucidation of his biography, and the history, manners, customs, costumes, &c., of his times, the volumes to be

scribers annually, price four guineas, the issue being
copies, and each book to "emulate the finest examples
presses."

Hall is married to the eldest daughter of the late
Philips, Bart., of Middle Hill, Worcestershire, and
House, Cheltenham, the greatest book-collector of
; and holding a place of honour among Shaksperians
erer, in 1836, of the marriage-bond of Shakspeare
ords of the diocese of Worcester. Sir Thomas only
uary, 1872, aged eighty, and in a death-bed will, made
to his decease, willed the magnificent library, which
Thirlstane House, to Mrs. Fenwick, and in the same
ected that neither his eldest daughter nor her husband
e allowed to enter that house. As, however, he died
e heir, the estates devolve on Mrs. Halliwell, although
nes extinct.

collector has a mission of no mean importance in a
arge, so interwoven with event and circumstance, so
r requiring illustration as ours is: the manuscript
ecipherer has also honourable duties to perform.
seem to some the value of the small facts of literary
have all this advantage, that they bring us nearer the
lp us to correct error. It has been Mr. Halliwell's
to preserve a larger number of rare tracts, literary
nd facts accepted as additions to our records of authors
ks, than any other labourer in this wide field. We
ith regret that ill-health has for the present laid a
his efforts. We trust he will soon be able to resume
g employments of his skilled mind. We know nothing
nature of the estate to which Mrs. Halliwell has now
or are we acquainted with the cause of that jealous
m the wondrous treasure-house of manuscripts, rare
arly editions which his father-in-law has left behind
s it is only another illustration of the old adage, "Two
never agree;" perhaps some other motive ruled the
old gentleman's perverse "will;" but we think that
l has done enough to become to England a "dear son
Even now, though, we hope he may live long and
to toil upward and onward as a bibliographer, a literary
d a Shaksperian illustrator.

Poetic Critique.

POETRY is the luxury of the intellect. It is choice thought daintily expressed. It is the essence of the soul conserved in the purest and fittest diction that the writer can command. It is thought in full flower, with all its most delicate odours breathing out of its perfected beauty. Hence not only the preciousness of the material, but the excellence of the workmanship—the tracery and the chasing as well as the substance which has been wrought up, come into the critic's consideration. We do not use the same ornamentation, nor do we expect the same finish on pottery as on marble, in bone as in pearl, in brass as in gold, in pebble as in diamond; but in all ornamental work we seek the gratification of taste and luxury. Thought is winged, and words are winged, but it is only when winged thought is mated to winged words that we have true poetry. The ecstasy of the soul, reflection, suggestion, expression, musical tone, current feeling and recurrent harmony, rhythm, rhyme, and all the artful aids of word-artistry combined in the concurrent production of emotioned thought, are requisite to form poetry of the highest sort. All poetry is thought artistically expressed. For example, "He delves" is plain, downright prose; but it becomes poetical when emotion and suggestion add their charms to it—

"His is the task God gave to sinless man."

Similarly, the sentence "Patience is a great virtue" is simply prose; but it breathes out in poetry when we say, with Decker,—

"Patience? why, 'tis the soul of peace;
Of all the virtues 'tis nearest kin to heaven;
It makes men look like gods. The Best of Men
That e'er wore earth about Him was a sufferer,—
A soft, meek, patient, humble, tranquil spirit,
The first true gentleman that ever breathed."

Perhaps few sentences could have been more appropriately quoted

poets are proverbially impatient; and the long delay in place in the inserting of a "poetic critique" must have tried them, and made them be found most cunning in concealing it.

considerable arrears on hand, and we have small space left now; but we shall do our best to bring out of our store a few of those pieces which seem likely to be most useful for our purpose, which is an educative and a critical one, and of all of such a nature as to imply that all that we lay before our reader is quite up to high-water mark. These Musings are to contain some very fair lines expressive of some good sense. We have slightly touched the arrangement of the pieces, but we have not otherwise altered. They will bear perusal with interest, and may incline some of our readers to indulge for a moment in a similar:—

MUSINGS.

PROLOGUE.

The theme is old, discordant are the notes;
The minstrel has but little power to melt
Or move the throng; but he himself has felt
The feelings; he himself has thought these thoughts.

Linger by a lowland river's brink,
The river fed by tiny silver rills,
That trickle down from low and barren hills
Among the grass. I watch the red sun sink
Far in the west. The cool of evening fills
The air. With odours rare the heated air,
The murmur of the stream falls like music on my ear,
While lingering there.

The water murmurs past, the bank appears
A vessel, bearing up against the stream,
And bearing me up with it; and I dream
Of all that happened in the bypast years—
Of years that had little in them to redeem
The weary flow, the motion slow,
The bursting of a light through the darkness now and then,
With a fitful glow.

It comes down gently, smoothly, from its source,
To make for a little eddy, and the spray
At some outjutting stone, it floats away
Interrupted in its sluggish course,

To mingle with the waters of the bay.
 I muse, and then I look again,
 And I fancy that I see in the eddies and the stones
 The lives of men.

How quiet and even is the human tide!
 Few days but what are like the other day;
 Just as the rocks, that in the stream midway
 Oft turn the current in its course aside,
 Are those events which, singly, far outweigh
 The mass of time that in youth's prime
 Flies unheeded as we dream of a glorious time to come,
 A future sublime.

Alas! the future never yields as much
 As we expect, as we too fondly hope;
 Yet through its dimness still we love to grope,
 Pursuing pleasure that eludes our touch—
 A phantom with whose speed we cannot cope;
 With hands outspread we're onward led
 In the vainest of pursuits, and we never fail to find
 That the phantom's fled.

We prophesy each morning as we rise:
 This day will yield more pleasure than the last,—
 And, heedless of the lessons of the past,
 We still look forward. So the present flies,
 And we mark not the shadows on us cast.
 Grey turns our hair, be it dark or fair,
 And the hopes that for a lifetime are deferred, cloud the brow
 With marks of care.

EPILOGUE.

And thus the stream of life goes gliding past,
 Insensibly it widens, and will be
 Soon lost among the waters of that sea
 Where flow all rivers great and small, at last.

J. L. M.

Our next extract is less perfect in its structure, but has a tender idea in it which we like. It would, we think, have been much more effective, however, had it been more compressed and more regular in its form. It is true that this would have demanded the patient touches of slow-endeavouring art, and so would not have given a gush of melody. Most young versifiers have false notions on this subject. Rhymes dashed off at a first heat are really seldom of much worth. Take the thought with all its emotion power as it comes into the mind, give it expression, and let it mould a form for itself, but afterwards apply to it all the care of an earnest revising

on the perfecting of the original. No great poet—
 Spenser, Shakspeare, Milton, Pope, Coleridge, Words-
 Burns, Tennyson, Browning, &c.—never slackened in the
 of the mintage of his soul. W. L. will see in the margin
 suggestions made which will show at least that on being
 over and carefully considered, there seem to be possibilities
 improvement in the diction and connection of his lines. Every-
 ves the theme—children are the favourites of all, as flowers,
 e, music, and rivers are, hence we shall give these lines

CHILDREN.

EARTHLY children! what are they?

A mystery about them lies!

Older mortals pass away,

[Elder

Children, ever children stay:

In their beauty beautiful,

In their wisdom wise,
 Caring not for stringent rule,

Knowing nought of worldly caste,
 Glorious in being freed

[Happy they

From the bigotries of creed,
 Filled with love as clear and vast

As the beams of starlit skies,
 Or the broader light of day;—

Universal are their ties,
 Nature is their only school.

Earthly children! what are they?

What the souls that they possess?

No knowledge of the earth can say,

[gained on

Mortal man can only guess.

Where are they their wisdom taught?

In what bright sphere do they awaken?

Philosophy can answer nought,

But from the branches of sweet thought

Are tender fancies shaken.

Love speaks from her ethereal height,

[topmost

Filling heaven's arches with delight,

[arched heaven

While echoes from God's heart do start,

[being

These assume a mortal shape,

Are of God and Love a part,

Are by angel feelings warmed,

To this lower world escape—

Thus are children formed.

[So

Buds of purity are they,

Filled with an eternal bloom

[Blessed in life's

Which burst and blossom on life's way

[They

Shedding daintiest perfume.

Sunbeams of a purer air, [from heaven's
 Subtle essences of light
 Coming from a world more fair, [Issues
 More delicate and bright.

As rivulets that sparkling run [gladsome
 With music, and with radiance rare
 Reflected from on high,
 So children of this earth go by,
 Scattering freshness everywhere
 Reflected from their God, their sun.

When dewdrops cling to earth's frail flowers,
 They sparkle with the light of morn ;
 So children beautify, in life's short hours,
 The human flowers whom they adorn.

An emblem of diviner life [Fair emblems
 Innocent and undefiled
 By the taint of care or strife— [any
 A Christ in embryo, pure and mild, [saint ?
 Is each immortal child.

Would that I could but attain
 To half the wisdom of a child
 Leading goodness in its train,
 To life would I be reconciled
 In spite of every pain. [all its
 W. L.

here is not much in our succeeding extract, but it has a tinkling sweetness of sound which makes it musical. It has not, however, the idea of abandonment to the mere impression and feeling of the moment fully expressed, in some such verse as that in brackets :—

THE EVENING BOAT-SONG.

"On! on! on!
 'Neath the glitter of the moon,
 Meanwhile the oar-sweep flasheth
 To the loving hearts' glad tune."

THE EVENING BOAT-SONG.

Come! come! come!
 Upon the river's [heaving] breast, [On
 When the shades of evening fall,
 And the winged winds [are] at rest.

Dip! dip! dip!
 Our white oar *dipping* light [dripping
 Upon the silvery waters,
 And the bending moonbeams bright. [In

Row! row! row!

Our shallop on the river,
As *from* the cutting prow
The laughing wavelets shiver.

[before

Bright! bright! bright!

Sparkles the *dripping* oar,
As fairy sounds re-echo
Their music from the shore.

[dipping

Sweet! sweet! sweet!

Are the *words* that lightly float
Across the sparkling waters
From dear ones in the boat.

[sounds

[Out o'er

[Come! come! come!

We could glide thus for ever
In our little fairy skiff
Upon the moonlit river.]

DUN-LORA.

two hymns which come to us from a self-taught and
er, who has scarcely crossed the margin of girlhood, and
few means of becoming acquainted with the best
have had a large packet of her verses forwarded to
e do not quote these as the most perfect nor the most
we cite them as specimens of the yearning of the
ls a joy to sing it out—a beautiful and bountiful pro-
being which imparts to praise its ecstasy and efficacy
of worship. For a girl of less than fifteen these verses
reditable—especially when we consider that her
ere few and her discouragements were many.

THE DYING CHRISTIAN.

I.

“The time of my departure is at hand.”

I’ve nearly reached my journey’s end

Here below,

And soon I shall to heaven ascend,—

This I know.

Weep not for me, my dearest friends,

The love of Jesus never ends :

My happy soul to Him ascends,

His grace to me He now extends,

Let me go.

I bid this sinful world adieu,

All its joys

Are fleeting as the morning dew,

Worthless toys.

I've tried the paths of sin, and found
That they with thorns and briars abound;
But in religion I have found
Purer joys.

Christ called me, and to Him I came:
Peace and rest,
Through believing in His name,
I possessed.

And soon shall I by angel bands [mid . . . charms
Be taken to His loving arms,
And rest for ever safe from harms
On His breast.

I soon shall wave the palm of victory,
Bliss untold;
I soon shall wear the crown of glory,
Bright as gold.
Then, when I've reached my native skies,
When to its God my spirit flies,
Celestial glories to mine eyes
Will unfold.

No gloomy doubts distress me now,
All are past.

The clouds which long hung o'er my brow
Gone at last. [Off are cast.

My hope of glory's bright and clear,
For, safe in Christ, I need not fear;
My God will guide me safely there, [—Saviour dear
Home at last.

B. L.

II.

1 Pet. i. 6.

My soul's assailed on every side
With sins and doubts and fears,
Close to my God would I abide
Till Christ my Lord appears.

The way is rough, but oh! if Thou
Art ever by my side,
If I can feel Thy presence near,
And feel Thy blood applied;

If I can feel that I am Thine, [dare
And shall for ever be
And feel as sure that Thou art mine [know most surely
To all eternity.

Then, though at times my faith is weak,
I'll press towards the prize;
I know I shall with Jesus be [dwell
For ever in the skies.

B. L.

The Reviewer.

of Anthropology; or, Science of Man based on Modern
 By Charles Bray. London: Longmans, Green,

BRAY is an active and influential thinker, who has for or so taken a deep interest in the science of man. His mind open to all the researches bearing upon that topic, he has summed up as well as summarized the literature of the subject. He has made a most interesting and book, and one which—even if we altogether dispute his man and morals—is worthy of study. He is a devout Gall, Spurzheim, and George Combe; and as a phrenologist faith in the results of thirty-six years of observation. He regards the study of the brain and nervous connected with thought and feeling, as highly important. He maintains that on these investigations there has been mental science more clear and practical than any with world has yet been acquainted, and which is admitted to psychological system that as yet counts any considerable number of adherents.

faculties, both of body and mind, have been first tried in animals; they have been transmitted to us through of organization; they have appeared singly, separately, until they have taken their last and most perfect development. The study of the animal world, therefore, both in physiology and psychology, is most important, and it has been neglected. . . . Only that knowledge which admits of improvement will endure and advance. Psychology, therefore, brought within the domain of law, if that also, like the sciences, is to make any progress. . . . If it took a hundred years to reconcile mankind to the Copernican astronomy, must be long before it will recognise and accept an ethics of the reign of law, instead of the present one based on the doctrine of free-will. Still we may hope that ultimately the moral world will establish the order of the moral world on a basis as universal as that of the physical. Why we have no

mental and moral science at present is because most people think they have in their religion a sufficient standard of them both, and that all the wants of human nature are included in the Bible; but this idea has been long exploded in physics, and it must be so in ethics before we can make the same progress in ethics as we have in physics. Men agree in science because it admits of demonstration, but we have no recognised science of human nature."

"The present work is another brief and humble attempt, by making use of the light of modern discovery, and by putting together and systematizing what have hitherto been detached and isolated truths, to answer this query of our whence, why, and whither. "I have" (the author says) "endeavoured honestly to think out modern facts and discoveries to what appear to be their legitimate conclusions, although it may, perhaps, take the labours of another generation of workers to test and verify the deductions that have been made. This task has been done without dread of the consequences, in the firm conviction that we have nothing to fear from truth, and that whatever intuitional aid we may receive from conscience, we must still learn what is true in order to do what is right. . . . All the novelty I lay claim to in this work is the application of the conservation, transmutation, and dissipation of energy to mind, morals, and religion. . . . Physics and metaphysics, physiology and psychology, thus become united, and the study of man passes from the uncertain light of mere opinion to the region of science."

These quotations from the preface indicate pretty fairly the standpoint of the author. It is not an *orthodox* book; but it brings into one view, from authoritative sources, all the best ideas of the most notable scientific thinkers of the day, and thus forms a sort of cyclopædia of the *heterodoxies* of science; and pressing them into other fields and forms, as it does, it may in some minds give shape to a *reductio ad absurdum* to many modern notions. The reviewer, while he recognises the force and power of the author, does not accept his conclusions; but the attempt to single out and controvert them would more than exhaust the space of a number of this serial, far more therefore than allotted to a critical notice. He, for instance, defines natural law as God; we believe it is only the exponent of the will of God; he believes the doctrine of Malthus, we doubt it, nay, disbelieve it; he thinks "the difference between the lowest and the highest animal is one of degree, not of kind;" we believe that the thinker, the speaker, the inventor, the reproducer of mental results has a power in him different not in degree, but in kind: he thinks our intellectual faculties give no *real* know-

opinion is the very reverse; lunacy and vice are, he
 same; we think that conscious responsibility parts them
 appears to look on death as the end of individual being;
 is that life is only the growth, and death the perfection
 ality: and so with many other ideas given expression to
 k. Yet the force of the author's powers, the largeness
 isition, the excellence of his selective taste, and the
 completeness and thoroughness of the book, lead us to
 an invaluable compendium of the prevalent opinions
 correlations of science and religion.

It consists of seven chapters:—I. In the beginning. II.
 Morality. IV. Physics and Metaphysics. V. Religion.
 gy. VII. Summary and Conclusion. The last chapter
 ent and well-managed abridgment of the preceding por-
 s a good specimen of epitomizing. We ought to speak
 praise of the full index (of twelve pages) attached to the
 index which makes readily available almost all the facts,
 atements, and quotations in the book itself. There in the
 Neil Arnott, Dr. Bird, Carlyle, Combe, Darwin, Fara-
 Grove, Hegel, Herschel, Huxley, Kant, Laycock, Lub-
 Maudsley, Malthus, Mill, Owen, Herbert Spencer
 ng, Tyndall, A. R. Wallace, &c., are analyzed and con-
 d many of the highest themes of thought are here dis-
 theism, beauty, breeding, brain, causation, Christianity,
 ss, co-operation, creation, death, evolution, force, free-
 government, happiness, heat, instinct, intelligence,
 wledge, life, marriage, mind, morality, nature, necessity,
 a, pauperism, prayer, purpose, religion, sex, soul, space,
 women, &c. The book is distinguished for fulness as
 ightfulness; a careful reader should learn much from it,
 at such ought to open its pages.

The Societies' Section.

THE AMERICAN LECTURE-STAND.

IN Troy, New York, Mr. E. H. G. Clark made his *debut* as a lecturer at a meeting of the Young Men's Association of his native town. Alike in manner and in matter it was a success. His topic was the Lyceum Lecture-Stand—our system of public lectures, one of the institutions of the land—a part of life in every city, and almost every village. It is the lay pulpit, the college desk carried out among the people. It owes its origin to John Andersson, Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, and founder of an institution there which bears his name, and was designed to throw open the temple of science to the hard-labouring artisan and the hitherto despised mechanic, and to one of the early professors in that institution, George Birkbeck, M.D., who is the reputed originator of mechanics' institutes, 1823. A short time afterwards Thomas Carlyle, in his struggling yet hopeful manhood, said that the time would come when the victory at Waterloo (1815) would seem less momentous in history than the opening of the first mechanics' institute (1823). In 1833 the Boston Mechanics' Institute was formed, and R. W. Emerson (b. 1803) began his career before it as a popular essayist. Then the Lecture-Stand became the people's instructor.

But the Lecture Stand owes an earlier debt than that—one to the Modern Reformers, whose best beloved and most filial child it is. Clarkson, Romilly, O'Connell, and

Brougham took up respectively the Emancipation of Slaves, of Law, Religion, and of Education. Among these agitations may be placed the revival of American education, 1815, and Horace Mann in promotion of this sent out lecturers over all the land, to hold meetings, conventions and assemblies. Again, between 1820-30 there arose the Temperance fight against old alcohol, and the lecturer was the toughest dragon in that warfare. In 1831 the apocalypse of the abolition of American slavery was opened, and the lecture path was trodden effectively in that behalf. In 1835 the Lyceum, the organized lecture system appeared: freedom was the father, temperance the mother, and education the schoolmaster of the lecture system, which asks science for the people, literature for the mass, civil, social, and personal equality for all. The elevation of labour the most thriving son, and the right of woman the liveliest daughter of the lecture system, which has always been aglow with the spirit of progress, and the experiment of justice, and philanthropy, ethics, politics, and free religious criticism.

Every intelligent person knows that for three centuries the historical tide in the affairs of man has set in two main directions—one towards spiritual freedom, religious enfranchisement—the other towards personal and civil liberty. Emerson represents the advance-breaker of independent spirit and thought.

He long since rose as the guid

ican literature, and the
his scale is found in that
word—*Transcendent-*
is Transcendentalism?
o laugh at, so seldom
with one word of infor-
ommon sense. History
it is the world's last
t to confirm faith by
convert intellectual
religious trust.

hundred and fifty years
renounced the autho-
e to interpret Scripture
nd Christendom prac-
away from all unques-
to accept thought as
edge. But now, per-
half the world's fore-
those claiming at least
ave renounced thought
otent in religion, con-
d void. And even
the dry rot as I think
itism—is a hundred
It centred in David
died in 1776, a month
our declaration of in-
Modern infidelity is
if that were all, to be
Why, when the pilgrim
settling around their
ck, the nominal athe-
were already counted
ousands, while the wits
re flinging a rhyme at
of immortality.

hat follows death the
oul of man
what it was an hour ere
"

of that gun was philo-
physics. Impatient
g down its glove, and
with to the ordeal of
ment. Then deeper,
thought took up the
end religion from the
own ground. Trans-
is the latest soldier in
Luther, the revival

of ancient letters, the discovery of
printing, Columbus with his new
earth, Galileo with his new heavens,
came suddenly on the world's long
slumber of pious trust. The world
awoke and asked a thousand ques-
tions. The answers often denied
old beliefs. So belief itself—all be-
lief—soon became a question. Then
the Frenchman Descartes turned
to the sceptic, to put him to rout
by taking him at his own word.
Would men doubt all things—the
very existence of God—because they
had now come to doubt tradition
and authority? Descartes pointed
to their own consciousness, showing
that the very conception of self—
the first step of thought—led them
back to their Maker. And if trust-
ing thought they had dared to
doubt, they must now believe, or
distrust their thought. Presently
the renowned Englishman, John
Locke, wrote his "Essay on the
Human Understanding." Three
things he supposed he had settled:
the existence of God, the existence
of mind, and the existence of matter.
But first the good Bishop Berkeley,
then David Hume, fully accepting
all his premises hopelessly reversed
all his conclusions. Berkeley re-
duced matter to an inference of
mind, and Hume reduced mind
itself to an inference of sense. Thus
God was left the inference of an
inference. A brilliant scoffer, an
expert and witty denier, arose as
the strongest personal influence in
Europe; for such was Voltaire
in such an epoch. The French
revolution was at hand, and down
in that hot atmosphere, the Author
of the universe was not only to be
thought out of His creation, but to
be swiftly *voted* out of it, and
ceremoniously superseded. A little
man in Germany answered No!—
a plain little man, equipped with
the best head that had been in the
world since Aristotle went out of it.

That was Immanuel Kant, the father of German philosophy; Kant sat down to write his "Critique of Pure Reason." From this book came transcendentalism. Kant's system was extended by Fichte and Schelling, and completed by Hegel, who claimed as the *result of transcendentalism*, that he had laid bare the inmost substratum of human thought, and found it one with the essential core of the Christian faith. Kant published his "Critique of Pure Reason" in 1781, and Hegel died in 1831. About 1830 a strong, fiery Scotsman found in this literature a spiritual significance, a spiritual trust, nowhere else existing. It was Thomas Carlyle. An American, too, doubtless helped by Carlyle at first, but a higher, finer, more human spirit, turned to this same German literature to gather new and needed food for our own land. Some of you have, doubtless, seen that calm, wise man. It is Emerson. In Scotland, while Carlyle touched the most palpable phases of the subject in application to ethics and criticism, Sir William Hamilton set up as a refuter of all the Germans, though he missed the vital meaning of Kant, and not understanding Hegel, asked with a sneer if Hegel understood himself! This conundrum has since been answered. Dr. James Hutchison Stirling, the newest and deepest thinker in Great Britain, has for the first time reproduced German philosophy, with sufficient insight and culture to render it thoroughly intelligible. Dr. Stirling has not only proved that such men as Kant and Hegel *understood themselves*, but he has duly scalped the quacks who have met transcendentalism with eisers instead of brains. But while Hamilton in special served to discourage thought and frighten ecclesiastical respectability, Auguste Comte, on the other hand, laid down

in France his Positive Philosophy, one of the least positive, I suspect, of many things, but the flat denial, at any rate, of all spiritual thinking from Plato to Hegel. Between Hamilton and Comte every hope of sustaining faith by any system of thought seemed once more to fade out and die. But at such a time, in spite of such conclusions, Emerson stood up for American scholars, for American thinkers, and affirmed man's moral and religious nature, man's high heroic needs and duties. He would not immolate reason, he would hold it as the test of authority. Still, let French science or Scotch philosophy muddle whom they might, man was the child of God and the heir to all the possibilities of the universe. The American Plato would go back with the saints of Palestine, the sages of Greece and India, and re-announce the truth on the strength of the individual soul alone, if the history of thought had left no other foundation.

Mr. Emerson is the eighth descendant in a straight line of Puritan ministers. But in his young manhood no pulpit offered sufficient breadth for the free word that pressed him for utterance.

As a new pivot in American literature the lecture-stand is now being used. Thanks to the early lecturers—those knight-errants of reform—there is now no human right, scarcely a human need or duty, but is held up to the light of popular discussion with the hope of a successful issue. Woman's rights and the nobility of labour have become watchwords of the lecture-stand. It is the lay pulpit of practical democracy, which means not only freedom for all mankind, but work, comfort, intelligence for every man and woman. The statesman is the man who stamps his purpose on the hearts of the people;

a mere ball of red tape unwound by public power behind the throne opinion. Mr. Wendell first forensic orator ica has ever produced, hero's will wrought out uth—"the people are power." Agitation is Every question gene- ro sides, but both sides tion generally deserve . Hence the lecture-

stand must hold its proud place as the independent centre from which noble men and true women shall instruct and encourage a willing people in their highest public duties, and so, by public opinion, spur our country yet farther forward to bless our race with all the benig- nities of life, love, hope, and faith.

The young lecturer achieved an immense success, and has shown himself to be a strong, fearless, and comprehensive thinker.

The Inquirer.

REQUIRING ANSWERS.

ould you inform me on ds the Rev. Charles s excluded from the at his peculiar tenets at works he has pub- T. P. usual in the articles on ogicians" to give much iographical matter at- where else, in the same east, but in the March gh much information f the German logician, old us of his English would it not be possible some farther notice of Lindsay is, and what he -S. T. P.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

e author of the article on eg very gladly embraces unity afforded by the T. P. to supply a notice of the life-work of the nas M. Lindsay as has s knowledge, as he was ined by the extreme

length of that paper from noting the facts of a worthy career.

Thomas M. Lindsay is, we believe, a native of what is called in Scotland the kingdom of Fife—a county in which the famous family of the Lindsays is particularly strong and numerous. Mr. Lindsay, we understand, had serious difficulties and trials to encounter in the attainment of that high education to which he aspired. He was a notable student in all his classes in the University of Edinburgh, and gained the favourable regard of all his professors, as well as many of the prizes given for distinguished progress—notably the medals in the classes of logic and metaphysics, and moral philosophy, and the Bruce and Falkland prize in mental philosophy. In 1865 he gained the junior Hamilton scholarship; in 1866 he graduated with first-class honours, and was appointed to assist in the moral philosophy by the senators of the university. In the same year he gained the Ferguson scholarship, at Glasgow, at an examination open to students of any

Scottish university. In 1867 he was appointed class assistant to Professor A. C. Fraser, and one of the examiners of the university, and gained the Sir William Hamilton scholarship. In 1868 he was appointed by the university court examiner in mental philosophy for graduation, and secretary to the Board of Local Examinations in the Edinburgh University, and won the highest academical distinction attainable in Scotland—The Shaw Fellowship. In 1869 he was one of the contributors to *Macmillan's Magazine* on historic and metaphysical subjects, and acted as assistant to the Rev. Dr. Candlish, having been duly licensed as a preacher or clergyman in the Free Church of Scotland, to which he is attached, and in which he had laboured as a Sabbath school teacher during his student-time. In 1870 he was chosen Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and was appointed examiner to the new college in regard to bursaries, and to the university in the entrance examinations. In 1871 he became a contributor to the *British Quarterly Review* on scholastic metaphysics, &c., on which subject also he wrote several papers read before the Royal Society. At the British Association he read a paper on "Democritus and Lucretius,"—a discussion on the question of priority in the discovery of the Kinetic (or Farce) theory of matter. He has written reviews on many philosophical topics in the Edinburgh newspapers on Ueberweg, Berkeley, Stirling's "Secret of Hegel," &c., and he is regarded in Edinburgh as a sort of combination of De Quincey and Sir William Hamilton in curious book-lore, extent of acquisition, and gluttony of every available sort of information. He spent several summers on the Continent, and learned practically to use the lan-

guages of France, Germany, and Holland. These, in addition to his high attainments as a Latin and Greek scholar, open up to him almost the whole stores of the world's thought. Besides other works of solid performance and standard value, he has translated the Logic of Ueberweg, and made philosophy his debtor in that behalf. His talents have attracted notice in other countries, and he has had offers of university appointments on the Continent and in the colonies. At present he is acting as Professor of Church History in the Free Church College, Glasgow, with much acceptance, continuing the classes of the late Dr. James Gibson, and his friends are making strong and justifiable efforts to gain a permanent appointment for him in a chair of such a nature as he seems highly qualified to fulfil. On almost every side he is spoken of as a man of singular devotedness to study, of prompt energy and stern persistence, of singular versatility, of endowment, and of noble Christian deportment. His friendship with all the higher and better minds of the country is a testimony to his worth which ought not to be overlooked, for it indicates a man of wide sympathy, and of extended power to affect as well as influence.—S. N.

972. The Rev. Charles Voysey was Vicar of Healaugh, Yorkshire, and issued a series of papers entitled "The Stone and the Sling," in advocacy of advanced theological opinions. For these he was prosecuted by the Lord Archbishop of York, and was by the Privy Council dissevered from the Church of England as a heretic. There is now being raised for him a "Voysey Establishment Fund," intended to be employed in erecting and endowing a church in London to oppose traditionalism, and to advocate those

seem to him to bring to harmony with the nature of the age, and the illusions of science. We authoritative abstract of

owing are the principal Mr. Voysey's teaching, ed in logical sequence, order in which they most conveniently taken the errors of the popu- of religion:—

right and duty of every k for himself in matters

absolute unity of God ; the denial of the doctrine

natural humanity of Jesus ; the denial of His miraculous of His having been in any than a man.

Fatherhood of God to all respective of race, creed, difference ; involving the the doctrines of the pri-, of the necessity for an and of all punishment as is corrective.

hope of an everlasting

life of ever-increasing goodness for every human soul ; involving the denial of the doctrine that this life is the only probationary one, and that any one will be condemned to endless torment.

6. *The paramount duty of brotherly love, and of practising all virtue uninfluenced by fear of punishment or hope of reward here or hereafter ; involving the denial of the orthodox idea of "salvation by faith only," and making religious belief entirely subordinate to morality.*

7. *The supreme authority of man's reason and conscience ; involving the denial that God has given to man any revelation which ought to be accepted without question.*

8. *The progressive character of our knowledge of God as of all our other knowledge ; involving the denial of finality in revelation, and declaring it to be incumbent on all men to keep their hearts and minds in constant readiness to receive every fresh ray of light which may lead them to a clearer perception of their duty, their destiny, and their adorable Creator.—B. M. A.*

Literary Notes.

"**UTIVIST PRIMER,**"—an catechism of Comtism, avis, has been issued in

story of Greek Art," by Brunn, of Munich, is ly.

"**Moralists and Philoso-** A. Frank gives some contributions to ethical physical philosophy in a portraits of many re- thinkers.

"**A Century of Bibles,**" 1611—1711, by Rev. W. J. Loftie, will contain a valuable bibliography of 350 editions of the Scriptures.

The Benedictine Fathers are about to publish "Annals of the Roman Catholic Church in England," by Dr. Morris, of Troy, who died February 22.

A library of Anglo-Saxon prose is announced, under the editorship of Dr. Grein.

Besides the Early English Text

Society, the Chaucer Society, &c., there is a proposal to establish an Occlive and Lydgate Society. Would it not be far better to form a Republication Society, whose funds, being augmented by the many, might be utilized for general literary purposes—each subscription of one guinea entitling to one vote and to the right of suggestion to the Council of works worthy of re-issue?

It has been proposed to establish a General Translation Fund under fair auspices.

Collegiate lecturers appointed by the universities to teach in large towns have been suggested.

Dr. Grätz, of Breslau, is engaged on a "History of the Jews."

Theodore Keim's "History of Jesus of Nazareth" has reached its third part.

Giuseppe Mazzini, the practical realizer of the idea of the National Unity of Italy, originated by Dante, died 10th March.

We hear of a proposed issue of unpublished "Letters of Lord Byron." Perhaps this is all right, but about twenty years ago there was a similar announcement made, not only about Byron Letters, but about Shelley Letters, and both were withdrawn because the supposed autographs were found to be cleverly executed forgeries—in some cases containing transcripts from papers in the *Quarterly Review*.

Lord Rokeby—a literary name—is, it is said, about to bring to the hammer the Montagu Library of rare and curious books. Is this a renewal of an old Jokeby?

A testimonial (Ehrendank) to Ludwig Feuerbach, the Hegelian of the Left, aged 68, and now infirm, is proposed. Between 1831 and 1848 he was one of the most influential minds in Germany.

Professor Oehler, a Tübingen

semi-orthodox theologian, died 18th February.

The son of F. D. Maurice, Mr. E. C. Maurice, is engaged on "The Lives of English Popular Leaders."

"Im Neuen Reich," a German magazine commenced last year, is under the direction of Gustav Freytag, the great novelist, dramatist, and political writer, and contains articles by eminent men on all the topics of the day. Though it is a weekly, it resembles *Macmillan's Magazine* among our monthlies.

Dr. Hase, a Rationalist professor at Jena, has issued recollections of his youth which supply singularly interpretative facts regarding the philosophic condition of Germany, 1818—1830.

A Theological Translation Fund has been instituted for the issue of a series of translations, by which the best results of recent theological investigations on the Continent, conducted without reference to doctrinal considerations, and with the sole purpose of arriving at truth, may be placed within reach of English readers. A literature of a more independent character, less biassed by dogmatical prepossessions, a literature which is represented by such works as those of Ewald, Hupfeld, F. C. Baur, Zeller, Rothe, Keim, Schrader, Noldeke, &c., in Germany, and by those of Kuenen, Scholten, and others in Holland, it is thought desirable to render accessible to English readers who are not familiar with the languages of the Continent. Three volumes, of about 400 pages annually, are to be issued for a guinea subscription. The prospectus bears the signatures of Principal Tulloch, Dean Stanley, Professors Jowett, H. J. Smith, Henry Sidgwick, Dr. Davidson, the Rev. James Martineau, Mr. W. G. Clark, the Revs. T. K. Cheyne, J. Allanson Picton, C. Kegan Paul, John Caird, and others.

Modern Logicians.

THE HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, LL.D.,
" *Prolegomena Logica*," " *Metaphysics*," " *The Limits
of Religious Thought*," &c., &c.

MANSEL was probably the most able of the controversialists of our age. Sir William Hamilton was a distinguished critic; Professor Ferrier was a well-known and conductor of metaphysical discussion; but Mansel, though a logical fence in metaphysical controversy, entrenched himself in psychology. With him psychology is the basis of philosophy. Logic is merely psychology consciously brought into a law regulating the processes of thought; and metaphysics is only the logical examination of the facts of consciousness and investigation of the contents—in form and in content of the human mind; in short, an exposition of the results of logical research.

It was his taste, rather than taste or genius, brought him before the public as a logician. His antagonism to the mathematico-logic of De Morgan, his acceptance of the doctrines of, and his payment of discipleship to Sir William Hamilton, and his controversies on the one hand with Dr. Whewell, and on the other with J. S. Mill, gave prominence to the association of his name with logic, much to the detriment of his own reputation, and to the injury, as we think, of his natural bent and powers. The clearness, distinctness, and limitation of his intellect led him not to suppose that logical training had ripened him in the mystery of the science and art of thinking; but he was a self-inquisitor, an examiner, not a developer of thought. His mind was a transparency; he knew and could distinguish the warp, the woof, the pattern, and the mode of the working of the web of thought. He saw the logic of it, and could

tell its manner; but he looked on the web merely, and confined himself rather to its texture and materials than its designer or its purpose. He steadfastly refused to look beyond man in his philosophical excursions, and held the consciousness of the thinker to be the entire extent within which logic could work, or in which metaphysic could be discovered. On this account we regard him rather as a psychologist than a logician by nature. We must take him, however, in the character which he held in the estimation of men; and as he was regarded as the legitimate successor of Sir William Hamilton in maintaining the psychological conditions of all knowledge as the regulative as well as speculative limits of right thinking, we have included his name—honoured and honourable in many ways—in our list of modern logicians.

Henry Longueville Mansel was born 6th October, 1820, at Cosgrove, Northamptonshire. He was the eldest son of the Rev. H.L. Mansel, Rector of Cosgrove, and Chaplain to His Royal Highness the late Duke of York; and his mother was Maria Margaret, only daughter of the late Admiral Sir Robert Moorsom, K.C.B. The lordship of the manor of Cosgrove, as well as the rectory living, belongs to the Mansels, who have held a high position both in the county and the Church for several generations. He was educated at Merchant Taylors' School under Dr. Bellamy. While he was yet a school lad, in 1838, he issued a volume of poems under the title of "The Demon of the Winds"—we believe for private circulation. We have, however, failed—after application to several friends, and at some university libraries—to procure a copy for perusal. We can only state the fact as an evidence of precocity and of literary proclivities. He carried with him a sort of poetic as well as a scholarly reputation when in 1839, as *dux* of this famous old City Company School, he was rewarded by a Junior Fellowship at St. John's College, Oxford, to students of which the chief benefactions in the gift of the Merchant Taylors' Company are appropriated. Not only while an undergraduate, but also while an Oxford Bachelor, he was a member of "the Union," and even among such competitors as Sir John Duke Coleridge, the late J. B. Blackett, M.P., Richard Congreve, the apostle of positivism, &c., his eloquence held sway over the minds of many of those who strove in that arena of oratory for mastery of men by speech. By many of his compeers he was reckoned the most effective speaker then in training, and he held the office of President

ciation for a term. In 1842 he was elected into full
 with all the rights thereunto attached. That he might
 election, he run for a double-first degree, and in the
 lists, 1843, his name appears as first-class both in
 mathematics. Immediately thereupon he was ap-
 or in his college, and his Lectures on Logic became
 once famous. He was a most effective, hard-working,
 ed private tutor as well, and occupied the post of
 ot only at Moderations, but also in the Final School.
 was ordained deacon, and in 1845 Bishop Bagot of
 mitted him priest. In 1849 appeared his edition of
 ce Rudimenta," from the text of Aldrich, with notes
 l references—a work to which such reference has been
 ormer article as may be held sufficient as a notice, and
 us in passing over any characterization of the original
 in limiting our remarks to the peculiarities of Mansel's
 e is no advocate for "the complete disinterment of the
 schools;" he prefers Aristotelianism to scholasticism,
 to effect a clear discrimination between those portions
 g to the original work of Aristotle, and those for
 indebted to subsequent logicians; and he endeavours
 "the happy medium between dogmatic assumption
 and and prolix discussion on the other." His intro-
 the province, nature, purpose, and definition of logic
 brief, valuable, learned, and clear. The foot-notes,
 e upon every page of the original Latin text, are col-
 widely scattered sources, and are singularly apposite
 ng. They exhibit an extraordinary amount of diversi-
 g, well mastered, carefully pondered, and diligently
 to illustrative juxtaposition. As an application of
 e to the explanation of the text of Aldrich, Sir William
 ghtly observed, "La sauce vaut mieux que le poisson"
 is better than the fish). The Appendix contains eight
 nsiderable value and extent:—On the predicables—On
 On material and formal consequences—Is the syllogism
 incipit?—On the enthymeme—On induction—On Aris-
 thetical syllogisms—On the demonstrative syllogism
 ion of these *verales questiones* of logic is conducted
 rigour, and temperance, learning, acumen, and contro-
 verity.

Mansel holds that "the dialectic of Aristotle is certainly an *art*; his analytic, both implicitly from his mode of treatment and explicitly from his own confession, must be regarded as a *science*;" but "the inquiry—whether the whole organon of Aristotle treats of an art or a science"—is not "susceptible of a single *aye* or *no*." "It is true that if we start from the organon of Aristotle as a whole, and presume the substance of logic to be already settled, the question whether it shall be called by this or that name is comparatively unimportant; but it is not so when, commencing with a clear conception of the one or the other, we endeavour to develop the whole subject in conformity to the leading notion. In proportion as we regard logic as a means of operation rather than as an inquiry into truth, in the same proportion are we in danger of overloading our system with foreign embellishments, and sacrificing its scientific unity to a spurious utilitarianism. . . . It is not intended to deny the usefulness of logic; but it may safely be asserted that its more valuable fruits are to be found in the training which the mind unconsciously receives, than in the conscious employment of knowledge in the formation and examination of reasoning, and that both, in respect of the true character of the science, are secondary and accidental results, not primary and essential features." He considers that definition of logic which is proposed by Kant and sanctioned by Sir William Hamilton—the science of the necessary laws of thought—a definition which vindicates to logic its peculiar province as a branch of mental science, and furnishes the leading conception by which we may hope one day to see it purified of the encumbrances with which it has so long been overlaid, and from which it has not yet been entirely emancipated. Thereafter he controverts the notion of logic made current by Aldrich and popularized by Whately, "that logic is chiefly conversant about language;" and suggests that "logic, primarily concerned with the laws of thought is secondarily but necessarily conversant about language as the instrument of thought;" for "logic is compelled to make use of symbols," and "as a matter of fact men do reason by means of language." So much for the view of the science of thought taken in the Introduction. It is almost impossible by any process of epitomizing to give an idea of the logical value of the Appendix. A hint culled here and there may induce intelligent readers to refer to the work itself, and may be useful as indicating where fuller

may be had. "The ordinary logical account of the even in its least objectionable form, cannot be consistent, except upon realist principles," except on the that genera and species are not mere conceptions of mind, but have an independent existence in nature:" tries to harmonize logic with science by making "genus express a relation of notions to notions, property of attributes to things." He supplies a concise the whole Aristotelian theory of definition. "We classes of definable objects—(1) *Attributes*, under which included all things belonging to any other category than substance. These exist only in substances as their subjects, existence is properly determined by demonstration." *Force*, which exists not in a subject, but *per se*. Of existence cannot be proved, but must be assumed before attributes can be demonstrated." "In the case of the cause is to be sought, not in the attribute, but in the substance, whereas in the case of substances which exist *per se*, the cause is to be sought in themselves only." "Aristotle and modern logicians do two very different things by definition. With the former an investigation of the *objective* cause of a phenomenon, with the latter an analysis of the *subjective* impression which that produces in the mind." Definition has nothing to do with inquiry into the *material truth* of attributes, (2) the *material* correctness of notions; still less does it (3) perform the functions of a dictionary or of an index to physical science, by furnishing logarithmic tables of things in general; or of genera and differentiae, to which we have only to refer to the given object to obtain full information concerning it." That "material consequence is rightly excluded from formal consequence alone is determinable by its promaintenance of the negative of the question, Is the *petitio principii*, or assumption of the conclusion against Mr. Mill, is ingenious and able—closing with his adversaries their choice of one or the other horn of the dilemma. If there are universal principles of truth not dependent on sensation, the existence of such principles is established by syllogistic inference. If there are not, whatever be the nature of our individual sensations, all inference from them by induction, example, analogy, or any method whatever, is, in respect

of objective certainty, worthless." His explanation of the enthymeme as "a syllogism from likelihoods or signs, whatever be the subject"—an argument of probability, a suggestion though not demonstrative, yet deserving attention in practical questions,—will be read with interest even by those who have read Sir William Hamilton, who is referred to by Mansel, and Facciolati and Dr. Quincey, who are not mentioned by him. He opposes the perversions of the Aristotelian induction by Aldrich and Archbishop Whately, oppugns the doctrine of J. S. Mill on that topic, as far as it is a logical process at all, and follows the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, to whom he acknowledges obligation. His remarks on Aristotle's hypothetical syllogisms are ingenious and learned, but rather of critical than of logical value; and his discussion of demonstrative syllogisms rather refers to Aristotle's correctness in mathematical reasoning than affords any matter of theoretical or practical value in logical science. The entire work is learnedly annotated, displays immense erudition, great keenness of discrimination, and acuteness in perceiving distinctions and differences. It is a storehouse of items of curious research and reference, and ought to be very profitable to the skilful student, who looks up the context and tests the precise worth of the specific quotation, when taken together with the whole doctrine taught by their writers.

In 1850 H. L. Mansel contributed to the *North British Review* a paper on "The Philosophy of Language," and in 1851 a critique on "Recent Extensions of Formal Logic." The greater portion of the matter of these two contributions was, in 1852, reissued, along with much cognate matter, in a substantive work, entitled "*Prolegomena Logica; an Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes.*" This work may be regarded as that by which its author made his mark on the age as a thinker of originality and power, capable of taking a grasp of a subject with a firm and steady hand, and holding it in the clear light of a luminous investigative inquisition. It is true that its main elements are reproduced from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," but they are newly set and adapted to a fresh purpose. When German philosophy was held aloof from by men in holy horror as the nursing-mother of infidelity, he reclaimed it as a bulwark to faith, and fitted it to conserve the doctrines of his church from the special danger which then confronted it; for the logical shield which he wrought with

his pains and earnest dexterity was really intended by him to the body of Church doctrine to which he was attached. The characterization of it may be given :—

intended as an inquiry into that which in the order of time is prior to logic, though in the order of time it is of later development, and in the order of study should be postponed after an acquaintance at least with the elements of logical inquiry into a subject which is indicated by every science in which mind and its operations are mentioned, and which is the touchstone by which the whole truth and scientific logic must ultimately be tested. An inquiry into the nature and laws of the thinking faculty, such as they are regarded by the logician as the basis of his deductions. It may be regarded as an attempt to prosecute, in relation to logic, the inquiry instituted by the prolegomena of Kant in relation to science, namely, What are the psychological conditions under which a specific system is possible? and what, in conformity to those conditions, are the characteristic features which such a system must possess? It is not intended as a complete treatise either on psychology alone or on logic alone, but as an exposition of psychology in relation to logic, containing such portions of the science as are absolutely necessary to the vindication and even to the understanding of the latter. . . . One of the objects of the present work is to show that logic, as a science, cannot be rightly understood and appreciated except in relation to psychology. The neglect of this relation has been acknowledged as the weak side of modern philosophy; its recognition has been imperatively demanded by the ablest modern writers on the subject. (We begin the paragraph.) "According to me," says M. Duval, "the object of logic is not merely the *direction* of the intellect, but also the *study* of the intelligence, the *direction* of the intellect, and a treatise on logic ought to comprise the description of the intellect, the theory of its laws, the exposition of the rules which it must recognise, either in its psychological state or in its relation to speech. The propriety of including these psychological matters in a *Treatise on Logic* may be questioned, but of the propriety of including them in a philosophical course, of which logic forms a portion, the whole history of the science bears witness. The alliance established of old between logic and metaphysics was dissolved by the critical philosophy of Kant, and was not restored except by identifying the two with Hegel. To reject this alternative a blank is made in philosophical science which can only be adequately supplied by a well-connected system of mental science, embracing as its constituent portions the nature and laws of logic, ethics, and psychology. To ethics, as to logic, psychology is an indispensable supplement. The science of man as he ought to be must be based on that of man as he is. . . . The psychological criticisms of the present work

are mainly limited to logical questions, and are designed to throw some light on matters which almost from the commencement of my logical studies have appeared to me to stand in especial need of elucidation. The main design of the present essay [is] that of testing the reviewed processes of logic by reference to the facts of consciousness." He treats logic, after Kant, as "the science of the laws of formal thinking." A science of the laws of thought is only valuable in so far as its laws are acknowledged to be those to which actual thinking ought, as far as possible, to conform, and which, if fully complied with, would represent only the better performance of existing obligations, not the imposition of new ones. "For this purpose it becomes necessary to ask what is the actual nature of thought as an operation, to what laws is it subject, and to what extent they are efficient?" "To psychology we must look for the explanation and justification of the peculiar features of logic." In order to determine accurately the province and capabilities of logic it will be necessary to examine the psychological distinction between thought, properly so called, and other phenomena of mind. "This being ascertained, there will remain the inquiry in what manner our consciousness itself, and the several objects submitted to it, may be regarded as subject to law; what are the different classes of laws, whether of the subject or of the object; the characteristic features of each; their mode of determining the several operations subject to them, and the consequent character of the respective products."

He next proceeds to show that consciousness refers to *individual* objects, represented by a concept to which imagination gives form; it is thus at the same time presentative and representative. A concept (1) cannot in itself be depicted to sense or imagination, and (2) it requires to be fixed in a representative sign. "Language, taking the word in its widest sense, is thus indispensable, not merely to the communication but to the formation of thought." "Thought is only operative within the field of possible experience." "The concept is the result of data furnished by intuition, and its legitimacy as an object of thought must be tested by the same data." Science depends upon presentation, but is formed through representation.

"Apprehension, judgment, and reasoning are rightly and necessarily regarded as distinct classes of mental operations, relatively to logic, inasmuch as their several products, the concept, the judgment, and the syllogism, exhibit distinct logical forms, and require a distinct logical treatment."

"It is more correct to describe apprehension as the analysis of judgments than judgments as the synthesis of apprehensions."

"A representative collection of attributes combined by means of a sign is a *concept*, if it represents a possible object of intuition. A *judgment* is a combination of two concepts, relative to one or more common objects of possible intuition. A *syllogism* is a combination of two judgments, necessitating a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual relation."

ence of laws of thought is a fact of which our every-day assures us." "Necessity is the result of law, and an agent whose working is regulated thereby." There of necessity—of the *ego* and of the *non-ego*,—"of laws I feel myself compelled to think, and of laws under other agents invariably working." "I am immediately law only as I am conscious of the obligation upon it as regards unconscious agents *law* means no more than a constantly observed fact in its highest generalization. Of mathematical and metaphysical necessity, he considers logical necessity as dependent on one negative and two sufficient reasons, and on three positive laws: (1) contradiction; (2) excluded middle. The matter of thought, the negative and positive in thought, receive the relation of logic to the other sciences concludes to which, however, a series of important appendices

was made in this work that by one party "laws have been degraded to generalizations from experience; another, empirical laws have been invested with the authority of original principles of mind," so touched a controversy which had been waged between J. S. Whewell, regarding necessary truths and their place in the sciences, that it awoke the leonine combativeness of Trinity, who had succeeded Dean Mansel, the Prolegomenist, and he at once issued a defendatory "The Author of the Prolegomena Logica;" and to this added in "The Limits of Demonstrative Science, consistent with Rev. W. Whewell, D.D.," and a large amount of discussion arose, leading to the investigation of the philosophy of logic with renewed activity and earnestness. The result, was a very valuable result, for no thinker is so great as he who sets in motion the minds of others. In this sense this was highly beneficial, too, for the stir of controversy is attractive to the student mind. Mansel was not worse off because he had achieved the notice of Whewell, Morgan and Boole, Whately and Kidd, and had set to gauge, weigh, and estimate his merits.

Rev. H. L. Mansel married a daughter of James of Clapham, Surrey; and in the same year he was elected the Readership in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Exeter College, named after and instituted in memory of Waynflete, Bishop of Winchester, Lord High

Chancellor of England, and founder of that college. This office, tenable for five years only, in accordance with the report of the Universities' Commission, was subsequently, in 1859, transformed into "the Waynflete Professorship of Morals and Metaphysics, and H. L. Mansel, now Bachelor of Divinity, was confirmed in it. As Professor he taught in his lectures the philosophy of the conditioned—of which more shall be heard in the after-tale; and the theory of a moral sense in a modified form. That there is a special moral faculty appears, he affirms, (1) by the fact that in all languages the *right* is distinguished from the *agreeable*; (2) by the testimony of the consciousness—we have conscience as well as understanding; (3) by the mutual inconsistencies of those who discredit the moral sense. The standard of morality is the *nature* rather than even the *will* of God. Moral judgments are necessary, though all virtue is not reducible to a single attribute or capable of expression in a single *formula*.

He inaugurated this course by a luminous lecture on "The Philosophy of Kant," worthy of a much wider circulation than University Inaugurals usually receive. The Kantian Philosophy was not accepted by him as entirely satisfactory, but he was greatly influenced in his own speculations by that illustrious thinker, whom he had closely studied.

It is not a little singular that the same mind which had made its first literary start by the issue of a volume of poems, but subsequently attained the chief place among the philosophers of Oxford, should also have been known in his college as a notable wit, and the issuer of some of the most poignant of those epigrams applicable to local and temporary circumstances for which our seats of learning have always been famous. It is difficult without the revival of the ill-nature of the contests of times which should be forgotten to resuscitate any of these, and this we shall avoid. It is, however, singular that though a keen Conservative by birth, training, and inclination; a strong partisan even, but an utterer of sharp sayings, he was personally popular with every party, and was acknowledged to be deserving of almost all the promotion he attained.

To volume xiv. of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, issued in 1857, he contributed the paper on *Metaphysics*—which was subsequently republished in 1860, with a few verbal alterations, as a separate work bearing the title "Metaphysics; or, the Philosophy of Consciousness, phenomenal and real." Considering the comprehensive view of

science taken by the author, and the limitations not
 ce, but those arising from the nature of the publication
 is treatise forms a part, the composition is remarkable
 its lucidity, brevity, and pertinence. It is divided into
 s,—Psychology, or the philosophy of the phenomena of
 ss; and Ontology, or the philosophy of the realities of
 ss. Consciousness is an intellectual state, and may be (1)
 intuitive, or presentative; and (2) mediate, reflective, or
 ve. Presentative consciousness is the immediate re-
 y the mind of the sensations which affect it, and repre-
 nsconsciousness, or thought, exercises a threefold function
 ect: (1) it forms a mental image of the objects of presen-
 by a comparison of many of these images it aggregates
 otions; and (3) it attaches some suggestive sign (gene-
 l) by which it may be recalled or recognised.

ative and representative consciousness, in their natural
 s distinguished must be considered as indicating a logi-
 an a real division; as pointing out the elements of a
 of consciousness which are separable in thought, but not
 acts existing separately in practice. In every complete
 ousness offered to us for analysis, the presentative and
 ve elements are combined, and without such a combina-
 appear as if consciousness, properly so called, could
 tence. . . . Neither of these two elements alone can
 a complete act of consciousness. . . . Human
 s, in the only form in which it can be examined and
 s a compound of various elements, of whose separate
 ever existed, we retain no remembrance, and therefore
 reproducing in thought. . . . Our personal conscious-
 e air we breathe, comes to us as a compound; and we
 e be conscious of the actual presence of its several
 an we can inhale an atmosphere of pure azote. Hence
 hat in distinguishing and describing the several phe-
 consciousness we must describe them according to their
 characteristics as compounds, not according to their
 ures as simples."

and time are known to us as formal conditions of
 s; whether they are anything more than such con-
 question which, at present, we have no means of
 The laws of consciousness must be primarily mani-
 nding upon the conscious mind. As such they neces-
 any every manifestation of consciousness, and in their
 tive validity they could do no more."

ness may be viewed in relation to its (1) *matter*—the
 supplied to it from without; (2) *form*, or relation of
 time which are invariable elements in every act of

consciousness, of which no effort of thought can get rid, and which cannot be conceived of as absent in any operation of the thinking faculty. These, as they are logically and chronologically prior to experience are the innate elements of those ideas which experience calls into actual consciousness.

"The matter of intuitive consciousness is (I.) sensation, or external intuition of the phenomena connected with our material organization as (1) animated, (2) material, and therefore (3) extended; and (II.) internal intuition, or reflection, by which we become cognizant of the several successive states of our own minds. Reflection is thus an original and independent source of ideas, not distinct from but identical with the acts that are its objects." These are (1) emotions or passions; (2) moral judgments; (3) volitions. These are defined as (1) those states of mind which consist in the consciousness of being affected agreeably or disagreeably; (2) the combined decision of the conscience—as intuition, and of understanding—as perception, and (3) the consciousness of a power of choosing between two alternative determinations, the next treats of personality, a relation between a permanent and a changeable element, a conscious *self*, affected in various manners. In his subsequent course he discusses the form and matter of thought. "The office of thought consists in arranging the confused materials presented to it in such a manner as to constitute an *object*. This is done by *limitation* and *difference*." "These two conditions of all thought, expressed in the most general terms, are the well-known logical laws of identity and contradiction, *A is A*, and *A is not A*; that is to say, every object to be conceived as such, must be conceived as having a character of its own, and as distinct from all others." "Not *A* implies the exclusion of *A* only, and of nothing else, and thus denotes the universe of all conceivable objects with but one exception—excluded middle; *every possible object is either A or not A*. These three principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, constitute the laws of thought as thought, and are the foundations of pure or formal logic"—"the *à priori* elements of reflective consciousness, derived from the constitution of the understanding itself, and manifested in relation to all its products." Thought passes through the three processes—conception, judgment, and reasoning. A few observations on the association of ideas and on necessary truths form a transition from psychology to ontology. "The philosophy which attempts to deduce a science of realities from the most abstract and general conception of existence must, from the necessity of the case, deal with words and not with things." "Deductive ontology, by assuming being as its starting-point, necessarily abandons thought to juggle with words."

"A metaphysic of being, even if successful, would answer none of the important questions which connect metaphysical inquiries with the interests and destinies of man; it would satisfy none of the

which compel men to undertake the study of them." Psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology the facts of consciousness, to take refuge in abstraction we are not and cannot be conscious." He thereafter the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Herbert, &c., and ontological systems of modern Germany. One or "pervades them all—that of identifying reality absolute or unconditioned." "The philosophy of the admits of a two fold refutation, in the consequences leads and in the premises from which it starts." "Philosophences with doubt, and doubt is a state of consciousness negatively testifies to the existence of the unsuggestion from the conditioned. It cannot, however, distinguish that which is from that which *seems*; for range of our personal existence we have no conception. We are environed by and subject to the laws and reason; and knowing these we are free to give heed to reasons of faith.

tion achieved by this contribution and the promise it held out of a valid defence of religion against rationalism him to the heads of houses, to whom by will the usually of a champion of the faith has been entrusted, as lecturer, and Mansel was accordingly appointed to eight Divinity Sermon-Lectures in confirmation and of the Christian faith, for which the Canon of had left his bequest.

in a great measure, that the theological struggle of its more important phases, must be waged round the limits of knowledge and the theory of human ignorance it is therefore well that we should have, in this concluding ablest statement possible of the argumentation against the dogmatism of evangelicism on the one hand, usually strong affirmations of rationalism on the other. We think that a full and triumphant vindication of the Christendom can be achieved by the creation of any fortress defender may entrench himself, and refuse to step beyond; utility of religion ought to be apparent on any field and attack. To affirm opponents shall only be encountered that we may proclaim as the limits of human thought, is to assign the field to those who affirm a differing philosophy,

and a creed that is modified accordingly. It is too much like palpitating, and scarcely can be called philosophizing. Accepted as a statement of a school it is valuable; regarded as an apologetic for Christianity it seems weak. But let us hear, at least in outline, what this theory of nescience is, and what it professes to determine with regard to religious thought.

LECTURE I. commences by affirming that "dogmatism and rationalism are the two extremes between which religious philosophy perpetually oscillates." "Scripture is to the theological dogmatist what experience is to the philosophical." Rationalism is "that system whose final test of truth is placed in the direct assent of the human consciousness, whether in the form of (1) logical deduction, or (2) moral judgment, or (3) religious intuition." They may be regarded as "severally representing, the one the spirit which adds to the word of God, and the other that which diminishes from it." "The two systems may be considered as both aiming, though in different ways, at the same end; that end being to produce a coincidence between what we believe and what we think." "And both alike have prejudged or neglected the previous inquiry. Are there not definite and discernible limits to the province of reason itself, whether it be exercised for advocacy or for criticism?" "The provinces of reason and faith, the limits of knowledge and of our ignorance, must both be clearly determined; otherwise we may find ourselves dogmatically protesting against dogmatism, and reasoning to prove the worthlessness of reason." "The primary and proper object of criticism is not religion, natural or revealed, but the human mind in its relation to religion." "An examination of the limits of religious thought is an indispensable preliminary to all religious philosophy; and the limits of religious thought are but a special manifestation of thought in general." If it can be shown that the limits of religious and philosophical thought are the same, that corresponding difficulties occur in both, and from the nature of the case must occur, the chief foundation of religious rationalism is cut away from under it."

LECTURE II.—"A philosophy of religion may be attempted either as a philosophy of the *object* or of the *subject* of religion. From the former it follows that as far as philosophy extends, revelation becomes superfluous; the latter shows us that reason itself, rightly interpreted, teaches the existence of truths above reason." "In the one we start from the divine, and reason down to the human; in the other we start from the human, and reason up to the divine." Three terms must be taken into account in every system of metaphysical theology,—(1) *first cause*—that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none; (2) the *absolute*—that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being; (3) the *infinite*—that which is free from all possible limitation. Do these not imply contradiction to each other when viewed in conjunction as attributes of one and the

A cause cannot, as such, be absolute; the absolute, which, be a cause; and how can the infinite become what was not at first? That which becomes a cause beyond its former limit. The absolute cannot be conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; as simple; by difference or absence of difference with the universe or distinguished from it. Rationalism is self-destructive. Suppose that the existence of the absolute is securely established on the testimony of reason, yet we proceed in reconciling this idea with that of a cause—how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the finite. Pantheism and Atheism are thus the alternatives offered to us, according as we prefer to save the infinity of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the infinity of the infinite. If the attempt to grasp the absolute as the divine object of religious thought thus fails us, we have no resource but to recommence our inquiry by the process, that of investigating the nature of the human mind may thus prepare the way for a recognition of the provinces of reason and faith.

II.—“The very conception of consciousness, in what it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between object and another.” Man cannot, therefore, be conceived as infinite: to speak of a conception of the infinite is a contradiction in terms. A second characteristic of consciousness is that it is only possible in the form of a *relation*; what a thing may be to consciousness no mode of consciousness can tell us. The absolute, such, is independent of all relation. “The conception of the absolute thus implies at the same time the presence and absence of the relation by which thought is constituted.” All consciousness, as being a change in our mental state, is subject to the law of time in its two manifestations of extension and duration; hence “an act of *creation* in the sense of the term, that is to say, an absolutely first link in a series of phenomena, preceded by no temporal antecedent, is thought inconceivable.” Subordinate to the general law that knowledge of body is governed by the condition of knowledge of mind by that of personality,—both of which are limitation and relation. “What is reality and what is appearance, is the riddle which philosophy has put forth from the very beginning of human thought; and the only approach to an answer has been a voice from the depths of the personal consciousness,—‘I am, therefore I am.’” The philosophy of the absolute, the most distinguished advocates, maintained as originating beyond consciousness. It attempts to prove that consciousness is a delusion; and consciousness itself is made the basis of proof. They thus assume at the same moment the truth and falsehood of the normal consciousness; they divide the mind against itself. “We thus learn that the provinces

of reason and faith are not co-extensive; that it is a duty enjoined by reason itself to believe in that which we are unable to comprehend." "The philosophical difficulties which rationalists profess to discover in Christian doctrines are, in fact, inherent in the laws of human thought, and must accompany every attempt at religious or irreligious speculation."

LECTURE IV.—"That the finite cannot comprehend the infinite is a truth more frequently admitted in theory than applied in practice." Reasoning must not be condemned for failing to accomplish what no possible mode of human consciousness ever does or can accomplish." "Religious thought, if it is to exist at all, can only exist as representative of some fact of religious intuition—of some individual state of mind in which is presented, as an immediate fact, that relation of man to God, of which man by reflection may become distinctly and definitely conscious." Two such states may be specified as the rude materials out of which reflection builds up the edifice of religious consciousness. "These are the feeling of dependence and the conviction of moral obligation." From these two sources issue "*prayer*, by which men seek to win God's blessing upon the future; and *expiation*, by which they strive to atone for the offences of the past." "Neither in the feeling of dependence nor in that of obligation can we be directly conscious of the absolute or the infinite as such, yet there runs through the whole of our consciousness 'the accompanying conviction that the infinite does exist and must exist.'" "We know that, unless we admit the existence of the infinite, the existence of the finite is inexplicable and contradictory." "In this impotence of reason we are compelled to take refuge in faith, and to believe that an infinite Being exists, though we know not how, and that He is the same Being who is made known in consciousness as our Sustainer and our Lawgiver." "In both we are compelled to regard ourselves as persons related to a person." "Guided by this, the only true philosophy of religion, man is content to *practise* where he is unable to *speculate*."

LECTURE V.—"In religion, in morals, in our daily business, in the care of our lives, in the exercise of our senses, the rules which guide our practice cannot be reduced to principles which satisfy our reason." "The primary fact of consciousness which is accepted as regulating our practice is in itself inexplicable, but not inconceivable. There is *mystery*, but there is not yet *contradiction*." "Contradiction does not begin till we direct our thoughts, not to the fact itself, but to that which it suggests as beyond itself." "The highest principles of thought and action to which we can attain are *regulative*, not *speculative*; they do not serve to satisfy the reason, but to guide the conduct; they do not tell us what things are in themselves, but how we must conduct ourselves in relation to them." "The perceiving *subject* alone and the perceived *object* alone are two unmeaning elements, which first acquire a significance in and by the act of their conjunction." But we must be aware of "mistaking the inability to affirm for the ability to deny."

not knowledge is man's destiny and duty in this life ;
 est principles, both in philosophy and in religion, have
 his end." "Let Philosophy say what she will, the fact
 taken. It is the consciousness of the deep wants of
 nature that first awakens God's presence in the soul ; it
 g His revelation to those wants that God graciously
 to satisfy them."

II.—"The conclusion to be drawn from our previous
 hat the doctrines of revealed religion, like all other
 man thought, have a relation to the constitution of the
 om they are addressed." "They are composed of two
 ents,—a *matter* furnished from without, and a *form*
 within by the laws of the mind itself." "Objection
 a against either of these elements, but those made
 orm are in reality directed, not against revelation in
 ut against all religion, and indeed against all philo-
 there is error or imperfection in the essential form
 ught, it must adhere to the thought criticising no less
 thought criticised." Hence we "must abstain from
 judgment on the nature of the message until we have
 ed the credentials of the messenger." On examina-
 appear (1) "that there is no rational difficulty in
 eology which has not its corresponding difficulty in
 ophy ;" and (2) "that the stumblingblocks which the
 offesses to find in the doctrines of revealed religion arise,
 ets peculiar to revelation, but from the laws and limits
 ught in general, and are thus inherent in the method
 a itself, not in the objects which it pretends to criti-
 principle of causality "is to the philosopher what the
 existence of God is to the theologian." "Without
 re can be no philosophy, as without God there can be
 Yet philosophy has never been able to determine
 on is—to analyze the elements which the causal nexus
 eason gains nothing by repudiating Revelation, for the
 Revelation is the mystery of Reason also." "Let
 n where it will, it must begin with that which is above
 Religion, to be a relation between God and man, must
 ief in the Infinite, and also a belief in the finite ; for
 e first, there is no God ; and if we deny the second,
 an." The limits of human reason in relation to those
 Holy Scripture which reveal to us the nature of God
 y to those representations which more directly declare
 to the world. The course of Divine Providence is given
 vofold aspect of general law and special interposition.
 phy proclaims irrational. Here "the rationalist mis-
 ral difficulty of all human thought for a special difficulty
 belief." "Experience is of two kinds and philosophy
 ds—that of the world of matter and that of the world
 ecession and action." "In passing from the material to

the moral world we pass at once from the phenomenal to the real; from the successive to the continuous; from the many to the one; from an endless chain of mutual dependence to an originating and self-determining source of power. That mysterious yet unquestionable presence of *will*: that agent, unimpelled yet not uninfluenced, whose continuous existence and productive energy are summed up in the word, *myself*; and all the struggles in and with it are facts of experience—facts which philosophy is bound to take into account; “facts which can deceive us, only if our whole consciousness is a liar, and the boasted voice of reason itself but an echo of the universal lie.” “Subordinate to the conception of special providence is that of miraculous agency. Law may signify that series of successions and repetitions which, in the progress of science, has come to the knowledge of man and imparts the general idea of the periodical recurrence of phenomena; or it may mean a determination made in and known only to the mind of God. When we speak of a miracle being impossible because contrary to law do we mean the former or the latter? If we mean the latter we assume that which no experience warrants us in assuming; if the former our inference is irrelevant. “Reason does not deceive us if we will only read her witness aright; and reason herself gives us warning when we are in danger of reading it wrong.”

LECTURE VII.—All human knowledge is relative. We cannot emancipate ourselves from the conditions of human thought. The systems of necessary truth—in the highest human sense of the term—numbers conditioned by time, magnitudes by space, and morals by personality—all rest on similar bases, and are confined within the same limits; all being equally necessary and valid within the bounds of human intelligence, and all equally negative and self-contradictory when we attempt to pass beyond these limits.” “The moral sense is like the intuitions of time and space, an *a priori* law of the human mind, not determined by experience as it is, but determining beforehand what experience ought to be.” “But it is not thereby elevated above the conditions of human intelligence.” “God did not create absolute morality; it is co-eternal with Himself.” “But God did create the human manifestation of morality when He created the moral constitution of man and placed him in those circumstances by which the eternal principles of right and wrong are modified in relation to this present life.” “The endless controversy concerning *predestination* and *freewill*, whether viewed in its speculative or in its moral aspect, is but another example of the hardihood of human ignorance.” “It is no disparagement of the value and authority of the moral reason, in its regulative capacity, within its proper sphere of human action, if we refuse to exalt it to the measure and standard of the absolute and infinite goodness of God.”

LECTURE VIII.—To construct a complete criticism of any revelation, it is necessary that the critic should be in possession of a perfect philosophy of the Infinite. “If that cannot be had, but is utterly

under the existing laws of human thought, it follows by means of philosophical criticism that the claims of revelation can be adequately tested." "The legitimate rational criticism of revealed religion is not to be contents of that religion but in its evidences." "If any of the human mind is competent to convey a direct of the absolute and the infinite, no one faculty is en- pre-eminence over the rest, as furnishing especially of the truth or falsehood of a supposed revelation." "Evidence for or against the religion is not to be found in these [inquiries] taken singly and exclusively, but in all of all, fairly examined and compared together; the conflicting evidences being balanced against each other, recently concurring evidences estimated by their united There can be no such thing as a positive science of theology; for such a science cannot necessarily be apprehension of the infinite; and the infinite, though called to believe in its existence, cannot be positively in any mode of the human consciousness." "If there think that the laws of thought themselves may change ing knowledge of man; that the limitations of sub- et, and duration and succession, of space and time, vulgar only, and not to the philosopher"—any who ought can be transcended,—“these, and these alone, correct revelation by the aid of philosophy; for e the conditions under which philosophy can attain knowledge of the infinite God.”

a curious fact that although the philosophical theory which, on the distinction between presentative and re- thought, a fresh start in the philosophy of science and attempted, is not referred to in this work, to which strong contrast as well as sympathy. An almost lar fact is that “The Philosophy of the Infinite,” by which extorted praise even from Sir William Hamilton, tirely ignored. The latter was issued in 1851, the 4, and both must have been known to Mansel. It is veracity of our consciousness should be maintained, the doctrine of the limitation of the human faculties ed too far. It is not certain that man knows all that or is it possible to know what man is unable to achieve, is endeavoured and been defeated. It is a piece of fence to assert that nescience itself bears witness to maniscience; but except for apologetic ends it seems to us to affirm that God is incapable of presentative the soul, for it may be inconveniently asked, ho-

then is trustworthy revelation of Him possible? What criterion does ignorance supply for the acceptance and recognition of the true God? Is not revelation of Himself a bringing of Himself into relatedness to man? and when he is revealed, does He not cease to be irrelative? Revelation itself is an issuing from the absolute and the infinite as a cause of conceptive origination in man. It is scarcely wise in a theologian to declare a faith in God to be unattainable by the reason, lest it lead men to believe such a faith to be unreasonable. Does not the very pressure on the *ego* of the *non-ego* give an infinitude of presentative power? Does not the very *affluence* of Deity supply the *effluence* by which consciousness is affected? The infinite does not require to enter into consciousness so as to be literally *comprehended* by it, but requires only to make impression on it so that it may be known, recognised, inquired after. The mighty spaces of the sky are comprehended in the intellect through the eye; why should not the infinite be known to and felt by consciousness? Is there not, too, so large a stress put upon the infinite in extent as to shut out the ideas of the infinite of power, wisdom, goodness, and beauty, which impinge on and affect man's thoughts? To proclaim God unknowable, is, we fear, to necessitate such a choice between faith and reason as no moral *eirenicon* can reunite. Limits to human knowledge there are, but all thought in its highest reaches has sought for God, and God himself has given revelation of His nature and will in answer to this creature longing to know its creator. We cannot shut in consciousness only to the investigation of experience without shutting out from consciousness those very experiences which men most desire to feel and to know about. By the philosophy of the conditioned thus pressed home we interfere with the very conditions of true knowledge—exploratory research. We believe that Mansel's psychological bias deprived him of the great metaphysical aid which might have been gained from considerations arising not only from preconscious and subconscious states, but still more from the almost undeveloped philosophy of consciousness and sympathetic thought. This appears to us the form in which the God-idea affects the soul, and brings the unit of finity into relationship with the unit of infinity. Intellectually and religiously alike does God reveal Himself "as *reconciling* the world unto Himself."

The book excited a storm of controversy, and newspapers, period-

reviews, pamphlets, &c., for years afterwards dealt in and dwelt on discussions on the limits of religious thought. The late F. D. Maurice published severe "Strictures upon the Bampton Lectures of Mr. Mansel" thought him neither a just nor a generous critic, and he therefore issued "An Examination of the Rev. Maurice's Strictures" separately. With other opponents he issued in the successive prefaces of the several editions of the work were rapidly called for. The preface to the fourth edition is an excellent specimen of clever controversial fence, and exhibits the keenness of the advocate as well as the skill of a logician, and the sharpness of the epigrammatist. It is exceedingly valuable as a specimen of carefully arranged, thoroughly condensed, and ably laid out argumentation.

William Hamilton had made long, laborious, and copious preparations for supplying a complete annotated critical edition of the works of Thomas Reid, D.D., with a general preface, and supplementary dissertations. Hamilton's mind was much more critical and determinative. He enjoyed the delight of contrasting authorities and contesting opinions. Hence his sheets, much to the annoyance of his publishers, went during the year 1837-8 slowly through the press, and a large expense had been undertaken with the hope of recoupment as note accumulated on note, and dissertation rose out of dissertation. The publisher remonstrated, Hamilton bought up his interest, and went on with his labours till 1839 till he was arrested by a paralytic seizure in 1844. The editions produced during 1841 and 1842 were then stereotyped, and there seemed no immediate prospect of continuing the original work; then, the work was issued in its incomplete state—ending, in the middle of a sentence, at page 914—in November, 1849. In 1849 it was reissued still unfinished, and on Sir William's death, 6th May, 1856, only a few fragments of the matter intended to complete this volume were found in a state proper for publication. Such as they were, however, it was felt that no scholar of Hamilton's possessed at once the reverence, the learning, and the cognate thought or like-mindedness which could fitly piecing together of the fragments which were left to H. L. Mansel, LL.D. These were accordingly placed in the hands of the Waynflete professor to dovetail into a mosaic which should give the work a somewhat greater appearance of completeness than it had. The task has been accomplished with the utmost painstaking and judiciousness; the learned research and care-

ful toil of reference and of collation which the supplementary matter shows to have been employed by the editor is not only marked by wonderful skill, but is, indeed, quite a feat of discipline and humility performed by a masterly mind and a loving heart. The intimate acquaintance with the books and authors quoted, and the speculations referred to, prove Mansel's possession of that rare gift of reading which enables the mind not only to assimilate what is taught, but to discriminate what is worthy of acceptance from what deserves or demands rejection. After a critical perusal and an adjudicative examination of these *disjecta membra* of notes, references, marginal jottings, leaflets of suggestions or of outlines, Mansel succeeded in giving some sort of shape to the diverse materials, and prepared for printing in 1863 the supplementary portion of that *torso* of speculative metaphysic which Hamilton had outlined to occupy the pedestal of the monument he was raising to the founder of the common sense philosophy.

In 1859-60 the Waynflete professor in conjunction with John Veitch (now LL.D.), the accomplished Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow, edited the Lectures on Logic and Metaphysics delivered by Sir W. Hamilton. This was a duty very congenial to both of the editors—the English author being the recognised disciple of the speculative thinker who had developed the conditions of the thinkable into a Philosophy; and the other being a beloved and valued student of the great master,—both being widely read and skilful in thought as well as eager to do honour to the Scottish Aristotle. On the publication of these Lectures, feeling regret that a treatise on Ontology from the pen of Sir William Hamilton, embodying the final results of the philosophy of the conditioned, had not been produced, he proposed to himself the task of in some measure supplying this deficiency in speculative science. This he accomplished by the issue in 1866 of "The Philosophy of the Conditioned," in which he skilfully constructs a form of philosophic metaphysics such as appeared to him to follow from the principles of his master. The work is undoubtedly able and important, but it consists rather of a reiteration of the same views than of any new development of them, and an analysis of it here would serve little good purpose.

In the meanwhile, on the appointment of Dr. Francis Jeune, Master of Pembroke, to the Bishopric of Peterborough, Dr. Mansel was appointed Honorary Canon of Peterborough Cathedral, and one of the Bishop's examining chaplains. On Dr. Stanley's appointment

ery of Westminster, Dr. Mansel was appointed his Professor of Ecclesiastical History, to which a canonry church, Oxford, was attached. It was not, perhaps, a n, although Mansel might have deserved well of his luckily the flood tide of promotion soon drafted him somewhat unsuitable sphere; although as a sort of not the supposition that it was so, he published two lectures on history. On the demise of Dean Milman, elevated by Mr. Disraeli to the Deanery of St. appointment to which the public voice assented as fit and Dean Mansel had long acted as delegate of the press had been one of the select preachers before the and had always taken a very active part in the politics of y, on the Conservative side. On behalf of that section he wrote and published a clever satirical *jeu d'esprit* Oxford Reformers, entitled *Phrontisterion* in allusion prophetic reference to the *thinking-shop* of Socrates. He er of the Hebdomadal Council for the government of the of Oxford, for the preservation of its privileges and d for the credit, improvement, and proper conducting, ness concerning it. In many matters brought under e acted most pertinaciously against the feeling of the n the cases among others of the Oxford Essayists, ice, the case for Professor Jowett, to name only a few; though he did so, he maintained his power and popularity iversity, the admiration and even personal friendship of political and ecclesiastical opponents. While staunch , and enthusiastic in the advancement of that party by e means, wit, quirk, formal opposition, or direct battle, rageously honest in pressing the merits and deserts of men upon the attention of the public and the State. was singularly free from self-conceit; his mind, if not partisanship, was at least free from self-seeking enjoy-

He was an able and earnest scholastic labourer, and a us ecclesiastic and Christian. He was a learned and reflective thinker, though he was rather formed for o than masterhood. He had not the daring of mind ht the high joy of new thought. He feared originality, ant of philosophic faith weakened his spirit. He died n Sabbath evening, 30th July, 1871, after little more a century of life.

Religion.

IS CHRISTIANITY OPPOSED TO HUMAN PROGRESS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

Not only false but mistaken beliefs are opposed to human progress. It does not need to be affirmed that Christianity is false to affirm the question before us. It is an undoubted fact that human progress depends on a knowledge of the nature, powers, processes, and laws of the universe in which man is now placed; and on a proper acquaintance with his own personal and social power. But it has so happened that instead of fully and fairly and freely searching into the nature of the universe around him, man has misspent his existence in discussions of and investigations into the abstruse doctrines of theoretical Christianity—considerations of metaphysically constructed creeds and tortuous researches among scholastic subtleties and matters of faith. In these ways centuries of time were absolutely wasted upon word-wars and hair-splittings about heresies. Men were set in antagonism to each other, societies were torn asunder, strifes were engendered, wars were even engaged in, because men could not be brought to speak, think, define, and collate their Christian faith in the same fashion. All the while that the energies of man were thus engrossed the knowledge of nature was neglected, and man became more and more ignorant concerning the world and his purpose in it. It became a common form of expressing Christianity to call it unworldly, to separate one's self from the interests, the cares, and the conditions of worldly life, and to seek to live superior to the bodily frame and earthly structure which God has given to us. Hermits separated themselves from human kind, convents arose, monasteries multiplied, and even the Church was constructed upon the principle that God had made a great error in creating man male and female. Hence there arose a disturbance in the relations of the sexes, a rebellion against the first principles of a happy human life, which is only to be found in accordance with the laws of our nature, and in harmony with the ordinations of creation

in which His will is clearly set forth. In this vain conflict with the very intent and purpose of God, misery was endured and communicated; and from this fruitless zeal to honour God and to imitate Christ a very large proportion of the woes of the early ages of Christian times is to be ascribed, but above all this persistent determination to set faith above nature; and human nature restricted man's efforts and interfered with human progress.

Again, there arose from this Christianity that sad separation between Church and State, that divorce of the spiritual from the temporal life, which is even now working such woe in our midst by making a merely formal profession of Christianity seem to be enough; and by causing men to trust in the mere organizations for the promotion or maintenance of Christianity as of more importance than the living of a genuine life in the spirit of the gospel.

Because Christ had declared that His kingdom was not of this world, and it was thought that He meant to set up a kingdom upon the earth, Christian communities arrogated to themselves the place and the rights of a kingdom, would have governors over them, and creeds, and laws, and modes of fellowship; nay, would have it that as the Church was the kingdom of Christ, so all the kings of the earth held power merely by the grace of His vicar on the earth. To how much interruption of the peace and brotherhood of nations that gave rise, history gives a very sad witnessing in the struggles of the Papacy for power, supremacy, and oppressive sovereignty. Every misused, misdirected, or neglected energy was a decided subtraction from the full power which should have been employed for human progress.

Christ himself has said that whosoever is not with us is against us. It is not enough to get rid of the idea of opposition to human progress to show, as S. S. does, that Christianity was preached, and when preached, progressed. He sketches the progress of Christianity and calls it the progress of humanity. But Christianity was given as an aid to human development, and really by its internecine strifes did more injury than the severest persecutions—nay, the severest persecutions were those to which Christian exposed Christian; as it is even at this day that the hates of sects are more deadly than man's hate of sin. We have agreed, for instance, in the unanimity of sectarian animosity to keep the children of the nations in ignorance until the very policy of nations, and the demands of human progress, thrust aside our

Bible squabbles, and give the command that knowledge should be free.

S. S. mistakes remarks on the nature and theory of Christianity for statements of fact; but we are concerned with facts, and these facts show that men have been withheld from the investigation of nature, from attending to political rights and claims, from seeking as well to know their own power as the Christianity thus proclaimed.

This is no merely fanciful inference. At least, from the day of Socrates, we know that every step in physical research and discovery has been made—as it even now is—in the face of accusations of heresy, infidelity and opposition to Scripture. Every new invention or development of human speculation has been decried and opposed, and thus Christianity has been fatally inimical to the growth of the civilization of man. Have the efforts of inquirers and ingenious men led them to the mysteries of the universe and the philosophy of human nature? But for this opposition from Christianity human progress would have been more rapid and more peaceful. B. W. A. rightly enough affirms that they need not be thus opposed, that each might aid the other. We presume that this is the very value which is to be attached to this debate. If the mistakes made by Christianity in the past, in retarding the progress of man, are shown to have been useless and futile, men may learn henceforth to look on the progress of discovery and invention with a friendly, not a jealous eye, and forsaking the errors of the past, repent of them, and be no more opposed to, but even further and forward human progress.

D. S. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

CHRISTIANITY is the religion proclaimed by Christ, and if there be anything called Christianity which is opposed to that which was taught by Christ, it is not, whatever it may be called, really Christianity. The crafty workman may artificially produce things which resemble diamonds; they may pass muster as such, and those who possess them may call them diamonds; but if, when put to the test, it is found that they will not cut glass, shall we then by reason of this fact assert that diamonds will not cut glass? No; real diamonds will do it; it is only these artificial productions, which merely resemble the precious gem, that will not. It would not be true or honest to say that the real diamond will not cut glass just because

it will not. In like manner there is an artificially produced religion which often greatly resembles Christianity, but is not more real Christianity than a glass bead is a diamond. Men conclude that what is true of the counterfeit must necessarily be true of real Christianity? No; an assumption would be neither true nor honest, and it would be a very fallacious conclusion to affirm that whatever is not counterfeit cannot be true of that which is genuine.

Arguments upon the affirmative of this question seem to us to be weak by not giving due weight to such considerations as are in the introductory portions of his article, T. O. J. argues that if that which is called Christianity really were true Christianity, it would appear to forget that there is a false as well as a true Christianity—a profession which has assumed its name without regard to its reality. Christianity is that which embodies the teaching of Christ; and that which does not harmonize with the life and teaching of Christ is not Christianity, whatever it may be called. Gnosticism was not Platonism, neither is this assumed Christianity without the reality true Christianity, although in its outward appearance it may be a very good imitation of it.

T. O. J. submits two theses as the foundation for his argument upon the affirmative of this question, the first of which is that Christianity has been opposed to the progress of humanity by the introduction of the inveterate hates of sectarianism into the Christian Church.

We beg to submit, as a counter-thesis, the assertion that Christianity is not responsible for the introduction of sectarianism. If Christianity had been simply accepted by its true teaching and rejected by all the rest of mankind, there would have been very little if any sectarianism. But since the day when Jesus himself preached Christianity there has always been a class of persons who from various motives wished to profess Christianity, whilst they have been unwilling to accept it as it was preached by Jesus and in the inspired writings of the apostles. These persons, unwilling either to accept or to reject Christianity, from time to time modified, or accepted modifications, of Christianity to suit the bent of their own minds. This has often been done in blind sincerity, but it nevertheless is responsible for the introduction of sectarianism. There were many in apostolic times who were Judaizing proclivities who professed to embrace Christianity, what they embraced was merely a Judaized imitation

of Christianity. Then heathen influences corrupted Christianity, and that was accepted as true Christianity which was but the mongrel offspring of Christianity and paganism. In modern times many influences which pure Christianity is opposed to have arisen and sought an alliance with Christianity, welding the opposing elements into one system by modifying Christianity so as to bring it into harmony with their own principles. It is not Christianity itself, but the modifying influences of various un-Christian tendencies, that have introduced "the inveterate hates of sectarianism into social life," and from these influences there have arisen numberless mongrel systems which have no more right to be called Christianity than the mulatto has to be called a European, or the mestizo to be called a Spaniard. T. O. J. says that all the evils of persecution are due to Christianity, but this we deny. Christianity is diametrically opposed to the spirit of persecution, and the latter has arisen out of statecraft, worldly policy, arrogance, bigotry, and superstition. Christianity teaches its disciples to "Bless them which persecute you," and to "Recompense to no man evil for evil" (Rom. xii. 14, 17); and Christianity has never been the originating cause of persecution. T. O. J. speaks of clerics setting Church and State in opposition to each other, but this must not be laid to the charge of Christianity, for Christianity teaches its disciples to "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's" (Matt. xxii. 21); and again it says, "Render therefore to all their dues" (Rom. xiii. 7). Titus also was directed to teach the people "to obey magistrates" (Titus iii. 1). It would not be just to take the conduct of clerics as an unerring guide to the tendency of Christianity, for there is as much difference between clerics and Christianity as there is between lawyers and the law.

T. O. J.'s second thesis is that "Christianity, as an embodied set of interests, has exerted a great influence for evil by leading men to withdraw their thoughts from the cause of true progress to expend their efforts on the promotion of sectional and sectarian interests;" but here we must repeat that sectarianism is not identical with Christianity, neither is Christianity responsible for the introduction of sectarianism. We might also remark that great is the number of those whose minds have been roused into useful activity by the influence of Christianity, whose intellectual powers would have remained dormant had they not been brought under its rousing influence.

first argument is that Christianity is opposed to peace because of the religious wars which it has led to. To maintain that Christianity does not lead to war; it is false. The whole tenour of its teaching is opposed to peace. The whole tenour of its teaching is opposed to peace. Many discordant elements have been mixed up with Christianity in the various religious systems of the modern world, and it is to them, not to the Christianity of the Bible, that the religious wars are due. Many who are called Christians have been engaged in war, and there have been true Christians in the battle-field, but it has not been their Christianity that has led them to engage in military pursuits, whatever may have been the purpose for which the war may have been declared. Do not think that our opponents in this debate have greatly confused *post hoc* with *propter hoc*.

My reply to T. O. J.'s article will serve as a reply to his second argument; and with regard to C. W. P.'s third argument, I would in the first place remark that Christianity does not rest on creeds rather than on deeds, for Christianity teaches us to "show thee my faith by my works" (James ii. 18); and that "Faith without works is dead" (James ii. 20). As to the contrast between the Sabbath-day profession and the day life of many who are professed followers of Christianity, this lamentable inconsistency is not chargeable to their Christianity. If immorality were not found in the lives of any but the disciples of Christianity, then we might expect that their evil deeds were the result of their Christianity, but no one will venture to affirm that such is the case. Their own personal conduct continually violates those principles of the preservation of health which they enjoin upon their followers; that is not the fault of the science of medicine. They often break the laws they are appointed to carry out, and evade the statutes they are supposed to defend, but Christianity is not responsible for these things. Neither are the disciples of Christianity chargeable to Christianity with the conduct on one occasion in converse with a friend pointed out as a bad example of the conduct of a professing Christian, and said, "See how religion leads to." His friend justly replied, "No, it is not religion, but rather the want of it, which leads to such conduct." Christianity will constrain those who are under the influence of it to lead a better life than they would do if

they were not under its influence." Real Christianity is a pure religion; it declares that "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world" (James i. 27), and it teaches "us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world" (Titus ii. 12); and we are sure that, whatever may be the life of those who are found "Having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof" (2 Tim. iii. 5), yet all who are really and truly under the influence of the power of such teaching as this will most assuredly lead a better life than if they were not under its influence. Thomas Jefferson remarks in most emphatic and unhesitating language, "I have always said, and always will say, that the studious perusal of the sacred volume will make better citizens, better fathers, and better husbands." If this be true, and we believe it is, then Christianity which is the essence of the "sacred volume," must be favourable to the well-being of the human race.

If memory does not deceive us, some heathen prince once addressed a question to the sovereign of this country, asking her to inform him what was the secret of England's greatness, in reply to which Her Majesty sent a Bible to the prince, telling him that that book was the secret of England's greatness. That was a noble and truthful answer. The Bible is the secret of England's greatness, and we must maintain that Christianity, which is the essence of the Bible, is favourable to human progress. Look at the nations of the earth which profess Christianity, and we hesitate not to affirm that you will find that the firmer the hold which Christianity has upon that nation, the purer the form of Christianity which there prevails and the more wide-spread its influence amongst the people, the greater will be that nation's progress.

A scripture-reader, in replying to the objections of a sceptical shoemaker, asked the following question, "Suppose all men were Christians according to the account given to us in the Gospels concerning Christ, what would be the state of society?" The sceptic's answer was, "Well, if all men were really Christians, in practice as well as in theory, of course we should be a happy brotherhood indeed."

This was an important admission, coming from the lips of a hostile witness, as to the influence of true Christianity upon society. If there were no principle opposed to Christianity at work in the

Christianity prevailed in a form unmixed with dis-
 sents, the human race would make very rapid progress
 exalted position mentally, morally, and socially, than
 in even the most highly exalted races of mankind.
 an opposite view of the civilized world. Let Chris-
 tianity be banished from the face of the earth, and substitute for it
 pleasure, whether superstition, scepticism, socialism,
 or rationalism, and who can doubt but that the
 Christianity would speedily lead to the degradation
 of the world. Our opponents have not ventured to affirm
 that the world would have made better progress if Christianity had
 been introduced into it, neither have they ventured to affirm
 that the world would now progress better if Christianity were banished.
 Our opponents have not brought forward sufficient evi-
 dence to believe that Christianity is opposed to human
 progress. We think that the arguments adduced in support of
 it in this debate justify us in still maintaining that
 it is not opposed to human progress. SAMUEL.

IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH?

TEMPORAL.—V.

Christ's reign, whether temporal or not, is to be a spiritual
 one, or which cannot admit of a doubt to those who accept
 the inspired word of God. The only point really in
 dispute is to apprehend, as to whether His reign will be a tem-
 poral or not. To this I say emphatically, yes. That is to say,
 His reign on the earth in person as both a temporal and
 spiritual. As evidence of this I purpose considering the pro-
 phets,—an aspect of the question which is seldom
 considered by writers on this subject, and this notwithstanding the
 promises form the very basis of other Scripture
 concerning Christ's reign on earth. They are to be found
 in passages in Genesis, of which it will be sufficient to
 quote two. In Gen. xiii. 15 we read that God said to Abra-
 ham, "All the land which thou seest, to thee I give it, and to thy seed for ever;" and in Gen. xvii. 8,
 "I will give thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land

wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God." Here is a distinct promise of this land to Abraham and his seed. It is generally said that the promise has been fulfilled in the possession of the land by Abraham and his descendants, the Jews. But is this so? In the first place, Abraham himself never possessed it, although he lived in it, for we find that he purchased a piece of that very land to bury his wife in (Gen. xxiii.), a very unnecessary proceeding if it were his own. We also read in Acts vii. 7, "And [God] gave him [Abraham] *none inheritance in it*, no, not so much as to set his foot on; yet He promised that He would give it to him for a possession, and to his seed after him;" and in Heb. xiii. 13, "These all [including Abraham] died in faith, *not having received the promises*, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were *strangers and pilgrims on the earth.*" (See also ver. 39 and 40.) These passages clearly show that the promise of the land of Canaan as regards Abraham personally has not been fulfilled.

Secondly, as to the *seed* to whom it was promised. It is generally supposed that this refers simply to the Jews. The fallacy of this idea, however, is evident from Gal. iii. 16: "Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, And to thy seeds, as of many; but as of one And to thy seed, which is Christ." Thus Paul says that the seed to whom the promises were made was Christ. It might, however, be said that the promises made to Christ had reference merely to the blessings to be brought upon all nations, and to the fact that these blessings were to be brought through Christ, and not to the possession of the land of Canaan. Let us see. It will be observed that in Gal. iii. 16 the apostle is quoting from a passage in which the words "And to thy seed" occur. Now the only passage in which these words occur in connection with the promises to Abraham are the two already quoted. One of them—Gen. xvii. 8—evidently refers to Abraham's multitudinous seed, the Jews. Therefore the only passage in which Paul could be referring, and which he probably had in mind when open before him when writing, is Gen. xiii. 15: "*All the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever.*" Reading this in the light of Paul's comment on it in Gal. iii. 16, we may read it thus,—"*All the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to Christ for ever.*" Thus it is beyond question that the la

of Canaan has been promised to Christ for a possession; and He has certainly never possessed it. What, then, can be more certain than that He is to possess it at a future time, seeing that God has said, "My word shall not pass away!"

The possession of the land by the Jews under the Mosaic law was not a fulfilment of these promises to Abraham, inasmuch as their tenancy of it depended upon and was a reward for their obedience to that law; they were only tenants at will; whereas the promise to Abraham was an absolute promise, and not conditional on a compliance with certain commands. The distinction between the inheritance of the land under the law, and the future inheritance of it according to the promises, is thus referred to:—"For if the inheritance be of the law, it is no more of promise; but God gave it to Abraham by promise" (Gal. iii. 18). The law was simply provisional, being "added because of transgressions, till the seed [Christ] should come, of whom the promise was made" (ver. 19), and was not therefore intended to bring about the fulfilment of the promise, the accomplishment of that being deferred till after the abolition of the law. This matter is also expounded in Rom. iv. : "For the promise that he should be the *heir of the world* was not to Abraham, or to his seed, through the law, but through the righteousness of faith. For if they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, and the promise made of none effect." Can anything more be wanting to shew that these promises concerning the possession of Canaan by Abraham and Christ were not fulfilled in the possession of it by Abraham or any of his descendants? They must, therefore, be fulfilled in the future, when Christ returns from heaven and raises Abraham (and others) from the dead, that they with him may inherit that land, the capital of which is now desolate and trodden under foot of the Gentiles, but only to be in this condition for a time (Luke xxi. 24), which is now drawing to a close.

But Christ and Abraham are not to be the sole occupants of this land; for Jeremiah predicted that the children of Israel should be brought from "*all the lands*" whither they have been driven; and he speaks of it like E. S. M., pp. (30—36), in contrast to the bringing them from Egypt: therefore as the latter was literal, so must the former be. Therefore it is impossible to spiritualize this in the way so much in vogue now-a-days, by saying that it refers to the Church, or to anything else that can be fancied by the lively imagination of a "theorist in straits."

See also on the same head Jer. xxiii. 3—8, wherein it is stated that they shall have a King who "shall execute judgment and justice in the earth," and who shall be called "The Lord our righteousness," a title applicable to none but Jesus, the Christ of God. See also Jer. xxxi. 27—34; xxxii. 37—40; xxxiii. 14—16; Ezek. xxxvii., and many other passages, which refer to a time when the Jews will be gathered to their own land, and instead of being divided into two nations, having two kings, will be one nation, with one king (Ezek. xxxvii. 21, 22). In this ruling Jesus Christ will not be alone, for Paul says in Gal. iii. 29, "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." This agrees with Rom. viii. 17, "If children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ;" and with 2 Tim. ii. 12, "If we suffer we shall also reign with Him;" and with Rev. v. 10, "And we shall reign on the earth."

The rule of Christ and the saints is not, however, to be confined to Palestine, for in Psa. ii. 8 we read, "Ask of Me, and I shall give Thee the heathen for Thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for Thy possession;" and in Zech. xiv. 9, "And the Lord shall be King over all the earth: in that day shall there be one Lord, and His name one." See also Dan. ii. 44; vii. 14, 18, 22, 27, where the kingdom is stated to be under (not above) *the whole heaven*. Therefore Christ and the saints are to reign over all nations of the earth. In the light of these statements we can understand the glorious predictions of the Hebrew prophets concerning a time when the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the result of the nations being governed by immortal, infallible, and omnipotent rulers, who will also act as teachers to lead men into the way of righteousness. There is no necessity, or even any reason, for so spiritualizing the writings of the prophets as to explain them away into an airy nothingness, thus making the word of God of none effect.

I regret that want of space prevents me enlarging at as great length as I should wish on this most interesting and thrilling subject, which runs like a golden thread through the whole Bible, from Genesis to Revelation. To such of the readers of the *British Controversialist*, however, as may wish to pursue the matter further I think I cannot do better than refer them to a book which treats of the promises to Abraham, as well as of the general question of the reign of Christ on the earth, in a most exhaustive manner, viz.

ectures on the Religious Errors of the Times, and the
 ery to be believed for Salvation," by R. Roberts, pub-
 Author at the Athenæum Rooms, Temple Row, Bir-
 (2s. 6d.), and to be had of Nichols & Son, 11, Long
 n, W.C. A. ANDREW.

CRITICISM.—Books, viewed broadly, are divisible into three
 osophical, under which head we include didactic, ethical,
 be allowed the word, preceptorial; historical; and poetical.
 se the critical and generalising faculty may be applied, but in
 ll be applied in a different way. When a book enunciates a
 contains precepts and ordinances, the systematising intellect
 ably does, eliminate the propositions of the philosophy or the
 the laws, point out their accordance or inconsistency, and
 et from them a system or conclude that they are incapable of
 into a system. When the book is historical, the problem to
 cal intellect addresses itself is to discover the amount of truth
 act which it contains. A philosophical critic of Plato or Aris-
 the fundamental ideas they promulgated, exhibits the con-
 en these, and shows how they ramify into minor peculiarities.
 done perfectly—when the generalizing and logical intellect has
 work—criticism has finished its task, and the largest possible
 which can be made by one mind, or number of minds, to the
 another mind, has been offered. An historical critic of
 demonstrates the veracity of the historian, and draws up, in
 the information he conveys. More subtle and more diffi-
 rk which the critical and systematising intellect has to per-
 ction with poetry, but even here it has a real and important
 at function is unquestionably dependent for its right per-
 n more than logic. He was a dunce who asked what "Paradise
 l, and the emendation upon Milton's magnificently vague and
 pression, "not light, but darkness visible," suggested by
 ely, "not light, but rather a transpicuous gloom," demon-
 and for ever, that the great scholar did not possess the higher
 y. Sympathy of widest range, sensibility of the most delicate
 motional richness and fervour of nature, are required by the
 Few, however, who have read such pieces of criticism as that
 on "Hamlet" will deny that the systematizing intellect, that
 leading ideas into their connections and consequences, and
 all up into unity of plan and principle, can play an important
 tening the effect of poetry, and in bringing its meaning per-
 to the reader. What is worth remarking, besides, all the
 as we possess, the "Iliad" and "Odyssey," the "Æneid," the
 medy," Shakspeare's dramas, "Paradise Lost," "Faust," the
 " and "In Memoriam," are all great intellectually as well as
 y and emotionally, and may therefore be indebted to the logical
 tizing intellect for the exhibition of the essential part of their
 A system of the intellectual purport—the philosophy, theology
 —of Dante's poem, would, if thoroughly well executed, be one
 valuable works we could possess. In short, there is no species
 on to which the critical, logical, systematizing intellect cannot
 even the lyrics of Burns shine with a more gem-like and golden
 burnished by the critical finger of Carlyle.

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE—II.

TILL we had read the article by E. C. M. we had no intention of taking part in the present debate. Even now it is not our purpose to enter at length into the argument in favour of the disestablishment of the Church. A few reasons we will offer for the consideration of our readers, and will then notice the arguments of the writer on the negative side.

It is on a *political* point of view that we have to regard the present question. Therefore we are not called upon to discuss its religious aspect. *Politically*, the establishment of the Church is unfair and unjust to other denominations. The establishment of the Church gives its clergy an unfair supremacy over the ministers of other denominations. Its bishops have a seat in the House of Lords, thus forming a part of the Legislature, to which we consider they have no greater moral right than the ministers of other denominations. In a variety of ways the establishment of the Church gives its ministers an undue influence, while through various channels a great part of the community has to pay for the upholding of an establishment of which they disapprove. At present the Sovereign is pledged to defend the Church as established by law, of which that personage is the supreme Head: whereas we see no just reason why it should not be possible for the Sovereign of these realms to be a member of any *Protestant* denomination. For these reasons the Church ought to be disestablished.

E. C. M. writes, "Christianity is not a thing separate and apart from human life; it is an integral portion of it." If this statement be correct, it follows that human beings are naturally Christians, and that true Christianity is not a supernatural principle which is communicated to them after they are born naturally by a second and spiritual birth. Not to argue this point, we ask, If the statement of E. C. M. be correct, how is it that a large portion of mankind are not even nominally Christian, but, on the contrary, are

etans, Brahmins, Buddhist, or worshippers of fetishes? Christianity an integral portion of the life of the people? and not, what becomes of E. C. M.'s statement?

M. further writes, "The State is not something different from the Church; it is the Church as a moral and religious confederacy or brotherhood, acting for the good and progress of the people." And again, "They are the same and indivisible." What assertions are these! "The State is not something different from the Church." We have always thought that these two were distinct. And if they be not, where is the propriety or point of the well-known motto that has been so long emblazoned on the flag of a political party—"Church and State"? Why Church and State, if "the State is not something different from the Church"? The State we take to be the commonwealth—the civil power, in distinction from the *ecclesiastical*. The Church we take to be a body of persons professing Christianity. Now all members of the State do not make such a profession; for some, as Quakers and others, expressly disclaim such profession. How then can the State be viewed as a part of the Church? Surely such members of the State are something different from the Church. E. C. M. says that the State "is the Church as a moral and religious confederacy or brotherhood." Yet many members of the State are not religious nor moral? How then can they be portions of the Church and religious confederacy?

M. himself, by implication, admits the fallacy of his first statement when he says, "*Almost every member of the State is a member of the Church in its highest and truest sense.*" If almost every member of the State is a member of the Church. But what proportion of the whole number of the members of the State is the Church? Here expressed by the word *almost* to be supposed to come? The word *almost* is a word of various shades of signification. However, E. C. M., by implication, admits that not every member of the State is a member of the Church, though he tells us that the State is not something different from the Church, but that it and the Church are the same and indivisible. Our opponent makes a concession when he says "the State is *all but* coincident with the whole body of the Christian people of the country." But the State, far from being actually coincident with, is *all but* coincident in that it is to be considered? When E. C. M. tells us that the State is not coincident with the Church, he implies that it is not quite

coincident therewith; therefore there must be some shade of difference, however fine, between them; yet he tells us that "the State is not something different from the Church," and that "they are the same and indivisible." E. C. M. remarks again, "The Church and the State are not really separate agencies, but only co-operative ones." But if they are not separate agencies, they ought to be. The work of the State is secular; the work of the Church is religious and spiritual. Now if it would be interfering with the work of the State for the Church to make laws for the government of the community, is it not interfering with the work of the Church for the State to exact obedience to the civil power in such matters as the appointment of bishops and incumbents, this subjection to the State being the penalty paid by the Church for the State's patronage?

E. C. M. writes, "'The powers that be are ordained of God,' in so far as they are the chosen representatives of the people, who claim to be moved by the Spirit of God in what they do and approve of." Does E. C. M. mean that the people or that their representatives claim to be moved by the Spirit of God? But whether he means the people or their representatives, the idea is quite novel to us. We were not aware that either the people or their representatives made any pretension to being moved by the Spirit of God in matters of the State.

In the event of the Church being disestablished, we are content that she should retain all gifts and endowments that have been bestowed upon her by individuals. We desire no injustice to be done her, but simply that she be put on the same footing as other denominations, no more favour being shown by the State to one than to another, and that this may be the case the Church ought to be disestablished.

S. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

VOLUNTARIISM has a fine sound. Free Church, Independency, &c., slip trippingly from the tongue; but are they not too often sounds signifying—nothing in particular? I shall not accuse any by saying,—

"License they mean when they cry Liberty;

for that would be, I apprehend, something very nearly approaching

er. But I do believe that men are very much misled by names and words. If people could just be got to look at the things that are meant by words how often would they turn away from the high-sounding platitudes to which they give so much

value. Words are so sweet as *charity*—not mere alms, but loving, Christian help! I speak rather of alms-deeds than of what Milton meant when he said,—

“Add

Deeds to thy knowledge answerable; add faith,

Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love

By name to come called Charity—the soul of all the rest.”

Nothing could be or should be more voluntary than charity. It is the highest Christian grace, and a distinguished moral virtue. It is the test which Jesus applies to His disciples, and yet Voluntaryism has failed in charity; and after the trial of centuries it was necessary to establish charity by law. So little can voluntaryism be relied on for consistent Christian activity. Here is the need of a plain and definite Christian duty left to voluntaryism handed down as a privilege as well as a responsibility. The early Church, neglected and altogether become a reproach to the nation from its almost total failure to fulfil the sacred duty of caring for the poor and aiding the wretched. In this voluntaryism failed, and it required to fall back upon establishments to care for the needy succour and for the miserable relief. This is the result of the callousness with which what is everybody's business is nobody's business when things are left to the free-will of the people. This referred to visible bodily want, to what excites the compassion of the merely sensitive heart and eye, and yet in this voluntaryism failed. How much more likely would voluntaryism fail to take to heart the spiritual destitution of the poor which may not be seen. Ought not such a fact to make us consider how far it is wise to attempt to leave to Voluntaryism the extension and the maintenance of Divine Service, and the encouragement and promotion of that righteousness which exalteth man to his place at the risk of impulse, avarice, heedlessness, or extravagance, the supplies of spiritual advice, comfort, warning, and succour among the poor, the solitary and the ignorant, the degraded and the degraded? For centuries, in England, Voluntaryism had its own sweet will in the carrying on of education;

and we know that, animated though congregations were with sectarian zeal, they made an egregious failure in attempting, to supply education to the poor. Voluntaryism having failed we have now resorted to Establishment.

We allowed the care of health and the attention to sanitation to depend on self-interest and voluntary effort; and though there were such powerful persuasives to anxiety for the preservation of individual and general health; such inducements to save ourselves by helping to save others—one or two hospitals, a few straggling dispensaries, a futile attempt now and again, under impulse of fear, to establish infirmaries, comprise almost all that voluntary effort has done in this direction. Here is an instance of a felt want and a general experience having failed so to excite men's minds as to induce them to give of their substance for the Christ-like purpose of healing diseases and preserving the lives of those who were dying through misfortune or neglect. If Voluntaryism failed to be touched to charity in regard to the visible and statistical health of the poor in their bodies, is it more likely to succeed in the things that concern the soul? We have been compelled to resort to Establishment in principle for hospitals, infirmaries, dispensaries, &c., for sanitation in general in fact, and can we believe that while the blessing of Establishment over Voluntaryism in all those things is being felt, acknowledged, and practised, that this is a time to decry establishment and to advocate disendowment in regard to spiritual things.

Monarchy was formerly supported by gifts, benevolences, &c.; it has fallen into a Civil List Establishment. The army and navy were formerly recruited, manned, and provided for very much on the voluntary system, but it has now become an Establishment.

Take, too, an illustration from all our great movements and charitable institutions. They all strive after endowment and establishment. The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, the Religious Tract Society, the Sunday School Union, &c. have a capital fund, i.e., an endowment and *pro tanto* an establishment. The United Kingdom Alliance asks an endowment of £100,000; and other philanthropic agencies follow in the same way, each showing the faith felt in establishment and endowment, the distrust of mere occasional and emotional voluntarism.

But even Dissenting congregations themselves apply a different law to their own case than they would apply to the Church. In-

churches endowments get a fund, a balance which may really as an endowment. Free Church Assemblies, Congregational Unions, Methodist Conferences, &c., try to get up funds, general purposes funds, and so on, which are, only forms of the principle of establishment and maintenance.

Then, as there seems to be, a general failure in all things voluntary principle; while all public movements seem to be turning towards establishment, it appears to me that we are going wrong course in endeavouring to destroy the Church we are in our midst. I think that if we look carefully to all the signs of the age they are towards doing much more by the power of the State than by voluntary agency; and if this is the tendency of things we ought not to disestablish and disestablishment reform and amend the Church as by law established.

C. H.

THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

My reply has been extended to an unusual length, but at last I have as well as a pleasure to us to notice and reply to such points as may have been adduced on the other side.

The position contained in the question seems to have aroused the indignation of its opponents, who are the advocates of a do-nothing laissez faire system, and who, accordingly, consume a considerable time in proving nothing, for I venture to say that they do not present a sound argument in support of their views.

Their leader, acts upon the principle expressed in the words, "You have a bad case abuse the counsel on the other side;" and accordingly he fulminates against the proposals of the Land Reform Association, and especially against the "Explanation" of the president, Mr. Mill, of whom, after a very interesting paragraph, he says, "When we see a master of the English of clear English purposely choosing to shroud his (the italics are mine) "in forms of negation not usual in speakers, but among rhetoricians, and giving his direct meaning the outward form of a subdued or scarcely articulated

affirmative, we have every reason to *doubt the honesty* of the cause which needs such a veil thrown over the expression of its foundation principles." I do not stop to criticise the composition of this exquisite sentence, but content myself with asking D. A. to point out what impure motive he supposes Mr. Mill or the Association can have in supporting the principles advocated in his "Explanatory Statement."

The foam of D. A.'s anger will beat in vain against the facts and solid reasoning of Mr. Mill on the subject, his advocacy of which is no novelty, as D. A. may see by referring to his "Political Economy," people's edition, pp. 141 *et seq.*, where he will also find many of his objections abundantly answered.

D. A.'s whole object seems to be to attack Mr. Mill's "Explanatory Statement," forgetting, apparently, that the real subject of dispute is the land tenure, and not Mr. Mill. If the latter gentleman had never written his explanatory statement, my position in this controversy would still have been the same.

But let us see what are the arguments adduced by D. A. and his followers against the proposition that the land laws do require a radical change.

D. A. assumes that a radical alteration in the land laws means a total repeal of all laws relating to property. He seems to forget that one of the first principles of the law of real property is that the property in all the land of the nation is vested, either mediately or immediately, in the Crown as the head of the State, and that therefore it would be no innovation for the State to legislate as to the quantity of land to be held by one person, and the consequent prevention of that accumulation of vast tracts of land in individual hands which withdraws such land from the wealth of the State, and impoverishes the people. D. A. is again wrong in assuming that "property is the most complete right which the law of a country gives to a person to or in any object or matter." If he will take the trouble to consult any book on the subject, he will find that mere property does not in any instance constitute a complete right, but that several other elements must combine before that complete right of which D. A. talks can be acquired. D. A. has evidently confused property in land with property in moveables, and hence the vague language which he uses.

To expose all the mistakes of which D. A. is guilty, and the illogical consequences which he seeks to draw from unsound pr

would be grateful to me, but would, I fear, entrench too much on the space which can be allotted to me.

Mr. A. gives a garbled quotation from Mr. Mill's "Explanatory Statement." I will give the whole of that portion from which he has extracted that part, with which he quarrels. "Of all our institutions, none are more unsuited than the land laws of the present state of society of which the Reform Act of 1867 is the result. Originating in an age when the landholders were the ruling class of the country, it is no wonder that they should require to be altered now, when the country belongs, at least in principle, to the people, and of its inhabitants. Our laws relating to land are the result of a system which, as history tells us, was designed to *prop up a ruling class*. They were made for the purpose of keeping the land in the largest possible possessions in the families which own it, and *by means of it governed the country*." Now, notwithstanding Mr. A.'s complaints, I ask, is not this statement palpably true? Is it not true that even up to the time of the Reform Act of 1832, members of Parliament were dependent for their seats, in a great measure, upon landholders, who thereby controlled the country? And is it not true that as the emancipation of the people has advanced, the oppression of the land laws has from time to time been more severely felt, and partially, though in an irregular and unworthy manner, grudgingly removed? D. A. says that the land laws have ever been inviolate and sacred, and should remain so. He does not seem to be at all aware that Charles II. effected a vast change in those laws by abolishing the various kinds of oppressive tenures, the abolition of which has been the subject of much complaint, but which every one now acknowledges to have been wise and salutary, although the use he made of the Reform Act for the purpose it answered, were unjust. The propositions of the Land Tenure Reform Association are no more open to censure than the proposals of Charles II. were then.

It is not true, then, that our land laws are the remains of a system designed to prop up a ruling class, and that as they stand, they operate in the same direction, from which a representative government can never be fully established, unless the laws are radically altered?

Over the rest of the platitudes contained in D. A.'s article, I will only remark that, if any one will read carefully the explanatory statement, which is the object of his attack, he will find that D. A.'s

deductions are not sound, and that consequently the observations which he founds on those deductions are unsound also.

The laws relating to land have hitherto been made by one class of the nation only—the landholders ; it is now time that the whole nation should legislate on the subject, for the national good, and not for the exclusive benefit of one class.

B. G. C. thinks that the first affirmative article ought to have replied to the arguments of the first negative article, putting altogether out of sight the fact that both affirmative and negative have a reply in which to answer the objections of their opponents, and of this fact I have now availed myself so far as D. A. (the writer of the first negative article) is concerned.

B. G. C. is mistaken in supposing that I disavow the advocacy of Mr. J. S. Mill on this or any other question on which I agree with him, because as Mr. Mill has the courage to think out a question, and to follow the results of his thought, a better leader could not be found, and on this particular question I especially adopt his efficient advocacy.

I have, in anticipation, dealt with the objection made by B. G. C. to my first proposition, viz., that the land of the nation belongs to the nation, which, as I understand it, means this:—The whole of the land, primarily at least, did, and in principle does now, belong to the whole of the people, who possess the right to have it dealt with for the benefit of the whole of the people, and not for one class only. A nation never “fluctuates,” as B. G. C. supposes, but always consists of the people, the nation being composed of the people and not of the land on which they live. It is hoped that this explanation may satisfy B. G. C.’s technicalities. Let me assure him that it is because (to use his own words) “the land has had the capital, energy, industry, and thought of thousands used upon it to make it useful, profitable, and productive,” these benefits must not be monopolized by one class of persons, who have not contributed towards those results, but live in idleness upon the work and brains of others.

B. G. C. will not tempt me into a retort, or beyond the rules of a fair controversy, by accusing me of communistic principles. “Hard words break no bones.” But let me ask, does not B. G. C.’s statement that the land was possessed, and has since been held by force, contradict his whole contention, and go to prove that a revision of laws enacted by force must be and is inevitable

ver, one of the complaints of those who object to the laws, that land is like nothing else in this country, that "put to usury," "made a profit of," or "compelled to give," as is supposed by B. G. C., who appears to have a kind of Arcadia, and never to have been brought in touch with those facts which prove the injustice and perversion of the present system.

Land can be, proportionably, as readily taken possession of, as wages, &c., as readily defined, and can be as readily sold as the cheese which B. G. C.'s hypothetical grocer is talking of; but B. G. C. must allow me to say that cheeses, pineapples, &c., are not the only articles of commerce. It is not at all to talk about buying and selling land with as much ease as a penny roll which itinerant bakers bring to your doors. The argument is simply ridiculous, and would go far to show that a man indulged in such absurdities does not possess even a modicum of common sense.

Mr. B. G. C. avowedly, from the issue as to waste lands, and is not the subject of any tenure. On this point he consults some book on the laws of real property before he enters into a discussion on the operation of laws, of the kind which he is manifestly not aware.

Mr. B. G. C. But what says his successor, L. M.? A Socialism is again his principal defence of the land issue, a charge of this kind seems to be the chief refuge of a valid contention on the subject. He commiserates his opponents "a lot of landless resolute," and is in that strain for a page or so. Is this argument? He presents himself as the advocate and supporter of an aristocracy of monopolists. He attempts to sneer down those who have made their wealth by industry, thought, and work. He should be allowed to make his statements, for his friend B. G. C., writing on the same subject, says that the aristocracy of land gained their land by purchase; and if this be true, as no doubt it is, L. M. is not himself the advocate of force opposed to industry and commerce. Indeed, L. M. avows as his whole reason for opposing land laws as they now are, that they are "well fitted to maintain in the country of a powerful [the italics are in the original] ramified, historic aristocracy, who have the accumulated name of centuries to influence them in their public

conduct; and so to keep alive among men a high and noble emulation, and to inspire in every other class the full spirit of industry and enterprise—the strongest interest and the *closest imitation*. Let L. M. turn to the files of the Bankruptcy and other Court and horse-racing records, and he will find, beginning with dukes and marquises, how the scions of this “*powerful, widely ramified historic aristocracy*” comport themselves, and he may judge what kind of “high and noble emulation” the body from whence the specimens are taken is likely to inspire.

L. M. is a little more charitable than his predecessor. He will not charge me with being about to “inaugurate communism,” but only “commercialism.” He shrinks with horror from our propositions, because he thinks they would “unsettle society.” This absurd bugbear, “society,” seems to frighten him and all his colleagues. I will not evade this issue. Let it be granted for the moment that the consequence of the adoption of these propositions would be the unsettling of society. I say, “Be just and fear not. If justice requires that society should be unsettled, unsettled it must be. Let it be unsettled and resettled as gradually as possible; but by opposing gradual unsettling L. M., and those who think with him, only postpone the evil day, and thus necessitate a violent unsettling of society, although what meaning they attach to that word no one knows but themselves. Probably a correct definition of the present state of society would be “a combination and grouping together of all kinds of iniquity and deceit, with as plausible and virtuous an appearance as possible.” And one can easily form an opinion as to whether the unsettling of that kind of society would be an evil or not.

L. M. seeks to justify the present system of primogeniture by the Mosaic law. If its defenders have to go so far back for a defence, it is not difficult to see that its end is near. But is L. M. prepared to abide by the Mosaic law as to the first born? because, if so, he must force the first born to accept all the duties and obligations imposed upon him by that law. And if the Mosaic law be his test, is L. M. prepared to justify polygamy and concubinage upon the same ground?

L. M. seems also to live in a land of dreams, and to look upon “landlordism” and “landlords” as fulfilling all the requirements of a perfect man and a perfect system, and not as they exist in fact.

L. C. cannot refrain from dropping upon communism again, for

that everybody who advocates a change in the laws of property must be a communist, as far as property in land is concerned, and that if a communist in that respect, he must be a communist in goods and labour. L. C. seeks to dispose of the controversy in a somewhat summary, though to him a very satisfactory, manner. He says the tenure of property is not to be radically changed, for, "first, it is property; second, it is not expedient that the laws relating to property, which the experience of all ages and many countries shows to be necessary and just, should be radically altered."

Difficult to understand this sentence. The laws of property are not to be altered, because they relate to property. I will assume that L. C. means landed property, but what is the consequence? This, that inasmuch as the land laws which were in force some hundreds of years ago related to landed property, they are not to have been altered, and the feudal or some earlier system might have been retained, civilization, progress, and improvement being altogether absurd so far as landed property is concerned.

But what do "the experience of all ages and many countries" show? According to L. C., that our present system of property is all that is to be desired. It means this, or it means that. But let me ask L. C., can he point out any country which has a system of land tenure approaching our own? As he has not, he may safely presume that it was not within his power, and therefore no argument can be founded upon, or inference drawn from, the existence of which is entirely supposititious. But the fact that the experience of all ages teaches that changes in the laws relating to property should never be made. What does the experience of all ages have from time to time taught that alterations in the laws relating to property should be made, and changes have accordingly been effected. The experience of the present age teaches peremptorily that, unless a change be effected, the country will be pauperized, and the livelihood of the nation will have to resort to other lands to obtain its livelihood which, under the present system, they cannot obtain.

Come to the last opponent of my proposition, O. S., and find myself quite unable to return thanks for the numerous arguments he and they have heaped upon me. I am, according to O. S., a Communist, a maker of "aphoristic phrases," an oracle, a man of debate," &c.

I have already dealt with the major part of O. S.'s argument in replying to other writers, and he must therefore excuse me from repeating myself; but I will satisfy the curiosity of O. S., who is desirous of knowing who the political economist is to whom I refer in page 197 of the September number of this magazine. I beg to inform him that Mr. J. S. Mill was the political economist referred to, and that the passage which I quoted is to be found in a speech delivered by him some time since at the meeting of the Land Tenure Reform Association. The date is unfortunately clipped out of the copy I have, or I would give it.

O. S.'s great mainstay is a long quotation from the *Edinburgh Courant*, apart from which all that he has to say consists of a slander upon his fellow-countrymen, upon which I shall venture to comment presently.

O. S. thinks that the remarks of the *Edinburgh Courant* are beyond controversy; but, on examining them, I ask of what do they really consist? Certainly not of the hard "nuts" which O. S. anticipates I shall find it difficult to crack. It consists of a series of unsupported and unreasoned assertions, such as "land is the mere representative of wealth;" "there is no land in this country that has not been passed from hand to hand for so much naked cash." Inasmuch as I do not know what the Scotch land laws are, I cannot say whether or not this is correct so far as relates to Scotland, but as to England it is decidedly incorrect, as any one at all acquainted with our system must know.

The following portion of the article, the tendency of which O. S. seems to have overlooked, is, however, worthy of quotation:—"It may frankly be admitted that no member of the community is entitled to use his wealth or any other property he may be possessed of to the injury of the community, and that it is the duty of the community, by their representatives in Parliament, to prevent by legislation any oppression of the subjects of the realm on the part of any member of it." This is, in fact, what the Legislature would do by an alteration in the present system of land tenure.

O. S. says that his thesis is, "that to divide your neighbours' property among those who want a slice of it, the League will be thoroughly supported by all the expectant and exigent neighbours."

O. S.'s view of the matter therefore is, that the only motive the community and the Land Tenure Reform Association have for asking for a reform in the land laws is, that those who ask for it

nothing to which they are not entitled. This is his
his fellow-countrymen, and it shows that, besides a
the land laws, a reform in something else which I do not
requisite.

with a quotation from the speech of Mr. Mill, already
Speaking of the measures proposed by the Land Tenure
Association, he said, "There are persons to whom these
appear extremely audacious and subversive. I expect
those who come after us may think our proposals very
d timid; for it is easy to foresee that this country and
are entering upon an era in which they will have to
alties much more alarming, and which will kindle much
ions than these. To confine myself to the subject of
ea of an entire abolition of landed property is taking a
of an active and stirring portion of the working classes.
honest attempt to find a middle ground of compromise,
ding individual injustice and sparing past acquisitions,
in the right of the entire community to all that it has
ed with, and finally close the door to any further private
n of what should belong to the public. It does not
that this is too much for the landed interest to concede,
n this there is not the smallest chance that the working
long accept. Even those who take the most unfavour-
f the changes in our social arrangements, which are
with increasing energy in behalf of the working classes,
sely to consider that when claims are made which are
and partly beyond the bounds of justice, it is no less
honest to concede with a good-will all that is just, and
defensive stand on the line, if they are able to find it,
ates justice from injustice."

H. K.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

that we have, in opening this debate, though quite un-
on our part, made a great, if not a gross mistake, which
as not only to be sorry on account of, but to apologize
asten to make such *amende honorable* as the occasion
Our fault, sin, or crime, is that, in the character of opener
ussion on the negative side, we were so innocent or so
to choose, as the most probable exposition of the views

of those who were likely to advocate the affirmative, the official "Programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association;" and the advocacy of its claims and opinions by the reputedly great political economist, J. S. Mill. We foolishly, it appears, imagined that if we attacked the main propositions advanced and advocated by the association, and especially those decisive explanatory statements which had the authoritative name of Mr. Mill given as that of their champion, we could not be accused of setting up a man of straw nor of selecting a weakly accoutred opponent. We have been entirely wrong in our precipitancy; we have made quite a mistake. Mr. Mill is naught, and the programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association is naught—or perhaps naughtier,—but H. K. "is your only wear." We cry *peccavimus*. But we have, it is just to say in our own defence, sinned in ignorance. We were not aware of H. K.'s great superiority to J. S. Mill, or of his more authoritative mastery of the Land Question than the statement put forth from the pen of the greatest logician of the age, under the auspices of the Land Tenure Reform Association. Had we really known that greater than J. S. Mill was to be heard on the affirmative of the question, we should have been more modest, and would not have rushed in—as the saying is—where angels fear to tread, in opposition to H. K. In our anxiety to deal properly with the debate we honestly chose the best available statement of the affirmative opinions of argument, and we ought scarcely to be held morally accountable for being so intellectually foolish as not to wait for the appearance of, if not an elder, yet a better man. After this ample apology perhaps H. K. will spare our blushes, and permit us, without further humiliation, to forget his greatness in the importance of the question, and to devote the remainder of our attention to his argument rather than to himself, for ours is not intended to be a personal but an argumentative encounter; and we contend for truth, not egotism.

We, of course, personally have no right to be dissatisfied by the cavalier treatment of H. K.; that is only what we deserve. Whose toucheth pitch may be defiled, and H. K. therefore will "not now touch the article of D. A." He enters upon a controversy, but he will not controvert. He justly reserves for *himself* "the treat of overturning his (D. A.'s) illogical statements" in his reply—where D. A. will have no opportunity of opposing his reply to H. K.'s nicely planned little victory of chicane. So far as regards debate:

er, this putting of his opponent out of court practically beautiful example of pettifogging tactics and smart practice—what of the readers interested in the controversy? what truth or fallacy concerned in the discussion? D. A. issues statements," and H. K. could overturn them and trip them easily as a crack hand at skittle-playing; and he will reserve to himself; meanwhile the reader may be led astray by the statements," but what does that matter? Do you not think a "nice little game"? If I pooh-pooh my opponent's statements, though I cannot answer them, I give them the go-by, when I come to write my reply they will be practically exempt from controversial consideration, and a cheap victory will be mine! Well planned and wisely clever, H. K.; only what is the play to opponents, honesty to readers, and true search for truth in the meantime? These are considerations that ought to weigh—except for a special pleader.

A fundamental principle of the law of property is that each person should be recognised as having a right to the exclusive use, or enjoyment of all that has been fairly produced by his exertions, or acquired by fair agreement or by free gift, lawful inheritance, or other form of transfer consonant with justice as interpreted by law. This maxim of morals, law, and politics H. K. bravely avows. "The land of the nation belongs to the nation" is his first statement. Does it mean the land belonging to the nation belongs to the nation? If so, it is a truism, and an identical proposition has no more bearing on the controversy than the statement "A is A." Does it mean the land of which the nation consists belongs to the nation? If so, the word *nation* is used as equivocally in the second sentence as it was in the previous one, and is only fairly equivalent to the land of the nation is the land of the nation, or A is A. The slipping in of the sense of property under the innocent-looking form of possession or procession "of," in the former sense, or the dropping of the implication of possession from the word *belongs*, and slipping it into *exists*, as in the second, is equally untenable in the question at issue.

Does "belongs to the nation"? All the land of which the nation consists, the entire territory of the state. If so, what are the rights of gift, bequest, inheritance, sale, disposition, and conveyance? Are they mere legal deceptions, keeping the word of property to reserve property to the ear, and breaking it to the eye?

rience of mankind? By what a master-stroke of smartness H. K. hides Proudhon's axiom, "Property is theft," when he disguises this wolf of communistic socialism in the sheep's clothing of the guileless phrase—the land of the nation belongs to the nation! Exquisite fooling! either the proposition implies that, notwithstanding all laws, customs, usages, purchases, inheritances, gifts, exchanges, dispositions, conveyances, bequests, allocations whatsoever, now or heretofore made, agreed to, and entered into, "the land of the nation" is the property of the nation, and all who hold it are "thieves and robbers;" or it collapses into the safe but irrelevant saying—any unappropriated land, any otherwise ownerless land, is the property of the State. Of such land as the latter we are making no inquiry. We are asking, "Ought the tenure of land to be radically changed?"

Land is at present held and possessed, used and enjoyed as property, with the privilege of exclusive rights. Some people think, or at least say, that land should not be property; but should be held and used, possessed and enjoyed for the common good. They proclaim confiscation of all land to and by the State; a resumption of the land to the State and its uses; and H. K. supplies them with a phrase as mild as mother's milk as the canon of robbery by socialistic philosophy—"the land of the nation belongs to the nation," and may therefore be justly taken over into its own possession.

To this we demur, unless it be carried out to the full extent in all other cases. The life of the nation belongs to the nation; and therefore the nation has the right to impress sailors, soldiers, &c., or to make what use it chooses of the life of the nation! The labour of the nation belongs to the nation; and therefore wages are nothing to the purpose, the nation compulsorily demands that the labour of the nation shall be employed for the common good as it chooses in regard to time, circumstances, remuneration, or personal wishes, dispositions, or desires! The wealth of the nation belongs to the nation; "whate'er we fondly call our own" is mistakenly so called; it is not ours, it is a common good, it belongs to the nation. It may demand our entire destitution of it, and the yielding up of it frankly, as not our property, but its. So that, like the Irishman in the story, we are not our own selves at all, but some other body's selves!

H. K. would not shrink from these applications of his maxim, because some of these would not touch him. By-the-by, will he forgive

fitting to say the smartness of the nation belongs to the nation. This we did out of pure compliment to our antagonist more than J. S. Mill, for we instinctively felt—whoever it might be—that there was a smartness peculiar to the nation, which could not be said to belong to the nation, if we were to say it belonged to the nation and to him.

The second follows up proposition first quite in the spirit of the communistic socialism of France in 1848. "It," i. e., "the nation," [which] "belongs to the nation"—"exists for the national good, and not for the purpose of being monopolized by a few persons." The same may *not* be said of grain, of cattle, of ships, of property of any sort, and especially of money. It exists for the national good, and not for the purpose of being monopolized by one class of persons." Therefore, capitalists, get ready for your day; the philosophy of H. K.—though it is wonderfully akin to that of Robin Hood, Rob Roy, Jack and other persons distinguished in poetry, fiction, and now abroad, and he will oppose the hoarding, possessing, and monopolizing of capital on the present personal property system; [see *ante*, p. 190] which results in the pauperizing of a large portion, and keeping in the chains of ignorance and servitude human beings who, in consequence of the natural inequalities of the system, are raised but little above the animal creation. At rare times, when everything shall be everybody's and not anybody's, when private care shall cease and public law is supreme, when every right-thinking person shall have a right to the fruits of the labour of others; when, as Comte preached, rights shall be defined by duties alone shall exist for man, who shall then attain to the fullness of his nature, not his propertied estate!

The system of land tenure under which we live was made by the "landed gentry" is certainly a grievous wrong, as H. K. strikingly says (*ante*, p. 191); and this he would, *not* illogically, remedy by giving to the nation, the true owners of the land, to make a new system of land tenure under which we are to live so that our children may not be able hereafter to object to these land laws. The present system of land tenure under which we live was made by the "landed gentry"—decidedly not! It certainly is very wrong that the inequalities of the landed tenure have been contrived for the purpose of concentrating together the largest possible landed possessions;" but it is only too true that the laws of the moneyed interest have been

contrived for the purpose of keeping together the largest possible moneyed possessions; just as it is true that all good laws have for their object the increase and development of the happiness of man. Unless we are quite prepared for a total abolition of private property and the institution of communism, we cannot advocate any radical change in the laws of land tenure which we are not prepared to see extended to all sorts of property. Improvements in ease, cheapness, and readiness of exchange are quite different from those radical changes which H. K. has advocated. The juggles of law and of lawyers may well be restrained, but that comes under an entirely different question from that which we are debating.

Perhaps H. K. has been long enough dealt with, especially when we consider his anxiety to avoid a fair consideration of what was set before him. We turn now to J. R. S. C. He thinks "we must make such considerable changes in the law of land tenure as will abolish, or nearly extinguish at least, those distinctions which now separate the landowners from the other inhabitants of Britain." What are these distinctions? They have only the free use and disposal of their property according to law. The evils which he depicts as arising from a desire to uphold a landed proprietary are those of the administration of the law as regards property, and can only, we fear, be rendered impossible when we have been able to realize a state in which we shall have honest lawyers among honest men. Why should a law limiting *extent* of property in land be passed, if we are not also to have one limiting the *amount* of money or the *value* of other property that may be held by one person, family, company, or firm? The question of entail can only be settled by a revision of our whole mode of wills and inheritance, and there are not a few deep economic principles opposed to the too great division of landed property, especially now when large farms and steam cultivation are on the increase. Conveyancing, if it is to be simplified, must be done by the lawyers, and does not involve any radical alteration in the laws of land tenure. That improvements are possible, in regard to leases and ground-rents, we may grant, but these are only such small matters of detail as involve little or no general principle.

A. W. thinks he would "make monopoly in land impossible;" why not make all monopoly impossible, and then what is private

but a monopoly? He does not rightly appreciate the land is not able to be indefinitely extended, and hence impossible for it to be otherwise than in great demand; happens to everything which is difficult to be had. Over- is not more a consequence of the land laws than of the of profit required or sought in commercial speculations. must make as much out of their commodity as they grain lords, cotton lords, money lords, &c. A. W. forgets between usury and rent, the thing rented is naturally ive, and is therefore preferable even to machinery, for interest only but rent also is charged; his objection to with this flaw in the analogy. The holders of land only keep the earth as a possession, exactly as the possessors her property do, so as to make the most of it. It is charge that as an evil against the land tenure laws which a to all laws constituting property.

be observed that the great question we have been dis- not, are any changes, or even are great changes requisite to land tenure, but are radical changes necessary? be no doubt that in a changing community laws must less be changed. But radical change is very different. changes go to the *root*, and the root of land tenure is the est of all property, viz., that the thing possessed shall be the exclusive use and benefit of the possessor; and that ly be called upon to part with it, or the use of it, when his place as a citizen by disobedience to the law.

isecate the whole land as being the property of the nation, proposes, and to use that for the general behoof which gained or handed down in accordance with the laws of property, is not just—never can be. The unsettlement of rights in land could only lead to the unsettlement of all of men in the property they have acquired. By all us have justice applied in proper measure to all the duties of men; but do not let us go to the foundations to convulse them by a so-called reform which would the relations of life, and ultimately necessitate an entire the principles of man's moral relations. The laws of re ought not to be *radically* changed.

D. A.

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE?

CREATION.—VI.

IN this debate there has been, among the disputants on both sides, a considerable divergence of opinion respecting the exact position upon which they should stand and unfold the banner of Creation or of Evolution. But whatever may be the exact stand-points from which we survey the subject we must maintain that creation affords a better interpretation of nature than Evolution. The advocates of creation do not altogether shut out the idea of evolution from their conception of nature, and some of the advocates of evolution seem to partially admit the idea of creation. In taking part on this side of the debate, we would at the outset state that we admit the idea of evolution to a certain extent into our interpretation of nature. We know that the butterfly is evolved from the chrysalis; we know that the oak is evolved from the acorn, yet we cannot but look at creation as the primal origin of that which we see in nature.

E. F. R.'s article consisted almost entirely of descriptive statements intended to set forth what the doctrine of evolution really is. In the concluding paragraph of his article, he lays down four theses to support his views of nature, and first concedes that "evolution does not necessarily imply no creation." If this be granted then we must maintain that if creative power and the force of evolution have both been at work in nature, creation must have preceded evolution in point of time, and must take precedence of evolution in importance. Creation must be the primary power, evolution a secondary operation, and creation must be the foundation of our interpretation of nature. E. F. R.'s second postulate is "That evolution seems to agree much better with the experiences of change to which men, animals, and plants are subject, than does a fixed typical creation." It may seem so to E. F. R., but it does not seem so to us. We have no evidence to lead us to believe that

there has ever been in animal or plant such a change as would transfer it or its progeny from one typical class to another. Have any of your botanists reared leguminous plants from the seeds of umbelliferæ? Is there any satisfactory reason for concluding that the progeny of rodents have grown up to be carnivorous beasts? We do not know of any evidence to prove that an exogenous plant has been propagated from the seed, cutting, or sucker of an endogenous tree. We have never heard of a Zoologist having seen any creature in the course of that change by which the viviparous mammal might be evolved from the oviparous bird. Till some such evidence be forthcoming we cannot accept E. F. R.'s second postulate, which is truly a position assumed without proof. E. F. R.'s third assertion is, "that even though creation is granted, evolution seems to be requisite to explain nature." We reply that creation is sufficient to account for the existence of all that we see in nature; we admit without hesitation that a modified kind of evolution is required to explain some of the phenomena of nature, as the growth of fruit out of flower, and the development of a tadpole into a frog; yet we maintain that evolution in the Darwinian sense is not needed to explain nature. Though we admit the idea of evolution in the development of butterfly from chrysalis, yet we have no reasonable ground for admitting the possibility of a butterfly laying eggs, from which might be hatched a creature that would not pass from caterpillar to chrysalis, and from chrysalis to butterfly. We have no evidence of any such evolution as that. E. F. R.'s fourth proposition takes the form of an inference deduced from the three preceding considerations, but as we have not accepted the premises, it would be illogical to argue about the conclusion.

W. G. P.'s dramatic figure is very pretty, very interesting, and very good, so far as it goes, but to convey the whole truth, it must be drawn out a little farther. "The world is a theatre in which we require to act our part without rehearsal, and take our share in working out the great drama without knowledge of the plot, or cue as to the course of the scenes and incidents." We readily allow that there is much truth in this remark of our opponent, but whilst we admit that "we require to act our part without rehearsal, and take our share in working out the great drama without knowledge of the plot," yet we must also at the same time admit that there must be some conductor to preside over the dramatic representa-

tion, who is himself perfectly acquainted with the plot, and with the course of the scenes and incidents, and he must exert a control and a directing influence over these actors who have not rehearsed their part, else there will not be the least semblance of harmonious acting upon the stage. The drama must have had an author and designer, the plot must have been constructed by some contriving genius, and the stage upon which the actors work out the drama must have had an architect. Thus, whatever figure be employed to represent the evolution of phenomena, if we follow it out it necessarily brings us face to face with creation and a creator to account for actual existences. W. G. P. says, "We have made no engagement with the managers." This remark implies a tacit admission that there is a power which does manage the drama of life. Again he says, "We have had no hand in the get-up of the joint-stock performance." This remark suggests that there has been some organizing mind at work in arranging the joint-stock performance of vital activity. Thus we see that the figurative argument of W. G. P. when followed out to its legitimate end tells far more for the advocates of creation than for the advocates of evolution.

W. G. P. argues that "we can only know phenomena," and goes on to observe, "We see things evolve: the bud becomes a plant," &c. A long list is given of things which we *see* evolve, and then W. G. P. says, "These are the mere phenomena we see. But we never see things created. We never can know a creator." In the list of evolutions we find the following included as "phenomena we see:"—"Ether contracts into comets; comets concrete into worlds; worlds cohere into systems, and in their revolutions evolve the life-germs they contain so as to bud into plant-life and burst into animation." But who has ever *seen* such a phenomenon as ether contracting into comets? It would be equally credible and equally accurate to assert that we have seen the creation of suns, moons, and stars. Who ever *saw* comets concrete into worlds? To speak of things which we do see evolve, and then to include in the same list such evolutions as comets evolved from ether, and worlds from comets, declaring by way of conclusion that these evolutions are the phenomena we *see*, is a confused jumbling together of speculation with perception, of things imagined with things seen, and is a direct insult to the common sense of the readers of this magazine when presented to them as a fact on which argument is to be based.

S. E. A. seems to be quite at sea in his search after positive arguments to uphold the views of nature which he has undertaken to support. His article is a vaporous tissue of exclamation and declamation. Note its commencement, "Creation is, and must be an imagination or a revelation. It never can be an experience." Have we no experience of the creations of mind? But let it be granted that "creation never can be an experience," it does not therefore necessarily follow that "creation is and must be an imagination or a revelation." May it not have been apprehended as a conclusion, a deduction from experience? S. E. A. asserts that "man cannot transcend experience," but many of the conclusions deduced by man from experience, do most assuredly transcend what has been actually experienced. Experience leads to these deductions, and then they in turn explain what we have experienced. Man possesses much knowledge which is neither experience, imagination, nor revelation, in the sense in which those words are usually understood. Thus our experience informs us that oak trees *only* are evolved from acorns, that blackberries are the only kind of fruit evolved from the flowers of bramble bushes, that monkeys have never been known to give birth to human beings, and that fowls only are hatched from the eggs laid by the hen. Our experience shows that life is not naturally evolved out of death, and that vitality does not germinate from inorganic bodies. The investigations of scientific observers are proving more and more clearly the truth of this in regard to even the very lowest forms of life. From such experience we deduce the conclusion that there must have been a creation and a creator, and then this conclusion affords a more satisfactory explanation of the experience from which it is deduced than any which could be derived from a theory that shuts out the idea of creation. If we are to believe nothing but what we experience and what we see, we certainly shall never believe that the idea of evolution suffices to explain the existence of what we see around us in nature. If even we admitted, with W. G. P., that "ether contracts into comets," we should still want some explanation of the primal origin of ether, which the theory of evolution could not afford. S. E. A. remarks that "creation is change," and says that "it is a weak idea of the Deity to maintain that He must have created. . . . It quite upsets the true and reverential notion of God as the Unchangeable." But our belief in a creation does not militate against our belief in

the unchangeability of the Creator. Creation implies change, not in the Creator, but in that which is created. Having penned this article as the creation of my mind, I am the same person after this as I was before; there is no change in me in consequence of this act. The idea of creation, therefore, does not imply any change in the creator. E. A. S., says, "We are only the ideas of God, given form to, and then called to pass away." But how can material existences be evolved out of immaterial ideas? If there were no material existence to operate upon, creative power must have been put forth before form could be given to the ideas of God.

In the April number of the *British Controversialist*, there is an article without signature in support of the evolution theory, but the absence of the signature will not cause us much inconvenience for the article does not call for any very detailed notice. The anonymous writer says that as God is "an infinite Being, and infinite in His activities, an infinity of possibilities arise and are realized in His nature; these realized constitute what we call nature, which is the ideas of the Deity evolved from possibility into reality." But we must here repeat the proposition we have previously maintained in reply to S. E. A., viz., that material existences cannot be evolved from immaterial ideas without the intervention of creative power.

Having adduced so much in support of our own conviction, and in reply to the arguments of our opponents, we will now merely say in conclusion that we do not hesitate still to maintain that creation affords a better interpretation of nature than evolution.

SAMUEL.

EVOLUTION.—V.

ABOVE all things else, an explanation must be reasonable. It is not that it is nothing to the purpose. Reasoning outweighs cartloads of belief if it is legitimately employed. It is on this account that superstition flees before logic, and dares not abide the touch of the spear of that Ithuriel. Reason is the arbiter in debate, and it is vain for our opponents to hedge themselves about by axioms of faith and quotations of Scripture. All that can be accepted in connection with this subject, is what reason and experience supply, and all that is not consonant to these must be put aside. Now reason really has to do with reasons, not with causes.

Cause is a mere metaphysical figment—a convenient if not a cunning term for concealing ignorance. It has its origin in our anthropomorphic notions of Deity, and our determination to attribute to Him motives, passions, and effortful labour—in fact, in our likening God to ourselves. We begin to reason by assuming a Deity formed after the fashion of our own thoughts, who begins creation, moulds nature, and imparts to it the powers of His own life; and having begun with an assumption, what can we hope for but the baseless fabric of a vision, exposed to wreck whenever reason asks the grounds on which such an assumption is made.

The candid reader is requested to notice that this is no denial of a Deity, but is a denial of that abstract metaphysical idea which has become the fetish of our theology—the theology of the system-mongers. Of an eternal, omniscient, omnipresent, incomprehensible Being, whose rule and purpose interpenetrate all matter, no scientific thinker requires to entertain a doubt; but then that is precisely because as a scientific man he has nothing to do with that topic at all. He is not an interpreter of God, but of nature; and the question before us is, Does creation or evolution afford the better interpretation?

Nature, as M. F. S., kindly quoting Boyle for us, shows (p. 43), is a term admitting of a great variety of significations. We may, however, assume that in this debate it means the whole result of an experienced fact—that upon which Science employs herself. This is to be explained. How is that to be set about? It is evident that it must be explained in harmony with what it shows, and in agreement with what it is. It is not something out of it that is to be explained by it; neither is it to be explained by something lying beyond it; it is to be explained as it is in itself. What is it? How does it operate? These are the things we want to know, and we do not wish to be brought into such a state of responsibility in regard to it as shall bring us into the region of faith—a territory which lies beyond the region of fact, lest by so going out of our proper walk we be called on to—

“Atone

. For knowing what should ne’er be known.”

Nature is before us, and its facts are within our purview; and when we examine all that we can get within reach of our intellect, we can discover the reasons, but not the causes of things—the conditions, if not the motives for the procession of phenomena of which

we are cognizant. All that we can observe is evolution; we cannot find a trace of creation. We may imagine a creation, but we cannot have no experience of one. But imagination is not explanation, and if we follow our imagination instead of keeping within the limits of the knowable, we must get into sad mistakes.

See, for example, how even M. F. S. gets into mist and muddle when he begins to treat of the subject proper of debate. "Creation invariably implies that that which originates it is arbitrary and irresistible." Very likely M. F. S. and many of his colleagues suppose that this is Christian theology; but it is very far from being so. As a statement, it assumes that what M. F. S. understands by creation is that which must necessarily be, and have been held by every existence, wheresoever and whatsoever it is, was or may have been; for he affirms that it "*invariably implies* what he thinks; as a matter of fact it may be queried, does creation imply anything—is it more real in its implication than Centaurs or Brahm? Again, he "originates Creation, so that not only do we require to consider creation as implying something in itself but something *before* itself! Besides these grave objections to be found in this single sentence, he affirms that Deity, as a creator, is "arbitrary"—while God, in Scripture, declares that He is not so; that He is "longsuffering and merciful," and "repenteth Him of the evil," and even condescends to issue an invitation to His creatures, saying, "Come and let us reason together." These references do not seem to support the arbitrariness of God. Furthermore, M. F. S. affirms the irresistibility of God, while one of the accusations brought against the Jews stands in these terms,—"*Ye do always resist the Spirit of God.*" We see, then, that the Bible does not sustain the position assumed by M. F. S.; and we fear that if he would read the works recently brought out regarding the Darwinian hypothesis, he would see reason for doubting the invariability and irresistibility which he makes so much of.

If creation is an arbitrary and irresistible series of creatures formed on a fixed type, how can variety, progress, or culture be explained? And yet these are the most marvellous of the phenomena we notice in the products of the various kingdoms of nature. If an arbitrary fiat has gone forth determining the forms and bounds of things, implanting in them their powers and forces, their reproductiveness and their predestined terms of continuance and decay,

then how can all the variations of species, all the strange anomalies of growth, change, monstrosity, or development, be made comprehensible? This is rendered more astounding still by the irresistibility which M. F. S. insists on being implied in creation. If the plan of creation is so arranged as to allow of, and admit no evolution in the things that the Great Former has made, nature is inexplicable, for we see variability in many things; and we can trace in the course of things such signs of the development of beings, that we cannot harmonize the definite creation of things at once and for ever with the facts of nature on which science bases her instructions. Science has shown that evolution is a fact, but it cannot show that creation is one.

I am sure that no reader of the *British Controversialist* will believe that the taking up of the defence of the idea that evolution furnishes a better explanation of the universe than creation originates in the holding of views at all adverse to Theism or to revelation. Revelation does not seek to explain nature, but to make God known to us, and beloved by us. To explain the moral and religious relations of God to man, the testimony of Scripture is essential. Nature itself speaks nowhere of God. It is not even a diaphanous curtain through whose mysterious tapestry the Creator can be seen. Beyond the universe nature is a blank unwritten page, and it does not bear the signature of the Highest written on it. Man in his higher moral nature feels the need of some soul originator and mind creator, some lawgiver and sovereign of the spirit; but nature is not explained by any such moral heart-thirst or panting of the soul. Nature is an evolutionary series of effects, whose causes imply not only a preceding cause, but also a succeeding result. Nature consumes all her energy, and that which we fancy is dissipated she carefully gathers up again that nothing may be lost. Nature involves all that she evolves. We have no evidence of creation, nor can we in the least comprehend what is really meant by creation.

A. T.

ARISTOPHANES AND SOCRATES—GROTE AND THE SOPHISTS.—The time in which Aristophanes lived was a time of change; atheists were undermining the old beliefs, and introducing new modes of thinking. These atheists were all sophists, but the sophists were not all atheists; and Aristophanes, who was for keeping things as they were, did not know this, and made his attacks against sophists in general. Jove, among the common people in Athens, represented Providence much more than people now-a-days would be inclined to believe, and Aristophanes fought for him. Aristophanes was the champion of Divine Providence. The only self-evident thing is the eternal divine Mind, there is no philosophy but theism, nothing beyond divine reason, which Aristophanes called Jove, and which we call God. Aristophanes not only attacked sophists, but he attacked Socrates as the leader of the sophists. He was wrong in this, but to the popular mind in these days there was no more difference observed between Socrates and sophists than in the early ages there was between Jews and Christians. Aristophanes was not bound to see into the soul of such a rare spirit as Socrates. George Grote, the Greek historian, made the same mistake as Aristophanes, but for a different reason. Aristophanes did it because he wished to attack the sophists, George Grote because he wished to protect them, belonging, as he did, to the same school. These men gathered their morality from an induction; they did not assert it as an emanation of the divine mind. George Grote would not perhaps see much difference between Plato and Socrates. He could not with all his talent perceive the difference between these minds.—J. S. BLACKIE.

PAUPERS may be conveniently divided into four great classes—children and infants, able-bodied idlers, able-bodied and deserving applicants for temporary relief, and lastly, a miscellaneous class, comprising the very aged, the infirm, the blind, the insane, the incurable—all those, in a word, whose poverty is hopeless, and absolutely irretrievable by any efforts, either of their own or of others. Babies, drones, bees, and cripples constitute our pauper population.

PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICS.—Whatever may be our institutions, public opinion has become the ultimate ruler of our political destinies. However formed—whether by statesmen or demagogues, whether by society at large or by the press, or by all of them combined—it dominates over ministers and parliaments. Under a more restricted representation it dictated the policy of the State; and under our present constitution it will exercise its influence more promptly and decisively. In public opinion, therefore, rest at once our safety and our danger. If rational and well-ordered, like the society of this great country, whose judgment it should express, we may rely upon it with confidence. If it should become perverted and degenerate, who shall save us from ourselves?—SIR T. E. MAY, K.C.B.

IGNORANCE AND KNOWLEDGE IN THEIR RELATION TO EACH OTHER.—It is the law of all human knowledge, that the mere the rays of the light within us multiply and spread, the increasing circle of light implies an increasing circumference of darkness to hem it round. Increase the bounds of knowledge, and you inevitably increase the sense of ignorance; at all the mere points in a belt of surrounding darkness do you encounter doubt and difficulty. It is absurd, therefore, to suppose that any science can abolish all doubts and prevent all mistakes.—E. S. DALLAS.

The Essayist.

ON THE STUDY OF HISTORY.

II.—SOME SPECIAL AIDS.

WE have attempted to set forth, for the encouragement of inquiring minds, the value and importance of historical studies, to obviate some of the difficulties which they seem to present, and to define the true nature and proper objects of history. We have availed ourselves of that classification of historical writings which, beginning with the chronicle or mere narrative, ascends to the classical, didactic, or "pragmatical" species of history, and completes the arrangement of materials with a view to such works as, from their recognition of spiritual yet ever-active principles, profound and all-embracing, which control the destiny of mankind, deserve to be described as philosophical. This classification has, in its essential features, been adopted by various critics of eminence, both native and foreign: it seems, indeed, to be a simple and natural one. In concluding our introductory article we proposed to inquire whether some practical aids might not be afforded to the student of history by the presentation of its numerous facts in such arrangement or grouping as should at once assist the memory and afford suggestions for the higher faculties of the mind to follow out. It is our intention to attempt some fulfilment of this promise in the present article.

A subject so extensive as history cannot be treated either conveniently or clearly without division, and the method of division must usually vary according to the character and object of the historian. The more philosophical the writer is, the less conventional or artificial his distribution of the subject will probably be; he will, in his division, have more regard to laws and principles than to dates or periods. The didactic historian, though he may pay more attention in his arrangement to reigns and dynasties, refuses to allow his flowing periods to be bound with chronological fetters; but this partial emancipation, however pleasant to the

reader, is not favourable to his recollection of the exact succession of events, or to the application of critical judgment. But history, although it is not mere chronicle, must prove a misleading study, if its chief result is to imbue the mind with some pretentious theory; or if, as too often happens, it leaves on the memory but charming but confused impressions which suggest the image of a vast picture gallery. The inquiring mind, aware of the danger of inaccuracy, and regarding a comprehensive view of facts and their relations of succession and co-existence, as a necessary condition of real knowledge, may seek aid from mnemonic systems. But these, whatever value they may possess, are founded on artificial or accidental correspondences in letters or figures; at least the tracing of real or vital relations is not their characteristic aim. Let us see whether chronology viewed in an aspect which personal study has suggested to us, may not afford some assistance at once simpler, more available, and more suggestive.

Writers of "universal history," and also ecclesiastical historians, have usually, from regard to convenience, adopted a chronological division, and arranged their matter under the titles of the successive "centuries." This mode of arrangement, simple and obvious as it is, is regarded by most readers as purely artificial, and accordingly those who desire to obtain a deep and comprehensive knowledge of history are rather apt to become somewhat impatient of it, or to regard it as a fetter rather than a help. It is, however, a significant fact that some ecclesiastical historians have been able to characterize the respective centuries by terms which describe with tolerable accuracy the distinctive peculiarities belonging to each of them. Thus they have described the first century after Christ as "apostolic," the third as that of "establishment," the twelfth as "crusading," the thirteenth as "papal," the fourteenth as "scholastic," the fifteenth as that of "councils," the sixteenth as that of "reformation." We have taken particular instances chiefly from recollection, as it would be tedious here to mention all the distinctive terms applied. No one term, of course, would fully express the tendencies characteristic of a particular century, and various terms might be chosen by different historians, according to their respective points of view; yet the fact that such arrangements can be adopted at all, and that on grounds not purely artificial, is somewhat remarkable and suggestive.

This division of history by centuries recalls to us some remarkable articles which we read many years ago, and which, if we mistake not, proceeded from the pen of that self-taught and most original genius, Hugh Miller. In comparing the political and ecclesiastical struggles of his own day with those of past ages, the author observed that the correspondence of certain years in successive centuries has been accompanied by correspondence in the character of great events occurring in these years, and states that the frequency of this conjunction of dates with facts had been noted by previous writers. Thus the year 1588 was made memorable by an event of deep importance to all Europe, the defeat of the Spanish Armada; while 1688 was the era of the English Revolution, a movement which was equally necessary to the cause of freedom and civilization, and which in its results affected a far wider section of the world than our British isles. Then the year 1788 marks an event which has often been regarded as the real commencement of the French Revolution, namely, the meeting of the Convention of Notables; though that Revolution is more usually associated with the subsequent year, 1789, when absolute monarchy fell with the Bastille.

Pursuing further this search after the connection of numbers or dates with notable occurrences, the writer dwelt on the recurrence of a special kind of events at certain dates approaching the middle of the respective centuries, and we think that this comprehended civil and ecclesiastical separations, sometimes resulting in wars, less international than internal. We can remember a more serious speculation regarding the influence of great public movements on the minds of men, as evidenced by the successive groups of heroes, poets, and philosophers, whose powers have come to maturity in conjunction with the several stages of advancing revolutions; and another interesting essay, apparently from the same hand, regarding the succession of critical periods through which Protestant Europe has passed since the era of the Reformation. To these articles we feel indebted, we believe, for some elements of thought which, followed out much later, and compared with ascertained facts, have led us to conclude that the first of these observations, relating to the coincidence of certain dates in each century with a certain class of events, is founded on something deeper than accident or superficial appearance; that when viewed, not with mere arithmetical accuracy, but with some little breadth of comparison,

this correspondence is found to be at once more universal and more significant than at first sight it might seem; and that the great crises or momentous epochs, with their oft-accompanying outbursts of human genius and power, stand in no uncertain relation to such recurring periods and divisions of time as have been referred to already, though our historians have usually relegated the latter to the care of some inferior science. In support of this view of the matter some evidence will now be adduced. It will be drawn mainly, though not exclusively, from British history in the first instance, and from the last five or six centuries of that history, not merely because it is most familiar to our minds, but in account of the fact that Britain has acquired and held, during this period, the position of an important European power. Her past thus affords a suitable field from which an arrangement of facts can be gathered, and in which also the working of historical laws can be advantageously studied.

It has been observed that in several centuries the year "eight hundred" has been important as an historical landmark. To the fifteenth century, however, this statement might not, at first sight, seem to be applicable. Let us here apply a less rigid measure than that of exact years, the names of which indeed do not, after all, necessarily represent equal intervals of time, for the important events may occur at the beginning of the year in one century, and near the close of it in another. With some slight extension of the range of vision, our eye falls on the date 1485, which marks one of the most noteworthy epochs in English, indeed in general history—that of the battle of Bosworth. This event had more important results than the substitution of a Tudor monarch for a Plantagenet, or the termination of the wars of the Roses. It led also to the fall of feudalism; introducing a strong monarchical influence which by successive strokes, aided by popular sympathy, was destined ere long to break the power of a proud aristocracy, and even to humble its ecclesiastical counterpart, lordly, rich, and dominant hierarchy. It was, in short, one of the great stages at which historians,—pausing, as it were, on the landing-place of a gigantic stair—look around to contemplate the general aspect of human affairs, and to measure the progress attained by society in the more important nations. Thus viewing the condition of Europe at the close of the fifteenth century, we can see that the "Middle Ages" were then closing, and that the

new era had announced itself. The invasion of Italy VIII. of France, in the year 1494, has by some historians regarded as the most suitable event from which we may date this great secular revolution; but in truth, a variety of facts present themselves in near conjunction as signals of a momentous change. Before the end of the century the printing press had been established in France and Spain, as well as the abolition of the ruins of feudalism. "In the same year which saw Columbus wrested from the Moors America was discovered by Christopher Columbus (1492), who then for Castile and Leon found a new world." (Hibbert.) Soon after this date Vasco de Gama effected the first European navigation of Africa. About the same time in Germany Maximilian I. was consolidating the imperial power by the establishment of a standing army, the prohibition of private wars, the creation of the Chamber and the Aulic Council, and the securing of matrimonial alliances with Spain and Hungary, and was opening up a prospect of universal dominion for his son, afterwards Charles V. These concurrent events, the fall of the Eastern Empire and the invention of printing, formed a worthy preparation for those mightier and more epoch-making movements which another century was to witness. The development, the revival of the arts and of literature, the rise of modern science and philosophy, the struggle of great nations for universal supremacy, and that Reformation of religion which found its chief apostle in Luther. We seem, then, to be justified in claiming for the last fifteen or twenty years of the sixteenth century the same kind of importance which belongs to the years marked by the dates 1588, 1688, and 1788-9; and we may as well as memory may be aided by connecting these great and yet conspiring circumstances with 1485, the date of the battle of Bosworth Field," and the accession of Henry VII. of England, the first of the Tudor royal line. It may be observed, however, that the year 1485 was not unimportant in the history of Britain; for it was the year of the revolution that terminated the life and reign of Richard III. of England, and placed on the throne of Scotland at the battle of Sauchie, and placed on the throne of that country the chivalrous and liberal though unfortunate James IV., whose interference in a European struggle led to his fall on the field of Flodden (1513).

We dwell the longer on one interesting fragment of time which marks the "death-birth," as Carlyle would say,

of a new period—because it affords illustration of the principle on which we are disposed to look at the striking coincidence, frequently observable, of similar dates with real historical parallels. Applying to another age the same liberal yet limited method of comparison which has been already tried, let us examine the closing years of the fourteenth century. This way of proceeding may seem peculiar, but it has the advantage of leading us backward from what is best known and familiar to what is more unfamiliar and remote. In British history the year 1388 is not distinguished by any events of remarkable importance; for the border battle of Otterburn, though it still rings clear and high in ballad minstrelsy, is of small account in other respects. But the period intervening between 1380 and 1400 was an eventful one both in English and in Continental history. It was signalized by the rebellion of Wat Tyler (1381), and by those other outbursts of popular indignation against feudal and royal tyranny which marked the capricious rule of Richard II., and prepared the way for that important revolution which in 1399 placed Henry of Lancaster on the throne, the founder of a dynasty under which, a few years subsequently, the brilliant but unfruitful successes of the third Edward were renewed. The year 1386 saw the independence of Switzerland, then scarce a century old, confirmed by the decisive victory gained over the Austrian chivalry at the Lake of Sempach. France had just recently experienced a temporary revival through the patriotic exertions of Charles the Wise and Bertrand du Guesclin, the warlike Breton. Germany, under the house of Luxembourg, had obtained some respite from confusion and civil broils, a respite which was destined soon to be interrupted by the misgovernment of Wenceslaus and the evils of disputed succession. In Italy, the close of this century was marked by the ascendancy of Venice, and in the Peninsula by the revived independence and enterprise of Portugal. Two ecclesiastical events of much moment must also be mentioned, the “great Western schism” in the Church of Rome which followed the “Babylonish captivity of the Church” at Avignon, and the reforming movement on which Wycliffe entered openly about the same time (1378) by his translation of the Bible, though he had previously assailed many prevailing abuses. On the whole, this era constitutes an important stage in European progress.

The statement is yet more applicable, perhaps, to the close of the

century; distinguished in England by Edward I., who called the "greatest of the Plantagenets;" by Rodolph, in Germany; and the powerful Philip the Fair, in France. This era also witnessed successful struggles for liberty, in Scotland, in Switzerland, in Flanders, and in Sicily; and, either directly or indirectly, the burghal and constitutional privileges which had been growing up in more populous

countries. We cannot easily carry this investigation further, but our present limits do not admit of extended illustrations, which would also tax the patience of our readers. We may refer, however, to the periods of Augustus, of Trajan, of Theodosius, of Charlemagne, of Alfred, as supplying notable instances of the coincidences already observed. These memorable ages, as well as others, which succeeded them in fame and moment, occupied the closing portions of the respective centuries in which they commenced, and their influences extended into the succeeding ones. Should our readers regard this oft-recurring coincidence worthy of the notice here given to it, we ask them to accompany us in some further investigations. Let us inquire into the character of the events which have distinguished the middle portion of various centuries, and ascertain whether or not they also possess some striking features. The "wars of the Roses" occupy a period of the history at this stage of the fifteenth century, their commencement being dated 1455, but their origin a few years earlier. The divisions of the Douglases produced a contemporaneous civil war in Scotland. The religious wars in Bohemia, as well as the English struggle, partly patriotic but also partly intestine, in France, which we are wont to associate chiefly with the fame of the "Maid of France," had ceased only a few years previously. Germany, under the third Frederick, was distracted by internal contests, and the same remark applies to the condition of the Christian kingdoms of Spain and Sicily. Henry of Castile was publicly deposed by the Portuguese; Naples was convulsed by a war of succession; and the schism, apparently healed, broke out anew, until Pope Sixtus IV., who put down "the last struggle for republican liberty at Rome in 1453, initiated a new period of prosperity for the Papacy. The persecution of Hussites and Lollards reached its height about this time, as that of the Albigenese had about a century before.

The middle of the sixteenth century saw most memorable contests in England, connected both with the Reformation and with the royal succession. It is scarcely necessary to mention the troubles which preceded the accession of Elizabeth, or the revolutions with which she had for a time to contend. These events were speedily followed by the "religious wars" in France, and by the "revolt of the Netherlands" (1566). The "Smalcaldic war," which Charles V. was opposed to the Protestants of Germany, terminated, after several years' duration, in 1552, when the powerful Emperor had to agree to the "treaty of Passau." Wars, chiefly religious in their origin, agitated Scotland, Scandinavia, and Hungary, towards the middle of the Reformation century.

In the succeeding one (the seventeenth) a like place is occupied by the English Civil War, the "Fronde" in France, and intestine conflicts in the Spanish dominions, in Poland, and even in the smaller states of Europe. The "Thirty Years' War" (from 1618 to 1648) partook more of the nature of civil than of international conflict, although surrounding nations were drawn into this essentially German struggle, some of them more through ambition than religious sympathy. This was also a time of ecclesiastical separations, especially in Britain and Holland.

The same features mark the middle of the eighteenth century. The fruits of the English revolution seemed likely to be lost at various times, especially in 1745. France, in the meantime, was agitated by just discontent, which proved more fatal than civil war. Poland was convulsed by those factions which paved the way for her downfall; and Russia saw a succession of domestic tragedies, unusually frequent even in her experience. The "Seven Years' War" (1756—1763) was, like some preceding ones, essentially a struggle for the lead in Germany, although other nations were involved.

The middle of the present century has, we may surely say, been marked by revolutions, not only on the continent of Europe, but in the remoter portions both of the New World and the Old. These revolutions, in many instances accompanied with civil wars, have not, however, left such traces as still survive of their grand progenitors, the American and French revolutions of a former age, in the abolition of feudalism, the recognition of religious equality, and the formation of a vast body of peasant proprietors. The fruits of temporary success were lost, in 1848, by a general reaction, which followed hard on that sudden uprising of the democracy; and the

ble changes recently effected in Southern Europe have been
ult, to a large extent, of indirect causes. The American
war has led to important changes, but we cannot yet fully
e these. The great national duel of Austria and Prussia, in
as, like some preceding wars, a struggle for supremacy in
y. Prussia—which, like Sardinia, had emerged from the
European struggle with Louis XIV. as a kingdom, and had,
at power, profited a century afterwards by the downfall of
on—was now, in her newly acquired character as the head of
y, to make way, by her successful resistance to France, for
mplete triumph of her southern compeer and ally, now
ed in the Eternal City. In these later events, unable as we
y to weigh their significance, may we not discern indications
o new and remarkable stage or landing-place in the world's
such as will make the close of our century at least as
ous as the corresponding epochs of the past? It will
be conceded that the middle of the present century was an
ecclesiastical divisions as well as of political agitation; but
ears have witnessed, in various and widely different quarters,
ressions of returning desire for unity and rearrangement.

may ask how far the investigations we have been pursuing
made profitable; and others may inquire whether, sup-
the course of events to have actually followed such a law or
ment as we have described, any reason can be assigned for
ence. To the latter question we may attempt some reply in
e article. The former might be answered by stating that
idation of truth must ever be advantageous; but we prefer
to the reader's attention the special benefit which memory
ive from the knowledge of such associations or coincidences.
nefit can be illustrated by reference to another study. He
sires to cultivate astronomy usually begins by acquainting
with the apparent situation and grouping of the stars; in
ords, with the various constellations to which, partly for the
convenience, artificial boundaries as well as names have
signed. Once possessed of this knowledge, he is able to
ithout difficulty or delay, to any particular region of the
even to any special body to which, in the serious work of
nce, his attention may be called. Thus also the student of
marking his course by centuries, and by the prevailing
of events which characterize their more central and closing

years, can refer or bind memorable facts, characters, or changes, to one or other of these "climacteric" epochs, and thus arrange in convenient groups the objects of his chosen study. But there belongs to this historic method a value such as cannot be claimed for its astronomical analogue. The latter is properly artificial; the former seems to have a foundation in reality. A strong confirmation of the basis of our statement is to be found in the fact that ages fertile in great events have likewise been rich in great minds. Let us observe the closing periods of several past centuries, already marked by us as stages or landing-places of human progression. One of these (*circa* 1300) was the age of Dante and Giotto, the great founders respectively of Italian literature and art; and it was about this time, in the days of the first Edward, that the English language, along with some of the most important of our institutions, began to take fixed form and character. The end of the fourteenth century was cheered by the first bright orb of our literature, Chaucer, who so closely followed Wycliffe, the "morning star of reformation," and was also contemporary with Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Froissart. Another of these epochs (*circa* 1500) glows for ever in the light of the "revival of letters," a glory more widespread and enduring, under which all influences conspired to promote the birth of new spiritual life throughout the nations. Of the Elizabethan age, with that galaxy of genius and power amidst which Shakspeare shines like a many-hued unfading Sirius, we need not to tell. Let it be remembered, however, that this grand assemblage of intellects in Britain, of which the poet sings,—

"Sublime their starry fronts they rear,"

formed part of a European company. Unrivalled as were Bacon and Shakspeare, "sons of light," as Ruskin has called them, there was a Tasso to compare with Spenser; and though France, Germany, Italy, and Holland were much exhausted by wars, they still could boast of art, science, and learning; while Spain had her Vega and Cervantes, and Portugal had but lately lost her Camoëns. The "Augustan age of Queen Anne" ought to be dated rather from the English Revolution, if not earlier; as a literary period it corresponds nearly with the "age of Louis XIV." The world-conflict a century later gave rise to a bright and general intellectual illumination, whose splendour has scarcely yet faded from our sight.

When we contemplate the intervening periods, we find them, as

The Reviewer.

Comparative Metaphysics, II. By SARA S. HENNELL.
London: Trübner & Co.

THIS is a continuation of the exposition of the original and singular views entertained by Miss S. S. Hennell—views which she has in part enunciated in her work on "Present Religion," in a former treatise on Comparativism, and in a previous instalment of this work, which contained three chapters of the treatise on metaphysics as the science of being, as distinguished from Science, the knowledge of experience in space and time—"not directed, as in science, to the gaining of comprehension of the universe, but only to the arrangement of our *ideas* of the universe." Space represents existences in an eternal *now* of extent; time regards them as an infinite of sequence and being; Miss Hennell claims for these two forms of thought function and effectiveness and considers them as having an ontologic unity, capable of being subjected to introspective analysis. Again, "if the ideals of time, space, and being, be conceived of as multiplied into one another with dynamic interpenetration, it is Deity in the highest modern sense that arises for product;" not "force, science's counter-ideal," but infinite being. The metaphysic which Miss Hennell aspires to build up is noble and wide-reaching; and she exhibits in wonderful combination the two great mate-powers in philosophy—sound thinking with poetic imagination.

It would be quite impossible in other words than her own—brilliant, original, and well-consorted—to give any idea of the fascinating power with which she shows in the science of the present day—"even matter and motion being driven from the field into sheer metaphysicalness;" and that wherever in nature the two modes of *vis.*, (power) positive and negative, work evolutionally together, there also is made present an ideal necessity of two kinds of evolved forms for result"—so giving the philosophy of sex difference. The star-symbol and the tree-symbol are made to aid the conception with graphic power and pertinence, and are useful for others as well as the author in bringing thinking into order.

Miss Hennell is an advanced, but also a genuine thinker. She

ple acquisition to enable her to speak with authority on
ism, Spencerism, Darwinism, Arnottism, &c.; but she has,
the originating force of a first-class mind. It would be
only by long extract, or severe epitome, to present a brief
of her metaphysics. It is to be hoped that opportunity
occur and be taken in another portion of this serial, to co-
r S. S. Hennell among "modern metaphysicians."

ures for the People," delivered in the Hulme Town Hall,
nchester, Nov., 1870, by Professors HUXLEY, Rosco, and
rd; and Dr. HUGGINS, and W. B. HAWKINS Esq. Man-
ter: Heywood.

se five lectures, reported as they were delivered by Henry
n, are to be had in single numbers at one penny, or stitched
andsome wrapper at sixpence. We need only name the topics,
r how truly this is a book every self-educator should get
; Huxley on "Coral and Coral Reefs" is the perfection of
ory science; Roscoe on "Spectrum Analysis" is clear, plain,
inted; while Dr. Huggins, in showing the application of that
of research to the Heavenly Bodies, is highly successful in
"from abstruse research to steal" its terrors. Mr. Hawkins
oal" is interesting and informing; and Professor Ward, "On
s," proves himself to be a masterly critic and expositor. We
know where a similar course can be had for a similar price.

US AND PUBLIC BUSINESS.—David Hume made the remark that
a combination among the dunces—who collectively are a powerful
to enforce the doctrine that men of genius are unfit for business.
genius is not incompatible with business qualifications. Hume
made a good Under Secretary of State, and Milton was a Foreign
ry under one who would have tolerated no slovenly work. Bacon,
bury, Chatham, Mansfield, and many others might be cited as
es where what is called genius is united with high capacity for
business.

RIES OF INDOLENCE.—None so little enjoy life, and are such
s to themselves, as those who have nothing to do. The active only
e true relish of life. He that knows not what it is to labour, knows
at it is to enjoy. Recreation is not only valuable as it unbends us,
le knows nothing of it. It is exertion that renders rest delightful,
ep sweet and undisturbed. That the happiness of life depends on
ular prosecution of some laudable purpose or calling which engages,
and enlivens all our powers, let those bear witness who, after
ng years in active usefulness, retire to enjoy themselves. They are a
to themselves.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

974. We shall feel glad if some gentleman can give us *early* information respecting a book entitled "The Prince of the House of David," and published by Routledge and Sons. It consists of letters professedly written by a Jewess at the time of Christ's public ministry and death. It is edited by Professor J. H. Ingraham. There are two editions of the work. The smaller one contains an extract from the preface to the larger one, which extract is as follows:—"It has been the author's aim in the present volume to present to the reader, under the guise of the narrative of an eye-witness, the various incidents in the life on earth of Him who 'spake as never man spake.'" Is there any evidence existing that the letters are what they profess to be? or is the book fictitious? Any information on this point, as well as respecting the editor of them, will be gratefully received by—S. S.

975. Who is the author and who is the publisher of "The Eclipse of Faith," on which J. T. C. writes an essay in the March number of the *British Controversialist*?—S. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

975. The author of "The Eclipse of Faith" is Henry Rogers, Edinburgh Reviewer, and champion of Christian orthodoxy. He was born at St. Alban's, Hertfordshire, in 1808. He was educated for the medical profession; but abandoned that career, and going to Highbury College, entered the ministry of the Congrega-

tionalists. Relinquishing his pastorate on account of ill-health, he was appointed, in 1836, Professor of the English Language and Literature in University College, London. In this connection he issued "A General Introduction to a Course of Lectures on English Grammar and Composition," and in the same year he published "The Life and Character of John Howe, M.A., with an Analysis of his Writings," supplying a view of the religious life and controversies of the time of the Commonwealth. In 1839 he began to contribute to the *Edinburgh Review*; and in the same year he accepted the Professorship of Philosophy in the Spring Hill College, Birmingham. In 1858 he exchanged this appointment for that of the Principalship of the Lancashire Independent College, near Manchester. His contributions to the *Edinburgh Review* were published separately in 1850 and again in 1855, and more recently an enlarged edition has, we think, been issued. Mr. Rogers is author of an Essay on the Life and Genius of Thomas Fuller, with Selections from his Writings; he has contributed Biographies of Butler, Gasendi, Gibbon, Paley, Pascal, Voltaire, &c., to the "Encyclopædia Britannica"; he was a contributor to "Kitto's Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature," edited by Dr. W. L. Alexander—notably of the article "Sabbath." He has also been a frequent contributor to *Good Words*, &c.

In 1850, Francis Wm. Newman issued his "Phases of Faith," a work which, while full of spiritualistic

and avowed its author's scepticism of the tenets of the orthodox. Henry Rogers produced, usually, his popular statement of the religious condition of the time, entitled "The Faith; or, a Visit to a Sceptic." It went through two editions in two years, and has frequently been republished. In a new edition of the "Phases" Procter added a "Reply to the Faith," wherein the author on Deism has been made his arguments not only from the very words of Newman's "Faith," but this only incited Rogers to

compose a "Defence of the Religion of Faith," in which rejoinder the professor is exposed to the fire of a good deal of vigorous thought and strong sarcasm. In logical acuteness Rogers certainly excels Newman, though not in clearness of expression or clever poeticalness of phrase. In all that Mr. Rogers writes learning, eloquence, humour, acuteness, and liberality of tone appear. He is very retired in his manners, habits, and mode of life, and now almost occupies the same soundly respected position among all parties in all churches as the late Isaac Taylor.—S. N.

Literary Notes.

"Study of Science," twelve by Herbert Spencer, are in the *Contemporary Review*. Graeme, affixed to an exhibition of Beethoven's, and prefixed to "A Novel of Heroes," is the *nom de plume* of Miss Griffin, daughter of Charles Griffin, publisher. Thornbury is engaged on a "London;" it is to be archaeological, and descriptive to be illustrated. Following notice has been given by the University of Aberdeen: the Blackwell Prize: Blackwell's trustees give at the next prize on this (value £50) will be for the best essay on "A True View of the Effects of the Reformation of Religion in the Nineteenth Century, in England and Scotland, on the Religious, Political, and Social Condition of these Islands." This prize is open to all who are required to transmit their

essays, written in a distinct hand, to the Secretary of the university on or before the 1st of October, 1874. Each essay to bear a motto, and to be accompanied with a sealed letter, bearing the same motto, enclosing the name and address of the writer.

The Actonian Prize or Prizes for 1872 will be awarded in December for the best essay or essays on "The Theory of the Evolution of Living Things," delivered to H. Bence Jones, Honorary Secretary, Royal Institution of Great Britain, Albemarle Street, London, W., by June 30th.

The first volume of a work by Professor Mommsen, which is to form three volumes, "On Roman State Rights," has been published.

Mr. F. Le Play, author of "The Organization of Labour," "The Organization of the Family," &c., one of the first economists of France, has commenced a series of tracts on Social Economy, at twopence halfpenny each, in which an epitome of his doctrines is to be reproduced.

Dr. Karl Mendelssohn is preparing a biography of his father.

George Cruickshank is preparing his autobiography.

An appeal for aid is made, through Karl Blind, on behalf of Ludwig Feuerbach, the philosopher of "free thought."

"The Letters of Junius" are to be adjudicated upon in a summary of the evidence by the Lord Chief Justice in the *Academy* by and by.

Mr. Emerson's revision of his essays is to contain an autobiographical preface.

W. F. Rae's translation of Taine's "Notes on England" has been collected and issued with additions, and a preface by the author.

Wm. Chambers has issued a biography of his brother Robert. If it is, as it should be, in a great measure autobiographical, so closely were the brothers related in habits and interests.

Adam Black, bibliophile, municipalist, and M.P., is writing a Political Autobiography.

Dr. A. Dreger has issued an Historical Syntax of the Latin Language; a new, enlarged, and revised edition of Truffel's Roman Literature is in the press; A. S. Werenberg has announced a new critical edition of "Cicero's Letters;" a Concordance to "Spenser's Poetical Works," on which the compiler has been engaged for many years, is now nearing completion. Might we not now have a Lexicon Concordance to the chief works of the great authors of the best periods of our literature?

M. Pierre Lafitte, the apostle of the French positivists, while here lately on a visit to London, delivered a series of three discourses on the doctrines of Auguste Comte. The services were held in the Positivist Church in Bloomsbury and made favourable impression with regard to M. Lafitte.

In Biblical revision a notable example of caution has been fur-

nished by the Swedish ecclesiastical authorities. A commission has been sitting on the translation of the Bible for the last hundred years, without producing more than a tentative revision, which is still exposed to the criticism of scholars.

M. Kraus, of Zurich, thoroughly persuaded by Gerald Massey of the tenability of his theory of Shakspeare's Sonnets, is about to issue a translation of the same with the title "The Southampton Sonnets." Of the same "Sonnets," a version into Swedish, by C. R. Nyblom, Professor of Aesthetics at Upsala, appeared in the early part of the year.

A biography of the late Rev. F. D. Maurice, one of the most influential minds of the age, is to be prepared. That and a volume of "Remains" will, we believe, be edited by J. M. Ludlow.

The National Society of Education at Lyons have offered a prize of 300 francs for the best essay on "The Best Methods of preserving the Young from Materialism and Irreligion."

As Gerald Massey presented the public with "Shakspeare's Sonnets never before interpreted," so he is now about to expound Spiritualism never before interpreted.

"Lead us not into temptation" may well be said when it is announced that 250 sermons can be had for 12s., post free; but what effect can such a fact have upon the prevalence of scepticism—regarding the preacher's honour and honesty?

The Aldine edition of the Poets issued by Bell and Dalby, though extending to 52 vols. at 1s. 6d. each, is to be supplemental by the works of authors not included in the former series—Chaucer, Oldham, Swift, Marvell, Keats, Shelley, &c., &c.

"The works of Goethe explained by his Life" is the topic of Critical Biography by M. A. Mazières.

Metaphysics in Poetry.

SIR JOHN DAVIES.

Author of "Orchestra," "Nosce Teipsum," &c.

Sir John Davies, a highly philosophical poet of the Elizabethan age, is well known to the readers of *William Hamilton*.

Philosophical poems are usually a failure. . . . Among ourselves, the most successful attempt, in a species of composition which the powers of Lucretius could not make popular, is the "Nosce Teipsum, the Soul of Man and the Immortality thereof," by Sir JOHN DAVIES. . . . The argument is not obsolete. It abounds in beautiful verse, and the versification is in general delightfully harmonious."—*Hamilton*.

Alexander Balloch Grosart, the eloquent and well-beloved minister of the United Presbyterian congregation of St. George's, in Manchester, Lancashire, has printed in his "Fuller Worthies' Library" a volume in private circulation, for the first time collected and edited, containing the complete poems of Sir John Davies. That ardent and hearty, and industrious searcher after the choice treasures of English literature, which the rich literature of England contains, but of which the fullness and evidences are, at least, beginning to be lost, also at the same time proposed to gather together and issue the prose works of this great and exact philosopher." We notice, with regret, in a recently circulated fly-sheet that from "the pressure of other claims and the strain of overwork," some of the precious anticipations of this volume must remain unrealized, as the results of the pressure mentioned include "postponement, at least, of the prose works of Sir John Davies." This is all the more matter of sorrow to us, while, the student of English literature, and the thoughtful reader, after a knowledge of the political and literary history of the Tudors and the first of the Stuarts—"Eliza and our country," because Mr. Grosart reserved for the subsequent volumes of the series, which would have found its appropriate place in the volume devoted to his poems had his prose works not been then among the published issues. Mr. Grosart's researches have, we understand

been rewarded by the upturning of new facts, but of these we have no knowledge. So far as we know, the materials for a biography of Sir John Davies are perplexingly scanty; but we think that, as a recreative variety in our papers, a notice of a writer whom Hallam praises as the "founder of a school of poetry appealing to the reasoning rather than to the imaginative faculty," some brief glimpse of his life and works may not be unwelcome to our readers, and that the gleanings of our readings concerning him may be perhaps, garnered with advantage in a short interlusive paper.

John Davies was the son of a legal practitioner resident at Chiseldon Grove, in the parish of Tisbury in Wiltshire. He was born in 1569—70, and was probably educated at the Grammar School founded by Queen Elizabeth in the very year of his birth at Salisbury, from which Tisbury is some dozen miles distant, in a westward direction. Thence he proceeded in his fifteenth year (1584) to Queen's College, Oxford, then under the headship of Henry Robinson. After five years' study at Queen's he graduated B.A. having meanwhile entered the Middle Temple, London, 1589, when that city was all aglow with the poetical excitement of Spenser, Shakespeare, and Marlowe; the controversies of Thomas Nash and Gabriel Harvey, Stephen Gosson, and Thomas Lodge; and the vagaries—not to use a worse term—of Greene and Peele; was lovingly stirred by the presence of the heroes of the Armada, and the new efforts making by Elizabeth and Henry of Navarre for the securing of the permanence of Protestantism; as well as moved by the recent demise of Dudley, Earl of Leicester, and the early steps to favouritism taken by the Earl of Essex. With a turn once for letters and politics these could not be without their influence on a mind of genuine activity and conscious power. He was called to the bar in 1595, probably in the Middle Temple, though "*Polimanteia*," published in that year, he is said to be of Lincoln's Inn. Besides his ability in law, he was distinguished too "by many a quality" not common in any age as the personal characteristics of the servants of Themis. He claims credit, in one of his epigrams, over one of his comrades,

"For vault, and dance, and fence, and rhyme I can."

These epigrams contain much wild wit and many references to the rakish habits of the period, as well as sundry snarls at the men about town and their unfeminine copartners. They seem to have been handed about pretty freely in MS., for though they were,

know, then unpublished, Sir John Harrington, in his *Phosphorosis of Ajax*, 1596," in these terms compares him with Heywood, the epigrammatist,—author of six hundred sallies, quibbles, proverbs, sharp sayings and rough jests,—who, but was then the traditionary exemplar of "an extemperate" for "the mirthe and quicknesse of his conceits." "This for his epigrams and proverbs is not yet put down by any country, though one [*Mr. Davies* occurs here in an explanatory note] doth indeed come near him." As an epigrammatist Edward Guilpin, in his "*Skialethia*" (Epig. 20), 1598, calls him "Our English Martial;" in "*Christoleros: Seven Bookes of Epigrams written by Thomas Bastard*," 1598, he is spoken of in connection in Book II., Epig. 15, and in Book III. 3, which is ascribed to John Davis, he says, in reference to Heywood,—

"But thou in word and deed has made him lesse
In his own wit."

In his "*Palladis Tamia*;" Charles Fitzgeoffrey, in his "*Epistole*;" Richard Carew, in his "*Epistle on the Excellency of the English Tongue*" refers to his epigrams; Ben Johnson calls him "as good, at least, as

"*Davies and Weever and the best have been,*

as "*Conversations with Drummond*" *Davies* comes up again as the subject of "censure." We quite agree with the Rev. Alexander Dyce regarding them:—"They possess some poignancy of ridicule and vigour of expression, but hardly enough to justify the praise which they once called forth; and they chiefly recommend themselves to readers of the present day as illustrating the manners and 'mourning' which prevailed towards the close of Elizabeth's reign."

Let us add also what Dyce appropriately subjoins:—"When *Davies* republished his poems in 1622 he did not admit a single epigram into the volume;" for as Grosart says, "they have the roughness, even coarseness, of the age, and belong to the 'old oats sowing' of the poet's youthful period."

His reputation for the elegant athletics, which form the accompaniments of the body and the dexterity and aptitude of the mind, which display the talents of the mind, made John *Davies* a favourite among the Inns-men of his time who moved to exert his powers for their amusement; and doubtless the enjoyment afforded them by the sharp-edged

rhymes in which he set the conceits of the times. At the instigation of one of his co-Templars, Mr. Richard Martin, whom he addresses as his "very friend," and as—

"You, the first mover and sole cause of it,
Mine-own-self's better half, my dearest friend,"

he produced his "Orchestra; or a Poem on Dancing." This work which is vivacious in style and admirably accurate in the choice of diction, was written under the spur, of course, of its occasion. Its author says of it, appealing to his friend's knowledge of the fact,—

"You know the modest sun full fifteen times
Blushing did rise and blushing did descend,
While I in making of these ill-made rhymes
My golden hours unthriftilly did spend."

Hastily written it was also probably intended to be rapidly hurried through the press; for in the registers of the Stationers' Company under date 25th June, 1594, Mr. Harrison entered for copyright "Orchestra," though the book itself was not published till 1596. It is important to note the early date of the composition of "Orchestra" because it proves the entire falsity of the smart epigrammatic sentence of Thomas Campbell in his "Specimens." "Sir John Davies wrote, at twenty-five years of age, a poem on 'The Immortality of the Soul;' and at fifty-two, when he was a judge and statesman, another on the 'Art of Dancing.' The vitality of cleverly expressed falsities is illustrated in the fact that notwithstanding the correction of this error by Peter Cunningham, founded on facts furnished by John Payne Collier, the story recurs in these very similar terms in a work issued under the name of the Duke of Manchester, but owing and owing to 'the historical knowledge and literary accuracy of Mr. W. Hepworth Dixon and Dr. Doran' much of its interest, viz., 'This once riotous Templar of Montagu's early days, who wrote a noble work on the immortality of the soul in the very heyday of his young blood, who afterwards became famous for his gravity as a judge, and his soundness as a statesman, terminated his literary career as the author of a poem in praise of dancing.'"^{*}

As we have just seen, the very reverse of the statement made by Campbell and endorsed and repeated by Dixon or Doran is the

^{*} "Court and Society from Elizabeth to Anne." Vol. I. p. 289.

the literary career of John Davies began when he was about three, by the production of "Orchestra" and the composition of a set of fun called "Epigrams." The original title-page to the edition of this poem reads thus: "Orchestra; or a poem dancing, iudicially proving the true observation of time and the Authentick and laudable use of Dauncing. Ovid. *ant. lib. 1.*"

"Si vox est, canta; Si mollia brachia, salta
Et quacunq; potes dote placere, place."

[If voice is thine, sing: if rounded limbs, then dance,
And with whatever gift thou canst delight, delight.]

London; printed by J. Robarts for N. Ling, 1596." Harrison, who printed "Orchestra" in 1594, was at that time holder of the copy-right of Shakespeare's "Venus and Adonis," and his "Lucrece." Robarts was the first printer of "Titus Andronicus," and "The Merchant of Venice;" and Nathaniel Ling was, with him, the publisher of Hamlet.

"Orchestra," says Mr. Grosart, quaintly and truly, "was welcom to you welcome a great-winged, vivid-coloured moth into the mine." Sir John Harrington, though himself an Epigrammer, speaking "of Master John Davies' Booke of Dancing. To him, making of himself however as yet "a stranger," to the author, in tones and with a bantering humour which reads kindly. The poem opens with a reference to "Chaste Penelope, Ulysses' wife, who kept her faith unspotted twenty years,

"Till he returned that far away had been
And many men and many towns had seen,"

of Homer, who by Jove's will "become the well-spring of poetry." But among "the long laborious travels of the man," he forgot "The courtly love Antinous did make." This he calls on Terpsichore to sing, as—

"You, Lady can remember everything,
For you are daughter of Queen Memory."

At the night's discourse, when Antinous disguised and un-
known in the darkness to

"The sovereign castle of the rocky isle,
Wherein Penelope the princess lay,"

was surrounded with the crowd of her suitors, while Phemius sang of the

wars and wanderings of her husband, does she profess to know
On this night her star-bright eyes did not dismay him, and he with
fair manners wooed the Queen to dance," assuring her :—

"If you will in tunely measure move
Not all these precious gems in heaven above
Shall yield a sight more pleasing to behold
With all their turns and tracings manifold."

She pleads that her feet, "did never yet the art of footing know
and expresses an opinion that

"Dancing is a frenzy and a rage,
First known and used in this new-fangled age."

This Antinöus denies. The elements or first seeds of things
the Lucretian atoms—were commanded by

"Nature's mighty King
To leave their first disordered combating,
And in a dance such measure to observe,
As all the world their motion would preserve."

This wondrous miracle succeeded, and then "the turning va
of heaven formed was," and all its "goodly architecture wrought
but—

"They err that say they did concur by chance,
Love made them meet in a well-ordered dance."

Time and dancing are the twins of love. The queen objects that
if dancing be the special joy of heaven, then should she gain
heights, she will a dancer be. To prove that it is also earthly
Antinöus says,

"When Love had shaped this world,
And had instructed it to dance aright."

Among the other planets, she taught men and women as a means
"another shapeless chaos to digest," to look at the sky and
imitate the orderliness that reigns in it, the loving joy of the me
asures observed in the motions of the spheres: and of the air,
asks,

"What are breath, speech, echoes, music, wind,
But dancings of the air in sundry kind?"

These being severally explained, he proceeds to show that the
sea's motions and the streamlets course go in music and measure

do the birds dance and sing, Love having thus demon-

"The motions seven that are in nature found,
Upward and downward, forth and back again,
To this side and to that, and turning round,"

men the method of combining them into the differen-
which are thereafter described, Statesmanship, Religion,
Pomp, and Art—all forms of orderly motion. Grammar,
ic, and Poetry, are only "congruent and well-according"
on to motion and set positions; these

"The guides and marshals are,
But Logic leadeth Reason in a dance."

the same with Music, Mathematics, and Astronomy—all the
arts:—

"Lo! this is Dancing's true nobility—
Dancing, the child of Music and of Love;
Dancing itself, both Love and Harmony,
Where all agree and all in order move,
Dancing the art that all arts does approve,
The fair character of the world's consent,
The heaven's true figure and th' earth's ornament."

elope next accuses Dancing of being—"Of every ill the hate-
er vile," "Wit's monster, Reason's Canker, Sense's bane,"
begetter, Love. Antinous defends Love;

"Life's life it is and cordial to the heart,
And of our better part, the better part."

ns that she herself is but the Love of loveliness daintily
sed into her dancing blood, that all the grace of every act is
g, that the perfect concord of her spirit is the wondrously
ked dance of heavenly order; and makes appeal to Love to
further in the argument. Love gives him a magic mirror
h Penelope looks. She beholds what is to happen—

"In the great, fortunate, triangled isle,"

ix and twenty hundred years are past, Elizabeth and her
ad ladies at their revels; for it—

"did represent in lively show
Our English court's divine image,
As it should be in this our Golden Age."

Penelope was dazzled, delighted, overcome, and so is the poet. He bids Terpsichore, the muse of choric verse, away, and asks Urania, goddess of astronomy, to come to his aid in this heavenly theme. The author laments that he has not the abundant vein of Homer, Chaucer, Spenser, Daniel, or even that of Edward Guilpin, whose "Skialetheia, or Shadows of Truth," though not issued till 1598 seems to have been known to Davies, Charles Best, &c.

"Yet Astrophell might one for all suffice,
Whose supple Muse, Chameleon-like, doth change
Into all forms of excellent devise."
So may the Swallow whose swift Muse doth range
Through rare ideas and inventions strange,
And ever doth enjoy her joyful spring,
And sweeter than the Nightingale doth sing.
Oh, that I might that singing Swallow hear,
To whom I owe my service and my love,
His sugred tunes would so enchant mine ear.
And in my mind such sacred fury move
As I should knock at Heaven's gate above,
With my proud rhymes while of this heavenly state,
I do aspire a shadow to relate."

So closes this poem, which displays much of the airy grace, the bounding buoyancy, the charming flexibility and orderly elegance of the subject; as well as a remarkable power of imaginative analogy and sprightliness of fanciful reasoning.

The reader of our abstract has probably noticed that in the two closing stanzas quoted, Davies makes a punning allusion to his friend Martin (under the term Swallow) to whom the poem was dedicated in a loving sonnet. In subsequent issues the sonnet to this "very friend" is omitted, and is, in edition 1622, replaced by a sonnet "to the Prince" [Charles], stanzas 127-131 are also left out. Probably by this time the authors named might require to have had worthy companions joined with them, and he may have chosen rather to delete these than provide additional characteristic stanzas; but unfortunately there is another explanation. Shortly after the publication of this poem a breach in the friendship between Davies and Martin occurred. In February, 1597-8, on some provocation which was probably great, and in all likelihood political, a quarrel broke out in the Middle Temple Hall at dinner-time between these fast sworn friends. John Davies assaulted Richard Martin. This was a breach of good-breeding and social fellowship which could not be overlooked. Davies was expelled from the Temple, forfeited

lege as a barrister, and fell into disgrace. Davies availed of the enforced leisure laid on him to compose a series of verses of a most ardent and glowing character in praise of his Queen. These were published under the title "Hymnes to Astræa, in acrostick verse. London: Printed for J. S., 1599." The book consists of twenty-seven quarto pages, containing, besides twenty-six acrostics. Ellis says, "they are probably the best acrostics ever written and all actually good." Of these as we quote the first and last:—

[*Elisabetha Regina.*

Before the day doth spring,
Wake my Muses, and sing;

Time to slumber,
My joys this time doth bring,
Which will fail to number.

Hereto shall we bend our
Knee
Up to Heaven, againe to

Prayd, which thence desired;
Brought againe the Golden

By the world amended.

As it selfe she doth refine,
Like an Alchymist divine,
Turnes times of yron turning
To purest form of Gold;
Corrupt, till Heaven waxe

Refined with burning.

"Envy, goe weepe; my Muse and I
Laugh thee to scorne; thy feeble
eye

Is dazeled with the glory
Shining in this gay poesie,
And little golden story.
Behold how my proud quill doth
shed

Eternal nectar on her head;

The pompe of Coronation

Hath not such power her fame to
spread,

As this my admiration.

Respect my pen as free and franke,
Excepting not reward nor thanke,
Great wonder only moves it;

I never made it mercenary,
Nor should my muse this burden
carrie

As hyr'd, but that she loves it."

"Hymnes to Astræa" were probably issued early in 1599 for the aim of gaining royal favour. Probably they were brought to the notice of the Queen by Mr. Michael Hicks, one of Burleigh's favourites, without much success. The secretary appears kindly suggested the writing of something less fulsome and direct; he even hinted at a topic which would, if soundly treated, be agreeable to the Royal Lady. About the close of the year 1599 were produced "*Nosce Teipsum*;" [Know Thyself.] This was founded in two Elegies—1. Of human knowledge. 2. Of the life of man and of the immortality thereof. London: Printed by I. D. Field, for John Standish—publisher of "Astræa." From

John P. Collier's Bibliographical Account of Early English Literature, Vol. I., we copy this letter referring to the presentation of copy of "*Nosce Tibi sum*" by Mr. Michael Hicks to Burleigh, and by him to Her Majesty.

"Mr. Hicks,—I have sent you here enclosed that cobweb of my invention which I promised before Christmas. I pray you present it, commend it, and grace it, as well for your owne sake as mine; bycause by your nomination I was first put to this taske, for which I acknowledge myself beholding to you in good earnest, though the employment be light and trifling, bycause I am glad of any occasion of being made knowne to this noble gentleman, whom I honour and admire exceedingly. If ought be added, or altered, lette me heare from you. I shall willingly attend doo it, the more speedily if it be before the terme. So in hast I commend my best services to you. Chancery Lane. 20 Jan., 1600. Yours to your service very willingly.—JO. DAVIS."

We presume that the poem was presented as appears to have been agreed upon; that its Dedication was found pleasant, and though not forwarded as a Christmas gift to Her Majesty,—his copy of St. Agnes letter procured its being fairly put before the Queen at latest on Candlemas—as perhaps suitable for the day of the "Purification" of the Virgin, or as an intellectual candle of the Spirit.

"While Shakspeare was peopling the stage with picturesque pageantry, and Spenser, in the zenith of his reputation, was irradiating the intellectual atmosphere with the sunshine of his beautiful imagination, Davies struck into a path in which he had no forerunner, and cannot be said to have had any successor. Having in the poem of the 'Orchestra' displayed a playful melody of diction, and shown his acquaintance with all the graces of style, he produced our first and noblest didactic poem—a poem which by the highest dignity of conception united the stateliest harmony of expression. With a fancy nourished by extensive observation of works and men he employs it only to light up the chain of his reasoning, and to render more completely manifest the mechanism of the argument." *

In its philosophical aspect the poem is a compound of Christianity and Platonism, as opposed to the spirit of scepticism and materialism. The thinking is profound, the reasoning close, the

* J. A. Willmott's "Lives of the Sacred Poets."

tation subtle, the logic keen, and the metaphysic idealistic, such a rapid succession of similes drawn from natural na that, as Campbell says, "we know not whether to call ights more poetically or philosophically just."

philosophical poem, the earliest of the kind in the language, ved the warmest praise from the most competent critics. s described by George Lillie Craik:—"It is written in the common heroic ten-syllable verse, but disposed in It has the disadvantage of requiring the sense general closed at certain regularly and quickly-occurring ich yet are very ill adapted for an effective pause. . . . However, has conquered its difficulties. . . . In fact, it densation and sententious brevity, so carefully filed and d as to involve no sacrifice of perspicuity or fulness of n. . . . Every quatrain is a pointed expression of a thought, like one of Rochefoucault's Maxims; each eing, by great skill and painstaking in the packing, made o fit and fill the same case. It may be doubted, however, Davies would not have produced a still better poem if he en a measure which would have allowed him greater and real variety; unless, indeed, his poetical talent was that required the suggestive aid and guidance of such restraints as he had to cope with in this; and what would a bondage to a more fiery and teeming imagination was support to his." *

erious, philosophical, and unimpassioned Hallam gives a erdict quite as high and appreciative, in these terms:— s no language can produce a poem, extending to so great of more condensation of thought, or in which fewer verses will be found. Yet, according to some definitions, ce Teipsum' is wholly unpoetical, inasmuch as it shows on and little fancy. If it reaches the heart at all it is the reason. But since strong argument, in terse and yle, fails not to give us pleasure in prose, it seems strange ould lose its effect when it gains the aid of regular metre y the ear and assist the memory. Lines there are in hich far outweigh much of the descriptive and imaginative the last two centuries, whether we estimate them by the

pleasure they impart to us, or by the intellectual vigour of display. Experience has shown that the faculties peculiarly deemed poetical are frequently exhibited in a considerable degree, but very few have been able to preserve a perspicuous brevity without stiffness or pedantry (allowance made for the subject of the times), in metaphysical reasoning, so successfully as Sir J. Davies." *

Dr. George MacDonald, with a poet's emotional demand says "It is a wonderful instance of what can be done for metaphysics in verse, and by means of imagination or poetic embodiment generally. Argumentation cannot, of course, naturally belong to the region of poetry, however well it may comport itself when thus naturalized; and consequently, although there are some poetical as well as profound passages in the treatise, a light scruple arises whether its constituent matter can properly be called poetry. In all events, however, certain of the more prosaic measures and stanzas lend themselves readily, and with much favour, to some of the more complex and logical necessities. And it must be remembered that in human speech, as in the human mind, there are no absolute divisions: power shades off into feeling; and the dialectic logic may find the heroic couplet render it good service. . . . The poem contains much excellent argument in mental science as well as in religion and metaphysics. . . . The feeling is assuredly profound, but in form and expression the philosophy is quite the upper hand." †

Of this English poetic "*Phædo*," or argument for the immortality of the soul, which has won an enduring fame for its author by the consent of critics so various and so able, we have to submit the following epitome, from which it will be seen with what a powerful, and comprehensive intellect, with what sagacity and nobleness of spirit, with what variousness and singularity of fancy, with what felicitous grace and exquisite strength, with what precision and clearness of language, he has accomplished the task of composing a philosophical poem whose subtlety of argument, fluency of style, glowing pictoriality of imaginative illustration constitute it a model of condensed thought and concise expression. In his *Dedication* "to my most gracious, dread sovereign,"

"Loadstone to hearts, and loadstone to all eyes,"

* Hallam's "Literature of Europe" (vol. ii., pt. ii., ch. v., p. 159).

† "England's Antiphon" (p. 159.)

it as showing

Some sparkles of that fire
Whereby we reason, move, and live, and be;
These sparks by Nature ever more aspire,
Which makes them to so high an Highness flee."

roduction of human knowledge he questions the wisdom

"Since the desire to know first made men fools.
And did corrupt the root of all mankind."

God had written on the hearts "of our first parents
of good," they desired to know not only good but evil,
gressed. In this men still follow their evil example.
ledge is, he asserts, "true wisdom in the first degree,"
ble because :—

power which gave me eyes the world to view
see myself infus'd an inward light,
by my soul, as by a mirror true,
her own form may take a perfect sight,
s the sharpest eye discerneth nought,
cept the sunnebeames in the Ayre doe shine:
e best soule with her reflecting thought,
s not herself without some light diuine.
ght which mak'st the light, which makes the day;
hich set'st the eye without, and mind within;
en my spirit with one clear heavenly ray,
hich now to view itself doth first begin."

mistakes have been made concerning the nature of the soul,
greatly to be wondered at, for :—

udge herself she must herself transcend,
greater circles comprehend the lesse;
she wants power her owne powers to extend
fettered men cannot their strength expresse.

soule a substance and a spirit is,
hich God himselfe doth in the body make,
ch makes the man: for every man from this,
ne nature of a man, and name doth take.

d though this spirit be to the body knit,
s an apt meane her powers to exercise
hich are life, motion, sense, and will and wit,
et she survives, although the body dies."

rms his opinion "that the soul is a thing subsisting by
out the body," thus :—

"For when she sorts things present with things past,
 And thereby things to come to pass doth oft foresee;
 When she doth doubt at first, and chuse at last,
 These acts her own without the body bee.
 When in the effects she doth the causes know,
 And seeing the stream, thinks when the spring doth rise; [ce
 And seeing the branch conceives the root below,
 These things she views without the bodie's eyes. . . .
 When she defines, argues, diuides compounds,
 Considers vertue, vice and generall things,
 And marrying diuers principles and grounds,
 Out of their match a true conclusion brings.
 These actions in her closet all alone,
 Retired within herselfe she doth fulfill;
 Use of her bodie's organs she hath none,
 When she doth use the powers of wit and will.
 Yet in the bodie's prison so she lies,
 As through the bodie's windows she must looke,
 Her diuers powers of sense to exercise
 By gathering notes out of the World's great book.
 Nor can herselfe discourse or iudge of ought
 But what the sense collects and home doth bring;
 And yet the powers of her discoursing thought,
 From these collections is a diuers thing. . . .
 But when she sits to iudge the good and ill,
 And to discern betwixt the false and true
 She is not guided by the senses' skill,
 But doth each thing in her owne mirrour view.
 Then she the senses checks, which oft do erre,
 And euer against their false reports decrees;
 And oft she doth condemne what they preferre,
 For with a power above the sense, she sees. . . .
 Then her selfe . . . being nature shines in this,
 That she performes her noblest works alone;
 The works, the touchstone of the nature is,
 And by their operations things are knowne."

In supporting the affirmative of the question, "Is the soul a thing more than a perfection or reflection of the sense?" he says

"Are they not sencelesse then, that thinke the soul
 Nought but a fine perception of the sense,
 Or of the forms which fancie doth enroule,
 A quicke resulting, and a consequence?
 What is it then that doth the sense accuse,
 Both of false judgments, and fond appetites?
 What makes us do what sense doth most refuse
 Which oft in torment of the sense delights? . . .
 If we had nought but sense, then only they
 Should have sound minds, which have their senses sound:
 But wisdom growes when senses doe decay,
 And folly most in quickest sense is found. . . .

outsides knowes; the Soule thro' all things sees:
 sense, circumstance; she, doth the substance view.
 she sees the barke, but she the life of trees;
 she heares the sounds, but she, the concords true. . . .
 is the Soule a nature, which containes
 the powerre of sense, within a greater power,
 which doth employ and see the senses paines,
 that sits and rules within her private bower."

certain is he that the soul is more than the temperature
 of the body; asking pertinently if it be so:—

doth not beautie then refine the wit?
 and good complexion rectify the will?
 doth not health bring wisdom still with it,
 why doth not sickness make men Bruitish still?"

g then that the answer will be in the affirmative, he en-
 d and sustains that idea by carrying the thoughts back to
 assertion regarding the nature of the soul:—

then the soul works by her selfe alone,
 springs not from sense, nor humours well agreeing,
 nature is peculiar, and her owne:
 she is a substance, and a perfect being."

he proceeds to affirm and argue "that the soul is a spirit"

is a Spirit, yet not like ayre or winde
 nor like the spirits about the heart and braine;
 like those spirits which alchymists do find,
 when they in every thing seeke gold in vaine. . . .

bodies are confined within some place,
 that she all place within herself confines;
 bodies have their measure, and their space,
 that who can draw the soule's dimension lines? . . .

in what vast body must we make the mind
 wherein are men, beasts, trees, towns, seas and lands:
 yet each thing a proper place doth find,
 and each thing in the true proportion stands? . . .

btlesse this could not bee, but that she turnes
 bodies to spirits, by sublimation strange:
 she converts to fire the things it burnes,
 as we our meat into our nature change.

in their grosse matter she abstracts the formes
 and draws a kind of quintessence from things;
 which to her proper nature she transformes,
 to bear them light on her celestially wings: . . .

the body and soule have such diversities,
 well might we muse, how first their match began;

But that we learne, that He that spread the skies,
And fixt the Earth first form'd the soule in man."

In discussing certain erroneous notions on the creation of souls he derives the idea of eternal transmigration or the existence of souls, from all eternity ready-made :—

"But as God's handmaid Nature, doth create
Bodies in time distinct, and order due ;
So God gines soules the like successiue date,
Which Himselfe makes in bodies formed new :
Which Himselfe makes, of no materiall thing :
For unto angels He no power hath given,
Either to form the shape or stuffe to bring
From ayre or Fire, or substance of the Heaven."

He thinks that if we believe that the soul is derived from the parents of a human being we shall fall into gross error :—

"How can we say that God the soule doth make,
But we must make him author of her sinne ?
Then from Man's soul she doth beginning take,
Since in man's soul corruption did begin."

"But many subtill wits haue justifi'd
That soules from foules spirituallly may spring ;
Which (if the nature of the soule be tri'd)
Will euen in Nature proue as grosse a thing."

Nature shows us that like gives birth to like, and that the soul being immaterial, could have no source but Deity :—

"Then is the soule from God ; so pagans say,
Which saw by Nature's light her heavenly kind :
Naming her kin to God, and God's bright ray,
A citizen of Heauen to earth confined."

Reasons drawn from divinity succeed those drawn from nature on this subject. Here is a good passage :—

"O could we see how cause from cause doth spring,
How mutually they linkt and folded are !
And heare how oft one disagreeing string
The harmony doth rather make than marre ?

"And view at once, how death by sinne is brought,
And how from death a better life doth rise,
How this God's justice and His mercy taught :
We this decree would praise, as right and wise.

"But we that measure times by first and last,
The sight of things successively, doe take,
When God on all at once his views doth cast,
And of all times doth but one instant make.

in Himself as in a glasse he sees,
 or from him by him through him all things be :
 sight is not discursive by degrees,
 at seeing the whole, each single part doth see."

sets the doctrine of hereditary evil, and speaks of it thus:—

what is this contagious sinne of kinde
 at a privation of that [God's] grace within?
 of that great rich dowry of the minde
 which all had had, but for the first man's sin? . . .

let us know that God the Maker is
 'all the soules, in all the men that be,
 their corruption is no fault of His,
 at the first man's that broke God's first decree."

ask why the soul is united to the body he is ready with

first made angels bodilesse, pure minds,
 then other things, which mindlesse bodies bee ;
 He made Man, th' horizon 'twixt both kinde
 whom we doe the Worlds abridgement see."

every further, in what manner the soul is united to the
 following beautiful quotation supplies a glimpse of his

in dwells she not therein as in a tent,
 or as a pilot in his ship doth sit ;
 as the spider in his web is pent ;
 or as the wax retains the print in it ;
 as a vessell water doth containe ;
 or as one liquor in another shed ;
 as the heat doth in the fire remains ;
 or as a voice throughout the ayre is spread :
 as the faire and cheerfull Morning light,
 both here and there her silver beams impart,
 in an instant doth herselfe vnite
 to the transparent ayre, in all, and part : . . .
 doth the piercing soul the body fill,
 being all in all, and all in part diffused,
 invisable, incorruptible, still
 'not for it encountred, troubled or confus'd."

cerns the manner in which the soul doth exercise the
 the body, we are pointed to the analogy of the sun, which,
 doing the same thing, produces a great variety of effects:—

in our little world : this soul of ours,
 being only one and to one body tied,
 with use, on diuers objects, diuers powers,
 And so are her effects diuersified."

A very ingenious passage on the vegetative or quickening power of the soul is given, and then he passes to consider the power of the senses, and concludes:—

"These are the windows through the which she views
The light of knowledge, which is life's load-stare,
And yet while she these spectacles doth vse,
Oft worldly things seeme greater than they are."

Of sight and hearing he gives explanatory notices, from which we select these verses:—

"Here are they guides, which doe the body lead,
Which else would stumble in eternal night,
Here in this world they do much knowledge read,
And are the casements which admit most light. . . .

"Thus by the organs of the Eye and Eare,
The soule with knowledge doth herself endue:
Thus she her prison may with pleasure beare,
Hauing such prospects, all the world to view.

"These conduit-pipes of knowledge feed the mind
But th' other there attend the body still;
For by their seruices the soule doth find,
What things are to the Body good or ill."

On the transformation of sensation into conception he is suggestive and good, but we can only give these detached lines:—

"These are the outward instruments of sense,
These are the guards which every thing must pass
Ere it approach the minds intelligence,
Or touch the Fantasie, Witts looking glasse.

"And yet these porters, which all things admit
Themselves perceive not nor discern the things;
One common power doth in the forehead sit,
Which all their proper formes together brings. . . .

"WHERE FANTASIE, neere hand-maid of the mind,
Sits and beholds, and doth discern them all;
Compounds in one, things diuers in their kind;
Compares the black and white, the great and small. . . .

"This busy pouer is working day and night;
For when the outward senses rest doe take,
A thousand dreames, fantasticall and light,
With fluttering wings doe keepe her still awake. . . .

"Here sense's apprehension, end doth take;
As when a stone is into water cast,
One circle doth another circle make,
Till the last circle touch the bank at last. . . .

"Thus the soule tunes the bodie's instruments;
These harmonies she makes with life and sense;

the organs fit are by the body lent,
But th' action flows from the soule's influence."

g thus dealt with fancy, memory, and active power he
to regard the intellectual nature of the soul, and singularly
here is a distinction which, when made long afterwards,
high to confer honour on Kant, and formed a great portion
bably Dr. Ingleby will tell us soon—of the philosophy of
e, :—

THE WITT, the pupill of the soule's cleare eye,
And in man's world, the onely shining stare,
Shines in the mirror of the fantasie,
Where all the gatherings of the senses are. . . .

here she rates things and moves from ground to ground,
The name of Reason she obtains by this;
At when by Reason she the truth hath found,
And standeth fixt, she Understanding is.

When her assent she lightly doth encline
To either part, she is OPINION hight :
At when she doth by principles define
A certaine truth, she hath true JUDGMENT's sight.

And as from senses Reason's worke doth spring,
So many reasons understanding gaine,
And many understandings knowledge bring ;
And by much knowledge, wisdom we obtain. . . .

For Nature in man's heart her laws doth pen,
Prescribing truth to wit, and good to will,
Which doe accuse, or else excuse all men,
For every thought or practice good or ill. . . .

And as this wit should goodnesse truely know,
We have a will, which that true good should choose ;
Nough will does oft (when wit false formes doth show)
Take ill for good, and good for ill refuse."

the relations between the understanding and the will, here
ideas which are exceeding Coleridgean :—

Will puts in practice what the wit deviseth :
Will ever acts, and wit contemplates still ;
And as from wit the power of wisdom riseth,
All other vertues, daughters are of will.

Will is the prince, and wit the counsiler
Which doth for common good in counsell sit,
And when wit is resolu'd, will lends her power
To execute what is aduised by Witt. . . .

his is the soule, and these her vertues bee ;
Which, though they have their sundry proper ends,

- And one exceeds another in degree,
 Yet each on other mutually depends.
- "Our wit is given, Almighty God to know;
 Our will is given to love him being known:
 But God could not be known to us below,
 But by his works which through the sense are showne.
- "And as the wit doth reap the fruits of sense,
 So doth the quickening power the senses feed;
 Thus while they do their sundry gifts dispense,
 The best the service of the least doth need. . . .
- "Yet these three powers are not three souls, but one,
 As one and two are both contained in three—
 Three being one number by itself alone,
 A shadow of the blessed Trinitie."

Having reached this conclusion he is led to reflection; and the consideration of the glorious nature of the spirit of man exalts his ideas and emotions so that he utters a splendid acclamation of praise and love, of which the following verses form but a part:—

- "O! what a lively life, that heavenly power!
 What spreading virtue, what a sparkling fire!
 How great, how plentiful, how rich a dower,
 Dost thou within this dying flesh inspire!
- "Thou leav'st Thy print in other works of Thine;
 But Thy whole image Thou in man hast writ:
 There cannot be a creature more divine,
 Except (like Thee) it should be infinite.
- "But it exceeds man's thought to think how high,
 God hath raised man, since God a man became.
 The angels do admire this Mystery,
 And are astonished when they view the same.
- "Nor hath He given these blessings for a day,
 Nor made them on the body's life depend:
 The soul though made in time survives for aye,
 And though it hath beginning sees no end.
- "Her only end, is never ending bliss,
 Which is the eternal face of God to see,
 Who Last of Ends, and First of Causes, is;
 And to do this she must eternal be."

Of the eternal duration of the soul he entertains no doubt. He argues this first from the desire of the soul for knowledge, and its eagerness to learn the truth of things:—

- "But in this life no soul the truth can know
 So perfectly, as it hath power to do;
 If then perfection be not found below,
 An higher place must make her mount thereto."

Another reason is deduced from the motion of the soul, its aspira-

endency. Of this splendid passage, replete with beautiful and marvellous logic, we can only give the suggestive open-

—
 AINE, how can shee but immortall bee?
 When with the motions of both will and wit,
 still aspireth to eternitie,
 and neuer rests till she attain to it?"

her grounds for trusting in the immortality of the soul
 in (1), the contempt for death often displayed by the
 (2), the fear of death felt by the wicked:—

ubtesse all soules have a surviving thought,
 herefore of death we thinke with quiet minde;
 if we thinke of being turned to nought,
 trembling horror in our soules we find.

d as the better spirit, when she doth beare
 scorne of death doth shew she cannot die;
 when the wicked soule death's face doth feare,
 ven then she proves her own eternitie. . . .

hen all soules, both good and bad, doe teach,
 With generall voice, that soules can neuer die,
 not man's flattering glosse, but Nature's speech,
 Which like God's oracle can never lie."

neral craving for eternal life is also thus brought before us
 nment for its rightful possession of an undying being:—

nce springs that uniuersall strong desire,
 Which all men haue of immortalitie:
 t some few spirits vnto this thought aspire,
 ut all men's minds in this united be. . . .

om this desire, that maine desire proceeds,
 Which all men haue surviving fame to gaine,
 tombs, by bookes, by memorable deeds;
 or she that this desires, doth still remaine."

he very question and doubt, the mere controversy regard-
 ords reason for believing it. There would be no dispute
 f there were no probability of its being true:—

even the thought of immortalitie,
 eing an act done without the bodie's ayde,
 wes, that herselfe alone could move and bee,
 lthough the bodie in the graue were layde. . . .

he more she liues, the more she feeds on truth;
 he more she feeds her strength doth more increase?
 d what is strength but an effect of youth?
 Which if time nurse, how can it euer cease?

He is aware that to his views objections may be taken, and he quite prepared to apply his reason to discussion of them:—

- “But now these Epicures begin to smile,
And say, my doctrine is more false than true,
And that I fondly do my selfe beguile,
While these received opinions I ensue.
- “For what say they, doth not the soule waxe old?
How comes it then that aged men doe dote,
And that their braines grow sottish, dull, and cold,
Which were in youth the only spirits of note? . . .
- “But they that know that wit can show no skill,
But when she things in sense's glasse doth view,
Do know, if accident this glasse doe spill,
It nothing sees, or sees the false for true. . . .
- “So though the clouds eclipse the sonne's fair light,
Yet from his face do they not take one beam;
So have our eyes their perfect power of sight,
Even when they looke into a troubled streame.
- “Then those defects in senses, organs bee,
Not in the soule or in her working might;
She cannot loose her perfect power to see,
Thogh mists and clouds do choke her window light.”

The other objections he considers are the soul's dependence upon organs, which he meets by affirming that the senses are in-bringers of knowledge, but that the soul having acquired that, can engage herself in the development of it, and in the contemplation of the truths she can elicit from it. If it be asked what progress she can make thus, the reply is, the senses are requisites for this life, but higher functions when they come, will necessitate the attainment and use of higher powers. The unborn child has organs suited to its womb-life, but when it enters into world-life it gains new aids and instruments, and new uses for those it had:—

- “So when the soule is borne (for death is nought
But the soule's birth, and so we should it call),
Ten thousand things she sees beyond her thought,
And in an unknown manner knowes them all.
- “Then doth she see by spectacles no more,
She hears not by report of double spies;
Herselfe in instants doth all things explore,
For each thing present, and before her, lies.”

If any one ask why souls do not return with news from the bourne they have passed he will reply, the good are too happy, the wicked too wretched to bring revelations of their state. Should any o

that this truth is a cunningly devised fable, he will ask how men could seek aid for virtue by being themselves sinners? y of God cannot be made to abound by lies, and all men e mistaken :—

or how can that be false which every tongue
Of every mortal man affirms for true?
Which truth hath in all ages been so strong,
As loadstone-like, all hearts it ever drew. . . .

at blest be that Great Power that hath us blest
With longer life than heauen or earth can have,
Which hath infus'd into our mortall breast
Immortal powers, not subject to the grave."

as womb-life, world-life, and reason-life :—

this third life, Reason will be so bright,
As that her sparke will like the sunbeames shine,
And shall of God enjoy the reale sight,
Being still increast by influence diuine.

and thou, my soule, which turn'st thy curious eye
To view the beames of thine owne forme diuine,
Now, that thou canst know nothing perfectly,
While thou art clouded with this flesh of mine.

re heed of ouer-weaning, and compare
Thy peacock's feet with thy gay peacock's traine ;
Study the best and highest things that are,
But of thyselfe an humble thought retain.

ust down thy selfe, and onely strive to raise
The glory of thy Maker's sacred Name :
Use all thy powers, that Blessed Power to praise,
Which gives thee power to bee, and use the same."

e man should reioice to know himself a being of God-like
and destiny, and guard against all that would injure his
fe :—

all things without, which round about we see,
We seeke to knowe and how therewith to doe ;
But that whereby we reason. liue and be,
Within ourselves we strangers are thereto.

We seek to know the mouing of each spheare,
And strange cause of the ebbs and fouds of Nile ;
But of that clocke within our breasts we beare,
The subtile motions we forget the while.

We that acquaint our selues with euery zoane,
And passe both tropices and behold the poles,
When we come home, are to our selues vnknowne,
And unacquainted still with our owne soules." . . .

"For this few know themselves: for merchants broke
View their estate with discontent and pain;
And seas are troubled, when they doe revoke
Their flowing waues into themselves againe.

"And while the face of outward things we find
Pleasing and faire, agreeable and sweete;
These things transport, and carry out the mind,
That with her selfe her selfe can never meet."

"This mistresse lately pluckt me by the eare,
And many a golden lesson hath me taught;
Hath made my sense quick and [my] reason clear,
Reformed my will and rectified my thought.

"So doe the winds and thunders cleanse the ayre:
So working lees settle and purge the wine:
So lop't and pruned trees doe flourish faire:
So doth the fire the drossie gold refine."

"She within lists my ranging minde hath brought.
That now beyond my selfe I list not goe;
My selfe ame center of my circling thought,
Only my selfe I studie, learn, and knowe.

"I know my bodie's of so fraile a kind,
As force without feauers within can kill.
I know the heauenly nature of my minde,
But 'tis corrupted both in wit and will.

"I know my soule hath power to know all things,
Yet she is blinde and ignorant in all;
I know I am one of nature's little kings,
Yet to the least and vilest things are thrall.

"I know my life's a paine and but a span,
I knowe my sense is mockt with everything;
And to conclude, I know my selfe a MAN,
Which is a proud, and yet a wretched thing."

So closes the magnificent music of the "*Nosce Teipsum*" of Sir "John Davies, beyond whom no metaphysician of the immaterial or spiritual school—including its great reformers, the Scotch, with Reid—its æsthetic expounders and logicians, with Kant—its accomplished rhetorical, eloquent embellishers, with Cousin—has advanced, any more than Faraday, Frankhofer, Stokes, Brewster, Kirchoff, have advanced from Newton in tracing the nature of the solar light." His was one of the finest intellects of England in an age when England was prolific of genius, wisdom, and poetic brilliancy and worth. By the time this poem was published he was thirty years

* Lord Lytton's *Miscellaneous Prose Works*, Vol. III., *Knowledge of the Word*, p. 432.

had been led to consider his ways, he had endured affliction—
had learned, what his greatest contemporary taught,—
the uses of adversity.” He admits that—

“This mistress lately plucked me by the ear,
And many a golden lesson hath me taught,
Hath made my senses quicke and reason clear,
Reformed my will and rectified my thought.”

The poem was appreciated we know, for editions appeared frequently during his lifetime, viz., in 1599, 1602, 1608, and Thomas Davies, Johnson’s bookseller friend, issued an edition in 1773, with a biographical notice in 1773.

Davies was recalled to the bar in 1601, and resolved to devote himself to a political in succession to his poetical life. He was elected to Parliament as member for the peninsular Dorsetshire town of Wareham, and began to turn his eyes towards “the rising sun,” James VI., whom he went to visit in the same year. The Earl of Corfe Castle not only attended the House, but with ambition sought Parliamentary distinction; he took an active and conspicuous part, in the House of Commons, and endeavoured by special efforts for the suppression of monopolies. He was also anxious to ingratiate himself with the probable successor of the Tudor Dynasty, and remembering that the King had made “the essays of an apprentice in the Divine Arts,” in 1585, Davies presented King James with a copy of his *ipsium*,” with which the recipient was delighted. In 1602 he paid a visit to James I. in Scotland, most probably with a view to the succession, and in 1603 he greeted the new King and his queen in two separate poems, suggestive of acquaintanceship; these were taken in good part by the King. Sir John Davies continued to be ranked among his Sovereign’s favourites, as shown by “verses sent to the king with figges.” On the official accession of James VI. to the throne of England in 1603, he did not neglect his poet-lawyer, but conferred on him the honourable semi-exile of Solicitor-General of Ireland. He was almost immediately promoted to the Attorney-General of the same country. In 1606 he was called to the degree of Doctor-at-law; and in the spring of the following year he was created a knight with knighthood by his Sovereign. In the same year he accompanied the Chief Justice of Ireland on a judicial tour through the counties of Monaghan, Fermanagh, and Cavan,

and subsequently drew up an account of his circuit journey. In his official capacity he was sedulous in his endeavours to dispense justice, and was honourably distinguished for his desire to promote the cause of civilization, order, and progress among all classes of the community under his influence. He was honest, humane, tolerant, sagacious, persevering, and popular. He set himself with peculiar vigour and earnestness to comprehend the spirit of the people among whom his lot was cast, and has a just claim to be ranked among the most intelligent and enthusiastic benefactors of Ireland. He was an able and excellent legist and politician, and knew men and how to manage them.

In his domestic relations Sir John Davies was peculiarly unhappy. His wife was a daughter of George Tuchet, Baron of Audley, who was, in 1616, created Earl of Castlehaven. She was a woman of some genius, but it closely bordered on madness, and, indeed, at last became quite insane. His eldest son was unfortunately born an idiot; on his death, at an early age, his father wrote a Latin epitaph of four lines which Antony Wood mentions, but does not give in full. His daughter Lucy also subsequently gave indications of an unsound mind. Of her, as the sole heiress of her father Ferdinand, Lord Hastings, afterwards Earl of Huntingdon, became a suitor. On this Sir John composed an epigram in Latin, which is considered to be remarkably good and able.

“*LUCIDA VIS oculos teneri perstrinxit amantis,
Nec tamen erravit nam Via Dulcis, erat.*”

The translation (in which, however, the anagram cannot be preserved) runs thus :—

“Lightsome vigour dazzled the eyes of the fond lover,
Nor did he wander, for she was the pleasant way !”

Lucida Vis is a pun for *Lucy Davis*, and *Via Dulcis* is an anagram on the same name. This mention of epigrams reminds us of what Disraeli, the elder, tells us regarding anagrams about Lady or Eleanor Davies, whose published writings brought her under the notice of the Government of the Commonwealth, and have been stigmatised by Campbell as “ravings.”

Perhaps the happiest of anagrams was produced on a single person and occasion. Lady Eleanor Davies, the wife of the celebrated Sir John Davies the poet, was a very extraordinary character. She was the Cassandra of her age; and several of her predictions

her to conceive she was a prophetess. As her prophecies enabled times of Charles I. were usually against the Government, was at length brought by them into the Court of High Commission. The prophetess was not a little mad, and fancied the angel was in her from an anagram she had formed of her

ELEANOR DAVIES,—REVEAL, O DANIEL!

agram had too much by an L and too little by an s; yet *reveal* were in it, and that was sufficient to satisfy her. The Court attempted to dispossess the spirit from the bishops were in vain reasoning the point with her. Scriptures to no purpose, she poisoning text against text. Deans of the Arches, says Heylin, shot her through and with an arrow borrowed from her own quiver: he took a last hit upon this excellent anagram,

THE DAME ELEANOR DAVIES,—NEVER SO MAD A LADIE.

Happy fancy put the solemn Court into laughter, and into the utmost dejection of spirit. Foiled by her own spirit suddenly forsook her; and either she never ventured on prophesying, or the anagram perpetually her hearers of her state—and we hear no more of this! * The appeals, addresses, and prophecies which the Dame into trouble appeared between 1641-52; her *and Wonderful Prophecies* in 1649; eventually these works her to the Tower, and thence to Bethlehem Hospital, where having survived her husband twenty-six years.

must return from this digression to note the further the life of her liege lord, Sir John. Ever and anon, as occasions demanding the effort arose, he issued historical tracts, full of accurate information, able reasoning, and good sense. The most important, however, of the labours of Davies were given, as was right, to the perfectioning of justice, and good government. Among the means by which to effect these ends we may mention the following treatises. An "Abridgment of Sir Edward Coke's Reports"—a work which contains a history of several typical "cases," arguments employed on both sides, and the reasons given by the *positives of Literature*;" on *Anagrams and Echo Verses*, p. 263.

Court for the decisions given. He also issued, in London, in 1615, "A Discoverie of the True Causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued, nor brought under obedience to England until the beginning of His Majesties happie Reigne"—a book which the Earl of Chatham characterizes as "a great performance, a masterly work, and contains much depth and extensive knowledge in State matters, and settling of countries in a very short compass." It has always been regarded as of great value to political inquirers, and Bishop Nicholson considered it "the very best view of the political state of Ireland from the reign of Henry II. to that of James I." It forms a standard authority to this day. The earlier editions bear the dates of 1664, 1666, 1704, 1747. His next work was one equally useful in reference to the legal and political history of that country in which—though visiting England occasionally for business, literary, social, or political purposes,—he had become a resident of much official reputation and great personal and social influence. The work bore the following self-explanatory title, "Reports of Cases in the Law-Courts in Ireland, 2 James I. to 10 James I. (1602-12) dedicated to Lord Ellesmere (Thomas Egerton) the Lord Chancellor—a lawyer eminent for the part he took in endeavouring to secure a mitigation of the savage code of Britain under the Tudors. There is also a learned preface to this "first Report of 16 cases published in Ireland during the whole of the four centuries in which the law of England had been exercised in that island. This preface contains an elegant eulogium of the Law of England and a defence of its professors and administrators. It is regarded as "the best that was ever prefixed to a law-book." It "vies with Coke in solidity and learning, and equals Blackstone in classical illustrations and elegant language." It was issued in Dublin in 1615, again in London in 1628, a French translation appeared in 1678, and a third English edition in Dublin in 1762.

In 1612 he was advanced to the degree of Sergeant-at-Law in England, and on the assembling of the first Irish Parliament under English rule called in 1613, he was chosen Speaker of the House of Commons. In 1615 he returned to England and was made Judge of Assize. Thereafter he became in 1620 M.P. for Newcastle-under-Lyme.

Mr. Grosart has succeeded in disinterring from the Tanner MS. in the Bodleian Library "A Dialogue between a Gentleman and a Post," made by Sir John Davies, in which a high eulogium

on the Virgin Queen who preceded King James. The son of our hero died March 27th, 1625, and on April 9th, great philosopher and lawyer, Francis Bacon, departed Charles I., to whom Davies had addressed some flattering ascended the throne amidst great rejoicings, but already mutterings of a storm, and Coke was in the opposition. ut for a popular, learned, excellent and able person to position of Lord Chief Justice, Charles bethought him of Davies, and in November he was nominated to that office y. The installation robes had been ordered, had been itted on; his ambition was about to receive its crown- ation, and yet it was not to be. King Death counter- e ceremony. He died of apoplexy 7th December, 1626,* arried in St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, where a monument d to his memory with an inscription which can scarcely o give an exaggerated estimate of his personal worth, ability, and public virtue, viz. :—" He was a man of fine uncommon eloquence, and an excellent writer, both in verse. He tempered the severity of the lawyer by the his manners, and the accomplishment of polite literature. faithful advocate and an incorrupt judge; and equally for his contempt of superstition, and his attachment to genuine piety."

so far followed what seemed to us a new fact in the biography Davies, as to draw up an abstract of the Essex Insurrection most active agents in which was a Sir John Davies, while one ents was Richard Martin, alderman of London, probably Davies' of old time, Ben Jonsen's patron in the after time, and sub- order of London; but a comparison of the date of the pre- "*Nosce Teipsum*" with that of the Rebellion, seemed to make able. Our mistake may help to furnish a solution to Mr. estion. "The sudden death of Sir John Davies is usually said rred in 1626; but if this be not an error, what is to be said of g registration in the book of St. Mary, Aldermanbury?—

Sir John Davyes, knight, May 28th, 1624."

ere two Sir John Davies', the London knight was probably he sion of being art and part in the Essex Conspiracy is still e State Paper Office, and is published with cognate explana- dding's "Life of Lord Bacon," vol. II. 298-300 and elsewhere. n Davies, who, however, was not a knight, but of Hereford, asionally been confounded with our worthy, so difficult is it to e strands in the thread of poetic biography in the Elizabethan minus was as pre-eminently manifested and developed.

Religion.

IS CHRISTIANITY OPPOSED TO HUMAN PROGRESS?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE topic for discussion in which we have taken the affirmative part was, without doubt, chosen as a proper one for consideration because a number of men of intelligence, earnestness, and reputation—numbering not only infidels professed, secularists of opinion, socialists of various schools, Comteists, Leigh Hunt, but a good many people who have not seen fit to break off from organizations for the promotion of order, intelligence, and charity which have become associated with Christianity—have come in some cases to entertain, and in many to express, the opinion that “Christianity” (as at present creed-bound) “is opposed to human progress.” I have ventured to be the mouthpiece of the moderate party of objectors in the belief that in an organ of impartial discussion I should have been argued with and shewn the error of my opinions. S. S. has favoured us with an Essay in favour of Christianity, conveniently enough managed, because, if any argument used against it referring to facts is employed, he is reproached with the hasty but inconsiderate assertion—that is not Christianity. The question of our debate referred to Christianity, and not to S. S.’s exposition of Christianity. We hold that Christianity, having embodied itself in creeds, sects, churches, organizations, and literature, we have these as the elements of an indication of what Christianity is, and need not regard the *ipse dixit* of S. S. as a ruling one in this discussion. His review of church history, the main, is beautifully adapted to his assertion—is anything good done in the world Christianity is the cause—does any evil arise in the Church even—oh, that is not Christianity—and so on, the most seriously inconsequential course of special pleading.

Then he furnishes us with this reason why Christianity is opposed to human progress, viz., “Christianity must be helpful to human progress” (p. 100). “Mark you, his absolute must” pro-

The baneful influences of all things else except Christianity as adapted by S. S.—make a terrible picture in p. 101; think we may ask S. S. this one decisive question—Is all to the progress of man Christianity? If not, what does it do in that?—where shall we find it pure?—and where shall it stand under such experimental conditions as shall justify his claim? Meanwhile, we know of no means of getting an idea of Christianity, as a historical power, is to be found except in the organized bodies, sects and churches, &c., and in explanatory works, catechisms, creeds, articles, &c. And we affirm that Christianity which thus appears in history has opposed human progress by being obstructive to the study of nature, of man, and of society; by persecutions, wars, contests of sects, and opposing opinions; by the institution of modes and rules of life unsuitable to man; and by setting its devotees against true culture and thought—gagging men's spirits by the fear of "woe eterne." Mr. C. commences his paper by a mistake of the first magnitude—he proposes to "consider these two entities, Christianity and Progress, separately" (p. 28). But the condition of the debate requires they are to be considered unitedly. He defines—as S. S. does—his Christianity as an abstract theoretical thing quite divorced from the concrete reality. As well might he, if asked if truths are everlasting, declaim on the eternal truths of mathematics and metaphysical circles. Then again he says, "the time is gone when Christianity need fear the daily discoveries of science." I can only reply that the fact is Christianity *does* fear progress and has always done so. What discovery of science has the Church ever accepted cordially and at once—against what beneficial progress has it not levelled all its guns? Astronomy, geology, physiology, history, history itself, have all been opposed by Christianity. But then he turns upon us and says, formal Christianity is not this, not Christianity in the sense that it suits him to judge (p. 262); and he actually goes back to the old plea in favour of the wars, persecutions, &c., sanctioned by the Church, and justifies the means" (p. 263), an argument which Mr. C. uses also as a defence against sectarianism (p. 345). Mr. C. really do not care about discussing the question under such conditions as these. If Christianity is not to be regarded as that living body of doctrine, practice, and organization deduced from the teaching, and the spirit of Christ, and known as

Christianity in the history alike of nations and of the Church, it impossible to debate at all. It is impossible for us to debate the question, "Is Christianity, as interpreted and understood by Messrs. R. W. C., S. S., &c., opposed to human progress?" We must have a concrete Christianity, and not an abstract, invisible one to debate about. Our affirmation amounts very much to what the Duke of Somerset has said, "For many years (ages?) past religious questions have incessantly interfered with the social and educational improvement of the community. Instead of gradually diminishing in their effects, these causes of disturbance seem to be increasing." We see this in the partizanship regarding the Irish Church Abolition, the Burials Bill, the Church Rates Question, the Revision of the Scriptures, the Improvement of the Liturgy, the position of the Nonconformists, the Roman Catholics, and the Establishment Church, in Education, even in matters affecting prison chaplaincy; but we see it also in the politico-religious partizanship imparted into questions of temperance, co-operation, public libraries, elections, parliamentary, burghal, and poor-law—nay, into the very associations for missionary, Bible, tract, and charitable purposes. Either then our Christianity is wrong, and the knowing ones who have the right views, like R. W. C. and S. S., should apostolize the nation, or Christianity is opposed to human progress, as we assume and argue in proof of.

This last remark brings us to the article of "Georgius." He thinks we have mistaken the character of Christianity. I do not arrogate to myself, as he seems to do, the right or the ability to say that all that has been hitherto called Christianity is only "sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal" compared to the Christianity he and his colleagues argue for. I have only undertaken to argue on Christianity in history, and our opponents must be sorely driven when they find it necessary to upset the whole Christianity of the world to gain a point in argument. This being the case I suppose they will accept this statement of the affirmative which is all that we really are contending for—viz., that Christianity (as it has exhibited, and is exhibiting, itself) is opposed to human progress. We are afraid "Georgius" will not do this. He approves of and defends sectarianism (p. 179), cunningly defends persecution under the cognomen controversy (p. 179), affirms that Christianity has purified life and made it happy (p. 180); but has only to look at the world as it is—in experience, in the way

if in society, law courts, commissions ordered by parli-
 aments of social and religious societies—to know that the
 does not accord with fact. “Samuel” exhibits his
 of the “much virtue” there is in an *if*. His last para-
 ally resolves itself into this—“*if* nothing went wron-
 g would be right.” The Queen’s Bible is a pleasing
 excellent as a story, not as an argument. He thinks we
 ed as if “all that is called Christianity really were true
 ty.” How could we do otherwise? We were not asked
 ristianity is opposed to human progress—that would have
 an innuendo that there was a spurious Christianity abroad,
 d have required us to have an infallible test for the detec-
 true from the base—the metal from its alloy. This sort
 pleading is really not argument. When “Samuel” and
 vants require to slander the whole professedly Christian
 hypocrites, and to brand the history of the Church as a
 fraudulent misrepresentation of the doctrine and fellow-
 e Lord, that they may make out that Christianity favours
 ogress, it is quite evident that they are not arguing the
 we are interested in—that is, Is the Christianity we know
 experience of favourable or averse to human progress?
 favourable, why do our opponents shift the question? If
 e, let us reform our Christianity; or, if that is impossible,
 That may be done by reverting to the pure doctrine of
 er sent from God, and holding by that, acting according
 egulating our laws, loves, and lives by that; or it may be
 y taking Christ’s noble view of the purpose of life, and
 o name anything progress which does not trend in that
 Truly something is needful, for at present “Christianity
 d to human progress.”

T. O. J.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

Subject under discussion is one which, from its very nature,
 ted to give occasion for the expression of many and widely
 at opinions. In every age during its eventful career
 nity has been instrumental in propagating hard and bitter
 Its nature has been twisted and erroneously distorted by
 s, though in many instances ingenious criticism; its high
 de the subject of wanton ridicule and witticism; and its

truths turned into the butt of the abusive and contemptuous attack of infidelity. No other principle within the pale of humanity has evoked so many enemies or gained so many friends. It is like a river whose course is marked with many a winding, sometimes flowing calmly through genial pastures, again dashing over frightful precipices, then careering through isolated glens, and anon bursting forth again, but only to cast its waters into the ever-changing ocean. It is the battle-field on whose time-tested surface truth and error have closed in many a struggle. Indeed, is it possible to imagine any other theme which could usurp the position Christianity holds to man? Swift's remarks on the influence of Christianity, quoted by Dr. Samuel Johnson in his "Lives of the Poets," are worthy of notice, not only for their truth, but as showing the powerful and peculiar character of Christianity. The passage referred to is as follows:—"If Christianity were once abolished, how could the free thinkers, the strong reasoners, and the men of profound learning be able to find another subject so calculated, in all points, where they could display their abilities? What wonderful productions of wit should we be deprived of from those whose genius, by continual practice, hath been wholly turned upon raillery and invective against religion, and would therefore never be able to shine and distinguish themselves upon any other subject! We are daily complaining of the great decline of wit among us, and would take away the greatest, perhaps the only topic we have left. Who would ever have suspected Asgill for a wit, or Soland for a philosopher, if the inexhaustible stock of Christianity had not been at hand to provide them with materials? What other subject, through all ages or nature, could have produced Tindal for a profound author, or furnished him with readers? It is the wise choice of the subject that alone adorns and distinguishes the writer; for had a hundred such pens as these been employed on the side of religion, they would have immediately sunk into silence and oblivion."

The term "Christianity" is at the present day very diversely applied, and accordingly presents various and entirely contrasting aspects. Keeping this fact in view, we may reasonably divide the religious world into three distinct sections, to each of which the principles of Christianity are ascribed. First, there is Vital Christianity; the truth of Christ wrought effectually into the heart of man, having raised his mind to the true idea of the purpose of life. Secondly, there is Nominal Christianity; that religion which exists

me, adopted and superficially observed by those who have
 ning or from the exigencies of circumstances, but without
 ual interest, acknowledged the divinity of its nature.
 ere is False Christianity; that form of religion so strenu-
 isted in by those who have either wilfully or ignorantly
 "truth of God into a lie." This hollow religion which
 into the Church of Christ has caused every imaginable

It has blinded the mind of man, and turned away his
 nd feelings into the darkest of channels, in which the
 rue morality have never been known to penetrate. It
 n to develop means of his own, and reject those provided
 his happiness. Such are the three sections of humanity
 the term Christianity is applied, but only one of these
 erts the name. Christianity is not so flexible in its nature
 ace *all* the doctrines which profess to be drawn from the
 nd life of Christ.

es this question fairly, we must consider the distinctive
 the different forms which Christianity has been made
 of assuming, the causes which have led to the breaking
 Church into so many divisions, and from that inquiry to
 of as to whether this disunited influence tends to further
 he progress of man.

nity in its true meaning is the religion taught by Christ,
 ictly speaking, no religious system but that drawn from
 ts of Christ deserves or can justly claim the name. Of
 ial influence of Christianity we have historical demon-
 besides the dogmatic proof of its suitableness to the
 rogress of man given by its great Originator—"Preach
 to every living creature."

says, "This is no debate regarding the life of Christ;
 ussion on the merits of Christianity—of the embodiment
 hich has resulted from the teaching and life of Christ;"
 ows the truth and spiritualizing influence of Christianity,
 gely enough, maintains that the embodiment and form
 resulted from the teachings of the *truth* is opposed to the
 f man! It is undeniable that a pseudo-Christianity is
 hich can only develop principles and dogmas effective
 e social and moral progress of man. Dogmas are held,
 o be based on the precepts of Christ, that possess no
 whatever to the doctrines of the Gospel; but then these

results are not owing to any fault in the nature of Christianity itself, the error consummated being the effect of the false teaching of it. "Virtue," we all know, "becomes vice when misapplied." To prove the impotency of a principle, not from the nature or tendency of the principle itself, but by adducing arguments drawn from facts which have issued from misconstruction and misapplication, would be to pursue a course in direct defiance to the laws of reason. The question must, accordingly, be contracted within these limits,—Does the *Christian Church*, in its divided state, retard the progress of man?

One notable feature in Christianity at the present day is the many divisions under which the Christian Church exists—a circumstance that has proved to be a great medium in extending the truth of Christ. T. O. J. says he has no hesitation in asserting that Christianity has been opposed to the progress of humanity by bringing "the inveterate hates of sectarianism into social life." There is much truth in the saying, "Union is strength," but it can only be applied to those things which can be bound by a law sufficient to hold them together. For example, that law which binds the Presbyterian Church is not of such a nature as could possibly be made capable of holding in unity the Episcopal Church. How then is it possible to effect a union with those churches? Strength does not depend upon mightiness in number, but in unity in feeling and unity in principle within the union. As to the "inveterate hates" referred to by T. O. J. being the result of sectarianism, although I do not agree with him in that particular term, yet I feel confident in stating that no instance can be drawn from the many ecclesiastical disputes on record in the Christian Church as arising from mere personal hate or without having any practical end in view; but since T. O. J. assumes that sectarianism has been greatly instrumental in retarding human progress, I would ask him, would Christianity have a more beneficial effect on humanity if all the various sects were to amalgamate and become bound together under a common standard? It is quite manifest that such a union would be highly detrimental to the gospel of Christ, for there could be no possible unity or agreement in teaching, government, and doctrine within such a (so-called) united church. It is beyond dispute that religious sects holding doctrines at variance with one another cannot effect a lasting union unless the distinctive principle of either is abandoned. Unions on any other basis, instead of lessening

number of sects, increase them. For sects holding divergent opinions, to unite under the delusive idea that mere numbers produce strength, would be to effect a union much the same—

“As long and short sticks are in fagots,”

slight convulsion being quite sufficient to sunder the cord which binds them perfectly powerless.

The various Christian sects throughout Great Britain, to a great extent, co-operate with each other in their practical efforts in extending Christianity; but it is both historically and dogmatically proved that the amalgamation of diverse religious principles not only retards progression but breaks down effectually many of the landmarks of truth, leaving a clear way for the entrance of error in many aspects. Further, the necessity of the different sects remaining apart is very clearly demonstrated by the facts that the latest and most bitter disputes arise within the pale of the respective sects; while quarrels and contests between divided sects are of rare occurrence. As long as there are barriers preventing interference of one sect with another, trifling disputes can only arise; but once let these barriers be broken, then wranglings of the most bitter nature will inevitably ensue, and as a consequent, much labour sacrificed to the mere advocacy of dogmatical theories. It is therefore in perfect harmony with history to say that the great progress which Christianity has made in the present age is the result of sectarianism.

It may be asked, Why should the precepts of Christianity be cast into so many forms and creeds? Simply because men are not all alike. There is as great a diversity seen in man's moral as in his physical constitution. What one man may hold as of absolute importance to the security of Christian religion, another may as *sincerely* pronounce a hindrance to its progress. The conscience of the Presbyterian would check him if he were to perform the distinctive rites for which the conscience of the Episcopalian would check him were he to neglect them. Accordingly, in the nature of things sectarianism is peremptorily essential to the progress of man.

T. O. J. makes the following assertion—an assertion, however, that cannot be substantiated by fact. “Not only are all the evils of the present due to Christianity, but all the grief and pain endured by those who have suffered from the contentions of conflicting

sects, either in their bodies or their feelings, in their relations or their experience." From the dawn of Christianity to its present stage, the wars which were associated in a more or less degree were not "due to Christianity," but due to the unwarrantable interference of those libertines who disbelieved in its precepts.

Before concluding I may refer to another most important fact connected with Christianity. All the influences which have been exercised against Christianity have proved unable to stifle its efforts.

"The blood of the martyrs," shed by the enemies of the truth, became "the seed of the Church." This truth, besides others relating to the progress of Christianity, proves that the very measures which furthered Christianity which were intended to destroy it, have beautifully illustrates the divine promise, "Thy seed will establish for ever, and build up thy throne to all generations." The continual struggles which have accompanied the course of Christianity cannot be adduced as facts proving that Christianity is opposed to human progress, for it is invariably the case that when Christianity settles into calmness the opposing influences accomplish the worse effects upon its truth. The wars, then, which Christianity was allied were necessary to the progress of man.

We hold that Christianity is not opposed to the progress of man from this besides other reasons, that on whatever nation Christianity gained the strongest hold, that nation became the most powerful influence in dispelling the dark and grovelling iniquities abundant among fallen humanity.

C. R.

IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH?

SPIRITUAL REPLY.

THE very memorable words with which the Lord Jesus closed His Passion-ministry—"All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth;" and the promise of His constant presence with His followers—"Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world"—Matt. xxviii. 18, 20—ought surely to be regarded as emphatic and complete, as even Jesus Christ's own exposition of the nature of his kingdom and reign. He had told His Apostles that "this generation shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled."

That is all the preliminaries and preparations for His reign. He had already affirmed that "this *gospel of the* shall be preached in all the world, for a witness unto all and then shall *the end* come"—not the beginning. His was achieved when He had finished His work and given by His passion, and the ministry that followed it, that He Resurrection-Christ; and when He ascended into heaven it glorious enthronization as the Captain of Salvation, and of the Moral Universe; God's Redeemed. This is His reign which shall know no end. He gave as His representative and vicegerent the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, through He spiritually reigns upon the earth. The teaching and the which He has provided through the Church by his word His Spirit, are the means which He has appointed for the of the souls of men to His divine dominion and nty.

seems to fancy that because many of the prophecies of the tament have been literally fulfilled, it is probable that the es of Jesus will also be literally fulfilled (p. 102.) This mprobable. The Old Testament prophecies were given to the coming of a temporal Messiah, and were intended to oreted and understood by men as indications and evidences oming of the Hope of Israel. They were prophecies about things having a spiritual foreshadowing. But the pro- of Jesus are quite different from these. They refer to his dominion in the soul of man—that sovereignty for which ands us to pray in these terms—"Thy kingdom come; be done on earth as it is done in heaven." But there an earthly witnessing to the truth of the Sovereignty of d some evidences of the prophetic certainty of that which d foretold. The truth of the temporal portion gives e testimony to the truth of the spiritual. Hence the lfilment of the sayings of Jesus regarding the calamities of s, their great tribulation, captivity and slaughter, the of his disciples and their deliverance gives good ground ing in the faithfulness of Him who prophecies a spiritual earth through the gospel, and a higher spiritual glory in through faith in Him as the Son of man our example, Son of God our Priest and King.

"e" thinks that it is assumed in this discussion that Christ

shall reign in future on the earth as a *fact*, the only question to be decided being, is it to be a temporal or a spiritual reign (p. 26) but he implies that this personal reign is assumed, while that is just the matter in dispute. Christ shall reign, we affirm, but not as an earthly sovereign or lord, but in the higher and holier power of having all men subdued to the sway of his law. We fear that it is more the promise that we shall reign with Him that makes us anxious concerning the temporal dominion of the Lord. But we affirm that every true Christian does *now* reign with Jesus Christ in the highest and noblest manner—in the power of persuasion subduing the will, and in the might of restraining evil. This is clearly revealed in the paper contributed by A. Andrews, where all the quotations all refer to the reign of the saints, with Christ instead of the sovereignty of Christ over all as saints, when he is made all in all by the power of the Gospel over the hearts of men.

I think that most of the contributors really agree however on the main and most important part of the question, viz. :—that Jesus shall reign, that his power shall be spiritual, and that his kingdom shall be in and over the spirits of men. This is the practical truth we should keep in view. As to his being *personally* present and *temporal* sovereignty for a thousand years, I presume we may leave that among the problems of Scripture to which we have no key. That he will reign spiritually admits of no doubt.

Every Christian already, even now, lives under the spiritual government of Christ a King, all-seeing yet unseen. Jesus dwells spiritually in us and among us by His Spirit. He has disappeared from the sight of the eye that he may be more reverently received into the heart as a power. It was not while Jesus was with them but after He departed that the disciples at Emmaus said, "Did not our heart burn within us while He talked to us by the way." It is the same with us. Our spirits are subdued by His Spirit. We have His presence of power with us in a more real manner than he had who "lay on the bosom of Jesus." The kingdom of God is within the believer. Christ in us the hope of glory abides in us with a vitality and power which no bodily presence or rule could accomplish. Christ hath ascended above all things; not that He may come down again from the throne of universal dominion, but that He may take us where He is that we may abide in the very mansions of His Father, and of our Father who is in Heaven. He reigns spiritually on the earth in our hearts, in His Church as the kingdom

heaven; and he calls upon us to live that we may be worthy of being joined unto the general assembly and church of the first-born." May it be granted unto us to be so "written in the kingdom of heaven."

L. M. S.

TEMPORAL REPLY.

THE words and promises of Christ are precious, and ought neither to be tampered with nor sought to be explained away. They are to be understood, for they were given to man not to mislead but to encourage, to comfort, and to influence. He has not spoken in vain; nor has He given light utterance to promises. Yet those who would deny the temporal millennial reign of Jesus Christ must believe that Jesus, who spake as never man spake, gave expression to words which do not bear the meaning they seem to have, and that He, whose promises are yea and amen, placed before His people hopes that are incapable of or were never intended for realization. Yet this very fact is a proof of the truth of the Scriptures whose truth they would impugn; for these Scriptures say "that there shall come in the last days scoffers, saying, Where is the *promise* of His coming? for since the fathers fell asleep all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation"—(2 Pet. iii. 3, 4).

Here is the promise,—"*The same Jesus shall so come in like manner as ye have seen Him go into heaven*"—(Acts i. 11). This comforting promise given by the angels of the ascension is evidently a repetition of the promise given by our Lord himself, "*Then shall all the tribes of the earth . . . see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven, with power and great glory*" (Matt. xxiv. 30). This promise itself refers back to a previous one: "*Verily I say unto you, That ye which have followed Me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of His glory, ye also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel*"—(Matt. xix. 28); and connects itself likewise with a subsequent statement regarding the time: "*When the Son of man shall come in His glory, and all the angels with Him, then shall He sit on the throne of His glory: and before Him shall be gathered all nations,*" &c. (Matt. xxv. 31, 32),—a period foreseen by John in the Apocalypse as that when "*the kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of His Christ; and He shall reign for ever and ever.*"

"Jesus shall reign where'er the sun
Does his successive journeys run."

Jesus will be Lord over all. His kingdom ruleth over all. His government shall be upon the shoulders of the Prince of Peace. His pre-eminence is unqualified. He is the Prince of the kingdom of the earth; Lord of lords, and King of kings; and the Father has given him authority and regal state. Hence he demands our absolute submission as a right due to Him, as Him by whom kings reign. He is not a Being dwelling apart in the cold majesty of invisible and distant royalty. He is always represented to us as One who has gone away for a season, but who will return to take account of His servants; and He has given us a charge to look and wait for the glorious appearing of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ.

"It is expedient for you that I go away," He says, for if I go away, the Comforter will not come unto you." He has gone, the Comforter has come, and the comfort that He gives is that we are to see our Lord, and that we are to pray, "Lord Jesus, come quickly," to be the King of saints; that He has given His Spirit as an earnest that He will "come again" to take His throne and hold the majestic sceptre of heaven here upon the earth where He had reigned unto death, but into which He brought marvellous redemption. He is to be a priest upon His throne, and He is to bear universal sway; and that sway cannot be fairly realized and secured by any purely spiritual energy of an unseen Ruler.

The consummation of Christ's kingly power upon the earth is His return in glory according to His own promise and the promise of His angels is the hope of His people. His purpose in coming to earth was to restore this earth and its inhabitants to their original state and pristine condition in the moral universe. In man's original state God was his personal Ruler, and talked with him. This restitution of all things (Acts iii. 21), this redemption of which the whole creation groaneth and travaileth (Rom. viii. 19), cannot, it seems to us, be accomplished till all men are made, like the first Adam, the servants of a personally reigning God.

I cannot admit with "Cris" (*ante*, p. 183) that the kingdom of heaven does not refer to any temporal dominion to be held by Jesus. He promised to come again in power and great glory. He is to be the King of Zion and the Lord of the whole earth. Still less can we agree with S. S. that the work of the devil are destroyed, and t

therefore it is not necessary that Christ should reign personally for their destruction (*ante*, p. 347). A woeful experience of the prevalence of the devil's doings in and on the earth is written every day in the newspapers; and we cannot see how he can believe in the perfection or fulfilling of all things (as he translates Acts iii. 21) while these things are so. In the closing paragraph of his paper S. S. gives us an excerpt from his creed on this matter, but does not supply us with any reasons for his "I believe"!

The views of the advocates of the temporal reign of Jesus may be limited, as E. S. M. says, but they are not therefore wrong. Probably no beliefs of men are so limited as those who have a firm faith in the multiplication table, but their belief is not wrong because it is limited. To us the subject is one which should be referred to the law and to the testimony; and we cannot but believe that when in Apocalyptic vision "a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness," were seen to be under the immediate rulership of our Lord, that was meant to be understood in the very sense of the expression, and was not to be refined away. L. M. D. may regard Daniel as quite evidently meaning the Church, but he calls it a kingdom, and I do not know that L. M. D. has in his contribution given us any reason for saying, "A Daniel, a Daniel, a second Daniel come to judgment." His accurate statistics which are intended to give us an estimate of the populousness of heaven and hell do not seem to us to have any pertinence to the argument before us. I place before myself the statistical account of L. M. D., and the simple faith of Job: "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he will stand at the latter day upon the earth; and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God" (Job xix. 25, 26).

I shall not attempt by the dexterities of controversy to ridicule the faith of those who think differently on this point from myself. But I shall thank the conductors of this magazine for their liberality in allowing this question to be discussed at a time when it is fashionable to despise and condemn millennial fanatics, and all those foolish persons who look for the coming of God their Saviour. I do not assume to be wise above what is written, but I am not afraid that my trust shall be shaken or that my hope shall be lost; while the arguments which have been used on the subject have strengthened my faith in what I previously believed.

G. H.

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED AND DISENDOWED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"The province of the magistrate is the world, and man's body; not of science, or the concerns of eternity."—*Sir Harry Vane*.

"The scheme of policy which, under the approbation of the apostles, was adopted for the use of the first century, may be discovered from the practice of Jerusalem, of Ephesus, or of Corinth. Those societies which were instituted in the cities of the Roman empire were united only by the ties of faith and charity. Independence and equality formed the basis of the internal constitution."—*Gibbon*.

"When I find that by those who plead for the Church of England, dissenting ministers are censured and condemned as usurpers, impostors, lay intruders, all their administrations nulled, their assemblies denied to parts of the Catholic Church, all who join with them sentenced to condemnation as schismatics, and no hope of salvation given them but what God's general mercy allows to moral heathen, and all the reformed churches that have no diocesan bishops falling so far under the same censure that their ministers cannot be admitted ministers of the Church of England until they be re-ordained, while those who have been Popish priests may, as all these harsh sentences excused on the plea that they cannot help it, their principles lead them to it,—then, think I, the Lord deliver me from such principles, and from that pretended unity which is destructive of real charity."—*Matthew Henry*.

THIS is assuredly one of the most important questions which presents itself to the thoughtful Briton at the present moment, more especially if associated with the measure which has actually been carried into effect in the sister island, where the Church has been dissevered from the State, and its revenues placed upon a different footing, though it is very far from being disendowed. Here we have before us an accomplished fact, and he who accepts the conclusions of those who regarded the change brought about there after long years of contention as a concession imperatively claimed by religion and reason, by justice and mercy, cannot fail to see that the same arguments which tell against an Irish Established Church do most of them, in a greater or less degree, against the English Church also. Though special circumstances might be alleged, in the one case, which hastened legislative action, yet

mately it must come to be argued in the other also, that an aggregation of evils, though pleading a sort of venerableness growing out of centuries of existence, must some day or another be dealt with, though the crisis may be long postponed.

To disestablish a State Church, and not to disendow it, is in some things to place matters in a worse aspect than before; and however gently and gradually the withdrawal of the moneys be managed, it must necessarily form part of a measure which contemplates entire religious freedom and true religious equality, so far as these are obtainable. So far, therefore, I am prepared to assert that the two questions are inseparably connected, and I answer "yea" to both.

The relations between the Church and the State, and the action which these exert, in unison, upon the people of this land, open up a theme of so great an extent that I shall have to confine myself to a few particulars, and these I cannot handle in an exhaustive manner. The issues are so multifarious, and flow out and intermingle with so many other debatable topics, which concern the past, present, or probable future, that one is almost at a loss where to begin. The Church, as established by law, reminds us of some tree, the downfall of which is resolved upon because it has ceased to be of utility, and, from its position near the road-side, has become dangerous to human life. Its vitality has gone through disease, the attacks of insects, and the influences of the weather; and yet, as the woodmen surround it, though so many parts of it present indications of decay and impending ruin, they are at a loss to know where best to strike, in order to bring it to the ground without injury to themselves, and also to preserve, as far as possible, what solid wood may yet remain available for use. The number and magnitude of the evils arising from the national Church have naturally led men to denounce them in terms which were vehement, and which may have seemed extreme and rash, and few have been able to argue either *pro* or *con*. dispassionately. And one phase of the dispute is at least serious. Owing to the misapprehension which exists in the minds of many regarding the true nature of an Established Church, attacks upon it are looked upon as if they were assaults aimed at religion itself. Men have confounded the picture with its frame; they have set a high value upon what was only husk, and set small store by the kernel, in exalting to a position of importance those externals which are

no part of Christianity, but at the very best cannot claim to more than her drapery. And so with our national Church, has acquired to itself an amount of reverence which with millions of our fellow-countrymen gives it an aspect half divine, and to touch it is to lay profane hands upon an inheritance which those receiving it from our ancestors, are bound to hand down unimpaired to our children. Few will pause to inquire candidly how our Church became as we find it—an integral part of the State, nor seek to know how many abuses, now hoary with the lapse of centuries, have mingled in the fabric with those which originally formed an essential part of it, until the thoughtful man shudders to contemplate the huge mass of evils which exist in and derive their nutriment from “the Church as by law established.” A State Church gains nothing from the history of the past; it is deaf to the lessons which its own experience might teach; and if it grows at all, it grows only in self-conceit. Yet multitudes, while such an organization exists, will come and put their trust under its shade, heedless of the truth that, as a separate church, it can be strong only with the support it receives from an unseen Power, before whose presence “formularies” and “rubrics” pass away as objects of little importance. No; the State Church is great in its system; it maps out human life from the cradle to the grave, and is fully prepared to act its part in each emergency; but its aid must be tendered in an official way, and by persons specially appointed. To the uneducated, and even to those of the educated who are imaginative or timid, there is much that is satisfactory in this belief which prepares persons to entrust the interests of their souls not to Christ, the Head of the Church, but to those who are supposed to have committed to their hands by Him the power of saving others on their compliance with certain outward forms. This belief, which is indeed an offshoot of the Papacy, has long been an integral part of much that calls itself Protestantism. We cannot say that it does not exist, in some measure, in connection with all sects which have a stated ministry, or recognise formularies which, though decorous or desirable, are of human construction or arrangement. In every denomination of Christianity there are those who, through the fallibility of humanity, will grasp the shadow and let slip the substance, yet it is in a State Church this error comes into full bloom; insomuch that one can scarcely think the remark of a living Nonconformist divine too forcible.

appalling though it be, to suppose it true that "the Church of England destroys more souls than it saves." Not thus injurious, of necessity, because of anything in its doctrine or modes of worship, but mainly so through its unlawful union with the State. The same thing might be as truly affirmed, in all probability, were either Presbyterianism or Independency constituted the religion of the State in the stead of Episcopacy.

A very little observation or reading supplies us with abundant examples in proof of the deadening effect which a State Church has upon religious life. Who can doubt that, if we view the matter in its bearing upon the clergy themselves, thousands of earnest, diligent men within the Church of England would be enabled to accomplish far more than they can possibly do now, were they freed from the shackles of the State? Amongst numbers in this country, again, belonging to different grades in society, an intercourse with the Church and its representatives, at two or three crises in their lives, is thought to be sufficient. They are borne, unconscious, into the sacred building to receive the right of baptism; they enter it of their own choice to pass through the ceremony of marriage; and, for the third and last time, their relatives or friends do what the insensible body cannot, and obtain from the Church such rites as it has to offer after the responsible being it professes to regard as a member of its community has gone for ever beyond its reach. Do we find such instances amongst other sects, where the ministers are only called in to aid those pretending to belong to the particular denomination on such occasions as these? The cases are rare indeed. Those not formally admitted as church members of Dissenting bodies, and who could only be called "adherents," do by attendance at the public services more or less regularly identify themselves with the sect they adhere to by the call of duty or the prompting of feeling. Dissenters generally do not look upon the intervention of the minister, at any important epoch in the life of an individual, as having a memorable and mysterious potency. That the "priest," however superfluous his services may be at other times, must necessarily perform his part at or after each birth, marriage, and death, is one of those beliefs which can only have grown and thriven under the fostering patronage of a State Church; and even when that is disestablished and disendowed, it will be long ere this assumption gives place in the minds of multitudes to a right understanding of the position

of the Christian pastor in these things. Or, taking an instance from the past, not without its bearing on the present, how many a country squire, in the days of the Georges, thought he had shown his attachment to the Church, and done something for which he should be credited with a certain amount of merit, which would cover some transgressions, when he filled a hearty bumper, and drank to the toast, "Church and King"! And, once more, in some degree (though not entirely, let this be conceded) through the connection between Church and State giving a kind of official sanction to the routine of Sunday service that attendance there in the forenoon is considered in the upper circles as a respectable and proper thing, while the afternoon and evening services, wherever they are held, are supposed to be the proper thing for servants and tradesmen to attend, if they wish to do so. But if we enter a church, not to comply with a decorous and convenient form of service but to join in a religious observance, there can be no reason, quite the contrary, why it should not be as incumbent upon us to do so in the evening as in the morning of a day set apart from the fellows. This idea of a distinction between one portion of Sunday and the remainder is also derived from the Roman ancestry of our Episcopal Church, and it is sustained in its present form by the constitution of that church. And, it may be incidentally remarked here, the warmest defenders of "Church and State" are to be found as we move higher in the social scale, not, I presume to think, because in such quarters there is a monopoly of wisdom, but because the larger share of the revenue which the Church draws from various sources falls to the lot of those who rank the life of a cleric amongst the few professions upon which a gentleman may enter. Nor are we very likely to give to our modern Christianity the large-heartedness and negation of apostolic times while a church exists in which the success of a clergyman is ordinarily held to be represented by the amount of preferment he manages to secure.

The Church of England ought to be disestablished and disendowed because it has for centuries existed under a false assumption and while designating itself, with proud superiority, *the* Church of the country, is in reality only the Episcopal Church in England. Such an appellation is proof of great ignorance or great audacity. The sanction of the State has confirmed this appropriation of a title which is really the due of all true Christian men in England.

be they of any or of no sect. In one sense it may be said that there is but one Church in England, within which, though seemingly separated from each other by indifference or positive estrangement, are all those who acknowledge Christ as their Head, and are members of the spiritual kingdom which He inaugurated. In another sense there are many churches, there are divers communities of Christians, each of which has *prima facie* as much or as little right as the Episcopal Church to consider itself exclusively the Church of the land; neither numerical strength, nor antiquity, nor a legal connection with the State, can confer upon any sect a right to hold itself as the one representative in a nation of the universal Church. For now, as is evident from the teachings of the apostle Paul, the Church of Christ stands in the presence of God, receiving (in a spiritual sense) those privileges, and being entitled to claim those rights, which were the sole inheritance formerly of the descendants of Abraham; and even as in the literal Israel there were twelve different tribes, so do the sister churches constitute different bands in the Christian host. The campaign against sin and every form of error cannot be fought so successfully while any section of the Church seeks to aggrandize itself at the expense of those who are its co-workers, and sooner or later it will fall to its natural level, or descend below it. There is a wholesome rivalry, wherein Christians strive to provoke each other to "love and good works;" and there is also an emulation—starting with an erroneous impression that one section of the Christian Church has undoubted advantages over its compeers merely on account of adventitious circumstances, which lend it an importance in the eyes of man—which cannot but result in jealousy and discord. So it has been most notably in this country, where the State Church has, in some of its pretensions, shown itself as uncharitable and, one might almost say, as malignant in its action towards other Christian sects as if it had taken for its guiding principles those dogmas which have made the Romish Church conspicuous as the most intolerant and persecuting of churches, when it has been allowed full freedom to act.

But what, after all, is a church? and in what peculiar sense does this New Testament phrase apply to modern Christians? We are all of us acquainted, as already hinted, with the broad meaning of the word as applied to the aggregate assemblage of Christians, living or dead; sometimes, however, denoting those seen by the Omniscient to be Christians in very deed, and sometimes to the

larger body, which is made up of professed believers in Christ. The Greek *ecclesia*, almost invariably translated by the word "church," is applied to an assembly of Christians, great or small, and it might be rendered "society" or "assembly," without diminishing the significance of the passages. In Col. iv. 15 it is applied to a gathering in a house of a believer, and in many instances is used by the apostles when speaking of the collective body of Christians in any town, often but a small one. At that time the Church was one in its main principles, though on minor points there were diversities of doctrine; there was greater harmony than there has ever since been and can be until millennial days, and there were many churches of Christ. How necessary is it, then, if we wish to bring our modern Christian churches into a state resembling that which prevailed in the primitive age, that they should be all associated on terms of equality! though it is not, of course, to be hoped that we can in all things mould our churches on the apostolic model: it is impossible, nor would it be well that we should, in some particulars, regard the practices of the early churches as objects of imitation. The Jerusalem church attempted a community of goods, which was certainly not enjoined upon them, nor upon any church; and though this, while it lasted, was approved by God for good, it could not last long. To prove, when it is possible, that any mode of worship or form of church government prevailed in the first century which was identical or nearly so with the one we now support would not by itself be valid evidence that it was incumbent upon Christians to adopt it in a different age and under a totally different national *régime*. On the other hand, we are not justified in condemning any usage we find in a sect which holds the broad principles of Christianity, only on the ground that this usage did not prevail in the apostolic era. But still I believe it must be admitted that we have a general outline, which was given us to be slavishly followed, and to which, in the opinion of candid critics (including some Episcopalians), Presbyterianism comes nearest, and, next to that, Independency. Hence we see the three leading organizations having a distinctive church government (and under one or other of which most minor sects may be ranked), Episcopacy is farthest from what is judged to be the ideal of a Christian church in New Testament history. Can a church, then, which holds to the system of government that is manifestly non-apostolic, and of gradual and human development, have

right to claim supremacy in a country where purer churches exist and flourish? And should it not only seize and retain, by the help of the State, the title of "National Church," but also persecute many of those who, differing from its views and disowning its authority, have the resolution to follow out an independent course? And the fact that doctrine which is in the main sound and Biblical is to be found in a church having interwoven in its structure an intricate, uninspired arrangement of officers and dignitaries, frequently useless, or even injurious in its operation, cannot be pleaded as a set-off, nor justify, in times the most latitudinarian in creed, the prolongation of the existence of a State church, which cramps Christian energy and often extinguishes Christian life, and whose whole history to the present hour shows a page so sadly chequered with evil. And few things are more startling than to read the details of the injuries which have been done by the Anglican hierarchy, not only to those who, though Protestants, were beyond its border, but to those who were its professed adherents, through a strictly legal employment of its machinery; and then compare the Church's own statements relative to its position. It assumes to be the "Catholic" Church, and can we say that throughout its career it has striven to promote a catholic spirit? Has it given due recognition to that love which is the *summum bonum* of every Christian community, or should be so? We know well the heart-burnings, the estrangements, and the contentions, of which the Established Church has been the generator; and experience proves that every State church, however Scriptural it may have been in doctrine, has shown a determination to persecute those who refused to conform to its creed and practices. This has happened even with those denominations repudiating Episcopacy, as was the case with the Presbyterians during the days of the Commonwealth in England, and with the Puritans (who were rather of the Independent type). Both of these parties had been themselves the sufferers through the persecution and oppression which Laud and the Star Chamber had set on foot and sustained; and yet, no sooner did power come into their hands, than they too began to deal severely with those who differed from them! This is, indeed, conclusive evidence that the very principle of a State church, be it small or great, newly formed or of venerable age, involves persecution; and we might expect, as has been the fact, that a church such as the State Church in England, so imperfectly reformed and with much of the Papacy

adhering to it, would distinguish itself by a measure of the intolerance which is the back-bone of Romanism. And it should be remembered that persecution may operate in two ways, actively and passively; and though in modern times the most zealous adherents and supporters of the Church of England can rarely put active persecution into operation, yet it is done, in various modes, especially in some country districts, where a strong feeling prevails against Dissenters. But passive persecution—that is to say, not so much doing a man a positive injury as withholding from him what he is justly entitled to have,—this is more or less brought to bear upon every man who comes forward as a zealous supporter of any sect but the sect which has a legal title to the regard of every individual in the land. Possessing the approval of his own conscience, and, as he trusts also, that of his Maker, he may persevere in the course he pursues, but cannot the less feel aggrieved that, however devoted to the interests of true religion he may be, the Church of England regards him as a “schismatic,” and fastens a stigma upon him in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, because he does not belong to her communion. While itself the prey of endless divisions, and only held together by the protecting arm of the State, the Church of England, by a fair interpretation of some of its declarations (an interpretation which may be softened down by certain of its supporters, yet which cannot be upset), is found to be engaged in the act of condemning those who decline to conform to its tenets, and yet, in various particulars, is itself unable to give a definite statement as to what those tenets are. For what does “uniformity” mean? Just this,—the imposition upon men of regulations regarding beliefs and modes of worship, which are agreed to by those who either are or have been predominant. A State church can never be truly tolerant, for it demands the fidelity of all the people, or it demands nothing. By its very nature it outrages the rights of the individual conscience, and must brand those who differ from it, and deny its principles, as separatists or heretics. The setting up of a State church must have this adopted as one of its fundamentals by those engaged in the enterprise,—that it is lawful for a numerical majority in a state to force the remainder to accept what religion suits the most; and from all the discussions and conferences which took place relative to the Established Church in the days of the Stuarts, it appears that this point was conceded, with some qualifications, even by those opposed to

Episcopacy, and from whom more largeness of heart might have been looked for. But with all our native love of freedom, we have been slow to emancipate ourselves from a system which took its rise in the dark ages, and which has been continued, with slight modifications, down to our own day, not for the benefit of true Christian faith and life, but because it subserved the interests of class and party in the State. There must always be divisions and sects under the present Christian economy in the most enlightened and highly cultured countries; still there need be little animosity, were all so situated as to have nothing to hope or fear from the State. The "Established Church" it is which occasions and sustains strife, by the attitude that its connection with the State compels it to assume. Complaining of the multiplication of sects, it is the parent of them, as Locke observed long since: "it imposes creeds and ceremonies, and articles of men's making, and also makes things not necessary to salvation the necessary terms of communion, excluding and driving from the Church such as, out of conscience and persuasion, cannot assent and submit to them." And again, he adds that the zealous defenders of Establishments "narrow Christianity within bounds of their own making, which the gospel knows nothing of; and often, for things by themselves confessedly indifferent, thrust worthy men out of their communion, and then punish them for not being of it."

It is a circumstance ever to be lamented that the Church of England was never thoroughly brought to those standards of reformation which were set up by the best amongst the leaders of the great movement in the sixteenth century. The whole history of the Church has been characterized by dogged opposition to those changes which would have set it entirely on vantage-ground, and enabled it to become the uncompromising foe of the Papacy and other forms of error. It arrived at the shape it now bears after a series of struggles which left it far behind the churches of the Reformation on the Continent, and comparing disadvantageously with the Presbyterian State church in North Britain. So many concessions were made by the Church and State dignitaries in England to suit Romish proclivities, while the pleadings of the Nonconformists were treated in no spirit of conciliation, and various pledges uttered from time to time were broken. Since it is now hopeless to think of carrying out any extensive series of reforms or changes which would bring the Established Church out of the

entanglements of centuries, it is, even on this ground also, necessary to dis sever it from the State, and let Episcopacy reorganize itself as it best can. It will probably break into three sections at least, if not more.

JOHANNES.

NEGATIVE ARTICLES.—III.

THE Church is an institution of the country which has done good service to its inhabitants for many generations, and has survived dynastic changes, political convulsion and revolution, social changes and many State vicissitudes. It has a history unequalled for the glory it possesses by any church in Christendom. It has been a great and a constant source of great and noble thoughts, influences and movements. Not unfrequently it has been the very bulwark of the national existence, often it has withstood the tyranny of despotism as well as confronted the rebellion of the populace. It has been a notable factor in the history of this great England of ours, and while it has deserved well in the past, it has in a very great degree given evidence of life, vigour, power, and spirituality.

It is true, of course, that it has faults. It is humanly worked though a divine agent for the upraising of men; and to err is human. It is not, we suppose, maintained that either a disestablished or a Dissenting church can be worked perfectly. The proper course to pursue, in any case of this sort, is to raise it as nearly as possible to the perfection of its theory, and to check its practice by the operation or institution of salutary laws.

The destructive rage of the present day is not balanced by its constructive power. It is always easier to pull down than to build up. It is not quite so difficult to set a cathedral on fire as it is to build one up. The Church is, as compared with its antagonistic congregations of sectaries, a cathedral beside the barn-structure of the Dissenting chapel. It is an organization, a articulated whole, whose effect and influence is somewhat uniform and national. It may not quite realize in every quarter the ideal of the Church of Christ, because it is a human institution; but it certainly fulfils that ideal much more nearly than can a whole host of assemblies of people congregating together under various sectarian denominations, in which little or no common faith is to be found, and who have entirely forsaken the unity of brethren in Christ. In the Registrar-General's return for October, 1871, the

were entries regarding places registered for the performance of divine service by 117 different religious sects in England and Wales alone. Surely this reveals such a tendency to separation and schism, even under our present form of united worship in an established church, as cannot but be looked upon as threatening to grow, by frequency of disraption, into quite a rending of the bonds of religious charity, if not a destruction of all likelihood of holding a common faith.

It cannot be without some serious meaning surely that the Church is so frequently spoken of in Scripture as a kingdom. On this topic I take the following from a source quite opposed to established churches, and therefore not liable to be suspected of being got up in favour of the negative we wish to uphold:—

"No one can read his New Testament carefully without noticing how frequently the economy of redemption, as accomplished by Jesus, and developed in this world, is called a "kingdom." The expression "kingdom of heaven" occurs thirty-three times in St. Matthew's Gospel alone, and is clearly synonymous with the phrase "kingdom of God," which Matthew himself uses five times, and which we find no less than fifty times in Mark and Luke, and seventeen times in other New Testament texts; in all, seventy-two times in the New Testament. In fact, the word *basileia* occurs no fewer than one hundred and forty-five times in the New Testament (for the most part in the Gospels) as a designation of the economy of redemption, in its progressive development and in its final consummation.— (*Congregationalist*, April, p. 222.)

It was the "Jewish theocracy, in which Church and State were one, which symbolized the kingdom of heaven." Is it not exceedingly likely that the kingdom of heaven, for the coming of which we are taught to pray, ought to be one in which Church and State are at one—if not altogether one?

The objects of the Church, as a function of the State, is duly to set forth the whole Scriptures of God before the people, that they may know God's law and regulate their lives by it, to provide for and impart spiritual guidance and instruction, advice and interest to the whole body of the people—to directly influence and keep before the minds of the people the necessity for the godly upbringing of the young; to bear testimony to and uphold the truth of God in Christ; especially in times of national declension or corruption—to promote, exemplify, and encourage personal religion

and social worship—to establish a centre in every inhabited part of the land of sympathy, comfort, help, and encouragement well-doing, and to exert as beneficial an influence as possible on those who are indifferent or hostile to religion. These things can be much better done we think by an established agency than by any merely transitory fit of missionariness which may be excited in different sects. And not the least advantage, as it seems to us of an established church, is that it may form a standard of living, keep up the salutary effects of public worship, and be a sort of measure of holy living, and afford a fair preparation for holy duty. On account of the benefits derivable from the Church as by us established we think it ought not to be disestablished, but to be amended, extended, and set in proper relation to the conditions of the age.

A. K. D. affirms that "the Established Churches in England and Scotland represent but a small proportion of the entire population," and hence that it should be abolished. This is not quite correct. The property of the Church has been allotted to the Church for given purposes, and so long as this duty is done in accordance with the law the Church ought not to be despoiled. If a father were to leave, by will, property to be employed by his children in effecting a purpose on which he had set his heart, and one or more of these children were to refuse to do that which the testator had required, but claimed his share of the property to do with it as he or they chose, I doubt if the law would recognise the right asked. Only those who implement the testator's intentions to receive the allotments; those who withdraw from the responsibility have no right to demand a division of the goods. The Church is an inheritor; it fulfils the contract by which the inheritance is given. Those who dissent resile from the active duty and responsibility of the Church—however truly they may fulfil as individuals as in them lies what they regard as similar aims—and consequently they lose their right to the property bequeathed. Disendowment ought only to arise as an advocated principle where proof is available that the Church has been faithless to the law under which it receives its endowments.

I do not think that A. K. D.'s introduction of the competitive system of preaching for the purpose of attaining popularity and income would be an improvement at all to the Church or the congregations which would then form churches. Preaching has never

been intended to be a means of mere living. While a clergyman has a perfect right to proper provision against want, and for his support, it ought not to assume the form of remuneration for work done. It ought to be given for responsibilities undertaken, and as a means of enabling these responsibilities to be fully and faithfully discharged, but not as salary for so much spirituality imparted, so much of the work of God accomplished in the world.

A. K. D. thinks that the destruction of the Established Church would lessen sectarianism. I doubt this much. I think it would embitter the sectarianism of the age by giving an increased power to the competition of sects. It would be like unloosening upon society, as a prize, a whole host of speculators who would seek a share of the influence, the wealth, the distinction which had belonged to the Church.

Although not prepared to deny that reform is required in the Church, I do not think it has yet become the apple of Sodom, which A. K. D. appears to fancy it is.

A. W.

RELAXATIONS OF LITERARY MEN.—Our great fellow-countryman, Samuel Clarke, took great pleasure in saltatory exercises. This profound logician has been found leaping over tables and chairs; and once perceiving a pedantic fellow, said, "Now we must desist, for a fool is coming in!" Petavius, a learned Jesuit, while engaged in composing his "*Dogmata Theologica*," a work which is said to be of the most profound and extensive erudition, used to find recreation at the end of every second hour in twirling his chair for five minutes. Spinoza, the philosopher, whose investigations and reflections upon divine and human affairs influence at the present moment every branch of philosophical and theological thought, would, after protracted studies, mix with the family party where he lodged and join in the most trivial conversation, or unbend his mind by setting spiders to fight, whose combats he observed with fits of immoderate laughter. Pierius Valerianus, a learned Latin, spent his spare hours in writing a eulogium on "beards." Holstein wrote a eulogium on "the north wind;" Heinsius on "the ass;" Menage on "the transmigration of a parasitical pedant to a parrot;" Synesius wrote a Greek panegyric on "baldness." One Tryphiodorus, a Greek, composed an epic poem on the adventures of Ulysses, consisting of four-and-twenty books, having entirely banished the letter *A* from his first book, the letter *B* from his second book, and so on. There exists a work in Latin, called "*Pugna Porcorum*" (pig fight), of which every word begins with a *P*. Lope de Vega, a Spaniard, wrote five novels, each with one of the five vowels excluded from it. Pindar also wrote an ode in which he purposely omitted the letter *S*. The Karl of Rivers, in the reign of Edward IV., translated the *Moral Proverbs of Christians of Pisa*, a poem of about 200 lines, the greatest part of which he contrived to conclude with the letter *E*.

Essayist.

PRIDE'S PURGE AND ITS PRECURSORS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY.

"PRIDE'S Purge" has sometimes been called one of the memorable events in English history, and though this designation is an over-rating of its importance, yet it has no doubt a title conspicuous position on the historian's page, and beyond the immediate results which it produced, the transaction has within it a meaning, which is worth searching out. The affair has been often misinterpreted, and especially by those who, receiving it in connection with the trial and execution of Charles I., write of and speak of it as if it were the primary cause of what some regard as an indelible national blot. But, in truth, it was not so immediately concerned in that event as might appear. The severities of the two parties (Presbyterians and Independents) which had arisen in the disorganized nation had become more marked, when a reunion had become well nigh impossible, it was a matter determined, humanly speaking, by accident, whether the Presbyterians ousted the Independents, or the Independents the Presbyterians. Apart from the violence done to the King's person, it was obvious that the army and the Independents, were they to take control of the State until a new form of government could be set up, must have subjugated their opponents by force, when persuasion was obviously futile. Had the monarch been deposed instead of executed, or had a Republic been set up instead of a Protectorate, in either case a force must have been put upon the Parliament or it must have been displaced altogether. By no other conceivable mode could the leaders in the new crisis have obtained for themselves the requisite freedom of action, and a prolongation of the bickerings between the two great Puritan parties (after the case of Charles I. became hopeless) might have led the way to a second civil war in England. As it was, we know that in Scotland where Royalist feelings run stronger, and there was a demarcation less distinct between the "Malignants" and the Puritans—

also the "Gospel party," as it was called, was divided itself—a fresh outbreak did occur after the death of Charles which would never have happened, in all probability, had there been Cromwell, or any other man approaching him in ability, or authority in the north.

Another point worthy of consideration with reference to this history of the liberties of Parliament is this: we can only rightly judge of it when we read it as immediately connected with the other events which preceded it, Pride's Purge is only one link towards the close of a series. Nor was it by any means the first time that violence had been offered to the Long Parliament. It does not need much thought to convince us that a Parliament sitting from year to year in a period of civil war, however it might be constituted and elected, must occupy a very anomalous position. More particularly did it become evident to the leaders of the Parliament could not hold undisputed authority, when the division of the Puritans into two separate interests, of the greatest national importance were liable to be decided upon in one way, and the resolution come to afterwards reversed by the fluctuations of majorities, now tending to one side and now to the other. An appeal to the people at large was impossible, through the confusion of events. To men who believed themselves to be under the Divine guidance, the merely human maxims of routine, and civil law, and "use and wont," were to be at once swept aside, if they cramped the actions of those who thought themselves, and really desired to be, the directors of the nation.

The history of the Long Parliament throughout, grand and noble as it must always be, is yet a history of "ups and downs" of singular and unexpected change, and beneath all the pledged glory of its surface there flows an under-current of gloom. The House of Commons, at one time with such a infusion of royalism pervading it that the Grand Remonstrance was only carried by a majority of nine votes, became, after the attempted arrest of the five members and the withdrawal of the Puritans from London, more markedly antagonistic to the Cavaliers. Those who did not change their views at the commencement of the Civil War, shook off the dust of their feet, and withdrew to what they regarded as a nest of sedition and fanaticism. It was now work for the House, the getting rid of these royalist

members, but by degrees they were "disabled," singly or in batches. So numerous, however, were they, that Charles I. assembled them at Oxford, and they met several times, as a sort of puppet parliament might, until the ridicule which assailed them led to their dismissal by the King. Thus was the first outrage, if so it is called, made upon the rights and privileges of members, and, when opportunity offered, the places left vacant were gradually filled with new men of Puritanic views, who were rather disrespectfully called "recruiters" by the other side.

Amongst the effects produced by the introduction of these new members we may certainly reckon the passing of the self-denying ordinance, and the formation of a "new model" army. It was through these measures that the cause of the King received its death-blow, and, indirectly, the monarch himself. Nor was it at all surprising that members elected into the House during the heat of a civil war, and who of course were only representatives of one of the combatants, were men of the more advanced type, and not likely to fall in very readily with the cautious or timid views of many of those who had at first the management of the war.

It was soon evident that the majority in Parliament was exuberant in its gratitude towards those who had subjugated the Cavaliers, and was much more inclined to take the Scottish Presbyterians by the hand than the non-covenanting "sectaries" or Independents. The conquering army, in fact, became a cause of alarm to those who had helped to bring it together, and the readiest way to keep it, in some measure, under the thumb of the Parliament was to mulct it of its pay. To accuse it also of a design to set up a military despotism was sufficient to create an alarm in the minds of many, who, while they distrusted Charles, dreaded almost equally any new form of government, at the head of which would probably be placed the principal men amongst the Independents. Hence ensued a succession of collisions, sometimes coming to actual conflict on a small scale between the army and the Parliament, the history of which we must skim over lightly, though it is not irrelevant to the topic before us.

It is evident, that in the House of Commons during the spring of 1647 the general feeling there was not very favourable to the army. The soldiers' reluctance to serve in Ireland had turned some of their friends against them, and the members engaged in the monetary affairs of the House were naturally reluctant

the large sum which the malcontents in the army desired. Others thought that the troops had a design to seize what they could not otherwise obtain, and so it was ordered on the 22d of March that the forces should not approach within twenty miles of London. A less distance might have sufficed had the army rigidly adhered to, but we find, as Carlyle observes, that the army "did not," and many others issued by the House, were terribly abused in the year closed. By an unfair device of Denzil Holles, a Presbyterian, and suspected of Royalism, a declaration was made to the House on the 30th of the same month, in which harsh language was applied to the army, and it was so worded as to offend both officers and men. Amongst other phrases used, it was said that the promoters of a recent petition to the House are "enemies to the State and disturbers of the public peace," the Presbyterians at this time being elated under the idea that it might bring their party that the king would be brought to terms. The militia of London also was heartily on the side of the majority in the House, and the militia of the city was in Presbyterian hands. The position of those officers who were members of the House of Commons was at this time a very awkward one, and some of them were guilty of indiscretion in speech or act, as, according to Whitelocke, "carried himself with much intemperance." And yet, if we are to believe the statement of the solid soldier, one day whispered to that member as he sat next him, "his eye at Holles and his friends, who were carrying matters to the wrong hand, 'These men will never leave till the army pull the strings by the ears.'" Significant, were it true; but the "pulling the strings" to pass in a mild way after all!

But Cromwell, let his traducers say what they will, was not so reluctant to drive matters to extremity, and there was something in this kingly man which commanded the respect of his enemies, and while he remained in London the crisis did not seem imminent. It was brought about by the bold proceeding of Cromwell, once a tailor, says Hume, at any rate he is now a dexterous soldier, and his seizure of the King's person threw the Parliament into the utmost disorder. Both houses seem to have gone through various phases of anger, fear, and indecision. The declaration is rescinded and erased from the journals, the money in settlement of the army arrears is at once voted; and it is ordered that all officers should at once join their regiments.

This was on June 7, five days after Joyce had intruded him upon the King at Holmby House; the general had already London, unimpeded, though it had been privately, if not openly debated whether he should not be sent to the Tower. It is to date that the vague story told by Burnet belongs. Certain members in the House of Commons gave utterance to their suspicions regarding Cromwell's complicity in the affair of Joyce, and he vehemently protested his innocence. Glynn, Grimstone, and Holles, anxious to have him arrested, obtain the testimony of two officers who are brought in, and state to the House that at an assembly of officers, when some one had said that it might be well to purge the army, Cromwell had cried out, "I am sure of the army, but there is another body it is far more urgent to purge—the House of Commons." Cromwell, so it said, fell first upon his knees, with vehement protestations appealed to heaven, and with a declaration that, speaking in the presence of God, he could testify that he had never for a moment swerved from his fidelity to Parliament. Then rising, he spoke for two hours on the present aspect of affairs, and so completely carried the House with him that, as Grimstone himself acknowledges, the members were inclined to send him and his witnesses to prison as calumniators. What portion of this story is true it is hard to say, a colouring of falsity tinges the narrative; but so much is clear that Cromwell was at this time in considerable danger. He withdrew from London the day before an order was issued by the House that the officers who were members should at once join their regiments. A resolution of the army takes place immediately thereafter, and a letter couched in very emphatic language, is then drawn up and addressed to the City of London, calmly, yet firmly, defending the conduct of the army. This was signed by Cromwell, Fairbairn, Pride, and ten other officers, and it was duly read also in the House of Commons.

On the 16th of June a formal accusation was sent up to the House in which "the eleven" members are expressly named, who are supposed to be the principal enemies of the army, and oppose such an adjustment of the pending disputes as would secure the rights of all citizens, whether Covenanters or not. Amongst them was the noted Denzil Holles, and he had to withdraw with his adjutors, though they subsequently returned, and had to depart again. The virulent "Declaration," which had so incensed

which Holles had been chiefly concerned in, was ex-
cluded from the Commons' journals. The result of this movement
the Presbyterian interest in the House sank into a state
of stagnation; but the London citizens got very vehement in the
afternoon; hearing that there was under discussion a new law which
would take the militia from the hands of its present leaders, crowds of
citizens and apprentices forced their ways to the avenues
of the House in spite of the guard. A number of them actually
entered the chamber where the House sat, and with menaces com-
pelled the House to reverse the decision which had just been come
to. There was an act subversive of the liberties of Parliament,
deliberately, it is true, yet quite as much of an outrage
as the Great Purge, and due to the influence of the Presbyterian and
the Royalist party. This fell out on Monday, the 26th of
January; the next day the House met and adjourned until Friday.
The Presbyterians were doubtless afraid of the result, and they, as
well as their opponents, believed that the army would not suffer
from proceeding to pass unregarded. And, in anticipation of the
result, the army was likely to take, the Friday morning dawned,
upon a complete house. The Independent party have with-
drawn themselves, expecting, as it would seem, that they would be
driven out by the dominant party in the House, backed by the
two speakers, and a *posse* of members, not of course
the majority of the Houses, but including many whose importance
was considerable, quit London, and proceed towards the
country that had already left Bedford, on news of the London
army and was advancing towards the metropolis. The fugitive
troops were received at Hounslow with shouts, and the soldiers
were to proceed and reinstate them. Now or never might the
citizens show what stuff they were made of, and their first
cry was heroic enough, to appearance. "We are the Parlia-
ment, the recreants who have withdrawn!" cry the remaining
members at Westminster; so new speakers are chosen, and forces
are mustered under Generals Massey, Poynts, and others.
But it was a failure; a sudden reaction took place in favour of
the citizens, who quailed at the thought of the advance of the
army, and clamoured that the Parliament yet sitting should
be dissolved. There was a slight skirmishing, but the Presby-
terians soon found the case was hopeless, and the principal
officers on both sides met at Holland House. A grand procession

set out for the city, and those members most hostile to the s fled or concealed themselves for a time. A very humble ap was tendered by the civic authorities, and matters were for present accommodated. And yet when it came to the vote, all done in the absence of the Independents and officers should declared null, the House of Commons made some difficulty o though the Lords carried the affirmative at once. But the tr which surrounded the Parliament formed a very cogent argu and Presbyterianism had to keep itself down for awhile. incidents of these transactions, occurring about fifteen mo before the purging of the House by Colonel Pride, should be in comparison with later events, upon which they throw some l showing that in the opinion of many in and out of the army welfare of the State would justify an extensive interference what would be esteemed, in a peaceful era, an unjustifiable br of the rights of Parliament.

Throughout the year 1647 it is undoubtedly true that the l was frequently in treaty with the officers of the army, and several times thought seriously of embracing their terms, w involved religious liberty for all sects, and a settlement of national affairs without the aid of the Presbyterian section in House of Commons. At the moment the Presbyterians were p ing him to treat with them on the basis of the proposals he made at Newcastle, the generals, especially Cromwell and Ire tried their utmost persuasions in an opposite direction ; and not wonderful that they were earnest, for they were aware of mischief likely to ensue from any long delay through the ap anance of the sect of the Levellers, some of whom regarded the l as a tyrant, who might lawfully be got rid of by assassina The generals spoke indifferently of the Parliamentary diffic and Ireton is reported to have said to Charles, " We will p the House, and purge it again, until it shall be disposed to arr amicably your Majesty's affairs." But when the next pur came about events had altered considerably, and it resulted in v different issues. Gradually, however, as a full persuasion of King's duplicity came upon them, the officers ceased to visit l and before the end of the year, these negotiations came to a sud close, through the withdrawal of the King from Hampton Cour

Not many days before that occurrence the soldiers had iss a pamphlet, addressed to the nation in the name of sixteen r

This dealt accusations all round with sufficient impartiality ; the King, the Parliament, and the King, being charged with treason and malversation, and an urgent request made for the calling of another and a free Parliament, to be elected by the King. The Parliament voted the pamphlet a crime, and declared the authors of it should be prosecuted—no easy matter. But the ruling principle got, for the time being, a decided check. A fortnight after, when at a " rendezvous " (or, as we should say, " review ") held near Ware in Hertfordshire, on Monday, Cromwell ordered out of the ranks eleven of the most valiant, and one of these was shot. Thus order was temporarily restored.

The irregular fluctuations which the House of Commons underwent, as shown by the record that on Dec. 16 a fresh negotiation was on foot, and by a majority of 115 to 106 it was determined to pass four bills for the King's acceptance as a preliminary condition to consider these irritated all parties in the House, and the Independents, already quite determined to oppose any attempt to deal finally with the King, took advantage of the occasion, and passed some resolutions, ninety-one members dissenting therefrom, and decided that they would make no more addresses to the King, that they would receive no communications from him, and also that they should apply to him without the sanction of the Houses. This was evidently put to the vote in a moment of irritation, and was expressive of the convictions of the Independents and the Presbyterians, not in accordance with the feelings of the majority of the House. It produced a marked reaction in favour of Charles, and the vote seemed to cut off all possibility of any satisfactory arrangement to which the King would be a party, the other side were in a state of anarchy or a new civil war.

The latter was actually impending, for the Scots had, after their operation, determined to march an army into England, and the Irish cavaliers were raising disturbances in almost every part. Cromwell in vain endeavoured to bring the two great parties to a better understanding ; he assembled several conferences with the nobles and laymen with very little good result. The Presbyterians, though partly overawed by the army, had rallied again. On the 27th April, 1648, it was ordered by the House of Commons that the Lord-General's troops should quarter farther from the forces in the vicinity of London were placed under the

command of Skippon. The next day it was resolved the government of the country should still be by King, Lord Commons, and also that the King's proposals of Hampton might be made a basis to treat upon. What Cromwell thought about these proceedings can be easily conjectured, but it was the moment for him to combat with the Presbyterian interest; compelled to leave London to take an active part in the suppression of the new Royalist disturbances. That he must have felt aggrieved at the ingratitude shown by many of the members of the House for the material services the army had rendered, and was still rendered them, is sufficiently obvious.

We have recorded a rather curious incident which occurred on May 13. There was a grand procession of gentlemen and holders of Surrey to present a petition to the House asking that the King should be restored. As some of the hangers on about the entrance to the House, they said to the soldiers on guard, "Why stand you here to guard a company of rogues?" A quarrel arose, and a soldier was killed. Others of the guard came up, and there was a *mêlée*, in which several were slain; and the result was that the petitioners were driven out. Such occurrences as these were not likely to raise the House in public estimation, though the members had little to do with the dispute. But the apprehension of new troubles through the Scotch army not advancing to rescue the King, and the arming of the Cavalier in the English counties, brought about a certain degree of reconciliation between the two conflicting parties in Parliament. It was resolved that they should still proceed with the punishment of delinquents and the sequestration of the Church lands. The House of London also declared its determination to live or die with the Parliament.

(To be continued.)

The Reviewer.

Book by Fire of Wood, Hay, and Stubble. By WALTER ROWSON. London: Houlston and Sons.

Book has been long in our hands; we have perused it with admiration and gratification; but knowing, as we do, the power of the heart to read with favour and acceptance whatever is congenial to its own feelings and resembles its own thoughts, we hesitate to say of it much that we would—perhaps should reserve the peculiar privilege of a reviewer in these pages that he decide on the matter of a special book which advocates a position on which honest differences of belief may be entertained; it is a just and right thing that the conductors of such a magazine should not be pledged by any individual thinker to the advocacy of peculiar views; as that in the long run, lead to failure on their part to be able to maintain the severe impartiality of consideration noticeable in the Let not the reader of this review therefore rashly imply that the conductors are committed to the opinions of this reviewer. We have been asked by them to give our opinion on this book, and we give it honestly; and hence our prefatory observations are necessary.

The book professes to be itself "a review," in thirteen chapters of the work, built upon the foundation of "precious faith." The title-page 1 Cor. iii. 11—15 is quoted; and in the preface it is said that "the doctrine of universal redemption" is one which the Bible not only allows, but encourages Christians "to believe as possible, and therefore probable." It is linked with the doctrines of the Atonement, Justification by Faith, and the work of the Saviour; and built upon "the literal word of the Bible, the implied, but the expressed word." "The writer does not believe that universal redemption *can* be in terms of the one salvation; that, therefore, it *may* be; but not for a moment that it is." "The writer does not believe that universal redemption *can* be in terms of the one salvation; that, therefore, it *may* be; but not for a moment that it is."

Chapter I. treats of "Generalities," and contains many well-said things on Christian dutifulness; Chapter II., on the "Spirit and its influence," is presented as the antagonistic principles of

human life, and is a grand practical exhortation to faith and fullness. Chapter III., on "God's Sovereignty and Man's Accountability," reasons well on the necessarian character of our excuse for evil and the free-will credit we claim for our good deeds, maintaining that as God's *will* is to be wrought out by our *efforts*, are requisite, and therefore that "human willing and doing, run parallel with God's, gives the only complete satisfaction to the of man." Chapter IV. speaks of "Wandering Sheep," and "heart-belief in the *true* Shepherd gives certainty of being among the sheep." "Give Him *your heart*; as for your service, that it should be, is sure to follow." "Give common sense to your understanding of His teachings, and act them out to the *very letter*." Chapter V. discusses "Literalizing *versus* Spiritualizing;" and decides that "spiritualizing is a bad habit, and is seen to be so, that it has led good men to do a very evil thing; would you place reflectors of light, they have thickened darkness throughout the Christian world." Chapter VI. considers "Eternal Torment, and Death, Hades." Eternal torment can only be maintained on the theory of the immortality of the soul. "That is nothing but heathen fancy. It is not in the Bible, *except for the ransom*." Life and death are alike gifts of God, and "it seems to me a possibility," says the author, "not mine but the Bible's, that eventually all God's children will be delivered from hades to life eternal glory." Chapter VII. announces "Hope for Earth's Unregenerate Dead." Chapter VIII. describes "Our Present Inheritance" as one of tribulation, brought on by defect of love. "As you know Christ, so will you love Him, and *so live*." In Chapter IX. we get "Wheat, Bad Wheat, Tares," explained as signifying real Christians, nominal ones, and children of the devil. In Chapter X. "Pharisaism" is roundly and soundly denounced as a too common sin, the cure for which is, "Get to *know* God, and you will not be able to sin against Him." "Manliness" is contrasted with idol-worship by Christians in Chapter XI. The Bible teaches, "Think a dishonourable *thought*, and you will not be able to do a dishonourable *act*." The world's pleasures are the Christians' idols. Who are "Christ's Followers," is taught in Chapter XII., viz., imitators of Jesus. The "Testing Work" of Chapter XIII. is very thorough and searching; bringing the heart and life opposite to the Sermon on the Mount, to see if its thoughts and works harmonize with that.

we merely a glimpse, as if but here and there for a moment were opened to show us the splendour and course of the, but even the glance shows something, however little, of the motion of the object. We have a profound conviction the book is a highly valuable contribution to Christian literature, original, bold, plain, suggestive, critical, serious, earnest, and it is besides suffused with the very spirit of the Scriptures. I not but agree with the doctrine it teaches, for that was a conclusion in our mind; but independent of the chief aim, the truth taught, and the undaunted spirit of reliance on the declarations of the Word, howsoever they seem to go, exhibited the book both welcome and valuable.

The Societies' Section.

INGHAM AND EDGBASTON DEBATING SOCIETY.

A PUBLIC meeting of the Ingham and Edgbaston Debating Society, of whose history a notice is given in the *British Convent* for December, 1871, took place on May 8th, in the Assembly Room of the Royal Hotel, Temple Street; Dr. J. A. LANGFORD, D.D., was in the chair. The subject for discussion was, "*That the present legal, social, and political position of Englishwomen is immoral.*" There was a large attendance, the majority of the audience being ladies, who listened attentively to the speakers.

MR. E. MATHEWS opened in the affirmative. He was not responsive to the exact wording of the resolution. For, if he had made the terms himself, he would have omitted the word "immoral," not because he did not believe the statement was correct as it stood, but because we were too much in the habit of permitting ourselves to

receive erroneous impressions by the careless selection of particular words. What he meant, and what he sought to maintain, was that the existing legal, social, and political condition of Englishwomen was unjust, and therefore contrary to the highest interests of an intelligent and civilized people. Their present legal position was simply a relic of barbarous times, and wholly unworthy of the age in which they lived. It was a very remarkable thing that, with regard to women, men were repeatedly constructing theories, and these theories were based upon particular ideals. There were only two positions they could assume—the first, woman in relation to man; and the second, woman in relation to herself. The first was that founded upon the old Bible story of the taking of a rib from Adam while he slept, and thus woman being formed as his complement, his servant, his companion, and occasionally his slave; which

he would take the liberty of calling the complementary or rib theory. The second was founded upon the belief that woman was the founder of her own destiny, and the arbiter of her own happiness; that she had a soul, and had to find her way to God by the use of her intellect: and so long as she could do this, untrammelled and unfettered, she was likely to fulfil the requirements of the highest nature, and obtain her just reward. This was called the independent or individual theory. In his advocacy of women's rights he did not seek to Americanize that noble institution, the Englishwoman; but he said that their position should be determined by themselves, and not by men; that our social code must be remodelled, and some portions of it expunged altogether. The law was most unjust both in regard to women before and after marriage, and he said this with a full knowledge of the provisions of the Married Women's Property Bill. After quoting instances to prove this he appealed to the meeting whether, if they were legislating for the first time, they would impose the same laws as were now found in their statute-book upon woman, whom they professed so greatly to love and admire. With regard to their political rights, he contended that their position was most unjust, and there was no answer at all to their claim to the franchise. It was one that could not be refused, either on the ground of justice or expediency. If a woman had the same qualification that would give a man a vote, because she happened to be a woman she was to be deprived of all advantage of that kind. She was, in the Act, ranked among children, paupers, and persons of unsound mind (laughter)—as being from personal unfitness or public danger incapable of exercising the privilege of the franchise. Let them take the case

of the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, Miss Ryland, of Barford, and what conclusion they would arrive at. Surely, then, there could be no personal unfitness or public danger. It was said that the interests of women were always sufficiently presented by the other sex; but this were so, many of the laws relating to married women would soon be abolished. Women would never obtain equal laws until they were able to address M.P.'s in the character of constituents. (Hear, hear.) Notwithstanding the recent decision of the House of Commons, notwithstanding the astounding action of Mr. Bouverie, that to give women a vote would sap the foundations of morality, and obliterate the distinction of sex; claim would, sooner or later, be made good, and the law would be brought into law. (Hear, hear.) The municipal franchise had been conceded to women, and women now sat on School Boards, and were eligible for election as governors of endowed schools, thus showing that the tide was rapidly turning in favour of woman and her rights. Allusion was made to the social condition of the sex, and it was urged that the important laws affecting women were not strictly legal or political, but as much as those imposed upon the male society. They were deprived of educational advantages granted to men, who had splendidly endowed schools and colleges, while women had none at all. They had the chance of the splendid career opened up to men. He urged the proposition, that every woman had the right to do whatever she could do herself capable of doing. (Hear, hear.) But he was sorry to find that there was too much dependence shown on the part of men to do upon everything done with regard to women, not as to how it would affect women, but how it would affect themselves.

Mr. T. GROSVENOR LEE followed.

negative, and while admitting the position of women was in respects very unsatisfactory at laws and disadvantages which they laboured, yet so the condition of many men. an open question, but he he could safely appeal to majority of Englishwomen they were on his side. (Ap-

The laws regulating the women in society were not as they were represented, position was not so black Mathews had painted it. al position of Englishwo- excellent. They were the society to a far greater than men were; in fact, in on, the position of women, their education was better, good. There were ample ities for women, in art, the drama, and other though they were debarred ering the legal and medical ns. It was quite true that ad the municipal franchise, nicipal affairs were very from imperial matters; e they might have a good e of the former, they many cases, be quite un- rcise the franchise in par- y concerns.

ev. H. W. CROSSKEY next the affirmative side, and the injustice arising from unequal provision made for

the education of women, while that of men was fully cared for. It was also very unjust to close the medical profession against women; and the treatment of Miss Blake, at Edinburgh, by a party of students, was one of the most disgraceful occurrences that could have taken place in a civilized community. They would all admit women were the best and tenderest nurses, and yet they would not admit them to the exercise of those great privileges which appertained to that profession. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. E. TANNER spoke in support of the negative. The present position of women was only what might have been expected, both naturally and by revelation.

Mr. R. F. MARTINEAU also spoke on the affirmative, and Mr. W. J. KNAPTON on the negative side.

Mr. MATHEWS, in reply, said that the basis of the opposition was a sinking feeling that it would be a very bad thing for men if women were as well educated as themselves. He thought that most of the laws that prevailed in regard to men and women were enacted solely in the interests of the latter. It would be well therefore if they were modified.

The CHAIRMAN then put the proposition to the meeting, when 64 votes were recorded for the affirmative and 42 for the negative.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

963. Is it not a little strange that neither in Chambers's "Encyclopædia," "The English Cyclopædia," nor even in Martin's "Handbook of Contemporary Biography," is there any notice taken of or given to Rev. J. W. Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal? The Biblical critic was born, we believe, 24th January, 1814. He was educated at St. John's College, Cambridge, where he was second wrangler and Smith's prizeman, 1836. He was chosen Fellow of his college and made tutor. He produced several excellent and highly valued works on Arithmetic, Algebra, Plane Trigonometry, &c., for schools and study in preparation for the universities. He was appointed Rector of Forncett St. Mary's, Norfolk, where he laboured assiduously and acceptably for eight years. He was appointed Bishop of Natal in 1854. His work on the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua "critically examined" created a huge uproar, and was condemned by Convocation. Amid all the commotion he has gone on steadily pursuing his course, issuing one part or volume of his Critique after another, of which four had been issued prior to his coming to England to appeal against a sentence of deposition pronounced against him by the Bishop of Cape Town, as his Metropolitan. This was, in 1865, declared, by a decision of Privy Council, to be wrongfully done, and he retains possession of his cathedral chair. In 1865 he issued the fifth part of his book, and early in this year he issued a sixth. Of this work it is not our province to speak here.—N. S.

965. An accidental circumstance has made it seem that the systems of Dr. Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster were different. Both seem to have come quite independently to the plan which forms the distinctive feature of the monitorial system of instruction. Joseph Lancaster, a Quaker, had opened a school for the poor at Southwark and had been led to employ the help of the cleverest of the pupils to instruct the others. Andrew Bell, at Madras, as Superintendent of the Orphan Hospital, then tried the same plan. Lancaster, being a Dissenter, was patronized by those who had abjured the Church, and through their influence established many schools in different parts of the country, and amongst them the Borough Road Model School of the British and Foreign School Society. The Church, apprehensive that the Dissenters should have the advantage of bringing of the children in any great numbers, it would be weakened, patronized Dr. Bell. Controversy arose regarding the originality of the schemes, and several minor differences were seen in the plan; but the essential element, the monitorial system, a plan of making the more advanced teach the less advanced, is the same in each. The system was eagerly adopted in the country and on the Continent. A reaction has set in, on the Continent and in this country certain modifications have been made by causing the monitors to become apprentices.—R. M. A.

968. "The Overland Route" is a phrase referred to the shortest pathway between Europe and India.

gestion was due to Lieut Waghorn, R.N., b. 1800, Cham. The route is in the the Peninsular and Oriental Company. From Britain a er wishing to go to India ard time as more important e money, or he may desire, a as possible, to escape a sea . According to choice, he il from Southampton, *viâ* ar, Malta, and Alexandria, if he carries much luggage, is le; or he may proceed, *viâ* and Calais, by railway to thence to Alexandria. From ria to Suez the steamer is e, and thence the Steam ny transports the traveller bay, Madras, or Calcutta, as require. This enables the er to escape the long sea along the African coast and the Cape of Good Hope, 0 days' journey. It was dis- us: Lord Ellenborough had nghorn with despatches, the machinery broke, Waghorn ot return to Bombay, but n an open boat up the Red ence he made his way over- Alexandria, thereafter from les. This experience con- him that this would be a great r travellers, and he spent time, and means in proving its ability. He died, worn out by ours, at Pentonville, 1850; 'aghorn's route is now tra- y many who know nothing of s a martyr of progress.— A.

Euripides was the last of the

Greek tragedians, properly so called. He was the son of Mnesarchus, and was born on the day (in 480 B.C.) of the battle of Salamis; and his name, derived from the river Euripus, where the invading navy of Xerxes was first successfully resisted, shows that his parents were patriotic Greeks. His mother, Clito, must have been a beauty, for she was a seller of herbs, while his father was a man of property and position. He was a pupil of Prodicus, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras. His first tragedy, *Peliadis*, was produced in B.C. 455, and gained the third prize. Fourteen years afterwards he gained the first prize, and again in 428 his "*Hippolytus*" received the same honour. He was a friend of Alcibiades and of Socrates, and the latter is even reported to have aided him in his dramas. He died (B.C. 406) on the day that Dionysius assumed the Tyranny. He was buried at Pella, and a cenotaph was erected to his memory. Of his plays, eighteen or nineteen are extant, viz., *Medea*, *Agamemnon*, *Electra*, *Orestes*, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, *Andromache*, *The Trojan Captives*, *Ion*, *The Suppliants*, *Children of Hercules*, *The Phœnician Damsels*, *The Enraged Hercules*, *Hippolytus*, *The Bacchanalians*, *Helen*, *Rhesus* (?), *Alceste*, *Cyclops*, *Iphigenia in Aulis*; and the fragments of his lost plays are numerous and considerable. I do not think that Browning is likely to be imitated. In Blackwood's series of ancient classics, Euripides is excellently treated of in a half-crown volume.—S. N.

Literary Notes.

Hunterian Club at Glas- as just issued its first six or 1871-2, handsome reprints

on thick hand-made paper, four tracts by the prolific but almost forgotten satirist, Samuel Rowlands,

from 1602 to 1613; and two very rare books by the Anglo-Scotch poet, Alexander Craige, of Banff, 1606 and 1609. They are valuable as specimens of the literature of Shakspeare's time.

The collection of works relating to Junius, which formed part of the library of the late Mr. Dilke, is about to be presented to the nation.

Mr. Carlyle has received from the German Empress the formal expression of the thanks of the Emperor for his "Life of Frederick the Great."

Messrs. Bush & Son are preparing an edition of the "English Novelists of the Last Century." They begin with a reprint of Murphy's edition of Fielding, to be followed by Smollett.

Sir William Stirling-Maxwell, Bart., has been elected a trustee of the British Museum. This is an honour fitly bestowed upon the author of "The Cloister Life of the Emperor Charles the Fifth," a bibliophile, the "Annals of the Artists of Spain," &c.; also who is well known to take a deep interest in the treasures of learning and art gathered in our great national museum.

Three volumes of the Hexaglot Bible, prepared by Messrs. Dickenson and Higham, will be published shortly, comprising the Old Testament prophets from Isaiah to Malachi in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, English, German, and French; and the New Testament in Greek, Syriac, Latin, English, German, and French.

A Documentary Biography of William Shakspeare, "our ever-living poet," appeared in the *Birmingham Morning News*, *à propos* of the birth-death anniversary, from the pen of Samuel Neil.

Moritz Hartmann, a writer well known in Germany and France as a poet and journalist, died at Vienna on the 18th inst. His songs and tales, some of the latter of which were published a few months ago in

the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, among the most popular productions of contemporary German literature, and his political writings are remarkable.

Mr. Julian Hawthorne, son of the illustrious author of the "Scarlet Letter," &c., has completed a work of fiction. The hero is a divine student in New England, but before the *dénouement* the scene is changed to Egypt.

"The Lives of the Saints of Ireland," by Rev. J. O. Hanlon, twelve vols., is a proposed addition to our biographical stores.

A complete edition of the Works of Michael Drayton has been undertaken by Rev. Richard Hooper.

Lieut. F. Maurice (son of the late F. D. Maurice) has gained the Duke of Wellington's prize for the best Essay on "Tactics."

Arthur Palmer, F.T.C., has translated "The Epistles of Ovid," for the first time, it is said, into English.

J. B. Marsh is preparing, for liberty's sake, a defence of Robert Ferguson, an ejected Nonconformist.

Ed. About is editor of "The nineteenth Century."

T. S. Barrett's "New View of Causation," of which a review appeared in the *British Controversialist*, Oct., 1871 (pp. 308-314), has appeared in a new edition with the revised title as "The Philosophy of Science—Cause and Effect."

Klaus Groth's Lectures on Learning and his times are likely to be published as they were delivered at Oxford, except that notes will be added.

J. D. Mullens, librarian, Birmingham, has issued a catalogue of the Shakspeare Library there, which already contains 4,000 vols. Shaksperiana.

The chair occupied by W. Whewell, John Grote, and T. Maurice, has been bestowed on Canon T. B. Birks, author of "The Bible and Modern Thought," &c.

INDEX.

	PAGE
LEADING ARTICLES.	
IN MEMORIAM MDCCCLXXI.....	124
MANY-SIDED MINDS:—	
Coleridge, Samuel T.....	239
METAPHYSICS IN POETRY:—	
Sir John Davies	399
MODERN LOGICIANS:—	
De Morgan, Augustus	1
Mansel, Rev. H. L.....	31
Ueberweg, F.....	159
THE PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS:—	
The Power of Parliament.....	79
DEBATES.	
POLITICS:—	
Ought the Tenure of Land to be Radically Changed?	
Affirmative Articles	35, 190, 359
Negative Articles	38, 192, 367
Ought the Church to be Disestab- lished?	
Affirmative Articles.....	270, 354, 442
Negative Articles.....	272, 356, 452
RELIGION:—	
Is Christianity opposed to Human Progress?	
Affirmative Articles, 23, 93, 264, 342, 428	
Negative Articles, 28, 97, 178, 262, 341, 431	
Is Christ's Reign upon Earth to be a Spiritual or a Temporal One—or Both?	
Spiritual Articles	30, 186, 436
Temporal Articles	182, 266, 349, 439
SCIENCE:—	
Is Creation or Evolution the Better Interpretation of Nature?	
Creation Articles, 43, 107, 196, 201, 276, 374	
Evolution Articles.. 41, 111, 202, 279, 378	
SOCIAL ECONOMY:—	
Does the Country seem to be ripen- ing for Revolution?	
Affirmative Article	52
TOILING UPWARD:—	
J. O. Halliwell (Phillips)	292

	PAGE
THE ESSAYIST:—	
Books	283
Consciousness, Value of the Testi- mony of.....	215
Descartes, René	60
Eclipse of Faith	204
History, On the Study of:—	
I. Method	286
II. Special Aids	383
Pride's Purge	456
GREEK DAYS & ROMAN NIGHTS:—	
Plato's <i>Phædo</i>	118
POETIC CRITIQUE	302
Musings	303
Children	305
Evening Boat-song.....	306
The Dying Christian	307
Trust	309
THE REVIEWER:—	
Davies', D. C., Christ for All Ages..	63
Forster's, J., Life of C. Dickens	147, 218
Dickens, Forster's Life of	147, 218
Bray's, C., Anthropology.....	309
Hennell's, S. S., Comparative Meta- physics	391
Lectures for the People	395
Roger's, H., Eclipse of Faith.....	204
Rowton's, W., God's Trial by Fire ..	465
THE TOPIC:—	
Ought Capital Punishment to be abolished?	
Affirmative Articles.....	231, 233
Negative Articles.....	234, 237
THE SOCIETIES' SECTION:—	
Anew: an Address	73
Birmingham and Edgbaston Debat- ing Society.....	467
The American Lecture-Stand	312
THE INQUIRER:—	
Accountant	77
Actuary, Education of	77
Bell's Madras Education....	77
Books on Legislation	77
Colenso, Bishop.....	77
Eclipse of Faith.....	395
Education, System of	77
Electric Telegraph	77
Euripides	77

		PAGE	
THE INQUIRER, continued:—		Q.	A.
Lancaster's System	77	157	
Legislature, Houses of	77	470	
Lindsay, T. M.	315	315	
Lines	77		
Neele, Henry	77		
Overland Route	77	470	
Political Parties	77	157	
Prince of the House of David ..	396		
Sunday Schools, Origin of ..	77	157	
Voysey, Rev. Charles	315	316	
LACONICS:—			
Aristophanes and Socrates	382		
Barker, T.	61		
Bibles, Luther's	291		
Books, Favourite, of Great Men...	275		
Confessors of the Message of Truth, Liberty, and Love	22		

LACONICS continued:—	
Favourite Books of Great Men ..	
Genius and Public Business ..	
Grote and the Sophists	
Ignorance and Knowledge	
Indolence, Miseries of	
Interest	
Logic and Criticism	
Mathematician, a Self-taught ..	
Memoirs, The Moral Lesson of ..	
Milton, The Idealism of	
Moral Responsibility	
Paupers	
Prophet	
Public Opinion and Politics	
Socrates and Aristophanes	

LITERARY NOTES	78, 158, 237, 3
---------------------	-----------------

THE
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,
AND
LITERARY MAGAZINE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

* *

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PREFACE

It has, unfortunately, become so much the practice to regard a preface as an inflated advertisement-like estimate of the book which it is meant to introduce to the notice of the reader, claiming for it surpassing worth and prime importance, that there, is perhaps only one thing in literature more disagreeable than the reading of a preface—viz., the writing of one.

To those especially who have devoted the whole earnestness and energies of heart and life to the promotion of a higher purpose; endured difficulties and incurred responsibilities in the eager endeavour to achieve it; and have laid the vigorous toil of the larger half of their existence as a sacrifice upon the altar of their hope, and as a testimony of their zeal in desiring to do something for the improvement of the world, it is a hard task to write words which appear to them a modest statement of their aims and efforts under the certainty that they will be regarded as the voice of an appraiser seeking to heighten the financial value of the wares he vends. The one consuming ambition of the conductors of this magazine has been to culture among its readers the free exercise of reflective thought, and to secure this by the open, impartial, and controversial discussion of every question which has interest for the human soul. That capacity which seems to them most manly and noble is independence of thought within the due limits of right reason and just ethical principles; and the acquisition of this they have endeavoured to encourage and facilitate with all the power that in them lay, under the circumstances in which they

were placed. Aspiring to be Free-thinkers in the large and liberal sense of claiming the liberty to exercise reason, within its own sphere, and in accordance with its own high laws, in regard to every matter of importance which might arise in life, thought, statesmanship, religion, or philosophy; they have been misunderstood, if not maligned, as Free-thinkers in the conventional sense of radicals in politics and sceptics in religion. Nor have the evidences adducible in the thirty-six volumes which, during nearly a quarter of a century, they have added to the literature of culture availed to relieve them from the unreasoning and unreasonable aspersion of being arrant infidels in the disguise of British Controversialists. The opening of but one volume might well have sufficed to have dispelled the hastily taken up prejudice arising from a name—a name most innocent in itself, as implying only the balancing of arguments one against another—but uninquiringly supposed to signify the balancing of doubts in religion and innovations in politics against things as they are among the Churches and in the State. The career of our *Serial* has been made against this current of prejudice; but it has been pursued unflinchingly thus far in the cause of the freedom of the speculative faculties of man, and of the culture of the sacred love for truth above all else among thinkers.

After enduring calmly for twenty-one years the passive but effective suspicions of those who regard all Controversy as originating in a disposition to doubt or an inclination to deny, we at last condescended to enter into explanations of our purpose, and referred to the facts of the history of this literary venture in proof of our averment that we had no other aim except the assertion of the right of free discussion, and no other interest than the furtherance of reasoned truth. This epitome of our *past* labours, of our *present* designs, with a few remarks on our *future* intentions, we circulated widely in what were believed to be the most influential channels for communicating information, for correcting prejudice, and for securing the encourage-

ment and co-operation of those whose divinely appointed duty it is to "buy the truth and sell it not;" whose Master is made known to us as "the Way, the *Truth*, and the Life," and whose God is revealed in the Scriptures, and revered by us, as the God of truth. The results have been all but inappreciable, and we still find the leaders of Christian society holding to their old-fashioned prejudice against this serial. Such is the power of unreason, even among those who have received the Scriptural command, prove "all things hold fast that which is good."

Close upon the point of having been for twenty-three years "spending and being spent" in this work, the interval of reflection has recurred which arises always with the need for determining on the efforts to be made on a new year, taking into account the progress made in the year that is ending. On looking over the volume now before us—exposed though it has been to great difficulties in the way of its being brought out—difficulties arising from the engagements in public life which thicken upon its conductors; from the telling of the tear and wear of toil upon the health of those who have given their mind's best days to supply contributions; from the scattering, inevitable in the process of time and the progress of change, of the persons most interested in the carrying on of the work; as well as difficulties of a special nature affecting the trade on which the production of such a serial depends:—we see mental power, cultivated thought, and argumentative skill; suggestiveness of material and originality of mind sufficient to gratify us that the contributions which display them have been entrusted to us; and more than enough to show that, as an agent for the promotion of reflective thought, self-culture, and intellectual improvement, the *British Controversialist* possesses an enduring value, and that the present volume is not altogether unworthy to be added to the libraries where its predecessors hold a place.

Of the value, interest, and ability of the controversies we need

not enlarge, they speak for themselves; of the merits of the several essays, and of the miscellaneous departments, persons of the highest capacity will form the best judgment; of the reviewer, not a few may assert that he has been found worthy to pronounce authoritatively on many books of varied worth; of the Home Tutor and the Collegiate Course the educative suggestiveness is pretty considerable; and the leading articles hold their former high place, and will—when the two hundred and fifty which are due to one pen are read, as the contributions of successive months following almost consecutively one after another—perhaps, hereafter, be more highly thought of than even now they are.

Of this review of past labours, however, enough. A word now, and but one, on our present decision regarding the future. “We seek not to grow great by other’s waning.” Admonished by the lapse of time, the increase of personal cares, the changes that have occurred in the literature of thought, the demands of other duties on their time and study, and the calls made on them for the undertaking of pressing engagements in other fields of usefulness;—as well as influenced by the severe though interesting nature of the competition to which their venture is exposed, the Conductors—who penned the earliest pages of this magazine in concert—hereby, with some sorrow, though with the same unanimity as has characterized their twenty-three years’ collaboration, now declare their labours, as regards *The British Controversialist*, ended, and with the heart, from the heart, and they doubt not to the heart, now bid their readers, contributors, and friends, all the kind and kindly disposed, a literary FAREWELL.

“If we do meet again, why we shall smile;
If not, why then this *parting* was well made.”

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Examinations.

I.—HOW TO PREPARE FOR, AND HOW TO SUCCEED AT THEM.

EDUCATION has become one of the mightiest interests of our day. It is felt that not only personal but national prosperity depends upon its acquirement and diffusion. Every earnest spirit has been stirred to consider its claims and to aid in its progress. At last the urgency of necessity has conquered the suspicions of parties and the contentions of sects, the stolidity of selfishness and the stupidity of "the let-alone system;" and we have become alive to the reality of the fact that man is only really what he should be when he is educated. Ignorance is not a normal human condition, but a degraded and depraved state of existence, quite alien to the utility, the worth, and the dignity of manhood. The manliness of man only comes out as it ought when that which is most within him and is himself—the spirit—is brought into manifest activity, overmastering the body, and making it the subject of that intellectual dominion which the soul should justly hold in the double-natured being—man.

The words of Michael Faraday seem to us full of the very essence of true wisdom in regard to the nature, necessity, and purpose of educative exertion:—"It is an extraordinary thing that Man, with a mind so wonderful that there is nothing to compare with it elsewhere in the known creation, should leave it to run wild in respect of its highest elements and qualities. He has a power of comparison and judgment, by which his final resolves, and all those acts of his material system which distinguish him from the brutes,

are guided : shall he omit to educate and improve them when education can do so much ? Is it towards the very principles and privileges that distinguish him above other creatures he should feel indifference ? Because the education is internal, it is not the less needful ; nor is it more the duty of a man that he should cause his child to be taught than that he should teach himself. Indolence may tempt him to neglect the self-examination and experience which form his school, and weariness may induce the evasion of the necessary practices ; but surely a thought of the prize should suffice to stimulate him to the requisite exertion : and to those who reflect upon the many hours and days, devoted by a lover of sweet sounds, to gain a moderate facility upon a mere mechanical instrument, it ought to bring a correcting blush of shame, if they feel convicted of neglecting the beautiful living instrument wherein play all the powers of the mind.”*

Knowledge has been variously classified, as consideration has been given (1) to its *sources*, (2) to its *purpose*, (3) to its *objects*.

1. The *sources* of knowledge are—1, *Perception* (including Sensation, Conception and Memory—as remembrance) ; and 2, *Reflection* (including Memory, as recollection) yielding conceptions, Reasoning, and Methodization.

2. The *purposes* of knowledge are either—1, *Speculative* or satisfactory, in greater or less measure, to the curiosity of the mind ; or, 2, *Utilitarian*, that is, capable of being of advantage to man.

3. The *objects* of knowledge are Truths, *Personal* or (egoistic), having their matter supplied in Man's nature as Metaphysics, Mathematics, logic, &c. ; 2, *Relative* (non-egoistic), having their matter supplied by other considerations than those included in man's personal being as (a) substance, yielding *Physics* in all their modes ; (b) life, giving the *physiological* sciences ; and (c) *man*, as a substantive being leading to the moral and social sciences, and circling thence towards the metaphysical again in that combination of personal and social culture which constitutes education, the out-leading and development of man alike in his animal and his intellectual life, with the ultimate purpose of securing, not only the triumph of mind over matter, but of invigorating the mind to self-mastery. The best inducement to self-mastery is to know that we are observed, and shall be tested—that trial is before us to prove our worth.

Emulation is a powerful motive to diligence. It is that which—

“The clear spirit doth raise
To scorn delights and live laborious days.”

* “On the Education of the Judgment :” a Lecture delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain.

Emulation is intensified by the presence and influence of *numbers*. When many compete along with us, we are ardent to stand fair in the ranks of those who contend for the palm—or the pass; sympathy excites our nobler emotions, and a sense of the discredit inevitable on evidence of incompetence spurs to care and industry. Competitive energy is also aroused by *publicity*. We wish to be held as the possessors of equal talent, the acknowledged and attested exhibitors of as much industry and skill as our compeers; and the publicity given to the results of examinations, in general, fully excites this love of distinction or fear of inferiority. The conditions, too, of examinations have, as far as possible, a reassuring effect upon the mind. The great aim is to put the whole body of competitors, as nearly as may be, on the same level, to bring them to a co-equality of opportunity. When this is secured, the result depends on the prudence exercised to make the most effective use of the knowledge we have acquired; the promptitude in deciding, and the accuracy of the execution of what we undertake; and the amount, reality, formal certitude, and methodical arrangement of that knowledge which we have acquired, and therefore in the long run on the care and attention we have bestowed on the attainment of culture and information.

The adequate acquisition of knowledge implies at least these three characteristics:—(1) that the knowledge is understood; (2) that it is *remembered*; (3) that it is able to be *reproduced in an applied form*. Thoroughness of learning demands all these, and is proved only by the tested evidence given that these three qualities belong to the knowledge professed to be possessed. Knowledge, to be useful in its effects, and especially to be influential on the character, must, above all things, be accurate. That is an indispensable condition of its being knowledge at all. It is in this sense only—referring to the depth of culture, and deprecating a shallow width of it—that there is any truth in Pope's famous dictum,—

“A little learning is a dangerous thing,
Drink deep or taste not the Pierian spring.”

Correctness in any branch of knowledge is attainable only by much study and severe attention. Watchfulness, patience, and perseverance are the requisites for attaining certainty of knowledge and accuracy in study. True knowledge is not a floating mark, a sort of general aptitude at guessing, or a randomness of dashing at the first and most plausible statement, remark, or reply. The most difficult as well as the most valuable of all intellectual acquirements is that of accuracy. If we desire—

“The mind to strengthen and anneal,
While on the stithy glows the steel,”

we must so labour as to produce at once and with care the exact effect which we wish to have it retain in permanency and display constantly. Sure knowledge we must have, however little it may be; extensive knowledge we should seek and endeavour after, always provided we make a point of its certainty. Otherwise to divide the attention is to distract the mind's faculties, and to perplex their results. It is a common error of students to be impatient of repetitions and revisals, to be eager to make new acquisitions without due regard to the retention and mastery of the old. They hurry to attain, and fail to retain; they do not perfect their power by practice, by distinct, sustained, conscious revolution of all thought in the intellect, until it lies explicitly before the mind, and all that is implied in it is noted. Thus alone do we gain a clear idea of what is essential and what accessorial. This observation brings us back to the statement made at the opening of this paragraph—that the prime characteristic of knowledge is, that it is *understood*.

This might almost be regarded as a paralogism;—for to *know* is usually defined as to understand or comprehend. To know signifies to have clear and certain perceptions, to possess, either intuitively, observatively, or discursively, a true acquaintance with facts as they really are. And thence knowledge is, as Locke says, “the highest degree of the speculative faculties, as it consists in the perception of the truth of affirmative or negative propositions.” To understand is to apprehend and comprehend according to certain forms, ideas, or rules which are regarded as explanatory and ultimate. We may know many things—facts, for instance, which we do not understand; and we may understand many things—arguments of a seemingly fallacious nature, for example—which we do not know. The understanding is the faculty of applying principles to the arrangement of facts in a comprehensible form; the knowing faculties receive what they perceive, whether the things so known are understood or not. Knowledge is the result of experience, understanding of reflection, and wisdom of right reasoning on well ascertained facts. Perfected knowledge is, however, the result of the exercise of the knowing faculties on the *data* of experience through the *data* of intelligence and has certainty or truth as its outcome.

As a preliminary to the adequate acquisition of knowledge we should endeavour to discover—what we ought to observe—how we ought to observe—and in what way the *data* of observation may be reduced to system in our minds so as to be reproducible on demand intentional or occasional. Occasion asks our reproduction of knowledge when circumstances call for its use; intention requires us to reproduce knowledge when it tests by selected means our capacity

to reproduce knowledge on demand of occasion by examination ; thus—

“The wise new wisdom on the wise bestow,
While the lone thinker's thoughts come slight and slow.”

Profitable study is that which compels us to think—to think intensely, cogently, and thoroughly, with a due knowledge and recognisably accurate acquaintance with the significance and subordination of the details involved. Such study is pursued with the resolved intent of fully understanding and properly remembering all that is valuable in the knowledge sought. Its aim is to make our knowledge an intellectual possession—a possession of both an intrinsic and an exchangeable value. If occasionally it shows that some, who have professed to be intellectually wealthy, have been trading on accommodation bills, it more frequently gives opportunity of proving the reality of that mental riches which has made but little show ; and “the good which it certainly ensures greatly surpasses the evils which it may accidentally occasion.” Examination not only encourages the exhibition but the acquisition of knowledge. It stimulates and excites to the energetic employment of talent, and so to the increase and development of a student's qualifications, fitness and usefulness. It reacts against the inertia to which many are prone, and by giving a value to exertion it makes its possession more marked, more eagerly sought for, and more certainly known to be at the command of those who have been made the subjects of it.

Examen signifies the tongue or needle of a pair of scales, the index of fulness or deficiency of weight, the test of sufficiency or insufficiency in relation to a fixed standard. The term occurs in this sense in Virgil's “*Æneid*,” xii., 725,—

“Jupiter ipse duas equato *examine* lances
Sustinet, et fata imponit diversa duorum ;”

thus versified in English by the late Professor John Connington :—

“Great Jove, with steadfast hand, on high
His balance poises in the sky,
Lays in its scale each rival's fate,
And nicely ponders weight with weight.”

The word bears the same signification in the Theodosian Code ; but it passes from this literal to the figurative sense of the careful and accurate consideration of a subject ; a rigid scrutiny and strict investigation with the view of discovering the truth or the real state of matters ; and hence an inquiry into the acquisitions and attain-

ments of those who have been engaged in certain studies, to discover whether they have made due improvement, or have gained a sufficing mastery of the contents, relations, and bearing of the matter and method of the knowledge on which the mind has been or ought to have been employed. In this signification of a poising or weighing of the tests used to discover the qualifications of students, applicants for office, &c., it gives the root of the technical term *examination*, that testing scrutiny of the evidence given of fitness or proficiency which is employed to ascertain its reality, extent, and worth.

In this form the older universities employ examination not only as a final test of progress and proficiency, but as a potent agent in the promotion and stimulation of the studies pursued within their walls; and the London University is founded for the very purpose of ascertaining, by means of examination, the persons who have acquired proficiency in literature, science, art, and other departments of knowledge, by the pursuit of a course of education; and of rewarding them by such academical degrees and certificates of proficiency as evidence of their respective attainments, and marks of honour proportioned thereunto, as may incline them to persevere in these their laudable pursuits, and may encourage others to follow their example and emulate their efforts. The beneficial effect of examination on the preparation of knowledge led to the idea that if there could be added thereto not only credit and honour, but reward and promotion in professional or active life, a large amount of activity would be called out and a good means of exciting interest in the pursuit of study would be brought effectively into influential power; hence prizes were instituted, exhibitions were allotted, and endeavours were made to make degrees when attained valuable by the privileges they conferred and the advantages they brought.

Examination brings to the test not only the knowledge we fancy we have, but the skill and dexterity of our own minds. It puts us on trial as to our tact to decide and do, our confidence to determine and arrange, the pliability of our constructive faculties, and the presence of mind we possess and show. It gives discipline an object, and makes the most arduous toil pleasant by placing it in the light of hope. It conduces to the attainment of completeness and accuracy, and not unfrequently encourages to the acquirement of that plenitude of knowledge which gives positive value to the endowments of man; and it promotes that self-inquisition which enables one to determine between the real and the contingent in his knowledge. It braces to diligence, and makes application less irksome by the supplying of an object distinctly before the mind to be attained. It drills thought to leisurely survey, careful exercise of its power, habitual revisingness and lively remembrance of what

we have learned, and so puts under thorough command the faculties we have been employing.

Sir William Hamilton has supplied, in a foot-note to one of his discussions on Philosophy, "a very compendious abridgment of what Melancthon said in praise of examinations;" and as these have been endorsed by so great a thinker, we may, not without use, present a few sentences from that *résumé* :—

"Examination whets the desire of learning, it enhances the solicitude of study, while it animates the attention to whatever is taught. Every student is alarmed lest aught should escape him which it behoves him to observe. This anxiety incites him also to canvass everything with accuracy. . . . In this fear is found the strongest stimulus to the labour of learning; without it, study subsides into a cold, sleepy, lifeless formality. What we have only heard or read come to us like the shadows of a dream, and like the shadows of a dream depart; but all that we elaborate for ourselves become part and parcel of our intellectual possessions. But this elaboration is forced upon us by examination; examination, therefore, may be called the life of studies, without which reading, and even meditation, is dead.

. . . Examination likewise fosters facility of expression, counteracts perturbation and confusion, inures to coolness and promptitude of thought.

. . . Nothing is more hurtful, as nothing is more common, than vague and tumultuary reading, which inflates with the persuasion, without conferring the reality, of erudition. Wherefore, if examination brought no other advantage than that it counteracts the two greatest pests of education, found, indeed, usually combined, *sloth*, to wit, and *arrogance*,—for this reason alone should examination be cherished. . . . Against sloth there is no goad sharper or more efficacious than examination; and as to arrogance, examination is the very school of humility and improvement."

The idea of giving a practical form to governmental action in the state of the Education question, under the impulse communicated to it by the establishment of the Public School Association in Lancashire, produced many thoughtful treatises. Of these, one of the most original and pregnant was one issued by Rev. James Booth, a graduate in honours of Trinity College, Dublin, now Rector of Stone, near Aylesbury, and one of the magistrates of Buckinghamshire, entitled "Examination the Province of the State, or the Outlines of a Practical System for the Extension of National Education," 1847. It did not produce any immediate effect on Government, but the principle of making attested knowledge the pass to appointments attracted the attention of many large employers of labour, and the Council of the Society of Arts took up the matter and prosecuted it to a successful result thus far that a number of these employers agreed to give a preference to those who could produce a certificate of having successfully passed an examination before those who were entrusted with the working out of this scheme by the Society of Arts. The success of this experiment emboldened the advocates.

of examinations to exert all their influence upon the Government to abolish the nomination system prevalent in the Civil Service Departments, and to adopt in a shape more or less modified the principle of Competitive Examinations. In 1853 a Commission was appointed to inquire into the whole subject. They strongly recommended the introduction of that system, and in 1855 the Civil Service Commissioners were appointed, and their duties defined by an Order in Council. Various changes and improvements have been successively adopted by these Commissioners in conjunction with the Heads of the several departments, and the system is not only consolidated, but is being largely developed.

The principle of Competitive Examination is now incorporated into our educational life. It has long been an effective agent in promoting the progress of students in university and scholastic life; and pretty successful endeavours have been made to employ it so as to aid in the elevation and extension of middle-class instruction and training, by its adoption in the bestowal of Government appointments, in order that as many as possible may be induced to avail themselves of these educational advantages, which are the "open sesame" to the Civil Service, to professional life, and to commercial success. Competitive Examinations are now in full working order in all departments of the Civil Service. Customs, Excise, Audit Office, Post Office, the Admiralty, War and Indian Offices are all guarded at their entrances by preliminary and competitive examinations, and examiners are duly and officially installed in office for the carrying out of the requirements of the open competition system now in vogue for filling up the working staff of the public service. The necessities of the times are such that the competition for appointments in the service of the country is very intense, and the requirements of the service are of such a growing nature that the amount of information to be acquired, and the mastery over one's own powers which needs to be gained, demands serious resolution, persistent industry, and an acquaintance with the best methods of study, as well as the most thorough and reliable sources of knowledge.

Examination has the effect of bracing up the mind to the exercise of a higher degree of energy, and to a more persistent culture of the faculties. It brings before us the need for concentration of effort, for the attainment of accuracy, for the methodic pursuit of study, for the diligent collection, classification, and propriety of information; it stimulates the natural desire to appear well before others, to acquit one's self so as to secure our own esteem, and to excel in the competition into which it brings us; it not only calls out all the social qualities into coactive influence, but it brings to bear upon our

exertions all the higher and nobler self-regarding qualities, and all the finer touches of sympathy. Besides, it demands from us the certain proof that our knowledge is not imaginary, an airy nothing to which we cannot give a local habitation and a name. Before we can be fit for being examined we must have made sure that we can not only revolve but evolve our thoughts, bring the implicit and inlying acquisitions of the mind into explicit perceptibility and presentativeness; reduce the confused into the distinct, and the vague into the organic. Whatever we may suppose we hold in "cloudland—glorious land" it makes us test and try, so that we may avoid the folly, before others at least, of endeavouring to construct a marble statue out of a vaporous cloud. As regards that, examination is a cloud-compeller.

There is a foolish idea afloat in the public mind that examinations are not of much consequence. When thus lightly thought of, and not fully, fairly, honestly carried out, examination degenerates into *exam*; and preparation for it, instead of being thorough and straightforward, loving and earnest, degenerates into that pest of sciolism and test of fools *cram*. This false and perverse idea of this matter has been made rather prevalent of late, and in fact has reduce itself into this saying,—“For exam you’ve but to cram;” and the idea has been further concreted into a rhyme for the time, thus:—

“No one an exam need ever approach
Unless he is up to—What’s driving the coach.”

If we thus regard examination as a sham, we are too likely to attempt to make our preparation for it an equally unreal thing; and if we put our trust in “a coach,” we are equally likely to lose trust in ourselves, and so to be in the most unfit of all states for going to an examination—a state of conscious incompetence.

Examination is not an end in itself: it is only a means to an end. Examinations are not made for their own sake, but for the sake of the study they evoke. Examinations are instituted, not so much that we should pass them, as that we should be stimulated to the acquisition of such knowledge as should enable us to pass. Study is only valuable as it sets us to select and make our own those materials of knowledge which shall improve our natures and enlarge our usefulness; and examination is only useful in so far as it determines the intellect to more vigorous energy, more persevering effort, more concentrated thoughtfulness and greater accuracy of preparation,—in short, as it makes us develop our nature in a fuller, larger, and more exact measure.

Success in examination, of course, is only to be obtained by preparing for it in such a manner as to make sure that we have the

acquisitions which by our appearance at one we profess to have. This again is best done by gaining a correct idea of the nature of the information required, the amount necessary, and the application to be made of it. Every true economy in study may be justifiably employed in preparation, and every possible mnemonic which is of permanent utility may be fairly made use of, but mere cram and temporary expedients are carefully to be eschewed. Due and true preparation requires that the matter of the examination shall be realized; all the elements involved in it ascertained, and the studies by which these are explained and made practically possible earnestly pursued. Every study has its proper method, the elements of all studies are related, and every proper examination keeps in view the applications likely to be required of the knowledge regarding the possession of which inquiry is made.

There are of course a few general observations on attaining success in examinations which have all the appearance of commonplaces, but yet are such as we cannot properly leave unsaid. Such are the observations on the necessity of forming a proper estimate of the value of time, and determining on the need for effort; of observing carefully what each study is concerned with and reflecting appropriately upon it; of analyzing accurately and exercising the memory to the best effect; of noticing one's own defects and of striving to gain the mastery over them; of maturing by diligent thought all one's acquisitions; and by revising frequently to secure readiness and thoroughness. In study let depth and intensity be aimed at; in practice readiness, steadiness, and activity or smartness.

These we hope our readers will regard as said, while we direct their attention to a few remarks of a more special sort.

One or two of these are of great importance, as they overrule all studies and require attention in each.

1. Every study is founded on certain matters which either are or are assumed as *facts*. In every study, as in trigonometry, it is requisite first of all to lay down a base. The base of every study is the series of facts on which it treats, which it explains, which it enables the student to manipulate, to build up into truth or to arrange as classified and accepted facts upheld and fixed by the principles which interpenetrate and interpret them.

2. Every study has an *object* which it seeks to know, or an *aim* which it endeavours to accomplish. This dominates in the details and in the whole. This we require to comprehend, to see clearly in order that we may seek to attain it. It is scarcely possible to hit a mark that we know little or nothing of, or that we have not had properly set before us, neither can we become proficient in any

study, be intelligent in the use of its methods, or able to elaborate its problems, unless we know its aim, attend to its purport, and observe its object.

3. In every study the truths which it contains are united in such a way as to make the transition from point to point easy if the law of its development and the method it follows is rightly apprehended—fact follows fact, truth is superimposed on truth, principle depends on principle, and rules result from conditions in such a manner that when we learn aright the plan of progress studies are easy, and the remembrance of what the sciences teach is simplified. Hence it is important to know the several studies we pursue in their proper method, form, and functional developments.

4. Not only are all special topics of study really connected, but all the special portions of each study are strictly continuous if we observe them closely and study them aright. The facts, principles, or rules of knowledge or of art are not isolated but linked together in related order, and form in reality a chain of sequences which follow one after another from the first fact of the study to the highest truth it raises the soul to. It ought to be the earnest endeavour of every student to trace this law of connectedness in all that he learns, and to hold in concord and oneness the entire amount of his knowledge.

5. Every true series is a gradual and progressive accession of units mutually dependent,—

“As in a wheel all sinks to reascend.”

Organization and arrangement depend upon the due gradation of each element or part, and the whole is made up of the several portions combined in their most natural manner. This gradation of things gives rise to the two philosophical operations—analysis and synthesis—the former of which recognises the parts and the latter their combination, and by these means we particularize and generalize. The observation of the *discordia concors*—concord in discord curiously blent—in studies each portion of which is to be acquired separately, and yet must be perfected into a unity and a whole, not only gives interest to study, but simplifies its processes. We ought not only to take the facts or principles of any study singly and apart, but we should notice their relations and gradations, how they connect, arrange, and organize themselves into a constituent whole, closely articulated and fitly joined together. Unless we do this,—

“Wide yawns the gap—connection is no more;
Checked Reason halts; her next step wants support;
Striving to climb, she tumbles from her scheme.”

6. The just proportions and importance of the several parts of a study should be attended to. Likings and dislikings are of great power among men, but in the student they should be controlled and overruled by reason. Trustworthy knowledge cannot be attained if we follow the bent only of our inclinations. In point of fact, the chief use of a course of study is to destroy, by principle, the partiality of option men display in their intellectual pursuits. Study is intended to bring the mind into a balanced state—to steady the mind in its exertions and fix it to dutiful endeavour. To be thorough in our studies we must look at all portions in an honest and impartial way, and give such diligence to each as each demands.

7. Our mistakes and their causes or reasons require minute attention, and may be usefully employed as auxiliaries in intellectual culture and adequate preparation. Not only ought our liability to make mistakes to incite us to circumspection and caution in forming our own judgment or in accepting the judgment—unless reasonably supported—of others; it should also be made effective in calling our attention to the difficulties we find in a given subject, so as to induce us to give greater care to those portions—in directing our minds to the prevalent weaknesses of our own mental character, so as to lead us to watchfulness of endeavour to avoid them—and in showing where we used safeguards and bulwarks thrown up for self-protection against failure. Instead, therefore, of doing as too many strive to do, setting our minds to forget or excuse our mistakes as swiftly as possible, we should note them well, examine into their causes, and seek to find out the reasons of them, and then direct as much time, attention, and care as we can to acquire the information in which we are defective, the habits we have hitherto failed to culture, and the power to overcome the partialness of intellect in which our liability to mistakes originates. Our mistakes give indications of those portions of our nature which are inefficient, or of those portions of knowledge with which we have neglected to familiarize ourselves.

8. Every obstacle we meet, or difficulty we encounter, ought to be sedulously overcome. It is a very common thing for people who are self-indulgent, whenever they try and fail, to cry out, "I hate such and such a study—I can never make anything of it—I never had any taste for it." This, which is intended for excuse, is really condemnation. It indicates unconquered weakness, shows defect of nature, implies pliancy of will and readiness to indulge one's self. It is dangerous to succumb to obstacles and to allow difficulties to deter. True bravery conquers, and persistent patience overcomes. To the inert everything implying effort is an annoyance, and in the precise proportion as we admit difficulty as a reason for yielding, we

consent to our own defeat and disaster. Obstacle should be met by stubborn obstinacy, a resolve not to be vanquished, and should not be crouched to in cowardice of spirit. If we wish to perfect our nature, that is to be done not by pursuing our tastes and indulging our inclinations, but by a robust and strenuous management of all our powers to overcome all we must, and to overtake all we should. Even when we have done our best, "much remains to conquer still;" and a firm resolvedness is the best bent of mind we can present to obstacles, difficulties, and hard questions. Difficulties shrink when faced.

9. Studies should be concurrent. Sameness tires, variety delights; constant exercise of one power or faculty exhausts; intermission is restorative rest. The mind requires change, and the change necessary is wiseliest sought and most easily found in concurrent study; in taking up one study after another in graded sequence, and as nearly as possible in their relative order. Thus we exchange the strain of thought from one faculty to another, and bring into activity the upstored energy of each different capacity. By a well-arranged division of labour among the faculties, a much larger amount of industrious effort can be made with beneficial results than by holding on in slow succession at the same study constantly. The concurrence ought, however, to be intelligently fixed, and each should be kept in hand under perfect mastery and control.

10. Studies ought to be employed to illustrate and aid each other. Analogy is a great help to the comprehension of different truths; and not unfrequently memory, judgment, and even reasoning, may gain advantage from using with judiciousness the facts, principles, or results of one study to illustrate another. The alternate passage of thought from one study to another affords opportunity for this twofold use of observation and meditation, for the uniting together of all our knowledge into a co-operative whole. It is becoming in man as a reflective and intelligent being—

"To send the soul, on curious travel bent,
Through all the provinces of human thought,
To dart her flight through the whole sphere of man;
Of this vast universe to make the tour;
In each recess of space and time at home;
Familiar with their wonders, diving deep,
And like a prince of boundless interests there,
Still some ambitious of the most remote;
To look on truth unbroken and entire;
Truth in the system, the full orb, where truths
By truths enlightened and sustained, afford
An arch-like, strong foundation, to support
Th' incumbent weight of absolute, complete
Conviction."

This is the proper principle which should guide self-culture, that we should make our life as high, as valuable, as worthy, and as useful as we have capacity for and opportunity of making it. And yet how few think of doing more with their life than securing a pass! In life a mere pass is but a slight thing, and the examination that lies beyond is strict and impartial. If we could pitch the aim of our whole intent in life high—as high as the Creator has made us capable of, we should be pretty certain to be able to make a fair figure at any board of examiners before whom we should be brought. But we must return to themes more humble and more in tune with the interests of the practical present.

In all studies two things at least demand the highest care; (1) the *matter* with which each deals, and (2) the *arrangement* which is most appropriate to each. The former requires the attentive culture of the memory, and the latter the strict use of the logically investigative faculties. The one conserves, the other elaborates. To both forms of intellectual activity the following recommendations apply:—

I. Begin at the beginning, and follow the natural order of evolution without admitting of presuppositions or presumptions.

II. Omit no steps that are required to join one fact, rule, principle, or result, to another. In study, skipping is fatal to success; and jumping at conclusions is mischievous. Regular progress along the entire pathway of each study can alone secure completeness, thoroughness, and full knowledge.

III. Revise and make sure. Look behind as well as before. See that at each step taken all that could be noticed was observed, all that should have been attended to has been carefully brought into “the very eye and presence of the soul.”

IV. In case of difficulty analyze each process. See what is necessary, weigh each to note if in it the misunderstanding or cause of failure lies. Settle one by one what is understood and what is not clear, so as to bring the mind as closely face to face with the whole difficulty as possible. When we have surveyed the field into the known and the unknown, we are in the best position for completing our investigation and perfecting our knowledge.

Memory is best excited and made masterful by gaining ideas which are vivid and clear. The former is got when we keep our observing faculties active, alert, and lively; the latter when we note with distinctness the resemblances and the diversities of things; and, if possible, bring to bear upon it the action of more than one faculty. Thus associations of time, order, inclusion, exclusion, or similarity and contrast, and completeness and consecution, may aid in attaching the several faculties which are concerned with these

things to the consideration of the studies which afford opportunity for their exercise.

Reasoning is best excited and promoted by the collecting, classifying and arranging of facts, so as to supply the mind with elaborated materials for apprehension; by the attentive weighing of qualities and characteristics on which the judgment may be exercised, and by acquiring a knowledge of the methods of induction, syllogism, and analogy. Logic is not nearly so difficult a study as many people imagine it to be, and it is of immense importance in the culture of orderliness of thought.

Of the true spirit in which preparation for an examination should be undertaken, it should be almost unnecessary for us here to say anything. It should be undertaken as a duty, and with a full sense of the responsibility it involves. It should not lightly be determined on, but once having settled that it is right, requisite, necessary, or advisable to undergo examination, no labour should be spared, no anxiety grudged, no effort omitted, no study neglected, which seems likely to aid in the attainment of success; success should be a sacred duty, and toil should be regarded as the gateway to success. Hear on this topic the words of a wise man—a man both mighty and weighty:—

“Strenuous energy is the one condition of all improvement, yet this energy is, at first and for a long time, comparatively painful. It is painful because it is imperfect. But as it is gradually perfected it becomes gradually more pleasing, and when finally perfect—that is, when its power is fully developed—it is purely pleasurable; for pleasure is nothing but the concomitant or reflex of the unforced and unimpeded energy of a faculty or habit,—the degree of pleasure being always in proportion to the degree of such energy. . . . There is no royal road to learning. ‘The gods,’ says Epicharmus, ‘sell us everything by toil;’ and the curse inherited by Adam—that in the sweat of his face man should eat his bread—is true of every human acquisition.”*

In all cases in which it is the duty, the pleasure, or the interest of a person who has to make his way in life, or maintain his position, to undergo an examination, care should be taken to determine wisely, to fix the resolution strongly, to pursue every study thoroughly, and to aim at a high standard of preparation; every step should be made secure, and nothing should be esteemed as too trifling to engage attention. Earnestness will impart the force which will insure progress, make the labour delightful, and bring out all the power of the mind. Judicious management of time and faculty will economize effort, yet maximize results, while a sense of dutifulness will induce confidence, lessen levity, and concentrate the mind.

* Sir Wm. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i., p. 385.

Social Economy.

SHOULD THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC BE SUPPRESSED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It is a defect incident to government by a popular Legislature that laws founded on the impulses and prejudices of the masses occasionally find their way into the statute-book. A national danger approaches, or a national vice degrades and demoralizes; the knowledge of it is brought home to unthinking masses by professional agitators; and, in the fear born of ignorance, men are returned to Parliament, not to discuss the danger or evil as statesmen, but merely to register a vote according to the views of their constituents.

In a paroxysm of dread the Ecclesiastical Titles Act was passed—remained inoperative for several years, and was finally repealed as a blunder.

The evils of drunkenness threaten in like manner to hurl us into pernicious legislation, to drive us to adopt principles which, when viewed in the abstract, will be seen to be false and unjust.

It will spare our opponents much trouble, if we at the outset, allow that all the evils of drunkenness shall be taken for granted. We will take the most reckless Alliance tract ever published on that subject as admitted facts, and still we must submit that prohibition is too great a violation of the spirit of our laws for any evil to justify.

It must be admitted that *prima facie*, the proposed prohibition is intolerant and tyrannical. Some people consider that alcohol is beneficial,—some that it is injurious. Common sense says, "Let those who like partake, and those who do not, abstain;" but to prohibit the sale, to prevent A from having it because B objects to it, seems on a par with compelling B to drink it because A thinks it beneficial. In reply to this, our opponents urge (1) that in free countries majorities rule, and that it is tyrannical to force the liquor traffic on a district against the wishes of the majority of its

inhabitants; and (2) that the indirect damages to the community from drunkenness are so great as to require urgent measures for its suppression. The first of these, in the form in which it is generally put, seems to throw back the charge of intolerance and tyranny. The short answer to it is, that the liquor traffic in a supposed district is for the minority who take part in it, not for the majority who do not. If others get what the majority themselves do not want, who is injured? But if others are prevented getting something, merely *because* the majority do not want it, there is a manifest injustice. This point, however, lies so closely to the root of the question, that we shall endeavour to define somewhat fully the respective rights of majorities and minorities.

To get a proper view of these duties and rights we must go back to the origin of governments. In a barbarian state, before restrictive laws grow up, a man has right to do anything he can,—a right in the sense that there is no law to prohibit him. Thus a man would have a right to till the land, collect herds, build himself a residence, and enjoy the results of his labour; but he would also have the right—*i. e.*, there would be no law to prevent him—of robbing the crops and herds, and despoiling the house of his weaker neighbour. The inconvenience of this would speedily be felt. By the unforbidden acts—and therefore rights—of one man, another man would be debarred of his rights,—the right of enjoying the fruit of his labour. All would feel insecure, and so they agree together to forego certain of these rights in order to preserve the remainder; and they create the power of law—the aggregation of the individual powers—to prevent and punish individuals breaking the arrangement. From this we get a view of a theoretically free government, as far as its domestic policy is concerned. It would be one in which those rights, and those only were surrendered, which clashed with the rights of others—in which each individual surrendered the same rights, and in which the power deputed to law was sufficient, and sufficient only, to maintain the forfeiture of the rights surrendered. We have not space to go very fully into the nature of the rights surrendered, but it may be generally stated that those are surrendered the exercise of which would curtail the rights of others; and conversely, those rights are maintained, the exercise of which do not curtail the rights of others.

We have here, then, a very clear limit to the rights of majorities.

They have only a legitimate control over questions within the surrendered rights. They have no control where the action of the individual does not trespass on the general conserved rights. After the compact of government is formed, and the rights to be surrendered are settled, differences of course arise, as, for example, respecting the temporal accessories of government, the mode of administering the law, the appointment and remuneration of officials, the raising of revenue by taxation; and on all these and similar questions *within the surrendered rights*, the minority must succumb. It is then a question only of oppressing in the least degree. The rejection of the views of the majority would mean the adoption of those of the minority, and it is of course the less evil for the smaller number to be thwarted. One of the rights surrendered is the right of enforcing one's view, when in a minority, on questions arising within the surrendered rights; but the rule of the majority is clearly bounded by the limits of the surrendered rights. This will be seen more clearly by a simple illustration.

If two-thirds of the people think some of the revenue should be raised by direct taxation, and one-third think all should be collected by indirect, the one-third must give way; for it is a question within the surrendered rights. But if the people in similar proportions decide as to eating or not eating flesh, each may do as he likes. The right of choosing diet has not been surrendered.

This is not a point merely of theory, it is a principle that our recent laws have fully admitted. We do not mean to say that it is all-pervading, for ours is not by any means a free country. Moreover here the order of things has been reversed. The case we have supposed is of a new nation, when first forming and progressing from a state of barbarian licence to a state of civilized liberty. With us the powers of kings, as representing the law, has been unduly exalted, and though our goal is the same, ours is a work of claiming back, not of surrendering rights. We are at an advanced stage of the journey from despotism to liberty. We have still a further road to travel—further rights to claim back; and we must not be surprised if we still bear marks of the feudal state we have quitted. That the principle, however, that majorities must not influence minorities, unless their rights and liberties are injured,—that this principle is established a slight glance at our laws will

prove. Take, for example, the question of religion. Do a well-intentioned body of men believe that alcohol is harmful? An equally well-intentioned body believe the same of Roman Catholicism, and of all forms of Dissent. Do many believe that the body and mind are injured by partaking of liquors? Many also believe that sin and vice are sown and spiritual and eternal injury inflicted by Nonconforming 'bodies. What then? Does the spirit of our laws allow that where in any district two-thirds of the ratepayers shall vote for the compulsory closing of any place or places of worship, it or they shall be forthwith closed? Decidedly not; and yet the cases are parallel. It is as wrong to allow religious houses to exist against the wishes of the majority, to work, as they believe, all manner of insidious evil, as it is wrong, if it be wrong, to allow public-houses to exist in opposition to the majority. But our laws say to the majority in the one case,—We cannot recognise your infallibility. Law exists to preserve the rights of all. If you believe it this place to be evil, stop away therefrom. Your neighbour thinks otherwise, let him 'go. Bethink you, if 'you crossed St. George's Channel, you would be of the minority. As you would defend the liberty of conscience of your co-thinkers there, respect the consciences and opinions of those who differ from you here. In this strain the law speaks on the religious question, and it enunciates a noble principle. In a similar strain it has hitherto spoken on questions of prohibition, such as the one we are discussing, and we have a strong belief that its tone will not alter.

We wish it fully to be understood that our argument, so far, is simply on the question of the rights of majorities. Whether the liquor traffic trespasses on the citizen rights of the people we have still at discuss, then it is not a question of majorities, for in such cases minorities would be 'equally entitled to [relief. All we wish to establish at present is, that the statement that it is wrong to force the liquor traffic on a district *against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants* is specious and fallacious. For the liquor traffic is something in which those can partake that like, from which those can abstain who like, and liberty requires in such cases that the rights of minorities be preserved.

But does the liquor traffic involve such damage to the community as to entitle abstainers to relief? In other words, does it trespass on those rights of others which by the principles of free government ought to be maintained? The Alliance assert emphatically

that it does. They state that it is the cause of crime and poverty ; that our gaols, lunatic asylums, and workhouses are filled by its agency ; that men in receipt of large wages drink up their incomes and allow their children to become a charge on the country ; and that by this means the taxation on the people—including the abstainers—is enormously increased. If this be so, we have no hesitation in saying at once that the Alliance have a substantial grievance, and are entitled to relief. Not in districts only where they are in a majority. We wish cleanly to sweep away that cobweb. If abstainers are unduly oppressed they are entitled to relief in all districts, and the prohibition should be universal. The prohibition is either right in itself and consistent with freedom, or it is not, and is not made right and consistent with freedom by being adopted by the majority of a district.

That moderate drinkers and abstainers alike are subject to the evils mentioned all must admit. The mistake is in assigning them to the wrong cause. It is not the liquor traffic, but drunkenness that is chargeable with the evils. It is the question again of use and abuse. Surely it is not necessary to repeat again that the abuse of anything is no argument against its use ; and yet divested of the "majority" fallacy, the abuse of alcohol is the only ground that prohibitors have to go upon. For where is the abstainer injured by aught that is done by the moderate drinker ? Nay, is he not benefited ? For out of our pockets a large revenue is raised, to which, if obtained from other sources, the abstainer must give his quota. We have not gone into statistics, because where principles are in question, they are futile ; but if there were twenty, ten, or even five moderate drinkers only to one immoderate, are the five to suffer because there is a grievance against one ? True, it is said, but if there were no liquor traffic there would be no drunkenness the question is as true also that if there were no drinking there would be no drunkenness ; but if there were no commerce, there would be no fraud or forgery ; that if there were no valuables carried, there would be no pocket-picking ; and so on *ad inf.* But it will be readily seen that under a free government we must not do a great wrong to bring about a little right ; that the immediate, not the proximate causes of evil must be attacked ; that drunkenness is the evil to be suppressed, and not the entire liquor traffic.

For the purpose of bringing home what we have said to our

abstaining friends, we will shortly refer to another "ism"—Vegetarianism. We believe there is no evil or grievance that teetotallers lay to the charge of alcohol which vegetarians do not credit to flesh-eating. We have heard and read arguments by the latter as horrifying as any used by abstainers. Constitutional taints, deformities, incapacity for work, sensual crimes, and murder, are all traced to the "murdered food." Have not then the vegetarians as clear a right to insist on the closing—permissive or universal—of butchers', fish, and poulterers' shops, as the Alliance have to call for the suppression of the liquor traffic? Our abstaining friends, we opine, would fight for their mutton chop. They would tell the vegetarians to eat meat or not as they thought fit, and to leave others to do the same; and for the crimes and evils they traced to flesh diet, such must be dealt with only when manifested. And, *mutatis mutandis*, so we reply to the would-be prohibitors.

We admit that drunkenness infringes on the rights of the community, and would gladly see all parties co-operating to draw up wise restrictions on the liquor traffic. The end in view is to remove the means of drunkenness, and to maintain the means of moderate drinking, which harms no one. We, of course, do not propose a plan; the form of the question does not require it.

With respect to one of the grievances, however—that the children of men earning good wages become, through drunkenness of parents, chargeable to the country,—it seems to us that guarantees against such happening might reasonably be required from the fathers. A man who marries contracts certain liabilities for maintenance, for which he is primarily and the country ultimately liable. We have seen positions similar in the commercial world, where a guarantor requires and is allowed an inspection, to enable him to see that all possible is being done to keep him free from the ultimate liability. This commends itself as just and right, and we can see no reason why the State should not claim a similar right over fathers who are drinking away their means. We have no matured plan for this, but we point it out as one of the directions in which reform, which we admit is necessary, should tend. By measures of this kind we should act locally and directly on the evil; we should, so to speak, cure the diseased part by healing it, and not by lopping off the whole limb in which it is situate.

We cannot say we regret the action taken by the Alliance, or the parliamentary progress they have made, though we feel sure that

their measure has only to get so formidable as to call for earnest attention to be condemned. Still they are doing great good by calling attention to a great evil. There is no doubting the existence of the disease, and through their efforts the attention of wiser physicians may be directed to it, who will give us a more efficacious and less extravagant remedy.

A. H. G.

SUPPRESSED.—I.

If the liquor traffic were unknown as a part of our commercial enterprise, and—with our knowledge of its baneful operations as complete as at present—we were about to discuss the policy of introducing it, there would probably be few who would venture to advocate such a course. But if its introduction ought to be prevented because of the results *in posse*, how much more should it be suppressed by reason of the evils *in esse*? To prevent the invasion of our shores is a duty not more imperative than it would be to expel the enemy should he stealthily obtain an entrance, especially if it were found that his depredations exceeded our most alarming apprehensions; and what foe ever inflicted a tithe of the mischief upon the people of this country which is being constantly produced by the traffic in strong drink?

We are aware it may be objected that the liquor traffic is not necessarily mischievous, but a useful branch of industry which may be so conducted as to insure its advantages and avert the evils flowing from it. If so, how is it that, although it has been a subject of legislation for several centuries, the united wisdom and singular sagacity of the British Parliament have not yet been able to devise a scheme by which the evils may be eliminated and the good retained? Notwithstanding all that has been essayed, the necessity for a reform of the licence laws is felt to be as urgent as ever; and seeing that during the last four hundred years, in which as many Acts of Parliament have been passed, our legislators have failed to so regulate the traffic as to render it innocuous, may we not reasonably infer that it cannot be done? That the failures which have attended all past efforts at regulation must characterize those of the future will be apparent if we carefully consider the nature of the trade itself. It is a business to commence which a limited capital will suffice, and to conduct which no special training is necessary; and as it affords the prospect of obtaining a competent living, with a modicum of mental and manual toil, many of the not

over-scrupulous yield to the temptation thus presented. Hence it becomes the special work of these to promote the trade in which they have embarked, and upon which their livelihood depends. Their ingenuity is taxed to the utmost to devise means by which the consumption of drink may be increased, and every scheme which cupidity can suggest is employed to allure the unwary. But the more successful the liquor-seller is, the worse it is for his customers, because the less money they have to spend on the necessities of life, and consequently their home comforts are correspondently diminished. Thus the liquor traffic is constantly tempting men to engage in it, and immediately they do so they become—it may be unconsciously but none the less effectually—the seducers of the people. No wonder our crime and pauperism and consequent taxation continue to stare us in the face, when we make it the pecuniary interest and special vocation of any class to promote the prime cause of these evils. Whatsoever a nation soweth, that, and not something else, it must reap. How to continue the traffic, and at the same time prevent its being carried to an extent prejudicial to the community, is the problem which many liquor law reformers are vainly hoping to solve—a problem about as certain of solution as is the discovery of the perpetual motion or the philosopher's stone; for so long as men are permitted to engage in any undertaking for the purpose of making money, and human nature remains as it is, they will make as much as they can. The only effectual way, therefore, to prevent the liquor traffic being promoted to a palpably pernicious extent is to keep men out of it altogether; and in order to do this the traffic ought to be suppressed.

But suppose it were possible to define the precise point up to which the sale of liquor might be carried without prejudice to health, happiness, and morality, and to insure that the proper boundary would never be transgressed, still its existence would necessitate the malappropriation of much of the earth's produce which is annually given as food for the people. To convert large quantities of highly nutritious grain into alcohol must surely be a wicked perversion of the bounties of Heaven; and a system necessitating such perversion, though permitted and protected by human law, cannot claim to be in harmony with law divine.

Not only does the manufacture of drink necessitate the perversion of food, but it occasions the loss of much valuable labour. Accord-

ing to Professor Levi, there are 672,000 persons employed in malt-ing, brewing, distilling and rectifying, and selling alcoholic drinks ; but who will say that these are contributing one iota to the wealth of the nation? Every stroke from the hand of the useful and wealth-producing workman increases the value of the raw material. By each additional touch its intrinsic worth is enhanced, and the national wealth increased ; but in the manufacture of drink the reverse is always the case. The grain, perfect from the hand of its Giver, is delivered to the maltster, and every process which it is made to undergo renders it less valuable than before. Each succeeding stage diminishes its intrinsic worth. The whole course from beginning to end is one of deterioration and destruction, and so pernicious is the article when produced that it is admitted to be the greatest of all the obstacles with which the Christian teacher and the social reformer have to contend. The liquor traffic is *pregnant* with mischief. Every restriction placed upon it is a proof of its dangerous character. We never dream of making the sale of beer as free as that of bread. To do so would be to open the flood-gates of vice ; and to make the livelihood of any section of the community dependent upon so pernicious a trade, is a policy of which an intelligent people should hang their heads for very shame. The injustice, moreover, of granting a licence to one and refusing it to another, is a condemnation of the traffic. If it is unsafe to admit all who may be convinced it is their proper vocation, why admit any? In this money-loving and money-getting age it is unwise to encourage any trade, the prosperity of which is antagonistic to the highest interests of the nation. By permitting men to engage in the liquor traffic we not only make it their business to minister to the vices of the people, but we give them a pecuniary interest in opposing both social and national progress. Let any legislative or social reform, however beneficent, be attempted, which might appear to lessen their profits, and immediately they combine to protect their trade. Witness the determined opposition of the licensed victuallers to the Government licensing bills of the past and present sessions. See how readily they pocket their political opinions, and how cordially they co-operate to secure the return of members to Parliament who are known to be favourable to their trade! To place their candidates at the head of the poll no expense is spared, and every engine which pelf can purchase is freely set in motion. The elevation of the people and the weal of the nation may be all

very well, but, to the great body of liquor-sellers, the protection of their trade is always of primary importance. To be well represented in St. Stephen's is their constant care, and so great is their supposed political influence in many constituencies that they are the first whom candidates endeavour to conciliate. Indeed, there are not a few boroughs in which the publicans claim to be the arbiters of every election, and where they boast of being able to return whom they will. How degrading and deplorable that the free people of a great nation should thus bow down in abject submission to an interest which is ever at war with the Church, the school, and the library! With the increase of knowledge the vicious character of the liquor traffic has become so apparent that the nation is making huge efforts to shake the viper off, but every struggle seems to deepen his fangs in the body politic. This, however, should not be a ground of despair, but should rather stimulate the united and determined action of every patriot and philanthropist to crush, both speedily and effectually, so great a monster. Towards a traffic so nefarious the attitude of every civilized community should be that of total and immediate suppression.

We presume there are few who will deny that the liquor trade is the cause of many evils, but it may be contended that its antiquity, the number of persons depending upon it for a livelihood, and the inconvenience consequent upon its prohibition, are arguments in favour of its retention. If these are the most cogent reasons which can be advanced in favour of a system fraught with so much mischief, then we may consider the controversy as good as settled. Antiquity, indeed! What should we say of the culprit who might plead the number of his crimes and his protracted course of sin in extenuation of his guilt? The fact that our ancestors, who were ignorant of the real nature of the liquor traffic, permitted it to grow up in their midst, is no reason why we should retain it if we are satisfied that its existence is inimical to the happiness of the people and the prosperity of the nation. To discover and correct the mistakes of each generation is the interest and duty of that which immediately follows, else what becomes of national progress?

As to the number of persons depending upon the trade, and whose living would be taken away were it suppressed, let them make out their bill and show just cause why they are entitled to compensation. No doubt each claim will receive, at the hands of a

generous nation, that consideration to which it is entitled; but, for our own part, we fail to perceive wherein those who have purchased a licence *for one year and no longer* are entitled to compensation if the authorities refuse to sell them another such privilege at the expiration of the twelve months. But better a thousand times support them out of the national funds than that they should continue to earn their bread by promoting the destruction of grain, the waste of labour, and an increase of vice and crime.

The inconvenience consequent upon prohibition we need not stay to consider, because it would sink into insignificance when compared with the immense advantages which would follow. Moreover if the liquor traffic is as prolific of evil as is proved by all experience, our plain duty is to waive every consideration of personal convenience, and suppress it with a vigorous hand; and if we possessed one-twentieth part of the Christianity which we profess, the work would soon be done.

W. J.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRIZES FOR 1873.—The following are announced as subjects for university prizes for 1873: Chancellor's Latin verse—*Balænarum Piscatio*. Chancellor's English essay—"The effects of continued War upon a Nation." Chancellor's Latin essay—*Quænam fuerit verâ Epicureorum Philosophia*. Sir Roger Newdigate's English verse (in heroic couplets)—"St. Louis of France." Gaisford prize for Greek Homeric verse—Milton, "Paradise Lost," book iv. 634—705; for a prose narrative in the style of Thucydides—"The Siege of Londonderry." Ellerton theological essay—"The Defence of Christianity as conducted by the early Apologists." Arnold essay—"The Normans in Italy and Sicily, A.D. 1070—1270." Lothian historical essay—"The History of the University of Paris, from its Foundation to the Council of Constance." Conington prize—"At what Time and from what Causes did the principal Writers of Antiquity become lost?" International law essay—"An historical and critical Examination of the Law of Piracy." Stanhope prize—"Joseph II."

Education.

OUGHT THE READING OF THE BIBLE TO BE PROHIBITED IN RATE-AIDED SCHOOLS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE diffusion of knowledge is the most effectual of those agencies by which the evils which afflict society may be removed, and the civilization and improvement of the mass of the people can be promoted. It is delightful, therefore, to find that Britain has at length been roused to a sense of the value and necessity of national education, and has placed on her statute-book a provision for the proper instruction of every child in the kingdom. It has long been the opinion of philanthropists and educators that the only way to permanently diminish intemperance, pauperism, and crime, and to increase the morality, happiness, and worth of the masses, is for the State to provide for the education of the people—make it not only possibly attainable, but compulsory. The time spent or mis-spent in discussion about whether so great a work should be undertaken by the State or by societies of professing Christians, should be provided by voluntary agency or compulsory taxation, is past, and we have now left only one of the topics of debate, namely, ought the education which is to be provided by the State to be entirely secular, or contain an admixture of the religious element in it, and even this in the present instance is narrowed down to the query, “Ought the reading of the Bible to be prohibited in rate-aided schools?”

This question has been raised on account of the jealousy felt towards each other by the various sects of professing Christians, the distrust with which the different denominations of Bible-believers regard each other, and the fear entertained that the rights of conscience might be tampered with or violated by any dominant sect in the hour of its power. Many persons, from differing motives perhaps, but all animated by some prevailing reason, have

been led to the conclusion that Government—in its collective civil capacity—ought to limit the instruction it confers or enforces to secular studies. Many others, induced no doubt also by what they regard as good and sound premises, have been brought to the belief that education, to be of any genuine worth, must be religious; and hence the two opposing parties have been ranged in opposition one to another as Secularists and Religionists.

I certainly should not be disposed to quarrel with these designations if they were restrained to their proper and natural purpose of expressing, in brief, the main point of difference between the parties to whom the phrases are by contrast applied; but I am sorry to say that they are not so used, and that a disingenuous use has been made of an accidental peculiarity in the history of these terms to bring a fallacy into the argument—a fallacy too of equivocation.

It so happens then the term religionist has always been kept in a sort of sweetness of odour by the incense of the churches, and that it has been found rather difficult to fix upon a term which would convey the sense of employing religion for insidious purposes or dishonest ends. *Religieux* does not translate itself well into English as a noun, and *religiose* is not likely to be received with much favour, because it would signify religious over-much rather than religious with a bias that is wrong. The phrase religious instruction has retained a respectability of appearance which it has not preserved in reality, and a great many people employ it in this respectable sense to the ear, yet in practice use it to signify instruction in the form of religious worship, observance, and faith which they follow, accompanied by contempt and dislike of any other form of faith or worship. What we mean is, that the phrase religious instruction has got a connotation in its favour by accident to which it is not justly entitled.

On the other hand, the other term has got a connotation, equally accidental, against it, and this prejudice of the name operates greatly against the progress of proper opinions. It so happens that historically there arose a considerable number of people who, as disbelievers in the worth of the Scriptures and doubters of the divineness of its matter, advocated the leading of a life regulated only by the dictates of worldly wisdom and prudence, and a mode of thought and action which the laws of nature seemed to sanction, without seeking any other sanction for their life's guidance. On

this account it came to be supposed that *secular* is opposed to *religious*—that secular is opposed to spiritual—meaning worldly as contrasted with holy. It is used as if it were opposed to instead of being employed as a means of distinguishing from religious, and includes secular education, but secular education does not exclude religious education, except in such way as a less circle inscribed in a greater may in some sort be said to exclude the larger, even though it is included within it. Let the words be properly understood and used, and the apparent incongruity vanishes.

Secular education is that which fits man for the proper discharge of those duties which man owes to his fellows and to himself, and is covered by the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself;" or, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." Religious education is that series of doctrines which concern themselves with the preparation of man for the proper performance of those duties which he owes to God as the Author of existence—the Creator, Sustainer, and Governor of the universe. A knowledge of the earth and its state, laws, requirements, &c., is secular; a knowledge of the Scriptures, with its commands and persuasions, is religious. But we require secular education—training of eye and intellect—to comprehend the teachings and truths of the Scriptures, and hence secular education is included and implied in religious education. Again, religious education requires man to perform all his duties—personal, social, and civil—under due recognition of Deity, and secular education thus forms some part of religious education. But the two are separable as parts of a whole—not perhaps rigidly, but practically distinct. To teach all that is required of man as a denizen of this earth, and such as shall fit him properly for the fulfilment of all the duties of a man's life as a creature who is human, is not *irreligious*—it is part and parcel of true religion. They are not in contrast or contradiction, but they are portions of one whole. But we begin at the centre of the circle, which is indisputable, and we proceed thence as far as the duty of the State extends, and we say so far the power of the State is permissible and right; but beyond that—into the realm of religious faith and worship—the State's power does not extend. Man in his earthly interests and practices the State has a right and a duty to rule and regulate. Man in his faith and in his relations to God transcends the compulsory power of the State. We object to the State's compulsion beyond its legitimate

scope. The Bible came into the world and the Church arose in the world without the aid or care of the State; and it has another aim and duty altogether than the State has. The State ought not to permit the use of a Book which has been and which may be much perverted, to form a portion of a child's education; it should prohibit its use in school, and keep it in the home and in the church. We contend that it is the duty of the State not only to maintain and observe, but even to "vindicate the principle that public funds should be appropriated only to the provision of that instruction which the children of members of every religious communion will receive in common." But if the State compels the reading of the Scriptures in the Authorized Version, which I presume is intended in the debate, Jews, Catholics, and Secularists will be compelled to pay for the reading of a book which they do not approve of; while it will introduce a great difficulty in regard to the distinction between explaining the words of Scripture and teaching the doctrines of it. It is a wise matter to keep the teaching in the secular school, established by secular law, for the attainment of a secular end, entirely restrained to a secular code of instruction. The object of the State in passing the Education Bill is to secure a secular purpose—the having of an intelligent, that it may have a law-abiding people. That is the catholic purpose, so far as the State is concerned. To mix up the education given compulsorily for the attainment of this end with any possible quarrels among sects would be unprofitable and unwise. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Here Christ discriminates between while He does not contrast secular and religious life.

In the interests of religion, again, the Bible ought to be prohibited from being read in rate-aided schools. The Bible claims to be a divine book, and so to be an exception to all other books. Acknowledge its claim by granting its exceptional position, and leave it to be read with the veneration and respect due to its origin. Why degrade it into a task-book? Why associate with the reading of it the ideas of drudgery and irksomeness? Why legally induce—if not absolutely compel—the scholar to regard the Bible as an ordinary book? and why excite in him an aversion to it—especially if it is to be *read* merely and not explained? The reading of the Bible should be a serious and beloved duty. It ought to be surrounded with all possible precautions lest the force of its precepts should

fail, unless we desire to run the risk of having it made distasteful to the mind, and so perhaps create an aversion to religion ever after.

As a book beyond the province of the State, as a book upon which all in common are not agreed as to its use, and as a book which has claims too high to be classed with the every-day tasks of the youth of our schools, the reading of the Bible ought to be prohibited in rate-aided schools.

J. J. H.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

“Unless religion is made the groundwork of education—unless it is interwoven with all its stages from first to last—unless public instruction forms a part of the religious establishment, and the schoolmaster is made the outwork of the Church, all that is done for the extension of knowledge will be worse than useless. It will be only opening still wider the doors for the admission of corruption, and accelerating, by the multiplication of its maladies, the dissolution of the empire.”—*Blackwood*.

EDUCATION is a theme on which we cannot speak too highly, nor stimulate the mind too earnestly to pursue the true and lasting acquisitions it holds forth. Its influence upon the mind of man is as great and glorious as the influence which the sun has upon the earth. As the sun sheds light, warmth, and beauty on all physical nature, raising into perfection all its inherent qualities, and regulating all its vicissitudes; so education exerts an equally beneficial and marvellous effect upon the mental constitution of man. The light of education being cast on the mind banishes all those weird, sottish, visionary ideas akin to ignorance; moulds into a true form its premature conceptions, and inspires it to pant after the higher aims, requirements, and associations of life.

The question we are called upon to discuss is one of seasonable importance. This great educational question has been over and over again debated from the various standpoints of religious opinion. The subject, therefore, has become involved in many intricate difficulties, arising from the wide differences entertained by the various religious sects throughout the country, about the State's relation to religion. Strongly expressed opinions have been liberally distributed, denying that the Legislature has a right to organize a *compulsory* system of instruction in the Bible, and

revolutionary schemes of the most obnoxious nature are spreading over the country, finding favour in many sections where sounder principles ought to have been cherished. It is vehemently maintained that the duty of teaching religion devolves upon the Church and the parent, this theory being advanced as a sufficient reason for the prohibition of the reading of the Bible in the school. Further, it is argued that there being so many religious bodies in the country, the introduction of religious instruction into the *national* schools must necessarily favour one portion of the community at the expense of another, thus causing continual strife. In addition to the foregoing, there has appeared another class, to whom education has become a most interesting and important question, though all they seem to have yet done in its behalf is expounding their theories and endeavouring to upset the old systems now so long associated with this country and its greatness. They come attired in the gorgeous wardrobe of what may be termed "liberal opinions," proclaiming the grand principle of equality of rights. This "new school" is based upon the principles of Secularism, which denies the reasonableness of religion, and treats the Bible as a sort of antiquated imposition. This theory carries with it principles which jar against reason, history, experience, and conscience. The Secularists' opinions in reference to religion and morality are as vague as they are contemptible; while their own experience is condemnatory of their principles, their influence being in a ridiculously inverse proportion to their pretensions. Their schools are extremely few, but seemingly quite sufficient for their scholars. They expound the principles of education who ignore that book in which the radical elements of education can only be found! They will require to prove that the *fear* of the Lord is *not* the *beginning* of knowledge; that instruction in mythology is preferable for the youthful mind to the knowledge of the God of the Bible, before their claims are likely to find acceptance. The Bible has been too long cherished, its truths too strongly known and felt to be overthrown by the assumptions of Secularists. Probably the best way to meet their arguments is to apply the patriarch Job's answer to his friends, "Verily *ye* are the people, and *wisdom* shall die with you."

In the proposition stated a point of primary importance is assumed upon which both parties will undoubtedly agree, namely, the absolute necessity for a *national* system of education. Expe-

rience has undeniably shown that education cannot pervade the land except through the medium of the State. If, then, it is admitted that a national system of *secular* education is essential to the progression of this country, how can it be argued that a national system of *religious* instruction is *not* necessary? Among the arguments which are very reasonably adduced in support of Government establishments of educational institutions are—1st. Many districts, from want of proper support, are unable to procure education. 2nd. Thousands of the population are too poor to send their children to the school. 3rd. Thousands are quite indifferent as to the education of their children. And 4th. Many thousands of children, having lost their parents, are cast upon the world with none to care for them. If such weighty arguments as the above in favour of a compulsory system of *secular* instruction exist, why do they not equally apply in regard to *religious* education? A good deal has been spoken and written about the duty of instructing the young in Bible knowledge as devolving upon the Church and the parent. This reasoning is undoubtedly plausible enough, and I have no objection to it, but I cannot admit that this duty *solely* devolves upon the Church and the parent. The Church has many duties to perform, and so has the parent; but can the Church *compel* every child to be educated in Bible knowledge? and does every parent act up to his responsibilities? The crime, vice, and misery, in all their aspects, which abound in every part and corner of our land, answer these questions very conclusively. Sabbath schools and other religious institutions effect a great good, but are insufficient to accomplish a thorough pervadence of religious education. It has been somewhat proudly argued, with regard to the Scotch Education Bill, that a compulsory clause in reference to religious instruction is quite superfluous, because the people of Scotland are generally in favour of the Bible being retained in the school, and as a matter of course will see that such an instruction be given. What the people *generally* wish is not, however, a sufficient argument for their getting it. The country generally desires a secular education, and yet it is notorious that an almost incredible portion of the people cannot even write their own names, and thousands more can do little else. It is an utterly false idea to assert that religion is safe in the hands of people who do not possess the very rudiments of education. We conclude, therefore, that a necessity for a compulsory system of *religious*

instruction is emphatically established by the fact that such a system is requisite for a secular education.

Another reason why the Bible should be read in State-aided schools is, that a purely secular education cannot be imparted. The teaching of the most important branches of education cannot be instilled without constant reference, directly or indirectly, to the Bible. How, for example, can the teacher *impress* upon the mind of youth the paramount importance of truth and honesty, if his authority be expelled from the school? What must such an expulsion naturally create in the scholar's mind? Can such a course instil a reverence for the sacred volume? Can such a course produce in his mind a sense of the absolute importance of this Book in relation to his moral and intellectual responsibility? Surely the reverse. It will lead the young mind to regard the other branches of education as of much greater importance. Mark, the Bible being *prohibited* to be read in the school, it can only be referred to in the light attached to profane history. Its simple doctrines *must* be kept secluded, consequently the being and attributes of God can no more be brought forward in relation to morality than if He were a heathen deity! This is certainly "changing the *glory* of the incorruptible God into an image." It may be argued that the expulsion of the Bible does not necessarily place the being of God in such an odious position. But this difficulty stands in the way. If the REVELATION of God be shut out from the school, the BEING of God must also be excluded, because a *knowledge* of God cannot be gained from any other source. We have only to look at the history of those great nations of antiquity which excelled in the arts and sciences, but being without the Bible, worshipped gods made by their own hands. When such facts as these glare before our eyes, establishing the essential importance of the Bible to man, we stigmatise that course of reasoning which attempts to justify the expulsion of the Bible from the school because of the prevalent differences existing as to its doctrines, as most shallow and miserably fallacious. Does the reading of the Bible tend to disseminate sectarianism? or does it tend to nurture heretical views of religion, when the reading of it is superintended by that evidently dangerous character, the school-master? The negative of this debate does not stand on sectarian ground by maintaining that the Bible ought to be read in State-aided schools, for every *Protestant* sect would derive an equal

benefit from the reading. As for doctrinal disquisitions being introduced by the teacher, there is not much fear to be entertained on that point, for it is against common sense to suppose that the young mind could possibly become interested in such instruction, in quibbles, quillies, and peculiarities.

Besides the arguments already adduced, we might refer to past experience of the reading of the Bible, in connection with Britain's educational institutions. Half a century ago, hundreds of schools had scarcely any other text-book than the Bible. And what did this text-book do for the country? It has raised it to an unparalleled position among the nations of the world. Its time-honoured truths are indelibly associated with our national prosperity. Through its blessed agency this land has made its power felt in every part of the globe. Tyranny, slavery, and cruelty have fled before its presence; while mercy, liberty, and peace are the emblems by which its influence is known.

In the face of these indisputable facts which gleam in every corner of this great country, as to the relation in which the Bible stands to man, individually and collectively, we believe it to be the imperative duty of the State to enact that the reading of the Bible shall be a necessary part of the instruction given in the national schools.

C. R.

CHEERFULNESS.—Cheerfulness, which is a quality peculiar to man—a brute being only capable of enjoyment—opens, like spring, all the blossoms of the inner man. Try for a single day, I beseech you, to preserve yourself in an easy, cheerful state of mind; be but for one day, instead of a fire-worshipper of passion and hell, the sun-worshipper of clear self-possession: and compare the day in which you have rooted out the weed of dissatisfaction with that on which you have suffered it to grow up, and you will find your heart open to every good motive, your life strengthened, and your breast armed with a panoply against every trick of fate.—JEAN PAUL RICHTER.

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED AND DISENDOWED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"I do not look for the general Christianity of the people but through the medium of the Christianity of their rulers. This is a lesson taught *historically* in Scripture, by what we read there of the influence which the personal character of the Jewish monarchs had on the moral and religious state of their subjects—it is taught *experimentally* by the impotence, now fully established, of the voluntary principle—and last, and most decisive of all, it is taught *prophetically* in the book of Revelation, when told that then will the kingdoms of the earth (*basileiai*, or governing powers) become the kingdoms of our Lord Jesus Christ; or the governments of the earth become Christian governments."—*Dr. Chalmers.*

It appears from the opinions elicited by the supporters of the affirmative in this debate, that the tendencies of civil legislation run in a totally different course from those arising upon ecclesiastical government. The magisterial province seems to be of a rather ignominious nature, for one of our opponents furnishes us with an extract, from which we find that this official person, whatever his other "concerns" may be, "conscience" is not one. Further, our opponents denounce the right taken by the State of establishing and endowing one sect at the expense of the rest, as an "anomaly which cannot be defended." Consequently national religion must emanate from the voluntary inclinations of the people, the State remaining altogether apart from any recognizance of the Church.

The State is an ordinance of God, and being such, it is bound to recognise the truth of God, and regulate its conduct accordingly. S. S. wonders why, if the State is not something different from the Church, the expression "Church and State" should be so persistently used. The reason why the Church and State are fundamentally the same is very obvious. Both institutions are under

the sovereignty of one Head—Christ. “He is Head over the nation,” and He is “Head over the Church.” The State is Christ’s authority in His *temporal* kingdom; the Church is His authority in His *spiritual* kingdom. The government of both must necessarily be the same in essence—religious and moral. S. S. cannot see how the State can possibly be entitled to the eulogy E. C. M. applies to it, that of a “religious and moral confederacy,” his reason for doubting the correctness of the statement being that “many members of the State are neither religious nor moral.” This is no reason whatever for disputing the point in question, because the same lamentable fact is as true in regard to the Church—any Church, conformist or nonconformist; so we might ask, regarding particular members of the Church, “How can they be portions of a moral and religious confederacy?” The State has a right (and surely it is competent to it to distinguish between truth and falsehood) to give its power and influence to the maintenance of the cause of Christ. Its duty may be summed up in the following passage from the Westminster confession of faith:—“The civil magistrate hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed.” The foregoing passage cannot be reasonably confuted, for its substance will be found in the Bible. Accordingly, being under the immediate sovereignty of Christ, it must found its laws upon the Bible, and guide and further the kingdom of Christ by all legitimate means. If the established churches of England and Scotland are separated from all government aid and recognition, does this not imply the practical countenancing, on the part of the nation, on equal grounds, the true with the false religion? That the State has no right to establish a church whose religious principles are not consistent with divine truth none will deny; but that is no reason why the State should not support the church whose principles are in accordance with the word of God. Statesmen ought to be men of religion—men under the authority of Him who is King over the nation, and therefore bound to support and further His cause in the manner dictated in His word—through the agency of His Church.

We hold that the Established Churches of England and Scotland

ought not to be disestablished, because State aid is the only effectual means of insuring a thorough pervadence of the gospel throughout the land. An important fact in connection with this point is, that in no country was religion ever known to have been thoroughly diffused until the Church became established by the State. This is an indubitable fact, and cannot be thrust into comparative insignificance by the loudest praises in favour of the practical effects of the voluntary principle. Voluntaryism has now had a fair trial, and we can speak with accuracy and confidence as to its capabilities in extending the gospel. Long years have passed since the voluntary torch was lighted, but still its flame is yet feeble and blinking. Vast tracts of land where it holds full sway are most wretchedly supplied with the gospel, for this natural reason, want of sufficient support—the invariable effect of the system of trusting to the *voluntary* contributions of the people. It is no difficult task to search for proof of this statement. The United States of America, the boasted arena of the efforts of voluntaryism, have been often pointed to as a brilliant example of the sound theory of the voluntary principle. Well, what is the result of voluntary action in these States? “On a transient view of the United States, *en passant*, the first impression made on the traveller by the sight of many beautiful spires pointing to heaven is that there is no lack of temples for the worship of God. But the question occurs, Is accommodation provided in proportion to the increase of population or the real necessities of the people? By no means. No such principle of supply has as yet come into operation, for this very obvious reason, that what is everybody's business is nobody's; and the spiritual good of the multitudes living in a state of heathenism in the finest cities of the West is left to the casual regards of well-meaning Christians or the mercenary services of a *ministerium vagum* in its most unseemly form. Places of worship are not erected in the localities where most required, because teeming with a population at once poor and ignorant, demoralized and wretched, but where a spirit of party may have occasioned divisions in pre-existing congregations, or where a spiritual empiric may think he has a chance of making a profitable lodgment, to say nothing of the impetus given to shrewd and calculating worldlings by the sanguine hope of making a lucrative speculation. . . . Even in the most favourable circumstances, where the population is dense, and where the sacred edifices are both commodious and elegant, a minister is too often viewed as a

secondary object, and an occasional passenger who will be contented with a trifle of pecuniary remuneration is all that is expected to conduct the public devotions of the sanctuary."* State-established religious institutions present a favourable contrast to the foregoing, and conclusively prove that a church, before it can become an adequate security for the complete pervadence of religion throughout the country, must be established by the State.

In the present times, when such loud and unwarrantable cries against Christianity pervade the land, when loose and heretical opinions are spreading among us, when secularism seems to be usurping the place of religion, and almost every true doctrine of faith and worship questioned, I deem it highly inexpedient that the Church should be disestablished. For the State to disestablish the Church at present would be to *recognise* those heretical influences which have brought this mania for disestablishment into such enthusiasm, and worse still, assume an equal indifference to all religious institutions. It has been well argued, and history sufficiently endorses its truth, that a State cannot be *indifferent* to the Church without becoming an *obstacle* to its progress. But we may ask those who deny the truth of the principle of ecclesiastical establishments, do voluntary churches, by keeping apart from all State aid, thereby free themselves from all State control? Can they, in their vaunted theme of liberty, defy the interference of the State? No more than those churches which are under State patronage. There are many cases on record which reveal this stubborn fact, that the voluntary Church is no more *free* than the State Church. They are bound to maintain their "legal advisers." Their churches are *public* institutions, and therefore within *civil* control.

A. K. D. says, "It is an observable fact that, as a general rule, ministers of Nonconforming bodies show a much greater degree of zeal and devotion in their calling than their brethren who sit beneath the fig tree of the Establishment." It must have been from a very limited experience that A. K. D. drew such an unfair comparison. How a *Christian* minister can possibly become more earnest in his duties when thrust from the pale of the Establishment is a mystery which we cannot fathom. But A. K. D. comes to the rescue with this plausible reason. "The former (the Established

* The Watchword, June, 1870.

clergyman) knows he is independent ; he preaches his sermon, and his congregation seldom see him from one Sunday to another ; the latter (the Nonconformist) aims at attaining an individual acquaintance with his flock," " fostering religious thought " for the purpose of making his " stipend sure." This is a most humbling position for a minister of the gospel to be placed in, and must rouse feelings in all who can appreciate the glory of Christ's gospel of the most painful nature. How must a clergyman necessarily become lukewarm or indifferent in administering to the spiritual wants of his people by having his own temporal wants amply supplied? We should think, that having this care taken off his mind—he would be the more able to pursue the duties peculiar to his calling. This insufficient system attached to voluntary churches in maintaining their support, compels their ministers to adopt many methods for raising pecuniary aid which ill befits their position. This objectionable feature attached to the voluntary church places it, as regards its competence in diffusing religion among the people, vastly inferior to the principles of Establishments. The Church in her alliance with the State forfeits none of her sacred duties ; so on this ground it is wrong to raise such cries for its disestablishment. If there are discrepancies in doctrine and discipline (and what church is free from these?), let *reform* be the cry, not *overthrow*. It is to a high authority that the Church can point to as her guide in this matter of union with the State ; while, on the other hand, the State by supporting the Church virtually acknowledges Christ as King over the nation—favouring His religion and discountenancing all religions inconsistent with His truth. It is mere sophism to reason that the State should assume a neutral position towards all sects, on the ground that a church does not represent the people. Such a course would be the practical placing on equal grounds Christ and Antichrist, besides diverting from the State its inherent right of acknowledging Christ as its Supreme Head. If the State exercises this right, it must either countenance or discourage the efforts of the Church—it cannot assume neutrality. "He that is not *with* Christ is *against* Him : and he that gathereth not scattereth abroad." We therefore conclude that this question cannot be answered in the affirmative upon the grounds of either principle or expediency.

C. R.

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE ?

CREATION.—VII.

It is very desirable, as the course of the debate has already shown, that we, who take opposite sides in it, should endeavour to ascertain what and how much ground we can occupy in common; and this will place us in a better position for discussing the point upon which we are really opposed.

The terms of the question *assume the fact* of the existence of God as an intelligent personal Being. This point is also expressly conceded by those who support the evolution side: and inattention to it has led at least one writer upon our side—R. W. C.—into a false position.

The point of our inquiries, therefore, is, What method of action has God chosen in regard to the operations of nature, that which we call creation? or that now understood by the term evolution?

Assuming, then, so much as common ground from which we mutually start upon our inquiries, let us now seek to determine the several points, What is Creation? What is Evolution? What is Nature?

Some of the friends on the opposite side, and particularly S. E. A., appear to be quite at sea upon all these points; and especially so upon the first, S. E. A. is evidently under the impression that he successfully demolishes our entire argument by the gratuitous assertion that "creation is, and must be, an imagination or a revelation. It never can be an experience." He forgets that creation and evolution, for the purposes of this debate, stand as two theories, each professing to account for or "interpret" the phenomena of nature; and that in discussing their claims we assume, necessarily, that that theory will best commend itself to our acceptance which most completely harmonizes all the known facts of the case.

In defending the theory of creation, then, we assert by the terms of our definition that God called nature into being; gave to it its

general laws and constitution ; formed by distinct acts of divine power, and at various epochs of its history, the different organizations and forms of existence connected with it ; and that He has, from the earliest to the present time, exercised over all its operations a sovereign and a personal control.

If then we succeed in proving that this theory is the one which most completely harmonizes all the known facts, then we shall establish our conclusion, that the theory of creation is the one which will best commend itself to our acceptance.

On the other hand, in opposing the theory of evolution, we understand it as affirming that God, in creating matter, endowed it with, or implanted in it, once for all, the germs of everything in vital force, in physical phenomena, in organization, in life, and in spiritual and mental endowment, which the whole past and present of nature discloses to us ; and that, along with this endowment of latent power, and necessarily associated with it, was combined an initial force, potent enough to compel its development, and to carry it on without pause through a never-ending series of years ; in other words, through all eternity. Thus W. G. P. says, "Ether contracts into comets, comets concrete into worlds, worlds cohere in systems, and in their revolutions evolve the life-germs they contain, so as to bud into plant-life and burst into animation." And Herbert Spencer maintains that man and other animals had their origin in and have sprung from a luminous mist. Mr. Darwin affirms his belief "that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator ;" and Professor Tyndall tells us that "not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that of the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena—were once *latent* in a fiery cloud."

This theory therefore teaches us that nature, by the will of God, contains within itself, and manifests by itself, in continuous, never-ending duration, every power, whether of production, regulation, or change, which its phenomena exhibit to us.

The theory of evolution is thus opposed to that of creation in two essential particulars. First, it opposes to the idea of distinct, definite, and repeated creative activity and of a general superintendence by God, that of a purely automatic and unvarying activity by the forces of nature, carried on, necessarily, without cognizance

of, or concession to, special circumstances. And, secondly, it opposes to the idea of periodical cessation from creative activity that of incessant and uniform activity by natural force in one direction—that of development.

In regard to the meaning to be attached to the word nature, it will for the purpose of our discussion bear a limitation of its most general meaning; and we therefore understand by it simply the earth which we inhabit, and all the phenomena connected with it.

If, now, leaving definitions, and proceeding to argument, we take a general and broad survey of the natural world, what striking facts do we find bearing upon the solution of our question?

The first fact, undoubtedly, in this connection, is that of the apparent unchangeableness of nature. Nature in its broad outlines and general features remains the same from generation to generation. It was so nearly two thousand years ago, when this very fact gave occasion to unbelief to exclaim, "All things continue as they were from the creation of the world." We do not of course pretend to say how long, measured in years, the present state of things has continued. But we can safely say that no organic change, no change upon any gigantic, or even very general scale of magnitude, has transpired since the time when man was introduced upon the scene. And as there has been no organic change, neither has there been in this interval any change of a strictly *progressive* development from a lower to a higher condition. The constitution of the earth was, so to speak, *fixed* at the time of the creation of man, and has remained as then fixed until now.

Now we say that this general fact, of which there can be no manner of doubt, is at once and easily accounted for by the theory of reation, which in its very essence provides for periods of cessation from creative activity; whilst, on the other hand, the theory of evolution, which recognises only a mill-horse activity which must pursue its endless unvarying round, can offer to a fact of this nature no explanation whatever.

But if we descend into the vale of time by those geologic steps which science has prepared for our use, we shall find in the course of the ages *preceding* our own epoch, evidences of the most *stupendous changes* having repeatedly occurred. The course of nature during these periods was, so to speak, not orderly and progressive, but in general sense *erratic*. That is to say, the evidence points to repeated instances of natural convulsion upon a most extensive scale,

which over large tracts of surface altered the whole aspect of things. The sea and land, for instance, have repeatedly, during the geologic periods, changed places. Over what are the islands and continents of our present acquaintance, deep seas have rolled their waves, whilst the summits of some of our loftiest ranges of mountains afford evidence of their having once rested in the silent solitudes of some primeval ocean.

Here again the theory of creation supplies a key to these mysterious occurrences. The world during those long, long periods of its early history was as clay in the hands of the potter; and for a similar purpose. It was passing through a series of changes, under the supervision of intelligence, wisdom, and power, which should eventually prepare it for becoming the abode of man—the great Creator's master-work.

But what, I would ask, can the theory of evolution say by way of explanation of those mighty forces which, as we have just said, having placed and displaced seas and continents, are now quietly slumbering in the bosom of the earth? I ask, according to what law did they act? And, having *acted out* a certain purpose in the economy of creation, to what impulse did they yield obedience when they ceased from their tumultuous, explosive activity? Can the theory of evolution, within the terms of its definition, supply a power sufficient to excite and control such powerful agents? *It cannot* supply one to which our reason can yield assent. The only power it provides is the "initial force" conferred upon matter at its creation; and this power is insufficient for the purpose. Forces so potent, so destructive, and, upon the principles of evolution, so *retrograde*, as the volcanic forces of the geologic period, must have been moved either by some power external and superior to themselves, by some law of nature, or by some influence innate, and similar in its nature to animal instinct. The latter supposition can of course only be stated to be dismissed. A "law of nature" is an active natural force which is unvarying in its action, and the result of whose action can be calculated. But volcanic action is not unvarying in its action, and the results of its action cannot be calculated. The *law of gravitation* itself would not be a law of nature if it were partial, intermittent, and occasional in its action. Therefore the only alternative supposition is that of some power independent of and superior to nature. But this is a power provided only by the theory of creation; and therefore evolution cannot

satisfactorily explain the phenomena of volcanic action which has played so important a part in the preparation of the globe for its present inhabitants.

If we turn from a consideration of the earth to the earth's inhabitants, what result do we realize? If the advocates of evolution can produce any instance in which one species has been developed from an inferior one, let them do so, and then they will have advanced *one step* towards the proof of their theory. The burden of proof rests upon them; and the sooner they can find some "species" weak enough to accommodate itself to the promotion of their views, the better for them. Is it fair to press for such proof from the advocates of a theory? I think it is so, clearly. According to our present knowledge of the animal and vegetable worlds every species is in itself absolutely distinct. We have not anywhere any instances of mixed or intermediate forms. If man has been evolved from the monkey, why has the interesting process been discontinued? And what has become of the many connecting links which must have intervened between two such strange opposites? And if all existing species have sprung by a process of evolution from one parent germ, and each step in the process of evolution requires so many ages to permit of its accomplishment, how is it that not only now, but in the previous geologic ages, so many thousands upon thousands of strangely diverse forms, in both the animal and vegetable kingdoms, exist and have existed *contemporaneously*? I do not now say that answers cannot be returned to these questions. I do say that in the absence of any shadow of proof from the domain of nature of the actual transmutation of one species into another, and of any explanation of the fact that species widely remote in structure and nature do exist and always have existed in the world contemporaneously; that in such cases any attempt to meet our reasonable questions with idle talk about "nature" being the "time-vesture of God," and such like follies, is worse than a mere confession of weakness: it is an abandonment of the controversy. In conclusion, we quote the authority of Rev. Thomas Milner, an elaborate and careful writer upon this class of subjects:—"These are indications only of a few of the number which might be named, yet sufficiently significant, which serve to establish the conclusion, that our present habitation has been framed under the direction of divine intelligence and power."

IRENE.

The Essayist.

PRIDE'S PURGE AND ITS PRECURSORS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY.

IN the present position of affairs a large number of the members of the House of Commons were to be found voting, sometimes with the Independents and sometimes with the Presbyterians, with most probably a secret bias towards royalism. This accounts for the sudden alterations which appear in the tone and temper of the Parliament. But the absence of the army and its distinguished leaders emboldened that party in the House, which had come to regard them with a constantly increasing dislike; and it is not therefore at all astonishing that the ejected eleven were called back to the House. The next step was to set on foot another negotiation with Charles. The majority overpowered the Independent members, who endeavoured in vain to protract the debate, and commissioners started for the Isle of Wight. This was on Sept. 13, and after some consultation, Ludlow went off in all haste to Colchester, which Fairfax was laying siege to. Addressing the general, Ludlow said, "They are plotting to betray the cause for which so much blood has been shed; the King, being a prisoner, will not think himself bound by his promises, and even those who urge negotiations care little about making him fulfil them." The general, with a well-known bias towards Presbyterianism, was scarcely the person to be moved by this appeal; and putting off Ireton with an evasive answer, he proceeded with his military duties.

The negotiations with Charles were merely a slightly modified repetition of what had already occurred at all efforts in that direction,—evasions, equivocations, and delays on the King's part, and an inflexible determination on the part of the Commissioners to put down episcopacy, and to except certain persons from amnesty. Four several times did the House of Commons vote that the King's concessions were insufficient; and from various parts of the land petitions came dropping in, which, in language sometimes daring, demanded justice or the "chief delinquent."

The victorious army, which had now completely quelled the Scots as well as scattered the English cavaliers, was in no mood for jesting or pottering. No longer was there the difference of opinion manifest which had at one time threatened to break up the army, by rendering the men no longer disposed to place confidence in their officers. The latter had now finally relinquished all hope of treating with the King, nor had they any intention of succumbing to the Presbyterian majority in the Parliament, unsupported as this was by any strong national opinion, and without any adequate force at its command to maintain its pretensions. Many of the members, indeed, kept away from the House on the plea of sickness, or on some other not very credible excuse, waiting evidently for some turn in the course of events. In the month of September, 1648, there had been a call of the House of Commons, and more than a hundred were absent on mere pretences. It was at first proposed to fine these £100 each; this amount was, however, reduced to £20; but it does not appear that payment was demanded or enforced. Meanwhile the army waited for nothing that would depend for its arrival upon the caprice of others; a terrible determination filled the breasts of nearly all the soldiers—they would have the man whom they regarded as the cause of all the nation's troubles brought publicly forward to answer to God and his fellows for years of misrule and violence. Whatever opinions the generals and leading officers might have once entertained, they were now fully prepared to justify this measure, and to assist in carrying it out. There remains, uninjured by the lapse of centuries, a memorable letter written by Cromwell to Colonel Hammond just about this time. In it he touches upon the vexed question which was troubling some amongst the Independents both in and out of the army, that is, “whether it was lawful, for a lesser part, if in the right, to force a numerical majority.” Much stress rests on the words *if in the right*; unfortunately, in such differences of opinion, both parties maintain that they are in the right. Certainly, in some cases, there is an appeal possible to indubitable facts. But Cromwell, in this instance, argues it out thus, and says, *inter alia*,—“First, is not this a sound position, that ‘the safety of the people is the supreme law’? And secondly, whether in the way in hand (the parliamentary treaty) really and before the Lord, before whom conscience has to stand, this be provided for, or if the whole fruit of the war is not like to be frustrated, and all most like to turn to

what it was and worse? Thirdly, whether this army be not a lawful power, called by God to oppose and fight against the King on stated grounds; and being in power to such ends, may not oppose one name of authority for those ends, as well as another name, since it was not the outward authority summoning them that by its power made the quarrel lawful, but the quarrel was lawful in itself."

A general council of the army had reassembled, and in the dull November days they were busily engaged in drawing up a solemn remonstrance, in which, besides making pointed allusion to the past, the officers introduced some very cogent demands for the future. They desired that the sovereignty of the people should be proclaimed and a king elected by the representatives of the nation; that the present session should be put an end to; and a fresh parliament summoned, to be chosen by a different plan than had hitherto prevailed, through a more equal distribution of the suffrage. Thereupon ensued a long and violent debate, the Independents proposing that the officers should receive the thanks of the House. From Nov. 20 the matter was adjourned to the 29th, many members, and even some of the Independents, advising that no heed be taken of this remonstrance. At last the House divided, and by 125 against 53 it was determined to refuse to take it into consideration.

Meanwhile, the general and the Army Council resolved to remove the King from the keeping of Colonel Hammond; and Charles, alarmed when it was too late at the turn events were taking, made some sudden concessions, and the conference at Newport closed Nov. 28, the Commissioners reaching town on Dec. 1—a day which we find from the old journals was spent by the army in prayer, to determine, were it possible, in what way God would have them to act. Both officers and men having resolved to march into London, the next day they broke up from their head-quarters at Windsor, and proceeded to the metropolis, quartering themselves in the City and in Westminster, but conducting themselves with the strictest propriety. They had no hesitancy now as to the course which they ought to pursue, yet they were willing to give the Parliament one more chance of doing justice. The Presbyterian party, now *in extremis*, was not yet prepared to submit to the very obvious necessities of the times. Clinging facuouly to the hope that Charles might still be brought to agree to reasonable terms

and to keep to what he promised, they moved the House to consider the proposals he had made. A few, even amongst the Independents, were inclined to look favourably upon these, and the majority in the House were warmly in favour of them. It was Saturday, and the party in favour of the views of the army, strove to bring on a division at once. Vane declared, "Now we shall see who is for the King and who for the people!" Another member on the other side, exclaimed that some had gained by the war and others had lost by it. Some in the army had gained money and land by their successes; but those who had suffered injury in divers ways naturally desired a speedy peace. Lights were brought in that the debate might be continued. A feeling pervaded all that on the decision hung the destinies of the King, the Houses, and the country. At last it was adjourned until the Monday.

On Monday, Dec. 4, when the House met, it was informed that Charles had been removed to Hurst Castle. By a large majority, it was voted that this had been done without the knowledge or consent of the House. Prynne, who had only been a member three weeks, spoke on the adjourned debate with great warmth for three hours, supporting the Presbyterians. Throughout the night it ran on, and not until five on Tuesday morning did the division take place. Many members were absent; but 129 voted that His Majesty's concessions were sufficient to treat upon. Thereafter the House adjourned until the next day (Wednesday), a proceeding which the Presbyterians ought certainly not to have agreed to without taking some precautions against their opponents, who were certain to employ the interval in contriving some plan to counteract the resolution which had been adopted by the majority in Parliament. With no means, or next to none, of supporting with vigour the plan they wished to pursue, the Presbyterians comforted themselves as if they had the kingdom at their back, forgetful that the officers were the heroes of many fights and men not to be daunted by mere words; while town and suburb swarmed with the stern Ironsides, and the streets resounded with the clatter of their arms.

The Reviewer.

The Argument à priori for the Being and the Attributes of the Lord God, the Absolute One and First Cause. (Sixth edition.)

By WILLIAM HONYMAN GILLESPIE, F.R.G.S., &c. London: Houlston & Sons.

[THE issue this year of a *sixth edition* of a work of which last year so large an epitome was made in the pages of this magazine, might justify us in merely passing the work over with a notice of its reappearance in an enlarged and a highly elegant form. But the editors have been able to secure the considerate notice of this Demonstration from another and an independent source, bringing into view other matters of grave interest, and they think it may be well to lay before their readers the following important review of a work of so much interest in not only a philosophical but a theological point of view.]

On account of the prominence given by the author to the moral attributes of the Deity, and the fulness and profundity with which this part of the subject is treated, we recognise in this edition of Gillespie's "*a priori* Argument," a new and impressive phase of the great theme which exercised the mind of Samuel Clarke.

The consideration of this peculiarity in the treatise may indeed lead some to desire that the *ethical* tendency had been carried out even further. The author tells us, that whereas Clarke wrote his demonstration "more particularly in answer to Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers," the present production is peculiarly applicable to the present school of "pure, or rather gross Materialists." This, of course, would be a most desirable feature of any new edition of the Argument; but the inquiry arises—Can the Materialists, the Positivists, the Nihilists, or more generally and also more especially the Sceptics, be confounded by purely metaphysical arguments, those reasonings whose very competency they call in question? Would it not be better to begin with what of moral or mental reality they either practically proceed on, or cannot question without argumentative suicide?

Their very *Negativism*, indeed, renders such foes difficult to deal with. To fight Scepticism, pure and simple, is almost to fight a shadow. Sceptics will not fight, and therefore they do not acknowledge defeat. A series of propositions and proofs, drawn out in the mathematical form so dear to Clarke and Edwards, makes little impression on those who will scarcely admit the moral facts "most surely believed among" mankind. To get them within grasp, you must start with arguments not merely "*a posteriori*"—i.e., drawn from marks of intelligence and order in the universe—but "*ad hominem*," in the better sense of that expression; arguments which the sceptic cannot evade without stultifying his own mental processes or falsifying his own experience. Speak to him of the "idea of Infinity of Extension" as incapable of expulsion from the mind, he will not deny this; but he will try to show that the notion is derivative, and will find a plausible *genesis* for it in sensation and association. Our conviction of infinite space he will describe as a result of experience, inevitable and indelible perhaps, but negative rather than positive, or objectively certain, because it proceeds from ignorance rather than from knowledge. Then, to fill up this infinity with a living personal Deity, this is the difficulty which must oppress all who venture on the "high *priori* road." Verbally, even logically, the steps of this great argument are imposing; but while Clarke himself seems to have regarded it rather as a confutation of sceptical subtleties by subtleties equally ingenious, than the natural dictate of highest natural reason, this amended expression of the process is somehow suggestive of a deeper and simpler ground of conviction on which our hesitating assent truly rests. The steps, we say, are imposing and inviting; but we feel that this is not our natural road to the temple of truth,—that the most careful repairs will not render it a well-frequented path.

This impression is rather confirmed than removed by those contemptuous statements applied to the opposing faction, whose reasonings, even where the stamp of vigorous or influential minds is on them, are ignored on some occasions, and on others are dismissed with very summary condemnation. Considering the very limited acceptance of the argument "*a priori*" on the part of earnest theologians, it is scarcely wise to characterise its opponents in terms suggestive of strong moral disapprobation. A position assailed at once by the high logic of Kant and the experiential sagacity of Mill may perhaps be strengthened with some success;

but its defenders can ill afford to be lavish of their weapons of controversy, which are neither numerous nor fully approved; and in resorting to the more indiscriminate methods of warfare, they give unnecessary and dangerous signs of weakness, of which their enemy will not be slow to take advantage. Is it not rash, for instance, to confound the opponents, as the author seems to do, under a general censure such as this, which merely displays more anger than polemic force or cogency, and will make, as we apprehend, a different sort of impression from that which he contemplates. " 'Twere ridiculous to contend that conscience, rudiments and all, could have been (not cultivated and improved, but acquired) absolutely acquired by education; for 'tis but too obvious that a conscience cannot be the product of factors themselves wanting all conscience." Here, and still more in the immediate context, the tone is dogmatical, the assertion is supported by argument more plausible to the ear than convincing to the mind; while the contemptuous treatment of theories supported by volumes of able discussion like those of Mill or Bain, to say nothing of their great predecessors, is calculated to raise the admiring reader's suspicions and to reverse the current of his sympathies.

At some important stages of the argumentative process there seems to be too little account made of the extent of human ignorance, and even too little scope left for the not wholly unfruitful exercise of doubting, if it be not for doubting's sake, but for the clearing away of real or possible errors. Then, when the sceptic challenges the truth of this dictum,—“the material world is *finite* in extension,”—first perhaps by calling for a clear definition of matter, next by propounding a dynamical, or possibly an idealistic one, as at least definable or conceivable, or lastly, by reminding us of the difficulties which belong to the very conceptions of infinity and of immaterial substance,—it is of course quite possible to scout or ignore such objections as arbitrary or impertinent. It is conceded that they are gratuitous, or unsupported by satisfactory evidence, or opposed to our better instincts. (And here it may be observed that the author is happy in his distinction between the *true* infinite, as capable of partial consideration, and that which is really divisible or terminable.) But his undertaking involves not merely presentation of evidence, not merely argument, but complete demonstration, where “if any one of the main proofs be not infallible, all goes for *nothing*.” Where such an enterprise is dared, no

enemy must be left on the field. But do we here find every foe met and vanquished for ever? Is it indeed possible, by one treatise, to chase away every spectre of doubt, every shade of ignorance? We question whether such rigid demonstration is practicable or even desirable; but, if it be undertaken, it behoves to be exhaustive as well as rigid; considerate regarding real difficulties, as well as destructive of sophistry; tolerant of great thinkers, as well as terrible to framers of crude theories.

In the transition from extension and duration to Deity are some reasonings which, despite of care and improved expression, have to ordinary minds that aspect of incompleteness, or even paralogism, which has always rendered the argument inoperative. So great is the mystery of time and space, so bewildering are they to peasant and philosopher, so various are the ways of regarding them, that we still hesitate to classify them either as substantial or as properties of a *substratum* of substance; and the step from the immateriality of *expansion* to spirituality, though natural and plausible can scarcely pass for inoppugnable demonstration.

We have used the word "paralogism," as not unlikely to be applied to even the improved forms of the *a priori* argument, when presented as a demonstration. This, however, is not our deeper or final judgment regarding all arguments *a priori*, if by this expression be meant arguments drawn from something deeper and higher than experience or observation. Nor do we regard the labours of Clarke and Gillespie as lost labours. We think that a place might be found for many of their arguments; nay, that just as these really presuppose and imply *à posteriori* impressions or proofs, so the latter are incomplete without some *à priori* considerations which, unconsciously, those who employ them subsume. Professor Wilson used to say, "We must bring in the *à priori* argument to supplement the deficiencies of the other." Principal Tulloch has attempted to connect the various arguments for a Deity by proceeding from the dim positive impressions of the supernatural, joined to the feelings of personality and obligation, to the dictates, if not demonstrations, of profounder thought; the latter being supported by, and reflected in, the revelations of external nature, and completed by the inspired testimony and "self-evidencing" power of Holy Scripture. This, we are inclined to think, was a step in the right direction; and though the attempt could not be completely fulfilled in one short treatise, it may be regretted that this contribution to

the great theme has not been better appreciated and followed up. We would now try to supply a few hints as to how this might be done,—how, at the wish of regarding the first part of Gillespie's process as a kind of "*hysteron proteron*," its best features might possibly be preserved, or rather restored, by being introduced at a later stage or "moment" of the proof, as supplementary to more forcible as well as more familiar considerations, some of which obtain noble exposition in the second part of his treatise.

The true ground of belief in Deity, as far as it is attainable by unaided man, seems to us to lie in the natural workings of consciousness, when brought into contact with the world and with humanity. We mean the primordial ground, for we have stated the belief that these impressions or intuitions are confirmed, expanded, and ultimately vindicated by subsequent experience or observation, so as finally, with the aids of reason and revelations, to claim exception from conviction, or the consent of our whole nature. Originally, and chiefly, of course, such ground of conviction, whether traceable, chiefly to that *belief* which is not opposed to higher reason (sense of the certain or necessary), but a part of reason, or to that ratiocination by which the dictates of reason are carried out or defended, must be described as *a posteriori*. But does it not require and draw into itself, even in its earlier stages, certain *a priori* considerations, elements, which in the course of its progress and elevation, assume forms akin to the *a posteriori* elements, to whose aid or completion they contribute their force? Is there not, in short, in our conviction, a union of these two elements, the *outward* derived from sense and observation, the *inward* from deeper and higher sources, supplied by the mind in its necessary and constructive operation; while the union or product of evidences calls, for its further evolution, on the aid of ratiocination both inductive and deductive? If such a view of the case be at all correct, it affords hints towards a more systematic as well as comprehensive treatment of the whole theme.

On the obscure questions connected with the obscure history of our earliest perceptions, notions, or intuitions, their growth, correction, and completion, we dwell briefly in the meantime. Memory does not reach back to infancy proper, to recall our sensations prior to distinct self-consciousness. Possibly it cannot do so because we had not then attained self-consciousness; because our simple consciousness knew no distinction between *without* and

within. It may be true that consciousness with us *now* is accompanied always by self-consciousness (though even this common assertion seems to be improved), but our lively infantine consciousness could hardly have been of *self*, else why is it so uniformly lost? The eye does not perceive itself, except by reflection in the outward mirror.* An acute writer has argued that the like may be said of the mind—the pure consciousness. The *I*, the *ego*, recognises itself only by reflection; its own essential activity effecting changes on things without, or checked in its intercourse with them, the feeling of selfhood emerges, as of something incommensurable with the world around us, yet in constant relations with it. With the growth of experience, and with education, this distinction becomes clearer; for man, unlike the mere animal, advances from ignorance and helplessness, reaching forward to fresh acquisition of knowledge, and unsatisfied, except when the pressure of physical obstacles is overwhelming without such application of external information as may minister to the strength of the active principles within. Metaphysicians have traced, with greater or less clearness, the steps of the process by which we separate *ourselves* from the world without, from our bodily organism, and ultimately from the lower manifestations of mind; and have shown how the inner world of soul, while it comes to be thus viewed, as restricted in extent, seems to grow in depth and intensity. Some of the deeper and more accurate thinkers have distinguished the knowledge of necessary truth from that of mere experience, the former being well illustrated by those mathematical certainties which cannot be traced to observation, even when followed by abstractions. It has been proved, we think, that thoughts proper, or general conceptions, are neither images drawn from sense, nor bare abstractions reduced from them; and that in dealing even with the objects of external nature, we *give* as well as receive. The impossibility of accounting for even our perceptions of the external world, on any other supposition, appears most clearly when we reflect on our recognition of other human beings. Let it be granted that this is the result of experience, so far as the preliminary conditions are concerned; yet how are we to account for the universality, the certainty, the confidence of the step by which soul recognises soul? No “series of sensations,” no “possibilities of impressing, or of being impressed, seem to satisfy

* In *Edinburgh Review* some years ago.

us here. We seem to arrive at this conclusion: Hitherto we have had sensations, painful and pleasurable; or rather, perhaps, these have been such in experience; but now the case becomes different. Not only have we a world without, different from ourselves, even differing from our sensations, though agreeing with higher sense: we meet in that world with living, acting beings, whom we cannot but regard as thinking like ourselves, even when most incompatible with ourselves, nay, the knowledge of whom seems necessary to the full recognition of ourselves. Reid counts it as a first principle, "that there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men, with whom we converse," and another, "that certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind." Above all, we would say, there is the recognition of *will*.

The feeling of personality, being thus perfected by social intercourse so as to become properly moral, does the process stop here? Does there not arise, with the conception of ourself and ourselves, some apprehension of a far greater being, whom we yet cannot help clothing with some of the attributes of self? In the world, and also in ourselves, we trace an orderly course of events, a course whose interruption we note and in the latter case resent; for we know that in some measure it lies in our own power to preserve or violate that order. Even in the world without, the interruption of order occasions in the simple mind a sort of resentment; and so far from interruption alone suggesting the supernatural, it rather gives rise to the idea of a malignant, but inferior disturbing force, revolting against the harmony that proceeds from a higher will. But, as regards both the outward and the inward, we naturally look, at least, for an author, an organizer, an upholder, and director. And now come into our aid those impressions of extension and duration, from which it has been attempted to deduce a Deity. We should say they rather complete the notion of a Deity already suggested. Instead of trying to fill these wastes with Deity, previously unknown to the argument (though, we suspect, assumed in the natural course of thought), we would find in them attributes for a God not entirely unknown. Here we see the legitimate *a priori* element in its beginning. To quote an able critic (*Princeton Review*),—

"We believe the existence of the infinite God to be known by such an instinctive perception. We could arrive at it by the

conscious exercise of reason (argument?) but it seems we instinctively perceive it in the marks of design in Nature, and in Providence. Newton used to say, that there was a peculiar style in all the works of Nature. These are the works of an infinite God acting in a finite relation. We can certainly know them to be works of a being of peculiar power, and wisdom, and goodness. Can we know them as works of the infinite God?"

"Just as to our perception of a particular example of cause is added a more remarkable power of perceiving its necessity, just as to the perception of space as indefinite is added the more wonderful power of perceiving it to be incapable of increase, so we think to the perception of the peculiar acts of God in design and providence, is annexed the more remarkable power of perceiving those acts to be the acts of an infinite Being; of perceiving this wisdom to be His wisdom; this goodness to be His goodness; this moral law to be His moral law." In the very framework of our minds is felt the same power, carrying with it the same knowledge of God; since the "general laws of mind" are obviously the same energy running through and through the *ego*, consciously distinct from the acts of the *ego*, and shaping our consciousness to the designs of infinite wisdom."

But it may here be asked: Are our impressions or convictions declaratory or objective fact, or may we be deceived by these, even as we sometimes are by our sensations? We might refer, in reply, to the permanence of the former, and their incapacity for increase when attained. But we must also remember that these impressions, while given by our conceptions, are yet felt to transcend them. We believe we have some apprehension of infinity, eternity, Deity; but it is allowed that we cannot exhaust these ideas. Our mental "contractions," rightly so called because sensation cannot give them, so *overmaster* us as to convey the impression of reality as well as necessity. We believe in nature; not with that faith in which the idealist and the sensationalist so strangely agree, but with a reasonable faith. The world of mind transcends that of sensation, which cannot be brought into perfect agreement with it even by experience of life, far less by observation of dead matter. Yet we believe in an independent external world; we apply to it successfully the laws and deductions of purest science; we discover anticipated planets, and witness foretold eclipses. Our faith then is not blind, although in what lies nearest to us we

cannot predict, for here there is the crossing of various lines of causation, the mixture of innumerable elements, the interpenetration of nature by the action of myriad forces, more or less free. And all this increase of contingency, as we approach human life and free agency, affords to us, as says John Maclaurin, an impressive evidence of our relation to a creative omnipotent cause. Chemistry and Astronomy reveal to us the unity and regularity underlying the apparent variety and confusion of nature. Faith, not blind, but keen-sighted as Spenser's *Fidelia*, reveals to us the reality that underlies the experiences of sensation, and looks towards a mightier, imperfectly discovered reality, wider than the world without, deeper than the moral world within. By such a faith, vindicated, it may be, by logic, and certainly brightened by revelation, we may "know that the worlds were made by God." Kant speaks of two unfathomable mysteries; the starry heavens above, and the moral nature within us; but surely these wonders give us intelligence of a greater mystery beyond and around us—living and working, and cognisable, though unsearchable.

"A vast, unfathomable sea,
Where all our thoughts are drowned."

Having thus far dwelt on the proof in what we conceive to be its complete form, comprehending the "threefold cord" of instinctive belief, outward evidence, and logical corroboration, we offer a few remarks on the development of the *moral* attributes, as illustrated in the third part of Gillespie's treatise. In this part of the work there is much to admire; original ideas being presented, frequently clothed in eloquent language, and distinctions exhibited with much ingenuity and clearness. In some parts of this development, indeed, we might feel inclined to observe a different order. The passage, by means of "transitional attributes," such as happiness, goodness, from the absolute to the relative attributes of God, is a result of the author's adoption of the *a priori* method. Yet we are brought at last to the absolute principles of righteousness and love, the first, as we understand him, being the source of Justice, the second of love in the limited, yet equivocal usage, which the term has unfortunately acquired, when taken to mean either benevolence, or a simpler, stronger affection. We think the author might have more readily established his important conclusions, regarding these attributes, by proceeding from the human

point of view, and then comparing our moral impressions with the lights supplied by higher information. By no paradoxism, or mere self-projection, as we believe, but by necessary self-evidencing faith and inference, do we complete and glorify our moral experiences by the thought of a God who is at once Holiness and Love personified. For Holiness, as we think, is a better expression for that comprehensive *negative* aspect of the Divine character, which lies behind Righteousness, when viewed as punitive or rejective of evil; and to which the author's words, when he speaks of Love omnipotent at both poles, may be referred. Strong as an aggressive force, it is equally strong as a resisting force. Equally positive; equally negative." Holiness truly is taken to mean freedom from pollution, and also general or combined moral perfection. But as the statement "God is love" reveals with self-evidence the deepest, most comprehensive conception of Divine ethics, so we require a similarly comprehensive term to express the negative aspect presented by love to every degree and form of evil,—to the principle of strife and confusion which wars against love and God. From these two cardinal attributes, one in their essence, and again revealed in unity by the Christian redemption, we conceive that the other moral attributes are deducible. Thus righteousness may denote the due proportion of love towards its objects; benevolence its aspect towards the sinless creature, fulfilled in beneficence; goodness, again, might be regarded as comprehending the two last mentioned; faithfulness and truth, even among mankind, are attributes or attendants of love; whilst vindictive or *vindictive* justice expresses that resistance which righteousness offers to sin, and grace its return to love.

In his own way of dealing with the attributes, however, the author has made a great advance beyond the old formula of "Power, wisdom, and goodness." And this advance is most manifest, we think, in his treatment of the questions. Does not love, even in the Deity, demand an object? Can God be an infinite person dwelling in perfect solitude? Was this the case even prior to creation? This he answers in the negative; and, of course, is led to a suggestion such as the Christian Trinity expresses. As Deity must be independent of the creation, the object, or objects of love, must needs have been divine and infinite; or else love is not essential or eternal. "The love to a creature of a Being, *loveless* before the creation, furnishes but a cold sort of

warmth. That dogma is besides a horrific dogma, holding within it the idea of an utterly solitary mind, existing, for the eternity before the creation was, in drear, dread solitude alone, and unloving; for the moment Love enters upon the scene, agent and patient, the lover and the loved enter too; and, in fine, the first step leading to *Hypostases* in the Godhead is taken." We are less satisfied with the manner in which the Divine Triad is represented. Self-reflection is described as expressing the relation of the first eternal personality to a second co-eternal, and a hint is given of another relation, which may indicate the completed sense of their identity. Were we to attempt stating the analogy of this mighty, yet attractive mystery, we should be apt first to think of pure consciousness, implying in its exercise an outward personal object, which, of course, in the case of the Infinite, must itself be boundless. Then in the act of self-recognition, through this object, in full self-consciousness, we might recognise the type of that necessity of the Divine Nature, inward of course, which completes the union of unity and plurality in Trinity, and affords the true foundation of the moral attributes. In its fulness and simplicity combined, we believe the doctrine might thus far commend itself to highest reason, though we cannot suppose that a merely rational process could ever have discovered it in its entirety.

We could wish that the author had given an earlier place in his discussion to the "all radiant idea, which throws warmth upon the field of our world." Rightly does he call it the "talisman yielding the primal causation," reaching "the very heart of God."

One word as to his theory of some future termination of punishment by annihilation. It is certainly much more plausible than that of universal restitution. We do not question the power of the Omnipotent to annihilate souls as well as bodies. But apart from Révelation we feel disposed to ask, What is such annihilation? Physical analogies may mislead us here. Then it is asked, "In what sense can God be the One Living One, if an antagonistic element, centred in a monstrous monarch, be bound up with the eternity to come as much as God himself?" Here we do think of an earthly, not physical fact, which may dimly suggest analogies. We see guilty men reduced in mind as well as frame to a helpless condition, where antagonism and activity well nigh cease, yet misery remains. We know not then, fully, what is consistent, or otherwise, with the consummation—"God shall be all in all."

W. B.

The Inquirer.

ANSWER TO QUESTION.

In the *study* of Virgil's "Georgics," a great deal of admirable help may be got from the "Notes on the Bucolics and Georgics of Virgil," by Thomas Keightley. They supply a good deal of apt collateral information and excellent references to other classical sources. A lively and pretty literal version of the Georgics was issued in 1834, by Isaac Butt, now M.P.; and a very good metrical translation, by W. H. Bathurst, M.A., was published by James Walton and Co. The edition of Xenophon's "Anabasis," issued by Charles Stuart Stamford, M.A., Curate of Glasnevin, contains excellent notes and informing introductory matter. Oliver and Boyd publish at 2s. 6d. the two first books of "The Anabasis," edited by James Ferguson, M.D., which for economical study is very valuable as it gives a full and accurate vocabulary, and though it has no notes the meaning of most of the difficult words in the text is given. Geo. B. Wheeler's translation is very fair and pretty literal. Long's editions, both of the Anabasis and Cæsar, supply probably the best texts. A text of the Anabasis by Alexander Negris has gained the approval of many scholars (issued by Clark, Edinburgh). In Arnold's Classics, issued by Messrs. Rivington, the Olynthiac Oration of Demosthenes appeared with English notes and grammatical references (mainly, however, to other works in the same series), a complete edition of the "Anabasis" and one of "Hecuba." Translations of Xenophon, by Spelman, and of Demosthenes, by Leland, exist, and of both there are versions issued in Bohn's classical library. In studying "Alcestis," Browning's "Balaustion's Adventure," which includes a transcript of that play, should be read for a full notice of this important work. See *British Controversialist*, Nov. and Dec., 1871, pp. 380, 435.—R. R.

I am unable to answer the whole query regarding the classics required for the Cambridge Local Examination for December, but one or two things that I do know may be useful.

I. Galbraith's "School and College Virgil" can be had in parts, part 2nd, a crown 8vo. of 314 pp. 3s. 6d. contains the Georgics—with marginal references, notes, &c.; part 4th, a 12mo. of 612 pp., 5s., contains "Æneid," books 7—12, with notes, &c.

In the "Oxford Pocket Classics," the "Georgics," the text with notes, is issued, J. Parker and Co., 2s. (as is the "Alcestis," also text and notes, 1s.).

II. An edition of Cæsar's "De Bello Civili," edited by J. Christison, was prepared for the use of candidates for the Cambridge School Examination in 1860, and was published by Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.

III. In the Oxford Pocket Classics, Cicero's "Pro Milone," text with notes, is published at 1s.—as are also the "Olynthiac Orations."

I hope that these few items may be useful.—A. A. R.

We see that John T. White, D.D., Oxon, proposes to issue immediately in his Grammar School texts the fourth book of the "Georgics" and the second book of the "Anabasis." These will be cheap, handy, and useful, though probably they will not be full enough on the historical, geographical, and other allusions. Very good and useful editions of the first three books of the "Anabasis," edited by Henry Young, price 1s.; of "Alcestis," edited by J. Milner, B.A., 1s.; of "Hecuba" and "Medea," in one vol., edited by W. B. Smith, 1s. 6d.; and Virgil's "Bucolics" and "Georgics," edited, the former by Wm. Rushton, M.A., the latter by Henry Young, in one vol., at 1s. 6d., are published by Virtue & Co., 26, Ivy Lane, London. In the "Catena Classicorum" the "Olynthiacs," edited with English notes by G. H. Heslop, M.A., 2s. 6d., is published by Rivingtons; Dr. A. H. Bryce's "Bucolics" and "Georgics," 2s. 6d. (Griffin & Co.), is full, informing, and valuable. Conington's "Æneid" should be studied, if possible, both in prose and verse. Charles E. Moberley, M.A., formerly scholar of Balliol College, Oxford, Lecturer on Logic there, and now one of the Assistant Masters of Rugby, Editor of the Rugby School "Shakspeare," &c., has just issued an edition of "Cæsar's Civil War," Book I., prepared for intending competitors at the Local Examinations. It is issued by Macmillan, price 2s.—R. M. A.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

976. The classical works fixed upon by the Syndicate for the local examination at Cambridge in December, 1872, are Cæsar's "De Bello Civili," I., Virgil's "Georgica," IV., in Latin; and in Greek, Xenophon's "Anabasis," II., and the "Alcestis" of Euripides, for the junior classes. For the senior classes they are Cicero's "Pro Milone" and Virgil's "Æneid" X., in Latin; and in Greek "The Olynthiacs" of Demosthenes and the "Hecuba" of Euripides. It would be a great help to students to know what were the best and most moderately priced editions of these several books, that, procuring these, they may proceed in favourable circumstances to their studies for that important competition. Can you aid in this matter, and oblige many besides yours, &c.—TYRO.

977. Can any of your readers inform me if there is a good history of this county (Monmouthshire) relating to the events of the past 50, 100, or 150 years?—A SUBSCRIBER.

978. Any information that could be given concerning Herbert S. Skeats, author of "A History of the Free Church," would be thankfully received by—SAMUEL.

Our Private Tutor.

BIBLE PAGES.

No. 1.—ON THE SECOND BOOK OF SAMUEL.

THE two books of Samuel (or Shemuel) originally formed one work, but by the Seventy, and in the Vulgate, it was (probably for convenience' sake) divided into two; the former recording the restoration of the Theocracy, of which Samuel was the leader, and the establishment of the monarchy under Saul:—to the recounting of the one 1 Sam. i.—xii., is mainly allotted; and 1 Sam. xiii.—xxxi. is chiefly devoted to the other; 2 Sam. supplies a narrative of David's reign. Another reason given for the division into two parts is, that the one shows us a sovereign as he ought not to be—Saul selfish and self-seeking; and the other exhibits a sovereign of another sort—God-fearing, even amidst his frailties and sins. Still another contrast has been noted as contained in this work—it furnishes an account of the last two judges—Eli and Samuel, and of the first two kings, Saul and David. These were all contemporaries, though unequal in age, and each had held in succession the position of chief ruler in Israel; hence the incidents of their lives are necessarily interwoven;* though as the administration of Samuel, either as judge or as premier (as we would now call the office of adviser to the sovereign) extended over

* In the preface to her "Scripture Readings for Schools and Families, with Comments," Miss Charlotte M. Yonge makes the following remarks, which have an interest for those who study this period of Bible history,—Joshua to Solomon:—"Striving to follow the best supported and most reverent conjectures, I have been obliged to transpose the narratives in the Book of Judges a good deal; bringing in the history of Ruth and the earlier chapters of Samuel where their dates seem to fix them. This may, I hope, assist teachers as well as pupils in understanding the bearing of events one upon the other. I have also introduced a few of the Psalms, and indicated others, in the hope that reading them in connection with the life of David may give a more vivid historical interest, and, what is more important, a stronger appreciation of their devotional and typical import. For it seems to me that nothing is a stronger protection against the 'hindering and slandering of God's holy word' than that deep sense of its unity and divinity which is produced by being early imbued with the typical and prophetic character of the Old Testament, and thus of its being part of the same design with the New, even to the smallest details—meaning, of course, those that are independent of human error in transcription or translation."

eighty years, he figures largely in the course of the narrative. As a great religious reformer, the organizer of the Prophetic Order into Companies or Colleges of Prophets he necessarily, too, held a high place among the literary class of the nation. Either from the circumstance of his being the chief legislator in favour of the prophetic schools, and hence was held worthy of honour by them; because he was the main actor in and manager of the policy of the nation during the period with which it deals; or because he was author of a large portion of it, his name has been privileged to stand as its title—particularly as the whole period involved is an illustration of events which, like Samuel himself, were “asked of and sent from God.”

His connection with the events of the book are as follows: He was educated under Eli, and anointed both Saul and David to the sovereignty they exercised. As we learn from 1 Sam. x. 25, he wrote an account of the establishment of the monarchy. So we learn, 1 Chron. xxix. 29, that an account of the reign of David was “written in the book of Samuel the seer, and in the book of Nathan the prophet, and in the book of Gad the seer,” it is probable that the work was composed from chap. i. to xxiv. by Samuel; by Gad, who was a *protégé* of Samuel, and a companion of David, the events from the death of the master till the accession of David as king at Hebron, 1 Sam. xxv. to 2 Sam. v., and the remainder by Nathan. Of these various records, when collected by Ezra, probably one book was formed; or the books of Samuel, as we have them, may be a compilation from these, as the authoritative and authentic sources. This is all the more probable from the verbal coincidences between Samuel and Chronicles. The book seems to have quite a genuine tone in it; the language is said to be remarkably pure, although criticism detects a few flaws in the composition. The errors incidental to repeated copying might, however, account for most of these. The canonicity of these books may be regarded as distinctly proved by the quotations made from them in subsequent books (*e. g.*, 1 Kings xi. 26; 2 Kings ii. 4—11; 1 Chron. xvii. 24, 25; Psa. xviii.) and in the New Testament (*e. g.*, Acts xiii. 22; Matt. xii. 3; Heb. i. 5, &c.) In an outline of the chronology, contents and correspondences of the Second Book of Samuel the seer, we shall note some other matters that may give help to the study of this interesting biography of the Shepherd-king and Psalmist of Israel.

AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE: PLAIN ENGLISH.

EXTEMPORE COMPOSITION; ITS ART AND MANNER.

INTRODUCTION.

THE faculty of speech distinguishes man above all other creatures on the earth. Friendship, sympathy, communication of thought and feeling, information and excitement, if not entirely made possible, are yet greatly aided by the use of oral language. It is of all the gifts of man the most constantly in active employment; and, like all human endowments, it is susceptible of great improvement by culture, practice, and careful diligence in its use. The art of composition is usually taught as a mode of writing, as a matter of style, and as a formal process registered by the pen. It seems strange that conversational composition has not yet had its Aristotle, its Euclid, or its Newton; and that the method of expressing ideas in clear, fluent, choice, and elegant terms, in just succession, and with appropriate adaptation to the topic and the time, has been left without even a Lindley Murray. Yet there is perhaps no condition in life which man can occupy where the power of communicating ideas in plain, carefully arranged, and expressive diction, and of taking part in an easy and unconstrained manner, in the interchange of reflections, remarks, statements, or criticisms, is not useful to the person himself, and a cause of delight to others, and does not gain for any one who shows that he possesses it an enviable distinction and regard.

We do not now refer to oratorical success or speech-making popularity, our remarks relate to ordinary talk, and the style in which we take our part in the common intercourse of society. It is certain that there are some who, either through a natural gift, special opportunity, or practical necessity, display in the most trivial affairs on which they may be conversing a mastery of orderly and just diction which at once impresses and interests; while there are others whose sentences are rugged and unsystematic, whose terms are ill-chosen, and whose speech exhibits strange flaws in its formal elements, even while the ideas gleaming through the confusion are good and improving. If by a little attention to the forms and methods of arranging sentences, and a little practice in the attainment of and promptness in bringing our words into order,

we could improve the conversational amenity and power of each other, it would surely be worth while to do it. It does not follow that because we employ art in the culture of our conversation, it would therefore become artful. Art which merely displays its artificiality is only in its apprenticeship, and requires thoughtful practice to perfect it and make it artistic. Then we do not use it in "double vigour, art, *and* nature," but—

"The art itself is nature."

The art of conversational composition requires that variousness of phrase and versatility of formative expression should be attained, and, in order that this lesson may be complete in itself, we shall endeavour to offer a few directions for the accomplishment of these ends, some specimens of the manner in which they may be acquired, and some exercises for the practical use of the student in the acquisition of the power of extempore composition.

LESSON I.

A simple sentence consists of two parts:—1. A *subject* spoken of; 2. A *predicate* affirmed of it; *e. g.*, "Time flies."

Take then any simple sentence, reflect on it, note its meaning, think out the different synonyms, more or less close and cogent, or, if need be, read, commit to memory, or write out a list of the same from any dictionary available; then form as many simple sentences as possible, by combining in all possible forms the synonyms thus brought together, *e. g.*—

Time, periods, duration, opportunity, ages, eras, occasions, terms, seasons, hours, &c., fly, pass, go, depart, hasten away, fleet, take wing, hie off, move rapidly, &c.

These may now be combined into new sentences, in some such forms as the following:—

Time flies, time passes away, time fleets, time takes wing, time hastens on, time hies off, time departs, times go, time moves rapidly;—*Ages* pass, ages take flight, ages hasten away, ages depart, ages fleet away, ages go:—*Seasons* depart, seasons hurry past, seasons take wing, seasons move rapidly, seasons hasten away, seasons fleet;—*Duration* hastens away, duration passes, duration fleets, duration takes flight, duration hies off, duration goes rapidly off;—*Opportunities* go, opportunities pass, opportunities hasten away, opportunities do not last, opportunities hie off, opportunity takes to itself wings, opportunity is a bird of passage;—*Eras*

depart, eras go, eras fleet, eras move rapidly, eras has en away ;— *Periods* cease, periods depart, periods come to an end, periods take flight ;— *Hours* fly, hours hasten away, hours are on the wing, hours depart, hours go ;— *Terms* move rapidly, terms pass, terms go ;— *Occasions* pass, occasions depart, occasions take wing, occasions cease, occasions do not abide with us, occasions go away.

Such sentences as these may be combined in various ways, and so form compound sentences of greater or less complexity ; *e. g.*,

Hours fleet, opportunities pass, occasion ceases, and time itself takes wing.

Opportunity fails, seasons pass away, ages roll on, eras fleet, and time perishes.

Terms close, seasons pass, eras come to an end, periods cease, and time hies rapidly away.

Duration is brief, time is fleeting, ages are transient, eras hasten away, and hours perish. Periods depart, opportunities are fleeting, occasions take to themselves wings, seasons hurry away, ages depart, and even time fails.

We may vary the form still further—1, by making the sentences interrogative ; 2, affirmative in the first member and interrogative in the second ; 3, negative ; 4, affirmative in one or more numbers, and negative in another ; 5, negative in one or more numbers, and affirmative in another ; 6, negative, interrogative, &c.

1. Does not occasion fail, opportunity pass, and time fly ?
2. Hours take wing, and do not ages hie away ?
3. Time will not stay, periods do not endure.
4. Terms pass, seasons fleet, ages depart, and occasions cannot always be ours.

5. Seasons do not last, time will not stay, periods cannot continue, and ages depart as certainly as hours take wing.

6. Do not hours fleet, do not ages pass, do not opportunities escape, do not occasions slip from us, do not periods elapse, and does not time fly ?

Ages depart and seasons fleet,
Duration's self is but a span ;
Hours pass with swift though noiseless feet,
Time flies,—and what art thou, O man !

Will our student readers first read these sentences over carefully, then, laying aside the book, endeavour to reproduce them as numerous and rapidly as possible, and add as many more as may

suggest themselves when the mind is excited to motion? If they do so, they will feel how readily the power of variousness and versatility develops. They may thereafter follow the same process with the following simple sentences as far as they can, observing only not to write anything down except the list of synonyms; if they do even that, and take care to extemporize all the compounds, they can form sentences as rapidly as may be consistent with distinctly outspoken expressiveness.

Birds sing, stars shine, trees grow, man thinks, winds blow, orators persuade, God exists, books instruct, music delights, rivers flow.

Pattern list of synonyms :—

God, Deity, The Almighty, The Omnipotent Jehovah, The Creator, The Supreme Being, The Eternal Father, The Most High, The Author of all, *exists*, lives, has been, is, is real, subsists, operates and acts, manifests Himself.

PRECIS-WRITING; AND HOW TO MANAGE IT.

INTRODUCTION.

"Consulting on the sum of things."—MILTON.†

OUR Civil Service Examiners, setting a very bad example to those who are to be examined in the various departments of the State, have adopted the word *precis*, long employed technically by diplomatists, somewhat unnecessarily, into the English language; but they have added to the enormity of their evil example by forming the hybrid noun which we have been obliged to place at the head of this paper, because that is the term by which it has pleased the Departmental officers to indicate the production in writing of a summary, epitome, outline, or abridgment of any extended or complex composition; what might be Anglified as summarization or reproductive abridgment: or why not employ the term already in use in our language, *Epitomizing*? The French term, *Precis*, is derived from the Latin *præcisio*, a cutting off; and is used to denote a brief, exact, and careful abstract of the essential particulars of a transaction or the specially important contents of a document or documents requisite to the ready understanding, by the head of a department, of any matter calling for his consideration in the course of his duty; or such a *résumé* of the facts or statements he may

call for as shall be trustworthy in details, though concisely expressed and as much as possible condensed.

The culture required for success in *precis-writing* is very extensive. It consists in learning to *read* with care, noticing all salient points, discriminating the essential from the accidental, and forming a fair judgment of the whole expressible in concise terms, embodying much meaning in few words; to *study* with intelligence and perspicuity a whole, however complex, detailed, lengthy, or involved, without losing sight of the main elements of fact, or the train of circumstances, or the persons who took share in the transactions; to *analyze* the circumstances, motives, and facts, so as to determine those which possess real relevance to the matter; and to *extract*, from the whole of the particulars, a detailed and vivid, clear, comprehensible, and firm conception of the gist of it all. It implies that we shall be able to plod patiently, yet with the mind alert, through any jungle of correspondence, narratives, statements, documents, &c.; that we shall retain a cool and collected mastery of the subject in all its divergencies, and yet discern with sagacity all that is germane or not germane to the end in view; and that we should judge soundly even while we are tortured by the irrelevancies or the passions provoked by the perusal, the irksomeness of the real task before us, and the struggling sense of the non-importance which lies heavily on us.

"What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba,"

when it becomes our duty to—

"Have the summary of all . . .

When time shall serve, to show in articles?"

We shall find that no single plan or form will suit. The art of making summaries, compendiums, abstracts, epitomes, and *resumes* in various styles of abridgment ought to be practised. Favourable specimens may often be found in those brief notices of current topics which appear in many newspapers; excellent examples may be seen in the memoirs of a good biographical dictionary, or in the contributions in an encyclopædia. Many of the best papers in every magazine are in fact forms of *précis-writing*, and may be used as models. The art of abridgment is a most important one, and may be exercised in a great variety of ways—from that of the smart paragraph writer in the newspaper to that of the summing up of the judge upon the bench or the narrative oration of a

minister of State on a great public occasion. Sometimes a brief and epigrammatic flash of summation is enough, at other times a selection of details must be given; often the greater matters and the more important results demand mention and explanation, and it very seldom happens that a *precis* should be so extended as not to allow of a good deal of skipping of many circumstances and the omission of minor details and specific incidents.

Taking a somewhat wide view of the subject, the main elements requiring attention in *precis*-writing may be conveniently noticed and classified under the following heads and particulars:—

1. *The essential fact* or series of facts of which a summary is to be given. This will require a *title* or designation, which should be as brief, telling, and expressive as possible; and will further form or give occasion to the *definition* or explanation of the terms used in explanation of the terms and facts.

2. *The history of the facts* in (1) origin, in time, and form; (2) cause; (3) gradations; (4) deflections; (5) complications; (6) solutions; (7) settlement; (8) result; and (9) present position.

3. Geography or topography—as to where, and what influence that had, or exerted, on the event.

4. *Relations of the topic* to history, morals, legislation, commerce, proposed movement or mode of bringing it to an end.

5. *Circumstances* as to persons, events, proposals, mishaps, conveyance of materials or messages, consultations, determinations, &c.

6. *Documentary notice* of the various letters, missives, laws, works, accounts, disbursements, receipts, legal processes, motions, amendments, interchanged suggestions, articles, &c.

7. *Reasonings* on the connection between the origin, progress, and end; on the abuses avoided, the benefits conferred, the obstacles overcome, the problem to be solved, the doubtful facts or the difficult phenomena, and the end accomplished.

8. *The methods* employed and the resources required to effect the end.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH ISLES.

NO. I.—ENGLAND.—A MNEMONIC HINT.

AN easy and ready mnemonic for the study of the geography of England is to take an uncoloured map of that country, and write

upon it, in red ink, the capital letter E. In doing so, let the small initial curve of the head enclose Durham, thence let it circle to Berwick, make the curve to the left such that it shall enclose Cumberland and Lancaster, while the centre loop whirls round Cheshire. The under half, which is more thoroughly circular, will sweep round Anglesea and Pembroke, leaving Cornwall outside; while with a flattened curve it proceeds towards Kent, round which it should swirl upwards round Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, and sweeping inwards, enclose Rutland, whence a flourish may be thrown out so as to surround Lincoln. We thus secure certain well-defined positions in space, associated with special counties, and from these we can readily construct related counties. The northern counties are easily remembered on this plan, so also are the counties of Wales, those on the base line and those along the east coast. If farther aid is required, it may be obtained by drawing straight lines across from the Severn mouth to the Thames, from Milford to Maldon, and from Barmouth to Yarmouth, and studying the counties upon, above, and below these lines. Attention to all the counties through which the second degree of W. longitude passes will make the central counties through the whole extent of the map certain.

Our Collegiate Course.

SAMSON AGONISTES.

A DRAMATIC POEM. BY JOHN MILTON.

Among the subjects fixed upon by the Syndics of the Cambridge University for the Local Examinations of Senior Students (*i.e.*, of those born on or subsequently to January 1, 1855, and prior to January 1, 1860) there appears in Part II., Section B, Division three, Milton's "*Samson Agonistes*," with philological and other questions arising out of the subject. We intend in these pages to supply a few notes on such matters as may be made topics of inquiry at such an examination, in order that, by judicious perusal and study of these, those who propose to go forward to that

examination may have some aid in their endeavours to make themselves proficient in the knowledge of the literature of, and connected with, this important and well-chosen poem. As it may be made to involve a great many important and interesting facts in Scriptural history, linguistic lore, allusive illustration, and metrical quantity, we shall devote some care to produce and lay before our readers such notes on these and other matters, as are likely to be serviceable not only in preparation for that examination, but also such as shall show the wealth of information which the self-culture student may acquire by the diligent and earnest effort to comprehend any of the masterpieces of the English tongue.

Two facts, when taken together, are not a little surprising, viz., 1st, that the earliest published lines of Milton consisted of "An Epitaph on Shakespeare" of singular felicity of expression, and admirable poetic art. These, though composed in 1630, when as yet only the first folio existed, were prefixed anonymously to the second folio issued in 1632; 2nd, that Puritan as he was, Milton had formed a lofty ideal of the power of the drama, delighted in Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, Shakespeare, Jonson, and Massinger, Beza, Buchanan, and Grotius, and himself aspired to re-endow the drama with new fire and power, interest and usefulness. Two of his earlier sustained efforts, "Arcades" and "Comus," take the dramatic form. Among his manuscripts are memoranda regarding a series of sacred dramas—Adam in Banishment, The Flood, Abraham in Egypt. His first aim was to compose "Paradise Lost" as a drama; he constructed an outline of Dramatic Illustrations of British History—English and Scotch—which, though he did not attempt to write them, show his inclination towards the representative poetry of the Elizabethan age; and the latest known product of his muse is this dramatic poem, "Samson Agonistes" (i.e., Samson, the *Athlete* or the *Striver*; not, as is often thought, the *agonized* or *wretched*).

The characteristic of the hero, Agonistes, is derived from the Greek word *agonistes*, a wrestler in the games, a competitor or an antagonist, one who presses on towards the goal. Æschines, the Greek orator, and Augustine, the Christian preacher, both employ the term to express a struggler against difficulties, to fulfil a task, duty, or appointed course. "Samson Agonistes," in the Miltonic usage, signifies the sunlike one who goes forth rejoicing as a strong man to run the race set before him with patience, steadiness, and

fortitude, and involves not only the idea expressed in Psa. xix. 5, but also that in Heb. xii. 1.

Bibliography. *Samson Agonistes*, "a noble poem, the swan-song of a mighty genius," was in all likelihood the last composed of all Milton's poems. *Paradise Regained*, begun in 1665, at Chalfont, where he was residing while the plague raged, was finished in the *Annus Mirabilis*, or year of wonders, 1666, at Bunhill Fields, while the fire of London was spreading its devastations through that great city. In the following year, 1667, *Paradise Lost*, in ten books, was published, and passed through nine editions in two years. In two years after that, 1671, there appeared "*Paradise Regained; a Poem in four books*. To which is added *Samson Agonistes*. The Author, John Milton. London. Printed by J [ohn] M [ilton], for John Starkey, at the Mitre, in Fleet Street, near Temple Bar." This is a handsomely printed thin octavo volume of 220 pages. The poem commences on B, without any prefatory matter, being preceded only by a leaf with "Licensed, July 2nd, 1670," on it; and the title also forming a leaf. *Paradise Regained* occupies the space from B to I, where there occurs a fresh title, *Samson Agonistes, A Dramatic Poem*, with a motto from Aristotle's "Poetics," ch. iv., to the effect that, "Tragedy is an imitation of a worthy, or illustrious and worthy, action, &c., through pity and tear effecting a purification of passions." This poem is separately paged, and ends on P 8, p. 101. A page of *Omissa* follows, then a page of *Errata*. The second edition of both poems again appeared in 1680, in 8vo, 136 pp. *Samson Agonistes* has, as before, a separate title page on E 4. The "J. M." of the title page we have interpreted *John Milton*; as this seems to us to indicate that the book was produced on the responsibility and at the sole expense of the author. The same *initials* occur as the printer in Milton's "History of Britain."

Dramatis Personæ.—Samson, the sun-like, was the son of Manoah, a Danite of Zorah, by an unknown mother. His birth was foretold by an angel to Manoah's wife during his absence, who described particularly the manner of his life and the chief purpose of it. At the request of Manoah the angelic vision and visit was repeated (Judg. xiii.). He was gigantic in strength, and entertained a strong hatred to the Philistines. Yet, contrary to the wishes of his parents and the direct injunctions of the law (Exod. xxxiv. 16; Deut. vii. 3) he married a woman of Timnath, a

Philistine town; his only reason being "she pleaseth me well." On his way to Timnath he had slain a lion, and found in the carcass of the beast afterwards a swarm of bees. He ate of their honey and gave some to his parents, and on this incident he constructed an enigma, which the Philistines could not solve. His wife, however, by earnest entreaties had got him to unravel the mystery to her; and they extorted the secret from her by cruel threats. He gave them the present he had promised to the resolvers of his marriage-feast pleasantry, but slew thirty of them in revenge for their usage of his wife, whom, also, as false to his interests, he forsook. Bethinking himself, however, that he was greatly to blame for her fault by the folly of giving the guess, and not keeping his own counsel, he resolved to forgive her. But going down to Timnath to be reconciled he found she had married again, and they scoffed at him. He took 300 foxes, and fastening a fire-brand to the tails of each pair tied together, set them loose through the fields and vineyards of his contemnners, and this almost desolated their land. They retaliated by setting fire to the house of his (discarded) wife, and burning therein her and her parents; and he smote them hip and thigh for their barbarity. He then retired to a rock between Bethlehem and Tekoah, called Etam. The Philistines came, laying waste the country of Judah in revenge. Three thousand of the men of Judah rebuked Samson for thus embroiling them with such foes. He submits to be bound by them and delivered to the Philistines. They received him with the exultant glee of gratified hate; but while they were congratulating themselves on the possession of their enemy he burst his withen bands, snatched the jaw-bone of an ass, slew a thousand of them, and put the residue to flight. Sorely athirst after his exertion, he could find no water, but, on praying, a miraculous supply was granted to him from the spot where he had thrown down the serviceable jaw-bone. He became by his prowess the accepted ruler of Israel, and held sway for twenty years.

Having gone to Gaza he consorted with a woman who was an harlot. The Philistines heard of his being there, and they hoped to entrap him. For this purpose they locked the gates upon him; rising at midnight he went forth, unfixing the gates from their fastenings, and carrying them with him to the top of the hill Hebron. He fell into an equally fatal error in the valley of Sorek in Dan, near Eschol, where Delilah dwelt. He loved her and

trusted in her ; but the chiefs of the Philistines bribed her to discover the secret of his strength. He gave her to understand first, that were he bound with seven green withes he would be vanquishable ; then, that if new ropes were used to bind him ; again, that if his locks were woven into a web, he would be unable to resist. These things were tried but he broke from their bondage and escaped from the Philistines who lay in wait to take him. Though thus thrice the victim of her treachery, he was not warned, and at last he told her the true secret of his strength. She petted him asleep, and during his slumber had his locks shaven, and his strength went from him. He was taken by the Philistines, who put out his eyes, bound him with brazen fetters, and made him grind in his prison-house. Great was their joy at his capture, and they decreed a festival to Dagon, whereat they derided their prisoner and desired him to make sport for them. This he did for awhile, then remembering God and the power of prayer, he besought from heaven a brief restoration of his former strength. His prayer was granted, and he used his might to pull down the main pillars of the temple of Dagon ; so that the whole fell with a crash, entombing in its ruins three thousand Philistines, men and women. His remains were recovered from the débris, and he was buried beside his father Manoah, between Zorah and Eshcol.

Delilah (eagerly desiring one) a woman of impure character, who dwelt in the valley of Sorek, who was beloved by and became the betrayer of Samson to his enemies the Philistines for eleven hundred pieces of silver. Milton represents Delilah as Samson's wife, which she probably then was.

Manoah (rest), father of Samson, a native of Zorah, where also he was buried. His wife during his absence had a vision of an angel foretelling the birth of Samson. Manoah requested a repetition of the vision, which was granted, and an auspicious sign was given to him by the acceptance of his sacrifice.

Harapha of Gath, an imaginary, unscriptural character, invented for the purposes of the fable or plot. The other characters are a public officer, a messenger, and a chorus of Danites, formal additions to the main actors for the carrying out of the action of the plot.

Prose version of lines 1—22, with the grammatical ellipses supplied, and arranged for construing, analysis, &c.—

Lend [thou to me] thy guiding hand to [wards those dark steps] which are a little on—a little onward ; for yonder bank hath (i. e., affords to me

a) choice of sun or shad(e)ow [and] there I am wont to sit when any chance relieves me from my task of servile toil, [that task which is] daily in the common prison else enjoined [on me], where [in] I, [being] a prisoner chained, [can] scarce[ly] draw freely the air, also [like me] imprisoned, [and therefore] close and damp, [an] unwholesome draught;—but here I feel amends [for my suffering, from] the breath of heaven fresh-blowing, pure and sweet, born with the day-spring [from on high]: leave me here to respire. The people this day hold a solemn feast to their sea-idol, Dagon, and they forbid laborious works [to be done during it]; their superstition yields me this rest unwillingly; hence I, retiring with leave from the popular noises seek this unfrequented place to find ease—some ease to the body, to the mind none [can be got] from restless thoughts that, like a deadly swarm of armed hornets, no sooner [am I] found alone but [than] they rush upon me thronging, and present [before me] what once I was in time past and what I now am.

Lexicographic Notes and Explanations.

Amends (9). Reparation of an injury, fault or wrong from the French *Amende*. Though singular in signification, it is a true plural *in form*; here it means *compensation*, the making up of what has been lost, an equivalent.

Chance (4). Circumstance happening without the exertion of the will of the individual to whom it happens in bringing it about.

Choice (3). The opportunity of exercising a willing preference.

Dagon (13). The idol of the Philistines, half man, half fish. See "Paradise Lost," i. 437—466; Josh. xv. 41; xix. 27; Judges xvi. 21; 1 Sam. x. 1—3, &c. He is mentioned subsequently in the poem—lines 437, 440, 450, 462, 468, 478, 861, 1145, 1151, 1311, 1360, 1370, 1463.

Dark Steps (2). A metonymy for steps invisible to me; imitated from the "Phœnissæ" of Euripides, one of Milton's favourite authors.

"Lead onward, daughter, since my foot is blind."

Dayspring (11). A beautiful designation of dawn. See Job xxxviii. 12; Luke i. 78. In Gower's "Confessio Amantis," ii., p. 97, ed Pauli, we find,

"For till I see the *daies spring*,
I set sleep nought at a risake."

In Shakespeare's "Henry IV." part 2nd, iv. 4, the phrase appears thus—

"As sudden
As flows congealed in the *Spring of day*."

It is used by Milton in "Paradise Lost," v. 139 vi. 521.

Else (6). At other times; besides; in any other way.

Feast (12). is festival or gala-day, civil or religious time of rejoicing anniversary ceremonial, opposed to fast.

Laborious. Labour, properly signifies toil which varies by the workman passing from the doing of one thing to doing another. Work is some continuous employment pursued as a trade. We call a person engaged in the various operations of the farm, a labourer; and one who is engaged in the toil of manufactures a working man. But here laborious work seems to be equal to coarse irksome effort, the "task of servile toil," of line 5.

Popular (16). Vulgar, common, mob-like, from *populus*, Latin, the national community. See "Paradise Lost," ii. 313; vii. 488; xii. 338; "Paradise Regained," ii. 227.

Relieve of (5) implies objective help; *relieve from* involves subjective aid or influence. We relieve from *anxiety*, but we relieve of a *burden*.

Respire (11). to breathe, combining inspiration and expiration; to exert; the full activity of the lungs in their healthy play.

Servile (5). Slavish, enforced, as below enjoined.

Solemn (12). Not here holy, but stated customary, established from *solemnis*, annual.

Some—none (18). A fine antithetic turn of phrase; *some* denotes an indeterminate quantity, uncertain and conjectural, being more than one, and less than all; in strict logic it implies a minimum of one or more; but, according to De Morgan it does not guarantee more than one in number; but here it is equivalent to *a little* in quantity: *none* here means *not any*, no appreciable quantity, when it refers to number it signifies no one, and is the contradictory of all or every one.

Superstition (15), from Latin *superstitio*, and that from *super* and *sto*, excessively scrupulous religiosity; and thence *false worship* overstanding the true. See Acts xxv. 19. "Paradise Lost," iii. 452; xii. 512; here, Idolatry, absurd opinion and practices originating in over-nice, through wrong, views of spiritual things.

Swarm (19). A great body or number of small animals, like bees, &c., who live in social groups; crowd, multitude, Dryden uses. "A swarm of bees that cut the liquid sky," and in Shakespeare we find Henry IV.: I; v. i.

"From the swarm of fair advantages,

You griped the general away into your hand."

It is used again by Milton, "Paradise Lost," viii., 400. "Paradise Regained," iv. 15.

Yonder (3). At a distance, but within sight; Yond, generally eupho-

nized to yon is the positive, and yonder the comparative, from the Saxon *geond*.

Literary and other Illustrative Notes.

6—9. It is not improbable that had Milton possessed the use of his eyes he would have altered these lines somewhat : *a. g.*,—

“Daily in the common *prison* else enjoined me,
Where I, a *prisoner* (captive) chained scarce freely draw
The air imprisoned also ” (impounded).

1—2. *A little onward*, . . . *a little farther on*. An elegant instance of the figure epanalepsis, or the echoing repetition at the close, of a phrase used at the beginning of a sentence or clause.

6. *Daily in*. The *y* is elided as a metrical element, and *prison* is pronounced as a monosyllable.

11 and 15. *Leave* in line 11 is the imperative of the *verb*, and signifies depart from me and suffer me to remain alone; in line 15 it is a *noun*, and means permission given.

17—18. *Ease, ease*, an instance of anadiplosis, or emotional repetition of term or phrase.

19. Todd quotes Sidney's “Arcadia” as the source of this line. “A new swarm of thoughts stinging her mind,” p. 164, 13th Ed., but in “Paradise Regained,” i., 196, we have this parallel:—

“Oh! what a multitude of thoughts, at once
Awakened in me swarm!”

20. *Hornets* (*Vespa crabrones*), from Saxon *hrynnetto*, a very large strong stinging fly, or wasp, which makes its nest and breeds in hollow trees. See Exod. xxiii. 28, Deut. vii. 20, Josh. xxiv. 12. Their sting is very severe, and the hum of their restless swarms distracts and maddens cattle and men.

22. *Time past*—(What once I was); an enlargement by apposition to make the contrast greater between (and what [I] am now).



Literary Notes.

REV. ALEX. B. GROSART, Blackburn, Lancashire, proposes to reprint, for private circulation only, "The Prose Writings of William Wordsworth."

"Mr. Henry Holbeach," is "Mr. Matthew Browne," the author of "Chaucer's England," "Views and Opinions," "Shoemaker's Village," &c. His real name is Randa.

The death is announced of Professor K. B. Hundeshagen, of Bonn.

J. R. Holyoake is about to write "The History of the Co-operative Movement."

Mr. Charles Edmonds's reprint of that very rare poem, Edward Hake's "News out of Powles Churchyarde, 1579," with a long introduction, will be ready this month.

Mr. J. L. Cherry is preparing for publication "The Poetical Remains of John Clare, the Northamptonshire peasant poet." The volume will include letters from Clare's friends and contemporaries, extracts from his diary, prose fragments, &c. Among the letters are some from Charles Lamb, James Montgomery, Bloomfield, Sir Charles A. Elton, Hood, Carey, Allan Cunningham, &c.

The trustees of the British Museum have lately paid the large sum of £1,072 for the *Ars Moriendi* of Weigel's collection, which is £72 more than was paid for the famous vellum of Caxton.

A new edition of Mr. Disraeli's select speeches, published in the "Golden Library," is about to appear. It will contain a report of the recent speech at the Royal Literary Fund Dinner, revised by the author.

The Cobden Club will publish "Cobden's Letters."

The Secretary of State for War has approved of the following authors and period of history being announced as those in which candidates will be examined for admission to the Royal Military Academy, at the examination to be held in January, 1873:—English Authors—*Chaucer*: Prologue to the "Canterbury Tales." *Shakspeare*: "King Lear," "Coriolanus." *Bacon*: "Advancement of Learning." *Milton*: "Paradise Lost," books 3 and 4. *Pope*: "Essay on Man." *Dryden*: "Absalom and Achitophel." *Macaulay's* "Essay on Milton." *Sir W. Temple*: "The Wars of the Succession in Spain." *Addison*. *Scott*: "Woodstock," "Old Mortality." Period of History—The History of England from A.D. 1650 to 1714.

It is proposed to establish at Rome a new library, to be styled the "Biblioteca Romana," of books relating exclusively or principally to the history of the imperial city. The Vatican Library is notoriously deficient in such works. The idea of this new institution originates with Signor Enrico Narducci. The well-known bibliographer, Francesco Cerotti, is likely to be placed at the head of this new library.

A prospectus has been issued of a photographic reproduction of the "Chronicle of the Council of Constance," made by Ulrich von Richental, during the years 1314—1419. The author of this chronicle was a native of Constance, well to do, and familiar with the principal persons assembled at the Council, whom he often entertained at his own table.

He was an artist as well as a chronicler, and enriched his work with coloured drawings of the principal events that occurred during the sittings of the Council—such as the entry of the Pope into Constance, also that of the Emperor, the Procession of the Golden Rose, the Pope's Benediction from the Balcony, the Martyrdom of John Huss, the Martyrdom of Jerome of Prague, &c. Altogether there are said to be 140 pages of text, and 160 of drawings. The photographs of the latter are intended to be coloured, so as to form exact fac-similes of the originals. The whole is under the direction of M. G. Wolf, photographer to the Grand Duke of Baden.

M. Gerstaecker, the deceased German novelist, was chiefly known as the author of romances, such as "The Pirates of the Mississippi," of which the scene was laid in America. He had emigrated in early life, and spent six years in the United States. In 1849 he undertook a journey—the expense of which was borne partly by the publishing firm of Cotta, partly by the Archduke John—to South America, Australia, the Society Islands, California, &c., which lasted three years. He wrote letters during this time to *Ausland*, and the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which were subsequently published in a collected shape and translated into English.

Dr. Conrad Hoffmann and Dr. Jacob Bächtold are preparing a new edition of the works of Marie de France, from the MSS. in the British Museum (the best) and Paris.

Charles Knight has edited for Messrs. Virtue and Co. a magnificent "Imperial (quarto) Shakspeare," which is issued to subscribers in forty parts. Each part contains a famous picture illustration. The work includes notes, introductions, and a memoir.

Prof. Kayser, of Heidelberg, well known as the editor of Philostratus,

and, along with Professor Baiter, of Cicero, is dead.

Charles Lever (Cornelius O'Dowd) died 1st June, at Trieste.

A corrected re-issue of Mr. Lever's complete works, with an autobiographical introduction to each novel, was in preparation when he died.

The proprietors of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* are about to add an important chapter to the history of French literature—a history of the Review, notices of the contributors, notes of their papers, extracts from their correspondence, &c. The *Academy* wisely suggests that the proprietors of the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Quarterly Review*, &c., should follow this example.

Benjamin Humphrey Smart, author of "Beginnings of a New School of Metaphysics" (1831-7), *Manuals of Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric*, &c., died 24th February, aged 86.

Hugo Reid, author of numerous educational works, died 13th June, aged 63.

Rev. Norman MacLeod, D.D., editor of "Good Words," author of "The Earnest Student," "Home Education," "The Gold Thread," &c., died 16th June.

J. A. Froude has undertaken to deliver a Series of Lectures in America on "The Relations between England and Ireland."

A handsome volume of 400 pages has been collected by an enthusiastic admirer, and published as a supplementary vol. of the author's Library Edition of his complete works, uniform with the title of "Carlyle's Letters."

Johannes Meister has produced a very full, clear, and excellent Essay on Shakspeare's "Tempest," which he allocates in the winter of 1611-12, and in which he exposes the fabricated poem of "The Enchanted Island," laid before the English public in 1839.

Many-sided Minds.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE—THE DIVINE.

By C. M. INGLEBY, LL.D., FOR. SEC. R.S.L.

(Second Notice.)

“A very epic of tragic defeat.”—*Mrs. Oliphant.*

ONE of two grave charges brought against Coleridge in several of the writings recorded in my bibliographical list,* and in particular in 33 and 38, is, in short, this: that as a philosopher, he professed so much and performed so little. Of course, the *so much* and *so little* are correlative; for assuredly, compared with many other men of genius, Coleridge accomplished a great deal. It would be hopeless to contest the truth of either clause in that charge. A few words to exemplify this will suffice. In the “*Biographia Literaria*,”† he writes:—

“In the third treatise of my ‘*Logosophia*’ . . . I shall give (*Deo volente*) the demonstrations and constructions of the Dynamic Philosophy scientifically arranged.”

That is to say, in the *third* treatise of a work whereof no *first* nor *second* treatise ever existed! This *Logosophia* is the “great work” which is so often alluded to and even described in his Letters;‡ and it was this work which *was* (but was *not* destined) to contain the boasted Coleridgean “system,” characterized in such very

* Prefixed to the *First Notice*. Here (as there) I refer to those writings under their numbers in the list. I am convinced that many must have eluded my search. I am told that Mrs. Oliphant’s “*Life of Edward Irving*” contains interesting reference to Coleridge. I forgot to include Mr. J. S. Mill’s “*Dissertations and Discussions*,” 1859, with whose paper on Coleridge, vol. i. p. 392, I was acquainted. I ought also to have included a *Review of Coleridge’s Poetical Works* (by Prof. John Wilson) in *Blackwood’s Magazine*, October, 1834, in the list of “*Anonymous Writings*.” We will call this 44, and Mr. Mill’s paper 45.

I must add, that I omitted the mention of Coleridge’s son, Berkeley, who died an infant in 1799.

† 1847. Vol. i., p. 267, foot-note.

‡ *E.g.*, 1 vol. i., pp. 7, 154—156, 161, &c.

1872.

general terms, in the "Table Talk."* What this system actually was, as existing only in the brain of Coleridge, is an open question, on which there may be *quot homines tot sententiæ*, i. e. *homines* who may care to speculate on the nature of a nonentity! This much is certain—that no *systematic* treatment of any *strictly* metaphysical doctrine (on its theoretical side, at least) is to be found amongst Coleridge's published works. What it was believed to be (though, again, mainly on the practical side) by the late Joseph Henry Green we know from his two volumes (edited by Dr. J. Simon) on "Spiritual Philosophy," recently reviewed in these columns by the former Editor of the *British Controversialist*. So fully was the Coleridge-Green system considered in that paper, and so largely was it exemplified by extracts from Green's work, that it would be an impertinence in me to expound or discuss that system here. I wish it to be clearly understood, however, that the conclusions I have arrived at, after a long and careful study of Coleridge's works, are unfavourable to his pretensions. I believe he made certain German philosophers his "thinking-ground" (in particular, Lessing and Schelling, and, in a far less degree, Kant, Maasz, and some others), deliberately intending to utilise their work, to stand on their shoulders, to make their germs fructify in his own mind, to scale the philosophic heights with their ladders, or (to employ a phrase of the late Prof. Ferrier) to swim in the philosophic depths with their bladders; and having scaled the one, or (if you will) *approfondi* the other, to kick down the ladders, or puncture the bladders, and thenceforth to set up as climber-in-chief, or swimmer-in-chief, or, to combine both metaphors, as the great explorer of the unknown in *metaphysical* geography. This was the *rôle* of a man of great parts; who possessed sublime powers of imagination, and whose intellect, in his chosen walk, was not contemptible, but who was, nevertheless, by defect of constitution or of discipline, *incapable* of excogitating *proprio Marte* a philosophy for himself. I believe, then, that Coleridge had no *original* philosophical system, but only the fragments of a system borrowed, without due understanding, and without original elaboration from some earlier works of Schelling; and that, as a theoretical philosopher, it will henceforth for ever be impossible to re-inflate Coleridge's collapsed reputation. Some English philosophers there are, I am quite aware, who are not prepared for the reception of this verdict. They will "for time, times, and half a time," work as if for their very lives at patching up the hole; but the re-inflation will be postponed *sine die*.

* Ed. 1851, pp. 146 and 329.

But there is also a practical philosophy closely allied to religion. Now in this field I conceive Coleridge's industry to have borne notable fruit; and to this special industry I attribute the remarkable influence which I hold his works to have had on the course of religious thought in England and America. Admitting the shortcomings of Coleridge, and deploring the enormous disproportion which his performance bears to his promise, I still think *this* fault admits of complete explanation without any very disastrous imputation on his morals. In the "Table Talk" * we find him speaking of himself thus:—

"Hamlet's character is the prevalence of the abstract and generalising habit over the practical. He does not want courage, skill, will, opportunity; but every incident sets him thinking: and it is curious, and at the same time strictly natural that Hamlet, who all through the play seems reason itself, should be impelled at last by mere accident to effect his object. *I have a smack of Hamlet myself, if I may say so.*"

This may, perhaps, serve as a key to unlock the problem of Coleridge's stupendous failure. But as a critique on *Hamlet* it is surely at fault. "He does not want will," says Coleridge. Why that's the very thing he does want; else he would not need to be "impelled at last by mere accident to effect his object." I strongly suspect that disease, in the first place, must be credited with Coleridge's indolence and desultoriness of study, producing an idiosyncrasy which opium (such is its perilously subtle influence) only served to strengthen and to disguise; and that, in the second place, the evil is due to the elevation from which he viewed his own relation to the great problems of life. The present Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, Rev. J. B. Mozley, a man of such admirable power and attainment in his faculty, that he has been called "the modern Butler," expresses in the most appropriate terms what I am seeking to convey. He wrote,†—

"Persons of the greatest capacity are often those who for this reason do the least; for, surveying themselves from the highest point of view, amidst the infinite variety of the universe, their own share in it seems trifling, and scarce worth a thought, and they prefer the contemplation of all that is, or has been, or can be, to the making a coil about doing what, when done, is no better than vanity. It is hard to concentrate all our attention and efforts on one pursuit, except from ignorance of others; and without this concentration of our faculties, no great progress can be made

* Ed. 1851, p. 40.

† *Christian Remembrancer*, Jan. 1842.

in any one thing. It is not merely that the mind is not capable of the effort; it does not think the effort worth making."

Here we have both the causes (co-operating with bodily sickness and the somewhat fraudulent habit of mind, which the habitual use of opium unfailingly engenders or confirms) which I conceive to have concurred in rendering Coleridge's intellectual powers so much less productive than they ought to have been, and his actual achievements so disproportionate to his pretensions,

"not answering the aim,
And that unbodied figure of the thought,"

of which he is so often found speaking and writing as of a *fait accompli*. That he could have done better philosophical work than almost any Englishmen of his own time I do not deny; but the sort of work he could have done, and I think would have done with a narrower range of tastes, and less self-consciousness, would have borne no proportion to what had been accomplished by the great Germans.

Coleridge's fourteen months' residence in Germany was for him an opening of the eyes. Fancy a poetic Rasselas, who had lived so long in his "happy valley" that he knew and loved every tree within its rocky bourn, till he could interpret the murmured language of its mountain runlets, and felt a yearning towards every little island which was lovingly embraced by the gliding river, or overwhelmed by the swollen torrent. Fancy such a man being taken for the first time to the summit of a glacier-bound Alp, and beholding thence "the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them." Is it wonderful that his heart should sink within him, when he finds how insignificant he is in the midst of creation, how little he can do, and how unsatisfactory it is when done? Is it wonderful that his will should fall before the work which he is invited to accomplish, and that after all the work should be left undone? Is not this a picture of Coleridge the poet growing into Coleridge the philosopher?

Such thoughts were suggested to me on attempting to trace Coleridge's career after his return to England from Malta in the year 1806. In 1807 I find him residing alternately at Nether Stowey, with Mr. Thomas Poole (at whose house he made the acquaintance of De Quincey) and at Bristol, probably with Cottle.* I have been unable to follow his footsteps in the next two years, except that he delivered a course of lectures on Shakspeare at the

Royal Institution in 1808,* and that in 1809 on June 8th, the first number of *The Friend* was published. This we may regard as his first essay in philosophy. The twenty-seventh and last number was issued on March 15, 1810.† This work will assuredly live, though its political economy has been condemned by Mr. J. S. Mill ‡ in terms which I conceive applicable to its metaphysics.§ To my mind, the most curious thing in it is the story of Maria Schöning in the second volume; for I am convinced, on internal evidence, that it contains scarcely a sentence of Coleridge's writing.¶ In 1810 I find him residing with Southey at Greta Hall, Keswick, ¶ and then with Basil Montagu. His irregular habits at Montagu's were so disturbing to that quiet household, that the host found it expedient to remonstrate with his eccentric guest, which led to a rupture. The result was, that Coleridge left in dudgeon and removed to lodgings at Hammersmith; thence he went by invitation to reside with a Mr. Morgan at Calne. In this grateful retirement he wrote his "Biographia Literaria," and composed, or perhaps I should say completed his *latest* and *last* poetical work of any pretensions, viz. "Zapolya." These, as I said, were published six or seven years later.

I have stated what is to me the most curious thing in *The Friend*. I will now notify what is to me the most curious thing in the "Biographia Literaria:" it is the enormously long letter which almost constitutes Chapter XIII., and is put there as the moving cause why that chapter was not written! This letter purports to be addressed to the poet by "a friend, whose practical judgment," says Coleridge, "I have had ample reason to estimate [? esteem] and revere, and whose taste and sensibility," &c., in reply to one from the poet asking that friend's opinion on the expediency of the proposed chapter. If the chapter was not written, how could this friend give any opinion upon it, *à fortiori*, such an elaborate and detailed opinion as he does give? That would be a *crux* indeed but for the fact that the friend knew intuitively what that chapter was (not) to be; for he was none other than Coleridge himself—his own best friend; like Mr. Noah Claypole's "number one," in "Oliver Twist." The simple fact is this: Coleridge was not prepared to write a chapter on such a subject as that announced at the head of Chapter XIII.; and he wrote this letter to serve as a plausible excuse for not doing so, and a means of making his readers believe that he had written and withdrawn it. To make this the more plausible, he refers them to a "detailed prospectus"

* 26, p. 333.

† 26, pp. 187 and 190.

‡ 45, p. 452.

§ 33 p. 9.

¶ 32 p. 7.

¶ 26, p. 261.

of the chapter which is to be given at the end of the second volume. This was "going rayther too fur," as Mr. Weller, senior, expresses it; for Coleridge's incapacity to write the chapter was gross and total, and even *teetotal*, embracing an inability to furnish the prospectus: which accordingly is as much a nonentity as the chapter "on the imagination or esemplastic faculty."

During the period from 1810 to 1816, I have not been able to follow Coleridge with any constancy or detail. In 1811-12* he delivered a course of twelve lectures on Shakspeare and Milton, at the Scottish Corporation Hall, Crane Court, Fleet Street. These are the lectures which Mr. J. P. Collier professed to have taken down in shorthand, of which notes the volume published by him in 1856 professes to contain *verbatim* copies. But the whole thing was exploded by Mr. A. E. Brae, of Leeds, in a pamphlet, entitled "Collier, Coleridge and Shakspeare," in which he proves that the Lectures published by Mr. Collier are fabrications; and the late Mr. Herbert Coleridge told me that he regarded them as "apocryphal."† In the year 1811, too, Coleridge delivered a course on the same subject to the London Philosophical Society, the first of which was on November 18.‡ In 1814 he lectured at Bristol,§ and at the Surrey Institution in London. During these six years, too, I gather that Coleridge's consumption of laudanum was excessive; in fact, his health began to suffer so much alternately from the abuse of laudanum and from his efforts to discontinue the practice, that he called in Dr. Adams, by whose introduction he made the acquaintance of Mr. James Gillman.

In the month of April, 1816, Coleridge called upon Gillman, who resided in the Grove, Highgate, and made a proposal for his being domiciled there, in order that he might be restrained from the excessive use of opium. He warned Gillman that though prior habits had rendered it out of his power to tell an untruth, he dared not promise that he "should not, with regard to this detested poison, be capable of acting one." On Monday, April 15th, 1816, he became an inmate of Gillman's house; and, with the exception of somewhat rare visits to Ramsgate, Cambridge, and some other places, the Grove was his constant residence till death. Up to a few years since, many a stranger has made a pilgrimage to this spot, and been shown Coleridge's study, religiously pre-

* 26, p. 262.

† It is unfortunate that Mr. Hort, in 30, adduces one of these spurious lectures as the sufficient evidence of an important date.

‡ 26, p. 352. 15, p. 52. 1, vol. ii., p. 220.

§ *Quarterly Review*, vol. cvii., p. 480.

served in exactly the same state as it was in his life-time. But all that is changed now. Even the old-fashioned dormer-windows in the top storey have given place to an execrable modern structure of sashes; and but for the specific instructions which were given me by another Highgate celebrity (now no longer resident there) I should never have dreamed that this hideous, staring, topheavy piece of cockneyism was the shrine of that Ancient Mariner, who, in De Quincey's words, had "cruised on the broad Atlantic of Kant and Schelling."

From the time of Coleridge's removal to Highgate, his life was uneventful. In 1817 he delivered his second course of Lectures on Shakspeare at the Royal Institution;* and some time later, a single lecture to the London Philosophical Society, "On the Growth of the Individual Mind," the subject of which seems to have been chosen for him immediately before the lecture was spoken.† In 1818 he delivered three courses,—one on the "Choice of Books," in Fleur-de-Lis Court, Fetter Lane;‡ one elsewhere on the "History of Philosophy," "Works," vol. xiii., as well as Charles Lamb's exquisite squib, "Letter to an Old Gentleman whose Education has been neglected," and one on the "English Dramatists," at the Crown and Anchor. Other courses he delivered later, at Willis's Rooms, and at the Russell Institution.

It was on January 26, 1818, after delivering one of the lectures on the English Dramatists, that a young man among the audience stepped forth and requested his advice on the best means of remedying the faults of a neglected education. This was Mr. Thomas Alsop. Coleridge's kindness to the stranger emboldened Mr. Alsop to write to him the next day, with a present of game; and thus began that strange and eventful intimacy between them which gave us the two remarkable volumes of Letters and Table-Talk, standing at the head of my bibliographical list, and also, I think, the "Letters to a Young Man," &c., by De Quincey.

Coleridge's habits and health were now such as to preclude him from really hard work: besides it was, in any case, too late for him to make up lee-way. It is not surprising that during the sixteen years of life which remained to him, he did not redeem the magnificent promise which he was always holding forth to his disciples and friends, and which he ratified even in his published works. Fragments of a philosophical system, indeed, are found in *The Friend*, the "Biographia Literaria," and the "Theory of Life;" but they are little else than translations from Schelling.

* *Quarterly Review*, vol. cvii. p. 480.

† 26, p. 354.

‡ 1, vol. ii., p. 80.

Those sixteen years, however, were not wasted. He dictated to the late Mr. Joseph Henry Green one large volume on "The Dynamic Philosophy"; to Mr. Seth B. Watson the essay on "The Theory of Life"; to the late Mr. Stutfield, a fragment on Logic, which is still in the possession of that gentleman's widow. Finally he dictated some portions of a "History of Philosophy" to the late eminent scholar and poet, the Right Hon. John Hookham Frere, who took them down in shorthand. This manuscript and the volume on the Dynamic Philosophy are, I believe, at present at Hadley, near Barnet, in the custody of Mrs. Green. Both were adjudged by Mr. Green, as Coleridge's sole executor, to be unfitted for publication. We know that as to the latter Coleridge thought differently. He tells Mr. Alsop that it was dictated to Mr. Green "so as to exist fit for the press."* Be that as it may, he invested Mr. Green, by his will, with absolute discretion as to the publication of his manuscripts; so that Mr. Green's verdict can be impeached only on the ground of his want of judgment. But for one thing I hold him to have been not free from blame—that he used the materials of the manuscript volume for the purpose of completing his own "Spiritual Philosophy." His reason for doing this was, I think, a conscientious desire to give Coleridge's "system" a logical consistency, so that the public mind might be prepared for the disclosure (inevitable in course of time) of the fragmentary views contained in the unpublished manuscripts. Here, however, his sanguine temperament led him astray; for there never was any prospect of his own work attaining that popularity which even the name of Coleridge (so potent a spell in the promotion of his kinsfolk †) has failed to do for the "Theory of Life."

Other works more directly bearing on Divinity were written or dictated by Coleridge during this period. The more important of these were "Two Lay Sermons," "Aids to Reflection," "Constitution of Church and State," and "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit." The last was a posthumous publication, edited by Mr. Green.

It was most unfortunate that Gillman did not write the second volume of his "Life of Coleridge" before the first; or that he did not live to accomplish the former, and complete his work; for with the exception of the last few pages, his solitary Volume I. is of very little value; for the materials were necessarily taken at second-hand, and are presented in a singularly slipshod manner; besides which the anecdotes are mere travesties, and many of the particulars inaccurate. Whereas the materials for his Volume II. would have been the record of his own experiences of the last

* 1, vol. i., p. 156.

† 1, vol. i., p. 225.

eighteen years of Coleridge's life, and would therefore, despite the faults of authorship, have had an abiding value. As it is, of those years we have no record whatever. What the late Henry Nelson Coleridge might have done to supply the defect we know nothing; for he died after writing a mere fragment of the biography he was attempting, and which is printed at the end of the second volume of the "Biographia Literaria." * The additional chapters added by his accomplished and admirable wife, Sara (the poet's only daughter) afford but few biographical facts.† In truth the somewhat sudden death of all those who, among Coleridge's relatives and friends, could have completed his biography, leave us at the mercy of mere "anecdote," which too often is found dispensing with the first two syllables.

This is my all-sufficient apology for the meagreness of my own account. I can venture on the allegation of only one fact more in Coleridge's life; viz. that he attended the meeting of the British Association at Cambridge in June, 1833; and that this was the occasion of the remarkable monoloquial display described by the Bishop of St. David's in my *first notice*.‡ He died July 25th, 1834.

Pursuing my prescribed plan, I proceed to a brief consideration of some of the work performed by Coleridge during the period of his domestication with the Gillmans. I considered him in the *first notice* as the Poet; in *this*, as the Divine. According to my judgment, what he wrote in that capacity has had an enormous influence on religious belief, and possesses an abiding value. It was provoked under two impulses; (1) to satisfy the legitimate wants of his own moral nature, sorely tried and even broken down as it was by his own repeated backslidings, and his inability to emancipate himself from the bondage of a vicious habit; (2) to supply a grave and pressing intellectual want common to all thoughtful men of his own times, viz. the means of holding to certain religious verities and facts in man's nature, while questioning alleged facts in sacred history, and inferences therefrom inconsistent with our primary ethical notions.

As to (1)—I remark that Gillman protests against the justice of Coleridge's designation of his opium-habits as a vice; asserting that his moral weakness was the result of disease, which made the craving too strong for him to resist. We are thus plunged at once into the vexing and vexed question § of moral guilt, in cases where habits inconsiderately, if not innocently established, or

* 15.

† 18.

‡ 3, p. 1. The correct title is, "Conversations at Cambridge."

§ *Quæstio verata* is a question that has been much tossed about or canvassed. The phrase is often greatly misapplied.

strong inherited tendencies, have subjugated the moral will. I am disposed to admit the justice of Coleridge's designation. His habit was a *vice* in two senses. It was a physical vice in the same sense in which we speak of the vice of a malicious or nervous horse. Any physical fact which carries a man beyond self-control is a *vice*, even though it were unjust to impute to him a corresponding degree of guilt. Coleridge's habit was also a moral vice. He was fully alive to the mischief of the submission of his will to the physical demand, and to the consequential injury to his bodily, mental, and moral health. Moreover, being very sensitive and contemplative, he had the advantage, such as it is, of stating to himself the whole nature and scope of the evil, and was able to devise the most likely means of procuring his liberation. In the face of all which he would stoop to the grossest deception, and resort to the meanest artifices, in order to procure a supply of that "detested poison" which he had solemnly and prayerfully resolved to abjure. Such an experience may be common; I believe it is. But surely it argues the utmost moral devastation in him who is self-abandoned to the Dantean hell of fierce extremes, throbbing for ever between both, without power of rest or means of extrication.

As to (2)—The doctrines of Christianity, as they were usually expounded, not only in Coleridge's day, but centuries before, were open to many rational objections; not the captious cavils of evil or crotchety persons, but the reasoned objections of those who set the highest value on intellectual and moral truth. In fact, the objections to which I refer grew out of the great ideal of a personal God, out of the moral principle itself, and out of its supporting emotions of benevolence and self-respect. Coleridge's faith had once been shaken by these very considerations. He had renounced the Tri-unity of the Godhead, the Atonement of Christ, and the use of Prayer. But he grew out of these objections, lived them down, and reasoned them down, and found at length that it was not the Bible that was at fault, but the foregone conclusion set forth by divines as to its peculiar origin and nature, and the strained and literal interpretations which they had put upon its utterances. Accordingly he addressed himself to the work of destroying certain mischievous dogmas, and vindicating anew the impeached doctrines of the New Testament. In his own words (borrowed from Holy Scripture) he endeavoured not so much to destroy as to fulfil. He was, in fact, the great pioneer in that work which has been carried on by so many divines since his time; among which we reckon J. C. Hare, Dr. Arnold, Bunsen, Dean Stanley, and others as great and good as they were.

Coleridge attempted to perform this delicate task by demanding a secure position between those of the *literalising* and *allegorising* divines. This he found in the great doctrine of the *symbol*, as being alike distinct from the *fact* and the *metaphor*. He thus established the *tautegory*, as the correlate of the *allegory*. The allegory is so named because it finds a superficial and often illusory resemblance between two facts or events of different genera: then the tautegory would be an *essential likeness*, a *substantial identity* between two distinct and differing facts or events that are of one genus. It is by this fundamental distinction between allegorical and tautegorical figures, that he expounds the chief doctrines of Christianity, certain of them, as regeneration, being figured tautegorically; others, as the redemptive work of Christ, being figured allegorically. I will briefly consider the latter, as a sample of Coleridge's work.

He contends that when Christ's work is described in Holy Scripture as a *sacrifice for committed sin*, an *atonement or reconciliation between man and God*, a *redemption of the soul from the bondage of original sin*, a *liquidation of an infinite debt due from man to God*, or as a washing of the sinner's conscience from moral taint, or even as a penalty inflicted on Christ for man's violation of the law, and imputed to man—these descriptions (which are not only various and discrepant, but *impossible*, and quite inconsistent with one another) are mere allegories or metaphors, intended to convey to man some notion of the consequential benefit he receives by virtue of Christ's life and death, and not at all substantive figures or tautegories, whereby man may learn the nature of the act itself, which is efficient in bringing upon man that benefit. Of course such an interpretation sweeps away at a blow the whole machinery of (so-called) *evangelical* exegesis, together with the point, so often insisted on, that Christ's death was a veritable oblation offered up to, and accepted by the Father, and also a penalty inflicted on him by the Father for our sakes.

This particular "aid to reflection" must prove at least of great negative advantage to Christian faith. Evangelical divines have fastened on Christ's "work" such absurd, incongruous, and repulsive features, for which Holy Scripture gives no countenance whatever, that it must be felt as a great relief when we find that those features are a travesty of a mere allegory, one among many employed by the apostles, with the aim of enforcing the *inestimable value* of that "work,"

"Whose worth's unknown, although his height be taken." *

* Shakspeare's Sonnet cxvi.

Thus it is said that "the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseeth us from all sin;" that He "washed us from our sins in His own blood;" and that the souls of the saved had "washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb." Divines of the school referred to have not hesitated to take these phrases as veritable symbols, good to the minutest detail for a representation of Christ's "work." Accordingly, they are never tired of insisting on the cleansing power of Christ's blood. The majority, however, mean by this no more than a Jew would understand by the sprinkling of sacrificial blood for purification; but even this would be to take the figure as tautegorical, instead of being, what all such figures must necessarily be (since the redemptive work transcends all understanding), a mere allegory. *

A ludicrous sophism fastened upon Professor Fawcett in Ruskin's periodical work, *Fora Clavigera*, is called by that writer "the position of William." In imitation of Ruskin, I will call an illustration adduced by Coleridge, in refutation of the literal interpretation of any of those figures, "the position of James." Coleridge says,—

"A sum of £1,000 is owing from James to Peter, for which James had given a bond in judgment. He is insolvent, and the bond is on the point of being carried into effect, to James's certain ruin. At this moment

* Some have gone the length of insisting on the appropriateness of an image which is not to be found in the whole length and breadth of the Bible, viz. that the soul is to be plunged into the stream or fountain of Christ's blood in order to be cleansed from sin! So sang poor Cowper, when residing at Olney, under the influence of John Newton:—

"There is a fountain filled with blood
Drawn from Immanuel's veins;
And sinners plunged beneath the flood
Are washed from all their stains."

We read in Holy Scripture of a water-baptism, of a Spirit-baptism, and of a fire-baptism, but not of a blood-baptism; which is so revolting an image that one would have thought, apart from its unscriptural nature, it would have always provoked more loathing than liking. Besides, the language is open to grave exception: for a "fountain" is the spring or source; and of that one may not say that it is full or empty, but that it flows or fails. Strange as it may appear, this shocking hymn, breathing of Cowper's unhappy malady, has been admitted into most of the collections used in Anglican churches.

Matthew steps in, pays Peter the £1,000 and discharges the bond. In this case no man would hesitate to admit that a complete *satisfaction* had been made to Peter." [He then puts the case that James had been guilty of the basest and most hard-hearted ingratitude to a most worthy and affectionate mother, &c. He then supposes a friend to step in and discharge all the offices of a son to her; saying,] "Now I trust you are appeased, and will be henceforth reconciled to James. I have satisfied all your claims on him: I have paid his debt in full; and you are too just to require the same debt to be paid twice over. You will therefore regard him with the same complacency, and receive him into your presence with the same love as if there had been no difference between him and you. For I have *made it up*."

Coleridge draws hence the grand distinction between things and persons in respect to *satisfaction*, and demands that when "the position of James," in the *latter* case is called one of indebtedness, that shall be taken as a metaphor or allegory borrowed from the *former*, but possessing no features of essential likeness. In the first edition (1825) of the "Aids to Reflection," appended to pages 323—325 (where the point is argued at length) is a long footnote, detailing the case of Angelini, who offered his own life in lieu of Fontleroy's, when the latter was sentenced to be hanged for forgery. It seems that the Lord Mayor, to whom Angelini addressed his singular request, told him that "it was contrary to all justice that the life of an *innocent* person should be taken to save that of one who was guilty, even if the innocent man chose to devote himself." But when Angelini adduced, in refutation of this argument, the example of our Saviour, he was told that it could not be so, because he (Angelini) was not *absolutely innocent*. The Lord Mayor of that day did not see that his surrejoinder destroyed his replication. But he had the excuse that he had not mastered "the position of James," *i. e.*, if excuse be needed; for it seems to me that the contradiction is merely verbal. I have called attention to this curious footnote, because it bears on the question of editorship; for it has been bodily omitted from all editions published since Coleridge's death, and it is not stated, by any of the editors, on what authority, or on what ground, the omission was made.

Such was Coleridge's doctrine of the symbol. Its value is unquestionable: but evidently its reach is restricted to the enunciations of doctrine. But the greater part of Scriptural difficulties spring out of an apparent (if not real) clash between the Book and either ethics or science (physical or historical), and evidently all such difficulties involve the question of the authority of Holy

Scripture. To this question Coleridge addressed himself in his *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, being six letters on the inspiration of the Scriptures. In the fourth letter, he addresses an imaginary friend in these remarkable words : —

"Friend ! the truth revealed through Christ has its evidence in itself, and the proof of its divine authority in [?] is] its fitness to our nature and needs ;—the clearness and cogency of this proof being proportionate to the degree of self-knowledge in each individual hearer. Christianity has likewise its historical evidences, and these as strong as is [*sic*] compatible with the nature of history, and with the aims and objects of a religious dispensation. And to all these Christianity itself, as an existing power in the world, and Christendom as an existing fact, with the no less evident fact of a progressive expansion, give a force of moral demonstration that almost supersedes particular testimony. These proofs and evidences would remain unshaken, even though the sum of our religion were to be drawn from the theologians of each successive century on the principle of receiving that only as divine which should be found in all,—*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*. Be only, my friend, as orthodox a believer as you would have abundant reason to be, though from some accident of birth, country, or education, the precious boon of the Bible, with its additional evidence, had up to this moment been concealed from you ; and then read its contents with only the same piety which you freely accord on other occasions to the writings of men, considered the best and wisest of their several ages ! What you find therein coincident with your pre-established convictions you will of course recognise as the Revealed Word, while as you read the recorded workings of the Word and the Spirit in the minds, lives, and hearts of spiritual men, the influence of the same Spirit on your own being, and the conflicts of grace and infirmity in your own soul, will enable you to discern and to know in and by what spirit they spake and acted,—as far at least as shall be needful for you, and in the times of your need.

Thenceforward, therefore, your doubts will be confined to such parts or passages of the received canon as seem to you irreconcilable with known truths, and at variance with the tests given in the Scriptures themselves, and as shall continue so to appear after you have examined each in reference to the circumstances of the Writer or Speaker, the dispensation under which he lived, the purpose of the particular passage, and the intent and object of the Scriptures at large. Respecting these, decide for yourself : and fear not for the result. . . . [The apparent exceptions to the fidelity of the Canon] will be found neither more nor greater than may well be supposed requisite, on the one hand, to prevent us from sinking into a habit of slothful, indiscriminating acquiescence, and, on the other, to provide a check against those presumptuous fanatics who would . . . frame

oracles by private divination from each letter of each disjointed gem, uninterpreted by the priest, and deserted by the Spirit which shines in the parts only as it pervades and irradiates the whole." *

All this is a careful feeling after the principle which Coleridge enunciates and supports at length in the sixth letter, viz., "that it is the spirit of the Bible, and not the detached words and sentences, that is infallible and absolute," a principle which implicitly disallows a plenary or verbal inspiration, and is consistent with the admission of various degrees of value in the various parts of the canon, as, for instance, that Jael could not have been blessed in her deed of treachery, and that it is of little or no importance to us to know that St. Paul left his cloak at Troas.

There is, indeed, nothing at all profound in these letters, nothing whatever to make one believe that the writer was a great philosopher; but they present an agreeable association of sound sense and eloquent language. The really important distinction indicated by Coleridge is that between *private divination*, or, perhaps, personal illumination, which may endlessly differ with different minds, and that catholic inspiration of God's Spirit which is one and the same for all inspired writers. The former is subjective, the latter objective. If we can but once for all be sure that the objects and purposes of that inspiration are the regeneration and conversion of man as a moral and responsible being, the foothold which Coleridge offers for faith seems sure enough; for then it matters not if the Scriptures are repugnant to each other in historical points, or that they are antagonistic to the results of physical science, for in his view those are matters on which the sacred penman need not have been inspired. I am far from asserting that this is a satisfactory conclusion, or that it is free from difficulty. I ought to add that from first to last Coleridge is opposed to that worship of the letter of the Bible which he was the first to call *bibliolatry*.

Space now fails me for the further illustration of his ser-

* This looks like a tacit allusion to the text of 2 Pet. i. 20, 21, where undoubtedly the words translated "private interpretation" present a great difficulty. The context suggests that the expression should be *private divination*; and a learned friend points out to me, while I am writing this paper, that not improbably *ἐκλυσίς* is an error for *ἐπηλύσις*. This conjecture is felicitous, for *ἐπηλυσίη* in the Homeric hymns, &c., means *enchantment*; while the confusion between *η* and *ι* in late Greek is the commonest of mistakes. It is now beyond the shadow of a doubt that in the somewhat similar passage in 2 Tim. iii. 16, the conjunction copulative *kai* has no business there.

vices to the cause of sound religious faith. For these sketches of Coleridge the poet, and Coleridge the divine, I must solicit the largest indulgence. It is not easy to trace Coleridge through the later years of his life; and it is a task of prodigious difficulty to epitomize the character and genius of so eccentric a being. It is a common saying, thirty or forty years after an eminent man is dead, that "he has been vastly overrated." It is said of Johnson, of Goethe, of Scott, of Coleridge, and many others. Will time bring about its revenges? It is curious that the larger number of men of mark do not attain an adequate popularity, nor to any just appreciation, till they have been many years dead. But there is a minority, consisting of men who were illustrious in their lifetime, each of whom lived to see his lustre culminate, and left behind him the waning track of an exploded meteor. Of such was Coleridge. I have done my little best to estimate his worth as poet, and as philosopher. I have rated him very high in the one character, and very low in the other: at the same time I have allowed the influence of his religious writings on his own generation, and on that which succeeded him. If I have ever found it hard to determine with firmness his moral worth, I have never doubted the intensity of his human sympathy. He had certainly a warm heart as well as an aspiring intellect. Whenever I read his letter to Lamb on the tragedy which embittered Lamb's life, yet moulded to highest excellence his character, it is "borne on my mind" that Coleridge was a good man; and that clear verdict I have now no temptation to qualify by the faintest echo of doubt. In conclusion, I will apply to Coleridge his own words:—

"Take him in his whole—his head, his heart, his wishes, his innocence of all selfish crime, and . . . what will be the result? The good—were it but a single volume that made truth more visible, and goodness more lovely, and pleasure at once more akin to virtue, and, self-doubled, more pleasurable!—and the evil,—while he lived, it injured none but himself; and where is it now? In his grave. Follow it not thither."*

* Lit. Rem., vol. i., p. 368.

Social Economy.

SHOULD THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC BE SUPPRESSED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE negative article by A. H. G. argues the question from the writer's point of view with perfect clearness, and with a commendable abstinence from the vituperation and insolent insinuations to which the Alliance is often subjected. He might as well, however, have omitted his allusion to "the most reckless Alliance tract ever published on the subject," especially as he is prepared to accept its statements as "admitted facts." A. H. G. adduces as the two leading arguments on the other side—(1) the right of majorities to rule; and (2) the need of urgent measures for the suppression of drunkenness because of its indirect damages to society. The first objection he meets by defining, as he imagines, the rights of majorities and explaining the contract theory of society. He illustrates his definition by a reference to religious institutions; but he forgets that his illustration upsets his conclusion. Religious profession and worship are free, but the liquor traffic is not; and A. H. G. does not wish it to be so, for he writes, "We would gladly see all parties co-operating to draw up wise restrictions on the liquor traffic." What is more evident, then, that A. H. G. recognises a radical difference between the cases, since he is ready to treat the liquor traffic in a manner which he would oppose if attempted to be applied to religious institutions? No Alliance advocate ever pretended that the rights of majorities were unlimited, but what is said upon this point is usually advanced in reply to the empty objection that permissive prohibition would be wrong *because* it would coerce the minority! The answer may be put interrogatively, "Is it right for the minority to coerce the majority? What we maintain is not that majorities may do anything, and therefore may impose prohibition on minorities; but that, as majorities rule minorities in all cases purely political and social, therefore there is no tyranny in giving to a local majority a power of deciding how this social question of the liquor traffic shall

1872.

be determined. Nay, this local power is already conceded, but it is entrusted to magistrates, irresponsible to Parliament or the people, instead of to the people who are directly and deeply concerned. At present the law calls upon the justices to settle two points,—Are liquor-shops conducted without public injury? and, if so, how many are required? The Alliance proposes that the local public (for whose good the liquor traffic is professedly licensed) shall be empowered to answer the former point, and that if their answer is in the negative, it shall hinder the justices from licensing, contrary to the public will, the traffic from the evils of which the people desire to escape.

In dealing with the second argument of the Alliance, A. H. G. is not very consistent. He allows that if the indictment against the liquor traffic is well founded, the objectors are entitled to relief not only where they are in a majority, but everywhere else: he declares, however, that "the mistake is in assigning them (the evils) to the wrong cause. It is not the liquor traffic but drunkenness that is chargeable with the evils." If this be so, why should the sale of strong drink be the subject of any "legal interference?" and why should A. H. G. support "wise restrictions on the liquor traffic?" Again, to say that the evils complained of are caused by drunkenness is a very defective statement of the case, since, in the first place, drunkenness is one of the evils, and cannot be its own cause; and since, secondly, the evils of pauperism, crime, &c., do not spring from drunkenness only, but arise to a great extent from that waste of money in drinking, and from those vicious habits with which drunkenness, either of the "incapable" or "disorderly" kind, may have nothing to do. But as I have said, A. H. G. is inconsistent, for he subsequently states "the end in view is to *remove the means of drunkenness*," and it is for him to show how it is possible to do this and to "maintain the means of moderate drinking, which harms no one."

The argument of the Alliance succinctly expressed is this: The action of the liquor traffic upon social interests is so pernicious that society is warranted and required to prevent the traffic; and the Permissive Bill sets forth a plan by which this may be done constitutionally, and without going in advance of the local public sentiment. This argument can only be met efficiently by proving one of three things; that the action of the liquor traffic is not socially pernicious; or that the traffic is separable from the mis-

chievous action; or that the benefits equal, or more than equal, the injury. As to the first rejoinder, it is not one that can be advanced with any pretence of truth—even the publicans only venture to affirm that they do the best they can to prevent the evils deplored; nor can this mode of reply be adopted by any one who is not prepared to go in for an absolutely free and open trade in intoxicating liquors.

The second rejoinder is exposed to the retort that what is wanted is not a theoretical separation of the common sale of alcoholic drink from its evil effects, but an actual separation; and till that is exhibited the liquor traffic must submit to a verdict against it. In this respect the case against the sale of strong drink is much stronger than is the case against the maintenance of pigstyes in populous districts, and other sanitary abominations. Such things may exist for considerable periods without any visible injury to life and health; but when and where was the drink traffic ever carried on for a year, a month, or a week, without evident results of suffering to some portion of the community?

The third rejoinder is one easily made, but which no advocate of the liquor traffic has ever attempted to substantiate. The evils are patent, enormous, and terrible; they concern property, happiness, industry, morality—the very foundations of civilized life and the springs of social progress. Who can allege, who can expect that the allegation will be accepted without a mass of evidences (not a tittle of which has ever been forthcoming), that the liquor traffic confers as much of social good as it inflicts of social evil; that it preserves as much life as it destroys; that it is as much the friend of virtue, the life's blood of society, as its enemy? Even if sure evidence and strong evidence of such a proposition were adducible, that circumstance would not militate against the Permissive Bill, which proposes, not to settle the question for the people, but to empower them to settle it for themselves, and thus to bring the issue in dispute to a practical trial. No sincere lover of his country could desire—and I am sure A. H. G. does not—that the nation at large, or any local section of it, should be subjected to the evils now flowing from the drink traffic without compensating advantages; and is it not most fair that the several districts of the country should be put into a legal position to judge, each for itself, whether the pleasures and the profits (if there be any) are a recompense for the pains? A. H. G. somewhat naively observes, "We,

of course, do not propose a plan," *i. e.*, for preventing the evils of the traffic, while retaining the traffic itself; but *that* is precisely what the friends of the liquor traffic are bound to do if their plea in its behalf is to have any logical or moral weight.

If, in a question of this social magnitude the public interest is to be supreme, the "vested interests" of the publicans and the appetites of the minority cannot be allowed to prevail, unless on the outrageous principle that class emoluments and inclinations should be placed first, and the public weal regarded as secondary, or not regarded at all. If the interests of liquor sellers are purchased at the public loss, the sooner such robbery under legal forms is made to cease the better it will be; and it is capable of proof, that the mass of liquor dealers would in the long run be benefited by the suppression of their traffic. The drinking minority would be interfered with only so far as the sale of liquor was involved, and if they desired to procure intoxicating drink in prohibitory districts, they would be put to the trouble of obtaining it in some way not conducive to the local intemperance, as is the local and common sale. Perhaps some of them would prefer to try total abstinence; and the example of myriads upon myriads who realize Milton's idea of "living happily and healthfully without intoxicating liquors" would encourage them in the experiment.

It only remains that I should notice the comparison instituted by A. H. G. between teetotalism and vegetarianism. But, in truth, the question is not one of teetotalism, but of the public right to stop a public nuisance (which in this case happens to be the liquor traffic); and further, though I know the most eminent vegetarians in the kingdom, I have never heard one of them assert that the use of flesh meat produces such evils as are the result of intoxicating drink. Were so foolish an assertion made, it would be so palpably false as not to deserve attention, and legislation to be worth anything must be based on ascertained facts, and not on Quixotic fancies. A. H. G. does not himself believe that there is any real analogy between the cases, or he would "gladly see all parties co-operating to draw up wise restrictions on the sale of butcher's meat!" But he makes no such declaration, and therefore he ought to forbear illustrations which illustrate nothing except the weakness of the cause he is seeking to uphold.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THOMAS CARLYLE has observed, when writing of the French philosophers and their visionary politics, for which such abundant scope was found during the deliberations of the National Assembly in the revolutionary crisis of last century, that "building" or "constructing" Constitutions, about which they largely employed themselves, was comparatively easy work. The Abbé Sieyes and others were excellent in the manufacture of paper schemes of this sort, but here was the rub—the getting men to come and consent to live under them! So it may be said with reference to legislation on the liquor traffic; for though it is a less easy question to deal with than many others, yet a code of laws might be framed which to their proposers and supporters would appear most excellent, and calculated to prove a thorough safeguard against vice and debauchery, or an effectual check to all excess; the inevitable difficulty would arise, that men would refuse to recognise these laws, and if that ensued, whether the majority were opposed to them, or only an active but irrepressible minority, the labour would be proved fruitless or worse. And it does not avail to ignore another question, which ought to be before the mind of every law-maker—he must consider not only how it will be obeyed, but how far is it likely that the penalties attached to it will be put in force? Oldest amongst the criminal laws of our country is one awarding death to the murderer—nay, as I am told, death even to him who attacks another with murderous intent, but it is frustrated—a law which surely the common and protective interests of the people might be expected to guard jealously, since the love of life is universal. And yet even this, in these days when laxity too often unnerves the hand on the judicial and magisterial bench, and the public mind is attuned to a false sympathy,—this, I say, is tending to be inoperative, and the dread penalty is becoming dread no longer, because so many alternatives offer a chance of escape. If the murderer can find those who will excuse or shelter him, how much more will it be the case with those who, in the opinion of most men, are guilty of nothing more than an act of venial self-gratification! Legislation against drink, that is legislation in the direction of suppressing or diminishing its sale, will never be popular, nor even approved, because the bulk of our community is determined to consider the crimes directly or indi-

rectly caused by liquor as merely accidental circumstances. Nothing can be more hurtful to a legislative body than the formal endorsement of measures which carry their impracticability upon their face; nor is it less degrading to the administrators of the law to be compelled to wink at numerous offences against statutes which stand formally enrolled in law books, but which appeal not to wide-spread sympathies, and become no better than obsolete before the ink is dry. Or if that result does not follow, a constant irritation is kept up in the commonweal by the attempts at the enforcement of some such measure, until "the common sense of most" leads first to its practical abrogation, and then to its repeal.

There are certain evils and crimes, great and startling enough in their mass, if not in their individuality, which human governments can only deal with in the stream, and cannot effectually attack at their source. The radical cure comes not through human hands, as extended in the attitude of threatening or admonition. The excessive indulgence in intoxicating drinks is one and but one of the forms of sensuality, against which we may direct many agencies, yet of all these absolute prohibition is likely to be the least effectual. There are things, dangerous in their nature, which a wise Government watches over and erects barriers around, for the sake of the ignorant or the incautious. We restrict the sale of gunpowder and petroleum, and we do not allow poisons to be recklessly vended—though even with these we cannot prevent their transfer by way of gift, or on fictitious pretences. But by no possible stretch of imagination can the universally used beverages extracted from the grain and grape be ranked amongst dangerous compounds; nor even the more potent spirituous liquors, though undoubtedly capable of producing injurious or even fatal effects. With regard to alcohol, or spirit of wine, in a greater or less state of concentration, the law might indeed be made more rigid, since only by a perverted taste could this be selected as a beverage; and also from its colourless appearance accidents have happened by its means. This is not a case where the law of the land can interpose to prevent or forbid use, though it may do something to guard against abuse. Prohibit alcoholic liquors *in toto* from being vended (were such a thing possible), on the plea that they are instrumental to evil, and we have entered upon a course which commits us to other absurdities. Who shall say how much

harm men do to themselves or others by excess in eating, or by indulgence in food which is unsuitable for their constitutions? Individuals have, so to speak, intoxicated themselves on beefsteaks, and every physiologist knows that many articles of diet, by their influence through the stomach upon the nervous system, produce irritability, and various mental effects, which may at once, or gradually, lead a person into the perpetration of various evil actions, very much as beer or gin might. Shall we have a "sanitary code" of articles of diet; prohibit some of those now in use altogether, and limit the individual consumption of others? As well might we, in order to prevent homicide or unlawful wounding, restrict the sale of knives and razors; while, in spite of us, every house must have its poker, and any hedge would furnish a club.

Human law can with advantage deal with those things of which it is capable of taking full cognizance, so that whatever penalties it attaches to breach of law can be exacted fully and imposed truly. Offences which are trivial, and likely to be very general, soon laugh a prohibition to scorn; and the news that one, or even a dozen parliaments, had decreed that traffic in intoxicating liquors was henceforth to be illegal, would bring no more real conviction on the subject into the great host of venders or purchasers than the information that the Darwinian theory had been acknowledged to be correct by the *élite* of our scientific men. You may succeed in cutting off from a mighty river the streamlets and brooklets which diverge from its banks, but the full force of the river itself baffles human effort. To oppose free trade, even in intoxicants, in a country of high civilization and growing intelligence, with a teeming population, is clearly impossible; yet we may dam up some minor channels and strengthen the banks by which it rushes.

We have had many examples, in the present century, of futile legislation. Measures sorely contested, or introduced with a flourish of trumpets, have dropped into desuetude, or they have had to be repealed. What did the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill effect?—what the Act for preventing the coinage from being defaced? An instance of an inoperative law comes within the ken of every passenger by rail—that which prohibits persons from leaving a train while it is in motion. This is incessantly infringed by impetuous persons, perhaps without thought of any danger (and this is but alight in some cases), yet as it affects not fellow-travellers, each usually absorbed in his own concerns, it passes unnoticed;

even the officials, themselves transgressors in the matter, very lightly regard the violation of the rule. So it would prove with any attempt at a legal suppression of the liquor traffic; however determined the law-makers might be, one could hardly anticipate as much resolution in the putting of it in force by those charged with its execution. Prohibition, even of a partial character, at once opens the door for a variety of shifts and evasions, since there is no risk men will not encounter when they are intent upon some gratification. A suppression of the traffic in the alcoholic liquors now in use would lead not only to the illicit sale of them, under circumstances which would too often make that a crime, which, unless the law had interfered, would have been an innocent substitution enough, but it would occasion many to resort to substitutes still more injurious. Of late, as it has been noticed, several new intoxicants have come into vogue in certain districts, such as chloral and ether. These and other stimulants or narcotics, upon which the law imposes no check, would probably find a rapidly increasing sale, and as soon as one of these was interfered with another would be introduced to supply the place.

In the liquor traffic the law cannot work from without, to operate upon the minds of men; we must reverse the proceeding. Let us elevate and educate, and imbue our people with Christian principles, and thus they may and will become "temperate in all things," not merely in this one thing. It is asserted that the consumption of strong liquors goes on with acceleration, beyond the increase to be calculated upon through the growth of the population; and however much this is to be regretted, we must in applying a remedy be careful that it is not worse than the disease. For it is most literally true that much of the unnecessary drinking does arise either from disease actual, or from disease—that is to say, an uncomfortable condition of mind or body, induced by the hurry and excitement of the days in which we live, which tempts men to resort too freely to stimulants, heedless of the reaction which must ultimately ensue. And again, there are those whose surroundings are so wretched, and their circumstances so painful, that alcohol in some form is to them, while they are in their present prostrate condition, almost a necessary of life. Before we strive to prevent any indulgence in intoxicants, we must first alter those circumstances which drive or tempt men to resort to them; and with regard to those who are, as we think, wilful sinners in this

direction, if moral suasions fail, forced abstinence, or its pretence, will do nothing, unless indeed the individuals are oinomaniacs, when coercion is of course necessary, but these are exceptions. "Has the law then nothing to do with these things?" I reply that the law may do much, but it must treat men as they are treated by the law of God; that is, as free yet responsible beings. There would have been nothing more easy than for God to have ordered that those elements which by fermentation now produce alcohol should have yielded something quite different, or had He willed, it might have been that alcohol, existing as it does, should have remained undiscovered by man. The Creator has, however, granted these alcoholic liquors to men for lawful and moderate use, and it is not for any party in a country or in a locality, merely because they are in a numerical majority, to interpose and forbid to a minority, possibly quite as intelligent and well-meaning as the preponderating section, what the minority is inclined, rightly or wrongly, to regard as a necessary of life. A sphere of action is open, within which it is proper to legislate. The State is bound to see that no wilful adulteration is practised, nor compounds sold under false representations as to strength. Certain restrictions need to be placed upon retailers, as well as upon wholesale dealers, so that a trade which is confessedly open to abuse may be surrounded with such safeguards as are feasible. The hours of business need to be limited, and a suitable punishment should be inflicted upon those who have been proved to be guilty of holding out encouragement to excessive drinking. An improved system of licensing is called for, not "permissive prohibitory," but one by means of which public-houses and inns should not be allowed to exceed in number the actual wants of a neighbourhood. More marked encouragement should be shown by Government to coffee-houses and places of refreshment where non-intoxicants are sold.

C.

Education.

OUGHT THE READING OF THE BIBLE TO BE PROHIBITED IN RATE-AIDED SCHOOLS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE abolition of the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools would, in our opinion, be one of the very best decisions that could be come to. In the meantime, and as things now are, it is taken for granted that children are instructed in the contents of the Scriptures. In this belief many parents excuse themselves from the observance of family worship; or if they do not neglect the private reading of God's word themselves, dispense with it as a daily custom as regards their children. In this case they flatter their consciences that having provided for the children the right of attending school, the Bible is there taught and moral duty inculcated, and hence their home duty and responsibility are both provided for. This is a grave error. It is only a salve for the conscience, and is the cause of great evil. The children are perhaps compelled as a task to peruse the letter of the Scriptures, but they entertain no love for their task-book, and there is little sign of love for it seen in the school world. In the family they see little, if any, loving perusal of it, and it is not made an aid to the family counsels by the mother, or to the government of the family by the father. A merely formal place is given to the reading of the Bible, and hence arises the dry and lifeless formality which prevails among even too many of the church-going people of the land. It is trusting to a broken reed to trust to the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools for the christianizing of the land.

But the same evil recurs in the Church. The perusal of the word of God in the church is very often proceeded with in the very same way as the perusal of it goes on in the school. It is *read*, and that, too, without note or comment. In the Sunday school we have the issue of the same evil. The reading of the Word is too often gone through hurriedly and carelessly, because the teacher has the design of giving expression to some strong feeling, an exposition of some sound doctrine, an utterance of

loving regard for the Saviour, or an extemporal epitome of the narrative so arranged as to give prominence to some special end in view. It is taken for granted that the Sunday school scholar in the day school has acquired an acquaintance with Bible facts, and is thereby prepared to benefit from the hortations given. We assume that the foundations have been securely laid instead of seeing to it ourselves; and we are not unfrequently grievously disappointed. Sermons in the same way are far too frequently merely expository of texts—essays on select topics instead of a full, free, and true handling of the whole word of God. These errors we are led into by the prevailing assumption that the Bible is familiar to every school-boy and school-girl, and that from a child each one has known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make wise unto salvation through faith that is in Christ Jesus.

Well, we require to get rid of these mistakes. The full force of family responsibility requires to be felt. We must have no second-hand doing of duty. Every household must be made to feel that the religious training of the young—founded on the perusal of the Bible—is a home duty, and cannot be performed by deputy. That to have a "household of faith" we must attend to the reading of God's word at home, and make it a responsible portion of our daily life to see the Bible carefully and prayerfully read in our homes.

The full efficacy of the Sunday school as a Christian agency requires to be realized. It is not to be a mere religious shadow of a day school. It is not to be quite a secondary, and because we can do no better thing; a thing to be kept going just because at schools Bible explanations are not doctrinal, and because at home Bible study is neglected. It is not to be a small "crying in the wilderness" of the Christian teacher, nor an almost helpless attempt to set up a moral reformatory during one day in the week. Still less is it to be a proselytizing church-member canvassing agency, where doctrine is dispensed gratuitously that adherents may be got disciplined to fill the pews of Bethel or cathedral. No, no! it is to be the nursery in which the children of God are to be cared for, nourished, and cherished, where souls are to be prepared for dutifulness by piety, and be brought through holiness to happiness.

The specific objects of the Sunday school must be fixed and determined now. Hitherto they have been a makeshift, and some-

times, we fear, even a snare, misleading people into a belief that if they saw that their children attended the Sunday school their religious duties were done by voluntary substitutes. It should be so no longer. The Sunday school should become a seminary of Scriptural teaching and training. Holding before itself an independent purpose, to declare the whole fulness of the gospel of God to the young, study should hold a high and requisite place in it. God's word should be the test of the instructions. It should be regularly, diligently, systematically perused and explained; it should be known as to its facts, understood as to its doctrines, felt as to its practical bearings on the heart and on the life. The Sunday school must have this object consciously before it, as a given responsibility not divided with any other school, upon which the blame of ignorance may be shifted, but accepted as a duty imposed by the Great Master who said, "Feed My lambs." By the prohibition of the perusal of the Scriptures in rate-aided schools we shall awaken the Sunday school teachers of the land to a sense of the paramount duty before them as the evangelists of the youthhood of the country, as the hope and dependence of the Church for the godly upbringing of the young.

The churches, too, need a new reckoning to be taken. Fine essays and eloquent harangues, the flash and flicker of emotional preaching, may require to be less frequently given forth from the pulpit; and the lessons of the reading desk may come to require a good deal more of the attention of the pulpit. The reading of the Word must be no perfunctory part of the worship of the sanctuary, but its meaning must be endeavoured to be driven home in demonstration of the Spirit and with power into the hearts and consciences of men. There must be a felt necessity laid upon the religious teachers of the day to see to the knowledge of the Scriptures being gained by their flocks, and it must cease to be assumed that everybody knows the Scriptures, just as it is assumed that everybody knows the laws of the land. Teaching-preaching must take a new development, and information concerning the Scriptures must be communicated. The Christian community must see to it as their sole responsibility that Christian teaching is given; not by substitutionary agents, but by those who know and acknowledge the unspeakable blessedness of Scriptural faith in its effects upon conduct, character, and hope. Christianity must no longer be sought to be propagated through byways, but must be taken up as the

given work of the Church of Christ as the sole depository of the word of everlasting life.

This is not Secularism, as C. R. taunts (p. 32) the holders of this affirmative with holding. It is fulfilling the teaching of Christ, "Render therefore to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's." The Church will never seek to "*compel* every child to be educated in Bible knowledge" (p. 33). It is not a compelling but a persuading power. Compulsion proceeds by outward force, persuasion by inducing an inward *appetency*. The Church, when it has taken up its true responsibility, will *persuade* "every child to be educated in Bible knowledge."

C. R.'s idea of the insufficiency of Sunday schools, churches, &c., is grounded on the past, wherein we have been trying to rest our Bible teaching on two stools, State and Church, whereas we ought to have rested it alone on the pillar and ground of the truth. When Christ's work is done for Christ's sake by Christ's followers, it will be done thoroughly.

Let us for our own sakes rise to a sense of our own duties and responsibilities, and seek to put away from ourselves the false security of trusting to others. Let us hold fast to our own work, and let the Church bear only the burden due to it cast on it. That the triumph of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost may be thorough, let us prohibit the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools, and make its perusal a work and labour of love, duty, and Christian responsibility.

G. E. M.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"**THE** Bible has been proclaimed to be the religion of Protestants," and one of the most binding of the precepts of that holy Book is to suffer little children to come unto Jesus, and forbid them not. And yet the Parliament of England, the most Christian country in the world, is asked to forbid the children of England to come to Jesus in the only way that they can now come—by the perusal of the Holy Scriptures. It will not be possible, if the National Education League and its supporters get their way in the country, to say to any child of the generations of the future, "From a child thou hast known the Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus." On the contrary, it will be the proud boast of the Non-

conformity of the land, that as far as the law had power, and we could enforce it, we have made it possible to say, as much as in us lies, we have made the Bible a sealed book to the children of Britain, for we have succeeded in withholding them, in any rate-aided school, from reading its pages, becoming acquainted with its contents, or learning the promise which God has declared not only to the believer, but to his children, and to them that are afar from Christ, even as many as the Lord God shall call to hear it and share in it.

In the name of freedom of conscience we have fettered the Bible; we have adopted the school books of secular compilers, but we have deleted from the possibilities of legal study the universal lesson-book of the school of Jesus. As the *Quarterly Review* tersely puts it,—

“The world in which the child is to live is the objective element, as the child’s own nature is the subjective element of education. But that world must be taken in its reality and fulness, past, present, and to come; the world of nature and society, of practical life and history, of thought and imagination; the world which implies a Creator and a moral Governor, and a future world beyond it. But in the perverted use of the term ‘secular’ we are to have a world with God left out, creation and providence both denied—that is, the teaching of nature and history based upon a falsehood.”

It is true the advocates of Bibleless schools in many cases will not send their own children to rate-aided schools, and may thus have them taught as they like; but the necessitous classes must take their lessons free from any admixture of the doctrine of God’s word. It is equally true that those who oppose the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools cry out that the teaching of the Bible belongs to the church and the parents. We merely remark that there has not been for long any law hindering the parentage of England, or any persons or parsons in any church, from giving instructions in the Scriptures; nay, that great trouble and expense were used to encourage churches and parents to give such instruction. But so little have the churches of the land cared for the freedom to teach—nay, the duty and right of teaching the Scriptures—that England has been becoming year by year more heathenish and sinful, and statesmen have been compelled to try to make men cease to be worse than the brutes of the earth by com-

pelting them to take and to have some education. If the churches have so acted in regard to education in holy things in the past, what security have we that they will act differently in the future, when things too have been made worse than they have been by the extrusion of the Bible from rate-aided schools? How the parcentage of England has attended to the teaching of the Scriptures, the necessity for an Education Bill embodying compulsion shows; and how those who are themselves untaught and untrained, and unrestrained, are rightly to teach the word of God, perhaps those who are so claimant for the right of the parent to teach his own child what he likes may be able to inform us. "Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it," is a maxim of the olden time, now quite effete. Now we train up a child to a compulsory neglect of the Bible, that when he is old he may value it highly, and we close that Book against his study, that he may the more excellently learn to walk in the ways of wisdom, righteousness, and peace!

We are told that Christ has left no command to have the Bible taught by the State-appointed schoolmaster. Verily, no! In the time and under the authority of Christ was there any school in which the teaching of the Bible did not form a large portion of the curriculum of study? The Bible is the educator of the soul; but we are asked to peremptorily and forcibly keep from the knowledge of the soul, during its school period, any attainment of the knowledge essential to salvation, unless that is got not in the rate-aided school where he is bound to go, but in the pastor's presence to which he may or may not go.

The laws of this land are professedly based on the moral law and on the principles of equity, freedom, and purity of life and conduct taught in the gospel. On the observance of these social laws of ours; governing the personal, family, civil, and commercial relations of persons one towards another, we insist. How are the root-principles of social and moral good conduct best to be learned—by the teaching of an abstract of the code of the law of England, or by the teaching of the Scriptures, the word of truth and of God? If the former, who shall prepare the code?—Government, the school board, the teacher, or the book compiler? and if any of these, who will guarantee its accuracy as a guide to reputable living and legal safety? Besides, what sanction will it have—unless it be the one single sanction of the power of the State?

If not the latter, we must carefully guard against the importing of any sanction from its pages or contents; for that would be to proscribe the Bible by law, and yet bring the exiled book forward as the very ground of the power of the law, and would be self-contradictory. We contend that there is a greater sectarianism in the interpretation and application of the law than in the interpretation and application of the Scriptures; and that it will be quite impossible, by any epitome of Blackstone, Coke upon Littleton, &c., to make the children of England acquainted with the duty they owe to the State, their parents, to each other, and to the community by any legal learning; and that if we cut off from their souls, by law, the very fountains of the waters of life, the Scriptures, we cannot claim that they should live quiet and peaceable lives in all godliness and honesty. So that if we wish children to know their duty and to do it, we must not only allow, but encourage the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools.

R. G. S.

THE SECRET OF HAPPINESS.—The secret of happiness is to make the best of everything; no matter what happens to annoy, let it all glide along as easily, and with as few words of complaint and fault-finding as possible. Little inconveniences will intrude upon the most fortunate people, so the only way to be master of every situation is to make up your mind not to notice small annoyances. People may keep themselves in a constant broil over what amounts to nothing; and, without accomplishing the least good, may ruin the peace and quiet of a household. We cannot have everything just as we want it in this world, and the sooner a person understands that fact, the sooner he may have a true basis for happiness. It is the greatest folly to set the heart upon uncertainties, and if disappointed refuse to be comforted or reconciled. Do the very best you can, and then take things as they come. If a man strive with his best knowledge and untiring energy to accomplish a certain object, working with skill and patience, he is a success, whether the scheme fails or succeeds, and he ought to reconcile himself to failure if it was inevitable. If his labours have been of brain and hand, he is the better fitted to succeed in other undertakings.

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED AND DISENDOWED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.

"That the due maintenance of the Christian ministry should be of the free and voluntary contributions of the Church ; that, according to Christ's ordinance, they which preach the gospel may live of the gospel, and not by Popish lordships and livings, or Jewish tithes and offerings."—(*Statement issued by Independents, 1612.*)

We feel somewhat disposed to regret that the bounds of this debate have been so circumscribed, and that the question has not been presented for discussion under a more extended view of the subject. Although the question is classed under the head of Politics, it is not stated in such terms as would definitely exclude all but political arguments. The question is not, "Do political considerations call for the disestablishment of the Church?" and therefore we should have preferred to have seen the subject discussed in all its theologico-political bearings ; but as A. K. D. and S. S., who have initiated the affirmative of this debate, have so pointedly limited their consideration of the subject to its political aspect, we will endeavour faithfully to follow their lead, and will not enter at length upon the religious bearings of the question.

We maintain that the Church ought to be disestablished because the royal supremacy in the affairs of the Established Church is wrong in principle, and also prejudicial to the interests of both the Church and the State. In the constitutions and canons agreed upon at a synod held at London in 1604, we read that "whoever shall hereafter affirm that the king's majesty hath not the same authority in causes ecclesiastical that the godly kings had amongst the Jews, and the Christian emperors of the primeval Church, or impeach any part of his regal supremacy in the said causes restored to the Crown, and by the laws of this realm therein established, let him be excommunicated *ipso facto*," &c. This is one of the

pillars upon which the royal supremacy in the Established Church has rested for generations, and by it, if a man denies the royal supremacy in matters ecclesiastical, he is excluded from the precincts of the Church established by law; and though the pains and penalties which were once attached to Nonconformity are now repealed, yet the social position and all other privileges which may be attached to membership of the Church established by law are by canonical law taken away from the man who denies the sovereign's right to ecclesiastical supremacy. The republican who denounces the principle of an hereditary monarchy is not by law deprived of any civil right, liberty, or position because of his principles, but the man who denies the sovereign's claim to headship of the Church is by law deprived of certain ill-defined privileges on account of his principles, and is shut out from participation in certain emoluments which his contributions to the State funds help to support. Thus the State allows less liberty in matters ecclesiastical than in civil affairs; this is a great political evil, and a possible source of political danger.

The legal enactment of kingly supremacy in matters ecclesiastical is based upon the laws of the Jewish theocracy, and the relations which existed between the Roman emperors and the primeval Church in post-apostolic times, thus introducing a very pernicious principle into our system of legislation. Laws pertaining to civil affairs would not be tolerated in this country if they were based upon such an argument. Why, then, should laws pertaining to the Church be maintained when they rest upon the same foundation? We might also observe that the canon previously quoted is like a man with one leg considerably longer than the other, because from the authority which is spoken of as being possessed by "the *godly* kings amongst the Jews," the framers of the canon proceed to contend that the same authority should be vested in the possessor of temporal sovereignty in this country, whether he be *godly or not*.

We fully endorse the words of Cardinal Pole upon this subject, wherein he says, "Those authors who write in defence of the king's supremacy proceed upon this false hypothesis, that the Church and State are *one* society. Now this is a capital mistake, for these two bodies are instituted for different ends, and governed by independent authorities." Truly the Church and the State are designed for different ends, and the supreme authority in the State has

no right to claim or exercise authority in the Church also. The Church concerns man in his relations to God, and the State merely concerns man in his relations to his fellow-men. Christ and his apostles sought no alliance with the State for the teaching and maintenance of Christian doctrine; we have no record of their expressing any desire for it, and they have given no precept to enjoin any such alliance upon us. When Jesus said, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's," He taught by implication that Cæsar had a right to demand obedience in civil affairs, but that in matters pertaining to religion the corresponding authority belongs to God alone. If the religious bearings of this question had been discussed, we should have maintained that the Christian Church in its collective and aggregate capacity, as well as in the individual personality of its members, is bound to acknowledge none but a divine head. The sovereign is head of the Church established by law, and when we consider that the system has provided the Church, and may again provide it, with men who lived in the grossest immorality, and in the open violation of its precepts, principles, and doctrines, the consideration affords an additional argument for the disestablishment of the Church. To give the headship of the Church to such a voluptuary as Henry VIII.; to James I., who has been described as "the greatest liar, and one of the greatest drunkards of his age;" to such a deceiver as Charles I.; to such a sensual devotee to pleasure as Charles II.; to such a papistical zealot as James II.; or to such a libertine as George IV., is as monstrous an inconsistency as it would be to compel an ardent republican to sit upon the throne, or to bind an habitual drunkard to assume the presidency of a total abstinence society.

We also maintain that the Church ought to be disestablished and disendowed, because the system of an Established Church fosters that spirit of hypocrisy, formality, dissimulation, and pretension which tends to sap the very foundations of society, and of national integrity and prosperity. There can be no doubt that a large number of the clergy of the Established Church retain their position in it greatly, if not solely, for the sake of its loaves and fishes. Many have entered upon the clerical duties of the Established Church merely with the view of seeking some of those prizes so richly endowed by the State. Such clergy discharge the functions of their office in a spirit of formality, and not in a spirit

of sincerity and love. We recently heard of an Episcopalian minister who met a Nonconformist minister one Sunday evening after the labours of the day. The Episcopalian began to congratulate himself that his day's labour was over, and complained, because that during the day he had been obliged to read prayers twice, and to read a sermon once. The Nonconformist minister quietly replied that such a day's work did not greatly tax the brain, neither did it require very much physical exertion; and then proceeded to mention how many miles he had walked during the day, and stated that he had preached three times, besides addressing a number of Sunday school children. The Episcopalian clergyman replied, "Oh yes, it's all very well for you; *you do it because you like it;*" and this remark implied that he did not serve in the Church because he liked it, but from some more sordid motive. Many hold office in the Church established by law because it "brings grist to the mill," although the very name of all religion is distasteful to them. The State patronage and support, and the legal security given for the retention of the "orders" once conferred, affords a great temptation to such mercenaries to enter the ministry of the Church established by law. Many pretend to believe what they really do not believe, in order to retain their position and secure their advancement in the ranks of the established clergy. These are strong assertions, we know, but observation and experience, newspaper reading and legal reports, afford many examples to prove their truth. In these days of political and social corruption, everything that fosters hypocrisy and mere pretence should be discouraged, and therefore we maintain that the Church ought to be disestablished and disendowed.

The Church ought to be disestablished, because as we have abolished in this country all ecclesiastical interference in civil affairs, so ought we to abolish the authority of the civil power in ecclesiastical matters. Formerly the Church in a great measure ruled over the State, but that influence is now set aside because State affairs do not come within the province of the Church. So also should the government of the Church by the State be abolished, because ecclesiastical matters do not come within the province of the State.

In his "History of the Reformation," Merle d'Aubigne appears to have deliberately avoided all discussion of the *quæstio verata* respecting the union of Church and State; and in one part of his

work he expressly says, "As we said in another place, we will not decide on this great controversy of Church and State." Yet here and there in his History we find passages that reveal something of the mischief wrought by State interference in Church affairs; and after recounting the events which followed the disastrous battle of Cappel, D'Aubigne brings the narrative to a close in the following eloquent words:—"Thus the Reformation that had deviated from the right path was driven back by the very violence of the assault into its primitive course, having no other power than the word of God. An inconceivable infatuation had taken possession of the friends of the Bible. They had forgotten that our warfare is not carnal. . . . As we bid farewell to this sad scene, we inscribe on these monumental stones, on the one side, these words from God's book,—'Some trust in chariots, and some in horses; but we will remember the name of the Lord our God. They are brought down and fallen; but we are risen and stand upright.' And on the other this declaration of the Head of the Church,—'My kingdom is not of this world.' If, from the ashes of the martyrs at Cappel, a voice could be heard, it would be . . . that the Church has no other king than Jesus Christ; that she ought not to meddle with the policy of the world, derive from it her inspiration, and call for its swords, its prisons, or its treasures."

We have dwelt chiefly upon the subject of disestablishment, which would of course carry with it the removal of all State endowments. We would leave in the hands of the Episcopal Church all endowments furnished by the charity of private individuals, but we maintain that no religious system should be endowed by the State. The nation is banded together for the maintenance of civil rights; the duty of the State is to preserve the liberty of the subject, to maintain international honour, to enforce social obligations, &c.; but it is no part of its duty to teach religion. It is right that laws should be passed to make men honest, but the State has no right to attempt to make men religious by means of legislative enactments. It is the duty of every subject to furnish his quatum towards defraying the expenses incurred by the Government in the performance of its legitimate duties, whether he approves of its action or not, because this obligation of citizenship necessarily devolves upon him so long as he claims the rights of citizenship. But it is unjust to force a man to contribute

towards the expenses incurred by the State in matters which do not fall within the legitimate province of State legislation, when the object of that expenditure does not meet with his approval. The ministers of the gospel, whatever their creed, should have State protection, and the same civil rights and privileges as all other subjects; but it is no part of the duty of the State to provide any of them with payment out of the funds contributed by the people for carrying on the functions of civil government. The State is a secular institution, and its exchequer is filled with funds raised for the maintenance of secular, civil, and social rights and liberties. We maintain that the Church is an institution, the management of which does not fall within the province of the State, and that no religious system should be supported, in whole or in part, by State endowments. It is unjust to compel a Congregationalist to contribute to the endowment of Episcopalianism, because it is no part of the duty of the State to provide, maintain, and enforce the teaching of dogmatic theology. The endowment of the Church by the State is a misappropriation of the national funds, and the money thus spent should be applied to the legitimate objects of Government expenditure, and to the reduction of taxation. This would tend to an increase of national prosperity, and would leave the people who would be called upon to pay a less amount of taxation, better able to support the Church according to the dictates of their conscience.

S. S. has dealt with the introductory portion of E. C. M.'s article in a very trenchant style, and the remainder of our opponent's article will not call for any very detailed reference from us. E. C. M. maintains that "it is as much the duty of a State as of an individual to uphold and maintain a Church." It is as much the duty of the individual members of the governing power of the State to do this in their individual capacity as it is the duty of any other person, but whatever duty there may be "to uphold and maintain a church" attaches to the person's individual and private character, and not to his corporate capacity in any secular association. The Metropolitan Board of Works is an association of men formed for the purpose of conducting certain municipal affairs, and it is no part of their duty "to maintain and uphold a church;" so the governing body of the State is an association formed for the purpose of managing the civil affairs of the nation, and in like manner it is no part of their duty "to uphold and maintain a

church," and they have no inherent right to claim official authority in ecclesiastical matters.

The second argument in E. C. M.'s article falls to the ground because he fails to recognise the fact that God does not now work in altogether the same way as He did in days of old. God does not now reveal His will to kings and prophets as He did under the Judaic dispensation, therefore such a theocracy as was maintained amongst the ancient Jews is not to be sought for in the present day, and consequently an appeal to the Jewish theocracy avails nothing in a discussion of the present union of Church and State.

The remaining arguments of E. C. M. are equally futile, and as we have already trespassed rather largely upon time and space, we will leave them and the articles of C. H. and A. W., merely referring in a cursory way to the leading argument in the article of A. W., derived from the fact that "the Church is so frequently spoken of in Scripture as a kingdom." Now the word kingdom necessarily implies a king, and the king implied in connection with the expressions "kingdom of heaven" and "kingdom of God" is the "King of kings, and [Lord of lords," and not a mere earthly potentate. Therefore the expression "kingdom of heaven" affords no just argument in support of the establishment of a State Church, especially when we consider that Jesus Himself expressly said, "My kingdom is not of this world."

We think we have said enough to show that our view of the subject is not altogether devoid of reason, and we do most strenuously maintain that the Church] ought to be disestablished and disendowed.

SAMUEL.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

CHANGE is not reformation. Emancipation from constituted authority is not liberty. Nonconformity is the very reverse of Christianity. A [revolutionary fever generally causes a great excitement of excitative spirits; and these, having their hopes agitated by the prospect and possibility of change, mutter discontent and complain of an uncompleted reformation.

Nothing appears plainer to us than that the old cry of a separation of Church and State is quite obsolete as far as regards its

grounds. In the days of Dissent's palmyest power there was reason in the cry; now it is as empty as the trunk of a five century old oak. As society was constituted then, the State was an oligarchy, now it is a republic *de facto*. Then the State was the power of a few, and the Church, which ought to be the privileged worshipping-place for all, was much as the State then was, a tyranny. Things are entirely changed now, the national will constitutes the State now. That will is deferred to by all parties when it is plainly and properly expressed, and all the freedom of action possible in an orderly state of society is now possible in the Church, because public opinion is the State.

Circumstances being altered, the case is altered. The cry which had sense, wisdom, and principle in it when the State was oligarchical, and had lordship over the Church, has neither sense, principle, nor wisdom in it when the State is only the embodiment of public opinion, and when public opinion is suffused with religious principle and is powerful in the Church.

The Church is, of course, an issue of a State covenant to uphold Christianity in the purest possible form, and as representative of the purest state of public opinion on religious topics which it is possible to attain to. The evils under which the Church suffers are not evils inherent in her constitution, but such as have been forced upon her by the misunderstandings to which she has been exposed, and the results of the actions of her enemies—enemies made so by misunderstanding her. The stereotyped state of the Church has been forced upon her, not by those who are within her pale, but by those who are without, and who see in her internal struggles signs of her weakness and their strength. The state of parties in the Church arises from the operation of an enlightened desire to pursue Christian duty in the best available way; but these desires are repressed and curbed by the action of the Dissenters, who deny to the Church the most essential of all Christian rights—the right of reformation and development. Were the Church to be allowed to introduce those modifications and changes which the changes of the times require, she could bring herself round to be the most efficacious of Christian agencies, and could fulfil all the duties of a church better than those do who oppress her. It is now Nonconformity which is both the aggressor and the oppressor. It resists the internal reformation of the Church; it objects to the preservation of its schemes, and surrounds with

difficulty every endeavour to make the Church of England approach more nearly to the nature of a true Church of Christ.

The Church of England should not be disestablished, because, in the present day, there is already too great a disposition to depart from Christianity, and neglect its precepts as well as despise its doctrines. The downfall of a witness church which has for ages been a visible testimony to the nature and power of Christianity, would be misinterpreted to signify a failure in the vital power of Christianity, and be regarded as a proof of the latent infidelity of our statesmen and our priests. The use of the agitations of the Nonconformist Churches for the furtherance of such a scheme of destruction, would incline men to believe that Christianity is only used as a political engine, and that Church doctrines were like party cries of use, mainly to assemble together those who have the same aims and similar desires. It is dangerous to remove the landmarks of history and the witnesses for the truth. Christianity ought to be dearer to men than their political animosities. The Church of England ought not to be disestablished, because an organization with so much power, *prestige* prevalence, and possibility of usefulness, is too valuable to be discharged from among the influences of society. We ought to reform, not to destroy. We ought to bring the Church, organized as she is, into her highest state of efficiency, and we ought to allow her to develop all her Christian activities, so that she might become such a church as would invite and bless conformity with her. Disagreement is easy; it is agreement that is difficult.

"Johannes" thinks the precedent of the disestablishment of the Irish Church is an argument of force. We think otherwise. The Irish Church was the church of conquerors, not of brethren—and it has only now taken its true position as a missionary church, whose duty is persuasion, not rulership. The Church of England is differently placed; it is the acknowledgment by the State of its conviction that Christianity is the law of life and the life of law; and just as the State is a family, the Church is the provision for the worship of the members of the family in their united ascriptions of glory to the Most High.

"Johannes" asserts that the Church has "lost its utility." This is a serious charge—a charge which acquires only a semblance of truth because the Church is blamed for what Nonconformity has done. The Church has not kept pace with population; because

Dissent has been engaged in crippling her energies, and in binding her in the chains of forms the age has outgrown. Dissent has opposed every means taken to increase her usefulness and enlarge her scope. It has rejoiced at every curtailment of her freedom, her finances, and her power. It has striven not only to weaken but to defame her priesthood and her sacraments, her worship and her efforts.

"Johannes" denies to the Established Church the title of the Church of England. Here he is wrong. England is the name of the State, and she is the Church of the State. The State, however, is now all England; free votes and ballot have made it so. When men are wise enough to see that opinion is the ruling power in the State, the Church of England shall be more firmly established than it has ever been, for it will become the Church of England's christian faith.

G. H.

PERSEVERANCE AND SUCCESS.—The Society of Arts has just issued the results of its final examinations for 1872, and it announces that the Prince Consort prize of twenty-five guineas is awarded to William Pollitt, aged twenty, clerk, a pupil at the Working Men's College, Salford. The prize is obtained upon his successes for four years past, during which he has gained nine first-class certificates—for German, English history, book-keeping, logic, Latin, English language, domestic economy, metric system, and measurement. In the same period he obtained at least a score of money prizes given by the Society of Arts, the Union of Institutes, and the Working Men's College. This year he also takes the first prize for domestic economy (£5), the second prize for metric system (£3), and the first certificate for phonography.

The Essayist.

THE PRINCIPLES AND ART OF TEACHING.

IN entering upon the consideration or discussion of any subject it is of the first importance that we should obtain clear and distinct conceptions of the meaning of the terms employed in the designation of that subject, as well as of the nature and extent of the departments of knowledge which they are intended to comprehend. Acting then upon this advisable, if not essential plan, we will endeavour at the commencement of this lecture to obtain and communicate clear definitions of the following terms,—PRINCIPLES, ART and TEACHING.

Principles are those general and fundamental truths from which the rules of art are deduced. These principles or fundamental truths are the chief and main considerations involved in the understanding of any topic. These principles or fundamental truths are often comprehended in the term Science—which in a general sense means knowledge, and in a philosophical sense, an arranged collection of the general maxims or leading truths of any subject. Hence the title of our lecture might have been more technically, but equally comprehensively, stated as the Science and Art of Teaching.

The term *Art* is frequently used to denote practical rules as opposed to speculative principles; but by Art is generally meant skill, dexterity, or the power of performing certain actions acquired by experience, study, or observation. *Art* and *science* may be distinguished thus: Science is knowledge—the knowledge of principles; art is the knowledge of practical rules, and the power or skill to apply them; the *art* is the practical use of the *science*, that is, of the principles of the science. Archbishop Whately defines science as “a collection of principles for something that is to be known”; and art is “a collection of rules for something that is to be done.” In general, an art is that on which practice depends; *science* that which refers to speculative principles. Thus the principles of music are a science; the practice of music is an art. Hence it is possible for a man to be familiar with the principles of music without being a proficient in the art; and hence also an ex-

planation of what we all have some experience of; that many art-critics may thoroughly understand the principles that must find embodiment in a good picture, and yet not be *artists* or practical painters.

It is right here to say that the converse of this is sometimes true, and that some men become familiar with an art by imitation or by routine; but he is far more likely efficiently and successfully to practise an art who understands its great underlying and all pervading principles, and such a one every teacher of the young ought to seek to be.

The term *teaching* means literally instructing, informing, communicating to another the knowledge of which he was before ignorant. But the word teaching is generally employed by us as embracing *education* as well as instruction—what, in fact, is beautifully and effectively denominated in Scripture *training*—bringing into the most vigorous and healthy condition of being, the harmonious and co-equal development of the entire nature of a child, so that it shall not have any of its powers ignored or stunted, but that all that is in it of possibility shall be made the outcome of it in actuality.

The word instruction comes from a Latin word meaning to *build in*; education from another word, meaning to *draw out*. But the true idea contained in this word education is not the drawing out of that which has been built in, but the drawing out, *the unfolding, the developing* of the faculties of the child, and *leading and training* the individual to the attainment of a character in complete accordance with God's law as the source of holiness, and consequently of happiness.

Such being the case, it is evident at a glance that the work of the Christian teacher is not one of secondary importance, nor is it one of mere routine, which may be performed by any person in a perfunctory, heartless, or unintelligent way. "It is very unfortunate," as Dr. Thomas Brown has said ("Philosophy of the Human Mind," sect .iv.) "that the noblest and, in proportion to its value, the least studied of all the arts, is the art of teaching. Teaching is, in fact, the experimental philosophy of the human mind;" and yet, in long connection with our Sunday schools this important matter was regarded as requiring no special talent, acquirement, or even preparation; but happily the London Sunday School Union, and its affiliated unions throughout the country, have done much to correct this very erroneous misapprehension, and practically by means of introductory, training and preparation classes—and now by the establishment of competitive examinations—have placed the means of and the encouragement to preparation within the reach of the great majority of our teachers.

And now comes the more immediate inquiry with which we are

concerned. What are the leading and more important principles of teaching? And I must confess that it is somewhat difficult to classify and summarize them; and you will have noticed that this has not been done in any of the text-books, or books of reference mentioned in connection with these examinations.* Mr. Groser's valuable little volume, entitled "Our Work," takes the most comprehensive and systematic survey of the subject, and deals most fully with its general principles. You may remember that he maintains that the "thoroughly furnished" artist, whether he work upon matter or mind, ought to possess —

- I. A knowledge of the material to be employed.
- II. A clear view of the result to be attained.
- III. A thorough acquaintance with the instruments to be used.
- IV. A knowledge of the methods of handling the instruments, so as to bring about the desired result.

Mr. Groser follows up the discussion of these topics with an interesting description of the teacher actually at work training his scholars. Simple and natural as this arrangement is, it will, on consideration, be seen that it is rather the division of a large subject, than the classification of fundamental principles, and therefore it does not supply us with that which we now require. Not having then at command any ready-made summary of principles, we must try to compile one for ourselves, and the following I submit for your consideration.

1. *Every Sunday school teacher ought to have a distinct conception of the objects sought to be realised by the religious teaching of the young.*

Happily, we shall all be agreed as to what this is. In the words of Dr. Watts, the "religion or virtue" which we teach, "in a large sense includes duty to God and our neighbour; but in a proper sense, virtue signifies duty towards man, and religion duty to God." Coleridge maintained that the object of all education ought to be to give a child "just views of his moral and religious obligations, his true interests for time and eternity." Mr. Groser states it thus:—"First, to make known to our scholars the divine character and will, especially as revealed in Scripture. Second, to awaken feelings conformable to that character and will. And third, to train them to the exercise of a corresponding course of conduct." And Dr. Arnold, that greatest teacher of modern days, forcibly remarked "that to give a man a Christian education is to lead him to love

* "Our Work," by W. H. Groser; "Counsels to Sunday School Teachers," by J. A. Cooper; "Ready for Work," by W. H. Groser; "The Child and the Book," by Messrs. Dunning and Hassell; and Collins's "Teacher."

God as well as know Him; to lead him to have faith in Christ as well as to have been taught that He died for our sins and rose again; to lead him to open his heart eagerly to every impulse of the Holy Spirit, as well as to have been taught the fact, as it is in the Nicene Creed, that He is the Lord and Giver of spiritual life." *And nothing less than this should limit our aims in connection with the teaching and training of our scholars.*

II. As the second great principle in the science of education, I would place *the teacher's acquaintance with the characteristics of childhood, and the successive development, with the progress of years, of the faculties of the mind and the emotions of the heart.*

Mr. Groser devotes a long and elaborate chapter of his book to the discussion and illustration of this principle. He commences by referring to those "gateways of knowledge," the five senses, and then inquires whether, instead of five, we have not six or seven senses! He then imagines himself passing through one of these gateways, and entering upon the domain of mind, where he discovers three peculiar forms or properties, namely, *INTELLECT or thought*, *EMOTION or feeling*, and the ever-active *WILL*. In plain language, he recognises *thinking*, *feeling*, and *willing*, as the properties of mind—and such youthful minds, too, as we have to deal with. He then goes on to speak, not like Shakspeare, of the seven ages of man, but of the three ages of childhood and youthhood, which he designates thus:—

1. *The Age of Perception.*—At this, the earliest age, the child is occupied by the *material* and the *present*. Of these "he acquires knowledge *directly*, through the senses, or *indirectly*, by verbal description, through the analogy of unknown to known objects, and in no other way."

Thus, for example, if you wish a child to comprehend the first facts in Geography that "the earth is a large globe, sphere or ball," you can only do so by laying hold of the perception of *roundness*, which has been acquired by experience of bodies having that quality, marbles, apples, oranges, &c., and of size, as denoted by measures of length used either to find the dimensions across or around, so that we have to explain "like an orange, a little flattened at each end, and 7,900 miles in diameter, and 24,856 miles in circumference."

Similarly in explaining moral qualities, as *mercy*, we require to take the *ognate* perceptions of the mind, *fondness*, *affection*, *love*, *kindness*, *goodness*, *favour*, and using these as the means of giving the ground work of the quality of the Divine Nature on which we desire to insist; we have to make the other perception of want of merit, or undeservingness clear to the child, and then to get

both of them so connected together as to lead them to see how the undeserved goodness of God receives the name of Mercy; and we may carry this further by showing how that feeling arises, what it results in, and why it is felt. Each of these, if illustrated in a well-chosen tale, may be brought readily under the comprehension of a child, and may be made interesting, instructive, and effective.

There are two important facts to be remembered respecting this age. (1) The *attention* of children is not much under the control of their *wills*, but depends on the *interest* they feel in the subject. (2) A child's interest cannot and perhaps ought not to be long kept up by *one* object. Learn hence to be brief, lively, and pointed.

2. The second period in a child's intellectual history is *the age of conception or imagination*: Conception is the faculty by which past perceptions are united and recalled, and imagination is the power by which conceptions are grouped together in endless variety. Now teachers should avail themselves of the law of mental association. "In order to do this we must," to use the words of Mr. Groser, "become *illustrative* teachers, associating Scripture truths with the every-day life of the scholar; like our divine Model, who pressed into His service bud and flower, sea and sky, sower and reaper; so that they who gazed upon these familiar things must perforce recall the gracious truths which He had linked with them." "Without a parable spake He not unto them."

3. Passing on in the history of the child's mind, and arriving at the age of ten years or upwards, we mark the advent of *the age of reason, judgment, or reflection*. Now the child's memory becomes more retentive, his capacity for receiving knowledge is increased, the ability to grasp abstract ideas is developed, and the command of attention is strengthened. Teachers will, however, do well not to presume too much on this latter point, for even now attention can only be gained and *retained* by that which is lively, natural, and fresh. Some illustrations and stories will bear frequent use, but others lose all their interest by constant repetition, and only create that sense of dissatisfaction which prompted the ragged school boy to exclaim, "Why, teacher, you surely ain't a-going to cut that 'ere fig-tree down agen?"

The various periods of child-life which we have noted have all reference to the region of intellect, and beyond it lies the vast and important sphere of the EMOTIONS. The exercise of the emotions is a source of gratification. "This is what we mean when we say that children love 'excitement,'—they delight in anything which awakens strong feelings; and many a teacher mournfully contrasts the lively emotions of his scholars when at play with their listless apathy when *apparently* under tuition."

The following is the list of emotions given by Mr. Groser :—

1. Curiosity, or the love of knowledge.
2. The emotion of pursuit.
3. The emotion of wonder.
4. The love of power.
5. The love of communicating.
6. The love of society.

Such then are some of the emotions and moral feelings of childhood, and we must all acknowledge how important it is for teachers to understand the best way of cultivating and regulating them.

The human spirit is not easy of analysis; and the various emotions of which the soul is capable may be classified in almost as many ways as there are points of consideration. This classification of Mr. Groser's is admirable for its purpose, as a sort of general directory of the several capacities of being stirred to action, in regard to the use of which the teacher requires to gain some practical acquaintance.

The young spirit is expectant; it finds, as it knows objects, that they have qualities productive of pleasure or pain. Expectancy is the soul of curiosity; we seek to know because we hope to gain. Hopefulness is kept alive in the young spirit by its finding that as its curiosity continues its researches, new pleasures and fresh delights arise, and hence curiosity, being made the habit of the soul, develops into the emotion of pursuit. Ever and anon, as curiosity pursues its course, marvels arise and strike, the unexpected comes forth to surprise one, and the sense of newness re-excites the acquisitive faculties to wonder what will next arise. Reproductive effort is now given, not only to cause a recurrence of what is known, but to effect what is unknown, and the power of doing either heightens our sense of self-value. We feel that there is not only something in that on which we employ ourselves, but that there is something in ourselves. We feel our being then strongly, and that being we always desire to be valued, estimated, and operative. Hence we seek to communicate our discovery, or make known the result of our endeavour, to show the actuality of our possession or our power. In this way our sympathy seeks the sympathy of others, and the sympathy of others excites us, and the social affections are excited, delighted in, and made effective in stirring us up to greater effort, and in exciting others to strive to be knowing, persistent, powerful, and capable.

In very young children feelings are "contagious," or *cataking*, and hence the first period of moral development is called—

1. THE AGE OF SYMPATHY, when child and teacher "feel together." Feeling awakens corresponding feeling. Our duty, then, is plain, but its performance is not easy.

Sympathy is fellow-feeling—feeling in harmony one with another, and implies likeness of state as the ground of similarity in feeling. The foundation of sympathy is emotion; similar emotions are excited in similar circumstances in minds in a similar state. Hence the power of example; hence, too, the strength of sympathy of numbers, and the opportunity of training. To bring into sameness of state, and to excite simultaneousness of emotion, is a high art. The orator exhibits it on a grand scale, the Sunday school teacher should have the capability of doing it in the small but not unimportant sphere of the few hearts under his charge, and should so train himself to success in this great duty as to prove that “he who winneth souls is wise.”

2. The child next enters upon a stage of development known as the AGE OF APPROBATION, in which the love or desire of *praise* comes prominently into view. How this desire can be best gratified in harmony with the spirit that should pervade our schools, is a question that has often been discussed by Sunday school teachers.

On this topic we may be permitted but a word in passing. Probation is trial—being put to the proof. When we have stood the trial, when we have undergone the ordeal, then we give as well as feel approbation. This is quite a different feeling from that of self-satisfaction, which is often mistaken for it. It is, properly speaking, the verdict of conscience, given heartily, that, having been exposed to trial, we have been found dutiful and been proved to be possessed of the character that we ought in the circumstances to have shown. Self-conceit is a low concession to success, whether trial was implied in it or not. Approbation may be given even where success has not been obtained, if the trial has been such as to prove and test the character. Love of praise is natural to every heart; love of approbation is quite a different thing. We should be chary of praising mere success, and wary in giving it; we ought carefully to discriminate in approbation between merit and success, between desert in success and desert in character.

3. As childhood speeds away, the AGE OF CONSCIENCE, or the moral principle, is entered upon. This is the final stage of moral development, as the period of judgment or reason is of intellectual development; and it is represented in our school organization by our Scripture class scholars. Much might be said about this critical period of youth, and about the importance of teachers striving to do something to guide the aspirations of the young towards maturity, to influence the development of their social instincts, to lead their ever-strengthening wills to submit to the divine authority, to prepare the altar of their heart for the kindling of that divine flame which, while it rises heavenwards, sheds its holy

light and diffuses its sacred warmth on all around. But let it never be forgotten that this flame is not only heavenward in its tendency, but divine in its origin. And just as Solomon of old, when he had reared the temple, built the altars, and placed the costly offerings upon them, looked to heaven for the descending fire, so must we, when we have completed our work, look up to God to kindle the fire of divine love in the hearts of our scholars.*

Having dwelt at such length on the second great principle in the science of education, I pass on to the next, which I consider to be—

III. *That children naturally desire and love knowledge.* This perhaps some of you may be inclined to dispute, and you may tell me that it is contrary to your experience. Perhaps you will excuse me if I say so much the worse for your experience! Just as the physical nature of a child craves for food, so the mind of a child desires knowledge—which is its food; and just as a healthy child derives pleasure from the exercise of its limbs, so a healthy child experiences satisfaction from the rightly directed exertion of its mental faculties. You say the scholars in your class are dull, careless, and inattentive. Has it ever occurred to you to inquire where the fault lies? The fact is, we often blame our scholars when we should blame ourselves—or at any rate when we should blame the system which has made them what they are, and which presents little or no ground of hope for their improvement. But you say that your scholars have no desire for the information you bring before them; let me remind you that the hungry boy has no desire for that which is not food, and little appetite even for that food which is not properly prepared for him. Knowledge, like food, should be suitable, attractive, wholesome, well-prepared, and properly seasoned. But dropping this figure, I assert my belief that the young philosopher who dissected the bellows in order to find out where the wind came from was not a bad illustration of what most children are—or at any rate of what with proper treatment they would be inquisitively eager to know “the right about things.”

VI. As the fourth principle of education, therefore, I would place *the possibility of presenting Scripture facts and doctrines in such a way as to rivet the attention, impress the memory, and move the heart of a child.* There is nothing in the nature of things to render this difficult. Indeed, the facts of Scripture have special attractions for the young. The marvellous and the miraculous, which prove stumbling-blocks to the sceptical adult, are the best stepping-stones of knowledge to the child; and just as God employed the material, the pictorial, and the emblematic to instruct

* On this subject farther remarks may be found by the interested reader in “The Sunday School Senior Class,” by J. A. Cooper.

men in the infancy of our race, so the record of these things will prove to be the best means of imparting knowledge to children in all ages of the world. Just as we are ourselves to pass from the known of this life to the unknown of the life to come, so have we to pass from the known of our present knowledge to the unknown of our future knowledge; and the known in this life is made by Jehovah the type and image of what is heavenly. If our scholars appear to feel no interest in Scripture narratives, we may be sure that there is some serious defect, in the manner in which they are presented to them. We are all too apt to fall into a dull, lifeless way of dealing with these matters, and some of us are afraid of being guilty of too much *realism*, or of being charged with indulging in too sensational a style. For my own part, I would strive to make my teaching as real and lifelike as possible, and should never be afraid of introducing what is called the sensational if it is found in the narrative itself. Nor need we confine ourselves to narratives. The great fundamental truths of our holy religion may be treated with such simplicity and attractiveness as to interest and impress the young. And where this is not fully done in the first instance, memory may be stored with precious treasures for future days. Well has the poet said,—

“ Oh, say not, dream not heavenly notes
To childish ears are vain,
That the young mind at random floats,
And cannot reach the strain.

“ Dim or unheard the words may fall,
And yet the heaven-taught mind
May learn the sacred air, and all
The harmony unwind.”

V. *An efficient teacher will be perfectly familiar with all that he tries to teach.* With regard to this there should be no hesitancy or want of confidence; nor will there be if adequate preparation has been made. A child's confidence and interest in what he is taught rises in proportion to the mastery of the subject which the teacher shows. Whatever may be the quantity and the matter of the lesson, the teacher should know thoroughly all of it—especially everything relating to *persons, places, dates, and numbers*. The teacher who so prepares for the lessons—conscientiously and persistently pursuing this course—will not only largely increase his own knowledge and greatly improve his own mind, but he will also impress and improve his pupils. “I never think of preaching,” said Martin Luther, without trembling, and he prepared accordingly. “I never think of speaking on *any* subject,” said Whately, “without a *great deal* of preparation.” Dr. Chalmers, when Professor of

Moral Philosophy at St. Andrew's University, kept a Sunday school; and his biographer informs us that "though his scholars were very poor, the Dr. prepared as carefully for them as for his class at the university: some stray leaves still exist in which the questions for the evening are written out."

How such preparation as this may be made I have endeavoured to show in the second chapter of my "Counsels to Teachers," and further help will be found in Mr. Groser's little book entitled "Ready for Work." This book contains some valuable hints on the preparation of Bible lessons, and some suggestive specimens of outline lessons. I am, however, inclined to take serious exception to the second black-board lesson. It is by the Rev. J. H. Edwards, and is entitled the "YZE" choice. The teacher is recommended to draw a large Y upon the black-board, and then to address his scholars thus:—"Yes. It is a famous old letter. It has taught a great many boys to mind their *moral steps*, and to choose right. The *Pythagoreans*, a sect of philosophers among the ancient Greeks, used it a great deal for this purpose. It has been called the *Pythagorean letter*." What working boys and girls would think of the Pythagoreans and of this Pythagorean letter we will not stop to inquire. It is worth while noting that the lessons in this book are merely "outlines," and are not announced as "materials ready for use," as some were that appeared in the *Teachers' Treasury* a few years ago. Read sermons or read lectures do not generally please, but a ready-made lesson to a class of children would never be endured. At a Sunday school convention recently held in the United States, one of the speakers said that "he had heard of a man who was once asked by his wife to scold a hired girl. He said that he would write out a good scolding! This he did, and his wife read it to the girl; but it did no good, and the mistress determined to go back to the old-fashioned way of scolding extemporaneously."

Thus, too, would it be with any teacher who, for a single day, tried "the cut and dried" system.

Not that everything should not be "cut and dry," i. e., in a state of readiness; but the cutting and drying are the processes of the study—they are the first steps towards preparation. The teacher requires to cut out his plan, to see it before him in the shape it is to assume. He is then to gather together all the materials in the dry old fashion of industry. He must see what will fit here and suit there and be useful elsewhere. This is a dry process; but the business of the teacher is to put together the cut portions of the plan into a living unity, and to impart to the dry materials a moral and intellectual vitality. He is to bring the cut wood of his re-

search and the dry bundles of his materials under the influence of that divine flame by which the bush burned and yet was not consumed (Ex. iii. 3). He is to build up the cut stones of the industry he has used into a portion of the temple of edification. He is to make the dry bones live, and live by the same means as those did which Ezekiel saw in the valley of vision,—the Spirit of the living God. The cut and dry system, which takes the flowers of Scripture and ties them up in bundles; separated from their roots, however fine the bunch of beauty it may provide, makes but a fruitless and growthless preparation; even if the specimens are dried and bound up in illustration of some classification or form of teaching, like the dry specimens of a botanist after a holiday ramble, he will do little that is effective with them compared to what he would do if he had the flowers from the garden of God growing in the true and pure life they have from Him, and showed them unto those who come to look and learn. The seeds of plants are *dry*, and the shoots of plants wisely chosen are cut for purposes of propagation. In each of these cases, however, the God-given life is preserved and fostered. So must we do if we adopt the cut and dry system; we must not bring our hay, straw, and stubble into God's holy temple,—and such the spirit of each child was intended by its Creator to be.

VI. The sixth and last general principle of teaching I shall mention is embodied in the assertion that *the efficient teacher will be characterized by moral earnestness and Christian vitality.*

In the term moral earnestness is included the idea of the complete penetration of the spirit, with the desire to place the lesson to be taught effectually *in* rather than *before* the mind of the scholar. Earnestness is contagious, and thoroughness is fascinating; they affect not only the intellect, but the heart. Secure these, and your scholars will become docile, attentive, and improved. Like loves like. Children are naturally earnest and inquisitive; the full teacher can satisfy the latter, and the enthusiastic the former desire of the soul. And further, there must be Christian vitality in the teacher, for, as I have said elsewhere, "*to teach* really means to *touch* the mind of a child with the mind of the teacher—to bring the scholar and the teacher into co-active, living exertion, and to make them work together. It requires not only activity of mind in the teacher, but earnestness and moral weight of character; because it is by the living energy of the spirit that the communicating touch is given. . . . This is the touching teaching, which works on and into the life of the young spirit, till it ends in newness of life—a life hid with Christ in God."

J. A. C.

ON THE STUDY OF HISTORY.

III.—A GLIMPSE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORIC PROGRESS.

IN a former article we dwelt on the importance of history as a branch of study, on the proper objects of this pursuit, and on the various methods of treating it which have been adopted by the chronicler, by the didactic historian, and by the philosopher. Arriving at the conclusion that a combination of these methods would best promote the success of the historical student, we were led to inquire whether an inductive investigation, suggested by correspondence of *dates*, might not enable us to *inform* the dry details of chronological narrative with the spirit of symmetry and of system, and thus to connect the lower elements of history with its nobler truths and deeper lessons. To an attempt in this direction a second article was devoted. From an examination of the leading events in modern history, and more especially in that of Britain for many centuries, we were led to note a very memorable and suggestive recurrence of important epochs towards the close of these successive periods, and to remark that those epochs had been generally regarded as days of intellectual light and social progress. On a similar comparative view of the periods near the middle of their respective centuries, a general correspondence in certain very different characteristics seemed to present itself, such periods having usually been marked by the gloomier phenomena of history. Making due allowance for the temporary influence exercised by vigorous rulers, and for the opposite tendencies of feebler governments—allowing also for the various modifying results of national character, political or religious institutions, and untoward circumstances—we found that for many ages the leading nations had passed, with a steadiness of recurrence approaching to constancy, through such cycles of transition, and that apparent exceptions, when closely examined, seemed to confirm rather than contradict the general rule. Those wars and revolutions which have attended the closing years of one century or the opening years of another were found to have been connected with struggles for advancement, as they were dignified by displays of human originality and power; while, on the other hand, the events of the periods intervening have stained the page of history with the repulsive hues of civil conflict, or darkened it with the sickly shades of scepticism, intolerance, and factious zeal. This impression seems to be justified even by the comparison of a favourable case of the one kind with an unfavourable instance of the other. The days of the Commonwealth in England, about the middle of

the seventeenth century, have much of the interest attaching to heroism, genius, and lofty patriotism; yet their glory did not endure; and the struggles and triumphs which distinguished them, however memorable and important in the history of our country, left but a slight mark on her institutions and laws. Their value was negative or relative rather than direct or positive. On the other hand, the French Revolution, with all those associations of blood and terror which its name suggests, was something more than the long-delayed vengeance of a nation on dignities become corrupt and *effete*, more than the product of scepticism and ignorance, brought into conflict with superstition and despotism. It was constructive as well as destructive; and the excesses of some of its agents and instruments should not blind us to the salutary, enlightened, and still enduring character of its earlier legislation. Even the Napoleonic institutions did not expire like those of Cromwell; and the famous "code" has, in various countries, survived the vicissitudes of the dynasty. To Napoleon himself, after making due allowance for his errors and sins, we find the words of Manzoni's noble poem fully applicable:*

"He uttered but his name,
And at his bidding came
Two warring centuries, to wait
Upon his pleasure, as their fate.
He sat, with steadfast mien,
His judgment-seat between;
Then, like a vision, passed and wore
His life out on that narrow shore."

But the time may come when the French Revolution itself, with all its wide and yet unexhausted results, shall seem to the reflective mind less important, as an historical landmark, than the rise of that American freedom which, after having communicated its own impulse to Western Europe, has caused its power to be felt over all the vast and varied regions of a long unknown but far more extensive continent. The language of Berkeley, at the beginning of the last century, must have seemed to the inhabitants of the "New England colony," as well as to his own countrymen, the mere expression of a poetic dream; but to our ear it begins to assume something of the sound of prophecy:—

"Westward the course of empires takes its way,
The first four acts already past;
A fifth shall close the drama with the day—
Time's noblest offspring is the last."

Having now, as we think, adduced a sufficient amount of evidence in justification of our assertions, we feel at once bound and

* Lately translated; see *Macmillan's Magazine*, May, 1872.

warranted to attempt some adequate explanation. What means the strange symmetry we have traced in many successive ages of European history? Whence have arisen these seasons of glory, with their dividing intervals of disintegration and strife, following one another, like alternate waves of elevation and of depression, on the ever-restless ocean of time? Surely, where so much appearance of order presents itself, there must be law. Some principles, not wholly undiscoverable, must underlie this varied yet surprisingly regular manifestation, in each term of one hundred years, of a certain cycle in which the events are comprehended, a certain course to which the phenomena conform. Reserving for a little the chronological element, let us see whether some interpretation cannot be given of the general truth.

The key to this is traceable first, we believe, in the natural operation of our powers as human spirits, situated amidst the manifold circumstances, ever varying, yet not utterly lawless, of our present earthly residence. In the experience of individuals, thought, like life, seems to have its seasons of waxing and of waning, of birth, of growth, of decay. The dreams of childhood pass into the hopes of youth, the efforts of manhood follow, crowned in many instances by fulfilment more or less gratifying; then, when exertion has culminated, decline closely dogs maturity, and faith, where it survives this crisis, dwells on some future attainment. The thoughts, designs, or creations of the human mind, whether greater or inferior, seem to follow a course analogous to that of the life-work of man. The synthetic, projective, creative moods are succeeded by fits of reflection and analysis; criticism takes the place of conception, the views already reached are examined and decomposed, the results hitherto produced are subjected to trial, until the mind, struggling to form out of this chaos a new unity, sees the separate elements rearrange themselves once more into an apparently harmonious and satisfying whole. What is true of the thoughts and projects of individuals is true also, to a great extent, of those thoughts and movements which affect communities. In both cases there are, doubtless, some elements that defy analysis and survive surrounding disintegration. There are thoughts which are a perpetual possession, words which outlive the din of earthly conflicts, and productions of genius whose beauty yields "joy for ever;" even as in nature there is a rock that underlies all soil and culture, and as, likewise, far beyond the clouds and vapours of our terrestrial atmosphere a "blue sky bends over all."

(To be continued.)

The Reviewer.

Ancient Classics for English Readers: Euripides. By WILLIAM BODHAM DONNE. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.

EURIPIDES was the last of the Greek tragedians; the Shirley after the Massinger and Shakspeare of the olden time, Æschylus and Sophocles. In the decline of the stage, eloquence and declamation take the place of passion and poetry; conscious rhetoric displaces the "fine frenzy" of the originating mind; scenic philosophy gives the ground to the Euripidean drama instead of the living impetuosities of Æschylus. Very opportunely has this volume made its appearance now, and welcome as it will be to all those who relish the recurrence to the memory of the sweet-toned phrases of the Athenic stage, to those who desire to taste the strange magic that charms in classic lore, and to those who wish to re-inspirit themselves to a re-perusal of the dramas which delighted in their college days, it will be received with the thanks of the heart by those who are to be brought to book by the examiners at Cambridge in December. This is just the sort of book to flash into the soul the taste for such a study, by giving the daintiest and most pleasing turns of sentiment and phrase put forth in artistic freshness and fitness, and by stirring within the spirit the desire of the intellect to seek for itself the genuine pleasure of tracing the lines of the original.

Very capitably has Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A., the editor of the series, chosen the author to whom he has entrusted the production of a sketch, a criticism, and an epitome of Euripides. W. B. Donne early acquired a reputation by his "Essays on the Drama," and gave full evidence of classical taste and culture. He has not only critical taste, but criticism is his profession. "As examiner of plays"—to which office he was appointed on the death of John Mitchell Kemble—he is especially "exercised" in observing minute points, and in noting the requirements of plot and passion in their dramatic form. He is a man of delicate taste and clear

discernment, of practised culture and supeptic taste, whose essays and contributions always bear evidence of being carefully elaborated, skilfully textured, and dexterously suited to be effective for the very aim he has in view. It is quite patent that he takes delight in his work, and desires to inspire his readers with his own feeling of enchantment. See in the following brief extract how he deals livingly and lovingly with the associations of the scholar, and links the feeling of the English student to that of the connoisseur in the classical drama; how he disports himself with his theme, how he transports his reader with the form of the presentation of the theme, and the gleam of imaginative reproductiveness he imparts to the palmy days and ways of ancient Athens:—

In the days of Euripides, "a resident in Athens might in one week assist at a solemn religious festival; at the performance of plays that for more than two thousand years were unsurpassed; might listen in the Odeum to music worthy of the verse to which it was wedded; might watch in the Great Harbour the war-galleys making ready for the next foray on the Lacedæmonian coast, or the heavy-armed infantry training for their next encounter with Spartan or Theban phalanx. In the intervals of these mimic or serious spectacles he could study the works of the most consummate artists the earth has ever produced; gaze in the gymnasium on living beauty, grace, and strength; or, if meditatively given, could hear Prodicus and Protagoras in their lecture-rooms, or Socrates in the market-place, discoursing upon 'divine philosophy.' If he were in any way remarkable for worth or ability, the saloons of Pericles, Nicias, or Glaucon were not closed against him by any idle ceremonies of good introductions, fine clothes, or long pedigrees. Athens, it is well said by Milton, was 'native or hospitable to famous wits.' And though he had not 'three white luces on his coat,' nor any coat of arms at all, he was 'a gentleman born.' His heraldry was the belief that before a Dorian set foot in Peloponnesus, a tribe of Persian mountaineers had established themselves in Attica, and taken part in the Trojan war."

In the opening chapter Mr. Donne sketches for us the beautiful and active Athens of Socrates, in its history, rise, progress, social life, and amusements, and describes the Dionysian theatre, when a new play has set the curiosity and criticism of the town on edge. A biography of Euripides follows in chapter second, wherein the facts—almost as scanty as those about Shakspeare are said to be—are brought together and interpreted in a manner which wins the admiration of those who delight in seeing the results of construc-

tive literary skill; even although that chapter of "the quarrels of authors," in which the names of Euripides and Sophocles figure, may be regarded by some to be quite as imaginary as that which has been evolved and deduced about Ben Jonson and Shakspeare.

As an exponent of the plan and an epitomist of the plots of the Greek dramas which have come down to us, Mr. Donne excels expectation. Judgment, taste, skill, conciseness, acumen, and tact are all displayed in consummate unity. Those who read this book for information will find in it knowledge made a joy for ever; those who seek pleasure will find it with the purest aromatic flavour; and those who strive in it to renew old impressions will find them realized with the brave sublunary grace of poetry.

HEREDITARY TRANSMISSION OF QUALITIES.—It is matter of daily observation that the ordinary run of children have about the same intellectual capacities as their parents, one or both; the education may be different, but the original nature seems to be about the same standard. This does not apply to those instances where continual culture for successive generations tends to exalt the intellectual powers. As we ascend the scale we cannot fail to perceive how comparatively rare it is to meet with but one distinguished person in any given family. Many of our statesmen have illustrated this position—the legislative faculty has descended from father to son in very many cases in our history. It would not be difficult to point to instances in our own Government where the forms and practices of legislation have been intuitive in as remarkable a degree as in the two Pitts and the two Foxes. Mirabeau the father contained, so to speak, Mirabeau the tribune. The family of Æschylus numbered eight poets. The father of Torquato Tasso had the gift, as his son had the genius of verse. This sort of succession of gift or ability in the family, followed by genius in the son, is not rare. Flaxman was the son of a moulder of plaster casts. Thorwaldsen, the rival of Canova, was the son of a poor sculptor. Raphael's father was himself a painter. The mother of Vandyke had a talent for painting. Parmegiano was of a family of painters; so was Titian; so is Horace Vernet. The father of Mozart was a violinist of some reputation; his children inherited part of his talent. Beethoven was the son of a tenor singer. A whole host of composers have emanated from the family of Bach."—*British Quarterly Review*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTION.

979. Every one does not possess a copy of "Men of the Time," and even though one has such a work, changes are so constantly taking place—"new men have risen, old ones left their stations,"—that it does not long suffice for the purposes of reference. I make this remark as a reason introductory or apologetical for preferring my present request,—that some of your staff, erudite in the "lives of great men," would supply some information regarding the new Dean of Lincoln.—H. S.

ANSWER.

979. The successor of James A. Jeremie, D.D., as Dean of Lincoln, is Joseph Williams Blakesley, M.A. and B.D. He was born in London in 1808, and was trained at St. Paul's School there, whence he proceeded to Trinity College, Cambridge, and graduated B.A. there in 1831, having gained the Chancellor's Medal for an English poem "On the Attempts made to discover the North-west Passage," stood third in the Classical Tripos, and was twenty-first wrangler in mathematics. Almost immediately he was appointed Fellow and Tutor in his college. He was soon engaged to contribute to the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, and produced for that able though unequal work "A Life of Aristotle, including a Critical Discussion of the Questions of Literary History connected with his Works," which was shortly afterwards republished, in 1839, as the first of a series of works in which the author hoped "to give an account of the several systems of ancient philosophy which converged in those of Plato and Aristotle." This very excellent biography of the founder of the Peripatetic School of speculation is full, acute, and informing. It was reprinted, in 1853, from the original edition, in the re-issue—still incomplete—of the *Encyclopædia* in which it at first appeared, in a volume on Greek and Roman Philosophy and Science."

All the Fellows of Trinity, then at least, were obliged to enter into holy orders within seven years after their admission to the

degree of Master of Arts, and having taken orders the Rev. Joseph W. Blakesley was, in 1845, promoted to the ecclesiastical living, in the gift of the college, of Ware, Hertfordshire. In the vicarage of this town, the head-quarters of the malting business, which is but about a score of miles from London, Rev. Mr. Blakesley has continued up till now. Dr. Ollivant was, in 1849, elevated to the see of Llandaff, and then the Vicar of Ware became candidate for the Regius Professorship of Divinity which the bishop vacated. His predecessor in the deanery of Lincoln, Dr. J. A. Jeremie, was, however, preferred at this time. After the death of Sir James Stephen he was offered the Regius Professorship of Modern History, but this he declined, and the Rev. Charles Kingsley received the appointment. He had during this period composed a capital book, entitled "Four Months in Algeria, with a Visit to Carthage;" illustrated by maps and copies of photographs. At this time England required some such book, written by an eye-witness, for just then Algeria was a topic of temporary interest; but this work is valuable for much beyond its gratification of the curiosity of the time, for its writer carried with him a scholar's mind and a thinker's observation. In 1861 he was chosen one of the Classical Examiners of the University of London. In 1863 the Crown gave him a Canterbury Residentiary Canonry, value £1,000 per annum. The Deanery of Lincoln is worth double that sum. Dean Blakesley has, in his "Dispensation of Heathenism," as well as in his Capitular votes, given proof of his being a "Broad Churchman." Several sermons also tend in the same direction. His scholarship is shown in his edition of "Herodotus" in the *Bibliotheca Classica*. He is esteemed an able thinker, a good administrator, and a man of noble aims and liberal views.—R. M. A.

Our Private Tutor.

BIBLE PAGES.

No. 2.—THE BOOK OF RUTH.

THE Book of Ruth is one of the most charming idyllic poems in any language. In the most accurate sense of the term, it is an *idyl*, brief, vivid representation of real life, its events and passions, made properly present to the imagination as visible fact (*εἶδος*, whence *εἰδυλλιον*); pastoral, like those of Theocritus, Bion, and Moschus; passionate, like those of Goethe, Longfellow, and Tennyson; but, unlike these, Providence-traced and perfectly true to fact, it forms a sweet, quiet, striking interlude between the stormy story of judges and the stern history of the revolution from theocracy to monarchy; and yet it links into unity the two great epochs and epics of Judaic history. It begins in the days when the judges ruled, and the genealogy with which it concludes connects it with the Psalmist King of Israel. In the Authorized Version, as in the Septuagint, it is placed between Judges and Samuel, though in the Jewish canon it was placed after the fine dramatic eclogue of the Song of Songs. Its canonicity has never been doubted. Its naïve simplicity, and the indescribable charm of the realistic rustic life it brings before us; its minute truthfulness of detail, and the characteristic naturalness of the entire narrative, impart to it a warranty of genuineness which is self-evidencing; while the sweet humanness of the love and piety it exhibits gives it the emotion-stirring power of the purest poetry. A general opinion has been formed that Samuel was its author. For our own part we can never divest ourselves, when reading it, of the opinion that it is an idyl by king David, presenting at once the humility of his origin and the God-guidance by which the Lord had disposed the lot which had fallen to him as "the man raised up on high, the anointed of the God of Jacob, and the sweet psalmist of Israel" (2 Sam. xxiii. 1). The unpretending genealogy ascribed in this book to David, and the references to the authenticity of that genealogy in tracing the earthly descent of Christ (Matt. i. 5; Luke ii. 32) are strong evidences of its truth.

The story—a pleasing digression from the sacred narrative—perhaps chronologically belongs to the period of which record is given in Judg vi. 4, where the occurrence of a famine is noted, though it was certainly written much later (Ruth iv. 7) even in the lifetime of David (iv. 17). It is beautifully simple, this story of “her who was,” as Dante notes, ancestress of the singer “Elimelech, in the time of the judges, under pressure of famine, leaves his native land with his wife and two sons, and migrates to Moab. There he dies, leaving Naomi a widow in a stranger’s land. Her two sons, though they had grown up and married natives of that country, shortly afterwards died, and Naomi, the pleasant Bethlehemite, was left alone, bereft and sorrowful. She determines to arise and go into her own land. Her daughters-in-law accompany her on the way, and by and by she proposes to say farewell. They are willing to accompany her, but she remonstrates; and Orpah, the widow of Mahlon, returns to her father’s house. Ruth, however, is steadfastly minded to live with and to love Naomi, and in a fine poetic burst of emotion (I. 16 and 17) declares this determination. They returned about the time of the barley harvest. Ruth goes to glean for sustenance in their poor estate; her hap is to glean in the fields of Boaz, a kinsman; he is interested in the beautiful young widow, deals kindly with her, and becoming gradually more and more taken with her, at length purchases the right of kindred, and marries her, so incorporating into the forerunners of David and the ancestry of Christ a poor, loving, pious Moabitess, and restoring Naomi to the pleasantness of the olden times, when she delighted in home-love and reigned in household duty.

This Book, as Thomas Fuller remarks, “hath the name from RUTH, the most remarkable person in it, to whom God vouchsafed His grace, not only to write her name in the book of life in heaven, but also to prefix her name before a book of life on earth.” It groups together and delineates in most fascinating style, with a natural charmingness and most impressive simplicity, the domestic life of Oriental lands. It is not merely a beautiful story of Eastern circumstances and customs, but is, besides, a wonderful exhibition of the working of the ways of God, in his providence, in the common life of men, to bring about the gracious purposes, of which He has a foreknowledge, such that the end is known unto Him from the beginning.

The *matter* may be divided into these two parts:—The first

chapter showeth that "many are the troubles of the righteous" (Psa. xxxiv. 19); and the three last do show that "the Lord delivereth out of them all" (Psa. xxxiv. 19). For her genuine human love and her simple piety the heroine of the tale, even though a Moabitess, was deemed worthy of being the foundress of the royal house of Israel, and an ancestress of the Messiah.

The main design of the book seems to be to note particularly the origin of the family of David, and therefore of the Messiah. This circumstance is enough to render the interviews of Boaz with Ruth, her gleaning in the fields, his kind instructions regarding her to his servants, and his marriage, worthy of record. "It delivers down to us," says Pyle, "the original of Christ according to the flesh, whose derivation was not only from the tribe of Judah in Israel, in conformity with the promises of God concerning Him, but also from a poor, virtuous Gentile woman, indicative of the bringing in of the Gentiles."

Proper Names of Persons occurring in the Book of Ruth explained.

BOAZ, or **BOOZ**, *strength or fleetness*; a wealthy and kindly Bethlehemite, who married Ruth, and so became an ancestor of Israel's kings and of the Saviour as a "Son of man." His name and that of Jachin, the fifth son of Simeon, were given to the two pillars in the porch of Solomon's temple (1 Kings vii. 21).

CHILION, *pining, wasting away*; second son of Elimelech and Naomi, born in Bethlehem-ephatah; married, in Moab Orpah, a native of that country, and died there.

ELIMELECH, *one to whom God is King*; a Bethlehemite who went to the land of Moab; father of Mahlon and Chilion, husband of Naomi, and father-in-law to Ruth.

EPHRATHITES, children of Ephraim, and natives of Ephrathah or Bethlehem (1 Sam. i. 1).

JESSE, *firm, wealthy*; grandson of Ruth, and father of David, king of Israel.

JUDAH, *Jehovah's praise*; the fourth son of Jacob and Leah, whose tribe became the most powerful among the Jews, and held the sceptre till Shiloh came.

MAHLON, *sick, great infirmity*; eldest son of Elimelech and Naomi; born in Bethlehem-ephatah; married in Moab, Ruth, and died there.

MARAH, *bitterness*; a name chosen by Naomi to indicate her many sorrows, in contrast to her own name.

NAOMI, *pleasantness, comeliness*; was the wife of Elimelech, mother of Mahlon and Chilion, mother-in-law to Ruth and Orpah, and afterwards to Boaz.

OBED, *restoring*; son of Boaz and Ruth, and grandfather of David.

ORPAH, *mane, forelock*; wife of Chilion, daughter-in-law to Naomi.

PHAREZ, *division*; son of Judah and Tamar. (Dan. v. 28).

RACHEL, *a ewe*; younger daughter of Laban, wife of Jacob, mother of Joseph and Benjamin; ancestress of the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh (Jer. xxxi. 15; Matt. iv. 18).

RUTH, *beauty, a friend*; a Moabitess, widow of Mahlon, wife of Boaz, ancestress of David and of Jesus; she is mentioned by Dante ("Parad." 32, 11), along with Sarah, Rebecca, and Judith, as "her that was ancestress to the singer who, for dole of his misdeed, sung, 'Have pity, Lord, on me'" (41); and by Milton with Mary, as having chosen the better part.

THAMAR, *a palm tree*; mother of Pharez and Zarah, sons of Judah.

Proper Names of Places occurring in the Book of Ruth explained.

BETHLEHEM is situated about six miles south of Jerusalem, the capital of the Holy Land. It is sometimes, as in Mic. v. 2, called Bethlehem-ephrahatah, sometimes, as here, Bethlehem-judah, or, as in Matt. ii. 1, Bethlehem of Judea, to distinguish it from a small town of the same name in Zebulun, mentioned in Josh. xix. 15. Rachel, Jacob's wife, while journeying towards Bethlehem, died on the way, and was buried "there in the way of Ephrath; the same is Bethlehem" (Gen. xxxv. 19; xlviii. 7). It was so insignificant as to be omitted from the general lists given of the cities of Judah (Josh. xv. and Neh. xi.), yet it became the birthplace, and so "the city of David" (Luke ii. 4, 11); and still more sacred and celebrated has it become as the birthplace of our Redeemer. It was the early residence of Elimelech and his family, and to it his widow Naomi returned from Moab after her bereavement, bringing with her Ruth, her daughter-in-law.

ISRAEL, which was also called the land of Judah, of God, and of 1872.

Jehovah, had many names, as *Canaan*, from Ham's youngest son; the *Land of Promise*, because God promised it to the seed of Abraham; the Land of the Hebrews, from Eber, one who has passed over the Euphrates from Mesopotamia, where Abraham's ancestors lived; *Palestine*, because it was inhabited by the Philistines; Holy Land, because God was the Ruler and Guide of its people; and the Land of Israel, because it was divided among the descendants of Jacob, whom God called Israel. *The Land* (ver. 1) is the whole land of Israel; for it was not till the revolt under Jeroboam—"the man who made Israel to sin"—that Israel's ten tribes formed one kingdom, and the remaining two the kingdom of Judah. In ver. 7 it is called the land of Judah.

MOAB, *father's children*, got its name from the son of Lot (Gen. xix. 37). It lay on the east of Jordan and the Dead Sea, on both sides of the river Arnon. The Jews were forbidden to attack the Moabites while they were entering Canaan, and they were left undisturbed; but in the days of the judges the Moabites tyrannized over Israel for eighteen years. David made them tributaries; they rebelled under Jehoram, and never resumed allegiance. The land of Moab was exceedingly fertile in ancient times, but it is very barren now. It was an idolatrous nation.

RUTH.

"She stood breast high amid the corn
Clasped by the golden light of morn,
Like the sweetheart of the sun,
Who many a glowing kiss had won.

"On her cheek an autumn flush
Deeply ripened—such a blush
In the midst of brown was born,
Like red poppies grown with corn.

"Round dark eyes her tresses fell,
Which were blackest none could tell;
But long lashes veiled a light
That had else been all too bright.

"And her hat, with shady brim,
Made her treasy forehead dim;
Thus she stood amid the stocks,
Praising God with sweetest looks.

"'Sure,' I said, 'Heav'n did not mean
Where I reap thou should'st but glean ;
Lay thy sheaf adown and come,
Share my harvest and my home.' "

THOMAS HOOD.

"The plume-like waving of the auburn corn,
By soft winds to a dreamy motion fanned,
Still brings me back thine image, O forlorn,
Yet not forsaken, Ruth ! I see thee stand,
Lone 'midst the gladness of the harvest band
Lone as a wood-bird on the ocean's foam,
Fallen in its weariness. Thy fatherland
Smiles far away ! yet to thy sense of home,
That finest, purest, which can recognise
Home in affection's glance, for ever true,
Beats thy calm heart ; and if thy gentle eyes
Gleam tremulous through tears, 'tis not to rue
Those words, immortal in their deep love's tone,
' Thy people and thy God shall be mine own ! ' "

MRS. HEMANS.

NO. 3.—THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MATTHEW.

THE AUTHOR.—MATTHEW, as he calls himself, "the publican" (x. 3), was also called LEVI by Mark (xi. 14) and by Luke (v. 27—32) The latter was probably his original legal and Hebrew name, and Matthew a name adopted by him on accepting the office he held under the Roman jurisdiction. Levi signifies a "crown, or garland ;" and Matthew, "the gift of God : " and both are appropriately borne by him who was called by Jesus himself to receive "the gift of God," and who has been privileged to place the "crown" of a biography on the life of Jesus, and to weave a "garland" for the Church in all ages, consecrated to the memory of Him who alone passed through a tract of three-and-thirty years ever most truly—

" Wearing the white flower of a blameless life."

" Publican " is the title given usually to farmers of the public taxes, who were persons of considerable importance and position ; though perhaps he was only one of the subordinate officers of the *publicanus* of the district. He was a Jew of Galilee, and seems to have held much the same position in social life as Zacchæus the

publican; and, it is not improbable, that an incident in Matthew's life gave occasion to the parable of the Pharisee and the publican. He accompanied Jesus through all his travels during His ministry, was an eye-witness of His miracles, and a listener to His discourses; he was acquainted with the facts of the trial, death, and resurrection of Jesus, was admitted to intercourse with Him after His rising again from the dead, and was present at His ascension. He remained at Jerusalem till the day of Pentecost, when he took part in the election of a successor to Judas Iscariot, and he, with the other apostles, received the gift of the Holy Ghost. He preached in Judea during about eight years, and, as is thought, during that time composed those "notes on the life of Jesus" which constitute his Gospel.

THE CHARACTER OF THE GOSPEL.—This remarkable book comes down to us as at once the chief and the earliest biography extant of the Founder of Christianity and the Saviour-Messiah of mankind. Of the four Gospels which constitute almost the only direct sources of the history of the life of our Lord, his occupies the first place, and it shows many of the characteristics of a series of notes drawn up soon after the events recorded had occurred, and bears the impress of the events and opinions of the age in which it was composed, probably about A.D. 42, and certainly not later (as internal evidence shows) than A.D. 66. (Compare the prophecies in Matt. xxiv. with the accounts of the Jewish war in Josephus and in Tacitus.) The story is not told with any attempt at completeness, or with any artisticality of style. His reports of discourses are fragmentary, and his narrative of events is connected rather by association of ideas than in chronological order. It has been remarked that "St. Matthew appears to group together events or discourses by the law of similarity, and on account of reference to the same subject, thus evincing that habit of classifying which might reasonably be expected from his previous occupations." The style, manner, and form of the composition show that Matthew's Gospel was written for the Jews. It is designed to prove to *them* that Jesus is not only *the* but *their* Messiah. This he does by expounding the relation of their ancient oracles to the circumstances of His birth, life, death, and resurrection. Hence the insertion of the genealogy through David to Abraham; his details of the birth and the birthplace, of His early ministry, of His miracles and His parables, of His suffering and His

death, burial, and rising again—on all of which he makes reference to the Old Testament to show how minutely the fulfilment corresponds in reality with the texts on which they relied as characteristic of the coming Saviour: the proof is varied, recurrent, well-planned and successful.

REFERENCES TO OR QUOTATIONS FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT.—

The following references to or quotations from the Old Testament scriptures occur in the Gospel according to St. Matthew:—Gen. ii. 24, Matt. xix. 5; Exod. iii. 6, xx. 12–14, xxi. 24, Matt. xxii. 32, xv. 4, 21, 27, 38; Lev. xiv. 2, Matt. viii. 4; Deut. vi. 13, 16, viii. 3, xxv. 5, Matt. iv. 7, 10, iv. 4, xxii. 24; 1 Sam. xxi. 1–6, Matt. xii. 3; Ps. viii. 2, xxii. 8, 18, lxxviii. 2, 3, xci. 11, 12, cxl. 1, cxviii. 22, 23, Matt. xxi. 16, xxvii. 34, 35, xiii. 35, iv. 6, xxii. 44, xxi. 42; Isa. vi. 9, 10, vii. 14, ix. 1, 2, xxix. 13, xl. 3, xlii. 1–4, liii. 4, vi. 7, Matt., xiii. 14, 15, 1, 23, iv. 15, 16, xv. 8, iii. 13, xii. 18–21, viii. 17, xxi. 13; Jer. xxxi. 15, Matt. iii. 18; Dan. ix. 27, Matt. xxiv. 15; Hos. vi. 6, xi. 1, Mic. v. 2, Matt. ii. 6; Zech. ix. 9, xi. 13, xiii. 7, Matt. xxi. 5, xxvii. 9, 10, xxvi. 31; and Mal. iii. Matt. xi. 10. Perhaps, too, reference is made in Matt. ii. 23 to Samson as in some sort a type of Christ, as noted in Judg. xiii. 5.

It is very important to notice this peculiarity of the biography of Jesus by Matthew. He was a Jew, acquainted with the Scriptures, the anticipations, and the aspirations of the Jews. He knew the portions of the divine Record on which his countrymen relied for their belief in a coming Saviour. He employs those passages on which they rested their hopes as a chain of evidence, which should be conclusive to them of the Messiahship of his Lord. We are not under the necessity of regarding all the passages quoted as given primarily and intentionally as prophecies concerning "Him of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets did write, Jesus of Nazareth." It is enough that he showed the Jews, on referring to facts which they did not deny or dispute, that their own Messianic expectations had been fulfilled in Jesus. His argument meets them on their own hypothesis, is planned to suit their case, is designed to carry conviction to their mind, not in regard to the occurrence of the facts he relates, for these he does not even imagine can be disputed or doubted, but in relation to his Lord's true and genuine claim to be the Realiser of the prophecies of those "holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

AIDS TO SELF CULTURE:—ON READING ALOUD.

At most of the Local Examinations it has been decided that the reading aloud of some passage from the works of one of the authors chosen for study shall form an indispensable portion of the course of tests to be undergone. The art of reading aloud is neither so trivial nor unimportant—still less is it quite so easy—as many imagine it is. This we may easily prove by reflecting how seldom it is that we find, even among those who should, for professional purposes, be able to read well, succeed in making what they read at once impressive, intelligible, and interesting.

The prime characteristics of good reading are clear articulation, proper accentuation, judicious emphasizing, and suitability of tone, or the adaptation of the voice to the nature of the matter read. These may be attained, except in a very few cases, by patient practice and diligent attention.

Lord Chesterfield has given very judicious advice on this topic. In one of his letters he says:—"Take care to open your teeth when you speak; to articulate every word distinctly, and to beg of any friend you converse with to remind and stop you if ever you fall into a rapid and unintelligible utterance. You should even read aloud to yourself, and tune your utterance to your own ear; and read, at first, much slower than you need do, in order to correct that shameful habit of speaking faster than you ought."

This is good counsel: in our early practice in reading aloud every word ought to be expressed as distinctly as if it were uttered singly. This careful pronunciation, of course, in colloquial intercourse would be ridiculous, because pedantic; but in the process of study it is indispensable.

The directions which we have to give are so extremely simple, that they may be in danger of being despised and neglected, but we assure the student that simplicity is exactly one of the requirements we have chiefly aimed at attaining, and that we have taken the trouble of analyzing the difficulties most formidable in regard to reading aloud, just that these difficulties may be compelled to vanish by the simple means here brought forward.

Rule I. Take a dictionary; write out from it, here and there, twenty monosyllables, those having the largest number of consonants coming together—as *eight*—to be preferred; next, twenty dissyl-

lables, observing the same condition, but this time noting the place of the accent; thereafter select trisyllables and polysyllables as far as possible—*e. g.*, per'-pen-dic'-u-lar'-i-ty, in-con'-tro-ver'-ti-bil'-i-ty, &c. Practise the reading of these words collected by twenties (1) slowly, distinctly, and singly; (2) fluently, and as if having only a comma's pause between each; and then (3) as if they formed a complete sentence, each word distinct, but with no pause of so much as a comma's length between each.

In performing this exercise observe the following cautions:—

1. Begin gently at the natural pitch of your voice.
2. Graduate your pronunciation so as to raise its tones somewhat towards the middle of each part of the exercise, and lower gently towards the natural pitch at the close.
3. Regain the natural pitch carefully again on beginning the next portion.
4. Do not overstrain the voice, nor continue the practice of the exercise so long as to fatigue your lungs or injure the vocal organs.

PLAIN ENGLISH.

EXTEMPORE COMPOSITION; ITS ART AND MANNER.

LESSON II.

THE grammatical predicate may be analyzed into its two logical parts, *viz.*, a portion of the verb *to be*, and an attribute generally expressed by an adjective; *e. g.*, Time flies=time is fleeting; God exists=God *is in being*.

The portion of the verb *to be* may be regarded as the copula, though the logical copula, properly speaking, incorporates with itself no association or indication of time. *Time fled* logically implies "that time passed rapidly *is* a true statement." *Time was* fleeting, similarly implies, "It is a truth that time was passing rapidly at the period or in the circumstances referred to."

Truth is eternal; therefore it is ever the same, and in itself has neither past nor future; it is ever present. Human thought about truth, and especially the human expression of truth, is constantly changing, liable to alteration according to the variations of human feeling or experience; hence, verbs are active, passive, or neuter in their voice; indicative, imperative, subjunctive, &c., in their mood; and present, past, future, &c., in their tense. The ideas of

men and their statements in regard to them are varied according to the feelings and experiences connected with them. It is seldom that pure, invariable, eternal truth is discoverable; still less frequently is it expressible by man. It may be true that "*water boils,*" but the sentence as it stands leaves us uncertain whether we are speaking of the constant capacity of water, or of the accidental condition in which it is. Logically, the latter statement is analyzed into *the water is boiling*, but the former requires to be expanded into the extended sentence, "*water boils at 212 degrees of heat.*" Every sentence, though not exactly in the same terms, is capable of being transformed (or converted, as it is technically called) from the grammatical to the logical form, and in general *vice versa*.

Examples.—Time flies, time is fleeting; water boils, water is boiling; ice chills, ice is cold; the boys are reading, the boys read; foam is white, the foam whitens; the grass grows, the grass is growing; play is pleasant, play delights; the ship is sailing, the ship sails; John is a scholar, John studies or learns; &c.

Take any simple, logical sentences, and transform them into grammatical ones, making, as before, lists of all possible synonyms, and employing these in as copious a manner as may be.

Examples.—He is a maniac, he raves, his intellect wanders, he demeans himself like a madman, he acts insanely; he is forgetful, he forgets, he lets affairs slip from his memory, he has lost his memory, he remembers nothing, his recollection fails, his memory is not retentive, remembrance fails him, he has let it clean out of his head.

Do similarly the following sentences:—

(1) He lives, he inherits, man labours, women sorrow, flowers fade, fortune changes, rivers flow, trees grow, hope comforts.

(2) He is careful, he is industrious, evil is dispiriting, care is harassing, man is mortal, life is fleeting, studies are useful.

Now combine the two forms into one, *e. g.*,—

He is a maniac, he raves. Is he not a maniac? he raves. Does he rave? is he not a maniac? He forgets; his memory is failing. How he forgets! and how his memory fails!

"Brief as is summer lightning,
While flashing through the sky
So brief, but far less brightening,
Is now his memory."

THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS.

(A FEW NOTES IN AID OF THOSE PREPARING FOR EXAMINATION.)

OLYNTHUS was a town on the Peninsula of Chalcedice, at the head of the Torenic Gulf (or Cassandra's Bay), and one of the most important of the Greek cities on the Macedonian coast. It had risen to such a height of greatness as not unfrequently to enter into contests with Athens and Lacedemon. When Philip of Macedon attained to the throne, two step-brothers of his received asylum in Olynthus. The Olynthians endeavoured to form a treaty with Athens, in opposition to Philip; but this the crafty king found means to defeat. As his throne had not acquired the stability of years, Philip bought (or bribed) the Olynthians to an alliance by the cession of Anthemus, a city to which the Macedonian kings had long laid claim, though the Olynthians disputed it. Besides this, he gave them Pydna and Potidea, which the Olynthians and himself had taken with conjoint forces from the Athenians. They were jealous of his success in arms, and distrustful of his character, and alarmed at some inroads made by him upon their territories; and they sent ambassadors to Athens to show the Athenians that it was their material interest to enter into an alliance against a king so bent on conquest, so perfidious in conduct. As the head of a confederacy of Chalcidian cities, Olynthus was a place of great influence, and Philip saw that severe measures would be required to bring the inhabitants of that city and district into subjection. He asserted that they had broken faith with him as an ally, and had entered into conspiracy with his brothers to his disadvantage, and threatened hostilities. Ambassadors were sent by the Olynthians to Athens to seek immediate help. An assembly of the people had been called to consider the question and determine upon it. Other orators had addressed the assembly; and when they were fully informed of the facts, Demosthenes arose to persuade the people to join the Olynthians, to combine against Philip, to reform themselves, and to avoid dissensions among themselves, as likely to lead to treachery in their own people and tyranny from the ambitious.

"The jarring states obsequious now
View the patriot's hand on high,
Thunder gathering on his brow,
Lightning flashing from his eye."

Our Collegiate Course.

SAMSON AGONISTES.

Transpositional Paraphrase of Lines 23—57. :

OH wherefore was my birth twice foretold from heaven by an angel, who at last ascended, in sight of both my parents, from off the altar where an offering burned, charioting as [if] in a fiery column his God-like presence, and [as if ascending] from some great act or benefit revealed to Abraham's race? Why was my breeding ordered and prescribed [to be] as [that] of a person separate to God, [and one] designed for great exploits?—if I must die a betrayed and captured one; and, having both my eyes put out, made the scorn and gaze of my enemies, [compelled] with this heaven-gifted strength to grind in brazen fetters under task[-work.] O glorious strength, debased lower than bond-slave, put to the labour of a beast! [The] promise was [given] that I should deliver Israel from [the] Philistian yoke. Ask [ye] for this great deliverer now, and find him himself in bonds under the Philistian yoke, at the mill with slaves, eyeless in Gaza. Yet stay; let me not call divine prediction in [to] doubt rashly. What if all that was foretold had [-would have] been fulfilled, but=[unless] through mine own default. [Of] whom have I to complain but=[except of] myself, who could not keep under the seal of silence who committed this high gift of strength to me, it what part [of me, it was] lodged [and] how easily [it could be] bereft [from] me; but weakly overcome with importunity and tears must reveal it to a woman? Oh [what] impotence of mind [was thus displayed] in [a] strong body! But what is strength without a double share of wisdom? [It is a] vast, unwieldy, burdensome [endowment, which is, though] proudly secure, yet liable to fall by weakest subtleties, [and is] not made to rule, but to subserve, where wisdom bears command!

Lexicographic Notes and Illustrations.

Charioting (27). Conveying as in a chariot triumphally; the substantive *chariot*, a wheeled vehicle of state or honour, is here used by poetic licence as a verb; not used anywhere else by Milton.

Breeding (30). Birth and upbringing; procreation and education.

Exploits (32). Achievements, thoroughly accomplished aims.

Captured (33). Taken captive, substantive employed as a verb—used again onwards, 694.

Heaven-gifted (36). Bestowed by God, a compound epithet, proving that Cartwright was right when he said Adjectives!

"They are the flowers,
The grace of all our language;
A well-chosen epithet doth give new soul
To fainting poesy."

Shirley's "Chances; or Love in a Mass."

Fetters (35) properly signify chains for the feet, as *manacles* do chains for the hands; but here the word signifies *bands* in general.

Philistian (39) formed not from *Philistine*, but from *Philistia*. (Psa. x. 48), "the land of the Philistines" (Exod. xiii. 17), the territory which lay along the Mediterranean coast from Joppa to Gaza, probably originally Pali or Pelasgi.

Gaza (41). The most southerly point on the sea-board of Palestine (Gen. x. 19). Its Hebrew name *Azza*, *Strong* is used by Milton onwards, line 147.

"Abraham's race" (29) is synonymous with Israel (39).

Eyeless (4) Sight-bereft—"both my eyes put out" (34), as in IV. Shakspeare's *King Lear*, IV. 6,—

"That *eyeless* head of them was first framed flesh
To raise my fortunes."

Default (45). From Norman French *defaultte*, omission or neglect of duty. So Shakspeare's "Comedy of Errors," i. 2.—

"We who know what 'tis to fast and pray
Are penitent for your default to-day."

Bereft (49). From Saxon *refian* to deprive, usually signifies made destitute, stripped, robbed; here it means *taken from*.

Literary and Other Illustrations.

23—36. A strong *erotesis*, an interrogation employed to assert more strongly as a fact that which is made matter of question. "Samson's history, so full of marvels, dates from a period before his birth. . . . Before he was conceived his destiny was unfolded. . . . Samson's father and mother gave implicit credence to the angelic message." Manoah's only fear was lest his wife should have misunderstood, or in her joy had overlooked

the directions delivered. Once informed, he took the precautionary measures recommended. (See Judg. xiii. 22—3.)—" *Typical Testimony to the Messiah*," by Rev. M. Hill, p. 94.

26. "From off the altar" is related to *ascended*, and the same verb is understood before "from some great act," in line 28.

31. "Samson from his birth was to lead the life of a *Nazarite*—a *separated* one. Abstinence from wine and luxuries was strictly enjoined." (See Numb. vi. Amos ii. 11, 12.)

34. *My*, we would now say, for euphony's sake, *mine*.

38. "Promise was that I." *The* is extenuatively omitted before promise, to give a mental indefiniteness to the assertion, which thus may signify *the* promise was that I, or promise (*was made* that I; while it almost indicates a lurking suspicion that the "promise *was*," but the reality has not entirely verified it, which the speaker hesitates to *speak out*.

39 and 42. "Philistian yoke," here finely repeated, so that by retaining the same terms, while the fact is so glaringly different, the full force of the contrast may be felt.

40. "Ask for this great deliverer now," is said in irony.

41. "Eyeless in Gaza." . . . "yoke;" an instance of climax (1) Eyeless in Gaza, (2) at the mill, (3) with slaves, (4) himself in bonds, (5) under Philistian yoke.

43. "Yet stay," &c., "What!" ecphonesis, or exclamation.

45—51. "What if all. . . . Importunity and tears;" prolepsis, or the anticipatory expression of objections.

HINTS TO STUDENTS ABOUT TO PREPARE FOR THE EASTER AND MICHAELMAS TERM, 1874, EXAMINATION AT OXFORD.

I. Logic.

I. THE Board of Studies for the Honour School of *Litteræ Humaniores* has determined that "Questions will be set in Trendelenburg's '*Elementa Logicæ Aristotelicæ*.'" It may be useful to intending examiners to mention that the article "*Organon*," in the Supplement to "*The Penny Cyclopædia*," contains, in fact mainly and professedly consists of, a translation of the extracts of which that book is composed. In the same article a few of Trendelenburg's remarks on logic are also to be found.

Questions will also be set in Bacon's "Novum Organum," Book I. and Book II., aphorisms 1—20. A very useful abstract of Bacon's "Novum Organum" appeared as one of the publications of the Useful Knowledge Society; a very good epitome also appears in Vol. II. of G. L. Craik's "Bacon, his Writings and his Philosophy," in Knight's Shilling Volume. In Bohn's Scientific Library, "The Physical and Metaphysical Works of Lord Bacon," by Joseph Devey, M.A., there is published "Wood's Version of the Original Latin," with annotations selected from the Playfairs, Sir John Herschel, and some of the French and German editors. Kuno Fischer's "Bacon of Verulam," translated by J. Oxenford, Chaps. II.—V., supplies a good critique of this portion of the "Organum;" read also Dr. W. Whewell's "Novum Organum Renovatum." Spedding's edition of Bacon's Philosophical works contains the Standard issue of the "Novum Organum," with notes, explanations, &c.

II. Under the head of Logic, candidates are recommended to study the following subjects, viz.:—1. "The Nature and Origin of Knowledge,"—on which see Sir William Hamilton's "Metaphysics," Lects. I. and II., IX. and X., XV.; "Logic. Lect.," XXVI., XXXII.—XXXV.; "Discussions in Philosophy," art. "Philosophy of Perception," with Appendix B and notes; edition of "Reid," notes B, C, and D, D,* &c.; Dr. J. H. Stirling's "Philosophy of Perception;" Mansel's "Metaphysics," Part I.; Dr. Alex. Bain's "Senses and Intellect;" J. S. Mill's "Dissertations and Discussions," Vol. II., art. Bain's "Psychology;" J. S. Mill's "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy;" Dr. J. M'Cosh's "Examination of J. S. Mill's Philosophy;" J. F. Ferrier's "Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness," in Vol. II. of his "Lectures and Philosophical Remains," also his "Institutes of Metaphysics;" Dr. C. M. Ingleby's "Introduction to Metaphysics;" Dr. Webbe's "Intellectualism of Locke;" Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge," Vol. I. of Dr. A. C. Fraser's edition of Berkeley's works; Ueberweg's "Logic;" T. M. Lindsay's Translation, Part I., pp. 77—126; Mansel's "Prolegomena Logica," Chap. I., II., and VII.; Dr. John Veitch's "Memoir of Sir William Hamilton," p. 443, &c. Of the Logical Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, J. S. Mill, Alex. Bain, H. L. Mansel, J. F. Ferrier, A. C. Fraser, Bishop Berkley, Dr. Ingleby, abstracts appear in the volumes of the *British Controversialist* for the years 1861, 1864, 1868, 1872, 1867, 1871, and 1869 respectively.

The Societies' Section.

KELSO DEBATING LITERARY SOCIETIES.

THERE are three debating societies in Kelso, viz., The First United Presbyterian Debating Society; the Kelso Literary and Debating Association; and the Dialectic Society. The first of these has been in existence for a number of years, and has a good roll of membership—the senior president being the Rev. Henry Renton. This society closed with an open night, to which the ladies were admitted, and where an agreeable evening was spent. The second mentioned was founded in 1887—and has, as senior president, Alexander Mollison, Esq., engineer, Kelso. A pretty successful session was brought to a close recently with an able and practical address by the president. The last named made its *débat* only last year, and boasts of

the Marquess of Beaumont, M.P., as honorary president.

Something new for Kelso has been introduced by the opening of a class for the study of mental philosophy and logic, in the Hill-house Bank Academy, under the guidance of the Rev. T. G. Salmon. This class meets on three nights, and is open to any who may wish to avail themselves of such an interesting study. The start is good, so far as numbers are concerned. No pains are spared to render the studies interesting as well as instructive, and at the same time understood. Kelso is a small burgh of less than 5,000 inhabitants, and if such things can be done in a place of this sort what should be done in larger ones?

Literary Notes.

MR. R. SIMPSON, author of "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Shakspeare's Sonnets," intends, under the title of "The School of Shakspeare," to republish a series of works such as Shakspeare may be regarded as having had more or less cognizance of and interest in. He thinks that Shakspeare had become a sort of *entrepreneur* of dramatic productions, and he proposes to include among his reprints, with introductions, notes, &c., A Larum for London; or the Siege of Antwerp, which he supposes was chiefly composed by John Marston, under

the direction of Shakspeare. Among the proposed reproductions, we find "Murederus," "Fair Em," "The Life and Death of Capt. Stukeley," "The Prodigal Child," *Histriomastix*."

James Orchard Halliwell (now Phillips, as Heir of Sir Thomas Phillips, Bart.) is engaged on a "New Life of Shakspeare." It is to contain new documents, illustrations, &c., and is likely to furnish many interesting additions to our means of knowing Shakspeare better.

In the *Birmingham Morning News* a noticeable series of papers on

"The Dramatic Art of Shakspeare," is in course of publication.

Dr. C. M. Ingleby has been making researches regarding "the law and the limits of Shakspeare's corrections."

Rev. A. B. Grosart's edition of Andrew Marvell's poems is expected about November.

Spedding's *Life and Letters of Bacon* has reached the sixth volume.

A controversy has been started regarding Chaucer's authorship of "The Flower and the Leaf."

A splendid eight-volumed folio edition of "The Works of William Shakspeare," is in course of preparation, illustrated on a new plan, by the publishing house of William Mackenzie, Glasgow.

R. G. Latham has pointed out some instances of the Greek learning of Shakspeare—especially influences from "Euripides."

A metrical translation of Goldsmith's "Deserted Village" into Armenian, has been published at Venice.

The death is announced of Mr. S. W. Fullom, for many years editor of the *United Service Monthly*, and author of "The Marvels of Science," "The Great Highway," "The Last Days of Jerusalem," "Shakspeare; the Player, and Poet," &c.

Henry Bulwer, Lord Dalling, who died recently, has left "The Life and Letters of Lord Palmerston" pretty nearly ready for the press, as well as "An Essay on Sir Robert Peel."

The first volume of a Russian work, entitled "The Predecessors of Shakspeare," has just appeared at St. Petersburg. Its author, M. Nicholas Storojenko, has devoted several years to the study of our early literature, and gives in it "a sketch of the development of the English drama up to the time when it received, under the hand of Marlowe, an artistic organiza-

tion." The second volume will treat of the works of the dramatists "who served, so to speak, as the connecting links between Marlowe and Shakspeare." On this topic two facts are frequently forgotten, first, Marlowe was baptized exactly two months to a day before Shakspeare; second, Marlowe left Cambridge as M.A. in 1587, in which year "Tamburlane," his earliest play, was performed; and at this time Nash, Greene, &c., were "girding at Shakspeare as a dramatist."

Shakspeare has rightly won the regard of women. Mrs. Cowden Clarke supplied an excellent Concordance to his plays, another lady is to "crown the edifice;" for Mrs. Horace Howard Furness, of Philadelphia, wife of the editor of "The New Variorum Shakspeare," has put forth a trial instalment of her "Concordance to Shakspeare's Poems." It contains every word in the "Venus and Adonis."

Prof. Giuseppe Pitre, of Palermo, the learned editor of the "Sicilian Folk Songs," of which two volumes have already appeared, will publish this month a third volume, under the title of "Studies of Popular Poetry."

An "American Jewish Publication Society" has been formed in the States, for the publication of works on "Jewish Life, History, and Literature."

We learn from the *Philosophische Monatshefte* that the Philosophische Verein, of Berlin, has undertaken to publish a Dictionary of Philosophical Terminology. It is greatly to be wished that some such work should be undertaken for British Philosophy—which is entirely destitute of any "Cyclopædia of the Metaphysical Sciences." The plan of such a work, we know, was laid before metaphysicians nearly twenty years ago.

Mr. O. B. Alcott's long-expected "Concord Days" is to contain

original sketches of Messrs. Emerson, Thoreau, Wendell Philipps, and other eminent persons connected with "Concord."

A correspondent of the *Athenæum* writes, "Professor Lechler, of Leipzig, is about to publish a life of our great reformer, Wicliff. He has been engaged in this work for several years, and has discovered in the library of Vienna several manuscripts of Wicliffe which have never been published; he has also made a careful examination of the Hussite manuscripts. His work will throw considerable additional light on Wicliff's intimate connection with Huss and the Bohemian reformers. The work is in such a state of advancement that it will probably be published in the course of the autumn."

Miss Fox is about to publish, through Messrs. Macmillan, a history of Holland House. The book will be very rich in anecdotes about Charles James Fox, Addison, Rogers, and others. It will be illustrated with steel engravings and woodcuts of the house and grounds, and of family portraits by some of the masters.

Professor Sir W. Thomson's work on Electrostatics is to be ready in August. It will consist chiefly of articles on electrostatics and mathematically allied subjects, which have appeared in various publications. It will contain matter never before printed, and will include nearly all that the author has written on Electrostatics and Magnetism.

A stained-glass window has been placed in the chancel of the Berkhamstead parish church to the memory of the poet Cowper, who was born in Berkhamstead, and whose father and mother are buried in the chancel. The subject of the window is the Resurrection, beneath the central figure being the poet, with hands clasped on an open

Bible. On one side of the poet is the royal Psalmist, and on the other the prophet Jeremiah. Cowper's tame hares are also included in the representation. The inscription is as follows:—"William Cowper, the poet, son of John Cowper, D.D., rector of this parish, and Ann, his wife. Born at Berkhamstead, November 15th, 1731; died April 25th, 1800."

The Queen has, through Earl Russell, permitted the Historical Society of Great Britain henceforth to assume the style and title of the Royal Historical Society. Its first president was the late Mr. Grote. The roll of members includes the Marquis of Lorne, Sir John Bowring, Mr. Froude, Mr. Ruskin, Mr. J. L. Motley, Sir John Lubbock, &c.

Signor Emmanuele Calesia has lately published, in Milan, a work entitled "The History of Italian Pedagogy." The author, whose "History of the University of Genoa" is well known, describes the progress of education in Italy, from Pythagoras to Vittorino da Feltre.

In a series of critical studies, Professor Augusto Alfani has made a useful contribution to the history of Italian philosophy, in the description of "the last age of Platonic Philosophy in Florence."

Mr. Graves, Pall Mall, has purchased a very interesting relic of Milton,—a portrait of the poet, taken at Cambridge by Cooper, and said to be the only authentic likeness of him at that period of his life.

The Rev. George W. Cox, M.A., and Mr. Eustace H. Jones, authors of "Popular Romances of the Middle Ages," have a new volume in the press, entitled "Tales of the Teutonic Lands."

Mr. Manning's "Lives of the Speakers of the House of Commons" is to be issued in a new edition.

Examinations for Sabbath School Teachers.

WHY THEY SHOULD BE HELD—HOW THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR—AND THE MEANS OF BENEFITING BY THEM.

No department of Christian duty requires a nobler spirit or a healthier sense of the necessity for adapting means to ends than that in which, in the progress of the division of labour now prevalent, the fulfilment of our Lord's command, "Feed My lambs," is provided for. The Sunday school is the nursery of the Church. Conversion may gather from the streets and lanes of cities, or from the hedges and byways of country villages, the wandering sheep of the Good Shepherd, and the persuasive voice of the earnest and prayerful pastor may compel some to come in ; but the lambs of the flock ought to be diligently cared for, and the younglings of even the strayed and lost should be the objects of peculiar and judicious care. In the young there is assurance of success ; in regard to the upgrown, although we should never abandon hope of them, we know that there are difficulties and complications and obstructions in the way of turning them from darkness unto light, and from the service of sin and Satan to the loving obedience due to God the most high. An inspired wise man has given the maxim on which the Sunday school teacher acts, "Train up a child in the way he should go : and when he is old, he will not depart from it" (Prov. xxii. 6). "Bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord" (Ephes. vi. 4). So that of each one it may be said, "From a child thou hast known the holy scripture which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus" (2 Tim. iii. 15).

Of old a teacher of wisdom declared, "That the soul be without knowledge, it is not good" (Prov. xix. 2) ; while a divinely instructed voice has given command in regard to the law of the Lord, "These words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart : and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up" (Deut. vi. 6, 7 ; xi. 19).

This is the charter of popular education; a charter renewed by Him who commanded His followers, "Go ye, make disciples of all the nations, . . . *teaching* them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you" (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, Alford's Version). We know that "all scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works" (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17); and therefore we are bound in a Christian capacity to spread this knowledge which quickens, refines, and sanctifies the spirit. Every professing Christian ought to be a professed teacher if he would be a true disciple, teaching by his life and conversation, by his example as well—nay, more even than by his precept, and by the aid he extends towards all that leads to the disciplining of the souls of men to the love and service of Jesus.

To some there has been communicated the power of teaching; to many there has been given the opportunity; to all there has been commanded the duty of teaching—personally or otherwise. The Sunday school teacher has a divine commission—a heavenly duty, as surely licensed by the Master of assemblies as that of any other ministrant in the household of the Lord. Those who have charge of the nursery bring the children to Jesus by His express wish; nay, it is only as children that the Sovereign of saints will accept any who come unto Him. Children of God is the dearest and holiest appellation of the most heavenly-minded Christians. The importance of the Sunday school as one of the agencies for the Christianizing of the homes of the people, for the enlightening of the young heart in the knowledge of Christ, and as a means of making the children wise unto salvation, cannot be over-estimated. As little can the value of the services performed to the nation and to the Church by the Sunday school teacher be doubted. Moral influence, kindly feeling, earnest effort, friendly counsel, well-meant expositions of the word of life, living interest in Christian work, all exercised in prayerful good-will and with voluntary zeal, are gifts for which we can scarcely be too grateful. We may disparage the apparent results, but we certainly cannot afford to discourage the exercise and manifestation of such love of souls and earnestness in the service of God. There may have been, nay, there must have been a large admixture of human infirmity with the spiritual effort of the Sunday school system of bygone days. All work requires to be done under drawback of the weakness incident to humanity. True wisdom does not ask the restraint of such effort as is made by earnest and zealous Christian-minded people; it only suggests that culture should heighten ability, knowledge should accompany

zeal, and reason regulate effort. It suggests improvement, not removal.

A great and important movement in the direction of adding to the efficacy and value of the Sunday school has been inaugurated in the institution of examinations for Sunday school teachers. It is proposed that by means of examinations the ability of Sunday school teachers should be both tested and attested in regard to knowledge of Scripture, the evidences of Christianity, and the principles and art of teaching. We cordially approve of this movement, as one alike valuable for the Church, the nation, the teacher, and the scholar, the progress of culture, and the diffusion of an enlightened, well-grounded faith in Christ. "The God of all wisdom" may surely be best served by those who know most of His word, His works, and His will. It is not a little singular, and is surely worthy of remark in this connection, that the Scriptures, while their main aim and object is to communicate a knowledge of the way of salvation to fallen man, imply and require for their full comprehension an acquaintance with the sciences which deal with nature and the philosophy which treats of human nature. No one of these by itself forms a complete sphere of truth of itself; when all three are properly united together we shall then have a course of knowledge in which God, man, and nature are no longer enigmas and difficulties, but in which there shall meet and be reconciled all the differences and difficulties of speculative thought.

The Bible supplies details in ethnography, or the migration and location of nations; in ethnology, or the changes and relations of races; in geology, or the structure of the earth as an abode for man; in astronomy, as a guide to man's operations on the earth, and as an evidence of the wisdom, goodness, and power of God in creation; in the phenomena of light and heat; in the chemistry of vegetable life; in the progress of agriculture; in the early history of man; in the geographical relations of primitive families; in regard to the causes which influence the prosperity or adversity of nations; in connection with war and peace, pursuits and commerce, governments and laws, which cannot elsewhere be got, and which being got therein suggest or help to explain the several secular sciences. In fact, the Bible is to books what Palestine is to the nations—the wonder and the exception,—related to all others, yet having specific peculiarities which give it a character unlike any other. It is central to all knowledge—it illustrates and is illustrated by all. Hence the Bible student need never fear to know too much, and may wisely enough make all the rivers of human knowledge contributory to this great sea and reservoir of truth which is stored therein.

We may illustrate this by reference to two departments of human knowledge. Bible history is the very fountain of knowledge regarding early man. The very idea of primeval man is taken from the Scriptures. It is the golden page from which many derive their knowledge, and who yet deny the source of their knowledge and deny its authenticity. Is it not from the gospel that our scientific men gain their idea of the entire totality of creation being possessed of a oneness—an admirable structure, all the parts of which are purposely shaped, arranged, and co-adapted to fulfil given functions, all of which affect and act upon, not only the combined and common, but also on the individual life of man? In the Bible we recognise the migrations of races, the moving causes of those outgoings of population by which the earth is peopled, and the historic influences of our age and place are carried over or down to others. The historical origins of the race are therein given, and the starting chapters of history require to be read, if not from, yet by the light of the revelations of the Scriptures. The history of that people which held the central shore of the Old World links itself with all the surrounding countries, and rays forth the light of historic truth upon the lands of the Mediterranean coast and the margins of the Red Sea, as well as the mighty empires which stretch their power and pride. These lands of the Gentiles have all more or less an interesting connection with the land of promise. This coast-strip of land has been brought into historic relationship with almost every country in ancient and modern times, having the rare distinction of territorial insignificance and historical significance. All that we learn of history is co-illustrative of the sacred Scriptures, and shows more plainly the providence-worked part which the chosen people have taken in the progress of the world; while the contents of the Bible act as “a light to lighten” even the history of “the Gentiles.” Babylon, Assyria, Persia, Arabia, Greece, Rome, Carthage,—where are they to be found accounted for as historic factors in civilization unless we accept and use the testimony of the Scriptures?

The geography of the Bible is the geography of the human race. It shows us the cradle of Man, indicates the migrations of peoples, and supplies notices of those early points of departure whence secular history takes up the perplexed narrative of the origin of nations. It puts into the historian's hand the clue to ethnographic nationality, and it presents to the geographer the earliest elements of a knowledge of the earth as it was traversed “when came the world's grey fathers forth to seek new dwellings and pursue fresh aims.” Mark, too, here as everywhere, the wisdom of God. He only fully reveals what we cannot possibly learn for ourselves.

What we may and should study by the aid of that intelligent curiosity which he has made the mainspring of our minds, He grants us but such a glimpse of as shall or should bestir our spirits to inquiry, set us at the right point for proceeding with our investigations, and having done so, leaves to human effort what is human duty and delight.

The geography of the Bible is concrete, not abstract. Abstract geography is emptied of human interest as far as possible, and made merely an intellectual mass of information or maze of mathematic teaching. But the geography of the Bible is missionary and ethnographic; exhibits the motives and purposes, the circumstances and conditions of emigration and change of place, and shows the divine designs overruling events even in the wars of tribes, the movements of races, and the journeys of individuals. The geography of the Bible connects itself, therefore, with high principles as well as singular details; and this is one of the grand characteristics of the gospel, that it does not confine the thoughts of men to these things which go on during the progress of the sun, but lifts them up to principles, ideas, and convictions which transcend the earth and lead thought to the sky.

"The Bible is the book of all mankind,—so, in its several degree, is every book that, although on uninspired ground, rightly claims kindred with the Bible. Prince or peasant—recluse or man of business—if a *man*, he finds something which concerns, something which moves, which reaches him in the volume of Revelation. On this ground, as in the temple of God, the rich and poor meet together before "the Maker of them all." The studies which a full understanding of it requires "are calculated to invigorate the intellect, to enlarge the reasoning powers, to awaken the conscience, to inform, quicken, and animate the whole soul of the reader in the way of salvation." The value of such a book to man transcends all human calculation. In its infinite reaches it contains wisdom which sages and philosophers cannot exhaust, though the meanest may comprehend the finest teachings of it. It is obvious that such a book affords full scope for varied study, and for the exercise of the industry of investigation. How eagerly ought we to desire to see the deep things it contains for ourselves! and how earnestly ought we to pray, "Open Thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things of Thy law!"

It has long been the delight of earnest spirits, glowing with the love of our Saviour and our Father, to seek to impress the truths of the Scriptures on the hearts and consciences of the young. During many generations there has been a desire in the churches to bring under conviction the young of the fold. In this Christian desire

Sunday schools had their origin; and when the way of usefulness thus opened up to earnest men and women was seen to be productive of good effects under grace, the Sunday school became an institution, and has continued since to yield a sphere of Christian effort, simple, unobtrusive, but effective. Of late great efforts have been made to increase the vital efficacy of these institutions, and as we have stated, one of the most recent and most promising of those means by which Sunday school improvement is to be wrought out is a scheme for the examination of Sunday school teachers.

Why, after ninety years of voluntary effort and personal philanthropic zeal displayed unwearyingly in the good work of the Sunday school, has it come about that examinations for Sunday school teachers should be reckoned one of the prime necessities of the age? It is in no spirit of disparagement of the past that the answer to be given is such as it is. The Sunday school is a monument of Christian enthusiasm utilized and blessedly incorporated into Church life. The soul-stir in which it had its early beginning required testing, and it has stood all tests,—the tests of time, weariness, ridicule, fashion, formalism, busybodyism, proselytism, custom, neglect, reviling, doubt, despair and hope that keeps alive despair, patronage, and independence. Among all the ups and downs, changes and eventfulness these commonplace words imply, the Sunday school has gone on, doing its heaven-work in heaven-trust, and the Sunday school teacher, made even “earthlier happy” by the effort—now smiled on in love, again smiled at in pity, and yet again smiled at in scorn, bated no jot of heart or hope,

“But still toiled on—hoped on—for it was sweet,
If not to win, to feel more worthy” *heartls.*

As times changed teachers changed with them, so far as they could, adapting themselves to circumstances and making themselves servants unto all, that they might gain the more. Out of these labours fruits have at last been given as results. The churches have become alive to the importance of the religious training of the young. They have now learned to look on that as a sacred duty—a portion of the “disciplining” allotted to them by the great Master of assemblies, and the Christian conscience of the churches is exercised regarding this point, seeking the path of duty and the means of best accomplishing it. The Sunday school, like all things else, is found to require reform, and the Sunday school teacher, like all human agencies, requires quickening. Hitherto the Sunday school has been regarded by some parties as a concentration of moral influence likely to be beneficial exemplarily upon children; some have thought it a safety-valve for those who lived under the

power of religious enthusiasm ; others thought of it as a harvesting of voluntary efforts ; while others still gave it consideration only as a sort of cheap reformatory system for keeping children off the streets, and from the exercise, for a little while, of their bad habits ; and not a few learned by its results to know it as the nursery of the Church. During all this time, however, and amidst all this variety of opinion, earnest men were watching the results of the experiments made throughout the nation, and were "reasoning together" as to how the work of God could be more effectively promoted by "teaching one another." Sunday school unions were established and spread, grew powerful, and not only aggressive but suggestive. They found the Sunday school tolerated ; they resolved on having it not only respected but incorporated among the Christian agencies of the Church. To do this they saw that it was necessary to show that the Church had a duty to the Sunday school, that the Sunday school should have a recognised place in the congregations of those who professed to worship Him who said, "Suffer little children to come unto Me, and forbid them not." The first step towards doing this effectively was to demonstrate the use and benefit of Sunday schools ; the enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of the Sunday school teacher ; but above all to prove that the Sunday school teacher was prepared to shrink from no responsibility which lay before him in the way of duty. Recent political movements have quickened the necessity for the speedy settlement of the place of the Sunday school among us, and the true solution of the proper religious training of the young now appears to rest upon this inquiry,—Are Sunday school teachers not only willing but able to fulfil the duty of training the children of the Church and the nation in the knowledge of Christ and in the way of salvation ?

To satisfy the Church upon this head has now become the duty, as it will be the delight of the Sunday school teacher whose heart is satisfied as to his call to this sanctified work. He will not hesitate to give evidence to the Church of his zeal, his trustworthiness, and his fitness for the honourable labours of the tending of the young shoots in the vineyard of the Lord. Hence it is that examinations have now come to be especially requisite for Sunday school teachers. In this age of demanding "the reason why" on every question, it may be proper to assign a few valid considerations which appear to us conclusive as to their necessity and value.

Examinations are required for Sunday school teachers—

I. To secure their personal fitness. A sense of fitness for the proper performance of any duty is a great aid to the person who is called upon to perform it, and is a great gratification to those who entrust the performance of duty to any one. To be possessed of

tested fitness is an unanswerable qualification, at which doubters may not jest, and furnishes besides a good ground why we should let no man despise our purpose and efforts. By an examination we can secure for ourselves the consciousness of having made those attainments which are required for the proper fulfilment of the responsibilities we undertake, and we are able to supply others with confidence that we are in earnest in our work and labour of love.

II. To secure usefulness. The usefulness of Sunday school teaching has been doubted—doubted not by the enemies of Sunday schools alone, but by the most enthusiastic and devoted teachers. They have looked upon the great field of the world lying before them, not white already unto the harvest, but demanding sowing the good seed, planting the tender shoots, watering the growing vines; and they have almost sickened to see the thinness of the ears and the scantiness of the fruits of righteousness which all their efforts seem to have produced. They know, of course, that Paul may plant and Apollos water, but it is God who giveth the increase; and they forget sometimes, too, that this is not the harvest-garner of the Lord; and so they despair and doubt, sometimes fold their hands in hopelessness, and slacken in their efforts. On reflection, however, they are reanimated by the thought that they are only charged with “the use of means,” and are not chargeable regarding the results. The right use of means, then, is the teacher’s responsibility, and the right use of means secures usefulness. The means of teachers are information, scripturality of thought and feeling, and an acquaintance with the heart to be softened, the affections to be regulated, the mind to be stirred. On our possession of at least a certain amount of these we may be examined, and we may thus assure ourselves, and to a certain degree insure to others the possible (nay, probable) usefulness of our efforts.

III. To give security to the churches.

The Church is “an household of faith;” the children of the household require care; those to whom Christ has said, “Feed My lambs,” are under obligation to Christ to see that the under-shepherds are capable, skilful, willing, and tender. In the presence of the great responsibility which is now laid more especially than ever upon the churches in regard to the godly upbringing of the young, it could not but be well that those who take upon themselves the office of ministering to the lambs of the flock should be able to afford testimony of fitness for the work, and of worthiness of the situation of trust sought, and ability to fulfil its duties.

IV. To do justice to the work.

The work is difficult, is growing more difficult, and will become more so. Education will quicken the faculties, early companion-

ship in school, factories and fields will ripen the social proclivities to sin, the increasing secularism of society will increase temptations, the entire voluntariness with which religious instruction will be received must, all put altogether, make it requisite that we should possess high attainments and exercise attractive powers; that we should be stimulated, not only by moral zeal, but by a sense of what almost might be called professional responsibility, while, as our main resource must be "moral force" alone, it seems clear that to do justice to our work, to do justice even to ourselves, we should take sureties for ourselves that we have exercised the spirit of preparation.

V. To make manifest our zeal in our labours.

By undergoing examination we determine ourselves to preparation, we pledge ourselves to study, we give evidence of our devotion to the work, we prove our enthusiasm neither to be like the morning cloud nor the early dew, we show that resolve has been at work in us, and we present our testimony before men and the Church that our zeal is not a Jonah's gourd, is not as the flower of the grass.

VI. To show our love for Christ *the* Master.

He who would serve a master well must display somewhat of his spirit. Our Lord manifested his love by many infallible proofs. We ought likewise to offer attestation of our love for Him, of devotion to His service, and of readiness to be in labours abundant. By their works shall Christ's disciples be known; let us therefore glorify him by our works—works seen and known, in which there is virtue and for which there is praise.

VII. To show sympathy with those whom we seek to teach.

When we teach, having given evidence that we have learned, that we have been toilers for Christ and not only for but with them, we should teach more effectively, more sympathetically, and we should gain more sympathy too. We know that under examination the examiner and the examinee appear under different conditions, and we learn from this that the teacher and the taught require to have sympathies evoked other than those which are merely brought out in question and answer. As we feel that the sympathy of Jesus for our infirmities is assured to us, "for He hath felt the same," so will our pupils do if we carry the sympathy of our own study true, and examination anxieties into our Sunday lessons.

VIII. To shew our love for the Church.

To offer service of any kind willingly is a good proof of love; but to seek attestation of fitness to render that service before presenting our offer, is a far greater proof of love—it is confidence-

inspiring, and where the heart's confidence is the love is always sincerest.

IX. To show our sense of the needs of the soul.

That which involves effort and self-sacrifice in ourselves is evidence of our earnestness when we undertake it and do it. By giving our days and nights to such studies as are required to gain testimony to our devotion and fitness for our work, we give proof of our sense of the reality of the need of Christian instruction to the human soul, and our own conduct becomes evidence of the earnestness with which we think the things that belong to man's eternal peace should be attended to.

X. To show thankfulness for mercy received by ourselves.

To have been awakened to a sense of the reality of Divine things, to have been called to exchange vague faith for sure conviction, to have had faith realized within ourselves, is surely a cause of thankfulness, an unspeakable mercy. If we have been so privileged as to have passed through that mysterious crisis of the soul which opens up to view the absolute encompassment of all life present with the life Divine; and have been called to examine ourselves whether we be in the faith, ought we not to make some definite sign of our gratitude for such a passing from darkness to light, and such a translation into the kingdom of the inheritance. Such a mode of showing our thankfulness is offered us by the opportunity of having our knowledge of Christ's work and God's word tested.

There is a noble army of the volunteers of the Churches. The Sunday school teachers of the world are working a great work. They are making a striking testimony in favour of holiness and righteousness, of love for Jesus and willingness to serve God. Circumstances have arisen that demand that they should be possessed of the weapons of a good warfare, being armed with the whole armour of God, especially "with the preparation of the gospel of peace." They are called to discipline and drill, and united and several exertion; to give evidence of zeal, ability, culture, fitness, and they shall not be found wanting. They have displayed patience, courage, endurance and constancy, and they will not now hesitate to give proof that they have made endeavours to become workmen that need not to be ashamed of their desire to be engaged in rightly dividing the word of truth. If we are asked, Why is it that now, and not heretofore, examinations for Sabbath school teachers should be held? May we not answer that now much more than heretofore is the greatness of the worth of the teacher's duty felt to be, not by himself only, but by the Church and the nation? And is not the desire to equal our ability as far as possible with

our duty and responsibility a proper development of Christian endeavour?

If it is admitted that Examinations for Sunday School Teachers have become requirements of the School, the Church, and the age, it is an important inquiry, How should they be prepared for? Such a question we can only answer in general terms, at present. We hope by more specific observations hereafter to add special aid in this matter, but obviously now we must condense and be brief.

Fix upon the matter to be studied, and think of it carefully and prayerfully. Peruse the best books attainable by you on it and sedulously mark the best thoughts upon it met with in the course of reading or reflecting. Keep the relation of the subject to the Scriptures always foremost in your mind. Employ books of reference and concordances to help you to get at every allusion and item connected with the topic which the Bible contains, brought into your memory. I. Make notes brief, concise, select, and to the point, of (1) the best thoughts of your own or of others upon the matter; (2) the best references you have been able to get to the main points to be studied; (3) the best method of exposition—plan for remembering or of explaining which you have seen. II. Draw out the clearest outline you are able of the whole matter of study, try to master that so that you can fill up the outline at once; (1) giving a connected view of the whole; (2) showing the relation of any one part to the whole; (3) expanding to the fullest extent you can each separate portion. III. Select the (1) simplest form of language in which you can express it; (2) the simplest form in which you can explain it; (3) the simplest lesson which may be derived from it. IV. Always have a method of study and pursue it methodically. Plan and purpose are indispensable to proper preparation. Perhaps the following explanation of a plan of methodic study may not be uninteresting as a transcript of experience, first employed by ourselves and then taught to others.

I have been in the habit of teaching my own Sunday school scholars to have, to use, and constantly to carry about with them, consciously, what I am accustomed to call "A simple *Hand-book* or *Directory* for Bible study." I direct them to assign to the several digits on the *right* hand, one or other of the following suggestive terms, call them, if you like, *Denotives* :—

Right hand, 1, Dates; 2, Doings; 3, Designs; 4, Desires; 5, Duties.

In reading a passage of Scripture for study, if we digitate as advised, we shall find ourselves directed to investigate (1) the chronology or time of each event. (2) The act or circumstance constituting the event. (3) The purpose (of God or man) in which

the event originated, which it promoted, or which it accomplished. (4) The emotional longing (good or bad) out of which it arose, which it excited, or which it teaches us either to guard against, or to give ourselves up to. (5) The picty (in act or thought) which it employs, inculcates, or suggests.

Having gained a fair and full knowledge of these matters, we have done so far *right*, but we have something *left* yet to do. Certain other Points require attention. They might be called Peculiarities. They are as follows:—

Left hand.—1, Persons; 2, Places; 3, Precepts; 4, Prayers; 5, Praise.

In studying Scripture we ought to bestow peculiar care in reference to the *individuals* of whom we read, their biography, their character, and the manuer in which character and destiny are united. Bible biography is of the highest importance. Next to this, as a matter of study, comes the geography of the Bible, a knowledge of the *places* mentioned. But these two, or twin facts, are of importance chiefly because they lead us to consider other matters of moment: and as all Scripture is given for instruction, it becomes us to endeavour to understand the *precepts* or lessons which its several passages either enjoin, illustrate, or suggest. Our spirit of worship should next be directed to reflection as to what matter of *prayer* for guidance, strength or safety to ourselves or others; and for ascriptions of glory to the Lord who over-rules all things, who gave the Bible for our learning, that we should magnify and praise His glorious name, who is the “Wonderful, the Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace” (Isaiah ix. 6).

A little familiarity with the use of this simple system of mnemonics for Bible study, will soon convince those who practise it of the essential suggestiveness of the method. It formalizes and formulizes the main elements of investigation; and without arrogating too much to a *memoria technica* so easy of application, we may say that if any portion of Scripture which we have to study is carefully and prayerfully considered in regard to the ten terms of this manual or handbook of Scriptural preparation, there will in general be few points of importance passed over altogether unnoticed: while if the habit is got into of systematically seeking to comprehend as far as possible regarding each part of God's word, all that may be brought under notice in these categories, we shall gain to ourselves a large scope for investigative thought and critical research. If we get all that they suggest “at our finger-ends” in our minds and in our hearts, we shall be pretty thoroughly furnished as regards the matter of the text and the mastery of its meaning. Take, for example, the Book of Ruth, and determine

regarding it the *date* of the *doings* it narrates ; the *designs* of the parties who take share in its transactions as well as of the divine inspirer and the human writer in composing it ; the *desires*, evil or good, which actuated the individuals in that sweet idyl, or which their example should excite in us, or incite us to entertain and observe. *Duties* which each performs or neglects, and those which it would incline us to attend to and practise, and a considerable amount of thought must be evoked, and a good deal of investigation suggested. Let us next direct our attention to the *persons* concerned in the narrative, the *places* or scenes in which the events occurred, the *precepts* which the narrative contains or suggests, that is, is fittest to convey to us (or to those whom we seek to teach), the *prayers* a consideration of the brief but moving story should lead us to breath forth to the overruling Lord of life as well as the *praises* which our souls are stirred to offer up to Him the whole disposing of the lot of our life belongs,—“ For of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things ; to whom be glory for ever, Amen ” (Rom. xi. 36).—And we shall have a *multum in parco* commentary on the Book of Ruth which will not only do good to our own spirits but will enable us to edify one another. Or take the life of Samuel. If we note the *persons* with whom he came in contact, the *places* to which he went or in which he sojourned, the *precepts* he received and taught, acted upon, or neglected, the *prayers* he uttered or was made the object of ; the *praises* he gave, received, or might be regarded as deserving of ; the *dates* of his birth, the chief events of his life and of his death, the *doings* in which he took part or to which he gave countenance, the *designs* he accomplished, entertained, shared in, and helped ; the *desires* with which he wrought, and the *duties* he performed, we shall have before us a pretty complete *videmus* of the biography of Samuel—arranged too, in a manner not easily forgettable on whatever point it became necessary for us to give answer, suggestion, or instruction. We may turn our mnemonic into a form of a briefer sort, by taking an objective division of all the elements of knowledge as those which relate to *facts*, viz., persons, places, dates, doings, and designs ; and a subjective division of the same into their *implications*, viz., desires, duties, precepts, prayers, and praise. If we bring these to their proper relations as branches of knowledge, *dates* give chronology, *places* geography, *persons* biography, *doings* history, *designs* teleology, *desires* morality, *duties* deontology, *precepts* education, prayer, worship, praise, hymnology. Of course there is a number of subsidiary topics possible, topics of great interest, too, which are not expressed, scarcely even implied, in these dactylic mnemonics. They are not given as exhaustive. Scripture and nature are alike

inexhaustible in human categories, for they are the issue of a divine mind to whom all things are present and known, in vision not in memory, in fulness, yet in unity, as seen not reasoned truth. Many other methods of study might be, indeed have been, suggested; and some of these we intend shortly to expound hereafter; but we must now pass on to the completion of our present task by offering a few remarks on the means of benefitting by the examinations provided for Sunday school teachers. It is very obvious that we shall best benefit by them if we prepare for them. If we do so we shall benefit personally, and as teachers, &c., shall confer benefit not only by our example but in our instructions. But this is vague. We would suggest the formation of teacher's mutual preparation classes. In these classes the various studies ought to be allocated to different individuals in specific portions according to their tastes, aptitudes, opportunities, and the books they can command the use of. It should be incumbent on each to get up the best and fullest information upon his special topic for the general behoof, and a free interchange of thought and acquirement should take place.

The simplest method of procedure would be to take the text books and read them carefully, paragraph by paragraph, pausing between whiles for consideration, discussion, and inquiry as to difficulties. Then that each upon his own specific department should give a few brief and pointed remarks, statements, or suggestions; or should read from books not generally possessed such extracts as are proper to the subject. A good plan too would be to have a correspondence or inquirers' book set in the middle of the table into which might be dropped written questions on which information was desired without committing the individual teacher to personal reference or suggestions upon points which might originate personal debate if the query were brought up in the course of study. Nor would it be amiss, as practice for an examination, that perhaps once in the month a mutual examination meeting should be held. This might be done in this manner. On that fixed evening it should be regarded as the duty of each student teacher to bring a written question with a written reply (on separate slips of paper, though in envelope) and to deposit the same in the afore-mentioned box. These, after the meeting has been constituted, the president for the time being should take out and arrange according to their subject. The members, sitting apart, should prepare to answer. The president should read each question distinctly out twice over. On the whole being finished the answers should be changed from one to another, and then the president should read out slowly and clearly the reply that had been

provided by the original suggester. In this way testing practice may be had.

No excuse should, however, be taken by the teacher regarding his own personal, careful, and prayerful study. He should make it a matter of conscience to do his duty in this as towards his pupils, his school, his fellow-teachers, the Church, and God (2 Pet. i. 5—8).

BOOK-BORROWING.—Charles Lamb, in one of his facetious essays, has divided mankind into two distinct races—the men who borrow and the men who lend; and he says that the most formidable alienators are your borrowers of books,—“those mutilators of collections, spoilers of the symmetry of shelves, and creators of odd volumes.” The old monks were very particular in this respect. As a general rule the greatest care was taken of the manuscripts of a monastery, and it was not an uncommon practice to anathematise any person who might steal or remove them from the house. Thus we find written in Latin, in a MS. of some of the works of Augustine and Ambrose, in the Bodleian Library at Oxford,—“This book belongs to St. Mary of Robertsbridge; whoever shall steal it, or sell it, or in any way alienate it from the house, or mutilate it, let him be anathema maranatha. Amen.” And underneath is written, also in Latin, by another hand, “I, John, Bishop of Exeter, know not where the aforesaid house is, nor have I stolen this book, but I have acquired it in a lawful way.” Another of such subscriptions ends thus: “Whosoever removes this volume from this same mentioned convent, may the anger of the Lord overtake him in this world and in the next to all eternity. Amen.” In Selden’s treatise “*Ad Fletam*” he quotes a document relating to a loan of a MS. of Bracton, which was borrowed in the year 1277 by the Archdeacon of Scarborough from the Bishop of Bath, and which he promised to return on the Festival of John the Baptist in the following year. In testimony of which he says, “My seal is affixed to these presents.”—Selden, “*Ad Fletam*,” ii, sec. 2. I may here mention that once I had occasion to consult the late well-known physician, Dr. Chambers, and while waiting in his library took down a book, in which I found written on a fly-leaf, “*Hunc Librum Gulielmus Chambers, Samueli Duckworth clam surripuit*,” which would have been an awkward piece of evidence in a criminal court. “History of Ancient Manuscripts,” a Lecture delivered in the Hall of the Inner Temple by William Forsyth, Q.C., LL.D.

Social Economy.

SHOULD THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC BE SUPPRESSED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

TOTAL prohibition is the true method of dealing with criminal indulgences. It is the divine mode of making and giving law. "Thou shalt not kill," "thou shalt not steal," "thou shalt not commit adultery," "thou shalt not forswear thyself," are instances in verification of our assertion. Now all these laws not only prohibit overt acts, but all that tendeth to induce, extend, cause, encourage, or even condone these offences. It is an absolute fact that all these commandments of God are totally prohibitive, inculcate total abstinence, and do not admit of moderate indulgence. If, then, the highest and noblest wisdom, the very issue of the Supreme's own divine intelligence, shows itself in prohibitory and not merely restraining legislation, surely the cry of folly and the charge of ridiculousness brought against the agitation for the prohibition brought against the liquor traffic as an indulgible beverage is shown to be inept, and is as a reed which pierces the hand that leans upon it.

Of course, those people who recognise the folly of prohibitory legislation are quite willing that restraining legislation alone should be applied to all other things as well as to the liquor traffic. As men may be permitted to drink so long as they do it in safety, and can keep within moderate indulgence of their appetites, so surely ought men to be allowed to steal in a moderate style, to perjure themselves now and again, to be a little less trustworthy than the truths of geometry in regard to matrimonial law and the indulgences of sex; and "killing is no murder" if it is but moderately indulged in. Prohibitory legislation, you know, is nonsense—utter insanity—a proposition which only fools could make, and which even they do not make with any serious design of ever being able to see it carried out. We have to deal with men as men—men of passions and habits—men, in fact, who will, in seeking the gratification of their appetites, ignore all law, or rebel against it.

It is very sad to find men so foolish as to insist on prohibition. How much more sensible would it be if, considering human infirmity, they could be brought to confine themselves "within the limits of the possible!" This is the *a priori* argument against prohibition; apply the same to forgery, embezzlement, defamation, the law of contracts, property, or marriage, and the protection of property, and where would our dislike of prohibitory legislation lead us? General insecurity would prevail, and a doubt and a difficulty would continually arise as to when the step had been taken which crossed the line of moderate indulgence and became criminal; just as we have it now in regard to drunkenness, for which there is no discoverable thermometer to regulate the selling of drinks, the decisions of magistrates, or the guidance of police. Prohibition alone is safe; regulation is not only dangerous, but almost impossible.

It is distinctly laid down in Scripture that drunkenness is worse than a crime; it is a sin—a heaven-excluding sin. It is so because it is the pander to all other sins, and opens the doors of the soul on the sly to them. There is no sliding-scale of permissible indulgence in quality, quantity, or times. It is essential to holiness and happiness that abstinence should be total, and that—

"A drunkard clasp his teeth and not undo them
To suffer wet damnation to run through them."

It is a terrible woe that Scripture denounces upon any one of those of whom it can be said,

"The worst of all the deadly sins is in him—
That beggarly damnation—drunkenness!"

The poet, dramatist though he is, to whom we owe these lines, does not exaggerate; so total and precise is the prohibition of the liquor traffic by Heaven, that no drunkard shall inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. vi. 10). See what indulgence in intoxicating liquor is classed with in Gal. v. 19—21: "Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like, of the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God." With such a total prohibition staring them in the eyes from the very book of the Most High, who are they who talk of the folly of the prohibition of the liquor

traffic? Is man wiser than God? Or shall man permit a stumbling-block and a rock of offence to stand in his brother's way at every hundred yards or so, inducing him to fall into temptation, and so bringing him into captivity to sin and death? Ought man to set free that which divine wisdom has placed under so severe a ban? "They that fear the adder's sting," said another wise dramatist, "will not come near her hissing"; and a holier book that "*The widow's tears*" informs us what it is that "biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder."

The *a priori* argument against prohibition will not go for much.

No appeal to principle can be made on behalf of indulgence in strong drinks. Inclination pleads strongly for strong drink, we admit, because the evidence of that is before the eyes in every liquor-vendor's store that annoys the roadway; but principle has nothing to say in favour of doing a little sin and permitting a little evil; nay, the book in which we learn the principles of eternal life warns us against the evil done by the little foxes in the vineyard.

Not only is total prohibition declared to be right by principle—it is shown by experience that permission is wrong. It is permission that works the mischief; nay, even the limited permission of licensing increases the mischief by making many suppose that the use of a means of indulgence which the law has licensed must be right. All that is lawful, however, is not right.

We see evils arising from the licensing system every day. Crime is deluging the land by it, and the habit of indulgence grows stronger and stronger daily. There are many men whom we scarcely ever expect to find sober—men to whom drunkenness has become a second nature, and who are brutalised into creatures beneath contempt by their constant frequenting of the house of grog. Moderation has had a long, long trial; but experience proves that moderation is but the inclined plane down which men slide into the state in which the inebriate maudlinly exclaims, "Perdition catch my soul but I do love thee!"

A. H. G. thinks that because laws get on the statute book which are not obeyed they are bad. How very bad, then, must the laws of God be which are every day by everybody infringed! and yet the law of the Lord is perfect. That men will not obey laws is a very bad reason wherefore they should not be made.

"Not the liquor traffic," says he, "but drunkenness is chargeable with the evils (p. 20) we deplore." But what makes

the drunkenness? Abolish the liquor traffic and where would drunkenness be? Can we have drunkenness without the drink?

"Drunkenness infringes on the rights of the community," he admits, and hence he would like, if all parties would co-operate, to draw up "wise restrictions on the liquor traffic." No wiser restriction can be drawn up than prohibition, for that gets quit of liquor traffic restrictions, drunkenness, and all the evil consequences which flow from them. S. (p. 99) shows plainly how grievous these are. C. speaks of prohibition as "visionary (p. 101); men would refuse to recognise it." Were this a valid reason, who would ever be able to make it his motto to "trust in God and do the right"? Prohibition would lead to illicit use (p. 104); but such an argument does not stand in our way in regard to highway robbery or embezzlement. We do prohibit many things pretty effectively; why not try this mode of managing to crush the hydra-headed monster who is wasting life, property, and souls? Let us by all means try.

R. L. O.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

HUMAN laws, dealing with human weakness, and issuing from legislators not infallible as a general rule, but contrariwise very liable to error, are never safe in dealing out proscription and prohibition, unless where they have the direct and unmistakable law of the One Infallible for their guide. No opinion can justify a prohibitory law. Certainty alone can do that. But certainty is a scarce commodity in this universe; and though Truth does live in the bottom of a well, it is not perfectly certain that she does so through pure love of pure water. Indeed, another proverb suggests something different, and affirms that "when the wine is in, the truth gets out." However that be, we cannot doubt that "truth is great and must prevail." When we have attained to "the truth—the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" on this topic, we shall be in a position to determine on its prohibition; but until we are possessed of certainty on the question, our duty is not prohibition, but regulation.

Prohibition is, we contend, beyond the scope of human law, and is only allowable when there is all-wisdom behind it to certify its justice and propriety. Moral law is prohibitory as regards actions

of an evil nature, because that law is given by the Divine Being to regulate and to control the heart. But prohibition, even by the divine law, is not made absolutely imperative, but is left to be observed or neglected, according to the persuasion of conscience in him who is called to obedience. Prohibition can only justify itself when it can prove that it is the issue of unerring wisdom. To prohibit upon mere opinion the come-and-go decision of a majority is inconsistent and wrong, unless the divine law has issued its canon against the thing forbidden.

That alcohol has a wise and good purpose to fulfil we may justly infer from the fact of its wide prevalence in nature. It surely could not, even by devils' ingenuity, be distilled from so many of the earth's products in every clime unless there were some good purpose effectable by its use. That it does exist in almost every kind of vegetable product, and may be distilled thence, is a chemical fact as patent now as the doctrine of latent heat, as the fact of the presence of electricity in almost everything indeed, nearly as common as the phenomena of gravitation. We cannot suppose that this widely diffused substance, a substance which has the power at least of stimulating nervous pith, has been so extensively included in the provisions of nature unless for some good purpose. We may be mistaking this purpose by using it for getting intoxicated with, but that it has a good use may be taken for granted by sensible people. But say our prohibition friends, No, it is distilled and manufactured; it is not a natural product, and we ought to prohibit its production and use. But the electric telegraph is not a natural product—neither is the steam engine. Electricity is the cause of terrific storms, and our newspapers are frequently informing us of its ravages. We ought to avoid the use of dangerous, unnatural things, things which diffused, like electricity and alcohol, as they are, are harmless enough, but when intensified and artificially manipulated do hurt and damage and bring about dreadful evils. Similarly with steam, whose use is so valuable, whose abuse is so terrible, and which is, as employed, quite an artificial distilment from almost harmless water. Gas, again, is a thing of the same sort, a non-natural creation of our luxurious age, a dangerous and terrible power, which man has disengaged by cunning from the earth, but which, as given in nature, is all but harmless, and plays the part allotted to it generally without injury. From the analogy of the possibly destructive effects and yet the real utility

of electricity and steam, of gas and gunpowder, of fire and friction, of guano and gravitation, we may infer that there is not improbably a good and proper use for alcohol, and that our tentations and temptations are not unlikely the means whereby the true place of alcohol in the storehouse of agencies laid up for man's behoof is yet to be found. That it should be so prevalent, and that its use should be so prevalent, and that as the hurry and haste of competition increases, so not only does the use of it wax more common, but its distillation becomes more copiously attainable from a greater variety of substances, seems to argue that there is a place for it in the economy not only of nature, but of human life. Alcohol, like everything else, is to be understood; the practical experience of men set at nought the theoretic deductions of partisans, and in almost all climes, in almost all ages, alcoholic beverages have held a high place in the esteem of men. Somehow or other, despite teetotal theories, it is found now, as of old, that in moderation "wine maketh glad the heart of man," and only in its abuse does it "sting like an adder." If, then, we were to prohibit the traffic, we should require to prohibit the manufacture; if we were to prohibit the manufacture, we should prohibit investigation of its properties, uses, and effects, and perhaps at last we should find it necessary to interdict the Deity from allowing alcohol to be developable in so many different ways from so many different substances, making a thing so harmful so common and easy to be got.

I am not taking a view too wild of the possibilities of fanaticism. I know that in religious matters prohibition has gone the length of formalizing itself into a thesis like this,—The reason of man ought never to engage itself in any speculation in opposition to the faith inculcated by the Church. I know that in the opposing section of society *doctrinaire* prohibition has given utterance to a conclusion like this,—"Every exercise of thought should be abstained from which has not some beneficial tendency, some actual utility to man." I know that it has been proposed by the great high priest of positivism that every plant and animal injurious to man, noxious and hurtful, ought to be ruthlessly exterminated in order that the happiness of man may be secured as the supreme concern of life. I do not believe in man's being wiser than his Maker. I do not believe that that which seems always is evil; I believe there is a soul of goodness in things evil, and I am not sure that prohibition in regard to any of the good creatures of God is

a proper thing for man to attempt. I have been told that sparrow-prohibiting farmers have learned to be sorry for their stupidity and greed, and have been compelled to give the sparrow "a permissive bill." I doubt the wisdom of prohibition, unless where we have the unerring wisdom to know what it is right to prohibit; and God, as it seems to me, has not seen fit to issue a prohibitory law against the use of alcohol. I am dubious of the prescience of man in this matter, and I am unwilling to concede to any alliance whatever the right to prohibit what God has permitted;—

"For man cannot cover what God would reveal."

The evils of alcoholic indulgence are undoubtedly very great, and the drinking habits of the people are indeed powerfully productive of evil. The liquor traffic is a difficult one to deal with; but it would take a great deal of wisdom to determine (with good grounds) that it should be improved off the face of the earth.

THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.—"It has been illustrated not only by the events which it is the more especial business of the historian to record, but also by the poetical genius of Wordsworth and Tennyson; by the historical and other works of Carlyle, Macaulay, and Buckle; by the ingenious and thought-suggestive speculations of Darwin and of the anonymous author of the "Vestiges of Creation;" by the scientific researches of Faraday, Owen, and Huxley; by the geological investigations of Buckland, Murchison, and Lyell; by the romances of Bulwer Lytton, Dickens, and Thackeray; by the invention of the electric and magnetic telegraphs; by works of unsurpassed excellence in science and philosophy, in sculpture, painting, architecture, and music; as well as by important social, political, moral, and religious progress."—MOLESWORTH.

Education.

OUGHT THE READING OF THE BIBLE TO BE PROHIBITED IN RATE-AIDED SCHOOLS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.

IMPROBABILITIES are unconquerable difficulties. The difficulty in regard to the allowance of the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools is the impossibility of doing it at all. It cannot be done rightly because it cannot be done religiously. The Bible cannot be read rightly only as a task-book. It can be properly read in a holy and reverent way only. If perused perfunctorily, it is worse than useless. It is a book intended not only to inform the intellect, but also to improve the heart. To employ it only for one of these purposes is to pervert its use. It is "profitable for doctrine, for instruction, for reproof, for correction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." Not one of these only, but all of them combined, and that with the end, too, of making a man "perfect." To make a mere reading-book of it, to degrade it to a primer, would be to destroy its moral power as far it lay in us. What would be thought of those who proposed to read Shakspeare or Milton in school without comment or explanation, merely that children might therein learn the art of combining sounds into words, and words into sentences? Would it not be thought a degradation of these great geniuses to use them for purposes so humble? And yet shall we not scruple to degrade to the level of a horn-book the Word of the Supreme Genius of Christianity? The mere reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools cannot be promoted by any who hold devoutly that it is the very word and will of "the most high God."

The mere reading of the Bible is not the right way to use it that is only to bring its words within the hearing of the ear—whereas its terms are intended to enter into the heart. Of all processes of instruction the most disastrous would be that which led children to read the Bible only as words to be pronounced, not

truths to be apprehended and applied; that would make it a veil between God's truth and a child's soul. How could it so come "to know God, and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent." It is not in word, but in power that the message of God is to be received. It will not profit unless mixed with faith in them that hear it. How much did Jesus warn those who having eyes see not, and having ears do not hear! But we would be specially cultivating such sightless seeing and such heedless hearing if we took the Bible into rate-aided schools for the purpose of reading it only, and not expounding and applying it. It would be a fearful responsibility to incur, thus to harden a child's spirit to the careless lip-reading of the divine Word. Do not let us give ourselves over to the strong delusion of believing that we could serve God by such a system of keeping up the form of godliness without the spirit of it. If we cannot teach the doctrines of the Bible in rate-aided schools, let us consecrate it from common use, and treat it as a casket holding God's jewel—salvation—within its boards.

I entirely agree with J. J. H. (p. 31) when he asserts that the reading of the Bible ought to be prohibited in rate-aided schools, first, as a book beyond the province of the State. It is the book of the Church, the repository of its doctrines, the guide-book to its practice, the foundation of its faith. It grew up with all the States of the earth opposed to it, and made its way divinely through all the obstacles States threw in its progress. It is an old art of the States to patronize to destroy. Judas betrayed with a kiss. Does not the State, in its dealing with the Church, perform frequently the part of him who brought Christ within the grasp, humanly speaking, of the civil power? Let us avoid the traitorous process of mixing up Christianity with statecraft.

His second ground also commends itself to my judgment. "As a book upon which all in common are not agreed as to its use," its reading should be prohibited in rate-aided schools. We ought not to make the Bible suffer for our sectarianism, nor should we so employ it as to injure its healthy normal action on the soul. We cannot rightly squabble over the Bible before children, and make them dislike the Book of peace because we have made it the theme of war. Do not let us carry our heartburnings and jealousies into the lives of the children. For their sakes, if we cannot be peaceable among ourselves, let us refrain from embittering strife and making it hereditary. And third, we assent to his proposition

that the reading of the Bible ought to be prohibited in rate-aided schools "as a book which has claims too high to be classed with the every-day tasks of the youth of our schools ;" but on this topic I have already spoken.

C. R., quoting from *Blackwood*, thinks that religion should be made the groundwork of education. So do we, but not of *schooling*. Schooling is to supply the instruments of education—to give facilities for the acquisition of knowledge ; but it is a different thing from education. Education combines the training of the whole of the powers of the mind and nature. Schooling is only an elementary training of the ability of the intellect to enable it to apprehend comprehend, and apply the truths of education ; but the whole habits and cast of thought, all the aims, requirements, and associations of life are looked to by education. Education goes through all life. It is all that C. R. says in his first paragraph ; but schooling is only a training in the instrumental arts of education. These cannot be made religious. You may make "the schoolmaster the outwork of the Church ;" but he cannot make reading, writing, and arithmetic religious. The multiplication-table cannot be transmuted into the ten commandments ; and though you may write in fair copy hand the law of God on tables, that does not secure their being written "on the fleshly tables of the heart."

C. R. accuses the advocates for the prohibition of the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools of basing these schools on secularism (p. 32). In this he is so far wrong, so far right. The State school is a secular agent, established for a secular purpose,—the utilizing of the intelligence of the children for the furtherance and progress of industrial pursuits and the prosperity of the State. In so far as it has secular aims it pursues them on secular principles. But the State, which has a right to see to the secular interests of children, cannot be allowed to have dominion in matters which affect the eternal salvation of those whom it trains for commercial machines, and the State agent, the schoolmaster, ought to be prohibited from interfering directly with the faith of the children. This neither implies that children are to be trained to secularism nor in secularism. The whole moral arrangements of the school may be suffused with religion—purity of speech, honesty of act, kindliness of conduct, geniality of intercourse, and the doing unto others as you wish others to do to you may all be insisted on and practised in the school. This is not secularism, and yet it does not

give the master power to proselytize children to his views of Christian doctrine, or to pervert them from the way in which their parents are engaged in training them to go. Conversion and perversion have been the bane of education conducted by ecclesiastics and their subordinates, but to arm these parties with the State power and importance would be indeed to secularize schools—by destroying religion to promote sectarianism. Even were it true that “a purely secular system of education cannot be imparted,” as C. R. (p. 34) asserts, that would not at all operate on our minds to support an agitation in favour of the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools—if anything, quite the reverse. We fear that a purely secular system of education is possible, for man is proved to be of the earth, earthy. But we can scarcely say that we fear much from even a purely secular system of education in a country where the churches are earnest, and the homes of the people are scenes of piety; and they will be so all the more that the burden of promoting the piety of the people will lie with the churches henceforth. In Britain there can be little fear of school teaching being conducted in opposition to the faith of the people. It is far more probable that they will always be carried on in harmony with the faith of the great bulk of the people. There will be no interest or inducement to schoolmasters to oppose the faith once delivered to the saints. But it would be all otherwise if we were to allow the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools. We can secure uniformity of results in the teaching of arithmetic, but not in the results of reading the Bible. The result sought by Bible-reading is a life of faith in Christ. The State cannot enforce that result,—has no right, in fact, to interfere in regard to it. It is the duty of the church to “teach all nations” *that*, and to seal its teaching by “baptizing them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.”

I do not think that Bible-reading in rate-aided schools can be allowed rightly even in regard to the State. Justice to all requires that nothing offensive to religious convictions should be introduced into those schools which all may, or perhaps must attend. But many, while willing to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's are unwilling to render unto Cæsar the things that are God's—the custody, the regulation of the reading, &c., of the Bible. The State has no right to favour sects; it has still less right to favour formalists and formalism. If it avoids doing the one by interdicting comment and explanation, it must do the other. Again, if by

admitting explanatory matter to be taught, how is this to be discriminated from the endowment of sects by the State, and how could it act otherwise than make the appointment of a schoolmaster a matter of contest as to which sect shall have the appointment, and reap the results of the proselytism he will practise?

Just as the State does not establish prayer in workshops, nor insist on praise at railway stations, nor prescribe homilies for public meetings, while these things are not denied as anti-Christian, so let it be with our schools. The Christian life of the country will permeate them, and they will get on all the better because the master and the children have their own duties to do, and school is not a little semi-hybrid church or chapel.

E. G. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.

WHEN the present Government introduced the Education Act into the House of Commons, it was admitted by persons of every shade of opinion that some such measure was needed, and all parties manifested a desire to co-operate in making the proposed measure effectual, and the result has been that every child in the kingdom can—by the School Boards exercising the compulsory powers vested in them—receive at all events the rudiments of education; but for this education to be entirely secular, and no knowledge of the Bible interspersed with it, would lead to very disastrous consequences, and would transform piety into scepticism and belief into infidelity.

Your correspondent J. J. H. says that the Bible should be kept at home and in the church, but it is an undisguised truth that if the children are left to receive religious instruction at home they will receive very little or none at all, and it is only on Sundays that they would hear it read at church or at the Sunday school. I am the teacher of a large class of boys (numbering eighteen) at a Sunday school, and I know from repeated conversations had with them *that not one of those eighteen children ever hear the word of God read at home* and during the last fortnight I have had occasion to see some children who for some cause have left—or are very infrequent attendants at the Sunday school, and they also tell me they never hear the Bible read at home, nor the Saviour's name mentioned,—and but for its being read in their day schools they would grow

up irreligious, and totally ignorant of the blessed Redeemer's loving messages to them; and I have no hesitation in affirming that if a correct estimate could be obtained, it would be found that more than three-fourths of the children of the lower and middle classes would, but for the Bible being read at school, attain manhood without receiving any adequate conception of the God without whose aid and blessing they could not exist. To exclude the greatest and best of books from our schools would undoubtedly be the first step to bring up our children as atheists and disbelievers in gospel truth. The wise king Solomon has told us to "train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it;" and if parents abdicate this high and important function, those to whom is entrusted the education of youth should consider it their privilege and duty—as it undoubtedly is—to direct the young and tender plant to God, and this blessed privilege is only to be obtained by the reading and study of God's holy word.

" Within this awful volume lies
The mystery of mysteries ;
Happiest they of human race
To whom their God has given grace
To read, to hear, to hope, to pray,
To lift the latch, and force the way ;
But better had they ne'er been born
Than read to doubt or read to scorn."

The Manchester Conference lately adopted a resolution to the effect that education should be entirely secular, and that religious instruction should be thrown upon voluntary effort, but that the teacher for the one should be ineligible for the other. If a child tells a lie, we presume the teacher is authorized to resort to castigation, or any other punishment he may consider necessary; but he is to be absolutely precluded from talking to the offender as a Christian would do, and showing him by the Bible how he has erred from righteousness; how grievously he has sinned against God, and with what terrible punishment God will visit him at the last day unless his sinful habits are overcome and mastered. If we just consider for a moment, it must be apparent to any one who will exercise that common sense with which God has endowed him that it is the duty of every teacher to impress upon the mind of every pupil entrusted to his care the risk he is running in com

mitting sin against his heavenly Father. Take the instance I have cited. The Bible tells us, "Liars are an abomination to the Lord;" and again, "Liars shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone;" and yet with these terrible denunciations written in characters which none can mistake before them, the teacher must not, *under pain of losing his situation*, use that mighty and most effective means of drawing the souls of children to their Saviour. To admit for the sake of argument that the plan J. J. H. deprecates would lead to some advantages, yet it is an indisputable fact, resting upon evidence which cannot be denied or controverted, that the advantages to be derived from allowing God's word to be read in rate-aided (or any other) schools would greatly preponderate over its disadvantages. If the spirit of the resolution we have mentioned were to be the guide for the election of teachers, we should obtain those who would not be swayed by any love for the children, and their only endeavour would be to teach the child by the fear of punishment; for every one knows that a man possessed of the smallest particle of reverence and love for his heavenly Master could not sit with a class of children for six hours a day at least five days in the week, and during the whole of that time banish entirely from his thoughts and actions that tenderness and love which a fervent desire to please God can alone give. In fact, it appears, so far as we in the limited capacity of our own minds can understand, that in whatever branch of education—be it history, geography, &c.—the teacher may be engaged, there is always an opportunity presented for teaching a lesson concerning the goodness of God, the love of our neighbour, and things relating to the kingdom of Christ; and are all these brilliant chances to be thrown away?

We are told to "Remember our Creator in the days of our youth." That is the time to receive the blessings of religion, and if the instruction received does not, while we are young, bring forth the fruit expected and desired, yet abundant proofs exist and will present themselves to the most superficial general reader, where the religion learnt has brought forth fruits at a later period. Sunday School teachers will find no difficulty in remembering anecdotes founded upon most incontestable evidence to support this statement. The Bible is without doubt the *sine qua non* of a child's education; in it he finds the requisite balm for any grief or disease incident to the soul of man, for any wound or sickness under

which he may be suffering there will be found in this treasure-house a remedy. The Apostle St. James tells us to "receive with meekness the engrafted word, for it is able to save your souls."

We appeal for the reading of the Bible in every school. "We would not, of course, admit into schools the peculiarities of the denominations which divide the Christian world. But religion in its broadest sense should be taught. It should entirely mix with all teaching. The young child should be guided through nature and human history to the Creator and Dispenser of the universe; and still more the practical principles of the spirit of Christianity should be matters of direct inculcation."—*Channing*. Children have, for years, been educated with religious teaching, and now they are now had enough. We require education on a more extensive and grander scale, but unless the teaching of the Bible is retained, and teachers who are willing to teach God's Holy Word are secured, the great education act—the work of so much time and labour—the work which was expected by its proposers to decrease pauperism, intemperance, and crime—will be rendered nugatory and useless.

We may not improperly close this article by a reference to two or three of the great men whose opinion upon this question is worthy of record. Mr. Forster (Vice-President of the Council of Education) the Minister who had charge of the Education Act in the House of Commons, has declared that "it would be a monstrous thing if, in a Christian country, the Bible, and not merely Bible reading, but Bible teaching, were excluded from day-schools. The late Lord Abinger, in addressing his charge to the grand jury at Leicester, said, "although he would never discourage educating the lower classes of society, he would boldly affirm that education, if not founded on religious and moral principles, instead of becoming a blessing to the poor would, in the end, turn out to be a curse. To give a sound education to the poor, moral and religious instruction must accompany it. The receiver must be made to know not only the moral duties he has to perform, but the religious ones. Education, if without religious instruction, would not control the strong passions of the human race. . . . It would be far better to leave the poorer classes of the community in ignorance, than to give them education which has not for its groundwork our revealed and blessed religion. The Bishop of Worcester, in deprecating the prohibition of God's word in day schools.

said it was like "teaching children that religion and morality were of secondary importance—something to be learned at leisure, instead of a most essential ingredient of all education; it would be equal to establishing a divorce between religious and secular instruction, against which the Right Rev. Prelate energetically protested." It may be worthy of note that in America, notwithstanding diversities of sects and of opinions in minor matters, the children of all denominations meet in the same school-room and open the day by reading the Bible.

Our wish during this article has been to prove the absurdity as well as the impropriety of acceding to the affirmative part of this question, and to our own minds this has been done conclusively. We readily acknowledge the errors manifest upon it, but not being well versed in controversy, we are unable to remove them. As it is written, so we put it forth with the wish—not that readers will take our premises—but that they may be led to read up the subject for themselves, and with the aid of the holy Book whose power as an educator is called into question, to come to a decision in its favour.

W. H. C.

THE HOPED FOR AND THE UNSEEN.—"In the enthusiasm awakened by the discovery of some new facts or of some new forces, and in the freshness with which they impress the idea of such agencies on our minds, we sometimes very naturally exaggerate the length of way along which they carry us towards the great ultimate objects of intellectual desire. We forget altogether that the knowledge they convey is in quality and in kind identical with knowledge already long in our possession, and places us in no new relation whatever to the vast background of the Eternal and the Unseen. Thus it is that the notions of materialism are perpetually reviving, and are again being perpetually swept away—swept away partly before the intuitions of the mind, partly before the conclusions of the reason. For there are two great enemies to materialism,—one rooted in the affections, the other in the intellect. One is the power of things hoped for, a power which never dies; the other is the evidence of things not seen, and this evidence abounds in all we see."—*"The Reign of Law," by the Duke of Argyle.*

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED AND DISENDOWED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.

THERE are, perhaps, few matters so difficult to accomplish as to convince a prejudiced man that he is in the wrong. Reason may be tried, the *pros* and *cons.* of the discussed question may be presented with the greatest perspicuity and logical sequence, the deepest mental emotions, or even religious convictions may be appealed to, but after all the ever-recurring prejudice will appear, and the man will probably be left either more prejudiced or precisely where he was before. Although we are willing to admit, to the fullest extent, the sincerity and the enlightenment of a great number of devout and intelligent members of the Church of England as by law established, we are equally strongly convinced that, in the minds of many of her members, on most controverted points, prejudice in favour of their Church holds a stronger position than reason, and in the room of intelligent conviction we find an affection for the venerable and a respect for the traditions of pious forefathers. The idea of a Church and State in unity possesses for many minds a charm which we think they would be sorry to lose. A State using its mighty powers and influence to further the interests of a Church; a State which is prepared to tend with careful solicitude, not merely the more material interests of its subjects, but also their spiritual interests; a State that will care for rich and poor alike, that will legislate with careful diligence on all that appertains to their souls' welfare, and will give them a helping hand to heaven, presents, we say, to the minds of numbers of our population a picture that is beautiful to look upon, and in the contemplation of which the soul is filled with rich suggestiveness; but beautiful pictures and imaginative musings are appropriate only in their own sphere. Stern truths and powerful convictions denote a higher state of mental cultivation; and an enlightened moral

robustness must not be sacrificed to ethereal dreaming and delightful contemplations.

We wish to consider what reasons, if any, exist for the union of a church with a State; or, the two being united, whether it is desirable they should so continue. We, as Nonconformists, assert that we see no valid reason why a church should be united to a State.

Christ comes to the world as a teacher and regenerator, with that mission only, to tell men of a better life, and to show them how to attain to it. He gathers together a handful of men, and expounds to them His mission. Struck by the purity and beauty of their Leader's life, they long to be like Him and to follow in His footsteps. Heavenly influences exert themselves; new light begins to dawn in the minds of the followers. They see and feel as they never did aforetime.

" They carry music in their heart,
Through dusty lane and wrangling mart,
And ply their daily task with busier feet,
Because their secret souls a holy strain repeat."

And now another feeling takes possession of them. They want to help others to be as they are, or better; and, with Christ-like affection for souls still in darkness, they say, "We would to God that all men were as we are." For purposes of holy evangelization they combine; "daily are added unto them the number of such as shall be saved;" they unite and call themselves a church. Lands and possessions are sold; every one is wishful to do what he can for the rest; a holy zeal fires their hearts with enthusiasm, and they deem no sacrifices too costly. God has commenced in their hearts the work of grace; to Him they bow the knee, and acknowledge no other leader. But here we will suppose a civic magnate interposes. He says, "The State of this land has a divine right to dictate your movements, to appoint your prayers, to formulate your creeds, to set bounds beyond which you are not to pass, to regulate your financial affairs, and generally to superintend the whole of your operations." What would be the effect? They would instantly, we should suppose, repudiate the notion, resent the interference as an insult to themselves and a dishonour to their only lawful sovereign. As good citizens and God's servants they would say, "We will render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, but unto God the things that are God's." They would declare themselves opposed

to all such control, and consider themselves able, by their reliance on their God, to carry out their evangelistic work without the aid and without the patronage of any State in existence. This is, we take it, a crude but truthful representation of our views respecting a Christian church, and the right of a State to interfere or patronize. We believe that the kingdom of God among men needs no assistance from civil powers. We believe that God has provided, does provide, and will provide for all our exigencies. We believe that State interference and control is damaging to the interests of religion, and that especially the receipt of State support freezes the natural benevolence of the heart, and stints its moral growth. We believe that God, and God alone, is the Head of the Church. We believe we have a right to choose our own formularies of faith, to adopt our own creeds, to alter, expunge, or expand what we have already adopted, and to conduct our public worship with entire freedom. We do not believe, even did we admit the principle of Church Establishments, that the Parliament of this country is so composed as to admit of its deliberations respecting the Church to be of a satisfactory nature. Infidels, Roman Catholics, Jews, heretics, men of all creeds and men of no creeds whatever, have composed and do compose that Parliament, and yet it deliberates on matters pertaining to the interests of one particular section of Christ's Church. We submit it is difficult to us to see how the Church can be benefited by union with such a constitution.

Further, were we to look at the question merely in relation to practical results and facts (as far as such results can ever be ascertained, humanly speaking), we should be more than satisfied with the results of Voluntaryism as compared with those of the Established Church. When we consider the work that is being accomplished by the three great sects of Dissenters, the Methodists, the Independents or Congregationalists, and the Baptists, with the other Nonconforming sects of the country, we think we have reason to believe that Voluntaryism will not yet prove a failure. When we say we are satisfied, we do not wish to be misunderstood. To be, in one sense, satisfied is a moral impossibility; but to be satisfied with the principle of self-reliance and voluntaryism as opposed to the principle of State Establishments is morally and legitimately possible. We believe that all religious creeds and peoples should meet on a common basis of equality; we believe that established religions have done much to embitter and set against

sect, and retard the progress of Christ's kingdom among men, and we shall hail with delight the day when the so-called Church of England—a church which, according to statistical returns, is merely a church of the minority—shall throw off its shackles, and declare itself willing to rely on God, and on God alone, for all the work it wishes to accomplish.

The opening remarks of E. C. M. are certainly remarkable. E. C. M. says, "The State is not something different from the Church. Every man who has a vote and moral or intellectual influence is a member of the State, and almost every member of the State is also a member of the Church in its highest and truest sense." Then, of course, "almost every man who has a vote and moral and intellectual influence is a member of the Church in its highest and truest sense." If this be true, an extraordinary revolution has taken place in society, of which we, unfortunately, had not been made aware. Nevertheless, if it be true, we are glad to hear it, and hope such a condition may long continue. E. C. M. says, "The powers that be are ordained of God in so far as they are the chosen representatives of the people, who claim to be moved by the Spirit of God in what they do or approve of." The expression is ambiguous; but we suppose E. C. M. means that the Commons "claim to be moved by the Spirit of God in what they do or approve of." What is his authority for such a supposition? We must not deceive ourselves in this matter. We deny *in toto* that the House of Commons is a religious and spiritual brotherhood, and because it is not, as we have before remarked, we consider that House incompetent to deliberate on purely spiritual matters. Certainly we, as Nonconformists, should unhesitatingly decline to submit our plans and resolutions to the consideration of the Houses of Parliament. E. C. M. says, "The Church ought not to be disestablished because heaven itself is represented as being separated into nations, peoples, and kindreds, and tongues." Will E. C. M., in his reply, kindly explain. One more remark: E. C. M. says, "Disestablishment would be the national disowning of God." Had E. C. M. said to a voluntary church, "If you unite yourselves with the State, and rely on it for control and patronage, you will disown God," we could have sympathized with the remark; but we certainly fail to see how a church, severing its bands from a State, and throwing itself on God's help and its own internal resources, can in any way be said to disown God.

C. H. opens with an ironical panegyric on Voluntaryism, and then proceeds to say, "I shall not accuse any by saying—

'Licence they mean when they cry liberty.'"

Then why, we ask, does C. H. make use of the quotation? A little harmless pleasantry is unobjectionable; but, as a body of Nonconformists, we disagree, to use the mildest form of expression, with such a remark, even if it be expressed in a negative manner. C. H. says, "Voluntaryism has failed in charity, and after the trial of centuries, it was found necessary to establish charity by law, so little can voluntary effort be relied on for consistent Christian activity." We are sorry for any church that makes such an admission. It speaks but little for the generous Christian love and philanthropy of its members. Establish charity by law! The mention of such a thing touches our moral sensibilities to the quick, and sends a chilling influence through our veins. We think too well of the Church of England to believe that it will endorse C. H.'s remark; but if compelled to do so, it may then write "Ichabod" over its lifeless ashes. Has Voluntaryism failed in charity? We think not. Ask our Sunday schools, ask our ragged schools, ask our tract societies, ask the London Missionary Society if Voluntaryism has failed in charity. "So little can voluntary effort be relied on for consistent Christian activity." Reviewing the census returns of 1851, the Rev. Isaac Taylor, M.A., says, "Looking at the Establishment on the one hand and the three sects of Dissenters on the other, these three sects have increased their accommodation sixfold in fifty years, while the accommodation provided by the Church has been almost stationary." This from a curate of the Church of England! Voluntaryism cannot at once accomplish all it would wish to do. It has difficulties to contend with, it has much opposition to meet with, but it knows the secret of its powers, and draws its springs from an eternal fount. It is a spontaneous expression of gratitude; it is love in operation. Voluntaryism, alone can be relied on for carrying out the work of Christian usefulness.

We have read A. W.'s article, but conceive it to be a eulogium on the Church of England rather than as advancing arguments in favour of its union with the State. Much that he advances in favour of that church might be advanced with equal truth in favour of almost any other church. For instance, "The objects of the Church, as a function of the State, are duly to set forth the whole Scriptures of God before the people, that they may know

God's law and regulate their lives by it ; to provide for and impart spiritual guidance and instruction, advice and interest, to the whole body of the people ; to directly influence and keep before the minds of the people the necessity for the godly upbringing of the young ; to bear testimony to and uphold the truth of God in Christ," &c. &c., all which we should consider to be the object of any Christian church. He then proceeds to say, "These things can be much better done, we think, by an established agency than by any merely transitory fit of missionariness which may be excited in different sects." Precisely so ; but as the different sects—by which, we presume, reference is made to the aggregate body of Dissenters—do not depend on transitory fits of missionariness, the argument, so far as it is in favour of churches established by law, appears to fall to the ground. Methodism is an established agency, Independency is an established agency, although they are not allied to any civil powers. Their home missions and foreign missions are extending year by year, and we think the day is very far distant when they will be required to place dependence on transitory fits of missionariness. We have scanned the horizon, but do not see the faintest indications of its dawn.

Considering as a whole the articles written by those in favour of Church establishments, we feel called upon to correct a little error into which they apparently have fallen. With little exception they appear to imagine that Nonconformity, Voluntaryism, or Dissent is some puerile and fragile infant just beginning to grope its way, hesitating in fear, wondering whether it would be quite safe to advance just a little step further ; endeavouring now and then, almost with a feeling of audacity, to gaze at the clear sunlight, and immediately closing its too dazzled eyes, occasionally startling every one with some spasmodic effort, causing the smiling onlookers to feel a little pity for the weakly thing, while they wonder whether it is an indication of increasing vitality, a frantic attempt to make its existence a matter of no uncertainty, or a convulsive gasp pre-saging its speedy dissolution. We do not think that would be a happy simile. Nonconformity is something very different ; its roots have struck deeply into the hearts and minds of an intelligent and conscientious nation. Voluntaryism can fearlessly assert its principles ; it knows its standing ground ; it has stood firm to its own ; it needs no apology for its existence, and it is prepared to give a reason for the hope that is within it.

A. W. says, "And not the least advantage, as it seems to me, of an Established Church is, that it may form a standard of living, keep up the salutary effects of public worship, and be a sort of measure of holy living, and afford a fair preparation for holy dying." But why is that an advantage of an Established Church? What church does not form a standard of living? What church does not afford a fair preparation, according to its own beliefs, for holy dying? Why it should be considered an advantage of an Established Church we do not perceive.

C. R. follows very closely in the wake of C. H. C. R. says, "Voluntaryism has now had a fair trial, and we can speak with accuracy and confidence as to its capabilities in extending the gospel. Long years have passed since the voluntary torch was lighted, but still its flame is yet feeble and blinking." Feeble and blinking, forsooth!—

"An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry."

Our opponents in this debate, we think, have not been careful to ascertain all the facts of the case. We may mention that, according to the census of 1861, more than half of the *worshipping* population of England belong to Dissenting sects. The so-called Church is not by any legitimate means the church of England. Representing only a minority of the worshipping population, it is an injustice to other sects, and an assumption to which it can lay no claim, to style itself by such a name. Practically speaking, we have no Church of England, and it is only for the sake of avoiding ambiguity that we consent to make use of the expression. With C. R.'s remark we must disagree. We deny that the flame of the voluntary torch is "feeble and blinking." Feeble it may be in comparison with what we yet expect it to be; but where it shines it does so with steady brightness, and knows nought of blinking.

C. R. asks "those who deny the truth of the principle of ecclesiastical establishments, Do Voluntary churches, by keeping apart from all State aid, thereby free themselves from all State control? Can they, in their vaunted show of liberty, defy the interference of the State? No more than those churches which are under State patronage. There are many cases on record which reveal this stubborn fact, that the Voluntary church is no more *free* than

the State church." He asks this question with an air of triumph. To C. R.'s inquiry we return an unmistakable affirmative. We are not prepared to admit that the Voluntary church is no more free than the State church. Take a case, and not an extraordinary one. An upright and God-fearing member of the Church of England has a child who dies at an early age. The father has faith in adult baptism only, and consequently his child dies unbaptized. He asks that the decencies of Christian burial may be performed over its remains; but what saith the Book of Common Prayer? "Here it is to be noted that the office ensuing [*i. e.*, the burial service] is not to be used for any that die unbaptized, or excommunicate, or who have laid violent hands upon themselves." Who shall prevent a Nonconformist from using *his* form of burial service? And yet C. R. says the Voluntary church is no more free than the State church. Take another case, one literally true. A man in a state of drunkenness was killed by another one Saturday night at a public-house; he was interred, and over his remains the clergyman was compelled to read, and did read, the following words:—"Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God of His great mercy to take unto Himself the soul of our dear brother here departed, we therefore commit his body to the ground, *in sure and certain hope* of the resurrection to eternal life." Can blasphemy more horrible be imagined? Who shall compel a Nonconformist to use such words? And yet C. R. says, "The Voluntary church is no more free than the State church."

We, as Nonconformists, heartily rejoice to say that every fresh investigation of our principles and their comparison with the principles of the Established Church but tends to make us cling to ours more tenaciously and lovingly. We would to God that all men were as we are. We wish only good to the Established Church. We admit the Christ-like purity and devoted lives of many of her members. We consider her liturgy as one of the most beautiful and appropriate that could possibly be framed. We rejoice in her missionary efforts, we hail with delight her works of charity, and the many indications of good that have appeared wherever she has set her foot and erected her sanctuaries; but we feel constrained to say, "Separate yourselves from the State, rely upon your own resources, dispense your own emoluments, choose your own spiritual leaders, see true moral expansiveness, work heartily as unto the Lord, and leave all else to Him." H. SCOTT.

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE?

EVOLUTION ARTICLE.—VI.

I CERTAINLY owe an apology to the conductors of this journal for having delayed the course of this very interesting controversy; a necessary intermission from severe labour became imperative on me before I was able to fulfil my undertaking; and I have but as yet scarcely been able to go into harness. As, however, the laws of controversy observed in this serial are such that there must be no unfair advantage given to any view of a question by putting forward papers on one side while others fall into arrears, it seems that I, being out of the way, have actually been standing in the way of the progress of this debate. The reader will probably not blame me harshly under the circumstances, and I hope that my explanation will free our editorial friends from bearing a burden of reproach which they ought not to be laden with.

There are several ways in which this question may be looked at, and it is very requisite that we should avoid confounding them one with another. We may note them thus:—

I. "Is creation or evolution the better interpretation of nature?" in a *religious* sense; that is, as an explanation of the being of all things in their relation to God as the Author of all, the First Cause and Father. This is a very proper and legitimate question, taking us into the region of theology, bringing us into contact with creeds, and exciting comparisons between orthodoxy and heterodoxy; but it is not, as I apprehend, *the* question upon which we are engaged, as will afterwards appear.

II. "Is creation or evolution the better interpretation of nature?" in a *logical* sense; that is, as giving satisfaction to the reasoning faculties, which must have all theses presented to them in linked syllogistic connection. Reasoning is a chain of dependence

of truth on truth, reaching along from experience to law or first principle, and requiring the concatenation or joining together of thought after thought into a unity of reflective results satisfactory to the mind of one who follows investigations according to "the laws of thought as *thought*," as Sir William Hamilton defines logic. It is pretty obvious that this also is not *the* question we are now engaged on.

III. "Is creation or evolution the better interpretation of nature?" in a *scientific* sense; that is, as affording a complete and understandable knowledge of existence, and their laws, arranged in accordance with and properly explanatory of human experience. This, we apprehend, is *the* proper point of view for us to consider the question in.

I argue that *this* is so from the *verba questionis*,—"interpretation of nature," not of what is above, around, before, or superior to nature, which passes into the region of creeds, church formularies, and confessions of faith, and is, in fact, a religious, or rather theological question. "Interpretation of *nature*,"—not of *thought* as the reflection of nature—which is a philosophical or logical question, involving debates about interpretation and its laws, experience and intuition, sensation and perception, memory and presentation, and of the relation between thoughts and their signs. This is a really important and valuable investigation to be made by those who seek to discover the laws of thought and the operation of these laws in the discovery of truth. But we are not asked if creation or evolution is the better interpretation [of thought as the symbol] of nature, as a philosophical inquiry; we are asked which gives, supplies, or allows of "the better interpretation of nature," as a matter within the range of *science*—for it is distinctly and distinctively as a scientific discussion it is brought before us.

The openers of the debate appear, taking their respective purposes into account, to have had a correct appreciation of the question. In his article on creation (preceding volume, pp. 43—49) M. F. S. very properly starts with giving some explanations of "the various significations of *nature*," though he very wisely gives us also the meaning he thinks should be attached to the term, viz., "the vast whole of things visible, the universe in its utmost latitude of extent." Equally careful E. F. R. (pp. 49—51) appears to have been, not indeed in his preliminary definition of terms, but in what is almost equally important, the placing of the question.

He gives the right start, and had the controversy been carried on, on the terms of the originators, it would have been better, not only for the interests of truth, but for the interest of the readers. F. T. D. keeps quite fairly to the question, and is evidently an intelligent reader, an acute thinker, and religiously inclined to prophesy smooth things between technology and theology. To him the universe appears "as a cosmic whole, possessed of and displaying an architectonic unity and plan." So it does to us. But then when F. T. D. gets this length, he goes out of his way altogether to affirm that "the very first thing in nature seeking explanation is its *origin*." This we question; nay, doubt. The very aim and object of science is to comprehend nature itself, and so to be able to present an "interpretation of nature" to thought. It is "of nature," not of nature's origin, that science makes a study. The *origin* of nature is a theologian's inquiry. Because such a matter did not come within the reach or range of science, it holds its place in the Book which reveals God as the Originator of all. "Nature," as G. W. P. says (p. 116), "is the domain of science." The supernatural, we add, is the domain of revelation; of revelation precisely because such "knowledge is too high for us"—"we cannot attain unto it." Science is a knowledge of nature; that is, of experience, existing things, systematically arranged. It does not include knowledge of the supernatural. Theology, again, is the science, if you like to call it so, of the supernatural, *i. e.*, of things *higher than* nature; or of the revealed, *i. e.*, of things made known *about* nature. Science may, however, keep entirely within her sphere—the interpretation of nature; or she may *accept* of the revelation which theology offers her, but it is the interest alike of science and theology to hold themselves independent, though related, and each to pursue its own course for its own ends. I am happy to find that this view of the distinct spheres of science and theology has been taken by Dr. Carpenter, President of the British Association who says:—

"And thus we are led to the culminating point of man's intellectual interpretation of nature, his recognition of the unity of the power of which her phenomena are the diversified manifestations. Towards this point all scientific inquiry now tends. The convertibility of the physical forces, the correlation of these with the vital, and the intimacy of that *nexus* between mental and bodily activity, which, explain it as we may, cannot be denied, all lead upwards

towards one and the same conclusion, and the pyramid of which that philosophical conclusion is the apex, has its foundation in the primitive instincts of humanity. By our own remote progenitors, as by the untutored savage of the present day, every change in which human agency was not apparent, was referred to a particular animating intelligence. And thus they attributed not only the movements of the heavenly bodies, but all the phenomena of nature, each to its own deity. These deities were invested with more than human power; but they were also supposed capable of human passions, and subject to human capriciousness. As the uniformities of nature came to be more distinctly recognised, some of these deities were invested with a dominant control, while others were supposed to be their subordinate ministers. A serene majesty was attributed to the greater gods who sit above the clouds, whilst their inferiors might "come down to earth in the likeness of men." With the growth of the scientific study of nature, the conception of its harmony and unity gained ever-increasing strength. And so among the most enlightened of the Greek and Roman philosophers we find a distinct recognition of the idea of the unity of the directing mind from which the order of nature proceeds, for they obviously believed that, as our modern poet has expressed it,—

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul."

The science of modern times, however, has taken a more special direction. Fixing its attention exclusively on the order of nature, it has separated itself wholly from theology, whose function it is to seek after its cause. In this science is fully justified, alike by the entire independence of its objects, and by the historical fact that it has been continually hampered and impeded in its search for the truth as it is in nature by the restraints which theologians have attempted to impose upon its inquiries. But when science, passing beyond its own limits, assumes to take the place of theology, and sets up its own conception of the order of nature as a sufficient account of its cause, it is invading a province of thought to which it has no claim, and not unreasonably provokes the hostility of those who ought to be its best friends. For whilst the deep-seated instincts of humanity, and the profoundest researches of philosophy, alike point to mind as the one and only source of power, it is the high prerogative of science to demonstrate the unity of the power

which is operating through the limitless extent and variety of the universe, and to trace its continuity through the vast series of ages that "have been occupied in its evolution."

The foregoing extract is not only a most important one in itself, but it is also not a little remarkable to notice that the very point chosen for the peroration of the greatest scientific speech of the year is precisely that to the consideration of which our minds had been brought by the prescient selection of this topic for debate by our editors. Of that, however, mention is enough.

J. R. S. C. has made somewhat of a mistake in attributing the philosophy of evolution to Darwin. The chief exponent of this theory is undoubtedly Herbert Spencer, a thinker of high mark and large powers. He is, however, only developer of the great thoughts of his predecessors, who have indicated their belief in the unity of nature, and regarded that as, for theological purposes, an evidence of the unity of Deity. He has, however, shown that this theological induction, however pertinent in its own place, has no claim to a place in science; that intruded into science it is only a useless encumbrance; and that it is the duty of scientific men to reject from their contemplations everything extra-scientific. J. R. S. C. has not seen it to be his duty to keep the provinces of thought distinct, and had he done so his entomology would have been better, while his theology would not have been worse. His illustrations of the difficulty of confining the exuberance of nature to our ideals of species, though he fails to see their tendency, go, indeed, a long way to show that type, order, species, &c., are terms to which nature refuses to conform. R. W. C.'s remarks are on a side question, and do not touch the main point of investigation; we need not follow him, as we have explained already that nature requires to be accepted by science as its origin—it begins with and it confines itself to nature. S. E. A. has given a fair idea of the manner in which an *eirenicon* between science and theology is possible; but he does not do much towards the elucidation of the theme, as he has been misled into the misty regions of religious philosophy. He has gone to *sea*, instead of remaining on *terra firma*, and yet he has given good justification for evolution in a philosophic point of view, and so far is a valuable coadjutor.

S. S. has endeavoured by a strong *reductio ad absurdum* to prove that evolutionism is quite an error. He asks us to go with him and trace back the forms of life from compound to simple, and then

to tell him whence the simplest organism comes; but we never undertook to explain the origination of life and nature, and hence he asks us to perform for him a gratuitous task. He thinks that "evolution cannot furnish us with any interpretation of nature," but "specific creation fully accounts for the phenomena which nature presents" (p. 279). We shall agree with him, perhaps, when he has shown us how specific creation of phenomena is possible. Meanwhile we have only got the length of regarding phenomena as caused, not created—not, at any rate, specifically created.

Our anonymous ally, in behalf of evolution, has given a fine, glowing, philosophical essay on God *in* nature, rather than on the God *of* Nature; and while we are glad to see that he strives to reconcile the opponent thinkers, and bring them into nearer relation (p. 282) we do think he has elaborately missed and mystified the question. He appears rather to have twisted the question round till it looked like this,—Is creation or evolution the better interpretation of [God *in*] nature?—so mistaking the end of this debate.

To science, as science, nothing is real which is not nature; to science, as science, the causes and phenomena of nature are the selected topics of inquiry. Beyond nature science does not and cannot go. Science is experience arranged and comprehended, and experience it cannot transcend. Science is godless, not through its rationalism or its atheism, but on account of its fixture of sphere and the special condition of its inquiries. It seeks to interpret the writing in the book of nature. It examines that. It puts nature, not God, to the inquisition of investigation. "*Of* nature" it seeks the interpretation, not *of* God. Creation is not an experience, nor is such an act seen in the course *of* "nature."

Creation is a form of thought altogether abstract and metaphysical, evolution is one altogether concrete and physical. Science is not metaphysics but physics, and creation is an idea entirely beyond our experience in the study, in order that we may attain unto an "interpretation of nature." We refuse to go beyond nature in our inquiry, because it is "*of* nature" we are making inquiry. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*,—no shoemaker beyond his last. You might as well insist on a shoemaker or a tailor making a preliminary study of astronomy before he commenced his apprenticeship, or tag on to his apprenticeship a farther provision that he should study astronomy before his apprenticeship as shoemaker or tailor

could be held to be *finished*. It is true that astronomy—ay, and chemistry—and much more is implied in tailoring to protect us from “the skyeey influences, and in shoemaking to shield us from the heat or cold due to the atmospheric attractions dependent on the course of the heavenly bodies; but we never think of carrying things quite so far. Science is a this-world thing; it is a knowledge of the laws and principles of the physical universe. That is what science endeavours to explore and know. Seeking to know more it ceases to be science. It neglects the business for which it exists in the vain dream of gaining a scientific acquaintance with that which transcends all science. Creation and a Creator are matters on which faith may supply some presumption, and about which metaphysics may gain some information; but science, as a knowledge “of nature,” can no farther go. A scientific man may—many would say must—accept of the idea of creation as the origin, and of a Creator as the originator of matter, but he does so not as a scientific man, but in consideration of those higher aspirations and nobler feelings which arise in the soul when he seeks to interpret his own place in nature, not when he is seeking an “interpretation of nature.”

L. S. E.

The Essayist.

THE PRINCIPLES AND ART OF TEACHING.

PART II.

WE pass now from the consideration of the principles of right training to the practical art of true education. In so doing we leave the region of speculative thought, and enter upon the domain of effective art. Here we have to do, not with theories and reflections, but with "systems" and "methods," two terms of learned sound with the use of which we can scarcely dispense, though we confess they have grown irksome to the ear, and almost offensive to the mind, somewhat by the mistaken use or careless employment of them in a sneering and depreciating tone, as if they were pedantic, stiff, formal, and unkindly words; and yet, properly understood, they are not so harsh in their nature as they seem.

These two words, "system" and "method," are often, in a rough and ready way, used interchangeably, but a distinction is sometimes, and perhaps ought always to be made; this I am willing to recognize on the present occasion, therefore I had better define them. By "system," then, I understand a plan or arrangement founded in all its parts upon one given principle; by "method" I understand an arrangement less fixed and determinate, founded on more general principles, and having a practical bearing upon the *way* and *manner* of proceeding. The three principal systems of teaching in our Sunday schools, as indeed in most places of instruction, are as follows:—

1. The *individual* in which the teacher concentrates his own attention on one scholar at a time, and tries to enchain the scholar's attention, leaving, necessarily, all the others, at least to some extent unoccupied, in the vain hope that they will be very good, and sit *quite still*!

2. Then we have the *simultaneous system*, in which all the scholars are expected to read and speak together. This system is very valuable for infant classes, and would be equally appropriate for elementary classes composed of ignorant boys of twelve or thirteen years of age—who are now a sore trouble to us,—if we had only good separate class-rooms in which to place them.

3. We have the *collective system*, which secures all the advantages

of the simultaneous system without any of its defects. The term "collective," is intended to indicate the simultaneous *fixing of the attention of the whole class* upon the lesson in hand, although several and even diversified exercises for that purpose may be employed. It is true that this is difficult, but it is not impossible; and you may have unmistakable evidence of its being done when in any school you see the heads of the scholars so bent down in their eager anxiety to listen and to reply, that a large umbrella would cover both teacher and class. But this desirable result cannot be certainly secured by the adoption of any single plan of proceeding; and hence the importance of those various *methods* or practical arts of *teaching* which we will now proceed to enumerate and explain.

First, in point of importance, I would place the *interrogative or catechetical method*, on which so much not only has been, but might, be said. Of course no one will suppose that by this term I mean the use of those compounds of question and answer called catechisms, but simply as a name for the employment of a catechetical style of teaching. Questioning is useful, first, to enable the teacher to ascertain how much the scholars know on any given subject, and hence to ascertain what his starting point should be; secondly, questioning is valuable as a means of **TRAINING** the scholars to seek and so to gain knowledge for themselves as to ascertain the relation and bearing of things, as well as the truths they illustrate and the doctrines which they teach; and thirdly, questioning may be profitably employed to gauge the amount of knowledge that has been gained or acquired by those who have been engaged upon any given exercise or lesson.

It would be impossible, perhaps also it would be impolitic in us to attempt, in the space at command, to go very fully into this subject. Mr. J. G. Fitch, M. A. (one of H.M.'s Inspectors of Schools), has published an excellent lecture on "The Art of Questioning," which I would earnestly commend to the attention of all my readers. With this reference I shall require only to mention a few simple rules for the practical guidance of the teacher in questioning a class.

- I. Cultivate simplicity of language.
- II. Do not tell too much in your questions.
- III. Questions should be definite and unmistakable.

I have heard of a clergyman who attempted to examine a village school on Matt. viii. "When He was come down from the mountain, great multitudes followed Him." He began thus:—"Where was He before this?" *No answer.* "What, don't you know? Why, what is the necessary consequence of going up a mountain?" Of course there was no answer to this. I confess I do not know "what is the necessary consequence of going up a mountain! The answer

he *wanted* was, "to come down again;" but as the children, if they knew what a mountain was, *did* not know what a *consequence* was, and as—despite the rhyme-attested fact that "the King of France, with all his men, went up the hill, and then *came down again*,"—*coming down* is not a necessary consequence of going up, we need not be surprised that they could not answer him. This question was above the children in *language* and sense—if indeed it had any sense,—and moreover it was vague and obscure.

IV. Avoid questions that can be answered by "yes" or "no," and which end with the word "what."

V. Avoid long questions, and such as imply or require two answers. Such, for instance as this:—"When and why did Christ curse the barren fig tree?"

VI. Do not often ask for definitions of words, and still less of doctrines, as they are difficult for children to frame; and yet they may sometimes be usefully employed in leading to the correction of misapprehension.

VII. Avoid a uniform manner of shaping your questions, and anything that tends to unintelligible routine. This is the great evil to which set questions and answers in catechisms are liable.

Years ago Miss Edgeworth told a story of a gentleman attending an examination of a day school, where the printed questions very readily drew forth the printed answers. The subject of examination was geography, and he thought he would test the knowledge of the pupils by a few questions of his own, so he asked one of them where Turkey was; and she answered, rather hesitatingly, "In the yard with the poultry!" I do not know whether it was the same gentleman who once showed his niece an apple, to explain to her something about the shape and motion of the earth. She looked at him a few minutes with much earnestness, and then said, "Why, uncle, you don't mean that the earth *really* turns round, do you?" He replied, "Did you not learn that several years ago?" "Yes, sir," she replied, "I *learned* it, but I never *knew* it before."

VIII. Always let your questions have point. Do not ask aimless and random questions, strugglingly got out to pass the time. Let the mind have something to aim at, to seek after, to hit upon. How many this? What distance that? Where *then*? Whence now? and so on, unless there is something of importance dependent upon the matter inquired about, are little more than makeshift questions. All the questions asked upon any given lesson ought to be such as to direct the minds of the children and to incline their thoughts to converge towards the point or points on which the main interest of the lesson is intended to turn. Our design in questioning should either be to lead to the apprehension of, or to bring within comprehen-

sion the topic of the lesson. Questions without point must disappoint.

IX. The use of indefinite adverbs of interrogation, such as *How?* *Wherefore?* *Why?* ought to be carefully avoided. When we feel tempted to employ these we should always fix the sense in which we are to make use of it, and in general it will be better to translate that meaning into plain English. For instance, *How?* may mean (1) in what *manner* or *way*? (2) for what *reason*? (3) from what *cause*? (4) in what *state*? (5) by what *means*? (6) to what *extent*? *Why?* again, as an interrogative is employed in these senses: (1) By what *proofs*? (2) from what *cause*? (3) for what *purpose*? (4) on what *account*? (5) through what *occasion*? (6) urged by what *motive*?

Wherefore is always associated with *why*—as in Shakspeare:—

“Shall I tell you why? Ay, sir, and wherefore, for they say every why hath a wherefore.”

It has these significations:—1, for *which* reason? 2, from *what* cause? 3, with what intent? 4, to what end?

We must study *how* to question, or we may know *why* our *wherefores* bring so little information.

We may learn a good deal about the utility of the interrogative method, and the manner in which it may be best employed by observing the interrogative reasoning of Scripture.

1. It is used to give emphasis to an assertion, and force to a remark—as in Paul’s address to Agrippa, Acts xxvi. 27. See also Rom. iii. 29.—viii. 35; Jer. xlvii. 67, for other examples.

2. Reproof may be conveyed forcibly by questioning—Hos. vi. 4; xi. 8; Acts xxii. 3; Gal. ii. 14.

3. Wonder or admiration may both be expressed and excited by interrogations—Job xi. 7—9; Isa. xi. 12—14.

4. Questions may be employed to give vividness and increase interest—Isa. lviii. 3—10; lxiii. 1—4; Matt. xi. 7—9.

5. Questions may be so employed in series as to bring the mind to see clearly and feel intensely the arguments used on a subject—Mal. ii. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 7; Rom. x. 13—15.

I have chosen these examples from Scripture as specimens of the additional uses to which questioning can be put, over and above the mere purpose of drilling the mind to look at subjects in a specific way, or for a particular end; and I think the inquiry might be pursued further with advantage by the teacher who wishes to have Bible example and direction in all his ways.

II. But I now pass on to speak in the second place of the *elliptical method* of teaching. David Stowe says, “An *ellipsis* is the leaving out of a point to be filled up by the children which they

already know, or which the teacher may have brought out in the lesson, and which he requires to be expressed in words. It ought, therefore, to be filled up not merely by a single word, but by a word or words including the *idea* or point to which the mind has been trained. It assists the child's mind—leads him to the point *without telling*; it is, in fact, a little question, assisting him to walk, as it were, without carrying, which telling would be."

But the elliptical method ought seldom to be used alone, or even chiefly, it should be mixed with direct and searching questions—especially with older scholars, who are capable of understanding the force of thought.

III. We have the synthetic and analytic methods. These are difficult terms, but they are capable of an easy explanation. *Synthesis* is a Greek word, and means *a placing together*. It is applied to that kind of teaching in which we adopt the method of *placing together* the simple elements of any subject, one by one—and step by step, until a knowledge of the whole is arrived at.

The word *analysis* is also Greek, and means just the opposite to *synthesis*; it implies the separation of any whole into its component parts, so as to show its composition and contents. "Analysis has been aptly compared to the efforts of the traveller who endeavours to find the source of a river by ascending to its mouth; synthesis, profiting by the labour of analysis, places itself at the source, and thence rapidly follows the course of the river to its mouth."

These two methods may be mutually employed in teaching most subjects; and indeed, generally speaking, the exclusive use of either of them will rarely be attended with success.

IV. *The lecturing or dogmatic method.* Talking is not teaching, and it has a terrible tendency to degenerate into twaddle. It seldom excites, rouses, awakens; but it generally flattens, dulls, and deadens. Even the best talk falls on a child's mind like water spilled upon the ground, it cannot be gathered up again, and it frequently fails of its anticipated results. Teachers, beware of talking, especially if your pupils look sedate, for then you may be pretty sure that, demure as they may seem, their hearts are far from the lesson. They will quickly pass from seem-land to dreamland. Talk should be explanatory—giving information to the child, not planetary—discoursing in a wandering style about the child's soul. Lecture little, preach less, *touch*, and you will *teach* the heart.

Mere talking is far too common in our Sunday schools. The dogmatic teacher has all the talk to himself; he says his say, gives his lecture, and concludes it all without even trying to ascertain from his scholars whether or not he—

“Has left

Deposited upon the silent shore
Of memory, images and precious thoughts
That shall not die, and cannot be destroyed.”

V. The illustrative method. Illustration is a sort of teaching by analogy—pointing out to a scholar wherein the thing to be learnt corresponds with something which he already knows or can easily apprehend. The sources of illustration are numerous; but the following are the principal:—Nature, daily life, the word of God, the facts of history. Avoid stale and far-fetched illustrations, and never state as a fact that which only reaches you on questionable authority. Never let it be truthfully said of you as a servant girl is reported to have said of her master—a popular divine,—“He is in his study making anecdotes!”

VI. The pictorial method, which is, to use the words of the Rev. J. B. Draper, “a style of speaking which may be called descriptive; it is the speaker using words which bring before the minds of his hearers a picture—a representation of the scene, or narrative, or event—so vivid or lifelike as to possess very nearly the same advantages as a drawing.”

One very essential requisite in painting word-pictures for children is minuteness of detail. You must be pre-Raphaelitish in this respect. On this point I may cite Jacob Abbott's remarks:—

“Be exceedingly minute in the details of what you describe. Take very short steps, and take each one very distinctly. If, for instance, you are narrating to a man, you may simply say, if such an incident occurs in the course of the narrative, that your hero ‘went down to the shore and got into a boat and pushed off.’ Your hearer has probably got into a boat often enough to understand it. But if you are talking to a child he will be more interested if you say, ‘he went down to the shore, and found a boat there. One end of the boat, the front part, which they call the bows, was up against the shore, a little in the sand. The other end was out on the water, and moved up and down gently with the waves. There were seats across the boat, and two oars lying on the seats. The man stepped upon the bows of the boat, it was fast in the sand, so that it did not sink under him. Then he took up one of the oars, and began to push against the shore, to push himself off. But as he was standing upon the bows, his weight pressed the bows down hard upon the sand, and so he could not push the boat off. Then he went to the other end of the boat, stepping over the seats. The other end of the boat is the stern. The stern sank a little, and the boat rocked from one side to the other, and made the oar which was on the seat rattle. There was nothing but water under the

stern of the boat, and that was what made it unsteady. The man stepped carefully, and when he was fairly in the stern he reached his oar out again, and now he could push it off. The bows rubbed slowly back off the sand, and in a minute the whole boat was floating on the water.”

As I said at the commencement of this enumeration, it is not by the adoption of any one of these methods of teaching that our object is to be gained, but by the judicious use of most of them. But, still further, very much depends upon the *tact* of the teacher, and his *manner* in imparting instruction. A writer on this subject in *The Church of England S. S. Teacher*, says :—

Now, we have seen teachers with average qualifications, with no lack of zeal or earnestness, the simple effect of whose presence in the class was to shrivel up the sensibilities of the children as if they had been so many sensitive plants ; and we have been pained to see both the teacher and the children *pounding thro’* an afternoon, dragging along as if they were the drudges and slaves of some crushing educational system, instead of their being intelligently and cheerfully interested in the subject before them. The fault was in the teacher’s manner. *It wanted something*. What that something was is about as difficult to determine as the something deficient in the picture submitted to Sir Joshua Reynolds. Sir Joshua was bound to admit “that it evinced great talent.” “Was not the light and shade perfect?” “Yes.” “Was the colouring to his mind?” “Yes.” “The perspective—was *that* at fault?” “No.” “Then what *does* it want?” was the eager inquiry of the young artist as he noticed that there was an air of dissatisfaction about the critic. “Well, sir,” was the reply, it wants—it wants—it wants *THAT—that* is what it wants.” There are teachers with many qualifications, but they fail something in manner. They want *THAT*, and this want prevents their success.

In sitting down to study a lesson, you must determine what you shall aim at in your teaching—how you shall proceed to effect it, and what lines of thought and forms of expression will be most adapted to your scholars. You should know the *context* of your *text*, its relations to other passages and to other doctrines ; its contrasts and opposites should also be noted. A full mastery of the actual meaning of the textual phraseology being attained ; the *lessons* to be given in it ought to be determined upon ; the *doctrines* to be deduced should be carefully drawn out ; the *illustrations* be used rightly placed, and the *application* distinctly determined upon.

Mr. Groser, in “Ready for work,” classifies our lessons thus : first, narrative lessons ; secondly, doctrinal lessons ; thirdly, figurative lessons, and then remarks :—

I. *Narratives* must be *explained* in their historical meanings, their doctrinal teachings *deduced*, and then *applied*.

II. *Doctrinal* passages must be *explained*, illustrated and applied.

III. Figurative lessons must be *explained as figures*, their *spiritual meaning* unfolded, and the *application* of the latter enforced.

It will thus be seen that these various forms of presenting divine truth are substantially one. The teacher's object is to *explain*, *illustrate*, and *apply* the chosen lesson—to render it *intelligible*, *attractive* and *impressive*.

In harmony with this Mr. Groser recommends a teacher, when he sits down to study his lesson, to consider these three questions:—

“What does this passage mean? [taking text and context.]

“What doctrines does it teach? [explicitly or implicitly.]

“To whom do they apply?” [persons, classes, or ourselves.]

In preparing “notes of a lesson” the teacher will have to provide—1st, for the *introduction*; 2nd, the *exposition* or explanation; 3rd, the *illustration*; 4th, the *application*.

In the *introduction* he must endeavour to rouse attention, as well to connect the present lesson with the previous one; in the *exposition* he must not only give information, but train his scholars to it by the elucidation of the subject before them; with regard to the *illustrations*, he must see that they are simple and natural, really calculated to throw light on the subject, and not to obscure by useless anecdotes and pointless tales. The *application* need not be kept to the last, but it should never be omitted, and never made without prudence and judgment, as well as sympathy and affection.

With regard to the position of the application, Mr. Spurgeon said, the other day, “The custom used to be always to finish a sermon with a practical conclusion, but he found that the sinners had learned to expect this, and got themselves ready for it. He therefore now brought in his practical conclusion in a part of the sermon where it was not expected, and so took a shot at them when they were not on their guard.” But the question will suggest itself, Is it wise to parade before a class such a division of a lesson as I have suggested? I reply, “Certainly not,” but it is wise to have such a division in your own mind; and though you do not visibly take it to school with you, you may very well employ it in the getting up of your outline notes. Such an arrangement will serve as scaffolding to facilitate the construction of your lessons, but you may follow the custom of builders in some parts of the country, who place the scaffolding inside their erections, and thus keep it from public view.

There is yet one important branch of the subject on which I have not even touched—I mean discipline. I shall not attempt to discuss

this subject fully now, but shall content myself with remarking that the pith of all that I could advance on this matter may be found in those words of the poet in which he says,—

“O’er wayward childhood wouldst thou hold firm rule,
And sun thee in the light of happy faces?
Love, hope, and patience—these must be thy graces,
And in thine own heart let *them* first keep school.”

And now I must draw to a close. Yet I cannot do so without expressing the hope that the survey which I have endeavoured to take of the province of Christian education, in its principles and in its art, will not, by its apparent and superficial extent, dishearten any one of my readers. Deeply should I regret such a result. Rather let me cherish the hope that it will stimulate each one more thoroughly to study a subject so interesting in itself, and of such importance to all who occupy the position of Sunday school teachers. If you do this, my friends, be assured that your efforts cannot actually or absolutely fail. I believe you will not only be able to look back with pleasure upon your home studies, but that their beneficial influence will abide with you, and will affect your class instruction for many a day to come. May it be so, even more than we can now anticipate.

But some of my readers may have long been engaged in the work of teaching, though they are still anxious for any information which will assist them in prosecuting their labours with increased efficiency and success. It is cheering to know that there is zeal like this, which age cannot weaken nor many cares destroy. May all such, my friends, enjoy an ever-increased pleasure in their occupation; may they be kept “faithful unto death,” and be enabled joyfully to finish the work which God has given them to do. Not to one only, but to all of us, the poet’s word of exhortation may furnish a heart-thought now and in the future:—

“Finish thy work, the time is short,
The sun is in the west,
The night is coming down: till then
Think not of rest.

“Rest! Finish all thy work, then rest.
Till then, rest never:
The rest prepared for thee by God
Is rest for ever.

“Finish thy work, then go in peace,
Life’s battle fought and won.
Hear from the throne the Master’s voice,
Well done! well done!”

J. A. C.

The Reviewer.

SCIENCE STUDIES. No. I.—THE SCIENCE OF BOTANY :

Notices of Works suited for preparation for Examinations.

The Pathway to Botany. By LEO H. GRINDON. London: F. Pitman.

The Little Things of Nature. By LEO H. GRINDON. London: F. Pitman.

Brief Notes on Structural Botany. By S. J. W. SANDARS, M.A., F.G.S. London Educational Trading Company.

First Steps to Botany, By Rev. C. A. JOHNS, B.A., F.L.S. Westminster: The National Society Depository.

Outlines of Botany; designed for Schools and Colleges. By J. H. BALFOUR, M.A., M.D., F.R.S.; Professor of Botany, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black.

IN fulfilment of the promise contained in the prospectus of the *British Controversialist* issued for the present half-year, we have, at the request of the conductors, examined with critical intent a few works on one of those subjects which appears in almost every examination-list. Botany is one of the "Science Studies" in which students, both junior and senior, are to be examined in December at the Cambridge Local Competition. Under the title of Vegetable Physiology it is also on the list of subjects to be prepared for the Oxford May examination, and a knowledge of its general principles is required at the London University. Independently of this it has high claims upon the attention of the self-educator, as well as to the general reader. We give the following as the result of our investigative criticism.

The whole science of botany, though really concentrated in a seed, a vital atom of sleeping but awakable life, a minute store-house of upwrapped energy, expands into an exposition of all that seeds may become, result in, or grow to; it traces the tiny tender atom from its firstling stir of life, through the whole course of its developable being, till it prepares inheritors and successors, and then passes away; and whatever variety of vitality

any such atom exhibits, botany registers, investigates, and tries to comprehend.

Flowers are not only the poetry but the philosophy of nature. The study of plant-life supplies strange analogies to human life, and in all ages the poets have woven into their bright verses the grace, the hues, the fragrance of the vegetable kingdom. Nature's magic, indeed, may produce the changes from the Necropolis of the winter clods to the abounding immortality of summer. From the seemingly relentless grip of the cold frost-king, the queen of warmth lovingly releases the arrested life, and nature quickens into verdure and beauty and bounty. The science of the secrets of seeds and stems, of flowers and fruits, of roots and reproductive power in plants, constitutes vegetable physiology, or botany. Leo Hartley Grindon, one of the most able and full-minded exponents of this science of plant-life, author of the two works named at the head of this paper, says, "Botany is the science which considers the nature of plants—how they are constructed, what they are composed of, the circumstances of their life and growth, what they are good for, the countries and places they inhabit, their various and charming beauty, along with many other curious and interesting facts, such as render the study of it exceedingly pleasant and instructive, both to young people and old, at all seasons of the year, and wherever we may go."

"There are," as every one knows, "thousands of different kinds of plants, and all these alike receive the botanist's attention, and reward him with something useful and satisfactory to know." "The individuals constituting this vast assemblage have, in every case, their peculiar features;" but they are "distinguishable from one another by the variety in their leaves, flowers, stema, roots, and seeds." "Although when we look at plants in the mass, they seem so varied as literally to place it—

'Beyond the power
Of botanist to number up their tribes,'

this is not the actual case. It is known to within a dozen how many kinds of wild-flowers grow in England, how many in France, how many in Italy, how many in every country that has been diligently and skilfully explored; and in course of time the whole vegetable offspring of our planet will no doubt be reckoned up, and an account of it be printed." "Half our native plants belong

to no more than ten families, three hundred species to ten others, and the bulk of the remainder happen to be so singularly formed that they stand as distinct and individualized as islands out in the sea. . . . The beginning of our contemplations of nature must always and necessarily be devoted to *differences*: as we ascend, we find that the highest and most beautiful part of knowledge is that which traces *resemblances*, and that resemblances resolve at last into unity, as the scattered trees of the plain, surveyed from the mountain top, become a forest, and fill the eye as a single leaf."

After these introductory observations Mr. Grindon proceeds "to consider the parts of which plants are composed, and by the peculiarities of which they are distinguished and associated."

Perfect plants are those in which all or nearly all the parts ever entering into the fabric of trees and flowers are present in high and beautiful development, a special organ being appropriated to every different function. The chief criterion is the presence of a *blossom*."

"None of the plants in the great division called *imperfect* ever produce *blossoms*. . . . They are replete with wonderful beauty nevertheless, delighting the true lover of nature not more with their delicate and unexpected forms than with the simplicity of their organization, competent as it is to the performance of every one of the offices which in perfect plants devolve on so many servitors."

However large and complex a plant may be, and whether tree or herb, its parts are all resolvable into these five:—(1) The Root. (2) The Stem. (3) The Leaves. (4) The Flower. (5) The Fruit.

1. "The Root is that strong underground part of the plant which holds it firmly in its place as anchors hold ships, and also sucks up water and transmits it to the stem above. . . . Generally speaking, it consists of two portions, one stout and thick, and more or less branched, called the *caudex*, and issuing from this a vast quantity of slender fibres resembling threads." "The extremity of every fibre is soft and spongy." "The tips of the fibres long ago received the name of *spongiolæ*."

"In botany, as in everything else, it is not the place that a thing is in that determines its nature, but what it is composed of, and how it is employed."

2. "The Stem is that part of the plant which ordinarily rises into the air, preserving a more or less erect position, generally dividing into branches, and bearing the leaves, the flowers, and the fruit; the boughs, the branches, and the twigs being included under the one general name. Many particulars have to be noticed in regard to it, the chief of these being (1) the shape, (2) the kind of surface, (3) the direction, (4) the ramification, (5) the internal structure of the stem."

3. "No part of the plant, not even the flower, requires more careful consideration than the leaf. In regard to it we must notice (1) the shape, (a) as simple and undivided, (b) simple and divided, (c) compound, with their different varieties; (2) the margin, (3) the venation as (a) net-veined, (b) converging-veined, (c) fork-veined; (4) the disposition of the leaves upon the stem, (5) their normal composition, (6) their surface, (7) their duration, (8) their use."

4. "The Flower is by no means the simple thing it appears at a distance. Ordinarily there are present in it four distinct parts, two of which are composed of still more delicate ones. Flowers are—(1) complete and simple, (2) complete and compound, (3) incomplete."

(1) "The most striking and beautiful portion of a complete flower is that wherein the colour usually lies. Botanists call it the *corolla*, or little crown, the flower being the consummate glory of the plant."

(2) "Outside and underneath the corolla there is a cup or vase, usually of green and leafy texture, about a quarter as large, and consisting, like the corolla, either of several independent pieces, or of a definite number of pieces more or less conjoined by their edges from the base upwards. The component pieces are called the *sepals*, and the total of them is the *calyx*. While the blossom is yet a bud, the calyx encloses and protects the *petals*, or leaves of the corolla."

(3) "The *perianth* is whatever surrounds the stamens and pistils, whether single or twofold, coloured or pale green, excepting only when these consist only of bracts, or of some kind of involucre."

(4) "In the very centre of the flower (when simple and complete) stands the pistil, or in certain plants a cluster of pistils. When solitary this important member usually consists of three distinct members, which in relative form and position resemble the three portions of an Ionic or a Corinthian column,—the lowest member,

called the ovary, resembling the pedestal; and the uppermost one, called the stigma, resembling the capital; while the intermediate stalk, called the style, corresponds with the shaft."

(5) "Standing around the *pistil* in all complete and simple flowers are the bodies called *stamens*, delicate organs usually consisting of a stalk called the filament, and upon its summit a kind of head called the *anther*, which is usually round, oval, oblong, or kidney-shaped." "The latter organ is a box, usually of two compartments, and containing a light powder called *pollen*. As soon as the flower has obtained its full development, and shines in the sweet perfection of its beauty, the anthers open, and their pollen is conveyed over to the stigma." "The passage and the anchorage of the pollen grains being accomplished, after a while a fine thread of semi-fluid matter exudes from the end of every grain that has effected a lodgment, and pushes its way through the style into the ovary, where it enters an ovule, fertilizing it with power to ripen into a seed."

The different forms of *inflorescence* are next defined and described. *Bracts* "occupy the space between the last of the true and perfect leaves of the plant, and the base of the calyx of the flower."

5. "After the root, the stem, and the leaves have fulfilled their duties as stewards of the vegetable household, enlarging its fabric, and maintaining it in health and vigour; after the flower has been put forth, and the stamens have executed their office, and the petals which were so bright and lovely have departed, and the glory seems at an end, the grandest event of all has yet to happen, and that is *the ripening of the Fruit*, the harvest home of the spring and summer labours. The fruit or seed-pod is the final production of the plant." The fruit is the enlarged and perfected ovary with its contents, . . . the seed-pod in its mature condition." The most important and the most frequent forms of the fruit are then described and defined; and the following summary is presented in a tabular form:—

The parts of a perfect plant are—

1. The *Root*, consisting of Caudex and Rootlets, which end in Spongioles.
2. The *Stem*, usually divided into Branches and Twigs, and generally composed of Wood, Bark, and Pith.
3. The *Leaves*, usually consisting of Blade, or laminae, and Footstalk, or petiole, and either simple or compound.

4. The *Flower*, consisting of {
- | | |
|---|-----------|
| Calyx, formed of Sepals. | |
| Corolla „ Petals. | |
| Stamens „ Filament and Anther, the latter containing Pollen. | |
| Pistil „ { Ovary, containing ovules. | |
| | { Style. |
| | { Stigma. |

5. The *Fruit*, or ripened Ovary, containing Seeds.

After treating of "Imperfect Plants," the author proceeds to "Classification," "Exogens" and "Endogens," the "Families of Plants," and their "Alliances," giving *lists* and *types*; he passes thence to "Genera and Species," "Varieties," and "Hybrids." He thus supplies in the space of 136 pages, to which he has appended 44 pages of illustrative woodcuts, containing 159 figures, an admirable outline of botany—free, instructive, accurate, pleasingly written and plain. He has added to its usefulness by ten columns of index, by reference to which almost any requirement of the student may be got in a moment's time. Altogether it is an excellent and valuable introduction to botany. The foregoing outline may supply an idea of its completeness, and the succeeding extracts will prove the good sense and the instructiveness Mr. Grindon displays as a teacher of the science of plant-life.

"Botanical words and names are often thought particularly hard and numerous. They are no more so than the words and names employed in chemistry, geology, or any other branch of knowledge, or than those of the ordinary geography of our every-day life, which in its Chimborazos, and Guadalquivira, and Titicacas, and Alleghanies, and Orinocos, and Spitzbergen, is quite a match for the vocabulary of the hardest botany that was ever invented. Depend upon it, things are 'hard' only when we do not care about them. Taking interest in a subject, no matter what, soon renders it easy. These very words, so much dreaded, are but like the names of new acquaintances, strange when we first hear them, but which in a week or two become as familiar as those of our best known friends. Technical terms cannot be dispensed with if we would master a subject. Every branch of knowledge has a language of its own, and it is quite a mistake to suppose that Botany can be made an exception. The simple fact of its variety and beauty implies a vocabulary to match, just as a large and populous country implies in its towns and cities a map full of names of places. To attempt to dispense with technical terms would be as hindering to the real progress of the student as uncomplimentary to his intelligence.

Ordinarily, too, these terms are so exact, so expressive, so indifferently translatable into words of colloquial speech, that it would be a far greater pity to attempt to leave them out than it is troublesome for the young botanist to make them his own. Moreover they have not to be learned all at once, but one by one, as they are wanted and become interesting; and when brought together in pages like the present, it is not so much with the idea of their being committed to memory in a lump, like a lesson in an old-fashioned school, as to be explained systematically and to be ready for reference. . . . The names applied to plants are either vernacular or 'botanical.' The vernacular name is that by which a plant is commonly called in the country or district where it grows wild, or is in ordinary cultivation; the 'botanical' is that by which it is known to science, and is either directly derived from the Latin or Greek language, or has had a Latin form and termination given to it, at once for the sake of uniformity, and to adapt it for citation either in Latin writings or in foreign languages. The Latin names have in no case been given out of pedantry; they are absolutely necessary to men of science, who cannot possibly communicate accurately without using them. Both sets of names have in many cases an 'alias.' The vernacular names differ in almost every part of the country. Just as the daisy, which in France is called the 'marguerite,' is in Scotland termed 'gowans,' the botanical names similarly differ in various authors, owing principally to individual and usually improved views as to the affinities of plants. But there is a great deal of mere caprice in this matter, and a large portion of the synonyms with which books are unhappily crowded would have been better never contrived. Properly constructed, both the vernacular and the botanical names are twofold, one denoting the genus and the other the species. Thus, *LATHYRUS latifolius*, the 'broad-leaved pea;' *LATHYRUS odoratus*, the 'sweet-scented pea;' *LATHYRUS azureus*, the 'blue-flowered pea.' *Lathyrus* and *Pea* are here the 'generic' names, and the adjectives are the 'specific.' In some instances vernacular names are simple, as primrose, cowslip, daffodil, and turnip; but it is seldom that a precise idea is conveyed by such, any more than by the use of a man's surname without the 'Christian.' The particular derivations or etymologies of the various names, both vernacular and botanical, have to be sought in many directions. They form an immense and very delightful object of investigation, being in many cases extremely ancient, and often highly figurative and poetical. Many others are commemorative, or given in honour of eminent botanists, whose example is thus pleasingly held up before the mind when the plant happens to come in view."

To those who want only an outline glimpse of the main elements of the science of botany, a mere bird's-eye view of the subject in

a concise, retainable form, and who do not care for or like big books on the subjects they study, the books noted at the top of this notice will perhaps commend themselves.

The "First Steps" forms one of the small series of "Elementary Books for Schools," published by the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor, and costs about three halfpence. It contains concise chapters on (1) the Seeds, (2) the Stem, (3) the Leaf, (4) the Flower, (5) Modes of Inflorescence, (6) the Fruit; and within 32 small pages gives a fair *abrégé* of the teachings of science on the subjects treated of.

The "Brief Notes" are designed to hold the place of notes taken at lectures, giving in a condensed form the substance of what may have been learned by a diligent hearer." It concerns itself with Structural Botany only, and is to be supplemented by a similar work on Systematic Botany. It consists of 32 pages 8vo. in cloth covers, with several illustrations set in the text, and costs about sixpence. Part I. treats of External Organization—(1) Conservative Organs: 1, the root; 2, the stem; 3, the leaf; (2) Reproductive Organs: 1, the flower; 2, the fruit; 3, the seed. Part II. Internal Organization, giving the chemistry of tissue, detailing the ordinary cell-contents in concise terms; describing next the structure of the stem, and explaining the cortical system. Afterwards it treats of cryptogams—filices, musci, fungi, lichens, and algæ; and it provides an excellent schedule for classifying plants;—showing thereby the amount and accuracy of the scientific knowledge possessed.

Of Professor John Hatton Balfour as a botanist and a botanical instructor, no one acquainted with the progress of science can be ignorant. He is the author of "The Botanist's Companion," "Manual of Botany," "Class-book of Botany," and these "Outlines" for the purpose of promoting the study of Botany in Schools, Colleges, and Philosophical Institutions. His contributions on this subject are valued by all the associations for the promotion of science, and are welcomed in every magazine devoted to the exposition of plant-life, and the scientific societies of Europe have delighted to honour Professor Balfour. He has not confined his studies wholly to botany; nor does he view botany only from the side of science. He is the author of a splendid work intended to illustrate the wisdom and beneficence of God as displayed in the

structure and functions of plants, entitled "Phyto-Theology." He has also devoted a separate treatise to the botanical description of the "plants of Scripture." He wrote the article "Botany" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and the work which we now notice contains the substance of that article, in which the aim was to give the important facts of botanical science as briefly and popularly as possible, without entering into lengthened explanations. It concerns itself with—(1) the structure and functions of plants, (2) their classification, and (3) their distribution both at the present day and at former epochs of the earth's history. It forms a work of 744 pages, divided into four parts—I. Structural Botany. II. Classificatory Botany. III. Geographical Botany. IV. Palæontological Botany, with Glossaries and Indexes, which make the study easy and pleasant. It is a book authoritative on the subject, and students who desire complete and thorough knowledge can scarcely do with less than these Outlines contain.

By a careful study of Balfour's Outlines for a year, a full acquaintance with the subject might be gained, if the student had access to a large botanical garden, and had a judicious instructor. It is the student's book, and seems quite a masterpiece of didactic botany. But for a general medium knowledge of the essentials of botany, Grindon's "Pathway" ought to be sufficient. By six weeks or two months' fairly given attention, the contents of that book might be thoroughly mastered, even by a self-educator, provided he had a friend who knew a little of scientific botany to show him the special parts of plants. Sandars' "Brief Notes" might be got up by an enthusiast in little more than a fortnight, and Johns' "First Steps" might be taken in a week. In these estimates we allow two hours' daily study, and think the time stated, if properly used, should amply suffice for the reproducing study an examination necessitates and requires.

The Inquirer.

QUESTION.

980. I should feel greatly obliged if some one who can will furnish me with the *History* of William Edward Hartpole *Lecky*, M.A. ? I mean, of course the eminent author of the "History of Rationalism," and the *History of Morals, &c.*," and "Irish Oratory." Who and what is he?—J. E.

981. Who and what is Arthur Lloyd, Windsor, who is the author of a handsome volume, entitled "*Ethica, or Characteristics of Men, Manners, and Books.*"—J. E.

982. Can any of your able correspondents inform me whereabouts is Henry Phylip Tappan, the author of the great work on the "Doctrine of the Will," and especially his "Review of Edwards, &c." He lived for some time in Michigan, America, when the last edition of his works were issued, but where and what is he doing now?—J. E.

983. Can any of your *readers* inform me how I may become a member or fellow of "The Royal Historical Society of Great Britain," and of "The Royal Society of Literature?"—ALEXANDRINE.

984. Will you kindly oblige by informing me in your "Inquirer" page, what is the best course for a young man to pursue, to become a good composer in English, to have an elegant flow of language, and if reading is recommended, please mention what books.—J. S. F.

985. Could you inform me of any illustrated work on botany interspersed with poetry?—J. S. F.

986. Can any of your readers tell me if the study of heraldry is useful? Does it conduce to a more thorough knowledge of history?—A. L.

ANSWER.

980. W. E. H. Lecky is, we believe, a native of Cork, or its immediate vicinity. He was borne about 1828, and is M.A. of Dublin University, where he was educated and where he graduated with high honour. He must have been a diligent student, as his works indicate a thoroughness of inquiry which few modern books show. He is a disciple of the Buckle, Grote, and Mill school. He possesses genius, originality, and industry, and has a mind, we think, of the ripening sort.—B. R.

1000. Having had the *British Controversialist* for this month placed in my hands, the inquiry you make concerning Mr. Skeats attracted my attention. I can inform you that he is the son of a surgeon now deceased, but formerly residing at Lymington, in Hampshire.

Mr. Skeats is now engaged, I believe, in writing for the London press. Any further information you may require I have no doubt his publisher would furnish.—ANONYMOUS.

Our Private Tutor.

BIBLE PAGES.

No. IV.—THE BOOK OF JUDGES.

THE Book of Judges is one of the canonical books of the Old Testament. The authorship of it is not known, though Jewish tradition ascribes it to Samuel. We learn from the book itself that it was composed in the early part probably of the reign of David. The references made in the work to there being no king *then* in Israel (Judg. xxix. 1; xxi. 25) show that there was, at the time of its being written, a king. A comparison between Judg. i. 19 and 2 Sam. v. 6—8 will suggest that the book was composed prior to the establishment of Jerusalem as the city of David. The canonicity of this book is clear from the references made to it by other sacred writers; *e. g.*, compare 1 Sam. xii. 9—11 with the events recorded in Judg. ii. 13; iii. 7—12; vi. 14, 32; x. 7, 10, 15, 16; xi. 1; xiii. 1, &c.; 2 Sam., where Jerubbaal is called *Jerubbesheeth*, with Judg. vi. 32; ix. 53; Psa. lxxxiii. 9, 11, with Judg. iv. 15, 24, and v. 21; vii. 24, 25; viii. 12, 21. Psa. lxxviii. and lxxxix. also afford parallels; Isa. ix. 4; x. 26, with Judg. vii. 22, 25, &c. The extent of time of which the book treats is (see chap. xi. 26) somewhere about three hundred years. Many of the events related occurred simultaneously, not successively. It can scarcely be regarded as a history in its chronological relation of events; it is rather a philosophy of history illustrated by references to, or anecdotes of, events which show the intimate, even causal, connection between sin and suffering, not only individually but in confederacies, and the special mercy of God to the Israelites, notwithstanding their transgressions, in raising up deliverance for them whenever they lifted up their hearts in penitent prayer to His throne who is the Theocrat of the race. The judges were the vicegerents of the invisible Jehovah, whose power was given to them, so that they became, through Him, mighty to save. They had no royal authority, though they exercised supreme power. They were the archons of Israel, holding their commission directly from God, and being responsible to Him. They are not to be confounded with

the administrators of justice appointed by Moses at the suggestion of Jethro, his father-in-law, after the departure from Egypt (Exod. xviii. 21—26).

JUDGES were not a regular succession of governors, but of occasional deliverers raised up among the Israelites by God as divine dictators. At ordinary times Israel was a republican confederacy, the elders and princes having authority, under God, in their respective tribes. Paul says (Acts xiii. 20), "God gave them judges about the space of four hundred and fifty years until Samuel the prophet." Of fifteen of these judges an account is given in the book bearing that name, viz., Othniel, *the lion of God* (iii. 8, 9); Ehud, *joining* (iii. 15); Shamgar, *warrior* (iii. 31); Deborah, *a bee*, and Barak, *lightning* (iv. and v.); Gideon, *one who cuts down* (v. i, vii., viii.); Abimelech, *father of the king* (viii. 31); Tola, *a worm, or scarlet* (x. 1); Jair, *whom God enlightens* (x. 3—5); Jephthah, *whom God sets free* (xi. and xii.); Ibzan, *splendour* (xii. 13—15); Elon, *oak* (xii. 11, 12); Abdon, *servile* (xii. 13—15); Samson, *sunny* (xiii.—xvi.); Eli, *exalted* (1 Sam. ii. 11); Samuel. Thus we read in 1 Sam. viii. 1, 2, "when Samuel was old, that he made his sons [Joel and Abiah] *judges* in Israel;" we are not to include them among the avenging and defending archons of Israel; they were rather of the sort to whom causes were referred in courts.

In Acts xiii. 20 it is stated that God gave the children of Israel "judges about the space of four hundred and fifty years." The following suggestion has been made in explanation of the chronology thus given:—1. Servitude to Mesopotamia 8 years. 2. Othniel judge 40 years. 3. Subjection to Moab 18 years. 4. Ehud and Shamgar judges 40 years each; 80 years. 5. Subjection to Jabin and Sisera 20 years. 6. Deborah and Barak, judges 40 years. 7. Subjection to Midian 7 years. 8. Gideon, judge 40 years. 9. Abimelech, judge 3 years. 10. Tola, judge 23 years. 11. Jair, judge 22 years. 12. Subjection to Ammon 18 years. 13. Jephthah, judge 6 years. 14. Ibzan, judge 7 years. 15. Elon, judge 10 years. 16. Abdon, judge 8 years. 17. Subjection to the Philistines 40 years. 18. Samson, judge 20 years. 19. Eli, judge 40 years. Total 450. The greater portion of the *times* calculated for each of these nineteen items are taken from the text of the book itself, and these may be regarded (1) as a proof how closely and minutely Paul had studied the Old Testament; and (2) one of those undesigned

coincidences which so frequently occur as incidental proofs of the inspiration of the Scriptures.

The Book of Judges has given occasion to a large amount of poetic effort. Chief of all such illustrative poems stands, of course, Milton's "Samson Agonistes." Among the Seatonian prize poems at Cambridge the following occur:—1814, "Jephthah meeting his daughter after his Rash Vow;" 1828, "Deborah;" 1839, "Gideon;" 1851, "Samson."

In Alfred Tennyson's "Dream of Fair Women," and in Nicholas Michel's "Famous Women and Heroes," Part III, "Jephthah's Daughter" forms one of the subjects. Byron has verses on the same subject. References to the matter of this book occur in Shakspeare; I. "Hen. VI.," i., 2, "The sword of Deborah," Sisera's Death, "Tempest," iii., 2; Jephthah, III. "Hen. VI." vi.; "Hamlet," ii., 2; "Samson," "Hen. VIII.," v., 3, I. "Hen., VI.," i., 2, &c.

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK OF JUDGES.

JOSHUA died. The elders who outlived him served the Lord. After their demise several of the tribes with partial success proceeded by separate warfare to subjugate their different lots, but they only put the Canaanites to tribute, and did not drive them out of the land. Another generation arose, which forsook God and served Baal and Ashtoreth, wherefore the anger of the Lord was kindled against them. Micah the Ephraimite became a stumbling-block to Israel by the erection of a domestic chapel furnished with graven and molten images, to conduct the worship in which he, first, appointed his own son, and subsequently a wandering Levite, priest. A war of the eleven tribes against Benjamin arose on account of the disgraceful conduct of some sons of Belial, men of Gibeah of Benjamin. The disorders which thus arose multiplied and the Lord delivered them up to spoilers, by whom they were exposed to sore distress. Nevertheless in their evil days God raised up for them supreme magistrates called judges, who delivered them out of the hands of the spoilers who successively afflicted them. From their *first* servitude under Chushan-rishathaim (*the blackness of iniquities*), king of Mesopotamia, they were delivered by Othniel; from the *second* under Eglon (*chariot*), they were freed by Ehud, who assassinated Eglon, from the *third* they were liberated by Shamgar, who slew six hundred of their oppressors, the Philistines, with an ox-goad. Their fourth oppression, endured under Jabin (*the knowing*) king of Canaan, reigning in Hazor, was brought to a

close, at the divinely prompted instigation of Deborah, a prophetess and judge, by Barak, who went forth to battle at Tabor against Sisera, the captain of Jabin's host, who mustered his army on the banks of the river Kishon. Sisera (*swallow-eyed*), utterly discomfited, fled, and by invitation took shelter in the tent of Jael (*a kid*), the wife of Heber the Kenite, who entertained him, with inhospitable guile, and while he was fast asleep in heavy weariness, pinned him to the ground by a nail driven through his temples, though there existed a treaty of peace at the time between Heber the Kenite and Jabin.

But the children of Israel again did evil in the sight of the Lord, and for seven years they were crushed and impoverished by the Midianites, who came up as grasshoppers in multitude against them. They were from this fifth oppression delivered by Gideon (Jerubbaal, or Jerubbesheth), son of Joash the Abi-ezrite, of whose life some notable incidents are related. He was singularly favoured with the presence of the Lord, who kindly—when he was humbly refusing to take the leadership against the Midianites, proposed to him by God's angels—gave token of His power and grace in the instances of the fleece and the dew. He collected an army of 32,000 to go against Israel's enemies, but this was by divine direction reduced to 300 by the sign of lapping water in drinking. The combined host of Amalekites, Midianites, and children of the east were, under him, put to utter discomfiture—in accordance with the interpretation of a remarkable dream—by these 300 men, each equipped only with a trumpet in his right hand and a pitcher containing a lamp in his left. When the Ephraimites chid him sharply for having summoned them to war just in time to intercept the fugitives at the fords of Jordan, he pacified them saying—"Is not the gleanings of the grapes of Ephraim better than the vintage of Abiezer?" He captured and slaughtered Zebah (*Victim*) and Zalmunnah (*shadow*) kings of Midian, and in the fear of God nobly refused the kingly crown of Israel, having permitted the fabrication of an Ephod, richly ornamented with the spoils of Midian, that they became a snare to him and to his house. He bore rule over the north and east tribes for fifty years, and receives honourable mention in St. Paul's epitome of the historic power of faith, (Heb. xi. 32). [During a famine at this time Elimelech and Naomi left Israel for Midian and dwelt there, where their sons married Orpah and Ruth]. Gideon was no sooner dead than the

Israelites turned aside after Baalim and made Baalim-bereth (*the Idol of the Covenant*) their God. Gideon's son by a concubine wife slew his father's seventy sons except the youngest, Jotham—who hid himself, and the mother's brother of Abimelech, the slaughterer of his kinsmen, made him king. Whereupon Jotham, Gideon's youngest, son having gone up to Mount Gerizim addressed the Shechemites in a fine parable—the trees choosing a sovereign—and expressed a wish that, as they had dealt with his father's house, so might they deal with one another hereafter. Three years afterwards the men of Shechem dealt treacherously with Abimelech, who fought against Shechem, and took it, razed it to the ground, and sowed its site with salt.

Gideon was succeeded by Tola of Issachar and the Gileadite Jair. Thus the children of Israel returned to their idolatries, and the Lord gave them into the power of the Philistines and the Ammonites, who vexed them eighteen years, and crossed the Jordan to fight against Judah, Benjamin, and Ephraim. Jephthah the Gileadite, after they had put away their strange gods, became their deliverer. He had been expelled from his father's house, and had become captain of a band of freebooters. On being asked to assume the command of the army of Israel, he stipulated that he should be acknowledged chieftain of the Gileadites. He vainly attempted to negotiate with the king of Ammon; and having made a rash vow, went forth, under God's guidance, to smite the Ammonites, whom he signally overthrew. His joy was turned into grief when he found, on his return home, that his daughter, glorying in her father's prowess, came forth to meet him, and so became the victim of his rashness. The Ephraimites after the battle insulted him, he upbraided them, and his kinsman slew of them, at the passages of Jordan, 4,200—distinguished by their pronouncing Shibboleth, *Sibboleth*. Of Ibzan, Elon, and Abdon little that seems important is told. Again the children of Israel did evil in the sight of God, and the Philistines vexed them forty years, when Samson, the son of Manoah, a man of Zorah, of the tribe of Dan, was raised up as a deliverer. He treated them with rigour, and they revenged themselves as described, *ante*, pp. 73—75.

Returning to the time when Micah the Ephraimite set up the images—provided by the money he had stolen from and afterwards returned to his mother—it proceeds to tell how the Danites sent out five men to seek an inheritance, and how these came to the

house of Micah, recognised his Levite, and were encouraged on their way. They went to Laish, and agreed that it was a place of good hope. Six hundred Danites, on their report, are sent to surprise and take Laish, but on the way they tempted the Levite to go with them, and stole Micah's idols. Micah pursued them in vain; they take Laish, and call it Dan. There they set up an idolatrous worship with Micah's consecrated idol. A Levite going to Bethlehem in search of a runaway wife, and on his return with her, is entertained by an old man at Gibeah, and the men of Gibeah maltreat his wife, so that she died. He, in the eager revengefulness of his wrath, cut the body into twelve parts, and sent one portion to each of the twelve tribes, accompanied by a cry for vengeance. The children of Israel assembled in council to consider this heinous crime, and called the Benjamites to account for it; they resisted, and a sore conflict ensued, in which, in two engagements, Israel lost 40,000 men; but in the third encounter all the Benjamites except 600 were slain. Sorrow seized on the Israelites for the woe of Benjamin; they destroyed the city of Jabesh-Gilead, and gave 400 of the women as wives to the Benjamites. These not sufficing they stole the virgin daughters of Shiloh, and began to revive. These events seem to be narrated as specimens of the anarchy prevailing in Israel's kingless state.

ON READING ALOUD.

ARTICULATION implies the proper movement and placing of the several portions of the vocal organs so as to produce in regular order any desirable succession of sounds. It is by specific alterations in the voice organs, from throat to lips, that sounds are articulated into words. The primary sounds are indicated by letters, the collective force of these several letters arranged so as to suggest ideas constitute words. Articulation requires a correct and thorough capability of producing the several simple sounds of the single letters, and dexterity in the expressive pronunciation of them in such compound forms as they assume in words:—

“Verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent
Nominaque invenere.”

[“Words and names by inventive genius brought
Expressions and sensations to denote.”]

We require thus, first, the prompt discrimination by the eye of

letter from letter; second, the immediate and accurate production, by the voice organs, of the sound of which each letter is the sign to the full gratification of the ear; third, the perfect yet assimilative compounding of these several sounds, so as to issue flowingly from the mouth, and to be immediately suggestive to the mind. Many errors in articulation are local, and such pronunciations as these involve are called provincialisms. Others, however, are due to personal carelessness or sloveliness, and constitute mispronunciation; but many occur through defect of pliability in the organs, and are mal-pronunciations.

Persons who are defective in the power of utterance often employ great ingenuity in the choice of words to express their thoughts, in which the fewest possible recurrences of the disagreeable letter occur; this hides but does not overcome the defect.

We recommend a different practice. Make collections of sentences graduated in difficulty, containing the letters in the articulation of which inconvenience is found, and devote a fixed portion of time daily to the endeavour to give clear, distinct, fluent and musical vocalization to these sentences. For instance, suppose it is defect in the discrimination of D and T, choose such phrases as these:—

It did not try me, but I decidedly tried it, and managed it.

An attitude of such altitude seemed affected, and I dreaded it.

At that spot dire dread distracted me, and sense deserted me there, therefore it seemed right to depart thence.

Again a very frequent defect is the mispronunciation of S and its compounds. To overcome this, compose sentences such as follow:—

Send seldom such services as those, so unsuccessful are they.

Sharply censure such as shamelessly suffer sin's slavery.

Show some sense of seasonable surprise and suitable sorrow.

Soon swell swift sea-swept breezes.

I acquiesce in asking asparagus.

Assiduous assistance gets acceptance.

Of course the same plan is to be pursued in other cases, such as an indistinct aspiration of the letter H.

High hierarchy of Heaven, all hail! How happy are we who hear these hopeful harbingers of holy things.

Oh help, thou, mine heart to have the heavenly art of humbly hearing high Heaven's own holy truth.

I am having ham; this helm is made of elm; hew the yew;
lift high your eye. Do no harm with your arm. This is an ill
hill to climb. That tale of an arrow the soul may harrow.

A like method may be adopted in regard to the letters *V.* and
W; e. g., A worthy versifier wants a very wonderful variety of
vivid, vigorous words reverberant to work vocally into his vagrant
verses.

Wander in wonder, wherever you will, you may view worthy
women walking through the villages, willingly working among the
woe-stricken and vigorous votaries of well-doing.

The woeful wolf with vexing vehemence wasted unavailing
vaunts upon the wind's wings. The vacant wilderness invites no
vigilant votary, while wandering amidst its varied verdure, to utter
voluble words in voluble worship.

Our Collegiate Course.

SAMSON AGONISTES.

LITERARY AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS.

31. "As of a person *separate* to God," that is, a Nazarite. *Nu-
zar* signifies a feeble and insignificant twig (Isa. xi. 1, a *branch*):
at line 318 Samson is called "heroic nazarite." See also 1359 and
1386.

70. *Prime*, from *primus*, first Gen. i. 3, as "first created,"
line 83.

72. *Annulled*, reduced (*ad nullum*) to nothing, annihilated.

79. Scarce half, &c. See onwards, line 100.

80. There is a peculiar poetic beauty in this triple alliteration of
"dark," brought, as it is, into such quick contrast with the blaze of
noon. Sir Egerton Brydges says "There are few passages in poetry
so affecting as this, and the tone of the expression is peculiarly
Miltonic." Compare with this passage "Milton's Sonnet on His
Own Blindness."

81. Irrecoverably, perhaps intended for irrevocably; at any rate
used with that meaning.

84. Let there be light, &c. Gen. i. 3.

85. Bereaved, beautifully used from Gen. xliii. 14 without of

and used in the uncontracted form, from its longer sound being more suggestive of melancholy than the shortened *bereft*.

89. *Interlunar*, relating to the period of darkness which intervenes between a departing and a coming *lunar* change.

92. "That light is in the soul," referring to the philosophy of Heraclitus. "Our sensations do not appertain to external objects, they reside only in ourselves."

95. Obvious takes here its classical signification. In the way so as to meet, and thus, exposed, lying open to danger.

102. *Sepulchre*. burial-place, from *sepelio*, I bury.

107. "To all the miseries of life," apparently an echo from the General Assembly's Shorter Catechism, xix., where the words occur with "this" preceding "life."

110. *Joint*. Step by step in marching order, united.

111. *Steering*, directing their course; originally used of a ship and appropriately placed in the mouth of a dweller by the coast and made more expressive by the subsequent employment of the term *stare*, for a dead, fixed look of stupid impudence.

131. *Forgery*, from Latin *forga*; French *forge*, a smith's stithy, that which has been wrought upon the stithy, hammered into the shape and temper required, and so working a change on it.

132. *Cuirass*, perhaps from Latin *cor*, the heart; more probably from French *cuir*, leather. A breastplate.

133. *Chalybean*, from Chalybs, a town on the Euxine, famous for the tempering of steel; whence also Chalybeate.

138. *Ascalonite*, native of or dweller in Askelon.

139. *Ramp*, upspring, fierce, violent leap.

140. *Plated backs*. Covered with frocks or coats of mail (133).

144. "Foreskins," &c. Male Philistines. Synecdoche.

150. "Like who," &c. *Atlas*, leader of the Titans, who, having attempted to storm the Heavens, was, for his supreme treason, compelled by Jove to upbear the vault of Heaven upon his head and hands, and was thus compelled to support what he had laboured to destroy. Mercator, (sixteenth century) gave the name *Atlas* to a collection of maps. *Atlas* is a mass of mountain-land in the west of northern Africa, said by Herodotus to have been called by the natives "the pillars of Heaven."

154. Is *inseparably* dark used instead of *insuperably*? The former signifies unable to be disunited, the latter unable to be overcome, incurably.

153-8. Mark here how singularly the idea of imprisonment had acquired a hold of Milton's mind, as a synonym for blindness. Here, as in 6-8, he repeats the idea and the phrase in close consecution in each line.

HINTS TO STUDENTS ABOUT TO PREPARE FOR THE EASTER AND MICHAELMAS TERM, 1874, EXAMINATION AT OXFORD.

STUDENTS in logic are recommended to study the following subjects:—"II. The Relations of Language to Thought," on which see "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought," by George Boole, LL.D. chap. ii. and vi.; Spalding's "Logic," part i. The Doctrine of Terms; Archbishop Thomson's "Outlines of the Laws of Thought," part i.—Language; Archbishop Whately's "Logic," Introduction; "Rhetoric," Introduction; F. W. Newman's "Miscellanies," "Fragments on Logic," pp. 9-12; Reid's "Inquiry into the Human Mind," Chap. IV., sec. ii.; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, IV. and V.; Hamilton's Edition of Reid, Note B; Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," XXXV. and XXXVI.; Lectures on Logic, VII.—IX., and XXVIII. and XXXI.; Mill's "Logic," Book I.; McCosh's "Examination of J. S. Mill's Philosophy," Chap. XIV.; Mansel's "Artis Logicæ Rudimenta," Introduction and Notes on Chap. I.; T. S. Bayne's "New Analytic of Logical Forms," 1-21; Thomas Sheddon's "Elements of Logic," Chap. I. to III.; Adam Smith "On the Formation of Language;" A Paper by M. Franck in "Dictionnaire des Science Philosophiques," vol. vi., p. 635; De Morgan's "Formal Logic," chap. ii.; Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding," book iii.; Mansel's "Prolegomena Logica," chap. i.—iii.; Neil's "Art of Reasoning," chap. iii.; Neil's "Rhetoric," chap. ii.—iv.; Max Müller's "Lectures on the Science of Language."

The Societies' Section.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON ON GREATNESS—INDIVIDUALITY—AND SELF-RESPECT.

MR. R. W. EMERSON delivered a speech at the opening of Amherst College on the 12th July.

We select the following passages:—

Who can doubt the potency of an individual mind? It is this that fires the ambition of every man. It gives moral character. We count as the world's great masters—Alaric, Mahomet, Mirabeau, Napoleon, and even Henry VIII. From these examples I am bound to say that no way has been found to make heroism easy. The key-note of the true man is greatness, and greatness comes from energy. This belongs to us all, to which we are sometimes faithless, but of which we never quite despair. We hope to make it our monitor through the eternities. It is only the best anecdotes of mind that we wish to hear. I know that men of character think they must needs go to Africa, to Rome, to China. We have learned that the college, the parlour, and the counting-room demand as much true courage as the sea or the camp. It is very certain that we are not nor should be contented by any glory we have reached. Every mind comes one day to be superfluous. We outgrow the minds that we once regarded as our teachers. How soon we become sick of the playthings of the nursery! May not the time come when the poetry of Homer and Milton will seem like the sound of a tin pan? The praises we give to the true hero we shall unsay. The very word greatness provokes a feeling of hostility. Greatness! Is there not

something unfeeling in the word? There are points alike between the old way and the new way of the road to the stars. Self-respect is one. To use a homely illustration, we are at once drawn to that man in a tavern that maintains his own opinions in the face of all the bystanders. We honour his self-respect. The common labourer refuses money for saving your life, and makes himself your equal by the act, and asserts his self-respect. What a bitter-sweet sensation we have after pouring out our praises to one to find him quite indifferent to our good opinion! One sometimes meets a gentleman who, if good manners had not existed, would have invented them, showing what man originally owes to man. Self-respect, then, is the following of an inward leader, and is one of the main elements of greatness. There are functions of nature supplementary to the bent of individuals. Thus for geology there will be men born for an eye to viewing mountains and marking the differences of strata. Such a man will have a desire for chemistry, for natural physics, for fishes, and for plants. Men of the present find a stimulus through the wonders laid open by means of the solar spectro-scope, finding the same elements in the sun and distant planets as in the earth. Again, one boy longs for the sea, another for foreign lands, another to be an architect. Thus there is not a man born, but as his genius opens, turns in that line to his pursuit. There is the poet, the

orator, the schoolmaster, the college man, the physician, and the jurist. It is singular to see the adaptations of men to the world and every part of it. I remember that Sir Humphry Davy said, "My best discovery was Michael Faraday." In 1848, I had the pleasure of listening to Faraday's lecture on diamagnetism or cross-magnetism. He showed the force by experiment with several gases, that when ordinary magnetism is from north to south, in gases it may be from east to west. Further experiments led him to say that every chemical substance had its own polarity. Is not there a similar attribute in the soul? The mind of a man differs from any other mind as it opens. There is a teaching from nature leading him in a new path which signalizes him, and makes him more important to society. We call this his bias. No one will ever accomplish anything commanding unless he listens to this so-called bias in his mind. Every individual has a *proprium*. Swedenborg calls it a passion. The individual must obey this as it becomes developed, and only as he develops this does he gain true power in the world. It is his magnetic needle that leads him through the world. In morals this is called conscience; in the intellect it is called genius; in practice, it is called talent. I remember a critic at a college commencement care more for how much of the boy was manifested in each speaker than for any other quality. He looked for the *proprium* of each. This self is often overlooked. Let ten men be set to keeping a journal, and nine men forget their experiences in describing the experiences of others. Others fail to mark the self in others. Young people especially should not leave out the one thing a discourse would say. I have observed that in all the public speakers there is a desire to please rather than to speak their self-conviction.

When the thought that he stands for gives him fuller greatness in the intellectual powers, so that mankind seems to speak through his lips, he accomplishes his true mission. There is a certain transformation to a man thus speaking. When the true speaker appears, they, the orators, and who wish to be, simulate him, shall we ask, What is this self-respect? This would involve a search into the highest problems. A man needs all the armory of thought, and must wait sedulously every morning for the thought the spirit will give him. And in this self-respect or hearkening to the highest oracle, the man ought never to be at a loss in respect to his deep religious convictions. This is the practical perception of the deity in man. We do not pretend to any revelation, says the Quaker, but if at any time I wish to perform a journey and something interposes, I let it die. If it don't, pass away, I yield to this deep feeling in my nature. If you ask me the nature of this I cannot describe it. It is too simple to be described. It is like a grain of mustard-seed, yet the opposition of all mankind could not sever me from its leadings, nor the consent of all mankind confirm it. Respect is the bias of the individual mind. The word is created as an audience for the scholar, and the atoms of which his world is made our opportunities. Let the scholar use his self-respect to cope with giants. Thus you develop a character somewhat more clear and incompatible than the midnight stars. There are men with catholic genius who draw the extremes of society, so that the very dogs believe in them. It is another element of greatness. We have had such examples in this country. In politics, Clay, Webster; and in the pulpit, Father Taylor. Voltaire was such a man, reaching every extreme of society. In England, Fox; in

Scotland, Robert Burns. And I have some conviction that this can be justified when there is great imperfection of character. Perhaps the old Trouvère poet was right,—
'I oft have heard, and deemed the witness true,
What man delights in God delights in too.'

. . . We admire the intellectual gods of the world—Homer, Plato, Dante, Shakspeare; but who were the gods these gods delighted in? They are the silent poised lovers who make the sense and conscience of the mind, only working in the intelligence as a living force. Such are our influences. Miners in California tell us that there is one ore in which the gold cannot be separated without loss. So there are men from whose minds nothing can be detached without the disintegration of the whole. How often, then, we lament when we see talent sunk away substance! how often we are unable to separate general from specific ability! Blessed are they who have no talent, for they live. It is impossible to inventory the

minds of the gods. We meet people who read us, but do not tell us what they read. The only real benefit of which we are susceptible is what has been dignified for us. We must ask with Marcus Antoninus, if a picture is good, what matter who painted it? What matter who does good, if good is only accomplished? It is always desirable to collect examples in which greatness is dwarfed by greatness of a higher strain. I must read you a story of humility. A Jesuit was once in his cell, when the devil appeared to him. In his humility he arose and asked him to sit in his own chair, deeming him the more worthy. Learn a lesson. The success of the true scholar is humility. Every man is my master in some point, and in that I will be a learner. Young men, you may perhaps say the questions belong to the church; I must say that they belong to the daily service of the college—the profane service, if you choose to call it so. Study, then, the humanities, for something true may be gleaned from them.

Literary Notes.

THE first part of the catalogue of the Shakspeare Memorial Library, Birmingham, has just appeared from the pen of the Chief Librarian of the Free Public Libraries of that Midland town. It contains a preface giving an account of the Shakspeare Library, from its suggestion by Samuel Timmins, editor of *The Hamlets* of 1593 and 1594; its public advocacy, 1861, by George Dawson; and its inauguration, 1864, till the present time—eight years afterwards,—wherein we learn that it already contains 4,012 Shakspearean works: then follows a catalogue of the English editions of Shakspeare's works, diligently and carefully collated, and mentioning all their noticeable points and peculiarities. To this is subjoined the most complete and accurate "chronological and topographical table" of English editions of these works which we have seen—the most elaborate and painstaking piece of Shakspearean bibliography. The work closes with notices of selections from Shakspeare's plays. Three other parts are in the press, viz.,—A list of separately printed Shakspeare plays; an annotated catalogue of 1,200 vols. of Shakspeareana, and a list of Shakspearean articles in English periodicals; and a catalogue of foreign editions of Shakspeare, with index to the whole work, arranged under the headings—Subjects, Editors, Authors, &c.

Rev. Alexander Ballock Grosart, of Blackburn, is engaged on a new "Variorum Edition of the Poetical Works of John Milton." This edition is based on photo-chromolith *fac-*

similes of the extant MSS.—so dutifully sought after by S. Leigh Sotheby years ago, and noted in his rare and scarce magnificent folio in "elucidation of Milton's autograph;" and it will supply annotations containing all the variations made in the several editions of Milton's poems, from the earliest publication of his—the Sonnet to Shakspeare, written in 1630, and published in the second folio in 1632—till the latest issue in the author's lifetime in 1674. Mr. Grosart has already in the press his edition of "The Complete Works of Andrew Marvell" (Milton's friend, amanuensis, and fellow-patriot), from the original and early editions, with additions and translations, for the first time, of the Latin and Greek poems, a memorial, introduction, and notes. This issue of these poems will be relished by all who value the champion of Milton's reputation, the advocate of purity of representation, the opponent of bigotry and oppression in the disguise of religious zeal, and one of the finest of the minor poets of England. Col. T. P. Thompson's three clumsy quartos were got up first for a political, not a literary purpose, so that a purely poetic issue is a desideratum. The work will be illustrated in the quarto editions with portrait, *fac-similes*, and views.

Messrs. Hachette and Co. will shortly issue the Holy Gospel from the text of Bossuet, illustrated with 128 large plates by M. Bida, a work which has been twelve years in preparation, at an expense of fifty thousand pounds. M. Bida has

studied in the Holy Land the details of scenery, architecture, costume, &c., for the purpose of imparting distinct critical and historic accuracy to the views. Type has been cast expressly for the letterpress, and printed by Claye, of Paris. The marginal decorations are by Rossignaux, engraved on steel. It is to be issued in two handsome folio volumes in November, price £10 each; a few superfine paper copies, £20 per volume.

"The Jesuits and their History" is in preparation by John F. Maguire, M.P., of Cork.

Somebody seems to have made a discovery which anybody might have supposed did not require to be made, namely, that Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales," were written separately, at different times, and circulated as they were composed; being afterwards collected into one and bound into unity by the poet's conception of the pilgrimage. "The Parson's Tale" is supposed to have been the latest work of the author, and like Ovid's "Metamorphoses" and Virgil's "Æneid," did not receive the finishing touches of the poet.

The poems of George Outram—many of which are remarkable for a queer quaint humour of their own—are at last to be published. Outram succeeded big Samuel Hunter in the editorial chair of the *Glasgow Herald*, and was Blackwoodish in politics, humour, and literary inclinations.

The spelling of Shakspeare's name has again turned up as a subject of controversy between Messrs. Dircks and Pigott, but they scarcely seem cognizant of the literature of the question which has already engaged such Shakspeareans as Halliwell, Dyce, Madden, Ingleby, Collier, Grant White, Neil, Bohn, Massey, &c.

William Miller, the poet of the nursery, born 1810, died 20th August.

Messrs. Reeves and Turner have

just published "The Works of John Taylor, the water poet" with life, &c. 100 copies, at 42s.

Morning Advertiser religion has mostly been taken for Grant-ed; but its late editor is to give special expression to his views in a new religious journal.

An entirely new series of essays by James Martineau, LL.D., is appearing in "Old and New," an American magazine.

A most important physiological work on "The Beginnings of Life," by H. C. Bastian, M.D., F.R.S., has just been issued.

The early English romance of "Guy of Warwick," has been prepared by Dr. Zupitza of Vienna.

Blackwood's Magazine has done honour to "The Coming Race" by appointing its author as its serial novelist in succession to Charles Lever. A biography Charles Lever, by Major Francis Doyne Dryer, is announced as in preparation. It will comprise a large quantity of his peculiarly captivating correspondence.

"Kenhelm Chillingly: his Adventures and Opinions," is the name of a new novel from an old hand—even Lord Lytton's—promised us soon.

M. Philaréte Chasles, Shakspearean critic, *litterateur*, and librarian, is, it is to be hoped, to succeed Father Gratry as occupant of a seat in the French Academy.

An authentic memoir of Dr. Norman MacLeod, D.D., late editor of *Good Words*, &c., is promised.

"The Philosophy of Mak-branche" has been re-expounded in a work in two volumes by M. Ollé Lapruné, who has had awarded to him the Monthyan prize of 3,000 francs by the French Academy.

The author of "Popular Songs of Brittany," M. Luzel, has a second volume in the press; and has also a collection of "Breton Tales" nearly ready.

Modern Metaphysicians.

WILLIAM PALEY, D.D., ARCHDEACON OF CARLISLE, &c.

Author of "Moral Philosophy," "Natural Theology," "Evidence of Christianity," &c.

"It has long been deemed the glory of Socrates, that he brought philosophy from the schools of the learned to the habitations of men, by stripping it of its technicalities, and exhibiting it in the ordinary language of life. There is no one in modern times who has possessed the talents and disposition for achievements of this kind to an equal extent with Paley; and we can scarcely conceive any one to have employed such qualities with greater success. The transmutation of metals into gold was the supreme object of the alchemists' aspirations. But Paley had acquired a more enviable power. Knowledge, however abstruse, by passing through his mind became plain common sense, stamped with the characters which ensured its currency in the world."—*Bishop Turton.*

PHILOSOPHY is apt to soar. It is not always easy to bring her home to men's business and bosoms. The recondite and profound have charms for men chiefly when they have been utilized. In the law of evaporation the mystery of steam was concealed for ages. In man's early observations on the eccentricities of amber (*electron*) the firstlings of our telegraphic wires, which impart the speed of lightning to thoughts and speech, are to be found. Even as the researches of Kepler aid us in the construction of "The Nautical Almanac," and so throw the light of safety along the ocean highways of the world; and as the discoveries of Newton in gravitation now control the structure of ships and the making of locomotives, so also do the scientific force of Socrates, the metaphysics of Plato, the logic of Aristotle, rule the experiences and efforts of men in life, legislation, and thought. The rainfalls of the sky break most frequently and plentifully upon the mountain-tops, but flow refreshingly along the valley-lands, filling them with joy, gladness, and fertility. So is it with thought. Thought has its sources in the All-wise, whether it comes to us as intuition or experience; it develops itself in the spirits of the great, is spread through those receptive minds who with openness accept their guidance, and passes thence into the accredited beliefs and hopes, the laws and lives of the race. Knowledge requires not discovery only, but communication and diffusion; and, like commerce, has in general its threefold

processes to go through—invention, production, and distribution. Hence, though yea, may—we should—glorify the special spirits who think great thoughts for us, we ought not to despise the mediating souls which bring them fittingly and effectively into our hearts.

Our readers are aware of the singular concinnity and copiousness of the philosophy of Hobbes; the force and far-reachingness of the intellectualism of Locke; the exquisite subtlety and purity of the reasoning of Butler; and the strong, good sense of Reid. Not quite so extensively prevailing, perhaps, was the profound Platonism of Cudworth; the splendidly idealistic realism of Berkeley; the powerful scepticism of Hume, and the grand effective faith of Boyle and Newton. The early literature of the first half of the eighteenth century was in a transition state. Great ideas trembled through the intellectual atmosphere, but few of those mighty souls which can conduct the enlightenment of heaven into the very spirits of their fellows were to be found. There was a confusion instead of a fusion of speculations. An interplay of specious splendour took place between the negativists and positivists of that day; but—just as in our own day, though the parties have changed names since then—there was a want of a great mediatorial soul between the parties who could bring into effective practicality the best portions of the best thoughts to which the minds of the age had attained. Scepticism required to be led from raillery to reason, and religion was in want of some calming spirit who could quieten down the extravagances of a waywardly enthusiastic faith, and yet conserve to it and in it “the whole counsel of God” in regard to eternal things. But the age which accepted Pope as its prince of poets had no such spirit to bring into the forefront as a leader of men to a religion consonant with reason, yet rising far higher in its teachings and results than reason could do. What was not able to be done by one was striven after by the union of many, and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge arose as at once a protest against and a concession to the weakness of that age. Warburton wanted the suavity of the Christian spirit, and reasoned with such dogmatic unamiability as to seem unreasonable in his finest *exercises* into the territories of speculative investigation. Leslie dealt one single decisively effective blow against unbelief in his “Short Method with the Deists.” Soame Jenyns, layman and wit, brought out the idea of the *originality* of the scheme of reforming the world by an exemplar and twelve witnesses to his life, character, and teaching, with singular popular acceptancy; and Lardner, with all the patience of a *fakir*, digested the whole results of the learning of his time into the proof of “The Credibility of the Gospel History;” but, by his detracting inanity, made a work ineffective through

dulness which by fulness was calculated to be marvellous in its worth. Singularly enough, the age was one of contest between reason and faith, and yet both reason and faith were almost at their weakest. The faithful had defamed logic as an investigator, and contemned it as tending to "doubtful disputations," until the study of it had almost become a thing of nought in the universities; and the sceptic using ridicule as the test of truth, instead of what it is, the test of consistency, cultivated dexterity or brilliancy of wit rather than intelligent thinking. While doubt increased, reason, her true antagonist, was weakened to inanition in all ways and by all means, and doubt or dogma seemed to be the only alternatives before men. Yet it was neither a researchful nor a respectful doubt; it was a doubt accepted almost gladly as a justification of a life of easy-going pleasure among the rich and social sensuality among the poor. No proof of the prevailing scepticism of the age is more patent than the fact that a premium was set upon the production of *evidences*—the Boyle, the Bampton, the Hulsean and other lectures were instituted for the purpose,—for men do not demand with sedulous iteration renewed "proof of that which is most surely believed among them." There was then rampant not only the sluggardly scepticism of the natural heart, but also the refined and cultured scepticism of the *Epicurist*—so we name him because we should defame a good thinker were we to call such a greedy grasper at pleasure an Epicurean,—whose animal nature had bribed his very soul to become the apologist of his *sensism*; who was not philosophic enough to be sensuous, nor conscienceless enough to be sensual, but who devoted himself to the culture of the *senses* as the means of attaining life's higher felicities. It was an age wearying for change, an age showing the value of a great spirit to a degenerate people, an age in which, because no reformer—as Dante in the thirteenth, Wycliffe in the fourteenth, Huss in the fifteenth, Luther in the sixteenth, Cromwell in the seventeenth—arose to cope with and to act upon the time, revolution arose, and swept away the deep stagnation of men's souls. Among those who sought to be faithful and to do his duty in a trying time the name of William Paley deserves mention as the mediator between the metaphysics of common sense and the mysteries of the Christian scriptures; and we propose here to lay before our readers a brief account of the main incidents in his life and a concise notice of his works.

William Paley was the son of Rev. William Paley, Canon of Peterborough, where the moralist, theologian and divine was born in July, 1743. His father was a native of Giggleswick, in the district of Craven, in western Yorkshire, where his progenitors possessed a patrimonial estate, and his mother, Elizabeth Clapham, was a lady in the

same parish, and in a similar station of life. Paley, however, was scarcely a year old when the Headmastership of Giggleswick King Edward's School was conferred on his father, and the happy couple betook themselves joyfully to the endeared Yorkshire district of their early life. Husband and wife rode on one horse, the latter on a pillion behind nursing her son in her lap. Among the shrewd, strange, industrious and sequestered dwellers in Craven, Paley had his upbringing, rude but trying. In boyhood he was rather weakly, and hence engaged little in the playful sports of his rough compeers. By and bye he went to school, and there, under his father's care, he acquired a pretty fair amount of education. He was a well-disposed, good-tempered boy; he read much, studied stubbornly, and displayed a ripe and discriminating mind. His chief amusements were angling, in which he was an adept, and stocking-knitting, which, though at first learned under his mother's care as a measure of economy, became afterwards a great help to him—even when a highly valued office-bearer in the Church—for securing a mingled employment of the faculties of habit and reflectiveness, favourable to concentration of thought. He was an ardent reader, and his great delight was to gather around him knots of his schoolfellows and read to them the books which, having come in his way, delighted him and supplied him with the means of adding to the happiness of others.

His mother, whose tastes were homely, economical, and what would now, we suppose, be pronounced provincial, though clever herself and happy in his shrewdness and good sense, fixed her mind on making him a tradesman, and when he was reaching the head of the school made overtures to a baker to take her son as his apprentice. To save him from this and to give him the chance of a different career the magisterial Paley took him to Cambridge, and entered his name on the books of Milton's College, Christ's, as a sizar. During the interval between his enrolment and commencing residence, Paley was put under the care of a teacher of mathematics, in which he made considerable proficiency. The elder Paley was certain the younger would turn out a very great man, for he had by far the clearest head he had ever met with in his life. His *gauche* uncouthness of manner, his broad provincialism of speech, and his awkwardly shy self-confidence, created some merriment among some of "the extra double-refined" undergraduates of his day; but he gave them a touch of his intellectual quality by going in for and winning two scholarships in the university. These secured, having proved his competence as a scholar to those who derisively greeted him with the *sobriquet* of "Tommy Potts," and having gained a competence which might free his parents from the charges of his education, he

yielded to the bewitchments of the twin sorceresses of the young, ease and pleasure. He soon became noted for indolence and extravagance; his gay, good nature, his witty conversation, his disposition to speak and spend, soon brought a number of college-toadies round him, and he was flattered into wastefulness, idleness, and self-indulgence. "We were not," he says, "immoral, but only idle and rather expensive." A word of friendly fellowship arrested Paley at this critical juncture,—so true is that saying, "Faithful are the words of a friend, but the kisses of an enemy are deceitful." While going on in his roistering fashion—going to puppet shows, frequenting the booths in which strolling players exhibited theatrical art in its lowest forms, gadding about at fairs, sitting at the wine and card table late at night and seldom rising before noon, in two years he had squandered a good deal of money and wasted a great amount of time; and he was beginning more and more to feel the necessity of finding some means "to drive dull care away," when the fashion of his life was changed by the most natural of means, but almost with supernatural suddenness and effect. The sole known agency in this arousal from carousals and carelessness was the faithful remonstrance of a fellow offender. At a late hour, after a long night of dissipation, laugh, song, jest, cards, wine, revelry tending to devilry, Paley had retired to sleep, but not to rest. A boon companion, who seemingly had been equally restless by an agony of conscience Paley did not feel, entered his chamber, sat down on the bed of his comrade, and began to talk with serious earnestness of the manner of their life. For himself he disclaimed the possession of powers of any value, but he was so impressed with the marvellous talents of his friend that he adjured him to change his course, showed how he might employ his talents to higher ends, and ended in making a conquest of the very soul of Paley. "I was," says Paley, "so struck with the visit of the visitor that I lay in bed great part of the day, and formed my plan. I ordered my bed-maker to prepare my fire every evening, in order that it might be lighted by myself. I arose at five, read during the whole day, except such hours as chapel and hall required; allotted to each portion of time its peculiar branch of study; and just before the closing of the college gates, at nine o'clock, I went to a neighbouring coffee house, where I constantly regaled on a mutton chop and a dose of milk punch; and thus, on taking my bachelor's degree, I became senior wrangler." "A word spoken in due season, how good is it!" This senior-wrangership was gained in 1763; thereafter Paley accepted a situation as usher in Mr. Bracken's academy, Greenwich, in which he taught with acceptance for three years, during a portion of which time, having taken orders, he acted as

curate in Greenwich. In 1765 he gained the first of the prizes given by the Members of Parliament for the University to those "Bachelors of Arts who shall compose the best dissertation in Latin prose, to be recited publicly on a day to be appointed near the commencement." The subject for the Senior Bachelors was—"Utrum civitati perniciosior sit Epicuri an Zenonis, philosophiæ?" "Whether is the philosophy of Epicurus or of Zeno (the stoic) the more destructive to the morality of the people, regarded as members of a commonwealth?" He wrote in favour of the doctrine of the pleurist. In 1766 he was elected Fellow of his College and subsequently Tutor, having taken his degree of M.A. His career as Tutor at Christ's College was eminently successful. He was animated, enthusiastic, and painstaking; he acted as an educational reformer, and for nearly ten years gave a new activity to the routine of academic study, in conjunction with Mr. Law.

Besides the more usual duties of a college tutor Paley lectured on Moral Philosophy and on the Greek of the New Testament. In conjunction with, or as colleague to, Dr. Edmund Law, afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, he not only held but advocated extremely liberal opinions in regard to the right of men to engage freely in speculative researches and in religious inquiries. Law was a Lockest and influenced Paley's mind considerably in the direction of what would now be called Broad Churchism. He saw Paley's clear, exact, forcible, and perspicuous mind striving to bring into practical effectiveness in the minds of men, the most precise views of the best thinkers on the most important topics, admired his zeal, acknowledged his skill, and aided his efforts. The party of progress, exactly a century ago, presented a petition—known as "the Feathers," from the tavern at which its promoters met—to the House of Commons, asking that honourable company of legislators to grant relief from the necessity of subscription to the thirty-nine articles of the Church of England, to those who were only asking the privilege of study in the University and not the preferment of office in the Church. It was signed by many members of the University, lay and clerical. Paley, whose freedom of sentiment was known, was asked to sign. He, knowing the nature of the House of Commons, the opinions of the heads of colleges, and having subscribed the articles himself, refused to sign. When urged importunately—seeing that his personal and professed opinion was opposed to subscription—to sign, he objected, and was asked how he could in conscience refuse? To this question he banteringly,—and as a means of putting a stop to the injudicious persisting of this canvasser for signatures, employed hastily—and perhaps without thought of the evil use that might subsequently be made of it,—the oft-quoted

phrase which is held to prove his want of principle, "Oh! I am too poor to keep a conscience!" The circumstances explain the saying, and show that it was not the expression of a fixed principle, but an excusatory saying, gasped out under pressure of importunity to escape from being badgered into doing what he had determined not to do. It was a quieting semi-sarcastic joke, having only a passing reference to a pressing political agent, not a characteristic proverb of general personal application. This was subsequently proven when the discussion of the question was pursued in the field where he had power—the republic of letters. To the discussion of the question of subscription, raised about two years afterwards, Paley furnished two striking pamphlets, advocating the abolition of it as a test or a barrier, and maintaining the need for an enlarged toleration in religious inquiries. He spoke when needful and useful, and then plainly and well. As a petitioner he would have been a consenting party to his own weakness, as a reasoner he could display strength, and use that strength to affect others. Effectless shots did not delight him, and he knew that only when an opinion had attained the irresistibility of a belief was it possible that subscription as a condition to university study could be abolished. Experience has given proof of his sagacity, and now we have accomplished, a century later, what he advocated and enforced.

In 1768, Paley's friend, Edmund Law, was raised to the bishopric of Carlisle, and for a while thereafter Paley continued in his tutorship; but having a desire to enter more actively into the duties of his holy calling, and of settling in life, he sought, through Bishop Law, some means of gaining these ends, and in 1775 was presented by his patron to the livings of Musgrove and Appleby, in Westmoreland. In 1766 he resigned his fellowship, and soon afterwards he was inducted to the vicarage of Dalston, in Cumberland, and promoted to a prebendal stall in the Cathedral Church of Carlisle. In 1782 he became, by promotion, entitled to the official designation by which he is best known, "Archdeacon of Carlisle," and three years thereafter he was appointed Chancellor of that Diocese of the North. He did not, in his remote residence, forget the requirements of society or lose his interest in the University. Now that leisure had come to him, he bethought himself of the taskwork he had undergone as a university lecturer on morals, and believing that the results of it might be beneficial, he prepared his well-known treatise "On the Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy." When it was prepared he was too poor to risk its publication; after some interval, and by the exertion of friends, Mr. Faulkner was induced to offer £250 for the copyright. On its being suggested that it would,

almost certainly, be adopted as the text book on the subject at Cambridge, another publisher expressed his willingness to pay £1,000, and this offer, which seemed munificence itself to Paley, was instantly accepted. Its success was immediate and extensive, bringing as it did before men's minds a practical argument level to the common comprehension, combining orthodoxy of tone with worldly shrewdness of remark which conciliated the most opposite of minds.

Paley in this work accepted and followed the plan proposed by Dr. Johnson—"When the obligations of morality are taught, let the sanctions of Christianity never be forgotten; by which it will be shown that they give strength and lustre to each other: Religion will appear to be the voice of Reason, and Morality will be the Will of God." To previous treatises on *Morals* Paley felt the following objections:—(1) Errors of principles; (2) Indistinctness; (3) Unsuitability to real life and modern circumstances. In their manner they were either (1) too axiomatic, or (2) too cumbrously prolix and wiredrawn. The former is objectionable "because few readers are such *thinkers* as to want only a bent to set their thoughts upon: or such as will pause and tarry at every proposition till they have traced out its dependency, proof, relation and consequences, before they permit themselves to step on to another;" the latter because "the reader becomes impatient when he is detained by disquisitions which have no other object than the settling of terms and phrases; and, what is worse, they for whose use such books are chiefly intended will not be persuaded to read them at all." He gives us the following account of his mode of authorship:—

"My method of writing has constantly been this: to extract what I could from my own stores and my own reflections in the first place; to put down that; and afterwards to consult upon each subject such readings as fell in my way; which order, I am convinced, is the only one whereby any person can keep his thoughts from sliding into other men's trains. The effect of such a plan upon the production itself will be, that, while some parts in matter or manner may be new, others will be little less than a repetition of the old. I make no pretensions to perfect originality; I claim to be something more than a mere compiler. Much, no doubt, is borrowed; but the fact is, that the notes for this work having been prepared for some years, and such things having been from time to time inserted in them as appeared to me worth preserving, and such insertions made commonly without the name of the author from whom they were taken, I should have found a difficulty in recovering those names with sufficient exactness to be able to render to every man his own. Nor, to speak the truth, did it appear to me worth while to repeat the search merely for this purpose. When

authorities are relied upon, names must be produced ; when a discovery has been made in science, it may be unjust to borrow the invention without acknowledging the author. But in an argumentative treatise, and upon a subject which allows no place for discovery or invention, properly so called, and in which all that can belong to a writer is his mode of reasoning, or his judgment of probabilities, I should have thought it superfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crowded my margin with references to every author whose statements I have made use of."

We do not intend here to analyze or criticise the works of Dr. Paley. That we reserve for another opportunity, when we shall endeavour to shew the unity of plan, style and purpose which pervade them, and to estimate their place in literature, theology and philosophy.

On the question of subscription Dr. Paley was consulted by a family of Dissenters in Manchester, in 1788, and he then gave expression to those views on that question which now find favour in the eyes of the comprehensionists—that subscription binds to the spirit of the articles, so far as they are applicable to the times and circumstances in which subscription is required, and does not bind by the letter and to the intent which that bore in other times and circumstances. His "Ethics of Creed Subscription" were considered lax and gave umbrage to many of his friends in the Church, but it satisfied the Percevals, and his younger son entered the Establishment. In 1789 the Mastership of Jesus College, Cambridge, was offered to Paley and refused. On the reason of his declination he was never explicit, but a political disinclination to be brought into contact with Mr. Pitt has been assigned as the ground of it ; and significance was attached to it as indicating a Whiggish turn in Paley's mind. In 1719 his "*Horæ Paulinæ*" appeared—a portion of the results of his study of the Greek New Testament, which forms by far his most original contribution to the stock of the literature of investigation. The argument of "undesignated coincidences" is conducted with discretion, penetration, sympathy and subtlety. The work was dedicated to his college friend, his patron's son, John Law, Bishop of Killala. In 1794 appeared his "*Evidences of Christianity*"—even yet a clear, valuable, vigorous, and admirably digested conspectus of the material proofs of the truth of the Christian religion, mainly, it is true, derived from the works of Dr. Lardner and Bishop Douglas, but put into such effective form by dexterous arrangement and condensation as to be justly regarded even now as a triumphant achievement in plan, statement and expository execution. It brought him fame,

friends and preferment. Dr. Beilby Porteous, Bishop of London, made him a Prebendary of St. Paul's, Dr. Prettyman promoted him to a Sub-Deanery in Lincoln Cathedral, and he was even spoken of as a Bishop; but when this was mooted, George III., remembering Dr. Paley's scornful treatment of "the right divine of kiugs" as holding the same level as "the right divine of constables," and his sarcastic illustration of the basis of property, exclaimed "Paley! what, *pigeon* Paley!" and refused to issue a *conge d'elire* in his favour.

It deserves to be recorded that when the Anti-Slavery agitation was commenced in 1787, Archdeacon Paley roused all his energies to give aid to the cause. When the slave-sellers, in 1791, presented to Parliament a statement of their claims, Paley composed an elaborate and indignant reply to it, and sent it to the parliamentary commission immediately before the discussion which arose on the question in the House of Lords, originating in the abolition bill brought in by Mr. Wilberforce. This reply produced a deep impression, and particularly attracted the notice of Dr. Shute Barrington, Bishop of Durham, who rewarded the advocate of the slave's freedom with the appointment to the rectory of Bishop Wearmouth, value about £1,000 per annum. On receiving these several preferments, he voluntarily resigned all his livings in the diocese of Carlisle, and removed to his Durham rectorate. There he composed and published his notable work on "Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity,"—even after the age of sixty studying anatomy that he might be qualified to write it; and writing it while suffering most severely from a disease in the kidneys, which he knew was hopeless of cure, and must prove fatal.

Paley thought the art of life consisted in setting the habits right, and this he did for himself in the following style:—he sedulously arranged both his duties and his recreations, allotting alternate but fixed times to each. He enjoyed a garden-walk twice a day of about an hour's length each time; he read for relaxation, one hour at breakfast-time, and another in the evening; dinner and his newspaper (a ministerial one) occupied an hour; he angled, mixed familiarly with his neighbours, and took part in their convivialities, socialities, and schemes of utility; and yet gave heed to the requirements of his calling, and devoted himself to the studies by which he came to be one of the most popular of theological philosophers of his time. He was genial, warm-hearted, benevolent, shrewd, plain, homely but intellectual, witty and perspicacious. He was too truly learned to be pedantic, too thoroughly philosophical to be pretentious, too distinctly clear to be esteemed

profound, and yet deep enough to make the recondite seem as if it had been always known; he was so full of faith that he did not feel the need of protesting he had it, so confident in the honesty of his purpose that he did not affect to conceal truths which might be disagreeable, too tolerant to denounce or traduce, and too serious to require to restrain himself from the laugh of joy a joke evoked; he was so filled with a sense of duty that he transmuted it into devotion, and even while the pressure of pain was laid most heavily upon him he could praise God, and aver that even in the very face of pain it was a truth of truths that the Deity is wise, benevolent, and good in all his works, in all his ways.

After a long and tedious illness, borne with patience, equanimity, and resigned faith, Dr. Paley died 25th May, 1805, at Bishop-Wearmouth, Durham. His remains were laid in the cathedral church of Carlisle, besides those of his first wife, who predeceased him in 1791—a handsome monument commemorates his name and worth. His family consisted of eight children—four sons and four daughters. His second wife, whom he married in 1794, survived. His eldest son, Edmund, became editor of his works, and biographer of the most popular of the holders of the Archdiaconate of Carlisle. The name of Paley has ever since been renowned in theology and scholarship, the inheritors of the name being unwilling to be remarked for an unfulfilled renown. Paley could do his duty like a hero, and endure pain like a Stoic; nay, he transmuted the heroism of the Stoic into the resignation of a Christian, and though he held the philosophy of Epicurus—that happiness is complete when health and mental tranquillity are possessed,—the sound mind which he sought was one which was at peace with conscience and humanity, and with God through his Saviour-Son, “through the free mercy of God enacted towards us,” as he said, “by the death and sufferings of Jesus Christ.”

In our next we shall analyse and review the works of Paley, in a mode adapted to aid those who desire to study the evidences of Christianity under the Whately of the eighteenth century.

Examinations for Sabbath School Teachers.

WHAT THEY MAY, CAN, AND OUGHT TO DO FOR CULTURE.

"So build we up the Being that we are:—

Thus deeply drinking in the soul of things

We shall be wise perforce."—*Wordsworth.*

"Some men covet knowledge out of a natural curiosity and inquisitive temper; some to entertain the mind with variety and delight; some for ornament and reputation; some for victory and contention; many for lucre and a livelihood; and but few for employing the Divine gift of Reason to the use and benefit of mankind. Thus some appear to seek in knowledge a couch for a searching spirit; others, a walk for a wandering mind; others, a tower of state; others, a fort or commanding ground; and others, a shop for profit and sale instead of a storehouse for the glory of the Creator and endowment of human life."—*Lord Bacon.*

THE worth of knowledge requires no enforcement in our day. "Knowledge is power" is a commonplace beyond which we have now passed, for we have learned the converse of that truth, namely, that "Ignorance is power." We know that mere "power" is not the greatest good, and that the love of power, unless directed by the power of love, is not an unexceptional desire. Power is a prime requisite of life, but all power requires control, in fact, life itself is controlled power: power controlled by the beneficent Creator to a Divine purpose, power to be controlled by us according to and in fulfilment of His will. Hence it is that life is real and earnest, and that all the powers of life should be stirred up to their most intense activity in the accomplishment of the commission from God under which we all live. That Divine Commission is *to be*—to be living from root to leaf, from leaf to fruit, with a perenniality of energy that circles through all power and faculty and might and endowment: to be *ourselves* in individuality of conscious character; to be agents of God in the out-working of His designs; to be not now only but so long as the destiny awarded to us by the Deity demands our being. To be, in any measure for perfectness however, we must *know* our attributes and functions, our relations and our duties, the nature of what we are to affect and overcome,

the qualities of the things upon or by means of which we are to be instrumental in effectiveness; and we must *do* the part assigned us in the time, place, and manner assigned to do it, thoroughly, whole-heartily, and as a divine duty. Examination, and tested work is therefore the very law of our life. We require to examine ourselves as to our knowledge, preparedness and dutifulness; circumstances test, try and examine us at every turn; results are constantly telling for or against us, and the total results of life are finally to be taken by an avoidless examination. Not only the ghost in Hamlet, but every human being must pass into the spiritual region—"in his *habit* as he lived"—even though

"Love melts the iron rim of fate
Around this weeping world of change."

The Divine Inspectorate of all living requires our careful thought, and this all the more because of the dread invisibility in which it is exercised. The sceptre is in the Monarch's hand, and his sovereignty is over all—pauseless, pulseless, persistent, and yet perceived only by the conscience which has been touched into feeling by Omniscience. The slowly up-gathered experiences of life often excite us as life's palpable realities, and as we discover daily the hitherto unknown to us qualities and characteristics of things, we feel them as co-efficients of our joy, we regarding them as the causes rather than the occasions of our experienced delights. Yet it is the life-contained sentiency we are that *is* the joy and knows the delight. We have joy only in the measure that we are alive to that which can excite it in us. Hence our need of culture, that every potency of the spirit may be quick to experience the specific delights of every gift of God in the true form in which it has been bestowed and with the proper purpose for which it has been made a possibility of our being. Under this constant sense of responsibility and accountability life should be passed; but this ought not to be regarded as an element of fear, it should be a delight to the soul as an evidence of love. It is as a developing of the soul through love that such experience is valuable, and we ought sedulously to preserve before our own eyes the loving oversight of life exercise by the Divine Father. If we do so we shall not fail diligently to examine ourselves, nor shall we fear to expose ourselves to examination. We shall feel examination needful by ourselves, and we shall recognise it as beneficial when exercised by others as a means of more thoroughly inducing effective being in us, and as bringing us into sympathetic contact with other and various minds—minds aiding us to develop and to rise.

Mind excites mind and evolves thought. As heat and electricity

are both developed by friction and pass into manifested activity thereby, so does emulation of mind bring into effective power the capacities of mind. Stimulated by the desire to compare well with others, eager to stand well in its own consciousness as a thing of worth, brought under the discipline of competition, it is roused from sloth, passivity or self-indulgence, and aims at nobler being. Touched by strong motives both external and internal, to endeavour after improvement the energy inborn flashes into self-vindication by effort, and seeks by self-help, knowledge and self-improvement, to attain self-control, and with it the true growth of self-culture. The intellect takes edge and polish, it becomes at once vivacious and stable, strong and active, independent and ascendent. The lower desires, not disdained or despised, but guided and guarded, fall back from being prominent powers of action, and under the prudent cautiousness of principle passion glorifies itself into emotion—emotion being desire intellectualized and moralized. The liberation of the soul from the dominion of passion is possible when the spirit is strengthened to burst the fetters of tyrannous desire, and exerts its powers under the controlled deliberation of a trained mind and a sanctified heart; a soul to which study is an habitual delight and piety a well-spring of joy. Education opens the mind and quickens the understanding, multiplies enjoyments, expands sympathies, refines taste and heightens the whole soul. Hence its incomparable value; excelling silver and gold more than these do the dross and dregs of minerals. It is power, for it unfetters all the engines of intellectual being, but it is also joy, for joy is the free, full, fervid activity of being in harmony with its own self and in accordance with its purpose. Such power and joy are heaven-given, and if rightly used grow into the awful capacities which man shall develop more fully and joyfully in the great life-journey of eternity.

"Every man," says Gibbon, "who rises above the common level has received two educations; the first from his teachers, the second, more personal and important, from *himself*." This has been vaunted as a wise saying, and, in some sort, so it is. But its highest wisdom rises only to a very common level—man himself. If we think what this saying truly implies, however, it contains a nobler and more valuable truth than, we fear, entered into the philosophy of Gibbon. For—what is a man's *self*? Is it not the whole nature of man—body and soul—his being, as He has given it who gives *all*? It is not in that "quintessence of dust" to which so many confine their desires and hopes that manliness dwells. It is not *that* which induces the exclamation, "What a piece of work is a *man*! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculties! in form and moving how express and admirable! in

apprehension how like an angel ! in action how like a god !—the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals ! ” It is the fearful, mysterious, divinely original being which man *is* rather than *has* ; it is the innate spirit in the outward form, both of which are to grow together until the harvest, that is, man—the top and crown of visible life. When a man’s nature really expands, develops, and forthgrows through all “ the round of life from hour to hour,” he is not so much self-educated as God-taught. The power that is within him is not him—is not even his ; it is the gift of God. God, in the very bud of his being, enwrapt all these capacities which unfold gradually into *him* and are called his ; so that when we talk of self-culture we speak in the foolishness of our hearts. We are “ not our own ” either naturally or spiritually, and hence it is that “ none of us liveth to himself and none dieth to himself.” Even in our natural being “ it is God that worketh in us.” We work because he works, and if we fulfil the end of our being we shall both will and do his good pleasure. Every man has a nature to the full height of which he ought to rise. This is no common level ; it is to become like unto

“ The first true gentleman that ever breathed.”

That Divine Vanquisher is not the symbol only but the reality of struggle—of struggle as the price of attaining the prize. Of dutiful being exposed to terrible trial, where is there an example like that One ? We are to be like Him ; like Him in struggle, especially if we would be like him in success. He shrunk from no trial ; and invited every investigation. His life was subjected to one continuous examination ; and he never flinched from the sternest strictness nor the most inveterate inquisition, for he wrought continually under a sense of the Father’s eye.

Well, we have now brought this thought round to the point in which it yields us aid in determining as to “ Examinations,” what they may, can, and ought to do for culture.

It is admitted that examinations stir to attention, inquisitiveness, and emulation. These practical advantages appear to settle the question so far as regards the utility of them. But it seems desirable to set the theory of examinations on a better footing than either their expediency in a worldly point of view or of their necessity in the present condition of society. We wish to see a principle on which the matter may be regarded as settled ; something that will satisfy the reason and make silence to the objections which arise as to the proper value of examination as a test of fitness or a contest for place. Examinations may be misused or they may be misapplied ; they may be employed as a means of determining in regard to matters in which they are inefficient or insufficient ; or

they may be used for purposes beside their true end. There may be mistakes regarding them or abuses of them, and upon these sides the issues may be misjudged; but if we can decide upon the proper place of examination among the agencies of human life, we shall be able to see more clearly where abuse takes place, at the same time that we shall more zealously work to proper ends—the tests and contests of examinations.

In a previous article, the nature of examination has been defined, and some ideas on “how to prepare for and how to succeed at them” have been placed before the reader. Our aim in this paper is, not to take examinations as things that are or must be, but to discover if we can the benefit to general life which might be gained if examination constituted a main element in it, and were looked at in that light. Examinative scrutiny, as we have said, must be undergone by all, either in a systematic or unsystematic shape, by comrades, friends, neighbours, fellows in workshop or at business, at college or in professional life, if not by syndics, committeemen, inspectors or boards. Our masters and our servants alike investigate our character and gauge our conduct from their judgment of us, and act accordingly. Social existence is one continuous form of examination, in which the weakest get plucked and go to the wall; not exactly what Mr. Darwin calls *natural selection*—a selection, of which we may remark with *Lady Macbeth*, that as—

“All’s spent

Where our desire is got without content;

’Tis safer to be that which we destroy,

Than, by destruction, dwell in doubtful joy,—”

but a selection which proceeds upon the principle of insisting on the possession and employment of some justifying ground for our holding the place we do, yet with some determination to show that we—

“have been kind to such

As needed kindness; for this single cause,

That we have all of us a human heart.”

It might be better for us if we were to acknowledge this reality of life as it is, and endeavour to make the best of it, reflecting that if we are to be examined it would be better for us to submit to it publicly than have it performed upon us on the sly; and that we prepared for undergoing the ordeal, not by cram for the occasion, but by the acquisition of the power of being what we are desirous of seeming.

This might be done by the arrangement and institution in all

grades of social life of certain examinations (1) as requisite and compulsory, (2) honorary and voluntary. Those which are requisite and compulsory should be those which indicate—and so far insure—the possession of the minimum of qualifications requisite for and essential to the due performance of the duties of life in the sphere which each person is called to occupy. The application of compulsion to the undergoing of such examinations as these commends itself, upon the principle that guaranteed fitness for one's station is indispensable to the proper performance of one's duty. The institution of honorary and voluntary examinations might be regarded as justified as affording a means of escape from

"Those twin-gaolers of the human heart,
Low birth and iron-fortune ;"

and an opportunity for those of aspiring disposition who desired admission, "*ad illud divinum animorum concilium coetumque*," to that god-like council and assembly of minds, who seek after higher things than are written among the mere requirements and necessities of their position—those who struggle to achieve and strive to accomplish even here some of those aims which belong to the higher life of mortal men. There are men, not a few, who seek to rise—but have few avenues to advancement open to them—to whom the possibility of showing their ability and desire to undertake higher labours would be of itself a boon, though no pecuniary advantage were attached to it at all. There are many to whom such opening of the gates "*to fresh fields and pastures new*," as unfolding a route to Eldorado, would give joy ; and all might by voluntary submission to such forms of attested fitness, give to society a larger choice of labourers in the harvest of happiness, and a better supply of men who desire to live useful and free from blame.

1. Examinations will excite to diligence in study.

There is no principle in nature so certain as that every man is under a primal necessity of standing well with himself. He cannot exist happily under the scorn of his own conscience ; hence, by self-excusiveness or self-flattery he tries to set it right with his own heart, and glozes himself over with the same-seemingness of his life to that of those around him. Douglas Jerrold used to say "*that flattering one's self is the worst of hypocrisies*," but it is perhaps also one of the commonest. We place our merits in full view before ourselves in making our self-estimates, and put our short-comings and faults far off into the back-ground, where they acquire by perspective the appearance of being but the accessories of the whole. In our estimate of our neighbours, however, we bring faults to the foreground and admit the merits to a place here

and there in our arrangement, and by this error of *pose* we deceive ourselves as to the relative proportions of the faults and merits of ourselves and others. Men are seldom fair judges of each other, and they are still less frequently impartial judges of themselves. Examination offers us an agency by which we may disabuse our minds of this *idola specus*, this inner, innate, fallacy of human nature's individual judgments. In an examination we bring ourselves forward for comparative survey, and lay open to investigation our powers and acquisitions, that another may judge us and not we ourselves, and that by the results of this lasting testing of the fruits of our efforts, as it were, we should be judged. In doing so we require to put away our self-flatteries and our engrossing egotisms, and getting free from our faults as far as we can, give evidence of our mind's worth. Thus we give loving industry to the work before us, appropriate time and thought to the success we seek, and pressed on by this self-love of ours to emulation, we do our best to bring our minds up to our own esteem.

II. Examinations will, if rightly conducted, tend materially to improve methods of study. Good methods of study go a great way to assure the ultimate success of slow minds. Sharp minds can mostly, even in an examination, secure a "pass position." "Slow but sure wins the day," however, saith the Scotch proverb, and Lessing supplies slow wits with this German wisdom and comfort: "The slowest, if he keeps his end always in view, speeds better than the swift man who has lost his way." In all things method is good, and above all things a good method is the greatest aid to success in study. Method is a progressive transition from one step in any course to another step, holding and keeping one aim constantly before us, and going on in a regular, easy, straightforward course towards its attainment. Methods of study are often dead and arbitrary, not having their issues according to the principles of minds, but the accidents of things. In some instances a haphazard indeterminate industriousness takes the place of method, and by sheer dint of the oft-repeated recalling of the mind to a series of thoughts, some knowledge of the matters studied is attained. Sometimes mistakes are made either in the method adopted, or in the use, according to inclination of certain portions of different methods. In all these cases study is carried on with a greater amount of trouble and fatigue than it might otherwise be. Examinations, however, by interesting students in the speed and certainty of the processes of progress, will quicken attention to the merits of methods, and people will strive with more diligence to gain those methods by which the progress made in respective studies, may be made most easy, pleasant, natural and secure. In

this way, examinations may make a critical comparison of methods indispensable, in order that the best and surest may be found.

III. Examinations will give a definite aim to study.

It is difficult among the multitude of our desires and inspirations to select an all-prevailing one, and make it master for the time being of our arrangements regarding study, effort, and designs. We are facile and fickle when we have ourselves for masters, and we often change from object to object more by whim than by determination. So power is frittered away, and effort is expended in vain, because we have not restrained our minds by self-determination, nor made register against ourselves of the unaccomplished aims by which we have been actuated. It is a great matter to bind ourselves to one main and manageable aim, and one by one to conquer the obstacles in our path. So do we fix and concentrate our faculties on the success to be achieved, and win to our one purpose all the ardours of the spirit: reduce our natural self-forgetfulness and indecision, and put the required strain upon our natures. We are not contented with the mere motion which carries us anywhere, we take our place for a given station, near or distant, and go forward speedily and straightforwardly for our destination, impatient of slackening and of interruption, grudging detours and sidings, criticising and objecting to any break in the journey, or deficiency in the power which should have carried us along. The making up of one's mind is often half of the intellectual difficulty in study. What shall we set about? So long as we hover in indecision as to this or that we do nothing, yet lay the flattering unction to our souls that our intentions are good, our motives proper. Examinations rightly arranged and incorporated with life as an aid to its duties would lessen the likelihoods of dilly-dallying by affording opportunity of fixing our aims to preparation for this or that examination commending itself to our desires or requirements, and so should we have definiteness given to our studies.

IV. Examinations would increase the accuracy of acquisition.

Accuracy of knowledge is difficult of attainment, but it is indispensable. Knowledge is naught if not exact. Knowledge must not be "in failure, half successful." It does not consist in "wrinkles," "having an idea," "guessing," "supposing," "imagining," or "should think"-ing. It signifies to be conscious of, to have knotted into the soul as a fact, or to have noted in the book of experience and acquirement some certainty. Knowledge is the highest result of man's intelligence applied to the comprehension of the nature within him, the world around him, the causes and sources of life, experience and thought. Examined knowledge must be accurate, must be capable of definite question and

decided answer. To become habituated to this accurate acquisition of knowledge is of the highest value, inasmuch as it ensures the usability of what has been gained. Examinations as disciplinary agencies induce careful correctness and critical attention to definiteness; encourage to search for correct information and distinct expression, and teach and train the intellect to regard as satisfactory that only which has been scrupulously investigated and sedulously examined into. They compel attention to the distinction between fact, thought, opinion and hypothesis; they demand care in the study and in the statements of the matters involved in the subjects engaging the mind; and so they antagonize sciolism and pretence, sketchiness and glimpses of things, that unsettled and weak-minded contentment with half-knowledges and hints of things, or hearings, or readings about them, which grows common where reading is easy, thinking irksome, and study toilsome. It would be a great matter if we would get back to the "not many but much" of the adage, but it would be still better if to the old much we could add the requisite correctness. Examinations might do much for the inculcation of a habit of accuracy in acquisition.

V. Examinations might exert a powerful influence in inspiring the learner with confidence.

Over-confidence is often the offspring of mistaken vanity, and is never commendable. Want of confidence, though frequently regarded as the result of modesty, is not uncommonly greatly due to uncertainty arising from want of knowledge, or that hesitancy which arises from the too common habit of uninquiring reciprocity and uncritical study. A hazy indefiniteness overhangs the whole of the acquisitions of the mind, like that of a dream within a dream, rather than the sun-clear atmosphere of experience. The sharp outlines of accuracy are wanting, and on account of this a want of confidence is felt. But examinations, by enabling one to get himself put to the test, giving him encouragement to get fixed knowledge, and imparting to him an attested evidence of his accuracy in comprehending and expressing his knowledge, would impart that calm and quiet confidence which the possession of a just sense of certainty inspires—a confidence which can never be had by those who though readers of many books—

"Know no more of them than of
The shapes of clouds at midnight a year back."

Everybody knows "How use doth breed a habit in a man," and the habit acquired by getting all our knowledge put into an examinable shape could not fail in effectively exciting the observant and critical faculties, and make them sedulous to ensure certainty.

Every new accession of knowledge thus brought into the possession of the soul would not only enrich it, but give it the assurance which enables a person to speak pointedly and unaffectedly about what he knows thoroughly, and equally restrains him from committing himself by speaking about what he is not well acquainted with it as if he were certain of it.

VI.—Examinations may be so employed as greatly to popularize *exact* knowledge.

Knowledge, if it is to be the captain and guide of existence, must make us sure of its rightfulness so to be. It must be itself exact before it can exact due regard from us. In fact, properly speaking, to be knowledge it must be exact. It is one of the misfortunes of our time that so many fallacies are accepted through mere superfluous words. One of these fallacies occurs when we use the term, "the exact sciences." Exactness is the very essence of science, science brings knowledge before us with all the clearness and precision of vision, and with such certainty as to allow of prevision. To call any forms of knowledge "exact sciences," by implication suggests that there are other forms of knowledge which are inexact, and so the *fallacia designationis*—fallacy of naming misleads, not only regarding the comparative trustworthiness of different branches of study, but in regard to the very fundamental characteristic of knowledge, which is certainty, accuracy, unmistakeability. To this misapprehension we are all the more exposed, because, in these days, we read so much that we cannot investigate, and accept so much in faith on the veracity of others; we so frequently employ inference or opinion, or guess for knowledge, that we are willing to admit that there may be a subdivision of knowledge into exact and inexact, for convenience sake. But this is not all the length the evil reaches. Men haste after the study of what are called the exact sciences; praise them as those alone deserving of attention, and maximize the attractiveness of certain branches of science which deal with matters capable of being weighed, measured, and experimented on, while they condemn others which are no less requisite to be known and studied because they do not afford the same palpable experimental sensational results. But this sad mistake of those common-place followers of a multitude which hinders men from pursuing studies on the assumption that they do not yield definite results prevents, or at least interferes with, the progress of many important branches of knowledge, and too much turns study into a drill instead of an education. If, however, we were *at once* to decide that all knowledge to be entitled to claim the name must be exact, we should do much to advantage the human mind by bringing methodic, thinking, testing criticisms,

and examining scrutiny to bear up all the efforts of the intellect. If by examinations, duly and truly conducted, we could furnish to the spirit of the student that incentive and encouragement which is most required—namely, the certainty of a right appreciation and appraisal of the efforts made in the pursuit of study in independent yet industrious solitude, we should excite the mental faculties to vigorous and healthy energy, and bring out the enthusiasm of the soul towards study. There should be no scorn of certain studies or pursuits; no contempt of honest effort, least of all discouragement of any of the great departments which promise to gratify the curiosity of the mind. If it were indeed a fixed and accepted principle that all knowledge must be exact, and that there was fair consideration to be given for every attainment which gave the exactness possible in the science studied, an important and effectual help would be given to the popularization of exact study. Enthusiasm and devotion are not dead among us, though much of both have been chilled by the tyrannous demand for figurate results in all knowledge. Political economy and arithmetic cannot be brought into figurate comparison as to definite results; but each way afford the student that training to exact thought and application of first principles, to the solution of questions which are so important, nay, so indispensable a part of education. Rightly arranged, examinations ought to have no greater difficulty in dealing with the one than with the other, and were this properly attended to in all branches of thoughtful study, great help would be given to the argument of exact knowledge.

VII.—Examinations might be so utilized as not only to make study attractive but honourable.

Mind is acted on by many motives, and man is induced to make active efforts through many avenues to his will. To some men the delight of acquiring knowledge is enough to repay all toil and over-pay all sacrifices. Such students say—

“We love and live on power. It is spirit's end
Mind must subdue. To conquer is its life;”

to others, hope and admiration are requisite; to others still, there is wanting a steadfastness of aim; and yet others there are who, careless on their own part, love to communicate happiness to others. Rightly arranged examinations might give men a means of measuring their progress and estimating their place among their compeer students, might afford such stimulant to hope and gratification to the love of admiration as might affect many; might hold out to others such inducements to determination as would lead to the studying of effort and the fixing of the mental faculties to

definite pursuits, and might even yield such tokens and testimonies of success as should seem guerdons worth having, shewn to those who are valued. It might be made as honourable in human life to have succeeded in certain examinations as to have gained glory by—

“Trophies captured, breaches mounted,
Navies vanquished, kingdoms won ;”

and while knowledge may be regarded as attractive in itself, it is certain that additional attractiveness would be conferred upon study if there were afforded means for recording and attesting honours gained. We think that such added attractiveness might easily be given to examinations, and that thus much good might be done to individuals and to society.

VIII.—Examinations might be so planned and arranged as to elevate very much the general tone of society.

Social intercourse is far less a delight than it might be. There are so many commonplaces of talk employed, and there are so many conventionalities attached to it, that social assemblages fail to attract to themselves our best men in their best estate. In order that general ease may be felt it has become essential that special superiorities should be minimized, and hence a very large proportion of individuality is under eclipse. It seems a truism to say that “every man is best at his best,” but it is a truism little understood by society. A man is always at his best when he is wholly himself—when the full force of his individuality is energetic. Then it is that we can see the infinitely varied play of human emotion, the exuberant delights of sense and sensibility, the energies of passion and the full energies of the active intellect. But the drill of society to bring all men to a dead level of commonplace similarity, or cultured and masked uniformity, destroys that noble and robust individuality which marks out man from man. The assiduous discipline in sameness which men undergo in order that they may be fitted for social intercourse might be quite done away with, and might become effete if the diffused culture of the intellectual were brought to attestation by examination, and the possibilities of human nature were shown by the actual eminence acquired by those who otherwise would seem to offer nothing unusual to mark them off one from another. Even though this should not be done, the very fact that a large number of the different members of society were studying for or had studied for examinations would have a tendency to elevate conversation, and would enable a great deal of the small talk of social intercourse to be dispensed with. Conversation could rise to a higher level, and the elementary littleness

of ordinary talk might give place to a living and lively consideration of the staple of those sciences which interest humanity, and concern themselves with the great serious questions of social existence.

IX.—Examinations might be so employed as to facilitate the consecration of cultured talents to the service of God—thus given.

This topic, fortunately, requires no enlargement. In a previous paper on "Examinations for Sunday School Teachers" the main thoughts in connexion with this topic of thought has been brought before our readers. We have only here to say that not only in relation to Sunday school effort, but in regard to many other voluntary agencies in behalf of moral and social progress, it would be a great matter to find attested talent readily available. In civil life how many times do we feel anxious to have some proper grounds for thinking that those who propose to fulfil certain duties are really qualified for undertaking and being entrusted with them by proper preparation. Experience would soon show how advantageous such a use of examinations might become in economizing inquiries and in making the acceptance of proffered services easy by references proving the possession of the knowledge required. In Scripture reading to the poor, in public or private; in lay preaching; in the management of elementary classes for week-day Bible students; in the diaconate or the eldership; in taking place among the managers of a chapel or on the School Board, the Board of Guardians, or the committee of missionary or charitable associations, how much security and interest would be secured if those who proposed thus to employ their talents as volunteers in Christian work and human charity would present themselves in attested possession of the qualifications requisite for holders of such offices. It would in no wise disparage them in the exercise of their duties; it would in no degree detract from the sanctified use of their talents, that they came, bringing evidence of fitness for the work they designed to engage in. Those who wish to be

"Not left in God's contempt apart

With ghostly smooth life—dead at heart,"

will be delighted to submit themselves in meekness and love to the testing which would set their own souls at rest and satisfy others.

These few observations on the uses of examinations we have ventured to bring before the reader, not because we think examinations to be complete and unexceptionable agencies for the decision of all questions of fitness, or suppose that they are not liable to gross perversion when taken beyond their sphere. Examinations are useful for securing minimums and averages, and for excitements

to industry and aspiration. But they are conditioned by the limits of examinability. It is only a special and peculiar class of topics of instruction that can be brought under the examiner's gauge. These, however, comprise many of the indispensable matters of fact which it is well that all should know; and so far as they aid in securing the study due to these they serve good ends. We are persuaded that they might be so constructed as to take in a much wider field of usefulness; that they might be so arranged as to give little or no scope for cram; that they could be utilized for many purposes to which they are not now applied, and that they might be easily kept free from the evils of all inspectorates—the tendency to run in grooves upon a general level. On such topics, however, we cannot now enlarge. We have exhausted our remarks sufficiently in the meantime. We hope our observations have been so set before the reader as to convince him that as auxiliaries to the utility and nobility of life they may be used with advantage. As they encourage men to the management of the controlling power of their lives, we think they have a large claim upon those who are peculiarly charged to examine themselves. It is a happy thing for a man to be able so to live as to be always prepared for whatever test awaits him. The man whose soul is open always to the influences of the Divine Spirit upon his life will be under no fear of an examination to which he can be subject—if the Great Audit Book of Eternity is written over with the grace of God in the Lord Jesus Christ.

POLYGLOT ENGLISH CLASSICS.—The British Museum Library contains no less than 125 English editions of the "Pilgrim's Progress." There are also 29 copies of the work in other languages, including Arabic, Bengalee, Danish, Dutch, French, Gaelic, German, Maori, the peasant dialect of Norway, Oriya, modern Greek, and Russian. Of "Paradise Lost" there are 72 English editions, while there are 53 other editions—American, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Icelandic, Italian, Latin, and Swedish, exclusive of the editions in Milton's collected works. Of "Robinson Crusoe" the library contains 74 editions in English and 28 in other languages, including Danish, Dutch, French, Gaelic, German, Latin, Maori, Polish, Spanish, and Turkish.

Social Economy.

SHOULD THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC BE SUPPRESSED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

ON reading the affirmative article of S. one is almost in the first place tempted to exclaim, "Physician heal thyself," and for this reason: In the beginning of his article S. makes the remark that A. H. G., from the point of view which he has taken up, argues the question with "perfect clearness," and so on. He then proceeds with commendable conciseness to the statement that A. H. G. "is not very consistent." From that, with great argumentative power, he proceeds to demonstrate the statement, and to my own mind clearly shows that A. H. G., far from being perfectly clear, is exactly in an opposite state, namely, "as thick as mud," but that only it must be borne in mind in the possible pleonasm in which he has rather injudiciously indulged. S. then, not satisfied with A. H. G.'s muddiness, next positively avers that he is inconsistent. This statement, at any rate when contrasted with the expression "perfect clearness," used in the first instance, creates, without doubt, a paradox surely not in keeping with the rest of the article, in which, to give him all due praise, S. argues his point with ability, and in a spirit of fairness.

The other arguments of S. I do not presume to answer or refute. Indeed I think it scarcely wise to begin so to do. There are certain modes of logic which, if taken by themselves and answered exactly from the same footing are, as it were, invincible; consequently standing on the same platform as S., arguing with arguments of the same calibre, and considering the question by the same confined light, one would soon have to acknowledge himself beaten, in consequence of the "large guns" having been picked out and carefully arranged by the Alliance, and the weaker left for the benefit of all opponents. Let us, therefore, come directly to the question as it stands. Should the liquor traffic be suppressed? and the answer is, No: for one reason, and this reason appears to be

the fundamental reason, after all. The suppression of the liquor traffic would involve an extremity which at once violates a law of the universe. The law is the *law of Equilibrium*. This is the grand central law of the universe. It holds over nature, and ever has done, the reins of government. It allows her, it is true, to stray at times from the central track, but for a distance almost infinitesimal. She may rise or fall above this law, but to its mandate she must ever bow, and at stated periods assume her medium course.

Electricity being an universal agent, produces all the phenomena and changes that transpire in our globe and its surrounding elements. By heat, which is an electrical effect, the air is rarefied and water is evaporated, when the rarefaction of the air is carried to an extreme then that portion of the earth and its inhabitants suffer. Nature becomes diseased, and the denser portion of the atmosphere is at length aroused from its slumberings and armed with mighty force. The sweeping hurricane rushes on, the dreadful tornado roars in its awful movement, to fill up and rescue that rarefied and diseased portion of the air, and continues its force till an equilibrium is attained in her aerial realms. At this point nature is well. She is cured by the at length attained equilibrium of her forces.

Even so as this law is manifested in the operations of nature around us in the physical world, so must we expect its manifestations in our social and political world. Virtue, if pushed to an extremity, becomes a vice—pleasure, if pushed to an extremity, becomes a pain, and even religion itself, if pursued without due temperance, becomes either idolatry or asceticism. The question therefore is by what means may the fearful consequences of the consumption and abuse of alcohol be remedied? Never by violent and extreme measures: Throw the scale of equilibrium from its centre, and sooner or later it will most assuredly again attain its equal balance. The world progresses by cycles. The scale may at the present time, when the public spirit is horrified by the crimes and other evils resulting from its indulgences, be raised in favour of the total suppression of the liquor traffic, but when a cycle has passed, how will it stand then? The swing of time's great pendulum shall bring up with it the same old state of things, as a direct sequence of the reaction occasioned by such a powerful stimulant as total suppression.

Again, supposing we manage to dispense, as a people, with the liquor traffic, what shall fill up the vacuity which would then exist in the pleasures and vices of the people. It is a known scientific fact that no nation upon the earth dispenses with its national narcotic, or its national abuse. The Turk has his opium, the Brazilian his betel-nut, and the Indian his hemp-spirit, the Swiss his arsenic, and the Teuton race their tobacco and alcohol. What shall, supposing the liquor traffic be done away with, fill up, I ask, the vacuum? Echo answers, what? And then the question would arise, in answer to the cravings of the people, their old cravings, Is this abstinence right? is it compatible with the religion of our fathers? Then would the great fact gradually appear that extremes are not proper, either with God or with man.

What then is the remedy? In the excellent and sensible words of C. I would say, "Let us elevate and educate and imbue our people with Christian principles, and thus they may and will become "temperate in all things," not merely in one thing. Individual education and individual religious advancement are after all the only true barriers with which we can stem the torrent of bloodshed and abominable vice, in which portions of the nation are even now wallowing. It is the commonest and the greatest mistake that politicians are now making, the effort to elevate the mob and the mass in preference to the cultivation of each individual member. The remedial power cannot with success, and ought not to, originate outside the people with the intent of penetrating inwards to the core of the evil. It should start from the inmost depths of mass, and even as a "little leaven leaveneth the lump," so it must seek patiently, untiringly, and perseveringly, to purge society of its abuses and its crying evils.

But this again can never be done until more time is devoted out of the twenty-four hours for its pursuance. Men now-a-days wear the collar of the Adamic curse, and wear it so persistently that they grow to love it. Labour is surely a blessed institution in the world as it now is, but there is as surely the sting of the curse in it. Men are almost at the present time working themselves to death. And until they learn the wisdom of devoting a little more leisure to the cultivation of their moral and intellectual capacities, and a little less time to the exercise of their physical energies, the world cannot be the subject of a radical or complete reform in any one respect. I fancy even now I see the poor artisan in a large

iron-manufacturing town—it is early when he goes to his work, it is dark before he has finished; tired, wearied, utterly without energy in body, necessarily so in mind, how can he improve his intellect, what can he do as the institutions of the country exist at present, if he has no home with wife and children, but go to the public house? There he finds change of scene, cheerfulness, and a renovating power for his physical frame: and there he rushes from the extremity of labour to the extremity of pleasure, which is ultimately pain.

Thus I have endeavoured to show where the improvement absolutely should commence. Men are not devoid of energy, strength of will, or any other quality which makes up the man. They do not require a veto to be put upon their actions; man should be free. The mandate "Thus far shalt thou go, and no further," resides within a man, it comes not from without. Place a man in a position in which he may thus exercise his freedom of will, give him opportunities for the cultivation of the proper pride of his manhood. Time, education, and facility, are necessary; he does not want disposition, that is in him, and you shall see the liquor traffic, not increased, but decreased and decreasing in its awful abuses; the war between the arch-enemy and the noble qualities of man, not fed by excess, but quenched by temperate and consistent demeanour. Then may we well expect the dawn of that day when all nations shall be hushed in the lasting Millennial peace, "the federation of the world."

J. H. D.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is rather remarkable that the author quoted, at the opening of C.'s article, against the suppression of the liquor traffic by a *Permissive Bill*, has recently given his hearty and unqualified adhesion and support to that measure. Of course the coincidence may go for what it is worth, but it is at least worthy of note.

I have said the suppression of the liquor traffic by a *Permissive Bill* (or rather *Permissive Act*) because, while the subject under discussion is simply "the suppression of the liquor traffic," which might be by moral suasion or by right of property, the arguments of C. are directed against legislation on suppression of such traffic in general; and permissive prohibitory legislation of the same in particular.

With these arguments I propose to deal. What I gather to be the argument of the first portion of C.'s article is this. "Suppress the liquor traffic and you might suppress vice, crime, &c., if people will live under your law, but they will not. Or if such suppression were attempted by a large majority of the people under a Permissive Act, the minority would disregard the law. The evidence of this latter proposition bearing the sympathy often shown to murderers, and the consequent efforts made to shelter them from death punishment; *ergo*, if there be such an objection to enforce the law in the case of such great crimes, it will be impossible to enforce it in the case of what is popularly considered a very venial one, or no crime at all.

Now I will endeavour to deal with the evidence on which this statement is thought to rest first, and I must say that I think C. has chosen an unfortunate illustration. He seems to have failed to recognise that somehow or other, rightly or wrongly, there is a largely prevailing feeling, if not opinion, that human life is *sacred*, to be taken only by HIM who gave it; and except in cases of peculiar atrocity, there is a strong objection to strangling a criminal as a means of curing him, otherwise there would be no sympathy for him, nor would there be any objection to punishment, however severe, other than killing. This illustration, for argument it can scarcely be called, may therefore be dismissed as not affecting the case at all—or, if so, in the least appreciable degree.

Now I rather hope to carry C. with me in the following points. The want of alcoholic liquor is not natural, but artificial. It is created entirely by the use of the article. Millions of people in the East do not know the want, while to millions of abstainers on principle in England, the very smell is offensive. All experience has shown that the use springs up where public houses are planted, and increases as they are multiplied; therefore in the absence of facilities the want for them lessens, and thus I argue in the case of entire suppression, the minority would soon quiet down.

Now I think no one would for a moment dispute the fact that it would be less difficult for two-thirds of a community to put down the sale of liquor by the enforcement of a law, than for one person to do so by his individual and arbitrary will.

An eminent minister of London once told me that he put the following questions to 100 city missionaries who, I think, were dining at his house:—

"From your knowledge of the working-people, what do you think would happen in London, if by law all the public houses were closed? Would there be any opposition or disturbance?" They almost all thought there would be strong opposition, and might be some disturbance.

"But," he asked, "what would happen if the people themselves had power to vote whether such houses should be closed or not?" Their answers were almost uniform, to the effect that the people would vote for their suppression by a large majority. This is, however, but opinion; now I will give some facts, showing that when the liquor traffic is suppressed by individual will, the people found to live under the prohibition are contented and prosperous, and that crime and pauperism are reduced to a minimum.

The late principal of the Brighton College told me that he lived for ten years in a parish where no public house existed, and it was a common remark, that however poor people were when they came into that place, they soon "got upon their legs." He had seen men come into that parish poor, and go away rich." There are some three thousand such parishes in this kingdom, and from over a thousand of them a committee of the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury received from the resident clergy statements to the effect that with this absence of public houses there was absence of drunkenness, absence of crime, and absence of pauperism.

Under prohibition by the will of Sir Titus Salt, the town of Saltaire, with 5,000 or 6,000 inhabitants, is contented, happy, prosperous, and moral. Bessbrook again, with a population of 3,000, has prohibition enforced by the proprietor, Mr. John Grubb Richardson, who told me himself that they have no policemen or pawnshops, and that every man and woman has signed petitions in favour of Sir Wilfrid Lawson's Permissive Bill, to enable other parishes to do for themselves what he, Mr. Richardson, has done for them. It may be said that these are small places, but they embrace a population of 60,000, are places, many of them, where public houses have never existed, but we now have one to present with a considerable population where such houses have existed, and are now put down. I will give the facts as I heard them given by the Rt. Hon. Lord Claud Hamilton, M.P. for the county Tyrone. In that county is a district of sixty square miles, with a population of some 11,000. Three principal roads cross the district to mark it.

There was formerly much drunkenness and rioting. But by the influence of an agent to one of the estates all the landed proprietors have been induced to put down the public houses, till the whole district has been cleared. The results which have followed are general sobriety, no crime or riot, the police barrack has been removed, there is not a policeman in the district, and the poor rates are gone down two-thirds. To complete my case, the people continue to live there, and the agent who brought about the prohibition instead of being the object of hatred, as so many Irish agents are, is about the most popular man in the district.

The next argument of C. is, that intemperance is like certain great evils which human governments can only deal with in the stream, and not effectually deal with at the source. This, if it means anything, means that efforts of regulation, of detail, and counteraction should be resorted to by the government or by law. Does not C. know that almost every possible experiment of this kind has been tried for ages, that some 500 Acts of Parliament have been passed during the last three centuries and a half, most of which have been passed with that object, and that now there is a general cry for a comprehensive measure, and according to the last report of the last committee of the House of Commons on the subject of drunkenness, during the very last session, drunkenness is still on the *increase*.

The illustration of razors and knives is not pertinent. We do not propose to prohibit *food* or *drink*, but the common sale of a certain *kind of drink* which has a natural tendency to produce frightful evils. If, therefore, C. can point out any particular kind of *knife* or *razor* which has a peculiar tendency to cut throats, or to wound and slay, I should say prohibit the sale of such knives. Or if the lancet of the surgeon were commonly sold, and a portion of the community were in the habit of using that to the terror and injury of others, I see no objection to confine the sale of such instruments to surgeons, as I would confine the sale of alcohol to the chemist or the physician. C. admits that free trade in strong drink is simply impossible. Why? Because of the dangerous character of the *article*. What, then, is the object of restricting but *protection* to the *public*. But if the article be dangerous in its essence, regulation does not seem to be the remedy, but prohibition. C. says the law cannot work from without to act upon the minds of men; but as the liquor traffic does work from without, and does tempt to all kinds of evil, why not let law remove this traffic? I

admit that all right principle and feeling springs from within; but in this case we have the following circumstance. A community, suffering from the weakness of the flesh, surrounded by temptations set up by sanction of law; such community wishing to improve—to protect the young from the temptation which they have suffered from, willing by a large majority to put away these temptations, are ready to do so; but C. says “No, you must have them kept in your midst by law.” I say, No, let the will of the majority be a law in this matter.

I know that the removal of these drink-shops will not cure the evils of drinking—that the only cure is abstinence from the drinking; yet if it will remove temptations to drinking, abolish crime—remove the need of police—diminish taxation and pauperism to a minimum, and give fair play to all moral and ameliorative efforts, then in the name of all that is good let us have it! J. H.

ACCIDENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.—“Paley narrowly escaped being a baker;—here was a decision upon which hung in one scale, perhaps, the immortal interests of thousands, and in the other, the gratification of the taste of the good people of Giggleswick for hot rolls. . . . Cromwell was near being strangled in his cradle by a monkey; here was this wretched ape wielding in his paws the destinies of nations. . . . Charles Wesley refuses to go with his wealthy namesake to Ireland, and the inheritance which would have been his goes to build up the fortunes of a Wellesley instead of a Wesley; and to this decision of a schoolboy (as Mr. Southey observes) Methodism may owe its existence, and England its military—and, we trust we may now add, its civil and political glory. . . . We know not whether the story of Newton's apple be true, but it may serve for an illustration, and if that apple had not fallen, where would have been his “Principia?” . . . If Lady Egerton had not lost her way in a wood, Milton might have spent the time in which he wrote “Comus” in writing “Accidence of Grammar;” and if Ellwood the Quaker had not asked him what he could say on “Paradise Regained,” that beautiful poem (so greatly underrated) would have been lost to us.”—REV. J. J. BLUNT, B.D.

Education.

OUGHT THE READING OF THE BIBLE TO BE PROHIBITED IN RATE-AIDED SCHOOLS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THERE is only one authorized agency for the propagation of Christianity, and that is the Church. To it has been confided "the lively oracles of God." To the disciples of Jesus alone has the teaching of all nations in what He has commanded been entrusted. Its commission is to teach and to preach Christ crucified as the means of salvation. To it has been communicated the faith, and to it belongs the duty of showing unto men the things that are most surely believed in concerning Christ, the Lord of the Church, the Saviour of sinners. So long as the Church had the main charge and control of education it rightly insisted on having the Word of God read in schools, for then it was exercising the prerogative conferred on it by Christ of teaching His way to those who came under its care. It was a missionary enterprise in which the Church was then engaged—and engaged because the State had neglected its duty to the children born within its limits. The Church cannot engage in education under any dutiful form unless religion forms a portion of the training of the child. Whatsoever it puts its hand to must have for its aim that the love of Christ be shed abroad in the human soul. At its peril—the terrible peril of faithlessness to the Redeemer—the Church would omit from any school under its sole charge the reading of the Bible, because the Church has been instituted as a witness for Christ. The function which properly falls to the Church is the education of the Spirit. It did in days bygone educate in the merely secular branches, in order that children might be brought under good influences; but this it did out of its goodness, not because of any vocation to do that.

The State has now resolved to do its own work—that work which the Church so long undertook through its generosity and

carried on, as it did the charity of ages, as a work of supererogation. The State employed its funds too much in the vilenesses of war to be able to undertake and overtake the education of its people; and the Church, feeling how sad a hindrance to the progress of the work of Christ the ignorance which prevailed was, went some few steps further than it ought, and provided for the instruction of the children it could reach in the elementary branches which have regard to the usefulness of the individual in the days of time and labour. It did this out of its supreme love to souls. It was similar with charity. The Church is not, properly speaking, an alms-distribution agency; but, through errors of State policy, sorrow, and want, and woe had little or no means of securing succour, the very institution which had been set up in the country to preserve and secure the greatest happiness of the greatest possible numbers, having failed to fulfil its part in the social compact, the Church stepped forward with chivalrous charity, and gave from the largeness of its heart succour to the sorrowful. It was the good Samaritan when the poor man had fallen in distress, and was all but hopeless as well as really helpless, and bearing the burden which the State ought to have borne, it received and distributed the charitable gifts of those whose hearts had been opened to kindness by a sense of the love of Jesus, until the State seemed altogether inclined to disregard its duty and to leave the whole burden of the poor to be borne by those who were religious.

The voluntarism of the Church in these matters of education and charity was really voluntary. The State had no claim on the Church for such aid. The State had no right to leave these two important conditions of human happiness to the precariousness of voluntary gift. It deserted its duty and demitted its functions where it neglected the training of childhood and the supplying of the wants of the poor. The Church educated the State to see that charity should be so exercised by it that want and destitution should be all but impossible, and that the sufferings of the poor should be reduced to the lowest, though the State has but imperfectly learned the lesson yet, notwithstanding the intricacy and the expensiveness of its Poor-Law Act. Now, too, the Church has educated the State to see that if it would have the children within its bounds fitted for properly engaging in the pursuits of life, it must educate them. All the long years of the Church's superintendence of education have only been employed in demonstrating

the value of education as a pecuniary investment ; and very reluctantly has the State released the Church from the burden of expense which it bore in making the demonstration plain. Even yet it has little more than half done what it should ; for it yet burdens churches with heavy conditions in its efforts to get a good, generous, genuine education for the people, and forgetful of the long years' devotion to the promotion of education the Church has displayed, the State holds back as much as it can from incurring the expenditure requisite to fulfil the duty of making ours an educated nation.

• This is the real point in the matter. The teaching of the Scripture is the duty of the Church, and of the Church only. The State is bound to see that all children under its control have the instruments of attaining and employing knowledge put in their possession ; but the Church has a right to claim that the State shall not put its interpretations upon or into the standards of the Church. It insists on having in its own hands the whole duty with which it has been entrusted from on high—the duty of teaching and persuading men to abstain from all sin, to seek after holiness, to obey God, and to trust in the mercy of Jesus for salvation. That it might be able to accomplish this latter duty the Church employed much energy and incurred much expense to secure the possession by the people of the instruments of knowledge, so that—unfortunately so far—the common idea of education is that attained through the perusal of the Scriptures. That was a necessity of the situation, and it now needs no more to be persevered in, than it is necessary to continue in our Sunday schools the provision made in their early days for the teaching in them of reading, writing, and even arithmetic. A division of labour is possible now which was not at all possible then ; we can relegate to the State its own duty, and we can retain in the hands of the Church its responsibility ; the former may teach any branch or branches of secular knowledge the times make necessary ; but the latter must retain under her own care the reading of the Bible, and cannot consent to its being read in rate-aided schools.

It has been said disparagingly that voluntarism has been a failure, inasmuch as it has not been able to provide efficiently for the support of the poor. But this is really a matter in which voluntarism has gained a signal success ; for by its tentatives and experiments it led the State to see not only that it could be

managed, but how it could be managed, and gave good reason for insisting that it should be managed. It has been the same in education. The Church has gone on building schools, training and engaging masters, inspecting the teaching given, and so have afforded, through the experiments it made, proof of the benefit of education, even in a worldly point of view, and supplied guidance to the State in regard to the best methods of arranging for and managing the education of the people. But all this, we maintain, was over and above the proper province of the Church—during this time it was doing the real work of the State gratuitously, and that, too, to the crippling of its resources for its own special mission. Having succeeded in educating the State to a sense of its duties and responsibilities, it has left that to be done by it now which it should have been doing long ago. In resigning its voluntarily undertaken functions, however, it cannot abdicate its heaven-given duties and prerogatives; and hence the Church holds by its own right to teach the way of Christ, and will not suffer trespass of its rights by the State. Hence the Church of Christ regards it as right to advocate the prohibition of the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools.

Such are the views we are compelled to entertain. We repel the idea of C. R. that ours is a position which indicates infidelity and secularism. It is a clear and true acceptance of the duty of the Church, and a strict fulfilment of the law, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, but unto God the things that are God's." R. G. S. declaims against "Bibleless schools," but that does not imply a "Bibleless land." Our churches will readily open Bible classes suited to all conditions of people, and shall secure for the study of the Scriptures the true care of a rightly-organized system. The Bible-reading classes of that day will astonish W. H. C., for they shall be free from much of the irksomeness of the present Sunday school, which still is leavened with the notion that reading as an exercise and explanation of words as a lesson, form part of the proper training to be given therein. This scholastic Scripturalism shall pass away. The power of reading and comprehending the plain words of our plain English speech will be possessed by all who come. They will come with bright clear minds to a Bible having all the charm of novelty and all the delightfulness of a book of God. Its truths will then be laid to heart. Its teachings will not sink into the hard and stony ground of hearts

that have been deadened to its divineness by taskwork. Hence for the promotion of the best interests and holiest culture of man we maintain that "the reading of the Bible should be prohibited in rate-aided schools." S. S. T.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

IN this debate we are almost as much opposed to what has been written on the negative as to that which has been written on the affirmative side of the question, and there is almost as much with which we agree in the articles contributed to the affirmative as in those contributed to the negative of this topic. In reading such sentences as some of those contained in the first and in the last two paragraphs of R. G. S.'s article, we felt absolutely grieved that any who take part on this side of the discussion should have indulged in such a clap-trap style of writing. But we must remember that it does not fall within our province to criticise the negative articles in this debate, therefore we will refrain from saying any more upon the point to which we have thus incidentally alluded to make our own position clear.

Although we do not approve of the prohibition of Bible-reading in rate-aided schools, yet we would exclude from them all sectarian instruction and dogmatic theological teaching. We would have the Bible read without theological comment or explanation in all such schools, and we contend that this should be for the following reasons:—

I. We maintain that, though it does not fall within the province of a State system of education to expound the Bible, yet it is incumbent upon it to recognise the Bible. In a free country such as ours, in which the inhabitants are found contending for many various denominations of Christianity, freedom of conscience must be respected, and sectarian instruction must be excluded from all schools supported by the enforced payments of men of all denominations, and attended compulsorily by the children of parents who advocate all sorts of creeds. But whilst sectarian teaching should be rigidly excluded, the existence of Christianity must not be ignored. In this country religious creeds must not be taught in a state system of education, but religion itself ought not to be wholly unrecognised therein, and the Bible should be read and expressly revered as the revelation of the divine will. Excluding Jews, Roman Catholics,

and Secularists, all sects believe that their creed is derived from the Bible, therefore they would all look upon the Bible as a book that their children should be taught to read. Let the Bible, then, be read in all rate-aided schools, and if found necessary in practice, a conscience clause could easily be framed for the relief of Jews, Roman Catholics, and Secularists. This is a Christian country, and a Protestant country—a fact which ought to be recognised in a State system of education; the ratepayers of the country, to whatever sect of Protestants they belong, all agree in appealing to the Bible for the fundamental facts, statements, and arguments on which their creed is built; therefore let the Bible be read without any dogmatic comment or explanation in rate-aided schools. The children of those who object to education, or have no liking for it, may be compelled to attend the school to receive instruction, and there would be no greater hardship in compelling those whose parents have no creed to take part in Bible-reading; and, as we said before, if necessary, a conscience clause could easily be framed for the relief of Jews, Roman Catholics, and professed Secularists.

II. We maintain that in a State system of education, moral instruction and discipline ought to have a place, that the Bible affords the best standard of and foundation for moral teaching, and that therefore the Bible should be read in all rate-aided schools. Morality is necessary to the civil well-being of the community. Moral principle in the subjects of the realm will afford one of the strongest motives to, and one of the securest foundations of, national prosperity. The more the principles of morality are observed by the citizens, the greater will be the prosperity of the State. The teaching of the principles of morality in a course of secular instruction would not be an unwarrantable intrusion upon the province of the Church, although morality would also be taught by the Church, because the observance of the principles of morality would benefit the community in secular matters, and therefore moral teaching ought to be included in a State system of education. If morality is to be taught in our schools, then Bible-reading ought not to be excluded from them. If we wish, for instance, to teach in our schools the lessons of obedience to parents, masters, and rulers, we cannot lay a better foundation for such instruction than by first teaching that the Bible is a revelation from God to man, and then by propounding the various Biblical injunctions concerning obedience. This would not entail the introduction of sectarian

specialities, and might be followed out to its fullest legitimate extent without placing the teacher in antagonism to the distinctive creed of any Protestant denomination. There is no branch of morality that we should need to teach to children but would be best taught by taking the divine authority of the Bible and its explicit injunctions as the foundation for such moral instruction. We therefore maintain that Bible-reading ought not to be prohibited in rate-aided schools.

J. J. H. very justly observes that religious and secular education "are separable as parts of a whole—not perhaps rigidly, but practically distinct." Very true, "*not perhaps rigidly, but practically distinct.*" In some branches of education they, as it were, overlap each other; they do so in regard to the principles of morality, &c. J. J. H. himself tacitly admits this by quoting two passages of Scripture to show what is included in the term secular education. We believe, as firmly as J. J. H. does, that "into the realm of religious faith and worship the State's power does not extend;" but Bible-reading, without dogmatic theological comment or explanation, as we contend for it, would not trench upon "the realm of religious faith and worship." We think that this exceptional method of reading the Bible would prevent it from being degraded into a task-book, and would thus obviate the objections urged by J. J. H. in the seventh paragraph of his article.

G. E. M.'s article does not seem to us to be much to the point, because we feel assured that the evils he deplors would not be remedied by the prohibition of Bible-reading in rate-aided schools. If "any parents excuse themselves from the observance of family worship" because Bible-instruction is given in the school their children attend, such parents would not be likely to observe family worship just because Bible-reading was excluded from secular education. Parents who would consider "their home duty and responsibility both provided for" by just sending their children to school, are such as would not be much troubled by a sense of parental responsibility, even if the reading of the Bible were prohibited in rate-aided schools. If the parents supposed to shelter themselves under so plausible an excuse were not such as we have described them, they would not be much influenced by such a specious pretext. The "errors" mentioned in the first two paragraphs of G. E. M.'s article are deplorable, but we are not led into them "by the prevailing assumption that the Bible is familiar to

every school boy and school girl ; " these evils are due far more to the absence of a felt interest in and an abiding reverence for the Bible. As a Sunday school teacher during the last six years, we fully sympathize with G. E. M.'s remarks on Sunday schools ; and though we admit that the prohibition of Bible-reading in the rate-aided schools might give a stimulus to Sunday school teaching, we cannot think that this effect would be sufficient to counterbalance the objections to wholly excluding the Bible from the rate-aided schools. The little additional energy that might be infused into Sunday school work would not make up for the non-recognition of the Bible in a State system of education, and the exclusion from the rate-aided schools of the best standard of and foundation for moral instruction.

We have duly considered the arguments of our opponents, but must still maintain that the reading of the Bible ought not to be prohibited in rate-aided schools.

SAMUEL.

WHEN COMES THE GREAT POET?—"A truly great poet is not he who wearies us with eternally sweet numbers ; is not Pope, is not Poe, is not even Keats. It is he who is master of all speech, and uses all speech fitly ; able, like Shakspeare, to chop the prosiest of prose with Polonius and the Clowns, as well as to sing the sweetest of songs with Ariel and the outlaws 'under the greenwood tree.' It is not Hawthorne, because his exquisite speech never once rose to pure song ; it is Dickens, because (as could be easily shown, had we space), he was a great master of melody as well as a great work-a-day humorist. It is not Thackeray, because he never reached that subtle modulation which comes of imaginative creation ; and it is not Shelley, because he was essentially a singer, and many of the profoundest and delightfulest things absolutely *refuse* to be sung. It is Shakspeare *par excellence*, and it is Goethe *par hazard*. Historically speaking, however, it may be observed that the greatest poets have not been those men who have used verse habitually and necessarily ; and if we glance over the names of living men of genius, we shall perhaps not count those most poetic who call their productions openly 'poems.' Meanwhile, we wait on for the miracle-worker who never comes—*the* poet. We fail as yet to catch the tones of his voice ; but we have no hesitation in deciding that his first proof of ministry will be dissatisfaction with the limitations of verse as at present written."—W. HUTCHINSON.

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED AND DISENDOWED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

IN what way and to what extent are our religious responsibilities politically binding? Every person is morally bound to teach to others what he believes to be true, according to the degree in which that truth is likely to affect their welfare and happiness. Religion on this point binds in the strongest possible force our responsibility one to another, because it determines our final disposition. But we must not confuse our social rights with our political capacities. The aim of religion is truth. What is truth? A something unchangeable and immutable. Within itself it is stationary, and is not affected by the variations undergone by opinions concerning it. Religion, logically speaking, can only be called the pursuit of truth; because what is called truth merely consists in the individual assumption, or the assumption of a collection of individuals, and is, upon as good authority, by another individual or body of individuals denied. By what principle is government empowered to impose a creed upon the nation? Is it upon the principle of mere individual preference upon the part of the members of Government? This would be an entirely false position. We do not only send our members to Parliament to think *for us*, but also *with us*. Is the right based upon the superior evidences of truth, as evinced in the number and character of its adherents? This cannot be, because amongst a great number of creeds there is not one capable of enforcing a general conviction.

Why is there a more general concurrence among the devotees of science than there is among the professors of religion? Science seldom advances a law unless, by a natural deduction, it can make the plausibility of its truth comprehensible. Religion, on the contrary, is, as we have it now in a great measure, an arbitrary exchange of assertion and denial. If any religion could be sup-

ported by natural inferences drawn from apparent or evident facts, the human mind would find no difficulty in its reception, and the Government would be commendable for using every lawful means for its propagation. But no religion has gained that conservative standing. Religion is uncertain, or it would not be disputable. It is not the height gained, it is the grand, hopeful, and indefatigable struggle towards it. Religion is a speculation about the truth concerning a Divine and originating Being and His attributes. Considering the loftiness of its aim, and the uncertainty of the evidence, because it has accomplished the finality of its object, Government ought not to interfere with it, Government ought not to retard it. But what has Government done? It chose an exclusive class of men who had just before avowed themselves ignorant and deluded. It gave to those men liberty to arrange and concoct a creed, and it gave to that creed a patent which it denied to all other creeds. It took that babe of a creed to its arms and it christened it. What a name to rejoice in! Orthodox! Sweet, but somewhat savouring of that ticklish ridiculousness we recognise in the notion of the Pope's infallibility. But what became of the other poor offsprings of the nation's thought? They were disowned, their legitimaacy was destroyed. At first they were treated as obnoxious persons, and stringent enactments were made to effect their extermination. But since that time the doctrines of "The Society for the Protection of Dumb Animals" have spread more magnanimity abroad. Poor little dears! They are now permitted to live under the leniency of modern law, and enjoy a simple—not ample—tolerance.

What has the Government done? It has christened a creed in contradistinction to all other creeds, "Orthodox." Our readers must understand that to be *unorthodox* means to be false or untrue. Now there is a notion abroad (especially in regard to religion) that whatever is false is pernicious. Being a dissenter, Government tells me that, *I am of those false believing pernicious and unorthodox individuals*. Reader, beware of me! I am under a moral taint. I am a schismatic and a heretic! But to what does all this tend? Does it not tend to cover with respectability the ease and comfort of a sometimes questioned acquiescence? Does it not tax at a heavy percentage the labours of our brains? We hold certain views in regard to religion. We strive by the strength of argument to convince you we are right.

Government, in its brute force, and rational weakness tells you we are wrong. Government ought not to become a partisan in religion, unless it is prepared to enter into its controversy.

Religion, as it stands, does not bear within itself that reasonable conclusiveness that will give it a safe standing in the front of open contradiction. It has come to us in mere conceptions, it must be worked out in philosophy and science. In its present stage it does not satisfy the earnest and rational yearnings of our times. It wants some extraordinary means of self-progression and development. Its radiance must be brought into clearer tangibility to the circles of human thought. Does the Government appreciate the importance of religious progression? Why then does it put a brake on its wheels? Does it know the goal to which it leads us? Why then stay us on our journey?

But some pious Christians may demur. They may tell us that is not right thus to enter the Holy of Holies and rend asunder the veil that shrouds our Maker from our eyes. Ye of the faithful, we are more faithful than you. We do not believe that if God had intended Himself to be made known to man He would have enveloped Himself in the vapours of ignorance, or clothed himself in the habits of disguise. But you say God is above reason, far, far above its topmost height. Then He must reside somewhere in the vast region of vacuum. Dear brethren, go a little farther and say it, He is *vacuum itself*. You strive to blind the eyes of man by the shadows of your own ignorance. You say God begins where reason ends. We say that the vast universe, with all its machinations of a divinity of thought, shows foot-steps where the intellect of man may find its way to God.

A state creed with its assumption of orthodoxy, is a giant in the path of free-thought, and as such it cannot be very favourable to the exploration of truth. On these grounds we oppose it, and ardently seek its downfall. Regarding truth as a problem, and the greatest and grandest of all problems, we think too much mental power cannot be expended upon its solution. We advocate unshackled liberty for religious thought, and we repudiate all attempts at political coercion.

Some of our opponents have had a wish to substitute "Reform." for "Disestablishment." Now, throughout this debate, we, on this side, have been advocating in their strongest and most unequivocal terms, freedom for individuals and impartiality in govern-

ment. What reform can we accept consonant with these principles so freely and often expressed ? Suppose we accepted an alteration of creed, the benefit of which would only be felt by one or two denominations. Would not this be the giving of strength to a principle we abhor—perpetuity to a principle we have been striving to annul ? Beware ! Our principles do not admit of a compromise. The Church must open her arms to none, or she must open her arms to them all.

WALTER G.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

HAVING read C. H.'s article in favour of Establishment, I at once thought that by a refutation of his arguments I might aptly advance my own. C. H. commences as follows :—" Free Church, Independency, &c., slip trippingly from the tongue ; but are they not too often sounds signifying nothing in particular ? " This remark, or query (or both if he chooses), displays thoroughly the whole tenor of C. H.'s discourse. But I must convey to his mind before farther digressing from this introductory matter of his, that they are these very dogmas, to which I suppose he alludes, that form the estimate of all creeds. You will find as a rule, that the more comprehensive a man's views of the attributes of his God, the more extensive will be his practical sympathy to his kind. For instance, he who believes in a Supreme Being of capriciousness, dealing out partial judgments, cannot be supposed to bear that largeness of love and tenderness to his fellow-kind as he who, on the opposite, believes in a God all-forgiving and charitable in His purposes. C. H. must yet learn that a Christian has in his creed a great reflective power to his practical Christianity.

Religion is not only of the heart, but also of the mind. They are those very speculations that lead our thoughts to God that also measure out the compass of our love to man. We must not forget that, in depreciating the scruples of others in things that concern their doctrinal belief, we invalidate in the eyes of the world the worth of our own conscience in the matter of our own faith ; and to do this is to produce a laxity tending to reduce religion to a mere moral force. If C. H. claims any sincerity for himself, he must, in the first place, grant it to others. On the other hand, if he lays no such claim, then it becomes a matter of indifference to him (so

long as the Establishment is preserved) if the Church adopts the "comprehension" system, as advocated in the time of Pitt, and combines within itself the whole body of professing Christians. If this were done, then the end and aim of the Liberation Society would be obtained. We only disapprove of Establishment as long as it arrogates to itself exclusive rights.

"Voluntaryism," says the writer with whom I am contending, "has failed in charity; and after the trial of centuries it was found necessary to establish charity by law." Here we find voluntaryism attacked upon rather a strange ground, and one which I fear will not stand the test of logic. Here is a plain avowal that the Church, supported merely by voluntary effort, would not find itself adequate to its charitable undertakings. Then it is the State, and not the Church, that supplies this great want in the commonwealth. We who advocate disestablishment might then say, Why should not the State in its almsgivings dismember itself from all religious considerations, that greater impartiality might be obtained in the administration?

C. H. further remarks that "what is everybody's business is nobody's business when things are left to the free-will of the people." Then he wishes us to "consider how far it is wise to attempt to leave to voluntaryism the extension and maintenance of divine service, and the furtherance and promotion of that righteousness which exalteth a nation." Here is a broad principle involved. C. H. must not imagine that Nonconformists have a less strong desire for the fostering and extension of religious thought and feeling than Churchmen have. We do not complain of the State's assistance to *religion*, but of its partiality to *creed*.

"Free Church Assemblies, Congregational Unions, Methodists' Conferences, &c., try to get up sustentation funds, general purpose funds, and so on, which are in reality only forms of the principle of establishment and endowment." C. H. must own that there is a wide difference between this kind of endowment and that granted by the State to the Church. Dissent claims endowment at the sufferance of the people, whilst the Church may obtain it in spite of any such regard.

WALTER G. (*Cambridge.*)

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

As in domestic policy the union in one of father and mother is to the welfare of the family, so we, taking the negative side of this question, hold that the union of Church and State in the British constitution, is a case of similar analogical bearings in which the State as the father and the Church the mother of the nation, is conducive to the good, in every way, of the children, its subjects. Had circumstances permitted I had intended to review the arguments of all those who have taken the opposite side of the controversy, as it is, I shall simply notice a few of those adduced by two or three.

I beg to differ from S. S. (p. 354) as regards the points of view from which this question has to be considered. It is *not* from a political point only, but from all three, social, political and religious, that we must discuss it. Nor can we separate one of these from another, and argue for or against the theory set forth on the subject, from one alone ignoring the existence of the two other propositions, thereby attaining a false position for such arguments, tenable no doubt in that one proposition, may be more than counter-balanced and perhaps in themselves weakened by others bearing upon the other two counts. He says that the establishment is unjust to the other churches and sects in the kingdom (p. 354), but we would remind him that these sects have seceded at various times from the Established Church; which, it appears to be the prevailing opinion, was selected by the State from amongst rival denominations for its special favour and protection, but which in reality had these accorded to it as being **THE** religious embodiment of the ideas of the people at the Reformation. No new church was created then, it was simply the Church of England reforming herself. The Church, says the Liberationists, is in the minority as regards the number of her followers. This is untrue in fact, as they form seventy per cent. of the population; and so fearful were the Liberationists of this fact being publicly manifested, that they employed every means to prevent a religious census in England, though they had no objection to it in Ireland.

As E. C. M. says, religion is an integral part of human life, though I cannot see how this should imply, according to S.S., that "human beings" are thereby "naturally Christians, and that "true Christianity is not a supernatural principle which is communicated

to them after they are born naturally, by a second birth." E. C. M. means—I take it—that it enters most closely into connection with man's relations with this life, and not that he is born possessing it by virtue of his humanity. The establishment of the Church gives it a wide and powerful influence on the hearts and souls of men, and therefore on social and religious grounds it should not be destroyed.

"Johannes," says (p. 445), "That the 'priest,' however superfluous his services may be at other times, must necessarily perform his part at or after each birth, marriage, and death, is one of those beliefs which can only have grown and thriven under the fostering patronage of a State Church; and even when that is disestablished and disendowed, it will be long ere this assumption gives place in the minds of the multitudes to a right understanding of the position of the Christian pastor in these things." Does he then consider him quite a superfluous agent at these important seasons? if so, I think few moral and religious men will share his opinion.

"Samuel's" argument as to the disgrace of immoral or unworthy monarchs being at the head of the English Church is met by the fact that they are thus head in their capacity of sovereign, and not as individuals. In the capacity through which they style themselves "We," not "I." And the English Church does no more foster a "spirit of hypocrisy, formality, dissimulation, and pretension which tends to sap the foundations of society, and of national integrity and prosperity" (p. 115) than Nonconformity. How many tales of drunken and hypocritical Nonconformist ministers can be brought to balance "Samuel's" of the Episcopalian clergyman!

Our opponents also allege that the Church has no business to be joined to the State because of their different functions, the one secular, the other religious. This we deny, because religion enters into such close contact with man in his every day life and concerns, and Church and State shows people that happiness depends upon God, it is the embodiment of the principle that religion enters into all their acts. "The supremacy of the Crown, that is, of the law over all causes and over all persons, ecclesiastical as well as civil, is the supremacy of the whole nation over its own concerns, spiritual as well as temporal. It is no encroachment on that which does not belong to it. It is the direct expression of the laity and clergy through the best organs which the experience and wisdom

of a thousand years have been able to contrive on matters which touch them more immediately than any other interests in the world." So says Dean Stanley, and thus speaks the *Christian Advocate* for March. "It"—the union of Church and State,—“gets rid of the divided allegiance; the conflicting duties of the members of Christ's body, and the subjects of the realm, which every other theory has to meet; that it contains nothing contrary to the teaching of our Lord, so far as that teaching bears upon man in the society of his fellow-men; that it preserves the individuality of nations or races which God has clearly established as He has ordained diversity and variety in the natural world; that it recognises the innate power of Christ's religion to adapt itself to the varying circumstances of humanity; finally, that it forbids and for ever destroys the atheistical or merely secular theory of civil governments,—the theory which takes away from man in his corporate capacity that responsibility to God which all men admit to exist in his individual conscience and behaviour." These are its grounds for supporting the Establishment, and they are real and solid ones.

That the English Church should be disendowed is the grossest injustice, the most flagrant act of spoliation and theft that could be committed. The Nonconformists possess many and large endowments, and who would question their perfect right to them? Tithes and revenues were given by private benefactors for the sustenance of the Church, and the propagation of Christian's principles, and the State simply holds a trusteeship, as it were, to see that they are employed in the way best calculated to bring about these benevolent ends; so that to deprive the Church of them, we repeat, would be injustice, confiscation, and dishonesty.

The intentions of the Liberationists, if they gain their ends in separating the Church from the State will best be shown by the following quotation from Tract No. 27 of the Liberation Society, by Mr. Miall, M.P.:—"When this is accomplished all that remains is to dispose of the Church edifices, and we shall have completed our task. With the exception of the cathedrals, which might perhaps be kept up for other public purposes than ecclesiastical, we think they might be fairly made over in perpetuity to the inhabitants of the parish in which each may be situate, to be sold, rented, or given as the ratepayers may determine." This needs no comment, we only respectfully beg to suggest to the enlightened rate-

payers of these happy parishes that they will no doubt find ready tenants in the "Christy Minstrels," or the proprietors of the "Royal Marionettes," or "Wombwell's Menagerie." For heaven's sake do not let us place the fair edifice which, planted on the firm foundations of truth and justice, has grown side by side with the nation, imparting to and drawing from it renewed strength and beauty as years rolled on, at the mercy of such unprincipled and blasphemous agitators, that they may drag its honour and glory, and with it that of God also, in the dust. "Church and State" may be a shibboleth, but it is a truism, and as such should be maintained. In the words of Cromwell, "If any whosoever think the interests of Christians and the interests of the nation inconsistent, or two different things, *I wish my soul may never enter into their secret!*"

R. W. C.

The Essayist.

THE PRINCIPLES AND ART OF TEACHING.

PART II.

DREPER, we may say, and also higher than these things, are the deeds which never fade away from human memory, and whose influence, surviving all the changes which affect human nature and human society, indicates their fellowship with what is infinite and divine. Yet even in the deeper and higher exercises of our human faculties are to be traced some elements of a more perishable and contingent nature, mingling almost insensibly with that "something far more deeply interfused," of which the noblest poets as well as the most profound philosophers have loved to discourse. Our deepest moral convictions, like our most unalterable intuitions, fail, in the present state of human nature, to yield the evidences of absolute perfection, and to this extent participate in that necessity of readjustment and revision which we have described as characteristic of our ordinary thoughts and reasonings. Thus may the productions and institutions of even the noblest periods be found incapable of satisfying the wants of a later generation, for some taint of imperfection will be found to cleave to all of them. Let us admit, as we fully believe, that beyond the reach of human criticism and of earthly changes there remains a "more sure word" of divine revelation: even here, in the interpretation and application of truth infallible, there is room left for the disturbing influences which mingle with the operations of fallible intellects. The best results of their processes are stamped with imperfection, mutability, and decay.

In those facts of history which have been already referred to, and of which the symmetrical arrangement has obtruded itself on our attention, we now seem also to trace the workings of this law of our existing human nature. Periods of hope and enthusiastic striving have blossomed into high attainment, to be followed by times of questioning and testing, often with such results as discord, division, and the dissolution of institutions once revered and prized; and this because, in every effort either wholly or partially human, some elements of error and weakness have hitherto found a place. So, that season of reflection and criticism which inevitably succeeds

the days of ardour and productiveness, ever finds something, perhaps many things, to correct or eliminate. With societies of men, even more than in the case of individuals, such a season must be in various respects one of trial. Established institutions are challenged and confirmed customs interfered with, existing interests compromised, until, as the growing sense of what is defective comes to be more and more confronted with the opposing unwillingness to surrender what has been already acquired, the occasions of conflict become multiplied, and the disposition to resort to extremities tends to increase. At last the bounds of resistance are broken; the battle, often fierce, prolonged, and for some time dubious, has to be fought out; and out of the wreck which it leaves behind there comes to be formed some new combination of the old materials—some solid outward unity animated by new-born hopes and ideas. In another form, with many differences, the cycle repeats itself, and wise men feel, as Goethe felt on the battle-field of Valmy, that a new age has begun.

For illustration of this process, at once of thought and action, in the more civilized societies, we can appeal once more to the more memorable centuries. Let us take the sixteenth. The middle of its predecessor had been marked by conflicts, religious as well as political; and these struggles had *seemed* to be decided in favour of those reactionary tendencies, in the direction of royal prerogative and renewed religious uniformity, of which the earlier years of the fifteenth century had given foretaste. Yet at the very time when despotism well-nigh personified in Louis XI., Edward IV. of England, and the Borgias in Italy, with some of their compeers, had apparently obtained a firm hold of Europe, there were witnessed some evidences that the triumph of authority, now perverted into tyranny, was not to prove complete or final. The principle of individual responsibility, demanding opportunities of free inquiry, seemed awhile to have been crushed under the weight of priestly authority, aided by the force of arbitrary power. Yet in various parts of Europe it began at that hour to revive, elastic as before, but purified from that crude extravagance, attendant on the ignorance of the darker ages, which had mingled with and marred some of its earlier manifestations. It rose again, to struggle and suffer indeed, but this time on the whole to prevail—to win more lasting conquests in a world now prepared by Providence to be the fitting theatre for its nobler, because better regulated exercises.

For in this instance, as has been remarked already, the grand moving ideas of that approaching age were heralded by a train of concurrent circumstances worthy of their divine origin and of their world-wide importance. The simultaneous occurrence of great

physical discoveries, momentous political changes, and a surprising literary revival has not escaped the attention of even commonplace historians; but the thoughtful and reverent mind cannot fail to note, as truly indicative of the forthputting of a divine finger, the preparation afforded by all these events for the growth and success of a secret, but spiritual, and therefore all-powerful principle. Surely it was Providence that made so wondrous a way for the rise of a living personal faith, grounded on a re-discovered Word of eternal truth! Surely it was no meaner influence that made the mighty men of a mighty age, either by means of their inclinations, or despite of them, the ministering agents of a movement which most of them despised or distrusted! Philosophical Catholics like F. Schlegel have admitted that some real benefits resulted from this great revolution, though they may have failed to perceive what Dr. Döllinger now seems to discover, that its root was moral and spiritual. But a candid view of the state of morality, private as well as public, in the age immediately preceding the Reformation, would, we cannot help thinking, render this opinion regarding the source and significance of the great movement unavoidable.

It is of importance to our inquiry, however, that we should note carefully the successive stages through which it passed. The new ideas did not, for a time, provoke so decidedly the opposition of the ruling powers in Church and State as to incur universal proscription. Kings like Francis I., ecclesiastical magnates like Wolsey, seemed at first to smile on certain aspects of the movement, and to sympathize with some at least of its aims. When it came to be manifest to such potentates that the Reformation proceeded on a principle far deeper, far wider in its range, than any or all of those efforts towards improvement that had been linked with it, these gleams of favour were exchanged for the frown of enmity, and days of trial came. The trial resulted, on the whole, in a triumph of regulated freedom. The northern nations, which had already afforded a favourable soil for the seeds of Christianity, now welcomed those principles in which freedom of conscience seemed to be reconciled with devout faith; and their power, already rising, received an accession of which the effects are not yet exhausted. But the middle of this eventful century, fertile in political changes, brought also discord and division among the ranks of even the enlightened advocates of liberty. When success had partially diminished the early warmth of the reformers, the drawbacks and difficulties of the new position began to reveal themselves. The gains acquired at such cost were re-examined and analyzed; divergence in the opposite direction of progress and conservation quickly followed; whilst the common enemy was enabled to profit by their mutual recriminations. Still,

however, the vast force of the original impulse, spreading throughout the various ranks of European society, carried the new ideas triumphantly over all opposition in the lands of their birth; nay, seemed likely also to establish their supremacy even in regions where blind submission to authority had long been the rule. Before the sixteenth century had closed, England had vanquished the world-empire of Spain; France had seen a Huguenot fight his way to her unstable throne; Holland had won her dearly bought but ample liberties; even Austria and Poland seemed to hang in the balance; the southern nations only afforded a decaying stronghold to the powers that once, in their united terrors, had confronted a solitary German monk. At this very time, however, the indications of a counter-movement, necessitated, it may be, by the very success of the Reformation, began to array themselves over the whole field of victory. The principle of authority, destined to prevail in the succeeding century, may now be traced in tendencies that wrought beneath or amidst the manifestations of free thought in the sixteenth. In France the transition was perhaps most rapid and conspicuous. The Huguenot king proved the founder of a despotic dynasty, whose ascending power became most inimical to Protestant Europe. In England the desire for reaction found expression in doctrines of "divine right" and "apostolical succession;" and although these views did not at first assume an aspect of direct opposition to those of the reformers, yet their real consequences became manifest ere long. Even the great work of Hooker, as has been truly observed, marks a transition in the sentiments of leading minds at this period; for while it repudiates the pretensions of bigotry, its chosen theme is the necessity and the sacredness of law. For the lands that still obeyed the Pope there had issued forth an embodiment of uncompromising reaction, opposing to the wilfulness of freedom a potent principle of absolute and boundless, yet enthusiastic submission. Papal Christendom was retained and reanimated, new fields were conquered for an apparently declining despotism; even the world of Protestantism soon found itself endangered by the unwearied aggressions of that terrible organization which had owed its conception to Loyola's erratic, yet most uncompromising spirit.

Thus the seventeenth century, like the fifteenth, proved to be a contrast to its predecessor. Its ruling idea was that of authority, either in its beneficial aspect as law, or regulated restraint, or in its perversions, such as fantastic loyalty, ritualistic sacerdotalism, and superstitious zeal. When these tendencies came into collision with the lately dominant spirit of freedom, a fierce and lasting struggle ensued; and this struggle was nearly co-extensive with the field of civilization. On the whole, towards the end of this period

the victory seemed to be on the side of authority, even in its more rampant forms. The majestic, yet artificial figure of Louis XIV. seems to overshadow European society, and monarchs like Charles II., themselves arbitrary, resemble satraps of this haughty potentate. But the fabric of kingly power, propped up by modified Catholicism, was undermined at the period of its most imposing splendour. Divisions and demoralization began to paralyze the strength that seemed so formidable; the success of "leagued oppression" occasioned jealousy, fear, estrangement; and at last the Papacy itself joined in resisting the "most Christian king;" while, in England, High Churchmen and Tories united with their old enemies against the designs of the second James. Before that century came to its close, the English Revolution had sounded the knell of irresponsible authority, and liberty, in its purified forms of toleration and constitutionalism, had announced a new and far-extending reign under William III. The eighteenth century has, in our own days, been subjected to hearty and unsparing censure. Notwithstanding the popularity of such a judgment, which, as proceeding from the men of the age closely following, can scarcely claim the merit of impartiality, it may be confidently stated that the last century fulfilled the promise of its introduction, proving favourable, in the main, to real progress, and not entirely belying its somewhat complacent claims to enlightenment. It has been stigmatised, on plausible grounds, as materialistic and sceptical, yet it may well be asked whether these tendencies were not partly the legacy of a preceding age, and partly the accidental consequences of increasing tolerance, in conjunction with the pacific, prosperous operation of constitutional government. In Britain, where the characteristic features of the age reached their fullest development, they did not prevent the influence of such thinkers as Berkeley, Butler, and Reid; while Samuel Johnson, who sat on the throne of literature, gave place only to the earliest of that wondrously gifted band whose honours, like those of their foreign brethren and of their more practical compatriots, have been somewhat unfairly accredited to a later age. Methodism, too, was one among the distinctive movements of the eighteenth century. And if a shallow literature, along with a cold, selfish philosophy, found wide reception in those days, we should not forget that in Germany they witnessed the birth of a nobler development of human culture, thought, and aspiration. Carlyle's account of the French Revolution as the necessary suicide of the century seems to require correction: that event was rather the death-convulsion of the protracted, yet hated system established by Louis XIV. a hundred years before, and France repeated

literally, though on a greater scale, the scenes and conflicts of yet earlier ages, which by themselves had been associated with resistance to evils too firmly established and too long submitted to.

We might dwell on the political divisions of the eighteenth century as illustrative of that spirit of criticism and reflection which always follows the attainment of new privileges. After the divisions of the progressive party had afforded opportunities of resistance to their opponents, the yet predominant spirit of freedom seemed to reach in the American Revolution, and in the first stages of the French, an ascendancy fitted to overwhelm any counteractive efforts in time coming. These sanguine hopes were doomed to speedy disappointment, and France especially became the field of counter-revolution, in the shape of despotism on the part of a minority, even before Napoleon arose to transform the movement which had given birth to his ideas. In constitutional countries the reaction in favour of authority took a milder form; but over the Continental kingdoms the spirit which found its embodiment in the "Holy Alliance" certainly ruled supreme in the early part of our own century. Nay, that spirit triumphed over a succession of revolutionary struggles in later days, and it is only now that we witness signs of another change. The tide seems to have turned, or to be in the process of turning, and if we may judge by the past centuries, the change is likely to be in the direction of freedom.

Our readers may have observed that for a long time, according to our induction, the prevailing tendencies of the centuries have been alternately in favour of liberty and of authority. The statement might be supported by the admissions of writers deservedly honoured as master historians, though we have not observed this alternative character recognised by any of them. By studying the whole historical literature for themselves, attentive students may find further confirmation of this very singular fact. Thus they may note the dominant "Cæsarism" of the *first* century, following an age of democratic licence. In the provincial enfranchisement of Trajan, Adrian, and the Antonines, they may trace a more liberal spirit presiding over the destinies of the *second*. The *third* was the age of military despotism, while the *fourth*, on the other hand, saw the triumph of Christianity and the rise of the northern nations. In the *fifth*, barbarian monarchs assumed the powers of conquered emperors, and the ambitious designs of the Papacy first appeared with Leo the Great. The *sixth* witnessed the rise of distinct nationalities in northern Europe; which token of freedom gave place, in the *seventh*, to their submission to Roman usages. The *eighth* century was marked by "new

administration" of the Eastern Empire, under Leo the Iconoclast, and the revival of puissant northern life by Charles Martel and the Lombard kings; the *ninth*, by the establishment of a world-empire under Charlemagne. The *tenth* was introduced in England by the national work of Alfred and his successors, while Germany also detached itself from the Carlovingian Empire, and France began to acquire a national character under the Counts of Paris. The *eleventh* century saw imperialism revive, to battle awhile with its spiritual rival in the person of Hildebrand. In the *twelfth* the genius of Teutonic Europe, striving earnestly after great results, found work for itself in the Crusades, and expression for its finer powers in Gothic architecture; while elsewhere the kindred phenomena of lyric poetry, reforming tendencies in the Church, and civic patriotism in Italy, proved that the free energy of Europe was reviving. The *thirteenth* century brought an Innocent III. to dominate the Church and terrify the world; mighty kings arose in the leading nations, and Aristotle became supreme in the schools. The next was the period of Swiss, Scottish, and Belgian freedom; of Wycliffe's attack on superstition; of the resistance to the Papacy by the nations; of Dante, Petrarch, and Chaucer.

Of later ages we have said enough. Let us now consider whether any reason can be found for the striking intervention of this element of time in the process of repetition which we seem to have discovered, and which, in its essential nature, we have seen cause to ascribe partly to the course of human thought in a world full of imperfection, partly to such concurrence of events as compels us to acknowledge providential interference.

In answer to the question, How came these eras of thought and Providence to be measured so regularly? we can only suggest briefly some grounds of explanation. Men naturally date events and form resolutions according to the divisions of time. Birthdays and New Year's Days are milestones, as it were, in the journey of life. Sacred prophecy says much of fixed periods, though we have avoided reference to these; believing as we do that undesigned coincidence is evidence more impressive than the application, too often arbitrary, of sacred to secular science. Again, three generations are said to be comprehended in a century, and these may be regarded as representing the growth, triumph, and disintegration of ideas. It has occurred to us, moreover, that the duration of one important human life is not to be reckoned merely by the number of years. Many of the greatest men have attained to an age far beyond the "three-score and ten," and their influence has survived them in many instances. The lives of some great statesmen, such as Brougham and Lyndhurst, may be said to have ascended with a spring-time of po-

litical fervour in which they shared; to have culminated in their own success, or in that of the ideas cherished by them, and to have subsided into an old age of reflection and criticism, though not perhaps into a "winter of discontent."

We may also call to mind the importance of the Augustan age as an historical and literary landmark, and the deeper importance of its contemporary, the Christian era. And this consideration suggests the inquiry whether we are not invited to trace, even in this symmetry of arrangements in earthly history, the manifestation of a divine purpose, causing ultimate and apparently opposing impulses to work together in promoting that advancement of human society which is surely a part of God's infinite design, and proving that order, not confusion, is, after all, the principle of His government. Luther compared the progress of society to that of a drunken man proceeding by a compensation of erratic movements. There is wisdom in the homely comparison; but we prefer to think of alternating waves of advance and retrogression in a flowing tide; and deeper suggestions may be found in the prophetic image of those mighty wheels or circles, so complex yet so harmonious, which even in a season of corruption and danger were chosen to illustrate the mysterious yet not wholly secret regulation of the universe.

SYMPATHY.

"Kindness by secret sympathy is tried,
For noble souls in nature are allied."

DRYDEN.

OUR life is made up of so many varieties, which we divide so ostentatiously into the two classes called virtues and vices, that it is sometimes well to look for ourselves, and not through the spectacles of society, at some of the component parts of our motley existence.

Perhaps no word in our language is more expressive than the one I have chosen to be the subject of this essay.

Sympathy is a virtue about which there is nothing heroic. If it is seen on a battle-field it is not met with among the generals and their glory, but is found with the surgeons and their science. If we look for it in the city, it is not on change or in the banks, or with the bill-discounters, but it is where unexpected commercial

misfortune threatens ruin to the upright man. It is a virtue that, like most others, does not pay—I speak as the world speaks. It is directly opposed to the “pound of flesh” principle. It tempers justice with mercy; indeed, I am afraid it is even glad that justice is blind, so that it may sometimes weigh down the scales with mercy. It is not aristocratic; it dares to live either with poor or rich, but mainly I find, perhaps because there are more of them and their days are shorter, with the poor. It shows itself in a variety of ways. The eye, the lip, the voice, the hand, are its messengers and exponents, but chiefly—as it ought surely to be—I think the hand.

And now I may just remark that I have often wondered how the South Sea islanders feel or express sympathy in any of its degrees when they, if I may put it so, shake hands by rubbing noses—as it is thus we are told they greet one another.

My private opinion is that the process with them is a mere farce, a parody on our highly esteemed civilized habit, an unintentional insult to some cold-blooded Englishmen, who go through the national ceremony a hundred times a day without meaning anything by it.

A nose can feel and feel for, but it cannot grasp another; it cannot possibly evince by delicate gradations of pressure the strength or weakness of its owner's affection. It may be Roman, and indicate firmness; or Grecian, and indicate delicate taste; or snub, and indicate inordinate vanity; or pug, and indicate general nastiness; or cogitative, and indicate an easy temperament combined with a good appetite; but in none of these diversities can it convey to another, even by rubbing, the appreciation of kindness received or its intention to do a kindness. We can speak of a generous hand, but who ever heard of a generous nose? we sing of going down the hill of life hand in hand together, but we simply couldn't do it nose in nose. So I set it down at once, and I mean to stand by what I say, that this Polynesian nose-rubbing business is a sham.

Far otherwise is it with the grasp of the hand. It is as various and variable as the expression of the human face. It can say in its pressure what the lip cannot utter, charged as our whole being is at times with love beyond, not pressure, but expression, with pity that hides itself in a tear, with hope that trembles in its hiding-place, with joy that almost bursts the beating heart; we cannot at such times fully convey our love, our hope, our fear, except in the sympathetic grip of the hand.

The eye looks love, and pity, and every good and every evil thought; the lips touching other lips, send a swift message of

innocent love, of hearty fellowship, of passionate fondness, ay, and of Judas with his thirty pieces of silver—for still people do sell one another with a kiss,—but neither eye nor lip can convey the depth of earnest sympathy that may be told in a grasp of the hand.

As there is a cause for everything, so it is not difficult to find the root from which sympathy springs.

Is it not strange that every virtue and all nobleness in our nature grows out of, and is the direct result of suffering, and that the tribute paid to virtue and nobleness is the simple but earnest expression of human sympathy with self-denial, hard work, endurance, and faithful devotion?

So that sympathy really is not only the expression of affection for the suffering, but also of genuine appreciation of the good that grows out of suffering.

It makes itself known in the quiet ministering of the sister of mercy tending the poor and needy, in the widow's mite, given with self-denying prayerful love, in the benevolence that bestows its energies to the furtherance of the sciences that tend to increase the general well-being of the world; in the little unobtrusive gravestone, graven with "sacred to the memory of" one who has led a village life, and whose village was his world; and in the marble magnificence of the tomb that tells of a life lived for others, of a genius born for all mankind, of a soul that belongs for evermore to all the world.

Such is sympathy. All through life, from the sunny time when the loving mother toys with her boy child, and prattles as it prattles to please its undisciplined ear, to the time when the sternly disciplined man looks in upon his own heart and all its memories, and out upon the world and all its teachings, and thanks God for everything, even for his sorrows; all through this time, with its many changes, the simple how d'y'e do, the kindly smile of a neighbour, the grasp of the true hand of a true friend is the very sunlight of life, the magician whose wondrous wand turns gloom into gladness and makes rainbows of our tears. Sympathy rarely builds churches or endows hospitals. For the most part it leaves such grand achievements to two classes:—good men and true who, working hard and prospering, give generously of their wealth, and ask others to administer it; and miserable old sinners who never gave to the suffering or the troubled either money or love, and who, unsympathetic to the end, dying, leave their hoards to institutions rather than to individuals. This is called charity, not sympathy,—I fear it is no more either the one or the other than if the giver or the gift had never been.

I sometimes think that with a little more sympathy going out continually in a brotherly and sisterly sort of way from hand to hand all the world over, we might possibly become altogether better than we are, and have much less ignorance and poverty in our midst, and perhaps require fewer churches in their grand emptiness craving for the well-dressed and well to do, and fewer hospitals, our true churches and chapels, opening their merciful arms to the brotherless and sisterless poor.

Does not the voice still say, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto *one* of these, ye have done it unto Me"? It is our sympathies and not our purses that the world wants most—the sympathy that will do its own work, and not depute it to another.

The want of sympathy, especially in our home or social life, is one of the most serious of evils. Take as one example only, what as applied to married life is called in our canting phraseology "incompatibility of temper," meaning simply want of sympathy. It argues ill for our foresight, or judgment, that there are so many ill-assorted marriages, men and women undoubtedly loving one another, but nevertheless from dissimilarity of soul, of tastes, of sympathies, totally unfit for life companionship.

The miser who loves, but cannot be loved by his gold; the spendthrift who wastes his money and his energies upon himself; the selfish of every state and degree, in lacking sympathy with others, and the sympathy of others, live only the gross, material, and sensual part of life, and know not anything of its divinity.

Trouble is our heritage. The sweat of the brow is our sin-begotten birthright; but the dew of love upon the heart is ours also to give and to receive, if we but read the lesson of life aright, and endeavour to live within the charmed circle of those simple words, "Love one another."

F. G.

The Reviewer.

HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

WILLIAM III. TO GEORGE III.:—

History of the British Empire. By F. D. COLLIER, LL.D. London: T. Nelson and Sons.

A School and College History of England. By J. B. CURTIS, B.A. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.

A Manual of English History. By ROBERT ROSS (Normal College, Cheltenham). London: Simpkin and Co.

A Concise History of England. By J. F. CORKEAN. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

Outlines of English History. By E. D. London: National Society's Depository.

Student's Handbook of Modern History. By SAMUEL NEIL. London: Charles Griffin and Co.

A Synoptical History of England. London: James Walton.

A Chronological Table of the Principal Events in English History. By JAMES PEMBRIDGE. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.

At the request of the editors of the *British Controversialist*, who are anxious to make its contents as far as possible practically available for self-culture, and, though subordinate to this main design, immediately useful in connection with those local examinations which are affecting so powerfully for good the studies of the rising generation, we have selected from our shelves the above-noted historical outlines for brief notice and characterization, as handbooks for acquiring a knowledge of the history of our native land, and for bringing together from them aids to an acquaintance with the annals and events which occurred between the Revolution in England and the Revolution in America.

With this double purpose in view we have not introduced into our list any of the higher histories, although, of course, Hume and Smollett and their continuators might be advantageously consulted,

and Macaulay's fragment on these times should be read. Special historical materials will be found in Sir James Mackintosh's "History of the Revolution," in the late Sheriff Alison's "Memoir of Marlborough;" Campbell's "Lives of the Admirals;" "Walpole's Memoirs," and Coxe's "Biography of Walpole;" Lord Stanhope's "History of England from the Peace of Utrecht;" "History of the War of Succession in Spain;" Carlyle's "Friedrich;" Chambers's "Rebellion in Scotland," 1715-1745; Croly's "Life of Pitt," and works of a similar character. Such works, however, interesting, informing, and valuable as they are, do not suit well for being got up in that compact and ready form which is required for an examination. In preparation for that sort of work facts require to be classified, got into brief and comprehensible compass, seen in their relations one to another with directness and clearness, and expressed in concisely careful terms. Our own impression of the best way to study any period of history for lasting usefulness as well as immediate success would be to gather together into groups the chief events of a period, and thereafter to peruse the best attainable accounts of these events in the several works available to the student—using, wherever possible, the accounts given in one of our first-class encyclopædias.

However that may be, it is evident that above all things else preparation for an examination in history requires (1) accuracy as to (a) facts, (b) dates, (c) statements, (d) relations of cause, effect, or consequence; (2) compactness in (a) form, (b) expression; (3) readiness (a) of being recalled, (b) of being stated, (c) of being contracted or expanded according to the time, requirement, and conditions of the questions; (4) fulness as regards (a) matters known, (b) accounts given, (c) opinions about, and (4) circumstances connected with the times and events examined on. To secure these in the best form we think that the construction of a "Tablet for the Memory," arranged chronologically, containing the dates of the chief events, persons, laws, changes, &c., involved in the portion of history to be studied, with notes, where possible, of the best sources of information, is highly advisable. Thereafter the study upon each of these several matters may be expanded by reading such authorities as may be within reach—as we fill up a skeleton map by additions in regular order in proportion to the amount of fulness required.

Dr. Collier's history is lively, full, lucid, and graphic; is notably full of key-words—distinctly printed and suggestive—of tables of

chronology and genealogical charts; and is particularly valuable in its attention to the development of social life, manners, and letters.

Mr. Curtis's history is carefully compiled and excellently arranged; valuable in its matter and its references, explicit in statement, and moderate in tone; and while it supplies an accurately dated narrative of political events, also gives in a different type, in well-chosen arrangements, a large amount of information upon literature, science, art, invention, customs and costumes, manners and amusements, trade and manufactures, laws and agitations.

Mr. Ross's "Manual" is composed on the grouping system, giving the main incidents under distinct headings in continuous narrative, bringing in around them the matters of less consequence, and adding notes and illustrations of the views, statements, causes, relations, and consequences of the events told, or explanatory of the action of the chief persons concerned. It is a reproduction of the matter of history rather than an abridged compilation from fuller records, and has a good deal of the lecturer's style of impressing and expression.

Mr. Corkran's "Concise History" takes up the epochs of our history, and traces their connections and relations in summary, sweeping, happily chosen notices, in which the doings and the domesticities of English life are shown in their intertextured unity. He has a graceful felicity and facility of style, and adorns his page with many exquisite and expressive phrases, which link the inner and the outer life firmly into one.

E. D.'s "Outlines" have been written with great skill, so as in one book to comprise two courses—one the mention of the main incidents of history, the other a description or fuller statement of the same. The language is simple, the facts well selected, the statements are guarded, and the intercrossing of the events and circumstances are pretty clearly brought out, and there is considerable art shown in epitomizing acts, statutes, laws, &c.

Mr. Neil's "Handbook" is rather a *list* of events than a history: a sort of chronological guide; it eschews narratives for the most part, and merely registers. The handbook, which forms one of the volumes of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, includes the history of the world from the Reformation, but as each country has a separate *annuaire* for itself, the chief events of every year may be easily got. The British portion has been reproduced in a "Cyclopædia of British History and Geography." Were this part of the work to

be issued by itself, it would be highly useful as a *vade mecum* for knowing the events of any given year.

"The Synoptical History" is prepared on a capital plan for preparing for an examination. It is an oblong volume which on opening up offers history at one view in a concise form. Each page contains three columns: (1) a brief abstract of the leading events in large type (2); fuller details in a narrative form; (3) a summary of contemporary history.

Mr. Pembridge's "Chronological Table" is a small summary of the landmarks of British history; it is concise, and purposely only takes in leading incidents, which are in general well chosen.

We propose after this summary criticism to help our readers to study the period between the British and the American revolution by presenting in one column the dates referring to this time from Pembridge's Table, which we shall supplement in another column, selected from the other histories passed under review, indicating the sources by the figures indicating their order.

Hints on Public Speaking. By GEORGE WHALE, JUN.

Woolwich: The Young Men's Christian Association.

THESE "Hints" contain the substance of a Lecture delivered before The Young Men's Christian Association at Woolwich, by one of its most intelligent and helpful members in July of the present year. It is, apparently, an inaugural discourse, and seems besides to be introductory to a course of nine lectures on the chief prose writers and parliamentary orators of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, now in process of delivery by the same author. This book is a very encouraging sign of the times, as it has been published at the special request of those who heard it, and who know the assiduity of culture the speaker has bestowed on his mind. We also happen to know by the intercourse of years, as a reader interested in the progress of this magazine, and a contributor to its pages, and a correspondent of our own—how eager Mr. Whale has been to acquire knowledge, power of thought, and ability of speech; and we have no hesitation in saying that every young man who seeks to encourage desert, and who wishes to profit by the actual acquirement and experience of a compeer should procure and study this pamphlet, and he will have a sixpence worth of worth.

The work commences with general observations on grammar,
1872.

logic, and rhetoric, the last of which he defines as "argumentative composition." He regards it as a first requisite for a public speaker to have something to say; to have a thorough knowledge of his subject; to have a definite outline of his thoughts on it pre-arranged; to be exact in the use of language, which should be clear and simple. Sentences should be so arranged as to be not only grammatically correct, but also well knit, forcible, apt, and specific, so that they may be concise, elegant, and tasteful. Particular attention ought to be given to the use of figures of speech. His observations on elocution are marked by good sense. "Delivery to be successful must be natural, not artificial." We ought to speak slowly, distinctly, and discreetly, avoiding awkwardness alike of voice and gesture. Shrewdness, industry, and a sense of duty will always make their possessors of avail in the mastery of men, if used under a feeling of responsibility such as ought to control every exercise of mind, but specially such as is intended to move others in thought or to action.

This cursory glimpse of the line of reflection which these "Hints" embody is by no means adequate to give an idea of the contents; but it will satisfy most that here is matter of moment to the thoughtful. We ask for the work purchase, perusal, and preservation.

The Shell-Flower Maker. By the Author of "Agnes Morton."
London: Houlston and Sons.

THIS is a recent addition to a sixpenny series of gift-books for the young. It is really "a true story," illustrating the fact that "God helps those who help themselves." The trials and struggles, the sorrows and mischances, and the ultimate conquest made over disease, cripplement, and poverty, by ingenuity, industry, hopeful endeavour, and faith, are well and interestingly told. We have tried its fascination on some young folk, and found that it told well.

The Credibility of the Christian Religion. By SAMUEL SMITH.
London: Hodder and Stoughton.

THIS little but precious volume is a reproduction in a revised form of two lectures delivered by a layman of energetic Christian spirit to his brethren engaged in commerce in the town of Liverpool. It is singularly clear and felicitous in reasoning, apposite and attractive in illustration, simple and forcible in language, and

it strikes upon the spirit with the true power of a felt Christian faith. It is concise yet full, and compendious without being enigmatical; it possesses the brevity of a synopsis, and yet displays the fluency of a carefully elaborated style. Its main characteristic is Christian good sense. The first part deals with "Rationalism and the Bible," and shows—(1) that the Bible is necessary as a written and authoritative revelation; (2) by showing that the teaching of the Bible is pictorial rather than scientific he dismisses the difficulty arising from the alleged inexactness of the Bible; and (3) by proving that from the structure of the Bible varieties of opinion are inevitable, he justifies religious sectarianism intellectually, though he objects to the moral errors to which it has given rise.

The Second part deals with "Rationalism and Miracles." Here he shows—(1) that Christianity is inseparably interwoven with miracle; (2) that the chief miracle of all, the resurrection of Christ, is the foundation of Christianity; (3) that the miracles of Christ are in keeping with his character and claims, and closes with, (4) an argument for the truth of Christianity drawn from the grandeur of the hopes it excites in man.

Part third, which is a sort of appendix to the lectures, denounces "the injurious effect of teaching Christianity in too theological a style, especially to the young"; and part fourth contains "remarks on the 'Shorter Catechism,' and generally on the over-exactness of theological systems."

This book is an admirable addition to apologetics (or, as we would prefer to call defensive controversy, *eristics*) and well fulfils the intent of the author "to consider some of the practical aspects of Christianity which recommend it to the unsophisticated human mind, and point out how irreconcilable are many of the modern objections with any plan of revealed religion that could possibly meet the wants of the human race." We remember no bit of argumentative literature so striking and original since the publication of "The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation." Our readers will value the book. It contains much that is valuable to an inquiring mind, much that concerns those who have to deal with the inquiring, and a great deal that will fascinate and improve those who delight in excellent argument excellently put. Here is the paragraph with which the book closes:—

"How inveterate is the custom which makes man mistake *words* for *ideas*! how slow and difficult a process to teach him that words are but

signs or symbols, and that they only serve as a common medium of thought when they stand for signs of the same thing! The great majority of people will argue endlessly about words, without ever inquiring whether their opponent attaches the same meaning to them as they do themselves; the two things are inextricably interwoven together, and the major portion of the disputes that divide mankind arise from their talking different languages when they think they are speaking the same. This is peculiarly true of theology; and were it generally recognised, there would be less anxiety to teach hard formulas, and more to see that the actual thing they signify is lodged in the mind. Amazing is the tendency in religious teaching to harden into theological forms, and lose its sap and vitality; stereotyped phrases come to be repeated by rote, and lose almost all their meaning. Preaching and teaching have a strong tendency to settle into narrow conventional grooves. The indolence and intolerance native to the human mind conspire to produce this result. We would rather settle on our lees than be emptied from vessel to vessel, and so the controversies that arise in the religious world are far from being unmixed sources of evil: they shake slumberous consciences out of their self-complacent torpor, and oblige people to dig deep for a reason of the hope that is in them.

"Religious controversy, were it conducted in a loving and charitable spirit, might be a great means of enlarging the horizon of our spiritual vision, but unhappily, it is seldom carried on without an acrimony that must often astonish men of the world. One indirect advantage may, perhaps, accrue to the Church from the activity of modern rationalism; it will tend to withdraw theologians from the dusty cobwebs of sectarian controversy, and force them to unite for the defence of the vital interests of faith. The great solid grounds on which we rest belief in our religion will have to be brought forth more prominently, and advocated in a way more acceptable to reasonable men. The petty differences among sects and their puerile ways of appealing to fragments of Scripture, will have to be put aside, that we may meet the common enemy on his own ground. We have no doubt that the spread of rationalism has softened the sharp edges of theology, and caused a virtual withdrawal from many untenable positions. As in a war with a foreign enemy home factions cease, so, in a struggle for the great verities of our faith, the various sects find out how easily they can fight under a common flag."

IRISH HEDGE-SCHOOLS.—The Irish hedge-school was not an institution altogether to be despised. The "mather," as his scholars styled him, though sometimes as uncouth and ungainly in figure as Dominie Sampson himself, was often quite as learned. With a "caubeen" on his unkempt head, so battered and weather-beaten that it must plainly have stood the storms of at least a score of winters, a blue or black coat of the shape sometimes called a "swallow-tail," adorned with brass buttons, but also sorely the worse for wear, and his nether man encased in corduroy breeches, grey worsted stockings, and hob-nailed brogues, he was not certainly a very imposing impersonation of learning. But next to the priest he was the great man of the parish. Not a cabin or farmhouse within its bounds but felt honoured to have the "mather" at its fireside. When the supper of fine mealy "praties" was set on the table in the wooden dish, and the bottle of poteen, the produce of Pat's own "wee still," brought out of its hiding-place in the thatch or the potato ridge in the garden, while the peat fire on the hearth was stirred till the pewter plates on the dresser glowed again, all felt it an honour—an honour not altogether unmixed with awe, which it required a drop or two of the "crather" to banish—to have the pedagogue as a guest. All knotty points of "larnin," which proved too much for Pat and his cronies, were submitted to his decision in the fullest confidence that he could unravel them—a confidence which he took good care never to weaken by confessing ignorance. He was good at "Joggraphy," and equally great at "Jommethry," loved to astonish his wondering hearers with long quotations from Virgil or Horace rolled out in his most sonorous voice, and with the air of one who held constant converse with the mighty dead; and even when his talk was confined to the vernacular, delighted to move along over his listeners' heads on stilted periods, or pelt them unmercifully with volley on volley of sesquipedalian words. When such an unusual thing as a letter was to be written, who but the "mather" would be called on to do it? When wee Thaddy took kindly to "the languages," and Pat thought he might send him to the college to be made into "a clargy," what could be done till a lengthened "shanagh" had been held with the same encyclopædic authority? It is true the hedge-schoolmaster was not always just such a man as one would choose to be entrusted with the education of youth. Often he was given to drink. Not seldom he was woefully excessive in the use of the biroh. Very frequently he was a mere superficial pretender to knowledge which he was far from really possessing, and sometimes his superior information only qualified him to be the leading spirit in the Whiteboyism or Ribbonism which have so disgraced his country. But yet this much must in justice be said of him—that with all his faults he kept alive the flame of knowledge when few else were found to tend it, and sometimes turned out of his apparently unpromising academy men who became a credit and ornament to their country.—*Leisure Hour.*

Our Private Tutor.

ON READING ALOUD.

ACCENTUATION.

Accentuation signifies that peculiar method of pronouncing words which secures their proper utterance in regard to force or elegance. Accent is a distinguishing characteristic of syllabic words. In these the relative tone is regulated by usage, so that some one syllable is marked out by the voice giving stress to it, and imparting importance to it. Correctness of accent is considered as a sure sign of good culture. Even in Shakspeare's time it was so, for we read in "As You Like It," III. 2, "Your accent is something finer than you could purchase in so removed a dwelling."

Syllables are accentuated, words are articulated. Accent is attainable in a twofold mode: (1) by dwelling longer upon one syllable than on the others, which is quantitative accentuation, as in *authór*, *glórify*, *mórtificátiön*, &c.; (2) by giving a smarter percussive utterance to one syllable than to the others, which is qualificative accentuation, as in *mor'row*, *mult'itude*, *immob'ility*, &c.

Accentuation may be farther arranged, as: (1) *radical*, or the distinctive pronunciation of the *root-syllable* of a word, as *indea'ture*, *leg'ible*, *rec'titude*, *zeal'ously*, &c.; (2) *terminational*, or, the distinctive utterance of any modifying addition made to the root of a word, as *pätrimon'y*, *ëxcüsätóry*, *hörtätive*, &c.; and (3) *distinctive*, or such as is used to show the difference of meaning attached to one word spelled like another from that other, as in *conversé*, *cón-verse*; *présage*, *présage*, &c. The *root-accent* is the prevailing one, especially in Saxon words and their compounds; the *terminational* accent is most frequent in derivations from the learned or classical languages, and the *distinctive* accent is employed as far as possible wherever need occurs.

In the accentuation of words care should be taken to avoid any unusual or affected expressiveness of syllabification. Accent is generally marked in good dictionaries, and an excellent method of studying the proper accent of words is to take a passage in any reputable

author, turn up the dictionary for each word, mark the accentuation given there, and thereafter read the passage somewhat carefully several times, until the articulation and accentuation of the passage can be given fluently and readily. For the attainment of the power of reading prose with rhythmical grace and elegance of accentuation this is the best plan we know. It seems a cumbrous and slow, but it is a sure mode, and lasting in its beneficiality. Should this method seem to be too difficult we would recommend the diligent study of the poetry of Coleridge, Shelley, and Southey, the accentuation of which is in general not only very exact but also finely marked.

A few rules regarding accentuation may be usefully given, but as a practical mode of habituating the eye, ear and organs of speech to attend to accentuation, the above plan is the best we know.

AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE.—PLAIN ENGLISH.

SENTENCES consist of subjects and predicates ; but as the qualities, circumstances, &c., of subjects and of predicates are capable of change, increase, or diminution, &c. both subjects and predicates may be enlarged by additional words called *complements*.

Simple Sentence.—Man rejoices,

SUBJECT ENLARGEMENT.

Article Enlargement.—A man rejoices.

Adjective Enlargement.—A wise man rejoices.

Adverbial Enlargement.—A truly wise man rejoices.

Conjunctive Enlargement.—A truly good and wise man, &c.

Prepositional Enlargement.—A man of goodness and wisdom, &c.

Relative Enlargement.—A man who is good and wise rejoices.

PREDICATE ENLARGEMENT.

Adverbial Enlargement.—Man justly rejoices.

Prepositional Enlargement.—Man justly rejoices in the success of his aims.

Conjunctive Enlargement.—Man justly rejoices in the success of his aims and the advancement of his views.

Relative Enlargement.—A man justly rejoices who has seen the success of his aims and the advancement of his views.

CONVERSION OF SENTENCES.

Many sentences may be made interchangeable as regards their subject and predicate, for example:—

This country is wooded. This is a wooded country.

This cottage is thatched. This is a thatched cottage.

This palace is splendid. This is a splendid palace.

This prospect is charming. This is a charming prospect.

EXTENSION OF SENTENCES.

Again, a sentence having a predicate may be so constructed as to form the subject of an enlarged sentence.

This country is wooded. This wooded country is level.

This cottage is thatched. This thatched cottage is let.

This palace is splendid. This splendid palace is vacant.

This prospect is charming. This charming prospect is free.

ABSORPTIVE COMPOSITION OF SIMPLE SENTENCES.

A sentence may be so enlarged that it shall absorb into itself a simple sentence so contracted as a predicate.

How lovely is this wooded country!

Ruin overhangs that thatched cottage.

Vacancy befits not this splendid palace.

Delightfully free is this charming prospect.

The student will find good exercise in choosing simple sentences and adding such complements to them as are exemplified in the first specimen in this lesson, and thereafter making a collection of such sentences as we have noted as interchangeable, and striving with the utmost rapidity to change them into various forms.

This beech is nodding. This is a nodding beech.

The nodding beech moans in the wind. The wind is moaning in the nodding beech.

This lawn is flowery. This is a flowery lawn.

This level grass-plot is overgrown with flowers. Flowers grow all over this flat meadow land.

This grass-plot's level is adorned with flowers. How beautifully those flowers adorn that level grass-plot!

Are not the flowers which grow over that level grass-plot beautiful? Do not the flowers which grow over that level piece of greensward adorn it beautifully?

"Oh, what a lovely hue hath overcast

All that sweet greensward, level laid and neat!

Nature's enamel, never yet surpassed,

Adorns this carpet for rejoicing feet."

BIBLE PAGES. No. 5.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MARK.

THE AUTHOR.—"John, whose surname was Mark" (Acts xii. 12)—the former, meaning "favoured of the Lord," being his Hebrew name, and the latter a Latin name, probably adopted when he was about to travel in Roman lands,—is generally supposed to be the evangelist. "Mary the mother of John" was a pious woman of Jerusalem, in whose house many gathered together. Her brother was "Jones, who by the apostles was surnamed Barnabas, the son of consolation, a Levite and of the country of Cyprus. It is conjectured, from the manner in which the narrative is given, that John Mark was the young man having a linen cloth cast about his naked body, who, following Jesus, was seized but escaped. It is not improbable that from Peter a hint of the importance of the night and the event was gained, and that, excited by curiosity if from no higher motive, he went after the crowd who were conveying Jesus to the judgment when the disciples all forsook Him and fled. His interest in Jesus was shortly deepened; for Jones, whose "sister's son" he was, attached himself to the Nazarenes, and Mary, his sister, probably at that time a widow, also joins herself unto them. Peter on his escape from prison sought her house as an asylum, and found there the early church at midnight, assembled in prayer on his behalf. Either before or at this time Mark gave himself, under the teaching of Peter, to the service of the Lord—whence he calls him "Marcus, my son." (1 Pet. v. 13). When Barnabas and Saul, who also is called Paul, fellow-disciples under Gamaliel, departed from Jerusalem to Antioch, after having taken thither the charitable contributions of the brethren who were first called

Christians from the banks of the Orontes to the capital of Judea, 300 miles distant, they took John Mark with them to Antioch. From Antioch John accompanied Paul and Barnabas as their servant to Seleucia, Cyprus, and Salamis, and thence to Perga in Pamphylia; but there for some reason or other "John, departing from them, returned to Jerusalem" (Acts xiii. 13). From Jerusalem John returned to Antioch, and when Paul and Barnabas returned from their first mission tour and projected a second, "Barnabas determined to take with them John, whose surname was Mark. But Paul thought not good to take him with them, who departed from them from Pamphylia, and went not with them to the work. And the contention was so sharp between them, that they departed asunder one from the other" (Acts xv. 37—39). Paul chose Silas for his companion, and went through Syria and Cilicia; but Barnabas (apparently believing him to be innocent of anything worthy of his friend's condemnation) took Mark, and sailed towards Cyprus, his native city. The heat of Paul's temper probably soon cooled, for he always speaks of Barnabas with respect (1 Cor. ix. 6). They met again and went to Jerusalem together (Gal. ii. 1), having Mark also probably along with him, and Mark accompanied Paul to Rome (Col. iv. 10); and he, along with Luke the evangelist, is named by Paul among "my fellow-labourers at Rome" (Philem. 4). Thereafter we find him at Ephesus in the company of Timothy, and we see Paul's opinion of him when we read, "Only Luke is with me. Take Mark, and bring him with thee: for he is profitable to me for the ministry" (2 Tim. iv. 11). No doubt he accompanied Timothy as desired, and went by Troas towards Rome. During his absence from Paul he had probably gone to Peter at Antioch and accompanied him to Babylon, where we know he was (1 Pet. v. 13); nor is it unlikely that he carried with him to the churches of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia, the second epistle which Peter wrote to them, in which he mentions his own substantial agreement with his "beloved brother Paul," and promises, "I will endeavour that ye may be able after my decease to have these things always in remembrance (2 Pet. i. 15; ii.),—an indication that he was about to take means that through Mark the churches might learn what Peter, one of "the eye-witnesses of his majesty," knew of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Mark is supposed to have written out his Gospel—from notes furnished by Peter—at Rome. Afterwards, according to Eusebius

Epiphanius, and Jerome, he preached the gospel in Egypt, and was first minister of the church at Alexandria, where he died a martyr 25th April—"St. Mark's mysterious Eve," A.D. 68. His corpse is said to have been transmitted from Egypt to Venice, of which city he is the chosen patron saint.

THE CHARACTER OF MARK'S GOSPEL.—The unanimous testimony of the early church assigns to Mark the position of disciple and interpreter of Peter. The most notable thing about this Gospel is the similarity in the facts, and in the form of their narration, between the evangels of Mark and Matthew. Augustine called Mark the epitomizer of Matthew, but any careful reader of the latter work will soon see that its author is nowhere a copyist. In it we have details of a graphic nature which, from their appropriateness in regard to time and place, as well as from the improbability of their being invented, seem to show the possession of original information. Indeed, by the reality of the sayings he quotes, and the specific details of circumstances he notes, we appear to be brought more nearly into the presence of the Master than by any of the evangelists: and it is not a little singular that where Matthew is most concise and reticent, Mark is most full and particular, most minute and circumstantial. This Gospel is notable for dealing with *action*, while Matthew gives prominence to *discourse*. Mark's style is clear, plain, and practical; his skill in grouping is masterly; his power of condensation is extraordinary. He refrains from comments, and though he interjects a few explanatory notes—requisite for Gentile readers of a Jewish history—he never introduces his own views. By single touches, in the fewest words, he easily and rapidly compresses the events he narrates into small compass, with effective grace and power. He eschews controversial points, avoids obscurities, and sets his story simply, earnestly, and warmly before the reader. It is highly probable that Mark would register carefully and transmit honestly whatever Peter narrated. It is also highly probable that Peter, having a fulness of personal knowledge of Christ and His doings, but admiring action more than talk, would give pre-eminence to the journeys and acts of Jesus, and supply only a synopsis of His doctrines and discourses. He could not fail to remember rightly, and Mark could scarcely fail to note with care what he told. The Gospel of Mark, therefore, brings us very close to the personal character, influence, and work of our Saviour.

REFERENCES TO OR QUOTATIONS FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT.—The following references to or quotations from the Old Testament Scriptures occur in the Gospel of St. Mark :—*Gen. ii. 24*, Mark x. 7 ; *Exod. iii. 6*, Mark xii. 26 ; *Exod. xx. 12*, xxi. 17, Mark vii. 10 ; *Exod. xx. 12—17*, Mark x. 19 ; *Lev. xiv. 3, 4, 10*, Mark i. 44 ; *Lev. xix. 18*, Mark xii. 31 ; *Deut. vi. 4, 5*, xxiv. 1, xxv. 5, Mark xii. 29, 30, x. 4, xii. 19 ; *1 Sam. xxi. 6*, Mark ii. 25 ; *Psa. xxii. 1*, cx. 1, cxviii. 22, Mark xv. 34, xii. 36, xii. 10 ; *Isa. vi. 9*, xiii. 10, xxix. 13, xl. 3, lii. 12, lvi. 7, lxvi. 24, Mark iv. 12, xiii. 24, vii. 6, i. 3, xv. 28, xi. 17, ix. 44 ; *Jer. vii. 11*, Mark xi. 17 ; *Dan. ix. 27*, Mark xiii. 14, *Zech. xiii. 7*, Mark xiv. 27 ; *Mal. iii. 1* ; Mark i. 2. The quotations given in italics appear also in Matthew ; the others are therefore independent allusions to the canon of the Old Testament. They seem to show, too, that the discourses given in the Gospels are not full, but epitomes, for we see the portions of the references which were regarded as striking by the one hearer are not quite the same as those which impressed the other, even when the reference was to the same portion of Scripture. Mark omits from his Gospel the birth and the flight into Egypt ; gives no extended account of the temptation ; does not mention Peter's casting himself into the sea, Christ's promise of the keys to Peter, or His direction about the payment of tribute with money got from the mouth of a fish ; he does not include in his narrative Pilate's wife's dream, the resurrection of the saints, or the earthquake during the crucifixion. He mentions Peter where the other evangelists do not name him,—*e. g.*, i. 36 ; xiii. 3 ; xvi. 7 : and gives details omitted by others,—*e. g.*, the finding of a colt at a place where two roads meet (xi. 4) ; the young man in the linen cloth (xiv. 51) ; the names of the sons of Simon the Cyrenian, Alexander and Rufus, mentioned afterwards, the former (Acts xix. 35 ; 1 Tim. i. 20 ; 2 Tim. iv. 14) as a reprobate, and the latter (Rom. xiv. 13) as one to be saluted. He supplies additional incidents about the cure of the man sick of the palsy (ii. 3—12), &c., of the raising of the daughter of Jairus (v. 35—43), and of the cure of the demoniac after the transfiguration (ix. 14—29). To him also we owe the parable of the seed growing secretly (iv. 26—29) ; the miracle of healing the blind man at Bethsaida (viii. 22—26) ; the answer of the scribe to Christ's exposition of the commandments. These items prove that he possessed original information ; and as in many cases the matter he thus gives us links into and harmonizes with that which Matthew supplies, being,

in fact, frequently implied in or alluded to in Matthew's narrative, this circumstance corroborates Matthew's truthfulness, while the omissions, seeing the purpose for which he wrote, do not in the least invalidate the lengthier biography. Neither Matthew nor Mark professes to write the biography of the Messiah. Their work rather resembles notes of lectures concerning the facts and lessons of the life of Jesus. The first four chapters of Mark, though differing much in the mode of narration, agree very closely in their statements with the first thirteen chapters of Matthew, and thereafter they agree very closely and continuously. The closeness of the similarity in the phraseology of the discourses of Christ, evidence of the importance attached to the very words of the Master, and that they could not have been long of being recorded after the departure of the Teacher. The Gospel of Mark falls naturally into three sections:—I. The ministry of John; Christ's baptism and temptation (i. 1—13). II. The ministry, discourses, miracles, &c., of Jesus from its commencement (i. 14) to His approach to Jerusalem for His last passover (x.). III. The triumphal entry into Jerusalem, betrayal, trial, condemnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension (x.—xvi.). It is a noticeable fact that Mark, writing apparently for Gentile converts, keeps his Gospel free from Jewish peculiarities, doctrines, and prejudices, makes few allusions to Jewish customs, and when he does so explains them—disburthens his narrative, in fact, of nationalism, and sets Christ forth as the very force and vital power of heaven's truth and man's Saviour. Matthew appeals to *faith*, Mark to *intelligence*, Luke to honest acceptance of *evidence*, and John to *love*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS.

987. In the prospectus of "The School of Shakespeare," to be edited by R. Simpson, it is stated that "it may be proved that he [Shakespeare] wrote for the Lord Strange's men, and for those of the Earl of Pembroke, and the Earl of Sussex." I beg leave to inquire, *has* it been so proved, and if so, where is the proof to be found?—G. H.

988. Was the Epistle to the Hebrews really written by St. Paul? If so, what relation exists between it and the Epistle to the Romans, in doctrinal basis?—B. J. J.

STUDYING ENGLISH.

"**STUDY** your own language, obtain a knowledge of its rules, seek to understand the principles by which its phrases and sentences are formed, and try to remove from your speech everything that is likely to mar its effect upon the ears of such children as, in a few years it may be expected, will be your lot to teach. I know that some have a grim horror of grammar, the thought of it almost makes them hysterical; their school-day recollections of it are anything but pleasant; and for them to sit down to master the conjugation of verbs, the cases of nouns, or the fundamental laws of syntax, would be to enter for a time the regions of purgatory. But supposing a knowledge of grammar is an essential element of fitness for your work in the future, ought you to shrink back from attaining it because it appears so difficult?

"A knowledge of grammar is not so hard to acquire as many imagine, and once acquired, it is of invaluable service.

"If, for a few months, you will give attention to it, using in your study of it only those 'odds and ends' of your time which, perhaps, you do not now make very servicable, you will be surprised to find how greatly you have become advantaged in the power which you have gained to express your thoughts clearly and correctly. And supposing that the labour required in attaining a knowledge of grammar were much greater than it is, ought you even then to be retarded from endeavouring to acquire that which will be to you such a great advantage in your work in the future? As your work is of the highest importance, affecting as it does the temporal and eternal destinies of many, surely no labour which will tend to make you more efficient should be spared."

DAY SCHOOLS IN BELGIUM.

"**PRIMARY** schools for young children and adults are not wanting, but scholars are wanting for the schools. The necessity of working for their daily bread, the complete destitution of a great number of families, the negligence as well as the ignorance of the parents themselves, all these cause the majority of the children of working men to absent themselves from schools, and the small number who do attend, generally do so casually, and during the winter, and then only up to ten or eleven years of age, when they commence to get weak in body and mind from precocious labour. It is the general opinion there now that instruction must be had at any price, even at the expense of parental authority."

Literary Notes.

AN English translation of the text contained in the eighth edition of Von Tischendorf's Greek Testament, by Dr. Davidson, is in the press, which will be an exact representation of the most recent and best critical text, as well as a revision of the received English version. The work is printed by Gleeske and Devrient, of Leipzig, and will have two introductions by Von Tischendorf and Davidson.

Professor Christoforo Pasqualigo has just published the second part of his translation of the complete works of Shakspeare into Italian prose.

A Dickens Club has been founded at Louisville, U.S., for the cultivation of literature and the drama.

Dr. Robert Chambers has a Scottish story in the press, entitled "Ailie Gilroy."

Dr. J. Hutchison Stirling, of Edinburgh, has contributed a lengthy essay on Buckle, to the current number of the *North American Review*.

Prince Bismarck is writing his autobiography. It will form a highly interesting contribution to the history of our time.

In succession to his brother, Dr. Norman Macleod, the Rev. Donald Macleod has been entrusted by Messrs. Strahan and Co. with the editorship of *Good Words*. He has been a frequent contributor to the periodical of which he has now become the editor.

Alfred Sabatier has in the press "A Programme of Positive Education," on the system of Comte.

Mr. Charles Bray, of Coventry,

is engaged on an abridged edition, intended for use in secular schools, of his book, "The Education of the Feelings," of which a third edition appeared in 1860.

Ludwig Feuerbach, born at Ansbach, in Bavaria, July 28th, 1804, author of "The Essence of Christianity," &c., died in poverty at Hanau, near Frankfurt, Sept. 12.

Prof. Kuno Fischer, expositor of Bacon and Kant, who has succeeded to the chair left vacant at Heidelberg by the removal of Professor Zeller to Berlin, will shortly publish the first part of a new section of his "History of Modern Philosophy."

From Denmark we hear of the death of Bishop Nicolas Grundtvig, born 1783, the well-known Danish theologian and poet. In 1849 particularly his songs had great popularity among the Danes, then engaged in the first Schleswig-Holstein war.

"Charles the First" is the subject of a new play by Mr. W. G. Wills. It is in four acts, and partly in blank verse. Cromwell and Ireton are among the *dramatis personae*.

Amongst the MS. letters, &c., of Cowper, sold recently at Sotheby's, there were some of considerable interest. But the greatest curiosity of the lot was certainly the MS. of a sonnet which he wrote on behalf of a printer at Leicester, who had got into prison for selling some of Tom Paine's publications. This is about as odd a conjunction for Cowper's name to appear in as can well be imagined. The sonnet fetched four and a half guineas.

Critical "Estimates of the Kings

of England from William the Conqueror to George III." is in the press. It is from the pen of J. L. Sanford, author of "Studies and Illustrations of the Great Rebellion."

Rev. William Edenson Littlewood, M.A., has just issued an excellent work on "The Essentials of New Testament Study."

"Myth, Miracle, and Mystery" have been engaging the attention of Gerald Massey, who will lecture on these subjects here and in America.

The second vol. of H. Furness's *Variorum* edition of Shakspeare's works is nearly ready.

Dr. Strauss has in readiness for issue a new work, "The Old and the New Faith—a Confession."

A memoir of the late Dr. Rowland Williams is nearly ready.

Dr. W. A. B. Hertzberg, Bremen, is editing Chaucer for the German Handy Library, which is superintended by Julius Zacher.

A collection of hitherto unpublished letters of Galileo has been printed in the (Italian) *European Review*.

"A Memorial of Mazzini," consisting of selections from his writings, is to be circulated among the working classes.

Mr. Broughton, at the Cambridge Archaeological Association, says that 263 editions of Shakspeare's plays had been issued, besides 650 publications of portions of his writings.

"A Biography of David Cox," by, it is hinted, S. Timmes, of Birmingham, is in preparation.

Baron Tauchnitz has in progress a Dictionary of the German Language, which is to excel all preceding works of the kind in the extent of its vocabulary and the accuracy of its definitions.

M. Littré's magnificent Lexicon of the French language is now nearly through the press, proof-reading and revising being all that remains now to accomplish. How is it that England has no rival-less lexicon? Is it the result of the ignorance of our *savans*, or the economizing habit of our publishers?

Sir C. Dilke as proprietor, and Dr. Doran as editor, are about to give new life to *Notes and Queries*.

Modern Metaphysicians.

WILLIAM PALEY, D.D., ARCHDEACON OF CARLISLE, &c.,

Author of "Moral Philosophy," "Natural Theology," "Evidence of Christianity," &c.

(Continued from page 251.)

"It has long been deemed the glory of Socrates, that he brought philosophy from the schools of the learned to the habitations of men, by stripping it of its technicalities, and exhibiting it in the ordinary language of life. There is no one in modern times who has possessed the talents and disposition for achievements of this kind to an equal extent with Paley; and we can scarcely conceive any one to have employed such qualities with greater success. The transmutation of metals into gold was the supreme object of the alchemists' aspirations. But Paley had acquired a more enviable power. Knowledge, however abstruse, by passing through his mind became plain common sense, stamped with the characters which ensured its currency in the world."—*Bishop Turton.*

RELIGION is founded on faith. "Now faith is the confidence of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen," confidence resting on evidence. "Belief is *assent upon trust*. When we have absolute demonstration of anything the result is not belief at all; it is knowledge. . . . Where doubt is absolutely impossible, there belief or faith is also impossible. You have certainly, but, as I have said, it is the certainty of knowledge, not the certainty of faith." *

Evidence is a series of facts or statements of a trustworthy nature, through which a truth is seen, or out of which a faith arises. Faith is the reposing trust of the soul, satisfied with the evidence brought before it of the correctness of the truths to which it assents—the realizing active spiritual acceptance of certain truths involving certain duties and responsibilities as the result of the confidence entertained in the truths relied on; "for faith, if it have not works, is dead." Religious "faith is," as Swift says, "an entire dependence upon the truth, the power, the justice, and the mercy of God, which dependence will certainly incline us to obey Him in all things."

* "Christianity and Scepticism," a lecture by William Conner, Lord Bishop of Peterborough.

Faith demands evidence, and Christianity invites the fullest researches into the reasons for the faith which its disciples possess and display.

Christianity is not a mere collection of articles of belief, a confession or a creed whose elements have been brought together as dogmas in the dim distances of antiquity, and which we now require to accept with the reverence due to age-old commonplaces. Christianity took its rise in historic times, and grew into power amid question, dispute, doubt, and disbelief. It did not come upon the stage of time till free-thought had developed its syllogistic tests and elaborated its philosophy of investigation—until doubt had become the very habit of men's souls, and inquisition was sure to be made into its claims and doctrines, because the doctrines it taught were distasteful to the men of that age. The intellectual want of faith had involved society in an almost prevalent moral faithlessness, and Christianity required to struggle into potency over men's souls in spite of the distrust of those whose very characters impelled them to deny or defy it. The vitality of Christianity was sorely tried, not by persecution and massacre only, but by the determined doubt which had acquired mastery over men's minds so much that the very essence of irony came out in the scornful form in which they asked, "What is truth?" Truth seemed a dream, and faith a fancy to those who had been bred in the schools of philosophy; among those who had not been taught in them, a sequacious superstition had been encouraged, and the habits of men's lives had got entwined with the forms of worship devoted to their differing and different gods. Unbelief among philosophers and misbelief among the people offered little prospect of success to men who set out to teach the realities of the unseen, and to place among the mightiest powers among the dwellers in the earth a simple faith in Christ. Yet that faith so ennobled men's souls that edicts and rescripts from the most powerful sovereigns of the most potent states were effectless to terrify its holders to surrender, submission or recantation. Doubt lost its dominion over men when the heroes of faith proved the power of their conviction to deride the flame of the State, defy the sword of the executioner, and blunt even the axe of the headsman. Truth became mighty and prevailed, because men beheld faith imparting grandeur to the aspirations, achievements, and characters of those who professed the religion of Christ. In all ages Christianity has been militant against doubt. "Why do ye not believe?" has been her query from age to age; and even when a response was given to her inquiry, and the grounds of doubt were stated, Christianity has been able to give a reason for the faith delivered to the saints pertinent to the time and theme. At no

time, however, did Christianity seem so hopelessly overthrown as when the terrible European convulsion known as the French Revolution reached the pitch of casting down the worship of the Divine One of Nazareth, and decrying as an imposture the doctrine of the Saviour. Philosophism, encyclopædism, legislatism, and sansculotteism all united to proclaim Christianity a lie, its disciples the enemies of the human race and Reason—in the visible form of “an opera-dancer, fair to look upon when well rouged,” the only worship-worthy deity of the universe. But even while the carmagnoles of the reason-worship were going on, and the communion-feasts of its votaries amazed Europe with revelries, so that men’s hearts were failing them for fear, Paley saw that the true antidote was not reviling or scorn, but a reconsideration of the whole implications and statements of Christianity in the calm and clear light of the logic of common sense. To this he set his soul, and it is the true fame of Paley that he has produced a full, fair, candid, impartial, and convincing review of the arguments of scepticism as opposed to the statements of Christianity, such as has done the Church and the world good service.

Paley’s, however, was a practical mind; he saw that the unsettlement of society arose from a revolt against the laws of morals and the practice of politics. If he could convince men that morals and politics had other foundations than the wild whims of men whose sole desire was change and its chances; if he could show that social life and civilization had principles underlying and governing the forms of life, property, law, and administration, he might somewhat restrain the irrational craving for revolution; while, if he could prove that religion was a safeguard for many of the privileges and benefits of society, he might bring some to regard Christianity with a warmer approval than they in their selfishness gave it. He sought to conserve social life by a judicious compromise between those who sought change for selfish ends and those who opposed change for ends equally selfish. He was aware that in pleading for religion as the foundation of moral law, and for reason as the ally of religion in civilization, he would require, on demand, to prove the claims on faith and practice which he asserted in favour of Christianity, and he would be prepared to do that also when the work that lay closest to his hand was done. His design of bringing into alliance the spirit of Christian benevolence and faith and the spirit of philosophic thought was a happy thought for his time, and entitles him to the loving admiration not only of professing Christians, but of professing philosophers.

We have been compelled by the exigencies of classification to enter the name of Paley under a designation which he would not in

all probability accept or regard as accurate. He had "an utter distaste for anything metaphysical," and, in fact, abhorred the very name of metaphysics. This was much more his misfortune than his fault. Metaphysic, when he was at the university, was in but a sorry plight. It had degenerated into a puerile set of logomachies where it had not dwindled down to a mere catalogue of nominal definitions. The very pith and marrow of speculation had gone out of it. Only a dry, ungainly skeleton remained. Locke had in vain attempted to bring the process of the human understanding into the daylight of practical reason. Berkeley had frightened the wits by his subtilty; Butler had astonished them by his ingenuity. But the English school of metaphysicians had failed, and the Scottish school had not yet raised the standard of common sense as the rallying-point of a new initiative to enter into contest with the difficulties of speculation. Paley's practical shrewdness showed him the utter ineptitude of the inane *compendia* of emasculated Aristotelianism which were the text-books of metaphysic in his day. Hater of metaphysics though he was, however, he had a metaphysical undercurrent in him which flowed along the whole course of his expository volumes, implied and powerful, though neither apparent nor professedly held.

Every philosophy is founded on a metaphysic expressed or understood. "To philosophy," says Coleridge, "properly belongs the education of the mind." Metaphysic is the mother of theory, the expositor of law, the governor of method, and the critic of thought. He who would kindle, refine, and discipline the soul, must know its powers and processes, and be able to bring them into activity in their best state. There are few works belonging mainly to the last century, the perusal of which have an educative effect so quickening and refreshing as those of Paley. His method, though unstated, is always compact yet sinuous; perspicuous and instructive as well as attractive. He was, in fact, too shrewd to precipitate metaphysics in his dissertations in an age which eschewed, avoided, and shunned philosophy as revolutionism. There is little or none of that barren and profitless word-spinning in Paley's works, which, in his time, constituted university metaphysics; but in the true metaphysics of common sense he was a veritable master.

He assumed as incontrovertible elements of reasoning—

1. That our senses do not so deceive us, when duly exercised and rightly compared, as to their witnessing, that they should be distrusted.

2. That our reasoning faculties, though impaired, are trustworthy so far as they lead us when proper precautions have been taken by us against errors arising from the known weaknesses of our powers.

3. That there is such a harmony between the mind and will of God and the mind and will of man, that reasoning, within due limits and with wise restrictions, may be employed analogically from one to the other.

These imply, of course, that God, nature, and man exist, God as the Prime, nature as His creature, and man as a phenomenon of nature.

While employed in elaborating his plea for the authenticity of the canonical Scriptures of the New Testament derived from the undesigned coincidences between the historical book of the Acts and the diverse epistles of the apostles of the Gentiles, his view widened, and he found that to give full scope to his mind's suggestiveness he must bring together into a brief and compendious unity his ideas on "The Evidences of Christianity,"—a most valuable and plainly set forth epitome of the proofs of the truth of the religion of Christ, such as has brought comfort, peace, and joy to many minds. As this work of his rested on the being of God, his thoughtful spirit accepted the farther task of composing a Theodictic which would satisfy the plain and thoughtful, as well as be suggestive of higher researches to those who could see the metaphysical questions which lay below the argument from design, and could by their culture travel by the *à priori* road to a reasonable landing-place where proof should be considered perfect as to the existence of the Deity. The cogent good sense and close-fitting logic of Paley did not desert him even in the task of moulding into usefulness the copious materials contained in the confused, tiresome, and illogical Dutch religious philosopher, Bernard Neiuwentyt. If in this production he displays less moral enthusiasm than some people think such a treatise should display, let us give him credit for self-restraint rather than blame for coldness, for we know that the entire work was a noble piece of sheer heroism, composed as it was in the midst of uncontrollable pain—pain which brought him constantly into the presence of death.

Though not a metaphysical writer *per se*, he possessed that power of intellect which could build up, on sure foundations, a consummate edifice of argument. His grasp of the subject is strong, and his handling of it is masterly. He disposes his argument, adjusts its plan, and follows out its course in a precise and effective though not a formal manner. Indeed, it is his argumentative power and consistency, rather than his originality, that mark him out as a trustworthy pursuer of philosophical investigations. Without parade of logic, without the pedantry of metaphysics, he could expound his theories in strong, exact, clear, forcible, and homely which hit precisely the level of common comprehension and

the requirements of his time. Doing always the work which seemed most needful, he suited the efforts of his spirit to the wants of his fellows; and when morals and politics appeared to be but the shams and customs of civilization, he showed that they had a true foundation in common sense, in expediency, and in Christianity,—all three being consenting witnesses in behalf of virtue and patriotism. His *Horæ Paulinæ* formed but a small section of a large design, but it was a most skilful and masterly application of the modern spirit of researchful criticism to the elucidation of the truth of the Scriptures; showing that criticism was not a foe to Christianity, but that it brought forth defence against scepticism from the overlooked interlinks of coincidence which a minute investigation discovered in the sacred text. He welcomed the advent of the critical school of thinkers, and showed anticipatorily to what good service such studies could be put.

"This is a work which," as R. Potts, M.A., the distinguished mathematician of Trinity College, Cambridge, says "consists of an accumulation of circumstantial evidence elicited from St. Paul's epistles and the Acts with no ordinary skill and judgment, and exhibited in a pellucid style as far removed from the unnatural as from the non-natural employment of language."

The Rev. J. J. Blunt, B.D., in a paper published in the *Quarterly Review* so long ago as 1828, says of him, "We think it next to impossible for a candid unbeliever to read the 'Evidences' of Paley, in their proper order, unshaken. His 'Natural Theology' will open the heart that it may understand, or at least receive the Scriptures, if anything can. It is philosophy in its highest and noblest sense; scientific, without the jargon of science; profound, but so clear that its depth is disguised. There is nothing of the 'Budge Doctor' here; speculations, which will convince, if aught will, that 'in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' are made familiar as household words. They are brought home to the experience of every man, the most ordinary observer of the facts of nature with which he is daily conversant. . . . In this unambitious manner does Paley prosecute his high theme, drawing, as it were, philosophy from the clouds."

We hold, then, that from his power of distinctly appreciating the different kinds of evidence appropriate to different departments of truth, from his care in weighing the scientific value of every idea as it arose in his speculations, and from his accuracy in arranging every one of these in the best possible method for conviction and conversion, he is entitled to be ranked among our philosophers. Only remark how free he is from being at the mercy of superficial impressions, or the obtrusive phases of things; with what a rational

tact he sees the gradations of things and thoughts, and avoids alike the indefiniteness of doubt and the superciliousness of dogmatism. He knew how to use the implied metaphysics which are latent in the mind of every man to high ends ; the complicated workings of the activities of human nature were so familiar to him that he fitted his reasoning into every curve and crook ; his discriminative perception of the best form of argument, his wonderful analysis of the topic so as to make it easy of comprehension, the patience and care with which he laid down the lines of his speculations, and the ease, homeliness, and sagacity which he displays in pursuing thought through its most devious labyrinths, amply testify to his exquisite acquaintance with the inner secrets of the laws of thought. The flaws in the fabric of his speculations are singularly few, for Archbishop Whately, who searched for fallacies as if with a torch whose light was kindled in heaven, though he differs from him on many points, only once or twice objects to the logic Paley employs—even although topics upon which he dissertates engage not only the reason and observation but the prejudices and passions of men. Does not this imply a capacity, however, removed from observation or restrained in manifestation, for appreciating that order and method which have their foundations in the vital spirit of man—an order and method which bear witness to the existence and operation of that eternal will which men feel and know and obey, which is the very first element in the divine education of the human soul throughout all the ages of the world's history ?

Of the important matters of thought which underlie the laws of moral and political philosophy Paley did not feel inclined to become an expounder, for he felt that by doing so he would run the risk of being readerless. He did not make his starting-point from a consideration of the destiny of man, or raise the question whether man's life had any origin apart from and prior to the appearance of each individual on the earth—or whether human destiny was all accomplished within the cycle of his earthly existence as the means of determining what human conduct should be under all possible and conceivable circumstances, and as the condition of determining the rules proper for human conduct. Had he done so his book might have been allowed honourable exile on a student's shelves, but it would not have been what it has been, one of the most popular books on the subject in English literature. It is a treatise which is less susceptible of analysis than most, from its seemingly desultory and detached character, and his love of illustration and detail. These qualities have made him popular and useful, although they detract from the scientific reputation of his summary. While confessing that it requires a considerable effort of

mind to keep steadily before one the principles he propounds, we propose to present the heads and particulars of his system in the briefest form consistent with a comprehension of his tenets and mode of treatment. Our readers will recollect that our epitome is but an outline of what professes to be a compilation.

In his "Moral and Political Philosophy," Paley defines ethics as "that science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it." The common rules of morals are—1, the law of honour; 2, of the land; 3, of the Scripture. The law of honour, which is really the power of social ostracism exercised by public opinion, he treats of in the narrow sense in which it was employed in fashionable circles in his day. It approves of most things which tend to make life pleasurable, and disapproves only of what incommodes social intercourse. It concerns itself only with the personal duties of equals towards each other. The law of the land deals only with duties that can be enforced because capable of being strictly defined and tangibly punished. The law of the Scriptures, as it is communicated in general rules, requires to be applied reasonably and judiciously, and therefore does not dispense with, but rather necessitates a science of morals.

He proceeds then to consider "the moral sense," giving an abstract of the arguments for and against the belief in an innate moral determinative faculty. We instantaneously and instinctively admire generosity, gratitude, fidelity, &c. This approval is bestowed uniformly and universally in all ages and countries. But this alleged uniformity is denied, and facts are quoted in support of the negation; while the generality (though not the universality) of certain moral determinations is accounted for by the felt utility. Farther, 1, moral rules bend to circumstances; 2, we are not born with moral *ideas*; and hence, on the whole, we are either destitute of moral instincts, or they are undistinguishable from prejudices and habits; besides, they have no power to punish, unless it be by remorse, which is often beaten down by the pleasure or profit of sin.

He next considers human happiness, which is the excess of pleasure over pain. Pleasures differ in continuance and intensity. I. Human happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense, because (1) they are transient; (2) lose their relish by repetition; (3) loftier pleasures diminish their hold. II. Happiness does not consist in exemption from pain, labour, care, business, or outward evils, but in the excess of delight on a balance of them. III. Happiness does not consist in greatness, rank, or station, for these are relative, not real. Happiness consists (1) in the exercise of the social affections; (2) the exercise of our faculties of mind or body towards some proper end; (3) the prudent arrangement of

habits which should tend to moderation, simplicity, and naturalness; (4) in health. Happiness is pretty equally diffused among men, and vice has no advantage over virtue in this respect.

But what is virtue? It is the doing good to mankind in obedience to God, and for the sake of eternal happiness. Human happiness and God's will are harmonious. We are under a moral obligation to be virtuous. There are various theories of moral obligation, but they all ultimately coincide; all the theorists agree upon the sameness of human duty, and none supplies an adequate motive or inducement to propriety of conduct. He supplies this want by defining obligation to be "a violent motive resulting from the command of another." Law is a command that is enforceable.

In answering the question, "Why am I obliged to keep my word?" he says, "I am obliged to do so by a violent motive—namely, the rewards and punishments of futurity—by the command of God. Though personal and private happiness is the motive, yet the rule is the divine command." How are we to learn the will of God? (1) From the Scriptures, and (2) from experience of His design in nature. God is good; He wills our happiness, and so far forth as any action tends to promote the true and lasting happiness of man it accords with the divine will. Utility is a common human test of right and wrong; but actions have both particular and general consequences: utility may easily adjudicate on the former, not on the latter; although therefore we declare in practice that "whatever is expedient is right," it must be so to the utmost extent of its consequences. As to right and rights, a right is a correlative of an obligation. Rights may be (1) natural or adventitious, (2) alienable or inalienable, (3) perfect or imperfect. These last are the only ones which belong to morals. Perfect rights are enforced by law, imperfect ones are not. Book III. refers to relative duties. These are (1) determinate protection of perfect rights, (2) indeterminate promotion of imperfect rights, (3) the duties of sex, which are partly determinate and partly indeterminate. Book IV. considers our duties to ourselves under the headings of self-defence, drunkenness, and suicide. Book V. has regard to duties towards God, and Book VI. discusses politics and political economy. On these topics his remarks are ingenious, lucid, and ably laid before the reader. His system of ethical philosophy is closely connected with theology; in which he makes a compromise, for the sake of practice, between Scriptural sanctions and utilitarian considerations. The peculiar cast of Paley's mind was that of a sagacious critic. He could take up readily enough the views and opinions of many men, and seeing their good points, could dovetail them together into practical forms. He could turn

about and manœuvre with the fragments of his selection so that the composite mosaic which resulted had many charms and advantages; and as he placed each part in the most engaging light, it is scarcely to be wondered at that his system gained acceptance among a people who are practical above all things, distrust theories, and delight in playing havoc with the logical demand for correct premises if it can anyhow manage to attain to fair average practice. There can be no doubt that, though far from being consistent or thorough, Paley's treatise is instructive and agreeable, and did much to promote better views on morals and politics than were prevalent in many circles under the red haze of the French Revolution—when loose and inaccurate modes of reasoning on the nature and extent of moral obligation required correction and objection; besides, it made possible much of the advancement in regard to a knowledge of the rules of rectitude which has since been made.

The *Horæ Paulinæ*, though it was his next work in the order of time, and is in reality, his most original contribution to religious literature, concerns itself particularly with a subsidiary section of the Christian evidences. "It would not be in the power of the most suspicious lawyer at the Old Bailey to subject two witnesses to a stricter cross-examination than that by which Paley has tried the testimony of St. Paul and St. Luke. This is the light in which the *Horæ Paulinæ* is to be viewed; it is a close and rigorous and searching series of questions, addressed to two men, by a most acute advocate, in open court, before an intelligent tribunal. We do not hesitate to say that a fiction contrived between them would have been shattered into pieces before they had gone through a tenth part of the ordeal to which he exposes them." This is the view taken by J. J. Blunt, B.D., and this is also the opinion formed of it by R. Potts, M.A., in whose most excellent edition of the evidences of Christianity the *Horæ Paulinæ* is given as a supplementary chapter—a strengthening and extension of the main argument. We shall refer to this work in the sequel, when we have placed before the reader our epitome of "the Evidences of Christianity;" "for the *Horæ Paulinæ* is but one of those many departments of evidence; but it is, perhaps, the most satisfactory, and certainly the most ingenious of them all. With this work in our hands, we care not how the Acts of the Apostles or the epistles of St. Paul were composed." . . . "The two documents are pregnant with coincidences which no possible hypothesis but their veracity can account for."

Dr. Paley composed his "Evidences of Christianity" with the design of promoting "the religious part of an academical education," but its influence has been far wider than its aims. It is,

indeed, a text-book valued in the universities, but it gained acceptance in the true university of modern times—the book-shelves of the people. For more than three quarters of a century it has been popular and powerful, as supplying a common-sense view of the foundations of the true faith of a Christian. It is not subtle, but it is clear and strong; it is not enthusiastic, but it is calmly confident of the goodness of its cause, and willing to trust to conviction roused by reasoning, rather than emotion excited by rhetoric. It has been complained of as being cold and icy in its tone of thought; but this, instead of being true blame, is, in our opinion, high praise. Passion and emotion always tend to interfere with the pure exercises of reason; for reason ought to be passionless except towards one love, the love of truth. Men do not wrangle over mathematics as they do over schismatics—the doctrines of the sects. To be a cool reasoner is a much nobler form of life than to be a hot advocate. As the sublime coldness of marble sculpture adds to the wonderful power with which genius animates the statue, so does the masterly suavity of Paley impart a sense of solidity and firmness, of trustworthiness and honesty. His “evidences” are, it is true, chisellings on the outside of scepticism, bringing it into pure form, but he knows that a nobler life than Pygmalion’s statue ever drew enchantment from, is ready ever to quicken into vitality the soul that truly seeks God. If it is the duty of a Christian to be able to give a reason for the faith that is in him, it is essential that he should have it. Paley supplies the reason in the full confidence that it will be efficient in exciting faith, and that true faith being once had, all else will follow through the grace of God.

Paley composed his treatise in an age when the philosophy of the materialists was in the ascendant—just before, by its vaulting ambition, it o’erleaped itself in the French revolution and fell on the other side. He required to accept the platform offered to him. No possible meeting-ground was available except that which spread out into a wide acreage of commonplace. He wisely accepted the situation, and did his best in the circumstances to demonstrate that the very implications of the metaphysics of the time required Christianity to bring them into explicit effectiveness. He meets the lauders of the lordship of reason on their own terms—as a reasoner,—but he does not, on that account, in the least feel it requisite to abjure his discipleship to Christ. Paley knows him to be “the way, the *truth*, and the life,” so that if reason leads to truth it must lead to Him—who is in fact reason’s true self, the all-wise God. Paley has no misgivings on this head, for he remembers that his God, recognising that the service He required was reason-

able, invited mankind to communion with Him in these words—"Come, let us *reason* together." He felt that truth was upon his side, and had sufficient faith in the truth to say and think, "The Lord is on my side, I will not fear." "If God be for us, who can be against us?" In this spirit "he fought the good fight of faith," and his "Evidences of Christianity" have been like a smooth stone from a brook, thrown from a sling against the boasting Goliath of infidelity.

The work opens with some "preparatory considerations," which are to the following effect:—Mankind stand in need of a revelation, and that must be either Christianity, or there is none: if God exists, and has formed man for happiness both here and in a future state—making his condition in the latter depend on his conduct in the former,—we cannot but suppose that a revelation would have been made. No revelation could be made without miracles. The purpose of God could only be communicated to man in some form in which that knowledge is not now given. Hence arises an antecedent probability in favour of a miraculously communicated religion, in opposition to Hume's argument, that "it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false."

Experience, if it means *our* own experience, is inapplicable to the question, for we have had no experience of that sort; but to assume that *universal* experience is against miracles is begging the question. Want of experience is a very different thing from contrariety to experience. In experience the same effects follow the same causes, but a uniform repetition of miracle under the same circumstances is impossible, the rarity of its occurrence makes it a miracle. The course of experience is the result of the will of God. Why should we think that will, on proper occasions, incapable of producing any other result? Miracles are not effects without causes: the cause of all causes is the same, the divine will. To those who believe in God miracles are not incredible. Belief in miracles is not a contest of improbabilities. Mr. Hume unites all the probabilities arising from the nature of God and the destiny of man, besides ignoring a phenomenon. "The existence of the testimony is a phenomenon; the truth of the fact solves the phenomenon." If we reject this solution we should have another to offer, but none is offered which is consistent with the principles of human conduct *now*, and we have no reason to believe they were different *then*. Mathematicians try their theorems on simple cases, so may we this. If twelve men relate an occurrence as being seen by them, are threatened with the worst evils unless they confess that this is an imposture, and with one accord not only refuse to recant, but

suffer all penalties rather than yield, I am not to believe them, Mr. Hume says; but I cannot resist having faith in them, or persist in incredulity. Spurious miracles have been asserted, but the evidence given for them has been far weaker than that allotted to those on which the truth of Christianity rests. [Besides, imitation is made of realities.]

Part I. presents two propositions. 1, "That there *is* satisfactory evidence that many, professing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of these accounts; and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct." 2, "That there *is not* satisfactory evidence that persons professing to be original witnesses of other miracles, in their nature as certain as these are, have ever acted in the same manner in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and properly in consequence of their belief in these accounts."

In support of the first proposition it is asserted—"That the Founder of the institution, His associates and immediate followers acted the part which that proposition imputes to them," and "that they did so in attestation of the miraculous history recorded in the Scriptures, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth of that history."

"The Christian religion exists, and therefore by some means or other was established." It owes its establishment either to its Founder or to others, and these could not have accomplished such a task if they had been conscientiously false, hollow, and hypocritical. "The propagation of the new religion was attended with difficulty and danger." It was opposed to the hopes and ideas of the people, to the teaching, the interests, and the ambitions of their priesthood, and to the habits and traditions of worship prevalent among the Jews.

The Founder of the religion was crucified by the Jewish rulers and the Roman Government. The promoters of it therefore required to impeach and reproach these rulers of unjust cruelty amounting to murder, and this would not make their duty more easy or safe. "The [early] preachers of Christianity had therefore to contend with prejudice backed by power," and "could not execute their mission with personal ease and safety." To the heathen they had only to offer a religion which could not be accepted except at the cost of the overthrow of every statue, altar, and temple in the world. It was not a competing but an exclusive religion; nor was it a mere philosophic school narrow and secluded, it embraced and agitated all who heard it. It opposed itself to men's habits, inclinations and dearest desires, and met with rude opposition on these accounts. It

is not true that unbelievers are generally tolerant. The doubters of Christianity were exasperated, and proceeded harshly against the propagators of it. Besides, religion was then an affair of the State, and interference with worship was rebellion. All the religions to which it was opposed were not only old, but established, and had many interests interwoven with their continuance; people believed the prosperity of the nation depended on rites, pomps, and ceremonies. If, as Gibbon says, "the various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosophers as equally false, and by the magistrates as equally useful," the early Christians must, less or more, have made enemies of all these. "Lastly, the original teachers of Christianity entered upon a new and singular course of life," "laying aside their old habits, and sedulously following new." What a revolution there must have been of opinions and prejudices to bring the matter to this! "It was"—what is very difficult indeed—"almost like making men over again." Seeing that "no act of power, force, or authority was concerned in its first success," against such odds, in such a time, and under such circumstances, there is great probability that the Author and His followers must have had a hard time of it, and much to bear.

Having thus estimated "what was likely to happen" in Chapter II., inquiry is made as to "how the transaction is represented in the several accounts that have come down to us," passages in heathen writers supplying "the concessions of adversaries." A well-known quotation from Tacitus affords proof—1, that Christ was put to death; 2, that in the same country in which He was put to death, Christianity, after a short check, broke out again and spread; and 3, that it so spread that in thirty-four years after his death a great number of Christians were found in Rome. From these facts we may infer that the original teachers were not *idle*, and that their mission was attended with danger. Suetonius shows that Christians were punished; and Juvenal appears to allude to these specific punishments at a period within the lifetime of some of the apostles or of the immediate disciples of Christ. Pliny's letter to Trajan refers to about seventy years after Christ's death, and proves, not only the number, but the success, notwithstanding much suffering, of the early Christians. By a rescript of Adrian's it was ordered that legal measures should be taken against the Christians instead of the clamour and tumult employed against them. Martial makes Christian suffering a theme for *ri dicule*. His verses, combined with the evidence of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, show that there were martyrs, voluntary witnesses for the faith—a faith strong enough to enable them to die calmly for it.

Chapter III. notices that the testimony of the heathens is quite in harmony with the books of the Christians. We have four histories of Jesus Christ; and we have various letters from the chief agents in the business, all concurring in fact, narrative, allusion, and inference, that Christ suffered and died, and yet Christianity made progress from Jerusalem as a centre throughout the Roman empire. These things had been foretold, and were not encountered by chance or blindly; and Christ prepared, by exhortation, His followers to endure with patience this contradiction of sinners. Had there been no such thing to be expected He would not have terrified them, nor would His disciples have put words of terror into His mouth needlessly. They could not have said so had it not been true, for they would have been detected; and they could not have said the sufferings were borne if they were not, for that would have been treason to the Government as well as faithlessness to their Master's teaching to speak, to do, to live the truth.

Chapter IV. epitomizes the early history of Christianity from the death of Christ to the times of Polycarp and Ignatius, as evidences of the propagation of Christianity amidst, yet despite of suffering, comparing the account of Luke, in Acts, with Paul's epistles, and with the writings of Clemens, Hermas, &c., who declare that its course was through suffering.

Chapter V. remarks that the Scripture history (1) shows the nature of the service which the apostles were engaged in, and (2) that it was painful and hazardous; (3) that it assigns adequate (therefore most probably true) causes for the effects seen in the origin and progress of Christianity, and (4) a difference in disposition and affections took place among Christians from what they had formerly been and from what their fellows were. The testimony of Pliny confirms this latter statement.

Chapter VI. asserts that the following particulars entitle us to believe in the miraculousness of the Christian religion:—1, Its prevalency at this hour. 2, The only credible account that can be given of its origin, viz., the activity of the Founder and His associates. 3, The opposition which that must naturally have excited. 4, The fate of the Founder, attested by heathens and Christians. 5, The testimony given to the sufferings of Christians. 6, The predictions of these sufferings by the correspondence of what we might naturally have expected with the statements of the history—as to the martyr character of the suffering endured. All these form grounds for believing that the story is true. The early Christians rested their faith on miracles, a sense of the miraculous formed the main element in their argument; and that miracles had taken place at the institu-

tion of Christianity is made all the more probable by the fact that miracles were feigned afterwards, for men are imitative, and are more likely to have pretended to miraculous power because it had really been exerted than if none had occurred previously.

In Chapter VII. the question as to whether the "story which Christians have *now* is the story which Christians had *then*" is considered; he believes so (1) because there is no trace of any other story. (2) The whole series of Christian writers, in all their discussions, apologies, arguments, and controversies, proceed upon the general story which our Scriptures expound, and upon no other. (3) "The religious rites and usages that prevailed amongst the early disciples of Christianity were such as belonged to and spring out of the narrative now in our hands." These books were not fabricated with a studious accommodation of the usages which obtained when they were written. The Gospels were not the *cause* but the consequence of the disciples' belief in Christianity.

Chapter VIII. considers the authority of the writings. "Such was the situation of the authors to whom the four Gospels are ascribed, that if any one of the four be genuine it is sufficient for our purpose." They lived at the time and on the spot. They are contemporary writers, mixing in the business. Hence "the facts recorded in the Gospels, whether true or false, are the facts and the sort of facts which the original preachers of the religion alleged." But next to their separate, let us look to their aggregate authority. There is an almost unexampled cumulative testimony in the evangelic history, though it is often overlooked in our Scripture reading. They are not a single authority, but a collection of proofs; and their early reception by the early Christians is evidence that they must have accorded with what the apostles taught.

Chapter IX. treats of the authenticity of the Scriptures—1, because a great number of ancient MSS. can be produced; 2, from the style and language of the Scriptures; 3, though they relate to supernatural events, that ought not to be regarded as an argument against their authenticity, whatever effect that may have on our opinion of the judgment or veracity of the writers; 4, it was not easy to forge writings in those early times; 5, the humility of the writers to whom they are ascribed; 6, the general agreement of the early Church regarding them; and he thereafter undertakes to establish the eleven following propositions, giving them as the substance of the conclusions to be drawn from an attentive perusal and study of the eleven octavo volumes of Dr. Lardner "On the Credibility of the Gospels," of which he professes merely to be an epitomizer. Having laid these propositions before the reader, he

repeats them in a similar number of distinct sections, subjoining the separate authorities for each. We cannot here follow him into the minute details by which these are proved; for these we must refer to the work itself. The propositions, however, are so clearly and elegantly expressed that they form a summary of what he not only professes to prove, but what is generally held to have been accomplished by him:—

I. That the historical books of the New Testament, meaning thereby the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles, are quoted or alluded to by a series of Christian writers, beginning with those who were contemporary with the apostles, or who immediately followed them, and proceeding in close and regular succession from their time to the present.

II. That when they are quoted or alluded to, they are quoted or alluded to with peculiar respect, as books *sui generis*; as possessing an authority which belonged to no other books, and as conclusive of all questions and controversies amongst Christians.

III. That they were in very early times collected into a distinct volume.

IV. That they were distinguished by appropriate names and titles of respect.

V. That they were publicly read and expounded in the religious assemblies of the early Christians.

VI. That commentaries were written upon them, harmonies formed out of them, different copies carefully collated, and versions of them made into different languages.

VII. That they were received by Christians of different sects, by many heretics as well as Catholics, and usually appealed to by both sides in the controversies which arose in those days.

VIII. That the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen epistles of St. Paul, the First Epistle of John, and the First Epistle of Peter, were received without doubt by those who doubted concerning the other works which are included in our present canon.

IX. That the Gospels were attacked by the adversaries of Christianity as books containing the accounts upon which the religion was founded.

X. That formal catalogues of authentic Scriptures were published, in all which our present sacred histories were included.

XI. That these propositions cannot be affirmed of any other books claiming to be books of Scripture, by which are meant those books which are commonly called apocryphal books of the New Testament.

At the close of Part I., section xii. contains a recapitulation, to the study of which great attention should be directed, it is so concluded.

cise and compact, so unstrained and so clear. We may state that when we studied the work, fully a quarter of a century ago, we committed this and several other portions to memory, and that we have found the utility of that summation not unfrequently showing itself when we had suddenly to meet an objection or suggest a remark pertinent to the line of thought suitable to our consideration of the evidences of Christianity.

Part II. deals with the direct historical evidence of Christianity. This he proposes to consider as it relates to the *proof* and as it relates to the *miracles*. The proof is contemporary, and was first published in the place where the history it relates was transacted. It was not a transient rumour which dropped, but it was (and has been) succeeded by a train of actions and events dependent on it. It is not a solitary record or naked statement, unsupported or unsubstantiated. It is confirmed by subsequent and collateral testimony. It possesses all the particularity of a direct narrative, and it implied duties in its reception which set the mind against assent to it. An active acquiescence through the love of the marvellous is therefore out of the question. It did not harmonize with, but opposed popular opinion, and therefore did not purchase assent to itself by flattery or time-serving.

Change requires a cause; the teaching of Christ, founded upon and fortified by His miracles, has been the occasion of the most complete revolution and the simplest that ever occurred. These miracles were wrought in the midst of enemies, under a Government, a priesthood, and a magistracy decidedly and vehemently adverse to their authors and the pretensions founded on them. Those who acted and suffered for the cause did so *for* the miracles. There was no anterior persuasion to induce them, no prior reverence, prejudice, or partiality to take hold of. Jesus had not one follower when He set up His claim. His miracles gave birth to His sect. This constitutes a partition wall between the *origin* and *progress* of Christianity.

What can be resolved into a false perception ought not to be credited as a miracle, nor that which has been frequently tried and only once or occasionally succeeded, nor that regarding which the miraculous element is matter of doubt, or in which the relation is but an exaggeration of singular facts or coincidences.

In Chapter II. he discusses the cases selected by Mr. Hume as the strongest which the history of the world could supply of alleged but false miracles, and applying the observations made in Chapter I. to them, finds that they cannot stand the tests to which the New Testament miracles have been subjected.

The auxiliary evidences of Christianity are next brought forward

in separate chapters :—I. Prophecy. II. The morality of the Gospel. III. The candour of the writers of the New Testament. IV. The identity of Christ's character. V. The originality of Christ's character. VI. Various instances of conformity between the facts stated in Scripture with the state of things mentioned in other records. VII. Undesigned coincidences among the writers. VIII. The history of the resurrection. IX. The propagation of Christianity,—with the confirmation of all these derived from other accounts and matters of evidence. This is followed by reflections on the account of the resurrection, and a notice of the religion of Mohammed.

In Part III. we have "a brief consideration of some popular objections :"—1. The discrepancies between the several Gospels. 2, Erroneous opinions attributed to the apostles. 3, The connection of Christianity with Jewish history. 4. The (apparent) rejection of Christianity. 5. That the Christian miracles are not recited or appealed to by the early Christians themselves so often or fully as might have been expected. 6. The want of universality in the knowledge and recognition of Christianity, and of greater clearness in the evidences. 7. On the supposed (evil) effects of Christianity. Thereafter he sums up in a conclusion of much lucidity and power. It must be recollected that Paley wrote in a deistic age, when a material philosophy reigned, and when the acuteness of Hume and the sarcasm of Voltaire were aided by the flaring schemes of the *Eccliarists*. It was, too, a season when the Church was moved by little enthusiasm, marked by coldness and moderatism of tone, and had become in a great measure estranged from the people. Though, therefore, the evidences which he marshalled and arranged are complete and thorough in their range, they are not now so directly applicable to the phases of the question as they were. The intellectual attitude of scepticism has changed in Europe. Philosophy has taken new steps into new fields, and the contest has raged around fresh banners. Little in Paley demands critical exception, but some portions require readjustment, while a considerable section might now be advantageously added on the harmony between the principles of thought in the soul and the operations of spiritual life, and on the metaphysic of the miraculous, the ethical excellence of the Gospel morality when compared with the doctrines of duty prevailing in the metaphysics of the wise men of Greece and Rome, and on the Elpistic, or grounds for hope the Christian system offers.

That Paley had a fuller conception of the nature and extent of the Scripture evidences than this book alone shows, his *Horæ Paulinæ* proves. In the former he gives the greater prominence to

the external evidences, and in the latter to the internal. His shrewd and active perception enabled him to see signs of continuity in the several books of Scripture, which implied the concrete oneness of the canon of Scripture; and his clear, solid judgment gave full effect to the argument based upon the credibility implied in the undesigned coincidences of statements made by different persons, writing at different times and places, with different purposes, and for different persons. Like "the two parts of a cloven tally," these are brought together, and the comparison at once establishes the genuineness of each. "One or two coincidences of this kind might be accident, hundreds cannot; many of them, too, as far from obvious as anything that can be imagined, such as would not have been detected by one reader in ten thousand; such as must be dragged out of their hiding-places into day by the opposition of texts from perhaps half a dozen quarters.

Professor Sedgwick objected to "Paley's Natural Theology" that it was reprehensible as an argument on account of its "shutting up the Almighty in a syllogism." This is an epigrammatic objection. The metaphysic of design is sustainable on the most substantial grounds. We live in a world of contingencies, and yet we know that we do not live in a world of chance. Our experience is that we apply the word chance to an event happening without the intentional (known) intervention of a regulating mind; but our experience also shows us that the prevalence of uniformity in nature could not be trusted in as we do if that were left to chance. Hence we reason that as the amount of coincidences in nature is such as to indicate a certain uniformity of procedure, it cannot be the result of mere chance, and the number of these uniformities and coincidences supplies us with the right to postulate that they are the results of a superior determining mind. The lines of specially determined coincidences and consequences we call laws, and the superior mind by whose determining agency sequence and consequence are arranged, we regard as the lawgiver. Experience, which teaches us that chance does not govern the universe, also suggests that design regulates the on-goings of things. We plan, and we see our plans succeed or fail, according to the intelligence and consistency with things as they are with which the plan has been formed. We see others working out aims, schemes, purposes, and ends, which we can either assist and further or frustrate. We reason on the things we behold as if they were the results of chance, and we paralyze knowledge and prevision, we reason on events and circumstances as if they were the results of design, and we can calculate, foreknow, provide for or against, and regard as fixed and settled. Design gives us the key to law and prevision. Design is the very basis of

science, and science approves of design as the fundamental director of experience by giving us the power of prescience. The cogitable world, and the world of experience alike, are interpretable only when we subsume design. The metaphysics of design are therefore irrefragable, and design implies a designer.

Whether we begin our reasonings from the universe of experience, or from the too inseparable elements of experience—space and time,—we are alike led up to a Being of intelligent goodness, whose design the universe is. So that the same fact is brought home to us in duplicate by this twofold course of reasoning *à priori* and *d posteriori*. Paley, in an age when the experience philosophy mainly took an external form, applied himself to that point which brought experience itself as a testimony against the atheism which was founded upon it. He did not attempt to embark on the obscure ocean of the metaphysics of causation; nor did he offer by deep philosophic research to discover the distinction between human adaptations and divine designs. He pointed to the facts of design, to the ingenuity and benevolence they exhibited, and accepted the common-sense explanation; such things could not have occurred by mere chance, and therefore they must have been designed. Not only does design itself imply intelligence, but the specific designs show an adapting intelligence. While as to the purpose of these intelligent designings we are brought to this,—“The Creator either sought the happiness of His creatures, or sought their misery, or was indifferent to both.” The two latter hypotheses are refuted by numberless facts; therefore the first hypothesis is true, and there is a God, intelligent and wise, who formed and rules the world.

Such is a glimpse of the metaphysic of Paley, not paraded, but latent in his works. He was a thinker who did no mean service as the mediator between scepticism and Christianity at an eventful time, and as the co-ordinator of speculative thought and Scriptural truth.

Science.

IS CREATION OR EVOLUTION THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF NATURE?

EVOLUTION.—REPLY.

THE questions arising between science and religion must be settled. Doubt is growing, and will grow more and more. Science is passing triumphantly along new and glorious paths to truths possessing noble interests for man. Religion seems standing in the old paths, denouncing progress, and seeking to fetter the mind in the course of thought. It is greatly to be regretted that religion, which should be the highest form of human thought, has taken the position of a decrifier of liberty of reasoning. Have not her own chief glories been won in the course of emancipating the human mind from the bondage of prejudice and passion in the early ages of her activity? And again, at the period of the Reformation, did its chief blessedness not proceed from the enfranchisement it procured and secured for the human intellect? Why should it now eclipse its good renown by withstanding science, which has so marvellously elicited its meaning from the universe, and read the messages of the Highest contained in its rocky pages, its multifarious leaves, and its star-graven sky? Science has verified many of her hypotheses, and given good reason for the belief that her processes are valuable as elucidators of the facts of nature. Religion ought to acknowledge the gains of science rather than gainsay them. In doing violence to facts, religious teachers do damage to their own pursuits, and place them in a false position before men. It is high time that this matter of dispute should be settled between science and religion, and we hope this debate may have helped it somewhat.

Few mistakes are so great as those which are made by stretching the conclusion farther than the premises rested on warrant. The Christian documents tell us of the fact of creation by a Creator, and this they give to be received as an element of faith. They give also an outline of the evolution of creation, which has in many cases

been regarded as a dry and literal statement. So held, science has had fact after fact brought under its notice irreconcilable with this account so interpreted, and hence the record has fallen into disrepute; not, be it remembered, on any fault of its own, but by the fault of its interpreters, who would insist that in a mere adumbration of the fact they had Heaven's own record of a real process. It is not really religion and science that are at variance, but the interpreters of religion and the interpreters of science. Scientific interpreters regarded the universe as an infallible record of the divine purposes, and this they have endeavoured to interpret. Every now and again, however, the evidence of reality proved that their theories were wrong. They did not then dogmatically assert that all reality, notwithstanding the decision of science, should stand, and should be held to be the true teaching of God. They retraced their investigation, re-examined their record, re-tested their previous findings; and having ascertained their error, got next a little nearer to the precise truth. They have accepted the correction as one only involving a confession of their error, not as one implying the falsity of the record.

Religious investigators have acted quite differently. They have searched the records, and written down in creeds their interpretation of these records. They have pronounced all doubt of not the records only, but the creeds derived from them, to be damnable error, for the punishment of which eternity is not too long. When objection has been brought against their tenets, they have accepted them as taken against their holy books, and have declared that they were blasphemous and heretical. They would neither consent to re-peruse their records, nor revise their creeds; and hence they refused the very means of readjustment between Scripture and science. The blame of the severance between them rests with the creedists. The free perusal of the Scriptures, like the free perusal of nature, would lead to the best results. It would almost invariably be found that the objections taken by scientific men against religion are in reality taken against the irrevocable creed-interpretation that has been made of its instructions and statements—not against itself. Scripture, rightly interpreted, would in all probability be found in perfect harmony with science, rightly interpreted, if these creeds did not act as meddlesome middlemen between those who wish to look at them eye to eye. When the expositors of religion, like the expositors of science, hold to their theories and

hypotheses only so long as there is the highest balance of presumption in their favour, science and religion shall be friends and allies.

Let it be observed that science only professes to be an interpreter of the natural universe, as a guide and help to the proper arrangement and management of our natural life. Religion, on the other hand, is the interpreter of the spiritual relations of man, for the right government and proper control of man's spiritual life. These two should not really collide. Their questions, though affecting the life of man and the interpretation of the universe in relation to man, are quite distinct enough to afford due field for a general culture of each without interference with the other. It is perhaps true that it is science which is now the intermeddler with religion. But we know that it was not always so—that religion employed the strongest repressive measures against science; so that if science now retaliate, it is not much to be wondered at. It would be very desirable that these two opposing excitors of thought should come to some terms, and that some possible irenicon could be proposed.

The attentive reader will have noticed that I, as the opener of this debate, desired to begin by clear marking out of the matter of debate, and fixing the point of view which should be taken of the question. I proposed to look at it as a question of interpretation, not of origination. I was glad to see that M. F. S., as the opener on the opposition, seemed to be equally anxious to get to an accurate and adequate definition of terms. The moderate tone, indeed, of his paper was more than I anticipated. It will be necessary for me to make a few observations on this paper of M. F. S.'s. I quite willingly accept of his definition of nature (*ante*, p. 43), as "the vast whole of things visible, the universe in its utmost latitude of extent;" and of his statement (p. 44) that "nature, in any sense in which we choose to use it, requires interpretation." Only two methods of interpretation are, he thinks—and I agree with him, possible—creation and evolution; and the purpose of the present debate is to determine which will form to the human mind the more satisfactory interpretation of nature (p. 45). His definition of creation as the first forming of all things, and of evolution as the self-unfolding of all things, I shall not dispute. I have to complain, however, that he does not hold by his definitions. After having defined creation as the whole forming of a whole, he goes on to speak of creation as if on its recurrence every separate species

of creature and kind of element was then formed, with all its specialities and peculiarities fixed and determined by the will and fiat of the Maker; and thereafter he speaks of evolution as if it only meant one of two things—the gradual self-unfolding of the several individuals of the respective species originally created, or the self-creation and coming into being of the entire original mass of the universe in some unimaginable system of progressive development. He thus not only misconceives creation, as he has defined it—viz., “taking origin and first form by command,” but misrepresents evolution as implying the self-origination of the universe from nothingness, and its development to what it is.

I think that *nature* cannot be interpreted by regarding creation as a first forming of the fixed types of things, such as we behold them now, in all the specific varieties which they show. I find it impossible to reconcile with such a determinate creative forth-calling of things (1) the passing away of many forms of existence to which Deity had given command to be; (2) the changes which have been produced by the development of civilisation; and (3) the adaptations observable in the same species to peculiar conditions of life.

The evolution in which I believe is not that of the spontaneous generation of worlds from nothingness; neither is it only the successive giving off of offspring from a type-form. As I have said (p. 51), “evolution does not necessarily imply no creation.”

Creation is a possible form of the primary coming into existence of the universe; but except as a revelation, which is not, be it observed, an interpretation, it is impossible to conceive of it. Nor for scientific purposes is it requisite at all. Science accepts nature as *given*, and seeks to know its qualities and processes, the course of its sequences and consequences, causes and effects. However given—and Science only regards that as an hypothesis,—it seems to have atomic or elemental powers, whose characteristics are such that as their combinations change they evolve new forms and qualities; these again acquire possibilities of higher or lower changes, developments and evolutions.

Taking arithmetic, for instance, what would we think if on any one's asking whether creation or evolution supplies the best interpretation it were replied to us, Evolution cannot explain arithmetic unless we accept of creation as well, for figures must have been created before their evolutions became possible? should

we not say, in regard to this, arithmetic is a series of evolutions, not of creations, and hence evolution explains all that we require to know of arithmetic; creation is beside the question.

M. F. S. seems to think that a first cause is an easier conception than a self-existent universe. I grant that when it has been revealed it is so; but even then it is an article of faith, not of knowledge. An interpretation, to be of any avail, must be understood; but M. F. S. asks us to accept of a revealed creation, and a revealed First Cause or Creator, two elements of faith, as a portion of known truth. To this we object. Science rejects assumptions, in demanding that a minimum of hypothetic supposition should be indulged in; and it endeavours to explain facts by hypotheses, not hypotheses by facts. Observe, I do not deny a First Cause. Science does not deny a First Cause. A First Cause may or may not be accepted by science. A First Cause I religiously believe in. I believe it as an interpretation of spiritual phenomena rather than of natural phenomena. It interprets the former to me, but not the latter. In fact, science accepts nature as the matter of its facts and the object of interpretation, and creation takes it away into the region of metaphysics. M. F. S. mistakes when he says that "beyond the region of the senses lies the region of the sciences." Science deals only with sensible phenomena; and hence it is that evolution is all that it can know and all that it can employ in interpretation. It cannot reach, nor does it profess to reach, a Creator.

We turn now briefly to consider some of the other advocates of creation as an explanation of nature.

F. D. T. has a far wider range of information than I can lay any claim to. He traces the history of evolution with a stronger pen than I can use. But he fights against an evolution which has not been maintained. "I cannot understand," he says, "how that which was but a lifeless, formless force could evolve not only form but vitality, not only life but thought." In this methinks he doth assume too much. The *prima materia* of nature are not supposed to be lifeless or formless in the sense F. D. T. accepts it. But the idea of science, "Every effect must have an (adequate) cause," takes us but a short distance beyond experience. When we seek up to a First Cause, our own axiom revolts against us; and hence we are compelled to limit our scientific axiom to the terms, every effect observable in nature, as we know it, must have an adequate cause. But the axiom of the religious metaphysician, by which he

attempts to refute the scientific man, equally fails to bear him up into the higher regions. "Every intelligent being must have had an intelligent creative cause." Is that so? Whence, then, originateth, or evolveth, or manifesteth forth the great First Cause? Plainly, if the axiom be prevailing, He, too, must have had a cause; and we are no nearer an interpretation of the mystery than if we had contained ourselves within the limits of mere science. In fact, a circle of darkness surrounds the very idea of creation, which our candlelight intellect cannot pierce.

F. D. T. makes too much of Professor Huxley's attempt to make the idea of *scientific* evolution palpable. He wished to show that if only the idea of force be given to man, he can reason onward from that bare idea to all the sumptuousness and grandeur of the universe. That scientific force may have been a created force, or it may be the great creative force for which F. D. T. contends. Be it either, science accepts it and begins with it. Its evolutions constitute science; for science is briefly the evolution of the forces of nature in all their correlations.

J. R. S. C. appears to think that age is a great objection to the truth of a theory. He twits the believer in evolution with taking up an idea which "floated through the schools of Greece." A certain science of logic did the same; and J. R. S. C., we presume, does not despise that. Why, then, should he despise the other? But if he will hold that old ideas must be false, and new ones alone true, what will he do with the argument that Christianity is as old as the Creation? And what has he to say regarding the claims to adoption of the last new pill? Surely J. R. S. C. must see that if animals are subject to evolution at all, they must get depressed in scale if circumstances are adverse, and get elevated if these are favourable. His disproof of the evolution theory from the fact that "species exhibit a tendency not to elevation but to depression" (p. 200) is neither apt nor telling; but could that which God created perfect be so depressed, unless by a power equal to or greater than God? And that results in an absurdity.

R. N. C.'s short and easy way with E. F. R. has not apparently been so destructive in its effects, or instructive in its matter, as he appears to have supposed it would be. If he will just look at the first sentence of S. C. A.'s article, following his, he will find (p. 208) an answer. "Creation must either be an imagination or a revelation. It can never be an experience." Nature is the whole of our experi-

ences, nothing beyond that. Hence creation cannot interpret nature.

S. S. thinks "specific creation fully accounts for the phenomena which nature presents" (p. 279). If God created the specific types of things, He either intended them to retain the form of their divine type, in which case change would be impossible, and variety could not occur except under the failure of Deity to effect or sustain His purpose—which is absurd; or He endowed them with the capacity of evolution, in which case the Deity's specific creations were not what S. S. supposes. "Samuel" reiterates the same idea, that creation is the most competent interpretation of nature. He, too, believes in fixed created types or species. These species must, then, either fulfil God's aim or not. If they do, they must be perfect and changeless; and if they do not, what does "Samuel" gain by his assertion? Is it not a far nobler conception—if "Samuel" must have creation—to regard nature as a whole cabinet of forces, endowed by Deity with such capacities as to assume such developments as the successive changes in the universe make necessary?

But our remarks are extending too far. We must close. We think the hard, literal interpretation put upon the record of creation ought to be rescinded. It should be regarded as showing that the Creator—revealed to us for spiritual purposes—imparted powers of evolution suitable for carrying out His progressive purposes to the elements of His creation; that light, for instance, took on itself the forms of earth and sea, of vegetation and of life, and so developed the universes of nature, of which science is seeking thus the interpretation. It is at any rate certain that Evolution is unlocking many of the mysteries which science finds in nature,—that the correlation of forces has grown into a distinct and influential theory, giving valuable interpretation to the phenomena of nature. Still there ought to be a distinct and definite attempt made by religious men to attain to a knowledge of creative power as God, the Father of all, that men's spirits may be quickened, raised, and refined. Again, among metaphysicians the idea of the Absolute One should be pursued till it clears up the mystery of its prevalence. But these should be pursued without dogmatic encroachment on the proper duty of science, which is to interpret the nature we know by the facts discernible in it, and through these to make known to man the laws of the evolution of events.

E. F. R.

CREATION.—REPLY.

THIS discussion has been long and keen. It is one of great importance, and it has been rightly judged that full scope should be given to the various writers who held different opinions on the question. For our own part, we know of no interest comparable to that excited in us by the speculations now commonly entertained concerning the relation between science and revelation. Science I hold to be a revelation of the discoveries made by man in his investigations regarding the true order, character, purpose, and progress of nature. It, however, must assume nature, take it for granted, and accept it as it is. Science takes nature as a subject of study; and when it does so, it sees it as a whole complex of phenomena, governed by and working according to law, and in its every change implying and giving evidence of causation. Here science requires to begin with existence, phenomena, law, and cause. It can only assume them, and it is *incomplete* by the very necessity of its object, and cannot afford an adequate interpretation of nature, no, nor even of the phenomena of nature. That nature exists it asserts, but it will not venture on explaining either *how* or *why*. That phenomena occur it affirms, but it cannot tell us of their sequences without introducing ideas of order, law, and cause, of which it offers and can offer no interpretation which does not transcend science. Its very foundation-thoughts belong to revelation; and there are no words possessed of such a neutral tint as will afford science language to interpret nature upon the principles of mere evolution.

One of the most distinguished of the Evolutionists of the present day—Professor Huxley—has in his *Lay Sermons*, and then in an *Essay on Geological Contemporaneity*, p. 256, said that “all who are competent to express an opinion on the subject are, at present, agreed that the manifold varieties of animal and vegetable form have not either [a] come into existence by chance, nor [b] result from *capricious* exertions of creative power; but that [c] they have taken place in a definite order, the statement of which order is what men of science term a natural law. If we analyze this sentence we shall find some curious matter in it. There is *first* the reservation made of the competency to form an opinion on the subject on which the exponent of an opposing view may be set down as an *ignoramus*. There is second the reservation of time contained in the words “at present,” which seem to us to imply an unmistak-

able limitation of the truth of the teaching of science to the point at which discovery now stands, and therefore debar science from claiming to be the expression of the eternal truth of things. There is next the tri-lemma of the possibilities of existence, in regard to which we observe that he (1) negatives the idea of nature's existence *by chance*, and so makes it necessary to find another exposition of the "order of nature" than the fortuitous concourse of atoms; (2) that while he appears to deny existence by creation, he only really denies "*capricious* exertions of creative force," a denial in which the advocates of the existence of nature by creation are in full accord with him; a denial which seems to involve the coming into existence of nature by *non-capricious* exertions of creative force; and (3) that the assertion that they (i.e., "the manifold varieties of animal and vegetable form") *have taken place* in a definite order implies either that a definite order had been planned, and a power to bring it into perfectness existed and was exercised, so that the places should be taken, or it involves the extraordinary assumption that "the manifold varieties of animal and vegetable forms" prior to their existence had an idea of the plan and order of the universe, and have each taken their place in that order intelligently and consentingly which is to endow each animal and vegetable form with an omniscient intelligence prior to its being, and antecedent to its having come into existence. We have furthermore to remark on the inadequacy of Professor Huxley's definition of "a natural law," the statement of the order of nature. This is defective from the omission of the idea involved in a law of nature of *invariability*, and as a matter of fact it requires to be supplemented by a saving clause derived from the professor's own phrase "at present."

So far as man's knowledge and observation have extended, when strictly confined to nature, when closely examined, therefore, Professor Huxley's views do not seem to indicate that nature can be fully interpreted *independently* of the idea of creation; and we see besides that he cannot proceed at all without the terms existence, order, sequence, law. Take nature as an existence and may we not well ask if it, being matter, preceded mind, and if out of matter mind was evolved? Take nature as order, and may we not inquire whether the order of nature is the issue of the necessities of its own activity? or if order has been impressed on it by an ordainer? Take nature as a sequence, and may we not seek to

know whether the sequences of nature occur by chance or by intention? and if not by chance, by what intention and by whose intention? Take nature as law, and may we not ask if a statement of fact constitutes a law? and if not, and law is a principle exercising determinate power, who settled the principle and exercises the power? Take, in short, nature as mere evolution, and may we not ask whence it evolves, how it evolves, why it evolves? And what interpretative answer can science give unless it accepts the reply of revelation, "In the beginning God *created* the heavens and the earth"?

Nature cannot evolve anything higher than herself; but in her evolutions, man, an intellectual, moral, religious, and law-making being, occurs; hence Nature must either be in herself intelligent, moral, religious, and law-making, or she must have evolved from something higher than herself, which is—that is, nature must have been created, and only on the idea of creation can nature be properly interpreted. The very term evolution implies, we contend, a creation. We could not have an unrolling unless we had first the roll which has been uprolled. The folded something which is to be unfolded must exist before unfolding begins. Volution is only possible when matter to be subjected to it is given, and neither evolution nor revolution are possible unless there be the original mass which is the matter brought under the evolving process. It is out of something that evolution takes place. Any interpretation of nature which merely describes and catalogues the evolutions of nature is not what it professes to be, inasmuch as it fails to account for that which is the greatest matter of curiosity of all—how nature came into being, how it has been enriched with all its possibilities, and how it has been endowed with all its capacities of evolution?

E. F. R. virtually gives up the very opinion he espouses when he says; "Evolution does not necessarily imply no creation" (*ante* p. 51). If this is so, we may assert that if "evolution *may* in itself afford an explanation of nature, (p. 51), evolution itself *must* be explained by creation, so that creation affords the better interpretation of nature.

W. G. P. holds that we only "know phenomena." I ask him, do we not know theories? Do we not even know false theories? Is gravitation a phenomenon, or is it a term which binds up what we know of phenomena into a theory? Is science only a phenomenon? Do phenomena reason, and calculate, and invent,

and decree principles? If W. G. P. affirms that science is not knowledge, and that the laws of nature which science employs to explain nature are not knowledge, then we say we do not even know phenomena; but if they are knowledge, then we know more than phenomena, and the basis of his paper is quite upset. Science reveals principles, and one of the principles of science is causation, and causation in its ultimate form is creation. S. E. A. denies that creation can be an experience. We may on the same grounds affirm that science can never be an experience. If, then, the only thing we can know is experience, we cannot know either creation or science, and that makes an interpretation of nature an entire impossibility. On S. E. A.'s principles, then, we cannot have any interpretation of nature at all. And yet S. E. A. does not see that an argument only *involves* what it, after examination, *evolves* (p. 202). A. T. expects that explanation, because it should be reasonable, should include all thought under the power of reason; must be *under* reason, and not only *according to* reason. Will he then kindly show by reason what reason is in some reasonable way? If we are to believe nothing that is *above* reason, what must we do with existence, eternity, space, &c., or can A. T. in reality supply us with a reasonable explanation of these terms, which shall be within reason? L. S. E. has written a very valuable contribution to this controversy. His observations have much force and importance. But he seems to us to have regarded this as a definite question between science and revelation, and to have sought to cut off the inquiry by asserting that it did not come within the range of science. It has not been asserted that there could be a science of the Creator. Revelation has, however, made known to us that "the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." Unless we accept of this revelation, science itself becomes an impossibility. Creation is the only true solution of the forthcoming of nature. Nature is the product of the love, wisdom, and goodness of the Deity. Science investigates and explains the phenomena of Nature, not Nature herself. Nature is created, and her phenomena evolve; but no ideas we have of evolution could produce nature. Taking nature as the matter to be explained, creation arises as the very first idea which we can entertain. This has been shown with ability and fulness of illustration by our able coadjutors in this discussion.

M. F. S.

Social Economy.

SHOULD THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC BE SUPPRESSED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

No question of greater interest and importance could possibly have been laid for consideration before the contributors and readers of this magazine than the one under discussion. Notwithstanding the vast amount of practical exertion which has already been devoted to this subject, the increasing effects of the blasting evil commands more than ever the most earnest attention. The liquor traffic is unquestionably a social nuisance, a moral drag, a national curse. Through its baleful encroachments the influence of Christianity among the masses has become almost stifled, and moral sausion weakened in its potency. So great and debasing are the effects resulting from this traffic that all the endeavours of the benevolent to check the vice and crime which it brings about, and to alleviate the sufferings of its victims, are totally inadequate to effect their purpose. Their efforts are like a few drops of water falling into a burning furnace. All the combined force of charity, morality, and religion cannot stay the desolating progress of this great Juggernaut of iniquity. The wheels of its death-crushing car are smeared with the blood of countless thousands, the victims increasing as it moves on in its ravaging course. It is therefore high time that this country should wake up and carry into force some more effectual means to suppress this fearful evil than have hitherto been adopted.

In a country famed for its liberty any attempts made to pass into law measures partaking of the nature of prohibition are invariably met, on their first appearance, with decided opposition, and not unfrequently scared off by the sneers of derision. But so far as experience is teaching us it appears that prohibition is the law which this country must ultimately be compelled to employ in dealing with this subject. It is, however, no feeble proof that a prohibitory law is absolutely necessary, that the supporters of a bill prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors are continually

gaining new adherents and advocates. Both sides are at one in regard to the fearful consequences resulting from the trafficking in intoxicating liquors. We only differ as to the *means* which should be employed in checking its overpowering influence. Our opponents say *restrain* and *regulate* the traffic; we say prohibit the sale altogether. Our opponents maintain that intoxicating liquors, when taken in moderation, prove a blessing; in opposition, we maintain that these same liquors, even moderately used, cause us to tamper with a temptation, and consequently this use of it ought to be avoided. Our opponents deny that prohibition is within the scope of human law; we maintain that the Legislation has not only the right, but is bound to exercise the power and prerogative of prohibiting anything which endangers the well-being of society. Regarding an evil so great and debasing, one, too, which irresistibly *compels* the law to legislate upon its traffic, it must surely necessarily follow that the Government can also prohibit its sale without going beyond its legitimate limits. "Prohibition," says the writer in September's *Controversialist*, "can only justify itself when it can prove that it is the issue of unerring wisdom." Quite true, but our opponent has failed to prove that prohibition, in respect to the liquor traffic, would *not* be the issue of "unerring wisdom." The law, by *regulating* the sale of intoxicating liquors, has only *increased* the evils which accompany its traffic. It is then an erring wisdom on the part of the law to regulate the sale of this traffic. On the other hand, it would be equally an erring wisdom of the law to remain apart from legislating on the traffic because the constitution of society would be outraged by having no protection afforded to it. It being the duty of the Government to protect and defend the rights and liberties of society, it *must* legislate upon the liquor traffic. Now it is admitted by both sides that the law's present legislation upon the traffic—restraining and regulating—does not protect the well-being of society, but in many respects increases the evils resulting from its sale. This legislation, it is very apparent, cannot be the "issue of an unerring wisdom," and consequently ought to give place to a law more effectual. What method can the Government fix upon, that shall prove effectual in checking this desolating evil, if its right to prohibit is denied? Clearly, no other method. Total suppression is the only measure which has not been adopted by the Legislature to suppress the liquor traffic. Above two hundred bills have been introduced

into Parliament, and every one of them proved to be absolutely impotent to reach the desired end. The reason of such lamentable failures of the legislation in regard to this subject seems very obvious. Legislation upon an evil is wrong—morally wrong. A more stupendous error than this we cannot conceive a State to commit. "An evil always becomes *worse* by being sustained by the laws of the land. It is much to have the sanction of law, and the moral force of law, in favour of any course of human conduct. In the estimation of many persons, to make a thing *legal* is to make it morally *right*, and an employment which is legal is pursued by them with few rebukes of conscience; and with little disturbance from any reference to a higher than human authority. Moreover this fact does much to deter others from opposing the evil, and from endeavouring to turn the public indignation against it. It is an unwelcome thing for a good man ever to set himself against the laws of the land, and to denounce that as *wrong* which they affirm to be *right*."*

Here, then, is an overwhelming evil consummated by the law's regulation. The law *must* legislate upon the traffic. Neutrality on the part of the Government in regard to this traffic would be, it is admitted by both sides, the height of national delirium. If then the evil is to be stayed, the only course left to the law to pursue is total suppression. The writer on the negative in the *Controversialist* for September says that until we have attained the whole truth on this subject regulation only can be the duty of the law. He assumes that the traffic is an *evil*, and that the present legislation upon it is *ineffectual*, but maintains that regulation, and not prohibition, is our duty "until we are possessed of certainty on the question." Whatever certainties we are not yet possessed of on this subject, there is one certainty which is quite sufficient to justify the Government in prohibiting the liquor traffic. The traffic *retards* our social and moral prosperity. That is a certainty, and one, too, which weighs more in favour of prohibition than regulation. But it is further stated by our opponent with reference to the principle of prohibition. He says, "Prohibition, even by the divine law, is not made absolutely imperative, but is left to be observed or neglected according to the persuasion of conscience in him who is called to obedience." This is, perhaps, the most remarkable passage which has yet emanated from the pens of our opponents.

* Rev. Albert Barnes.

Divine law *not* absolutely imperative! What does our opponent mean by this phrase? Does he mean that divine law *prohibits*, but the prohibition is only valid in cases of "persuasion of conscience"? According to our opponent's idea, divine law is regulated by the conscience. This interpretation of divine law is utterly false. Divine law appeals to, but is never regulated by conscience. It is impossible to combine our opponent's theory of prohibition with the divine law. A man's conscience may never persuade him to obey the divine commandments, but that fact will not save him from its curse. It is by first coming under that law that conscience feels its force, and it solely depends upon our obedience to the law's mandates whether our conscience directs or misdirects. Divine law is therefore absolutely imperative. "Thou shalt," and "Thou shalt not," portray its nature, there being no reference whatever to the "persuasion of conscience."

Another and very important point in this debate has been adverted to, viz., that a total suppression of the liquor traffic would be an encroachment upon the liberty of that portion of the community who object to be deprived of the *use* of spirituous liquors simply because the same is *abused* by others. At first sight such a prohibitory law does appear to be an infringement upon the liberty of the subject, but there are many considerations to be met before a proper conclusion can be come to. Divine inspiration has said, "Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others." It is clear, then, that as members of society we cannot act independently. True, no one can be justly deprived of the use of anything on the simple ground that another abuses it. But we are bound to look upon the things of others, and acting up to this truth we frequently feel it expedient to abstain from that in which, in other circumstances, the same course would be uncalled for. Accordingly, no one can justify himself in the determined use of wine on this ground, that he never misused it, or brought about the evils that others effect, in partaking of the same. The drunkard's family have no right to be deprived of the necessaries of life on account of his bestial excesses, but nevertheless they are deprived of them, and borne irresistibly towards crime, pauperism, and premature death. Is it then, we ask, *expedient*, in the face of these indisputable facts, to persist in the moderate use of that whereby so many of our fellow-creatures are deprived of the essentials of life? It is an admitted fact that the moderate use of

alcoholic liquors is *not* essential either to man's happiness or prosperity. On the other hand, it is equally true that its prevalence causes the greatest amount of evil which abounds in society. In these circumstances what is our duty? Past experience has sufficiently proved to us that if we *persist* in the moderate use of liquors, the drunkard shall not *desist* from its abuse. The moral force of *example* must then be looked to, for the primary duty of each member of society as such is to act, not under the limited idea of personal benefit, but with a strict conformity to that which is productive of the greatest general good. Total abstinence seems to us the only true attitude society can assume in regard to this traffic.

The moderate use of intoxicating liquors is a tampering with temptation, and being such it ought to be avoided. All men are liable to fall. The fact that wherever the liquor traffic is, drunkenness is there also, proves that the traffic is a *great* temptation. Every *new* public-house attracts *new* customers. As these houses increase, drunkenness and crime increase in proportion. The very nature of the traffic presents temptations which are wholly peculiar and of the most ruinous kind. "The drinker collects his circle; the circle naturally spreads; of those who are drawn within it, many become the corrupters and centres of sets and circles of their own; every one countenancing, and perhaps emulating the rest, till a whole neighbourhood is infected from the contagion of a single example. This account is confirmed by what we often observe of drunkenness, that it is a *local* vice, found to prevail in certain countries, in certain districts of a country, or in particular towns, without any reason to be given for the fashion, but that it had been introduced by some popular examples." *

There is another objection raised against the total suppression of the liquor traffic. It is argued that alcohol must have a "wise and good purpose to fulfil from the fact of its wide prevalence in nature" (p. 180). We do not dispute the assertion, but we hold that the use to which it is in the present day put is neither "wise nor good." Our opponent, in adducing this argument, virtually assumes that its present use is neither wise nor good, and merely argues against its total suppression from the fact that unless alcohol had a wise and good purpose it would not have such a "wide prevalence in nature." We are not discussing what the true use of alcohol

* Paley.

may be, but whether the popular use it is put to should be tolerated or suppressed. It has been truly said, "Drinking does more to destroy the wholesome influence of the family, and ruin the character of the home, than all other causes put together." This traffic is an *evil* in whatever aspect it may be viewed, and nothing short of suppression can possibly free society from its curse. If our country is to be saved from the terrible crisis the liquor traffic is swiftly dragging it to, if the degraded multitudes who worship at those shrines of iniquity are to be rescued, then those ill-omened palaces must be pulled down, and that fountain of disease and death be broken, before such results can be accomplished.

C. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is an interesting and thoroughly established fact, that men in all ages and in most countries have had, more or less, a habit of using drinks capable of intoxicating them. This seems to indicate not only a tendency in man to use them, but also a sort of suitability in them to human nature and to human wants. When we join to this general desire for the use of intoxicants, of whatever sort, in man, the absolute and undeniable fact that there is a very large provision of intoxicants in nature, we have arrived at these points: (1) That alcohol must have an important use in the economy of nature; (2) that alcohol must have a specific capability of being of use to man; and (3) that man's business and duty is to find out this proper specific use, and to employ it for that, and, when discovered, for that only. Meanwhile, the liquor traffic cannot be prohibited with due regard to these points, because alcohol is in the field, possessed of the right to have its existence and use admitted until a just writ of ejectment can be proved against it.

Analogy is against its prohibition. Deity, the very Author of the Moral Law, has not even in His beneficence prohibited to us the means of transgressing His law, although He not only possesses the right but the power to do so. He could most effectually prohibit the use of drink by banishing from the elements of creation the alcohol which brings it about and makes it possible. But he has not seen fit to do so; and that, in all probability, because it has a use, either as a test or a beverage.

The divine method of procedure is, in all cases involving moral responsibility, to regulate, not to prohibit; and, until we can show

that, on a fair calculation of all the possible consequences, we are wiser than the Deity, who permits, but calls upon the conscience and the will to regulate, the existence of alcohol, and has created it evidently for use. If, however, having got wisdom of that hyper-divine kind which shall enable us to determine, on a full view of all the consequences, that the existence of alcohol is a mistake and a wrong, by all means—the premises being proved—let prohibition follow; but mere opinion will not justify prohibitory legislation.

Tyranny always cloaks its designs under a fair show. It was thus that the prohibition of religious opinions was palmed on the world. The duty of saving men from eternal fire made the prohibition of error a right and proper thing. This, like all prohibitory laws—except such as have their foundation in the eternal law of God—has failed. Laws for the prohibition of changes in the classes of society, for the prohibition of special dresses, drinks, meats, &c., have all failed. The soul will not readily submit to “shall nots” that have no sanction except the mob of voices. Men may be persuaded into self-control—they will not be drum-majored into abstinence. Opinion is powerless either to form or to enforce conformity to it as if it were a moral obligation.

We seek to over-legislate when we enter on our law books prohibitions such as men do not give their consent to as involving moral characteristics; and by our prohibitions we tend to bring the law into disrespect. Rome has ineffectually tried an *Index Expurgatorius* of books; but Britain is not likely, from the success of that experiment, to try suppressive legislation by enacting an *Index Expurgatorius* of drinks. If a prohibition requisite to preserve from spiritual woe has failed, is it likely that one which refers to a bodily safety will prevail?

I see little in W. J.'s article which it concerns me to debate, I may only oppose to his idea of “invasion” of drink the fact of a complete pervasion of nature with alcohol, which must have a human use, or God would not have made it.

That the evils of the liquor traffic should be lessened is perfectly right; but it is not right to do evil that good may come, and to write in our statute book the tyrannous word suppression is doing evil. Even Lord Campbell's Wholesome Literature Act errs in this way, amiable Act though it is.

The perversion of food argument will only be tenable when

W. J. has proved that we should only use God's gifts as He gives them to us; and what will he then do with all the manufactures and traffic of the world?

Prohibition is unjust unless suppression is total not only of traffic but of manufacture. Justice deals out the same measure to all. Unless by the absolute suppression of the manufacture, import, sale, purchase, use, or possession of intoxicating liquors, we abolished alcohol altogether, the rich would be able to have what the poor could not get; and class laws are of all laws the most unpopular.

The liquor traffic, like the silk-mercator's traffic, will regulate itself best, by being left free from sumptuary laws; by giving scope to intelligence, and security for a proper article to be properly used. We cannot allow liberty to be menaced, free-will to be harnessed, the mark of enforced abstinence to be put on the poor, while the rich revel and revile. Suppression is oppression. Conviction alone will make man abstinent, but not police convictions, fines, and imprisonment.

L. A. F.

SHAKSPERE AS A GEOLOGIST.—The hill men insist that the mountains have been upheaved ready-made out of the bowels of the earth by expansive forces acting along the axes of the chains; the valleys being for the most part mere cracks produced by the intrusion of the mountains. The dale men, on the other hand, recognise in the elaboration of a system of valleys and hills the results of working together of denudation and upheaval through long periods of time. The founder of the dale school—and, indeed, the first geologist of any note—was William Shakspeare. His "Theory of the Earth" has unfortunately been lost, and is only known from a few quotations scattered through his less serious works. The following fragment may serve to show the character of his philosophy:—

"I have seen the hungry ocean gain
Advantage on the kingdom of the shore,
And the firm soil win of the watery main,
Increasing store with loss and loss with store."

Over and over again in the history of the world whole continents have been washed by the action of rain and frost, and the simultaneous gnawing of the "hungry ocean" along the receding coast-line. Tracts of country thus reduced to the level of the sea become plains of marine denudation. On the re-elevation of such a plain, the rivers commence again to their old task of destruction, carving out valleys, and leaving behind—till their time shall come—fragments of the table land as hills or mountain chains.

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED AND DISENDOWED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VIII.

IN the course of this debate no terms have been more frequently used than those of "Church" and "State," and yet no writer on either side appears to have attempted to give a clear definition of the meaning of these terms; perhaps, therefore, we may render some service if we endeavour to supply this omission before stating the reasons which lead us to advocate the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of England.

A State is a political body, or a body politic, and includes the whole body of a people who are united under one government whatever their religious creed may be. Citizenship is in no way dependent upon a man's philosophical opinions or religious faith, and we presume none of our opponents would wish it to be.

A Church is a body of Christians, or an association of those who profess to believe in Christ, and acknowledge him as the Teacher, Pattern, and Saviour of mankind. In this sense the term Church is sometimes applied to the Catholic or Universal Church; and at other times to a particular body of Christians united in one form of ecclesiastical government, as the Church of England; and at other times it is applied, as by the Congregationalists, to any "Congregation of faithful men"—to any "number of professing Christians, united to each other by their own voluntary consent, having their proper officers, meeting in one place for the observance of religious ordinances, and who are independent of all other control than the authority of Christ expressed in his word."

It will thus be perceived that a state is a political body, while a church is a religious body; that personal connection with a state depends upon residence in a given country under a certain form of government, but personal connection with a church depends upon similarity of thought, feeling, faith, and practice. The two bodies

are therefore distinct in their natures, and should, we maintain, be kept distinct in their organizations. It is therefore surprising to find that so intelligent a writer as E. C. M. should open this debate with the assertion that "The State is not something distinct from the Church; it is the Church as a moral and *religious* confederacy or brotherhood, acting for the good and progress of the people." The Church is a moral and religious confederacy, but clearly the state is not. The assertion by this writer that "*almost every member* of that State is also a member of the Church in its highest and truest sense," is opposed to the facts of the case, as well as to his own previous statements, as S. S. has already pointed out. Bearing then in mind the real distinction between the nature and province of a state and a church, we are prepared to maintain that when a state seeks to "establish," by its patronage and support, any church whatever, it goes beyond its true province, it inflicts an injustice upon, at least, a portion of its people, it does violence to the genius of religion, injures its own interests, and interferes with the highest usefulness of the Church itself.

If our conceptions be correct of the essential difference between the nature and province of civil and ecclesiastical bodies, it follows that it is not the duty of a state to select any body of Christians, set its seal of approval upon their creed and ritual, support their services, and subsidize their ministers. But all this is included in the idea of an established church, for, to use the words of Paley, "The notion of a religious establishment comprehends three things: a clergy, or an order of men secluded from other professions to attend upon the officers of religion; a legal provision for the maintenance of the clergy; and the confining of that provision to the teachers of a particular sect of Christianity."

But it will be regarded by those who hold the views set forth by C. R., that although it may not be right for the State to establish *any* sect it may wish to favour, it is right for it to establish a Church, "whose principles are in accordance with the Word of God;" and further, that "the State has a right to give its power and influence to the maintenance of the cause of Christ." But who are to be judges of what is in accordance with the word of God, and what is the cause of Christ? C. R. anticipates the answer when he declares that "it is competent for it (the State) to distinguish between truth and falsehood," although this body (the State), consists of believers and unbelievers, Jews, Catholics, Mor-

mons, and the adherents of the thousand and one "different forms of dissent!" But C. R., maintains that "Statesmen *ought* to be men of religion?" But are they such men, or are they likely to be, when the body that appoints them consists of such heterogeneous elements? And further, would C. R. make a religious character a condition of citizenship, and the honours and duties of official positions in the State? We believe that he will feel that it is too late in the day for such a suggestion to be entertained for a moment. The world has seen enough of persecution for conscience sake. There are at the present time in the House of Commons, Catholics, Jews, Unitarians, Baptists, Independents, unbelievers of various classes, &c., and C. R. is willing to leave to this body to decide what is in accordance with the Word of God, and appertains to "the cause of Christ!"

Another class of our opponents assert that it is the duty of the State to establish the Church to which the majority of the people belong. These persons do not wish to remit to the State the task of deciding what is truth, but simply what is generally believed, no matter whether it be true or not. On their principles the government of a pagan country ought to establish paganism; the government of a Mahometan country ought to establish Mahometanism; the government of a Roman Catholic country ought to establish Roman Catholicism, and so on. And further, on these principles when the majority of a people change their religious opinions, the former establishment ought to be destroyed and another set up in its stead. On this subject our present premier, the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, remarks:—

"As long as the Church at large, or the Church within the limits of the nation, is substantially one, I do not see why the religious care of the subject, through a body properly constituted for the purpose, should cease to be a function of State, with the whole action and life of which it has, throughout Europe, been so long and so closely associated. But when, either by some revolution of institutions from their summit to their base, or by a silent and surer process, analogous to that which incessantly removes and replaces the constituent parts of the human body, the State has come to be the organ of the deliberate and ascertained will of the community, expressed through legal channels—then the inculcation of a religion can no longer rest, in full or permanent force, upon its authority. When, in addition to this, the community

itself is split and severed into opinions and communions, which, whatever their occurrence in the basis of Christian belief, are hostile in regard to the point at issue, so that what was meant for the nation dwindles into the private estate, as it were, of a comparative handful, the attempt to maintain an Established Church becomes an error fatal to the peace ; dangerous, perhaps, even to the life of civil society."

* * * * *

"An Establishment that neither does, nor has her hope of doing, work, except for a few, and those few the portion of the community whose claim to public aid is the smallest of all ; an Establishment severed from the mass of the people by an impassable gulf, and by a wall of brass ; an Establishment whose good offices, could she offer them, would be intercepted by a long unbroken chain of painful and shameful recollections ; an Establishment leaning for support upon the extraneous aid of a State, which becomes discredited with the people by the very act of lending it—such an Establishment will do well for its own sake, and for the sake of its creed, to divest itself, as soon as may be, of gauds and trappings, and to commence a new career in which, renouncing at once the credit and the discredit of the civil sanction, it shall seek its strength from within, and put a fearless trust in the message that it bears."

In connection with this part of the subject, it will perhaps be well to inquire what proportion the members of the Established Church of this country bear to other bodies of Christians and to the population at large, for very conflicting statements on this subject have been made in the course of this debate. A. K. D., in his opening paper, speaks of the Established Churches of England and Scotland as representing only "a small proportion of the entire population ;" while B. W. C. boldly asserts that "This is untrue, as they (the followers of the Church) form seventy per cent. of the whole population." What are the facts of the case ? The following figures will speak for themselves :—

"When the census of religious worship was taken in 1851, it was found that 52 per cent. only, of the number of persons attending religious services on the census Sunday, were estimated to be present at the services of the Established Church. At the Established Church services the number was 3,773,474, and at Nonconformist services the number was 3,487,558, the total being 7,261,032. In Wales nearly nine-tenths of the people were found

to be Dissenters ; while in Scotland nearly two-thirds of the nation rejected the services of the Presbyterian Establishment of that country. What the exact numbers may be at the present time it is impossible to say, but it may be assumed, with safety, that if any change of proportion has taken place during the last nineteen years, it has been in favour of the Dissenters.

“ At the Census of 1861 the population was as follows :— England and Wales, 20,061,725 ; Scotland, 3,061,117. If the proportion established in 1851 remained the same in 1861, and extended to the whole population, there would be in England and Wales :— Adherents of the Established Church, 10,432,097 : Non-adherents, 9,629,628.

“ If this calculation were extended to Scotland, the net result would be that the non-adherents of the Established Churches of the two countries would be found to be in a majority of more than a million persons. In England and Wales alone the Established Church, as is shown, is probably in an actual but bare majority. The Episcopalian Church in England and Wales is theoretically established for the benefit of the people as a whole, but only a fraction of the people take advantage of the public religious services which she provides. Out of a total population in 1851 of more than twenty millions, not three and three-quarter millions were to be found within the walls of the churches. That is to say, the Established Church actually ministered to only *eighteen per cent.* of the population.”

It is courteous to suppose that R. W. C. was ignorant of these facts, or he would not have made the statement we have referred to.

Whatever may be the exact proportion between the adherents and non-adherents of our Established Church, we maintain that by the simple fact of its establishment an injustice is done to a considerable number of the inhabitants of this country. What right has the Government to compel any number of its subjects to support a religious system which they believe to be erroneous in its principles and pernicious in its practice? For years this was done by means of Church-rates, Easter Dues, &c., and although these imposts have been happily abolished, tithes are still enforced, and the conscientious dissenter who refuses to pay them is liable to have his goods distrained and disposed of at a fearful sacrifice and under most humiliating circumstances. Further, the so-called Church of England is allowed the possession of an enormous amount

of national property, the annual value of which has been estimated of upwards of ten millions sterling! In these facts we have no difficulty in finding a serious violation of the first principles of common justice. Very forcibly has it been said:—

“To take by force a man’s property to support a religious system he does not believe in, to exclude him from an office in the State for which he is well qualified, only because his religious creed differs from that which is fashionable, to enrich one class of religious teachers at the expense of those who disapprove of them, is surely oppressive and unjust, and ought not to be possible in a Christian land.”

If these things be so, we need not attempt to show that the establishment of any form of religion by the State is injurious to its own true interests, and if any proof were necessary the present agitated condition of society on ecclesiastical questions would readily supply it.

Further, the establishment of a church is unnecessary to the prosperity of real Christianity, and is a violation of its true genius. The Lord Jesus Christ, when upon earth, sought not the aid of rulers and governors, but he boldly declared that his “kingdom was not of this world,” and he sought the extension of that kingdom only by means of the power of truth and the force of love. Nor were his efforts in vain. The progress, too, of Christianity in apostolic times was made not only without the aid of the civil power, but in direct opposition to it. If therefore we hold the same truths as the Apostles did, and if our hearts and lives are ruled by the same high motives that theirs were, we need not fear that like results will not follow our faithful efforts and earnest prayers. “Away then,” to use the words of Mr. Gladstone, “with the servile doctrine that religion cannot live but by the aid of parliaments. The security of religion lies first in the providence of God and the promise of Christ; next in the religious character, and strong sentiment of personal duty and responsibility, so deeply graven in this country and its people.”

Space forbids us to pursue this subject as we could wish, but we cannot conclude without bringing forward in support of our theory one illustration from actual experience, and it shall be given in the words of one who has witnessed the effects of disestablishment in his own country. Dr. Dexter, of Boston, in speaking recently on

the Established-Church principle in New England, and its ultimate overthrow, said :—

“As to the effect of the separation of Church and State on the community, there was no doubt in his mind that it had a good effect. In the first place, the moment restraint was taken off religion was looked at from a different standpoint. In the next place, personal responsibility had been developed very strongly, which was a great advantage in the little towns of New England and the West. People learned to love that for which they had sacrificed something, and it was human nature that it should be so. The change had brightened religion, and not dulled it as many expected, and a new and vital power had manifested itself all through the towns and churches. Religion had been immensely quickened. This was perhaps due, to some extent, to Sabbath schools and young men's Christian societies, and such agencies ; but in no sense whatever could there be seen any loss to religion from the loss of its connection with the State in America. There was no comparison to be made between the aggressive power of the voluntary Churches and that of the old system. The strength of the old system was to sit still ; it had no power to go out and be aggressive.”

This witness we believe to be true and trustworthy, and therefore we rejoice in the the belief that—

“As Christianity was promulgated and prevailed in the world without any aid from the civil power, it will, when it shall have recovered its pristine purity and its pristine vigour, entirely disengage itself from such an unnatural alliance as it is at present fettered with, and our posterity will even look back with astonishment at the infatuation of their ancestors, in imagining that things so wholly different from each other as Christianity and Civil Power, had any natural connection.”

J. M. S.

The Essayist.

PRIDE'S PURGE AND ITS PRECURSORS : AN HISTORICAL STUDY.

PART III.

THE remainder of the Tuesday was passed in deliberation by the army leaders and the minority in the House of Commons; and they resolved to exclude the more prominent Presbyterians, by force, if need be. Even in this determination they showed that loyalty to law which is a marked feature of the English characters, or they had matters so completely in their own hands, that nothing would have been easier than the sweeping aside of the whole Parliament and the establishment of a military dictatorship. They wished to proceed, as far as possible, in a constitutional way; and as a proportion of the members, sufficient to form a house, held the same opinions as did the army, they decided that they would maintain the appearance of carrying out the changes contemplated, and above all, the impending trial of the King, by a proceeding in Parliament. The Presbyterians were regarded as men who had receded from the high principles for which the war was at first commenced against the monarch, and they had attempted to treat with him as if he was in a similar position to what he was when the conflict began.

Early in the morning, we find that Skippon, who held command of the London forces under the Parliament, has, rather treacherously perhaps, withdrawn the City trainbands which had heretofore guarded the Houses and their vicinity. Two regiments, one of horse one of foot, are placed in Palace Yard, and the six persons who were placed in charge of the business, posted themselves near the entrance leading to the House of Commons. Then, to relate it in the impressive words of Carlyle,—“Colonel Pride stands watchful there, and in his hand is a written list of names, names of the chief among the hundred and twenty-nine; and at his side is

Lord Grey, of Groby, who, as this member after that comes up, whispers or beckons, 'He is one of them, he cannot enter;' and Pride gives the word, 'To the Queen's Court!' and member after member is marched thither, forty-one of them this day; and kept there in a state bordering on rabidity, asking, 'By what law?' and ever again, 'By what law?' Is there a colour or faintest shadow of law to be found in any of the birks, yearbooks, rolls of Parliament, Bractons, Fletas, Cokes upon Lyttleton for this? Hugh Peters visits them; has little comfort, no light as to the law, confesses,—'It is by the law of necessity, truly by the power of the sword.'"

A sufficient number of the Presbyterian party succeeded in entering the House to enable them to make resistance there to the measures taken by the Independents. The House resolved not to proceed with any business until the imprisoned members took their places. An imperative message was sent out to Colonel Pride, requiring him to liberate those members he had unlawfully apprehended. The Colonel made an evasive reply in the negative. Then the members appointed a committee, and this was desired to wait upon the general, and complain to him about the conduct of the soldiers. On various pretexts the committee was refused access to the General and to the other principal officers, and had at last to return frustrated.

During the day a petition was presented to the Commons by certain of the officers, demanding that the excluded members should be formally declared by the House to be incapable of sitting there any longer, on account of the course they had pursued with regard to the King and the army. Meanwhile, others amongst the Presbyterians, finding that the crisis had come, and that their cause was for the present hopeless, began to withdraw from the House; but some very determined members of that party still remained, and opposed the proceedings of the Independents. Colonel Pride kept his prisoners in a sort of loose confinement, and they were removed from from one place to another throughout that day, and, finally, the most of them, sent to Mr. Duke's tavern to pass the night.

As yet the Independents had not sufficiently succeeded in ousting their Presbyterian opponents, and the leaders in the army had to resort to the same expedient on the Thursday. Others of the party were arrested, and others, without waiting to be arrested, took

alarm, and withdrew. The number thus excluded from the House is variously estimated, ranging say from a hundred to a hundred and fifty. Very few of these were sent to the Tower, the majority were, after a short confinement, either set free to go whither they would or sent home to their respective counties. On this day the House of Commons passed a special vote of thanks to General Cromwell; and a small remnant of the Presbyterians, who had entered the House, made a last attempt to stem the tide. When it was moved that the army proposals be taken into consideration, they opposed the resolution, and divided the House upon it. They were beaten by fifty votes to twenty-eight; and after the result was announced, the minority arose and withdrew, leaving the field to their opponents, since it was clear that farther resistance could effect nothing.

This division reveals a curious fact; though the Independent party in the Commons amounted to a hundred or more, only about half of these had courage or determination enough to go to the extreme length with the army, in the affair of the King's trial, and the change of government (temporarily) to a kind of republic. For some months the attendance of members does not seem to have hardly ever reached sixty; but by and bye some twenty or so of the absentees were admitted, on their signing an acknowledgment of what had been done during their absence. Sir Harry Vane, the younger, one of the most remarkable men amongst the Independents, was one of those who disapproved of the King's execution.

The minority thus retained in the House of Commons did not at first contemplate a long stay there. The General, in the name of the army, presented to the House what was called an "Agreement of the People," in which, amongst other things, it was stipulated that it should dissolve itself, and make way for a free Parliament at the end of April, 1649. But circumstances occurred which considerably prolonged the life of this fragment of a Parliament, which came to be derisively called "the Rump." How it was at last swept out by the iron hand of the Protector is a story well-known and noteworthy, but which must not be recounted here.

J. R. S. C.

OUR MAGAZINE LITERATURE.

OUR modern newspaper press, take it altogether, may be considered to be in advance of the like literature which was current thirty or forty years ago. In some respects its style has not improved, certainly ; inelegant Americanism, and roughly transplanted French and German idioms have lowered the tone of the leading articles of some newspapers, and the extra haste with which so much has to be written on fugitive topics leads to various faults. Still, on the whole, the newspaper as we now find it is about as good as we can expect it to be in a utilitarian age ; it is full of detail, generally accurate, and not lacking in life and energy. What it might become in an age less pervaded by the spirit of business, and with more time to spare for those embellishments which give a finish to literary compositions, is another thing. For the present we have therefore no special reason to be dissatisfied with our current newspapers ; they are an efflorescence from the passing hour, and suit our requirements well enough, though posterity may think lightly of the residuum which survives the crucible of time.

But what judgment shall we pronounce upon another class of literature, of which this era yields an abundant crop, and which, in its influence upon the minds and hearts of the people, may be said to surpass the sheet in which so many ephemeral events are chronicled, read about, and forgotten ?

The magazine is an implement of high importance, capable, in an age so much given to reading, of exerting a mighty force, since it addresses itself to multitudes who have not time, inclination, or capacity for entering to any extent upon the world of books. And in this respect, also, magazines differ markedly from newspapers ; no one, save for reference, turns up a newspaper even of a month's age, while magazines are frequently collected into volumes, and establish themselves in the library as a marked feature of its contents. Another circumstance which has done and is doing, much towards the wider diffusion of magazine literature, is the facility with which, through lending libraries, clubs, and book societies, such periodicals can be read without purchasing them. And though it is quite true that to some persons what is said or asserted in a magazine is of comparatively little weight as set against book matter, yet it is as true that, with many others, deeper effects are produced by magazine than by book literature, from the fact that a magazine often influences an individual unconsciously to himself, and acts upon his mind at a moment when it is in a receptive state, and with the critical faculty dormant or only slightly aroused.

So extensive is our magazine literature at this time that we are accustomed to break it up into sections. We have what we call "high-class" magazines, and we have others, pretty numerous, alas! which, whether we designate them so or not, are "low-class" enough! Price, size, quality of paper and type are open to endless variation, but passing by these differences, we find some religious, some partly religious, partly secular, others entirely secular; we have magazines intended for general diffusion, and those intended for a town or neighbourhood; there are magazines of various trades, or other organizations of a friendly or necessary sort; and again, magazines chiefly dedicated to certain sciences and pursuits. Some of these are so aberrant as scarcely to deserve to be entitled "magazines" at all, or so sober and matter-of-fact that they may with more propriety be reckoned as "journals," or "chronicles," rather than magazines. For what is the ideal of a magazine? Its contents should contain an abundant variety, ranging from "grave to gay, from lively to severe;" the present and the past should be laid under contribution; and imagination should have its due scope, while graver and historical details are not neglected. A kind of repertory, in fact, a storehouse of reading, containing compositions which would suit different and very diverse tastes, though there ought to be pervading the whole a species of harmony, so that in passing from one article to another there should be no strong or unpleasant revulsion of feeling. The idea that such a performance in literature was, as it were, a storehouse or treasury, led to the application thereto of a name applied to a place where provisions or necessary articles were stored up, kept in a repository, whence they were readily available for the use of men, and yet in a position of security. By one of those changes which come over a word, "magazine," as designating a place, has become almost restricted to one devoted either to the manufacture of warlike materials, or to the storing of them. May this not be also, in a qualified sense, only too true of our modern printed magazine, that too universally it will be found ministering harm rather than nutriment, supplying material which stirs up war amongst the passions of man, and wounds the susceptible spiritual nature, instead of giving it strength and a wholesome stimulus? For we could easily pick out a score of our magazines, magazines too in high repute, and saleable, which are not at all more likely to help to usher in the Golden Age than are cartridges and cannon-balls! Utility is not at present the prominent idea which serves as the guiding-star to the bulk of contributors, editors, and publishers connected with our magazines.

In a paper which does not pretend to go into the subject at all exhaustively, it would obviously be unadvisable to single out by name any one or more, and apply either praise or blame to these, since it would be scarcely possible to form a correct estimate of them, unless their position in our magazine literature could be fully determined by contrasting or comparing them with their competitors or compeers. To one not inclined to be hypercritical or censorious it is far more agreeable to commend than to censure; yet honesty will not, we believe, admit of a favourable judgment being passed upon our magazine literature as a whole. A literature which is to lead a nation onward, to mould a people into nobler forms of life, and supply aspirations and high hopes to the hesitating, the timid, and the erring, must needs be in advance of the age in which it acts its part. Magazines, therefore, which are too truly the mere representatives of the age which has developed them, may seem to satisfy the exigencies of the hour, yet fail to fulfil what should be their purpose, and it is a wonder if they pass away without doing actual mischief.

The reader who has accompanied us thus far will now be prepared to receive our assertion that, looking at modern magazines with no jaundiced eye, it is sufficiently obvious to a capable critic that, viewing them as a whole, we cannot regard them as adequate agencies, considering how very largely their sphere has widened in these recent decades. There are many conspicuous, nay, illustrious exceptions, but the revolution which has swept over our literature, and has made, not patrons and publishers, but the million-voiced and ever-esurient public the real stay of writers for the press, has not failed to operate injuriously upon current magazine literature. To write so as to please the public taste has become a seeming necessity to the great host of contributors to magazines, and [when that public taste becomes depraved, there are few indeed who will set themselves to the Quixotic enterprise of endeavouring to change it. Far more agreeable, as well as profitable, is it to furnish a literary aliment which just suits that taste, false though it be; and, indeed, a considerable number of authors are not satisfied to run alongside the public in their race after the morbid and extravagant in literature, but foreseeing whither the popular 'movement tends, they rush ahead of it, and lead the people still farther astray. That this has been so with what is called the sensational fiction of our day is unquestionable, and the only hope which remains to us is, that from the well-known phenomenon of reaction readers will ultimately be first sated and then disgusted with the luxurious and highly flavoured fare which is served up to them in the pages of those

magazines which have the popularity of the hour. The responsibilities resting upon those who pander to a diseased appetite in literature are very great, and it appears to us that the veriest Grub-street scribe who in the last century concocted lampoons and scurrilous pamphlets is quite as good (or as bad) a man as the sensational novelist, whose pen rolls him off more guineas in a month than the petty scribbler could raise in a year by harder work. But one is flattered and favoured by the *élite* of society, only too often, and the other—*he*, why, his career ended mostly in a pauper's funeral and a nameless grave. But some will urge, in defence of the course pursued by modern novel-writers in magazines and elsewhere, that authors must live; and as the public seek what is hurtful or worthless, and will be supplied somehow, one person may as well be the medium of communication as another. This, however, suggests to us the noted retort of Lord Chesterfield, who, when censuring another writer for a composition which was notably feeble, added an observation to the effect that this individual had better not handle the pen at all. "But I must live," exclaimed the criticised person, in an injured tone. "I do not see the necessity of that," was the reply. A too cutting rebuke, it may be, and yet if living be a necessity, writing is certainly not. An author had better renounce his profession, at least in so far as publishing his thoughts goes, and betake himself to the most menial of employments, nay, even beg of his friends, if he cannot work, than cast off all recollections of the pure, the noble, and the good, and give himself up to the weaving of a fabric which may be compared to the fatal gift of Nessus, and which will cling about him, to his horror, at the most dread crisis of his life, poisoned with the sorrows and maledictions of those who, though culpable in having surrendered their minds to the vile and debasing in literature, will not cease to curse the instrument which helped to betray them.

We have dwelt on this with emphasis, because the position which fiction occupies in our modern magazine literature is startling to contemplate; for though the tide of innovation has flowed in by waves which have had their rebounds, these have been both slight and ineffective; and the magazines most in favour may now be said, on the whole, to be nothing but contrivances for the circulation of tales in weekly or monthly portions; these tales being kept in countenance by an addendum of other matter, which is vulgarly denominated "padding;" and that not one reader in ten ever troubles to glance at this may be safely affirmed. In truth, so excessive has become the demand for tales, and so superfluous have ordinary compositions of an historical or descriptive cast come

to be, that it is expressly announced by the editors of some magazines that they will look at nothing but fiction; while others, who do not go quite so far, state that they only *pay* for fiction. It has been said, in commerce, that when an article is scarce, and therefore valuable in the market, it deteriorates, because its adulteration is profitable: In literature, especially of the imaginative sort, the case is just the reverse when there is a plethora, the quality becomes inferior; for owing to the difficulty of competing with those who can improvise rapidly, those whose inventive powers are not prolific resort to various expedients in order to turn out the quantity of literary matter which is required in a limited time. Therefore we find that, in addition to defects of a moral character which attach to the stories to be found in not a few current magazines, there are numerous faults of style which are avoidable, and due to haste or carelessness. A host of modern novels and novellette, also, are only *réchauffés* of those which have had their run in other days, the incidents being transposed, or differently draped.

Indeed, it is surprising—and yet again not surprising—how much of old literary matter of every description is dished up by the ingenious and the unscrupulous, and presented for editorial inspection; so that the office of an editor, as years go on, is rendered more and more arduous, through the need there is of carefully ascertaining, not the merits of a composition merely, but also its originality. With all caution mishaps must sometimes occur, and palpable repetitions get into print: fortunately, however, the bulk of readers, especially readers of magazines, have short memories.

The predominance of fiction in most modern magazines, and the peculiarities of that species or form of it which is largely approved, affects injuriously both the matter and manner of the portion which is assigned to other prose compositions. With a view to make these readable, and not too great a contrast to the sensational tale, the essay, the biographical or historical sketch, is worked up in as exciting and startling a manner as possible; the object being, very frequently, not to say a thing in the best and clearest way, with such elegance or rhetorical adornment as is admissible and practicable, but to produce an impression of a pleasurable nature on the reader's mind. The author throughout is thinking not so much of his subject as of himself, and of those who are to read or criticise what he writes. Compare the prose and verse contents of such a periodical as the *Spirit and Manners of the Age*, which had a respectable circulation amongst families in the days of our grandfathers, and a dozen of modern highly estimated magazines, and in purity and correctness of style and diction the former will be

found superior; though of course here and there amongst the pages of the latter, papers or passages may be picked out of manifest superiority to the literature of the past.

If modern editors of magazines were to devote themselves to the work of selecting and revising, with a conviction that the prevailing taste in literature is a bad one, and needs to be transmuted, they might achieve much, for it is through them, as well as through public opinion, that a revolution must be wrought.

J. R. S. C.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS.

989. What was the number of inhabitants universally last Census?—J. W.

990. What date did printing first spring into existence?—P. C.

991. Which grammar do you consider the simplest and most comprehensive, especially for writing or being able to write?—W. R.

992. I should be glad if any of the contributors to this magazine would give me the number of newspapers published in Great Britain and Ireland, classified as to their *issue*, i.e., daily or weekly *Politics*, and *Religious Opinions*.—W. L. S.

ANSWER.

983. Concerning the Royal Historical Society, apply to the Secretary, Rev. Dr. Rogers, Snowdown Villa, Liwesham, S.E., who will give you ever information.

W. H. R.

"CRAMMING."—The present generation has furnished not a very large amount of original thinkers, but an immense number of young men who by the aid of cram, achieve the distinction of getting very high numbers indeed at the Chinese method of testing capacity by the memory, of which Mr. Lowe, Mr. Forster, and the present Government seem so fond. They resemble, in one instance at least—that of his capacity for the reception of facts—the celebrated Mr. Toots, the head boy of Dr. Blimber's academy, who has been immortalized by Dickens. Poor Toots, who bloomed early, and had by cram been enabled to answer any given set of questions and to work out any papers at an "exam.," bloomed at last into a feeble but good-natured nonentity, and the truth of the sketch may be seen if we choose to look around us.—*Morning Post*.

The Reviewer.

The Truth in its own Light ; or Christianity shown from itself to be a Divine Revelation to Man. By Rev. JOHN COOPER. Melbourne: George Robertson. London: Strahan.

THIS book comes to us with special claims to notice. It is a product of the Victorian dominion in Australia as to authorship, printing, and publication. To all the parties concerned it does credit. Its literary merits are those, however, which fall more directly under our consideration ; or rather, the thoughtfulness of the product of our friend on the insular continent—who is, though known to us only by good report, earned by good works, evidently a man of mark—claims our attention.

The book before us is a thoroughly logical and soundly metaphysical, as well as a sternly philosophic testing of the internal evidences of Christianity, as being a sufficient reason for the external and historic phenomena of Christianity, on the principle that if a sufficient cause and one only can be pointed out as accounting wholly for any phenomenon or series of phenomena, that may and indeed must be regarded also as the efficient cause. The author has studied the Hamiltonian metaphysic and the Whatelyan logic with good effect ; and while using the ladder of logic to scale the heights of metaphysic, never loses sight of common sense, or of his own purpose in making the ascent. He rises that he may see farther, and sweeps the horizon of vision with a cool head and a clear eye, with an honest purpose and an earnest spirit ; and he never forgets that theological heights must be reached by safe logical steps.

In a former work, entitled "The Science of Spiritual Life," the author endeavoured to prove that the prevailing incompatibility of temper between evangelicism and intellectuality, which seemed to be tending towards a divorce, proceeds in fact from a want of community of sentiment rather than a diversity of interest. He pleads for a reconsideration of their position as certain to lead to a wise reconciliation. The fruits of his meditation and experience

are given in lucid order, with great frankness and power, and with a large amount of originality of argument and profundity of thought. As a philosophy of personal Christianity it is bold, consistent, and instructive. That work went to show that the phenomena of the Christian life are as real and true, as fully borne witness to by experience, as the phenomena of health, sight, or digestion—that spiritual life is not less real than bodily life. This book aims to prove that Christianity, as the agency for the imparting, sustaining, and perfecting of the spiritual life of humanity, is as real as gravitation or electricity, if not much more so, as being a more direct and personal issue from God. In its own way it is a praiseworthy addition to the evidences of Christianity. We quote the main portion of those fifteen theses which he lays down as sufficient to prove the divine origin and power of Christianity and the divinity of Jesus. Those who read these and desire to peruse the grounds on which they are maintained should procure this work and study it; they will find it fresh, powerful, readable, and reflective.

"Christianity is a fact the existence of which cannot be disputed. There is such a thing among men as the Christian Church. Christian edifices, Christian office-bearers, Christian doctrines, Christian influence, are facts of every-day observation and experience. Now whence these? How or by what means did they spring into existence? Let those who, on the principle of unbelief, think they can, reply. The position and influence of the Church are facts of history, and cannot be gainsayed; and they must be accounted for as other well-known facts of history are. The extraordinary nature of Christian truth and of Christian work can be satisfactorily accounted for on no other principle than the divine nature of Jesus Christ. The enlightened denier, the consistent rejecter and candid opposer of the divine origin and supernatural character of Christianity is bound by every principle of enlightened reason to give a satisfactory explanation of the following facts:—

"I. That for centuries before the appearance of Christ writings existed which predicted the coming of an incarnate Saviour of men.

"II. That all ancient predictions regarding the coming of the Messiah centre in and find their fulfilment in Jesus Christ; predictions extending over (1) a period of thousands of years, (2) given at various times, (3) in different forms, and (4) by men of different characters and circumstances; predictions which advance into clearer and clearer light from (a) the first obscure announcement in Paradise to (b) the full and explicit statements of Isaiah; predictions (I.) in words, (II.) in figurative ceremony and rite, (III.) in national institutions; predictions of (i.) the time and place of

birth, of (ii.) the nature and character, (iii.) the circumstances and object of the life and death of the predicted One.

"III. That the most stupendous works ever done on earth were performed by Christ. . . . His miracles are (i.) too divine in their nature; (ii.) too clearly avowed *by Himself*; (iii.) too satisfactorily attested in history to be set aside by the mere denial of the sceptic, or to be explained away by the mere assertion that they were 'the charlatan exhibitions of an artful deception.'

"IV. That He, untutored in the halls of science and the schools of learning, could come forth from His workshop, and give utterance to the most profound and enlightened and comprehensive wisdom ever known on earth; and regarding the theories which had occupied the highest genius and talent of the world, but which baffled their every effort to penetrate, could speak with such ease, fulness, and clearness as proves that they were the truths in which He lived.

"V. That He, born and reared among the most degraded and bigoted of the race, lived the most dignified, catholic, and only innocent life ever known on the earth; who could forgive the sins of others, call upon all men to repent and believe on Himself for the forgiveness of their sins; yet never Himself confessed sin, but claimed to be blameless in the sight of God and man, and [was] by both acknowledged to be so.

"VI. That He alone introduced among men the new and only principle of elevating life for a fallen race—the principle of self-sacrifice for the glory of God and the good of men; a principle which, until He announced and exemplified it, was utterly unknown among men.

"VII. That He is the only philanthropist who earnestly and perseveringly set Himself to the work of elevating the social condition of the race; in displaying a deep sympathy for and associating Himself with the poor, the degraded, the outcast of society, raised them to pure and beneficent life; and that the profound wisdom and omnipotence of this method of reclaiming man and raising society is only now, in this nineteenth century of the Christian era, beginning to be duly appreciated.

"VIII. That He is the only generous man who wholly and perseveringly devoted Himself to the spiritual, physical, and social well-being of men, so as to bestow upon them the greatest benefits ever received by the suffering, sick, and dying of the race; and who, by those He had benefited in every possible manner, was put to a cruel and ignominious death, and mocked and derided by them in the agonies of His dying.

"IX. That He is the only One who in such unparalleled circumstances exhibited a dignified, sublime, divine spirit; fervently praying for the forgiveness of His murderous foes while they were in the very act of heaping upon Him all the insult, shame, and agonies in their power.

"X. That His enemies who took possession of His body, and guarded it in a powerful and careful manner, were unable to produce it when they strove by every possible method in their power to deny the fact and refute the story of His resurrection. To have brought forward His body would have been the most honest, the simplest, and most satisfactory refutation they could have given; and the fact that they were never able to do so only shows, in a clear light, the absurdity of the method they concocted to attempt to account for the absence of His body.

"XI. That He did rise from the dead is proved by the most satisfactory evidence possible, viz.—(1) not only the inability of those who took possession of His body, and who guarded it, as stated above, to produce it; but also (2) by the fact that His disciples testified to the reality of His resurrection by dying in defence of their testimony.

"XII. That by appearing as the risen One to His most intelligent, bitter, and determined enemy, He converted him into the most enlightened, ardent, and devoted friend. That a man of the learning, clear judgment, and bitter hatred of Saul could only have been converted by such a vision as he declares he saw.

"XIII. That Christianity had spread so rapidly among the nations, that in less than forty years from its first announcement by Himself, his doctrine not only filled Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, and the provinces of the Roman empire, but the imperial city itself, to such an extent that "vast multitudes" of disciples in Rome of both sexes, of all ranks in society, and all ages in life, were ready to brave death in its most appalling forms rather than deny or blaspheme His name.

"XIV. That Christianity has advanced for upwards of eighteen centuries in the face of the most numerous, formidable, and subtle oppositions that pagan and infidel ingenuity could invent to retard her progress and overthrow her standing.

"XV. That Christianity is still advancing in her progress, increasing in her influence, and is at this hour exerting such a power in the earth as throws every other religious power and influence into the shade.

"These are facts in connection with Christianity which cannot be disputed; and any one of them taken by itself, much more the cumulative force of them all, is incapable of a satisfactory explanation except on the admission of the fact of the essential divinity of Jesus Christ, and the supernatural origin of Christianity."

In the five sections into which the work is divided the writer proceeds to consider, defend, and enforce these propositions with skill, earnestness, and argumentative power. Through all the subtilty of his argumentation, however, there glows a frank manliness and a steady considerate charity which very much enhance

the worth of the treatise. We have been induced to form a very high estimate of the author's intellectual force and literary capacity, his religious spirit and his philosophical dispassionateness, and we hope for his book appreciation and success.

The Best of all Good Company:—A Day with Lord Lytton. A Day with Disraeli. Edited by WM. BLANCHARD JERROLD. London: Houlston and Sons.

Good books are "the best of all good company;" for in them we find the author almost always at his best—not ailing, or dull, or averse to our taking him into the confidence of our souls. Lord Lytton has been now for more than half a century a writer of books as well as a maker of history. He has been prolific in poetry, novels, criticism, political suggestion, and literary counsel; and in most of his books there are subtle thoughts and fine speculations, curious observations and strange remarks, which lurk in the eddies of the stream of passion or event which he narrates. Mr. Jerrold supplies in this *brochure* a pleasing biography of Edward George Lytton Bulwer, Lord Lytton, as a literary man and a politician, and follows that up with choice specimens of the productions of his genius, the whole forming a valuable possession. It includes too a fac-simile of Lytton's caligraphy. We quote an interesting passage from the Memoir on Bulwer at the Cambridge "Union:"—

"At Cambridge Bulwer was fortunate in his friends and associates; or perhaps it is nearer justice to say he chose the best as most congenial to his fine spirit and tastes. There was then flourishing, it should be observed, at the university on the banks of the Cam the once famed debating society known as the Union. It had about this period attained the height of its influence and celebrity. Macaulay, the future baron and historian, together with Charles Austin, afterwards the eminent Queen's counsel, had but very recently taken their departure, leaving behind them, among their fellows at the Union, a high repute for eloquence and scholarship. Contemporaneously with Bulwer Lytton, as among the principal speakers of the Society, were Winthrop Praed, editor of the *Edonian*, and at that time also a brilliant university prizeman; the Right Hon. Charles Villiers, recently Judge Advocate-General under Lord Palmerston's Government, (and more recently still shamefully neglected under Mr. Gladstone's); another Right Honourable, the late lamented Charles Buller; Sir Alexander Cockburn, now Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas; together with John Stirling, son of the famous thunderer of the *Times*, afterwards the

here of Mr. Carlyle's biography; not forgetting, either, another of the *alumni*, Hawkins, who a few years later, on the introduction of the Reform Bill, acquired for himself a momentary distinction by delivering the most remarkable speech in the whole of those renowned discussions.

"Principally passing his time among these congenial associates, who then constituted indeed the most gifted *coterie* in the university, Bulwer Lytton acquired his first taste for public life, his earliest relish for politics. Although speaking but rarely at the Union, he nevertheless won for himself there no inconsiderable reputation. Distinguishing himself chiefly for the soundness and the amplitude of his historical information, and rendering himself especially noticeable among such youthful debaters by views remarkable for their practical character—rather perhaps, it should be said, for their precocious moderation—he was unanimously chosen by that debating society as its president. It is peculiarly interesting, moreover, to remark at this early stage of his career that the political opinions then professed by the Cabinet Minister of the hereafter appear to have been maintained consistently, but with very trifling modifications, throughout the whole of his life—opinions generally sympathizing with, or rather directly espousing the more liberal policy, yet maintaining that constitutions, while they can rarely depart with safety from the principles embalmed in and sanctified by the customs and habits of a people, can no more be imported wholesale than an acorn can in a single day be expanded into an oak tree. . . . Conspicuous among the more remarkable speeches delivered about this time by the young president of the Union was one arising out of a discussion upon the comparative merits of English and American institutions—a logical and yet impassioned harangue in vindication of monarchy and aristocracy. It attracted considerable notice even beyond the precincts of the university, and obtained for the stripling orator the tempting offer (as soon as he should have attained his majority) of a seat in Parliament—an offer at once declined, however, by him from a characteristic unwillingness to enter first of all as a mere nominee within the walls of the imperial Legislature."

The "Day with Disraeli" gives chapters on "starting-points" full of startling points:—Disraeli's Literary Work, and extracts from "Coningsby," "Contarini Fleming," "Vivian Grey," "Tancred," "Sybil," and "Henrietta Temple." It then supplies a speech on the acquirement of knowledge delivered at the Manchester Athenæum, October, 1844, which many of our readers would be glad to peruse. Not a few also would be glad to have at hand the remarkable speech on the representation of the people, which he delivered in March, 1867, which is here to be found, as well as the Condola-

tory Address delivered on the occasion of the death of the Prince Consort. Two fac-simile pages, letter size, of the romance "Lo-thair" are contained in the number, the cover—but not the title-page, which is a mistake—of which is enriched by a characteristic portrait of the leader of the constitutional party in England.

The handiness of these *brochures* is a great recommendation. They are really usable as half-hours with the authors of whom they treat. We notice in the two numbers under review a considerable improvement in the get-up and printing of the series. We think they should be valued by those who know how to use the selected essences of precious works for purposes of culture and progress.

A History of Philosophy, from Thales to the present Time. By Dr. FRIEDRICH UEBERWEG. Vol. I. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

No one can have read the brief narrative of the life of Dr. Ueberweg supplied for the first time in British literature in this serial in the issue for March, 1872, without admiration of the man and sorrow for his early demise. He was one of the indefatigable workers whom one marvels to find in this era, and to whom even our Hallam and Mill and Grote offer no rivalry in investigative research. The mere reading he accomplished would have occupied the whole lifetime of nearly a dozen of English students; not to reckon the original thought and the controlling interpretativeness which he has employed efficaciously in the production of this notable work—which differs entirely in form, substance, method, and matter from any history of philosophy hitherto accessible to the English reader. It is, in fact, encyclopædiac in its contents, though not in its form; and if there is added to the second volume a full working set of indexes—of topics, books, and thinkers—it will be easy to employ it as a synoptic dictionary of metaphysical thought. Its fulness is only equalled by its faithfulness; and the care, excellence, and mastery shown throughout the whole of this massive work are observable on every page. The volume contains 500 pages; and as the type—which is of three different sorts—is clear though small, there is a most unusual quantity of reading in the tome.

The present volume deals with ancient philosophy and mediæval thought, from the source of reflective meditation till the time of

the great change that came over men's minds at the Reformation. Wherever we have turned in its pages, testing it by the periods and the doctrines to which we had ourselves given the most specific study, we have found it ample and trustworthy, supplying *precis* and criticisms of the most modern expositions and discussions on philosophy. The reading of the book has astonished us at the comprehensive and capacious spirit of the author. How compactly he puts before the eye the very essentials of human speculation, plainly arranged in an order so lucid that one is almost dazzled by the light that leaps from its pages. Having ourselves given somewhat near a quarter of a century to the study of the writings of the sages who have won glory in bygone ages as thinkers and sovereigns of thought, we confess to being constrained to determine that the book must be studied, not read merely. Not a few of the works that have come to us on this topic have, we are sorry to say, been unable to bear perusal, and could scarcely even be skimmed, so diluted were they ; but we have in this book material for considerate digestion. We therefore notice this History now to urge those who have any influence in libraries, reading-rooms, or book societies to get this book introduced. We hope to provide for those who have not an opportunity of reading it themselves an analytical *resume* of its contents at an early period, after we have given it critical study.

Our Private Tutor.

BIBLE PAGES.

SELF-TESTS FOR STUDENTS OF THE BOOKS OF SAMUEL.

THE Books of Samuel contain biographies of Samuel the seer; King Saul, King David, and his son Absalom. It is of great importance to be able to separate the threads of the narrative of these books one from another, so as to bring before the mind at one view, despite of the interwovenness of the story, all the facts connected with each memoir. A diligent and careful perusal of the narrative would soon enable an intelligent reader to arrange in his mind the main facts of each life; and so make him qualified for examination on these, with such associations as would give unity to his replies, because he had attained unity of idea in his studies.

We recommend to those of our readers who are engaged in the study of Scripture to peruse carefully the eight early chapters of 1st Samuel, and then having closed the books endeavour to answer the following queries in reference to Samuel the seer, the answers to which should all be found in them unless otherwise noted. After having written out the replies, compare them with the text of Scripture, mark every error, and after a restudying of the passages try again. Self-examination fits for any examination.

Who were the parents of Samuel? Why did Elkanah go up yearly to Shiloh? Wherefore to Shiloh? (Josh. xviii. 1). Who was high priest? For what did Hannah pray? When she was harshly judged what grace did she display in her reply? (Pet. iii. 4). How did Eli and Hannah part? Where was her residence? What answer was given to her prayer? What name was given to her child? Why was it given? What vow did she make? Did she keep it? In what way? Had she any other children? With whom did Samuel find favour? Compare or contrast the characters of the children of Hannah and of Eli. How had the latter been rebuked? What sort of priest did God promise to raise up? Narrate the circumstances of Samuel's message from God. Ought children to be punished when they do wrong? (Prov. xiii. 24).

What effect had this message on Eli's mind? (Psa. xxxix. 9; Lam. iii. 33, 39). Against whom did Israel go to war? What were the results? What was done with the ark? Had it any beneficial effect? Report the account given to Eli. What happened thereupon? Give an account of the birth and naming of Ichabod. Whither was the ark taken? What happened where it was? What changes of place was it subjected to? In what manner was it restored? Who saw the ark received? What sin was committed by the Bethlehemites? How was that sin punished? How long did the ark remain at Kirjath-jearim? What did Samuel say about the deliverance of Israel? Why were the people assembled in Mizpeh? What made them afraid? What did they say to Samuel? What did he do? What was the result? What memorial of the circumstance was made? Where did Samuel reside? What cities did he visit? Had he any children? What office did they hold? How did they execute their duties? What did the elders of Israel say to Samuel? What did he do? (Psa. lxi. 1, 2). What did God say of their request? Was it granted? What warning did God, through Samuel, give them? Did they desist or persist? Why? (Hos. xiii. 10, 11).

HOW TO PARAPHRASE.

To paraphrase is to change the language of one expression or collection of words, phrases, or sentences, into another in such a way as to retain and explain the ideas the original words express in different words and form; if possible, in simpler diction, and generally in a less closely textured style. The aim of giving exercises in paraphrasing is to discover whether the paraphrast has been able to take in the full meaning of the writer, to see the force and value of the construction and diction employed, and to reproduce the same in an intelligible manner. The best proof that this is the case is given when the very thought of the original production is brought out in plainer terms in an altered form, all its ellipses supplied, and all the implications of the phrasesology made palpable by such expansions as may show that they have been felt and felt the value of. A good paraphrase ought to be not only a sort of explanatory translation of, but a kind of commentary on, the terms engaging attention. It should possess the perfectness of form under its new guise which the original had, and while the matter is

fully and faithfully retained, there should be neither addition to nor diminution of the entire meaning of the passage, except such as necessarily follows from the change of form; as the clay cast of a marble sculpture, or a water-colour copy of an oil painting.

1. Read carefully so as to comprehend thoroughly the whole matter to be paraphrased.

2. Mark especially in the course of reading, the particular points which the subject involves.

3. Notice the distinct averments made in it, and distinguish these from the accidents or peculiarities which are reported as accompanying them.

4. Divide the matter so studied into sections containing specific particulars; consider whether these can be expressed absolutely or must be associated with accessory matter.

5. Settle the order of exposition most suitable for the plan of paraphrase about to be adopted, and according to this order array the separate elements of the matter read.

6. Having given so much regard to the matter, turn now to the language in which it is expressed, and make jottings (if requisite) of the significations of the most important and peculiar words employed in the original.

7. If any of these are technical, and therefore indispensable in the reproduction, see that its meaning has been properly gained, in order that it may be used in such a manner and at such a time as will suit the new form of sentence in which it is to appear.

8. Sentence by sentence, in the order determined upon reproduce the sense of the original in such new form and fresh expression as can be commanded, and repeat the process till neatness and accuracy have been secured.

Suppose it were these words from *Coriolanus*, iii. 1:—

“His nature is too noble for the world.

He would not flatter Neptune for his trident,

Or Jove for his power to thunder.”

We see that we have here (1) an assertion *his nature is noble*, (2) an implication noble natures are not too much in favour with the world, and (3) two illustrations of the nobility of his nature, (a) he would not flatter even Neptune to gain his trident, or (b), Jupiter to acquire his power to thunder. We proceed to note that *nature* signifies disposition or character; *world*, society; *flatter*, fawn upon, or hypocritically ingrate himself with; *Neptune*, the

ruler of the sea ; trident, sceptre, sign of supremacy and might ; *Jove*, the father of gods and man ; *thunder*, ability to frighten, to threaten, to punish, and to destroy ; *noble*, refined, gracious, excellent. Now we may paraphrase the phrase as follows :—

He is of disposition too excellent to suit the meaner character of mere society, [common men would stoop to any baseness to gain their ends] ; he would not condescend to fawn ingratiatingly upon the lord of the ocean, were he even thereby to attain the might by which the waves are ruled, nor would he do unworthy homage to the mightiest of the gods to receive in return the ability to destroy or strike others by the terrors of the power so acquired.

[1834]

HEALTH.—Health is a great matter, both to the possessor of it and to others. On the whole, that humorist in the *Moral Essay* was not so far out, who determined on honouring health only ; and so, instead of humbling himself to the high-born, to the rich and well-dressed, insisted on doffing hat to the healthy : coroneted carriages with pale faces in them passed by as failures, miserable and lamentable ; trucks with ruddy-cheeked strength dragging at them were greeted as successful and venerable. For does not health mean harmony, the synonym of all that is true, justly-ordered, good ? is it not, in some sense, the net-total, as shown by experiment, of whatever worth is in us ? The healthy man is the most meritorious product of Nature, so far as he goes. A healthy body is good ; but a soul in right health,—it is the thing beyond all others to be prayed for ; the blessedest thing this earth receives of Heaven. Without artificial medicament of philosophy, or tight-lacing of creeds (always very questionable), the healthy soul discerns what is good, and adheres to it, and retains it ; discerns what is bad, and spontaneously casts it off. An instinct from Nature itself, like that which guides the wild animals of the forest to their food, shows him what he shall do, what he shall abstain from. The false and foreign will not adhere to him ; cant and all fantastic diseased incrustations are impossible ; as Walker the *Original*, in such eminence of health was *he* for his part, *could* not, by much abstinence from soap-and-water, attain to a dirty face ! This thing thou canst work with and profit by, this thing is substantial and worthy ; that other thing thou canst not work with, it is trivial and inapt : so speaks unerringly the inward monition of the man's whole nature. No need of logic to prove the most argumentative absurdity absurd ; as Goethe says of himself, 'all this ran down from me like water from a man in wax-cloth dress.' Blessed is the healthy nature ; it is the coherent, sweetly co-operative, not incoherent, self-distracting, self-destructive one ! In the harmonious adjustment and play of all the faculties, the just balance of oneself gives a just feeling towards all men and all things. Glad light from within radiates outwards, and enlightens and embellishes.

—*Carlyle*.

Our Collegiate Course.

"SAMSON AGONISTES."

Literary and other Illustrations.

165. Since man [was placed] on earth unparalleled = unexampled.

166. Example, either from *eximio*, I select as a selected one; or from *ex* and *amplo*, as taken from a large quantity.

169. Pitch usually refers to degree of height; here, as if connected with *pit*, it signifies depth.

172. Sphere, wheel; Fortune, chance.

181. Eshtaol, a town in the lowlands of Judah, south-east of Askelon; Zorah, the birthplace of Samson, near the boundary line between Dan and Judah (Judg. xiii. 2, 25).

185. Tumours, swellings, and hence distresses.

186. Festered, rankled and corrupted. South in one of his sermons truly says, "Passion and unkindness may give a wound that shall bleed and smart; but it is treachery that makes it fester."

201. Divulged, revealed, made known.

203. Proverbial, exposed to ridicule. This was a terrible fate, as may be seen from the frequency of its mention either as a threat or a regret. See Deut. xxviii. 37; 1 Kings ix. 7; 2 Chron. vii. 20; Psa. lxi. 2; Ezek. xiv. 8; Hab. ii. 6.

207. Two, wisdom and strength; transverse, into oblique paths.

210. Tax, unjustly censure; disposal, providence, Prov. xvi. 33.

235. Peal, noise.

236. Fort[ress], stronghold. "Speech is silvern, silence is golden."

246. Ambition, canvassing self-praise: *ambitio* is the technical Latin term for going about as a candidate for office, or the attainment of any object by self-commending.

257. Harass, the laying waste of.

263. Trivial weapon, euphemism for "the jawbone of an ass."

268—276. Should probably be read as a Miltonic reflection of his own state and fate.

278. Succoth . . . Penual, Judg. viii. 4—9.

283. Jephthah, Judg. xii.

289. Shibboleth, the word by which the Gileadites distinguished the Ephraimites in their pronunciation of *s* for *sh*; now used figuratively to denote the criterion of a party.

297. Psa. xiv. 1; liii. 1.

301. Edicts, decrees, fore-ordinations.

320. Fallacious, deceiving, not to be trusted.

FAME, LOVE, AND SELF-LOVE.—O son of Adam, great or little, according as thou art lovable, those thou livest with will love thee. Those thou livest *not* with, is it of moment that they have the alphabetic letters of the name engraved on their memory, with some signpost likeness of thee (as like as I to Hercules) appended to them? It is not of moment; in sober truth, not of any moment at all! And yet, behold, there is no soul now whom thou canst love freely,—from *one* soul only art thou always sure of reverence enough; in presence of no soul is it rightly well with thee! How is thy world become desert; and thou for the sake of a little babblement of tongues, art poor, bankrupt, insolvent not in purse, but in heart and mind! "The Golden Calf of self-love," says Jean Paul, "has grown into a burning Phalaris' Bull, to consume its owner and worshipper." Ambition, the desire of shining and outshining, was the beginning of sin in the world.—*Carlyle*.

SPEECH.—A speaker, in so extremely serious a Universe as this of ours, should have something to speak about. In the heart of the speaker there ought to be some kind of gospel-tidings, burning till it be uttered; otherwise it were better for him that he altogether held his peace.

WHAT boots it that a man's creed is the wisest, that his system of principles is the superfinest, if, when set to work, the life of him does nothing but jar, and fret itself into *holes*? We do say, that ill-health, of body or of mind, is *defeat*, is battle (in a good or in a bad cause) with bad success; that health alone is victory. Let all men, if they can manage it, contrive to be healthy!

The Societies' Section.

CANON KINGSLEY ON THE "LIMITS OF EXACT SCIENCE AS APPLIED TO HISTORY."

His Lecture, delivered as an Inaugural at Cambridge, on "The Limits of exact Science as applied to History" is memorable as one of the contributions to an important controversy not yet heard the last of, in which Buckle, Froude, Lecky, Goldwin Smith, and others besides Kingsley, took part. Other lectures due to his elevation to the professoriate are "The Roman and the Teuton." He has also issued "Three Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution on the Ancien Regime." In fiction we may note "Hereward the Wake, the Last of the English," contributed to *Good Words*: "The Water Babies," contributed to *Macmillan*. Of his sermons we have besides to notice, "The Water of Life," "The Gospel of the Pentateuch," "Discipline," "Good News of God," and four splendid discourses on David. We do not just now remember the exact title of his Book of Travel towards Southern Seas, which is exceedingly lively and fresh. But we cannot forget "Town Geology"—which converts the very streets of the cities into science, and realizes the great thinker's idea of sermons in stones. In his own intellectual life Canon Kingsley appears to be able to find "good in everything," and that is the sign of a good healthy spirit.

"There is a subject on which I must beg leave to speak somewhat at length, one very near to my heart and very heavy on my heart, both as a Christian, and, I trust, a patriot. I

hope that my fears are exaggerated. I should thank God to find myself mistaken. But I must say here as elsewhere—in season or out of season—I want the science of health taught more widely, more systematically, than I find it taught anywhere. We talk of our hardy forefathers, and rightly, but they were hardy just as are savages generally hardy, because none but the hardy lived. The population of this island increased slowly, if at all, for centuries. Those terrible laws of natural selection, which issue in the survival of the fittest, cleared off the less fit in every generation, principally by infantile diseases, often by wholesale pestilence, and left, on the whole, those of the strongest constitution to continue a sturdy, valiant, enterprising race. Then came a sudden change. The rapid increase of population during the first half of this century began at a moment when the English stock was specially exhausted at the end of the twenty-five years' French war. At the beginning of that war—and, indeed, ever since the war with Spain in 1739—a war popularly snubbed as the one about Jenkins's ear, but which was, I hold, one of the most just and the most world-important—as it certainly was one of the most popular wars in which this country ever engaged—the English people, from the gentleman who led to the common soldier or sailor who followed him, were, I believe, one of the mightiest and most capable

racés which the world has ever seen, comparable best to the old Roman at his mightiest and most capable period. They created the British Empire; they won for us our colonies, our commerce, the mastery of the seas of the world, but how?

'Their bones are scattered far and wide,

By mount, by stream, by sea.'

Year after year till the final triumph of Waterloo, battle, disease, fatigue had been carrying off our stoutest, ablest, healthiest young men, each of whom, alas! represented a maiden left at home, unmarried or married, most probably to a worse man. The strongest went to the war, and each who fell left a man weaker than himself to continue the race. The middleclasses, being most engaged in peaceful pursuits, suffered less of this decimation of their finest and youngest men, and to that fact I attribute much of their increasing preponderance in electoral, social, and political agencies unto this day. But now, I say it very deliberately and earnestly, it is their turn to beware indeed of all classes, and for this reason: here is, as you may see, the most hideous of all physical curses which man can inflict upon himself, for this simple reason, that it reverses the very laws of nature, and is more cruel even than pestilence. Instead of issuing in the survival of the fittest it issues in the survival of the less fit, and therefore, if protracted, must deteriorate generations yet unborn; and yet a peace, prosperous, civilized, human, such as we, thank God, enjoy now, is fraught with the very same danger. In the first place, tens of thousands—who knows it not?—lead sedentary lives, stooping, asphyxiated, employing as small a fraction of their bodies as their minds; and that such a life must tell upon their offspring—may be for generations to come—what medical man does not know full

well; and all this in dwellings, workshops, mines, and what not?—the very atmosphere of which tends to unhealth and not to health—to drunkenness as a solace under the feeling of unhealth and depressing influences.

“But now—and this is one of the most fearful problems with which modern civilisation has to deal—we interfere with natural selection from conscientious care of life, just as much as war itself does. War kills the most fit to live. We spend vast energies in saving alive those who, looking at them from a merely physical point of view, are most fit to die. Everything which tends to make it more easy to live—every sanitary reform, prevention of pestilence, medical discovery, amelioration of climate, drainage of soil, improvement of dwelling-houses, workhouses, prisons, every reformatory school, every hospital, every cure of drunkenness—every influence, in short, which has, so I am told, increased the average length of life in these islands since the first establishment of life insurance offices 150 years ago by nearly one-third—every influence of this kind, I say saves persons' lives who would otherwise have died; and the great majority of these persons, even in surgical cases and cases of zymotic disease, will be those of the least resisting power—the weaklier thus preserved, to produce in their turn a weaklier progeny. Do I say that we ought not to save them if we can? God forbid! The weakling, the diseased, whether infant or adult, is there on earth, a British citizen, and no more responsible for his weakness than for his existence. Society—that is, in plain English, you and I and our ancestors—are responsible for those; and we must fulfil our duty, and keep them in life, and, if we can, heal, strengthen, develop to the utmost, and make the best of that which 'Fate and

our own deserving' have given us to deal with.

"I do not speak to-night of higher motives still—motives which to every minister of religion must be paramount and awful—I speak merely of physical and social motives such as appeal to the conscience of every man—the instinct which bids every human-hearted man or woman to save life, alleviate pain, give pleasures for all alike, like Him who causes His sun to shine on the evil and on the good, and His rain to fall on the just and on the unjust. But it is palpable that in so doing we must year by year preserve a large percentage of weakly persons, who, marrying freely in their own class, must produce weakly children, and they weaker children still. Must, did I say? There are those who are of opinion—and I, after watching and comparing the histories of many families, indeed, of every one with which I have come in contact for now five-and-thirty years in town and country, can only fear that their opinion is but too well founded on fact—that in the majority of cases, in all classes whatsoever, the children are not equal to their parents, or they again to their grandparents of the beginning of the century; and that this degrading process goes on most surely and rapidly in our large towns, and in proportion to the antiquity of those towns—this and cognate truths have been felt more and more deeply, as the years have rolled on, by students of human society. English society and English human nature are what they have become by the indirect influences of long ages, and we can no more reconstruct the one than we can change the other. We must teach men, therefore, not merely that they ought to be free, but that they are free, whether they know it or not, for good and for evil; and we must do that in this case by teaching them sound practical science—the science

of physiology as applied to health. It is still a question whether science has fully discovered those laws of hereditary health, the disregard of which causes so many marriages disastrous to generations yet unborn.

"But much valuable light has been thrown on this most serious and most important subject during the last few years. Nay, our light, and I thank God for it, is more widely and deeply diffused month by month as to the value of healthy habitations, of personal cleanliness, of pure air, pure water, of various kinds of food, as each tends to make bone, fat, or muscle, provided only that the food be unadulterated; the value of various kinds of clothing, of physical exercise, and of a free and equal development of the brain powers, without undue overstrain in any one direction, 'We don't want our children to be stripped giants and braves, but clean, able, highly educated. Intellect is what we want, and intellect makes money. Intellect rules the world. I would rather see my son a genius than an athlete.' Ladies and gentlemen, and so would I; but what if, for want of learning the laws of nature you got neither genius nor athlete, but only an incapable, unhappy personage? Without healthy bodies you will not, in the long run, have healthy intellects.

"Of moral I say nothing. They are quite independent, as far as my reading and observation go, of either healthiness or unhealthiness; and I thank God sincerely that such is the case, and that, in virtue and piety, He so often chooses the weak things of this world to confound the strong; but wherever you have a population generally weakly, stunted, scrofulous, you will find in them a corresponding type of brain, which cannot be trusted to do good work. I would make men and women discontented with that divine and wholesome discontent at their own

physical frame and at that of their children. I would accustom their eyes to those precious heirlooms of the human race, the statues of the old Greek—to their tender grandeur, their chaste healthfulness, their unconscious, because perfect might, and say, 'There; there are tokens to you and to all generations yet unborn of what man could be once, of what he can be again, if he would obey those laws of nature which are the voice of God.' I would make them discontented with the ugliness and closeness of their dwellings; I would make the man discontented with the fashion of his garments—and still more, now the woman of all ranks, with that fashion of theirs, and with everything around them, which they have the power of improving if it be at all ungraceful, superfluous, tawdry, ridiculous, unwholesome—I would make them discontented with what they call their education, and say to them you call the three Royal R's education. They are not education; no more is the knowledge which would enable you to take the highest prizes in this institute. They are not education. They are only instruction—a necessary ground-work in an age like this for making practical use of your education, but not the education itself. As Mr. Gladstone says in a passage which I must have the honour of quoting at length, 'As

regarded all other functions of our nature outside the domain of life to godward, all those functions which are summed up in what St. Paul calls the flesh and the mind, the physical and bodily life, the tendency of the system was to exalt the human element by proposing a model of beauty, strength, and wisdom, in all their combinations, so elevated, that the effort to retain them required a continual upward strain. It made divinity attainable, and thus it effectually directed the thought and aim of man 'along the line of limitless desires.' Such a scheme of religion, though failing grossly in the government of the passions, and in upholding the standard of moral beauties, tended powerfully to produce a lofty self-respect and a large, free, and varied conception of humanity. It incorporated itself in schemes of noble discipline for mind and body. Indeed, if a life-long education and these habits of mind and action had their marked results (to omit many other greatneses in a philosophy, literature, and art which remain to this day unrivalled or unsurpassed) upon those old Greeks, and induced them to do what they did for their own education without science and without Christianity, we who have both, what might we do if we will be true to our advantages and to ourselves?"

DUTY versus IMPULSE.—You may trace an act of courage or generosity to vanity, which is only abstract selfishness, or to a passing impulse bred of animal pity, love, or excitement: you cannot trace years of plodding, that is, honest, hard-working life, to anything but a clear, sound mind. And a clear mind argues a well-ordered heart. If a man have so conquered his passions as to become a machine working regularly, uncomplainingly, patiently, from a sense of duty, I take it he is the more worthy character.—*"Mademoiselle Viviane."* in the *Cornhill Magazine*.

Literary Notes.

THE Aldine Edition of the Poets has now been completed in a cheap edition at 1s. 6d. per vol., including Akenside, Beattie, Burns, Butler, Chaucer, Collins, Cowper, Dryden, Falconer, Goldsmith, Gray, Kirke White, Milton, Parnell, Pope, Prior, Shakspeare, Spenser, Surrey, Swift, Thomson, Wyatt, and Young. It requires for completeness Graham, Hayley, Mason, Logan, Bruce, Bloomfield, Gifford, Somerville, Oldham, Shenstone, Waller, &c.

The editor of the *Newcastle Weekly Chronicle* offers for the three best essays on "The Shorter Hours of Labour; their effect on the moral, intellectual, commercial, and social life of the people," prizes of £20, £10, and £5 respectively.

Mr. Peek's offer of prizes for original essays on the Established Church of England has been responded to by 103 candidates.

Mr. Albany W. Fonblanque, author of "England under Seven Administrations; how are we governed?" &c., for many years the head of the Statistical department of the Board of Trade, died 14th Oct. He was born in 1797.

W. C. Hazlitt will issue sketches and essays, including *Winterstow*, by Wm. Hazlitt.

In "Memorials of a Quiet Life," by J. A. C. Hare, we are to have reminiscences of Coleridge, Arnold, the Hares, Penrhyns, Stanleys, Stirling, &c.

The fourth edition of Dr. J. H. Stirling's Schwegler's "History of Philosophy" has been issued.

M. Michelet's second vol. of the "History of the Nineteenth Century" is exclusively devoted to the career of Napoleon, as the first was to his origin, and promises some very interesting revelations on the Consulate, and Kleber's expedition to Egypt in lieu of Buonaparte. The long doubtful question, treated so cautiously by M. Lanfrey, whether Kleber's assassination by an Egyptian was not reckoned upon by the First Consul, is to be more fully elucidated than it has been hitherto. M. Michelet goes so far, in his forthcoming work, as to doubt Buonaparte's personal courage.

Dr. R. G. Latham will shortly add to the illustrative literature of "Hamlet," by laying before English readers a translation, with introduction, notes, &c., of the "Bestrafte Brudermord" (the Fratricide Punished); a German "Hamlet, Prince of Denmark," supposed to be an adaptation from, if not a translation of, Shakspeare's play. Two papers of interest read before the Royal Society of Literature will form part of the volume.

"A History of Democracy in Europe," by Sir Erskine May, is in the printer's hands.

Rumours of Dickens's Domesticities have been set afloat by the announcement of Forster's second volume of the "Life."

A picture said to represent Shakspeare's marriage has been brought forward for critical examination.

The Apocalypse of St. John is engaging E. Renan.

The *Printer's Register* informs its readers that the editor of the *Times* is John Thaddeus Delane—born 1817, became editor in 1841, called to the bar 1847. Mr. Stebbings is *assistant editor*; Rev. Canon Moseley, Mr. L. H. Courtenay, Dr. Gallenga, Mr. Laurence W. Oliphant, and Rev. Henry Ware, are *leader-writers*; criticism on the Fine Arts is done by Mr. Tom Taylor; the Drama by John Oxenford; Music by J. T. Davidson. Among the special correspondents are Captain Hozier, Dr. Russell, Dr. Charles Austin, W. S. Dallas; Messrs. Kelly and Broome; Dr. G. V. Patten is Irish Correspondent, and Mr. O'Connor Morris contributes on Irish topics. Some of the pseudonyms used in the *Times* are *Mercator*, Lord Overstone; *Viator*, W. L. Kinglake; *S. G. O.*, Rev. Lord S. Godolphin Osborne; *Historicus* and *H.*, Mr. Vernon Harcourt; *C.* and *J. C.*, Dr. John Cumming; *C. E. T.*, Sir Charles Trevelyan; the *Hertfordshire Incumbent*, Dean Blakcaley; *Anglicanus*, Dean Stanley; *An East-End Incumbent*, Mr. Bowsell; &c.

As a set-off to Mr. G. W. Wills' Royalistic play of "Charles I." an adaptation of Victor Hugo's Republican "Cromwell" is shortly to be put on the stage.

Messrs. Moxon are about to issue a library edition of the popular poets, edited by W. M. Rossetti.

A revised edition of Sir T. Philipps' "Million of Facts," has been issued.

A plea for the abolition of the Master of the Revels (*Magister joorum*) has been put forth in *Colburn's Magazine*; but as a public recognition of the place and power of recreative amusement, we think the office should be continued in a nation which takes its pleasures so sadly.

"A History of the Rothschilds" is in preparation.

A controversy on the merits of Manzoni is agitating the *savans* of Italy.

The poems of the late Charles XV., King of Sweden, have been translated into German by G. Limberg.

The Roxburghe Club is to issue Wm. Weever's "Sir John Oldcastle," and several other rare tracts from the Pepysian Library, Cambridge.

John Nichol, Professor of English Literature in the University of Glasgow, has in the press "Hannibal," an historical tragedy; and in preparation, "Lectures on the English Poets of the Present Century."

Joseph Devey, biographer of Joseph Locke, author of "Logic, the Science of Inference," &c., has issued "Criticisms of the Poets of the Nineteenth Century."

A library edition of the *Lives and Works of the Brontës*, with illustrations of the scenery described in them, from drawings made on the spot by G. M. Wimperia, has been commenced.

"A Journal of the History of German Culture" has been re-established, after an interval of thirteen years, by Dr. J. H. Müller. It resembles the *Retrospective Review*, which used to be issued in this country.

Mr. James Grant, in his "The Newspaper Press," states that "no instance is on record of any advertisement being inserted in any of the newspapers of the day prior to 1652." Mr. John Piggot, F.S.A., has found two earlier advertisements in the *Mercurius Eleuthericus* for the year 1648.—*Antiquary*.

Messrs. Macmillan and Co. announce an illustrated "History of Holland House," by the Princess Marie von Lichtenstein, *sée* Fox, the adopted and recently married daughter of Lady Holland.

"The Latter-day Pamphlets" form the November volume of Carlyle's Works, People's Edition.

Earl Russell is about to publish a volume of "Essays on the Rise and Progress of the Christian Religion in the West of Europe, from the reign of Tiberius to the End of the Council of Trent."

Dr. Francis Lieber, a well-known publicist of New York city, author of "Civil Liberty and Self-Government," editor of the "American Conversations-Lexicon," translator of Niebuhr's History, &c., died Oct. 2d, aged seventy-two. He was a native of Berlin, and saw active military service in very early life, having served in the Prussian army during Napoleon's wars, and at Waterloo. He was also a member of Byron's expedition to Greece; and finally, in 1827, emigrated to the United States, where he devoted himself to literary pursuits.

We hear of the issue of "a collection of curious and interesting Scotch historical and political ballads" by Robert Sempell (originally printed in black letter at Edinburgh as separate broadsides), now first collected.

Messrs. Dulau have formed a collection in six volumes of caricatures published in Paris in 1870 and 1871. It is not unlikely they may be published.

The *Athenæum* publishes a letter concerning "Unpublished Notes on Milton," by John Keats; and also gives a tracing of an early version in the handwriting of the poet of one of his sonnets.

The concluding part of the second volume of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Psychology" has been issued. It completes the first half of the whole series of volumes which are to comprise his system of philosophy.

The twelfth edition of the first volume of John Forster's "Life of Charles Dickens" is just issued; it is to extend to three volumes of which the second will be published early.

Mr. W. H. Hart will issue the

first part of an *Index Expurgatorius Anglicanus*, a descriptive catalogue of the principal books printed or published in England which have been suppressed or burnt by the common hangman, or censured, or for which the authors, printers, or publishers have been prosecuted, imprisoned, &c.

A volume is announced under the title of "Outlines of German Literature," by Mr. Joseph Gostick, author of a "Handbook of German Literature," and Mr. Robert Harrison, librarian of the London Library. The work is, we are told, the result of many years' reading of German authors, condensed into a small volume, dedicated by permission to Mr Carlyle.

Dr. John Hill Burton has been engaged on a revised edition of his "History of Scotland, from Agricola's Invasion to the Revolution of 1688." The first volume of the new issue will appear in January, and the other volumes will be published monthly. Dr. Burton has also recast his "History of Scotland from the Revolution to the Insurrection of 1745"—a work which was written some twenty years ago. In its new shape it will form a sequel to the larger history.

The *Athenæum* has commenced some notes "On Unsuspected Corruptions of the Text of Shakspeare," by Mr. Howard Staunton, a first-rate critic of the English of Elizabeth's time.

A bibliography of the dialect, songs, and poems of Lancashire, Yorkshire, and other English counties has been undertaken by G. P. Pardon.

Mr. W. J. Thoms, formerly editor and proprietor of *Notes and Queries*, has in the press a work on Longevity—the object of which is to show that great doubt should be entertained of statements regarding extreme old age.

"A Memoir of Deaf Alford," by his widow, is promised.

BIBLE REVISION IN AMERICA.

An American Committee of Revisers of the English Scriptures, in co-operative union with the British Committee of Revision, was organized Oct. 4, at 40 Bible House, by the election of permanent officers, and has actually begun its responsible work. The leading denominations and literary institutions of the country were represented in the meeting by ex-President Woolsey, Bishop Lee, Professors Drs. Abbot, Day, Green, Hadley, Hare, De Whitt, Packard, Schaff, Short, Strong, and Thayer. Dr. Schaff reported the results of his correspondence and personal conference with the British revisors, and distributed confidential copies of the revised version of the Books of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, and the first three Gospels, which he had received from England for the use of the American Committee. The committee then proceeded to elect permanent officers. Dr. Schaff, of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, was elected President; Professor Day, of the Divinity School of Yale College, Corresponding Secretary; and Professor Short, of Columbia College, New York, Treasurer. The committee then divided into two companies, the one for the Old, and the other for the New Testament. Professor Green, of the Theological Seminary at Princeton, was elected Chairman of the Old Testament Company; ex-President Woolsey, Chairman of the New Testament Company. Both companies will hold periodical meetings every month in the Bible House.

The following scholars compose the committee:—

Old Testament Company.—Prof. William Henry Green, D.D., Chairman, Princeton, N.J.; Rev. Thomas J. Conant, D.D., Brooklyn, N.Y.; Prof. George E. Day, D.D., New

Haven, Conn.; Prof. John De Witt, D.D., New Brunswick, N.J.; Prof. George Emlen Hare, D.D., Philadelphia, Pa.; Prof. Charles P. Krauth, D.D., Philadelphia, Pa.; Prof. J. Packard, D.D., Fairfax, Va.; Prof. Calvin Stowe, D.D., Hartford, Conn.; Prof. James Strong, D.D., Madison, N.J.; Rev. C. V. A. Van Dyck, D.D., Beyrout, Syria; Prof. Tayler Lewis, LL.D., Schenectady, N.Y.

New Testament Company.—Ex-President Theodore D. Woolsey, D.D., LL.D., Chairman, New Haven, Conn.; Ezra Abbot, LL.D., Cambridge, Mass.; Rev. G. R. Croons, D.D., New York; Prof. H. B. Hackett, D.D., Rochester, N.Y.; Prof. James Hadley, LL.D., New Haven, Conn.; Prof. Charles Hodge, D.D., Princeton, N.J.; Prof. A. C. Kenrick, D.D., Rochester, N.Y.; Rt. Rev. Alfred Lee, D.D., Wilmington, Del.; Prof. Matthew B. Riddle, D.D., Hartford, Conn.; Prof. Philip Schaff, D.D., New York; Prof. Charles Short, LL.D., New York; Prof. J. Henry Thayer, D.D., Andover Mass.; Rev. Edward A. Washburn, D.D., New York; Prof. W. P. Warren, D.D., Boston, Mass.

Among works in preparation for helping those who require to undergo examinations, we notice "*Dates and Events in English History*," and "*Places and Facts in Physical and Political Geography*," by Rev. Edgar H. Rand, B.A., for Weale's Rudimentary series; and the *Civil Service Handbooks of English Literature*, by H. A. Dobson; for the *Civil Service Handbooks*, issued by Messrs Lockwood.

The historian of the Reformation, Dr. Merle D'Aubigné, died suddenly, 21st Oct., at Geneva, aged 78.

It is reported that Dr. D'Aubigné has left two additional volumes almost completed, carrying his *History of the Reformation* down to the death of Luther.

Those who require to go up to the examinations at Oxford and Cambridge in 1874 will be glad to learn that Vol. II. of the "Speaker's Commentary on the Bible," containing,—Joshua, by Rev. T. E. Espin, B.D.; Judges, Ruth, Samuel, by the Bishop of Bath and Wells; and 1 Kings, by Canon Rawlinson, is promised shortly.

A new edition of Charles Buxton's "Memoirs of Sir T. Fowell Buxton" is announced, and "Notes of Thoughts and Conversation," by the late Charles Buxton, will be edited by Rev. Llewellyn Davies.

A Memoir of "The personal life, of George Grote, the Historian," with Selections from his Letters, is nearly ready from the pen of Mrs. Grote.

The first volume of a complete edition of "The Dramatic Works of Sir Wm. Davenant," has been issued under the editorship of Messrs. Maidment and Logan.

All lovers of Elizabethan literature will be pleased to hear that the fifteen comedies and tragedies of George Chapman, 1557 to 1634, the "Father of our English Poets," as John Davies of Hereford called him in 1611 issued separately in various years from 1598 to 1564, but never before collected, are on the eve of publication by Mr. Pearson in three volumes. The text is reprinted *verbatim et literatim* from the rare original quartos, and is accompanied by a memoir of the author, of whose drama, however, we may note Dr. G. L. Craik gives a list of *twenty* as printed, and supplies the dates of their issue in the English Cyclopædia, *sub nomine*.

"Faith and Free-Thought" is the title of the Christian Evidence Society Lectures.

Lord Houghton, through Mr. Murray, promises "Personal Monographs"—probably reissues from *The Quarterly*, of his best contributions.

The first prize of £10 offered by the Baptist Union for the best essay on Early Christian Doctrine as gathered from the Apologists of the Second and Third Centuries, has been gained by John Norton, student at Rawden College—the competition being open to all students at Baptist Colleges in Britain.

M. Theophile Gautier died October 24.

The publication of a very cheap series of English Classics, often suggested, has been again urged by W. L. Clowes. Might not a commission for this purpose be granted by Government; and after due editorship under its members, could not the works be issued at cost price?

The Rev. Orby Shipley has in the press nine essays, by various writers, on "Ecclesiastical Reform."

A collection of nearly 500 autograph letters of the chief persons belonging to the Court of James I. has been presented to the Bodleian Library at Oxford by the Hon. G. M. Fortescue.

The literary remains of the late Miss Susan Ferrier, author of "Destiny," &c., are being prepared for publication. Miss Ferrier died in September 1854. Her correspondence embraces letters from Sir Walter Scott, John Gibson Lockhart, and other distinguished contemporaries, while her common place book contains unpublished compositions of Sir Walter Scott, Thomas Campbell, John Leyden, Mr. G. Lewis, and other eminent poets.

On 10th Jan. 1873 the Centenary of Linnæus will be celebrated at Stockholm, and a statue will be unveiled.

The "Aldine prize" in the gift of the Academy of Sciences of Bologna (100 francs), is to be awarded to the best essay on Galvanism, or Electro-Dynamics, sent in before 30th June, 1874.

In his *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects*, Dr. John Henry Newman has reproduced in the compass of four hundred pages, six discussions, of which the first appeared in the *British Magazine* in 1836. It is carried on by two speculative Anglicans, who aim at giving vitality to their Church—the one by uniting it to the Roman See, the other by developing a nineteenth century *Anglo-Catholicism* — “the narrator siding on the whole with the latter.” The second and third papers are the 83rd and 85th numbers of the “Tracts for the Times,” published in 1838, and refer to “The Patristical Idea of Anti-Christ,”

and “Holy Scripture in Relation to the Catholic Creed.” The fourth effort is on ‘The Tamworth Reading-Room,’ a feeble priestly reply to Sir Robert Peel’s praise of natural knowledge, reprinted from the *Times* (1841). The fifth essay, entitled “Who’s to blame?” was written on the Crimean War, and appeared in the *Catholic Standard* in 1855; and the last, which was published in the *Month*, in 1866, is a review of “*Ecce Homo*.”

John Morley, who has already dealt with Edmund Burke and Voltaire, has now issued a “*Life of Rousseau*.”

THE WORKING MEN’S OWN PUBLIC-HOUSE.—Nothing in Shrewsbury interested us more than the Working Men’s Own Public-house, established by Mrs. Wightman, widely known by her little book, “*Haste to the Rescue*.” The wife of the vicar, entering heart and soul into her husband’s work among the people of his charge, she found that intemperance was its greatest hindrance. It was intended that this public-house should be a place where well-cooked food of the best quality should be constantly on sale at the lowest prices: “where instruction of the heart and head, and recreation, should go hand in hand; where nothing debasing or demoralising should be countenanced, and where holy and elevating influences should be encouraged and strengthened.” This design has been fully carried out under Mrs. Wightman’s superintendence; and she has made the institution self-supporting. It is furnished with a refreshment-room, a reading-room and library, a lecture-hall, baths and lavatory, and rooms for public and business meetings; a sick fund and provident club, mothers’ meetings, Bible classes, and even a ragged school (established by the younger members), are carried on there; and quarterly tea parties, annual railway trips, picnics, juvenile treats, winter-lectures, social evenings, &c., maintain in all a lively interest. In the refreshment-room are to be seen farmers and their wives; men attending the corn-exchange, cattle-markets, and fairs; market-women; young men in lodgings in the town, who are engaged in houses of business; the county constabulary, when on duty at the sessions, &c.; the steady men belonging to the militia, when attending drill; and the ordinary mechanic and labourer. Many a drunkard has been reclaimed, many a home made happy, by these influences.—*Leisure Hour*.

Modern Metaphysicians.

SHADWORTH HOLWAY HODGSON, ESQ.,

Author of "Time and Space," "Theory of Practice," &c.

OF the biography of this eminent living metaphysician we have learned no particulars. He was, we have been told, educated at Lincoln College, Oxford, but he places on the title of his books no alphabetic advertisement of collegiate training and success, though the works themselves give good evidence of thought, learning, and special originality of mind. To these we shall call the attention of our readers, as they have attracted us considerably, and as, we believe, they contain not a few matters which those who have felt interest in our former endeavours to keep a knowledge of the course of speculative thought before the more earnest thinkers of our reading circle, will be glad to have brought under their notice. They form a contribution to philosophical thinking of great value, from the evidence they yield that among Englishmen the studies which delighted Cudworth, Locke, Berkeley, Clarke, Butler, Coleridge, and Mansel have not lost their charm or their power to excite the strong devotion of the soul; and they are of still greater noteworthiness as they put forth the protest of a vigorous thinker against the prevailing speculations of Mill, Bain, Spencer, Lewes, Darwin, Huxley, &c., and takes the side of Mac Cosh, Stirling, Fraser, Jowett, Simon, Lindsay, &c.;—that is to say, he believes in the possibility of metaphysics, he espouses the idealistic doctrines, and endeavours to work out the problem of thought by research expended on the investigation of the nature and contents of thought itself.

Shadworth Holway Hodgson was born in the ancient English borough and seaport of Boston, in Lincolnshire, within the precincts of the town over which St. Botolph exerts his holy influences, in December, 1832, shortly after the parliament which granted the Reform Bill had been dissolved, and when the rejoicings in regard to a new popular representative assembly were agitating the minds of the people. After receiving the elements of education at home, and in school, at Boston, he was entered as a pupil at Rugby shortly after the rulership had been transferred from the dying hands of Dr. Arnold to those of Archibald Campbell Tait, D.D.,

now Archbishop of Canterbury. In the closing session of Dr. Tait's *régime*, he was successful in gaining one of the five exhibitions annually competed for by the pupils of the highest form tenable at Oxford or Cambridge. In this way he became a member of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Here he proceeded to B.A. and M.A.; after which he became a student of Lincoln's Inn, with the intention of reading for the Bar. In 1857 he married, and in 1859 his circumstances became such that he no longer felt it incumbent on him to pursue his profession as a means of attaining a competency. He had early acquired a love for logical and metaphysical studies, and had his fervour for them increased by the able, original and suggestive teaching of J. M. Wilson, then lecturer on Logic in Corpus Christi, and now one of the most impressive and capable of the Rugby masters. On being emancipated from the need to toil, he devoted himself to the labour of thought, designing with his best and freshest powers to become an expositor of the secrets of the soul as they revealed themselves to him in his speculative researches. After five years of strenuous strife of mind, he found himself in possession of some results. These, in June, 1865, he laid before thinkers in a metaphysical essay on "Time and Space,"—an attempt at an ultimate analysis of consciousness in its phenomena of perception, association, reflection, and reasoning, as an arbitratrice solution of the problem argued between the psychological and the introspective philosophies. In 1866, when the Parliamentary Franchise was the theme of most men's thoughts, and the balance of classes seemed about to be upset, Mr. S. H. Hodgson contributed to the discussion of the question a philosophico-political pamphlet, arguing for the principle of the representation of classes and interests rather than of persons. In this work he discusses the functions of Government, the threefold division of the classes and interests of the country, and the problem to be solved in balancing by revised legislation the share which each should have. England has always been more prone to practical than to philosophical schemes of Reform. Even from J. S. Mill, the advocates of an improved suffrage would not accept a speculative plan of parliamentary reform, and Hodgson's elaborate and calculated political scheme was cast aside along with those of Mill, Hare, Fawcett, Lowe, and Kinnear. The work has now, we believe, been withdrawn from publication, as the tide of agitation has swept away the chance of its effectiveness.

In 1870, having returned to his more beloved studies in metaphysics, Mr. Hodgson produced an ethical enquiry into "The Theory of Practice." He in this work opposes the ontological, the empirical, and the psychological schools of morals, sets himself against

the Lockean view of the upgathering of the elements of character, as well as the Benthamic utilitarianism now prevalent, and endeavours to show from a survey of the systematic activities of the spirit that a metaphysical philosophy of practice is possible; and that in the scheme propounded the several branches of practical science may be conceived and classified into a formal theory as truly and readily as can the physical sciences. This work, even more than his exposition of "Time and Space" attracted the attention of thinkers, and the university of Smith, Brown, Stewart, Hamilton and Frazer recognized in these books such signs of worth as induced them to confer on the writer the honorary degree of L.L.D. in 1871.

Mr. Hodgson appeals to consciousness—"consciousness as existing in an individual human being,"—the truths drawn from which "can have no validity for other conscious individuals unless they themselves recognise their truth as descriptions applicable to the procedure and phenomena of their own consciousness."

"Metaphysic takes its stand at the junction between the mind which knows and the world which is known, and deals with the relations which obtain between them, so far as these relations are necessary and universal"—"the common ground of phenomena with a double aspect, subjective and objective." "Metaphysic contains, as its proper object-matter, those cognitions only which are common to all objects of knowledge and to all modes or states of consciousness." Metaphysic is the applied logic of the universe; the method of stating the problem in its lowest terms."

The term *necessary* is but the correlate of the term *universal*; what the latter is in the world of objects, that the former is in the world of consciousness. Whatever is necessary in thought exists also always, without exception, in the object of thought; and whatever exists always without exception in the object of thought is necessary in thought. "Universality means that the thing in question, whatever it is, never is otherwise; necessity means that we cannot conceive it otherwise; "they are but two aspects inseparable from each other of the same phenomena."

"There are two distinct senses of the term *à priori*." I. (a) a knowledge of the consequent derived from a knowledge of its conditions; (b) those conditions, without which the effect could not be what it is, are said to be *à priori* conditions:—these two modes rest upon priority of time, and constitute one sense of the term *à priori*. II. The other sense of this term has nothing to do with priority in order of time, but solely with priority in order of logic. "Time and space are *à priori* inasmuch as they are *à priori* to all objects of cognition, to cognition and existence,"—

they are "elements of any and every particular experience, entering into every one of them as its necessary *form*." "Metaphysic is, properly speaking, not a science, but a philosophy." "Philosophy is carried on for the sake of the learning and knowing alone which it involves." "The need to philosophize is rooted in our natures as deeply as any other of our needs." "All men who reflect are metaphysicians, and all sciences have a metaphysical side." "But it approaches cognitions from the cognitive side, and treats them as cognitions, not as feelings or emotions." Ethic is a systematic cognition of feelings; metaphysic of cognition. Religion is spiritual emotions; theology is the embodiment of religion in doctrines.

The sentence of Descartes, "*Cogito ergo sum*," is the fountain-head of all modern metaphysic; "*reflection*" is the starting-point of philosophy; "*consciousness*" is its object. *Cogito* stands (1) for the act of reflection; (2) for one of the two objects of reflection—conscious thought as a revelation of *existence*. "Consciousness is limited only by existence, no less than existence is limited only by consciousness"—"the two things are co-extensive."

"It is the lasting service of the post-Kantian philosophers, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, each in his degree, to have established the doctrine of the perfect co-extensiveness and mutuality of existence and consciousness. There thus rises before us the conception of the world *distinguished*, not *divided* into two kingdoms—the kingdom of *knowing* and the kingdom of *being*."

"The object-matter of psychology is the mind or consciousness in relation to the bodily organs which are its seat; that of metaphysic is consciousness in relation to its objects." The former "links physiology to metaphysic," the latter is "an entirely statical and not a dynamical theory." Spinoza regards the absolute as substance; Schelling, as reason; Hegel, as mind. All such transformation is foreign to metaphysic, whose last word is—*analysis*.

Of cardinal distinctions in philosophy there are matter and form, and first and second intentions, which must be kept carefully before the mind. "Perception of the first and simplest objects is a synthetic act; perception of all other objects is an act of comparison. The first and simplest objects of perception are complex; all other objects of perception are compounds of these." "The simplest empirical act of perception includes three elementary acts: 1st, the perception of element A; 2nd, the perception of element B; 3rd, the perception of their relation. These three taken together constitute the empirical perception of the object A, or of the element A as an object." "The first case arises in perception and without volition; the second arises in reasoning and in conse-

quence of volition : the first case is intentional, the second logical ; the first a percept, the second a concept." "First intentions may accordingly be defined as objects in relation to consciousness alone ; second intentions as objects in relation to other objects in consciousness. The distinction between first and second intentions, though arising in perception, can only be employed by logic ; it is discovered in perception by analytical reasoning ; it is a fact in all domains of consciousness, but it is an instrument only in reasoning." "On this distinction between first and second intentions hangs that between definition and description." "A definition is a name of the first intention in an expanded form ; a description is a name of the second intention in an expanded form ;" the one "is the expression of an object as it exists for consciousness alone—that is, of the object as it is, or in its essence ;" the other "is an expression of an object in its relation to some one or more objects besides itself in consciousness—that is, of its comparative value in consciousness." "Every feeling must exist for a certain length of time, and some feelings must exist also in a certain position in space, and some also in a certain extent of space. The time and the space in which the feelings exist is called the formal element of the phenomenon ; the feeling, whatever may be its kind, is called the material element of the phenomenon." "Every phenomenon, as such, contains these two elements,—time (or time and space) on the one side, and feeling on the other." "The two elements, matter and form, in the phenomenon, are distinguished by direct attention in perception ; the two aspects, subjective and objective, are distinguished by attention and reflection." "From one side the world is all mind ; from the other all existence." "Of the two points of view already distinguished—the objective and the subjective—the subjective is the only one which is necessarily universal." "The subjective contains both aspects at once, the objective only one."

"Feeling is the material element in consciousness ; an element which in some modification or other constitutes all consciousness." "Feelings may be roughly classified as, 1st, the feelings of the five special senses which have defined organs—sight, touch, hearing, taste and smell. 2nd, feelings which have as yet no specially defined organs, such as hunger, the *sensus communis* in all its branches, feelings of heat and cold, of muscular tension, and others : these two classes are commonly called sensations. 3rd, feelings which arise only in redintegration of the feelings of the first two classes, such as desire, aversion, love, hate, anger, fear, joy, grief, admiration, feeling of right and wrong, of honour and dishonour, of justice and injustice, of effort and resolution, and

many others, all of which are called emotions, and are also sometimes distinguished, either by differences in kind or by differences only in degree, into two classes—emotions and passions.”

“Time is involved in every moment and in every object of consciousness.” “The senses of sight and touch contain the logical elements, but not the historical causes, of the perception of objects in three dimensions,” *i. e.*, space. “Space is necessary, not because it is a native form of the operation of the mind, but because, being irreducible to anything else, it is all-embracing and exhaustive in its nature, and occupies the whole field of being.” “Phenomena, whether of one or more or all the senses, exist accordingly both in time and in three dimensions of space.” “There is one consciousness and one universe; each fact is the counterpart but not the cause or the effect of the other.”

“Time and space alone never change, never vanish, never leave spaces which are not spaces, nor times which are not time; are always continuous, always the same. They cease only when consciousness ceases.” “They are necessary, not because we know the causes which produce them; not because they depend on innate or supersensual constitution of the mind or soul, but solely because their negation is inconceivable.” “Time and space alone unite the properties of being immediately and ineradicably certain, of being universally present in all phenomena, of being knowable in their first intention and defined as what they are, and of being in nature the same in all objects however different; they thus become the common basis or bond of union between all other cognitions, and as such the starting-point and corner-stone of philosophy.”

“Time is infinite in extension, and in division and space the same.” “Time and space, as *finite*, are modes of voluntary consciousness; of consciousness adopting a proposed limitation: as *infinite* they are modes of involuntary consciousness, which we can never transcend so long as we are conscious at all.” “The finite character of time and space is subordinate to their infinite character—subordinate, not contradictory.”

“The elements in every *cognition* are time, space, and feeling; and in every *object* are time, space, and quality. Consciousness is feeling in time and space; objects are qualities in time and space.” “All theories, possible and actual, as to the origin of consciousness, may be divided:—I. (a) An exterior cause inferred; (b) an interior cause revealed by analysis. II. (a) Immaterial; (b) material. III. (a) An essence (statical); (b) a movement or activity (dynamical).” “The principal phenomena of consciousness are (1) the total difference in kind between consciousness and every other

affection, quality, or mode of existence in objects ; (2) the unity or oneness of every moment in consciousness, no matter how multi-form the objects of that moment of consciousness may be, or whether they are a combination of presentations or representations, or of the two together ; (3) the unity or oneness of the individual consciousness throughout life, whereas the body of the individual has completely changed, that is to say, the sense of individual personality ; (4) the sense of effort or volition, known as will ; (5) the sense of freedom or liberty of the will." "Oneness is an ultimate fact in consciousness, as it is in every single object of consciousness." This constitutes the empirical *ego*, *i. e.*, "the complex of all feelings or states of consciousness, as distinguished from the qualities which are their objective aspect." "Presentative perceptions are the source from which all others are derived, and from their vivid and inevitable nature they give the law to all others." "Representative perceptions are repetitions of presentative perceptions, with a decrease in vividness ;" "and a store of representations is thus laid up, some of which are always present in consciousness." "Representations are different from the presentations which they repeat." "All our representations have been once presentations, or have been formed out of their elements differently modified and combined—a difference which is capable of an infinite variety." This is known as redintegration. The laws of spontaneous redintegration are three:—1st, that consciousness is one connected whole, and that any object may call up, either directly or indirectly, through other objects, any other object or the whole past objects of consciousness ; 2nd, by interest ; and 3rd, by habit—the two latter being forms of pleasure. "There are three degrees of complications in redintegrations:—1. Where there is pleasure or interest, but no sense of effort. 2. Where there is both effort and interest. 3. Where there is effort, interest, and anticipation." "Volition is anticipation of a result, and all interest in redintegration which is anticipatory is a volition, and makes the redintegration voluntary from being spontaneous." "Voluntary redintegrations are the highest and most important class, and under this class fall (*a*) all reasoning processes, (*b*) all action and conduct of reasoning beings, and (*c*) all happiness of which such beings are capable as such." The author then proceeds to show "that understanding and reason, in all their branches, are nothing more than modes of true time and space applied to perceptions and redintegrations, and that the laws of logic themselves are founded on and are an application of these forms." "Induction and deduction are the two great divisions into which reasoning or voluntary redintegration develops itself." "Critical generalization precedes acquisition in logical order."

The view of logic which results from this view of categorizing, as it were, all things under time and space, is so deserving of special and specific attention, that we shall not trust ourselves to analyze the author's views, but shall adopt his own brief summary of the subject :

"Logic has always been considered to be a purely formal science, making abstraction from all content or matter of knowledge, and giving only the laws which are afterwards applicable to all kinds of content or matter, but which do not contain any in themselves or of their own. If this were strictly true, it would follow that there was no community of nature between metaphysic and logic, for metaphysic always has in its objects both form and matter, the latter being as essential as the former ; and consequently that metaphysical truths could not be deduced from logical, nor logical from metaphysical. Two faculties or functions would then exist side by side in consciousness, which might be capable of harmonious action, but which would not be necessitated to act harmoniously ; and thus a third principle or set of principles would be required to establish the practical rules which may regulate or ought to regulate the concert of the two functions. But now if any one, startled at the apparent incongruousness of such a system, should inquire whether, after all, it were the true one, and should experience the wish to reduce it to greater simplicity, the mode of doing this which would be likely first to suggest itself would be to ask whether one of the two kinds of principles, metaphysical and logical, could not be derived from the other. And having put the question in this shape, it would probably next occur to him that the most concrete of the two kinds of principles must be deducible from the most abstract. This attribute of being the most abstract he would at first be led to think was possessed by the principles of logic, since it has always been proclaimed that logic makes abstraction of all content, and consequently is entirely and completely abstract. But when it had been proved that there is no object of thought or of consciousness which does not contain in itself both matter and form, and that consequently even the postulates of logic can make no claim to be entirely and strictly formal, any more than the principles of metaphysic, or of intuition of existences as objects, namely, time and space ; but that both kinds of principles alike contain both matter and form, that is, are felt as well as known in consciousness,—he would then find the question of the reduction of one kind to the other opened afresh, since in this respect they stand on the same level ; and it would remain only to ask, not which was abstract and which was concrete, but which was the most abstract—the most simple and elementary. The difficulty arising from the apparent difference in kind of the two sets of principles would be thus removed ; it would remain to compare them together, and see whether either

contained the elements of the other, whether either contained more than was contained implicitly in the other.

"Now the postulates contain explicitly more than time and space contain implicitly. In other words, they are a development of time and space, and not an additional or new principle. Time and space contain all feeling; the postulates are particular feelings. They arise only when matter or objective feeling has been perceived in the forms of time and space; and they arise in the act of separating one object or feeling from another in and by those forms, which act is itself a feeling. A feeling placed in a definite time and space is one object; when experienced again, *i. e.*, at a different time, occupying the same space and the same portion of historical time, it is the same object; when another feeling is experienced, if it is in the same space and the same portion of historical time, it is a different quality of the same object; if it is in a different space and portion of historical time it is a different object. Objects which are the same according to this definition of sameness, for instance—cotton in England and cotton in India or America, justice in the law courts of Athens and justice in those of Paris—we class together and distinguish from all others, whether different from them in point of feeling only, as cotton from wool, both being in one bale in England, hardness and whiteness in one piece of marble, or in point both of feeling and position in time and space, as a bale of wool in England and a bale of cotton in America. The constant recurrence of objects in these conditions, the recurrence of feelings held apart only by difference of times and spaces, is the simplest form of the fact which is expressed by the postulates. *A* is *A*, the postulate of identity, is the assertion of sameness, is the assertion that the feeling *A*, though experienced in different portions of space and historical time, is the same feeling,—that is, that as far as feeling goes, and abstracting from the differences of its environment, it is one feeling, a logical unit. The postulate, No *A* is not *A*, is the assertion of difference of feeling. Everything is either *A* or not *A* is the assertion that sameness and difference, as above defined, are the only way in which we can conceive of two objects. The incompressibility of time and space, and the consequent security of the feelings or matter which they contain, is the ground of the certain assertion of the postulates. The postulates, again, are the assertion of general facts, facts as necessary and certain as any others, only less general and less certain than the forms of time and space which they express, but express with the addition of a matter or content contained in them and distinguished from them. They are the first and most general and most necessary laws of empirical phenomena as such.

"The unity of feeling in difference of position in historical time and space is the first and simplest fact which the postulates can be employed to express, or which they express in the first instance. Afterwards, any

feature in an object can be fixed on and made a concept,—for instance, a particular figure, a particular duration, a particular position with reference to other objects, as well as a particular feeling, such as hardness or colour. Objects in which occur this particular figure, duration, position, or particular feature, be it what it will, are then said to be the same in that particular respect, or *quatenus* such. That is to say, the postulates are applicable to all and every feature in objects without exception. Still this refers only to objects existing in time and space historically. When we go farther and reflect on objects as objects existing both historically and in consciousness, a further application of the postulates is made. The same feature is then perceived as twice present to consciousness when regarded as a single feature or feeling. I reflect that I have said of it, *A* is *A*. The only difference of the two *A*'s is the difference of their times of recurrence in consciousness, not, as before, the difference in their environment; cotton in my mind now and cotton in my mind five minutes ago, the Roman empire in my mind now and the Roman empire in my mind five minutes ago, occupy historically the same space and time at each moment of representation. The subjective space they occupy is also the same; they are environed by the same body and the same external world each time. The only difference between them is that one is before and the other after an intervening series of feelings. The judgment, *A* is *A*, is now the outward expression of this reflective act of consciousness; and the reflective moving from one feeling to the other requires time, and this time from *A* to *A* is represented by the two *A*'s of the judgment. Reflection ratifies the postulates by adopting them; and the postulates are expressions of the ultimate judgments of reflection, as well as of the original judgments of perception and understanding.

“The simplest expression or formula of the postulates contains a material element in it besides that contained in time and space as pure objects. It has been already said that even the pure cognitions of time and space are material as well as formal; that they are felt as well as known, and involve a being conscious as well as a form of that consciousness. But the particular or determinate mode of this material element is, in the pure object, only provisionally present. In the postulates, on the contrary, the material element is present determinately; it is some distinct limitation of time and space impressed upon them by volition. Three things were distinguished in paragraph 16—1st, time and place themselves; 2nd, the material element; 3rd, the limitations and divisions of time and space impressed upon them by the material element. The postulates express those divisions which can exist only when form and matter are present with them. Volition fixes on the divisions and retains form and matter provisionally; the divisions so fixed are the concept form, and the expression of them is by the postulates. The simplest formula of the postulates is representative of

any determinate material element whatever; it is not an expression of one object or one element existing alike in all objects, or of all objects or all matter indifferently, but it is one object, chosen for its insignificance by itself, in order to represent any determinate object whatever as determinate. A letter of the alphabet serves this purpose well. There is no simpler or better formula for the postulates than this concrete, determinate, yet representative one,— A is A ; no A is not A ; everything is either A or not A . A and not A are not, properly speaking, abstractions, they are not abstracted as universal properties or qualities of objects, and considered logically as independent of the concrete objects to which they belong; but they are signs denoting any concrete, empirical, determinate object whatever. A means this object; not A means not this object; and the three postulates express truths concerning objects, but no other truths than are contained in the facts of perception, in the subjection of feelings to the forms of time and space. In other words, the cognitions of time and space are the condition and ground of the postulates. The A of the postulates is an object of perception fixed by attention, and distinguished from everything else by volition; and the expression A , being insignificant in itself, represents any and every possible empirical object.

“It is certainly the case that a more evident truth has been attributed to the postulates, and even to more concrete and less general forms of them than the above, than has been attributed to the cognitions of time and space. There has never been a time when the postulates have not been appealed to as the test, or the *conditio sine qua non* of truth. A thing cannot at once be and not be, is the most current coin of argument which every one must admit or be excluded from arguing. It seems at first sight to be a certainty far superior to the certainty here claimed for the cognitions of time and space, which appear to be not older, in their character of *a priori* necessary truths, than the days of Kant. And it is true that, for all purposes of argument about empirical phenomena, the postulates represented by such current phrases as a thing cannot at once be and not be, are quite sufficient, and, being within the reach of every one, are best fitted for the purpose which they have, time out of mind, served and will serve. But this empirical character of theirs at once accounts for their greater currency, and shows that they are the development of more general and more recondite cognitions. They are the common ground where metaphysicians, logicians, men of science, and men in general can meet, and which all must admit to be firm. They are at once demonstrable and empirical. As the former, it is absurd to attempt to prove them or show their certainty. As the latter, they must be capable of being resolved into non-empirical elements. This latter analysis, here attempted, is no attempt to prove the postulates, to add a certainty to

them which they had not before ; but it is an attempt to show how they came to be invested with that character of certainty. In other words, it is an attempt to assign their *conditio essendi et existendi*, as distinguished from their *conditio cognoscendi*, an attempt corresponding to that made in Chapter III. with respect to time and space ; the only difference being that in the last-mentioned case the *causa existendi* was sought in objects in their objective, in the first-mentioned case in objects in their subjective character ; in the last case in objects as empirical existences, in the first in the metaphysical analysis of such objects.

"A singular phenomenon has been observed in the relation of the cognitions of time and space to each other. Just as the postulates, being empirical, are more familiar than the forms of time and space, and have consequently usurped their place in men's minds, so space, being more complex, is also more familiar than time, and has become the mode in which we represent everything to ourselves, time itself included. Space is more complex because of its three dimensions, which can be compared together ; it contains in itself the conditions of its intelligibility ; but we render time intelligible to ourselves by an image drawn from space—by a line, the image of the first dimension of space. Yet no statical image is really contained in the image of time, but time is entirely irreducible to any form of space.

"The cognitions of time and space, as lying deeper than the postulates, are discovered later ; they have, however, been familiar from the first, and certainly before the postulates, if the present account of them is true. There should be no confusion on this point. The knowledge of time and space is coeval with consciousness ; the knowledge that they are coeval with consciousness is of late growth. The knowledge of the postulates is later than the knowledge of time and space, and depends upon it ; but the knowledge that the postulates are necessary truths is prior to the knowledge of the corresponding fact in the case of time and space. But the knowledge that the postulates are necessary truths does not depend upon the knowledge that time and space are necessary truths ; in fact, it is known long before it in point of time. The earliest recognition of a necessary truth as such, that is, of such and such a truth as necessary, is the recognition that the postulates are such. This was done satisfactorily first by Aristotle, while the corresponding recognition in the case of time and space is due to Kant. The knowledge, therefore, that time and space are necessary truths is no *causa cognoscendi*, no reason for our recognising the postulates as such ; that is, it affords no proof of the postulates. But, on the other hand, the knowledge of time and space is the *causa essendi et existendi* of the knowledge of the postulates. The existence of the one cognition is the cause of the existence of the other. Unless we had the

cognitions of time and space we could never have arrived at the cognition of the postulates. The existence of consciousness in one mode is the cause of the existence of consciousness in the other mode. Neither the knowledge that the postulates are true, nor the knowledge that they are necessarily and universally true, depends upon the knowledge that the cognitions of time and space are necessarily true. This would be to make the former depend on the latter as their *conditio cognoscendi*. But they depend, both of them, upon the knowledge that the cognitions of time and space are true; this is to make them depend on these cognitions as their *conditio essendi et existendi*. They depend upon a knowledge of time and space, but not upon a reflection on that knowledge. To make them depend upon a reflection on that knowledge, for instance, upon the reflection that time and space are always true, or necessarily true, would be to prove them by or deduce them from the knowledge of time and space as their *causa cognoscendi*, instead of analyzing them into these cognitions."

The *ratio sufficiens* may be either (1) cause, (2) reason, each of which has two forms:—

I. — 1. Everything which exists must have an antecedent.
2. Everything which exists must have a cause.

II. — 1. Everything known must have an antecedent in consciousness. 2. Everything known must have a warrant in consciousness.

Intuitional truth is not the co-ordinate of logical truth, but at once its source and its field. Reflection or reflective consciousness has two modes or stages—self-consciousness and reason,—the former being the intuitive and the latter the discursive stage of reflection. "Man reintegrates voluntarily, but does so by fixed rules of abstraction and generalization; he not only reflects psychologically, but he distinguishes himself from his feelings, as well as his feelings from qualities in space. This is the condition of all human culture." Following the line of thought indicated in these quotations, Mr. Hodgson gives a review of the progress of metaphysics and of science, in which he makes some highly ingenious remarks, and from which he concludes "that there are two stages of the development of consciousness, the direct and the reflective." "There are thus two laws of the development of the sciences: first, they advance from the inductive to the deductive stage; secondly, they advance from the objective or solely empirical stage to the metaphysical, or that which is at once an equally subjective and objective." There are three great functions of consciousness—conation, cognition, and feeling. The three branches of knowledge founded on these are technic, theoretic, and teleologic; but the functions on which they are founded are not separate, but *dis-*

cerned. In a concluding passage of great power the author treats of ideas and ideals, and he examines our ideas of goodness, power, and truth; shows that they are apprehended by faith, and then, as the great Exemplar of the ideal, he examines the logical idea of God. "God is the object of the religious consciousness, and man is by his nature religious." *Father* is "the only name which expresses by itself alone the nature of God; a name in which the whole of religion finds its utterance, a name first uttered in its full significance by Christ. Christianity, as Christ conceived it, is the true religion."

Five years after the publication of his "Time and Space"—in May, 1870—Mr. Hodgson issued his continuation of the fresh and vigorous philosophy which he had begun to add to the speculative literature of England. It was entitled, "The Theory of Practice," and begins by showing that ethic is a part of metaphysic. The author proposes in it to deal with the remaining half of the subject, namely, the material element in consciousness, the feelings under which term actions are (as is explained) properly included. The work is an "endeavour to apply the logic of the formal element to the analysis and classification of the different modes of feeling, whether sensations, emotions, passions, desires, pleasures, pains, efforts, volitions, or actions; to the modes of movement or working which pervade them and connect them into a life; and to their combination, in consequence of such working, into types of character, so far as these can be dealt with without taking into consideration the effects of different external circumstances, which in all cases so largely contribute to mould them." He next treats of "The Senses and Sensations." His first step is to distinguish between—

Presentations or sensations, and—

Representations or emotions—direct, reflective.

He then treats of the organic or systemic sensations, those in which "the sensations are distinct but not their organs," in seven groups; after which he passes to consider "the sensations of the special senses" in a clear and informing manner. "The emotions and their relations to representation" yield, under the author's manipulation, a considerable amount of striking speculation. The result may be most succinctly exhibited in the following table of direct emotions.

1. Emotions which arise from the *matter* of the object represented, with pleasures or pains of enjoyment, joy, grief, fondness, aversion.

2. Emotions which arise from the form [&c., as before]. The æsthetic emotions, or sense of beauty in sights and sounds, with the corresponding sense of ugliness or deformity.

3. Emotions which arise in comparison of two or more complete objects represented with pleasures or pains, (1) partly of enjoyment, (2) partly of admiration.

(a) Wonder, surprise, astonishment; (b) terror or dread, eeriness; (c) joyful surprise, mirth; (d) curiosity or logical interest; (e) *ennui*, emotional and intellectual.

Imaginative and direct emotions. 1. Emotions of first class, with addition of desire or passion, hope, fear, congratulation, regard.

2. Emotions which arise in imagination of feelings of the second and third classes, fancy, wit, humour (grave and gay), fun, irony, sarcasm, *naïveté*.

We quote next the table of reflective emotions.

A. Arising from the matter:—

1. The sympathetic group: good-will, affection, *eros*, love, friendship, gratitude, piety, rejoicing in good.

2. The antipathetic group: ill-will, hate, anger, bitterness, revenge, rejoicing in evil, malice.

3. Passions belonging to both groups: benevolence, affection, high spirit, rage, courage, rashness, audacity.

4. Emotions of the comparison of having: ashamedness, admiration of externals, vanity, contempt. *Passions*: envy, jealousy.

5. Emotions of the comparison of being: humility, admiration, of essentials, self-complacency, scorn. *Passions*: emulation, honour.

6. Emotions of reflections on self alone: shame, self-respect, pride.

B. Arising from the *form*—justice and injustice, veracity, equity, mercy, indignation.

C. Arising from matter and form together—the emotion of moral sense, good conscience, remorse. *Modes*: expediency, duty or moral right.

His analysis of the emotive powers is completed in a splendid chapter, to which he appends this table of reflective and imaginative emotions:—Group I. The poetical emotions. Group II. The religious emotions. *Primary*: worship, sin, sense of justification. *Secondary*: faith, hope, charity.

In Mr. Hodgson's next chapter we have an "analysis of action or movement of feeling," while in the next again he supplies many excellent remarks on "combinations of feelings and the formation of character." "Character," he says, "may be defined, at least provisionally, as that combination of feelings and emotions, and that mode of redintegration of emotions and their frameworks, which together are dominant or predominant in any individual person." To this succeed (1) chapters on the logic of practice, (2) of

ethic, (3) of politic, and (4) of the practical sciences. These four chapters occupy a volume of upwards of 500 pages, and are full of interest, value, exquisite expression, subtle thought, high reflective power, and genial appreciation of the philosophical systems of the best thinkers. We are not able to extend our quotations or our analysis farther. We shall conclude our *résumé* by excerpting the closing words he utters on the aim of philosophy :—

“The great aim of all philosophy, an aim which is its ethical justification as the pursuit of a life, is to give unity of conception to all branches of knowledge, as the basis of unity of action. The unity must extend to all conceptions in the individual mind, as the condition of uniting individuals, and finally nations, in the same philosophical system and the same general plan of action. It must be a unity which contains and allows of all possible differences, whether of character or of creed, assigning them their place in the history of belief, their function in the direction of practice. No partial philosophy can fulfil these conditions. The philosophical task of the present century has been one of construction; but this is not a task which can be completed at a blow. The foundation had been laid by Vico. But there was still needed much critical and destructive work, which the last century supplied. The two great constructive minds of this century have been Hegel and Comte; both aimed, but by different methods, at an all-embracing system of philosophy, and Comte may be regarded as the Andersseyn, the negation of Hegel. Neither the one nor the other system is complete in itself; each finds its completion only in ideas peculiar to the other. The task of the future is to combine the two contradictories in a system which shall be the truth of both, a system at once metaphysical in its method, positive and experimental in its contents. Such, at least, is the problem immediately to be solved, whatever may be the next step which may be revealed and proposed by its solution. To contribute in some measure to this solution has been the endeavour of the present work.”

We notice that in the November number of *The Contemporary Review* Mr. Hodgson has been treating of “The Future of Metaphysic,” giving utterance there to some weighty observations in the same strain. To this able paper we direct the attention of every reader interested in modern metaphysics. We hope it is true that he is prepared to furnish speculative philosophy with a *Theodicea* or science of religion such as shall crown his system.

Social Economy.

SHOULD THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC BE SUPPRESSED?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.—VI.

L. A. F. contends that because "men in all ages and in most countries have had more or less a habit of using drinks capable of intoxicating them," there is "not only a tendency in man to use them," but also "suitability in them to human nature and human wants." By such reasoning as this we might justify every evil that has been habitual with men of all ages. The question is not, "Have these things prevailed?" but rather, "Should they be suppressed?" A great deal of the reasoning throughout this controversy has dealt with the appropriateness of means to an end, and failed to answer the question whether or not the end should be gained. The arguments against the suppression of the liquor traffic have been more in defence and excuse of human weakness and folly as they exist, than in vindication of that strength and wisdom which ought to prevail. "Because alcohol is in the field," L. A. F. contends for its right of existence and use, but he fails to support that contention by any argument for its sale and use in the form of a beverage that carries ruin and misery into every nation that permits the traffic.

He further contends by analogy against prohibition, because "Deity, the very Author of the moral law, has not even in His beneficence prohibited to us the means of transgressing His law;" but surely he would not have human law permit the infliction of mischief upon individuals and the community because God has permitted the existence of means by which such mischief can be inflicted. If evil of any kind exists, it is because God's law has been broken, and it is man's province to discover and to work in harmony with God's law, so that the curse of its transgression may be removed. If therefore alcohol in drink, even in its moderate use, operates inharmoniously with the laws of man's physical well-being, the law or rule of man's life should be abstinence from alcoholic drink. I speak of the divine laws of life and health as imposed upon man

by his Maker, and do not now deal with exceptions, such as the medicinal properties of alcohol. This controversy is clearly intended to refer to the habitual use and common sale of intoxicating beverages, and should therefore steer clear of exceptions that may require exceptional legislation, moral or political.

L. A. F. fails to substantiate his statement that "the divine method of procedure is, in all cases involving moral responsibility, to regulate, not to prohibit." The divine law in its utterances is most emphatic. "Thou shalt," or "Thou shalt not," leave no option to do *wrong*, whilst these very utterances imply the *power* of the governed to transgress. The *operation* of divine law is the universal sequence of suffering from sin—the transgression of the law. What are the results of the habitual use and common sale of intoxicants? Three-fourths of the social evils and miseries, of the irreligion, and of the criminality of the community. These results *prove* the violation of the law—the divine law, or, as expressed in the question in debate, what *should be*. Such a question can have but one answer. The traffic in an evil thing that results in such calamities and crimes *should be suppressed*.

But it is argued that because the existence of alcohol indicates that "it must have a specific capability of being of use to man," and that because it is "man's business and duty to find out this proper specific use, the liquor traffic cannot meanwhile be prohibited with due regard to these points." We say rather, "*Because* it is proved that the introduction of alcohol into man's drink is *not* its proper specific use, *therefore* it '*should*' not be so employed; and *because* the community suffers from its employment for that specific purpose, the community should *suppress* the traffic which, by this proved abuse of alcohol, contributes to and fattens upon the vice and suffering of the community.

"Divine procedure" never by law *regulates* but always *prohibits* what is wrong. We contend that the liquor traffic is wrong. This does not imply that alcohol has not a specific use to man; and to argue that because it has a specific use, therefore its proved abuse should not be suppressed, is like a justification of firing the ball of a pistol into a man's head because the pistol, powder, and ball employed are all composed of elements "of which there is a very large provision in nature," and that therefore their destructive use must not be suppressed until every *ignoramus* is quite sure of the specific purpose for which these articles were created.

L. A. F. says "the evils of the liquor traffic should be lessened," but that "it is not right to do evil that good may come." Well, he admits that lessening the evils of the liquor traffic "is doing good;" surely, then, removing these evils cannot be doing evil. Regulation of wrong-doing is in itself wrong. The curtailment of the power to do wrong is progressively right. But so long as evil exists, even in a small degree, by my privity and consent, I am responsible for its existence; and my power to restrict or suppress any evil I know to exist is the measure of my duty; therefore I fail in my duty in proportion as I only regulate or restrict an evil I have the power to suppress. This is an abstract question of right or wrong; not whether a law may or may not harmonize with the British constitution, nor whether total legislative suppression may be immediately enforced by Act of Parliament with beneficial results; nor even whether such suppression is possible. These are all questions which must follow the settlement of the abstract question, "Should the liquor traffic be suppressed?" which has first to be settled as a question of right or wrong. I fear that L. A. F. has yet to understand the legitimate grounds of this debate, or he would not advance so unsound a statement and so irrelevant a reason of objection as that "the liquor traffic, like the silk-smercers' traffic, will regulate itself best by being left free from sumptuary laws." So long as thoughtful men compare the liquor traffic to beneficent and legitimate trades, we must, as he urges, continue to "give scope to their intelligence," for only when they are alive to its deadly character can we hope to convince them that the liquor traffic should be suppressed.

W. C. T.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

It now becomes our duty to shortly review the progress of this debate, which, as our space is limited, we shall proceed to do without further introduction.

W. J., the opener on the affirmative side, commences by asserting that, if with foreknowledge of its effects, we were discussing the first introduction of the liquor traffic, "few would venture to advocate such a course." The truth of this depends entirely upon who are the "we." If they were members of the Alliance, it is no doubt true; but if the ordinary British public, it is false—witness that

from our new settlements and colonies the liquor traffic is not excluded.

W. J. is aware that it may be objected that the liquor traffic is not necessarily mischievous, but because the "united wisdom and singular sagacity of the British Parliament" have not solved the problem of suppressing the evil and maintaining the good, W. J. holds that this cannot be done.

If this is to be the test, what can remain unsuppressed? Bankruptcy law, partnership law, joint stock enterprise, the law of marriage, of wills, of succession, municipal law, poor law, and so on, are all matters in which the "united wisdom and singular sagacity of the British parliament" have failed to suppress the evil and maintain the good. Therefore, per W. J., let partnership, joint stock enterprise, marriage, wills, &c., &c., all be suppressed.

But W. J. says that the failures which have attended the past must of necessity attend all future legislation on the subject. This is a bold statement, which should not be made unless supported by most powerful facts and reasonings. The exact limits of parliamentary power should be defined—not of the present only, but of the possible future,—the obstacles in the particular case should be pointed out; and how the case in question differs from all successful legislation be shown and illustrated,—the possible methods should be fully discussed, and their faults shown. All this and more should be done before such an assertion is ventured on, which, as it is semi-prophetical, should even then be made with modesty and caution. In this we do not certainly overstate what is necessary; let us then see whether W. J. by this lightens. His statement, in the first place, is not modest and cautious, but absolute and reckless, and it is founded on the following seven weighty reasons:—(1) "It [the liquor traffic] is a business to commence which a limited capital will suffice;" (2) "to conduct it no special training is necessary;" (3) "it affords the prospect of attaining a competent living with a modicum of mental and manual toil;" and therefore (4) "many of the not over-scrupulous yield to the temptation thus presented." So far we can see nothing essentially antidotic to parliamentary control; all four propositions might be affirmed of the Alliance Advocate business. But to proceed, (5) "it therefore becomes the special work of those to promote their trade on which their livelihood depends;" and (6) "their ingenuity is taxed to increase their trade." These two propositions we readily concede; they are true of every

trade; but, lastly, "the more money is spent in liquor, the less remains to spend on necessities of life;" which is a truism applicable to all luxuries, moderate or extravagant. Such are W. J.'s seven weighty reasons. We have weighed them well, pondered over them, viewed them in their wretched nakedness; but we fail to make out a scintilla of a reason why there are insuperable obstacles in the way of all but prohibitive legislation.

W. J. next plunges into political economy, and he is here still more unfortunate. We pass by the paragraphs about "wicked perversion of the bounties of Heaven," deterioration of the grain perfect from the hand of the Giver," and so on. While the large majority regard alcohol in moderation as a blessing, it is folly to write in that strain. But to the economical view; 672,000 people, W. J. says, are employed in producing and vending alcoholic drinks, and who will say that these are contributing one iota to the wealth of the nation? In reply, firstly, we would express our surprise at the small number employed. The whole working portion of the nation is of course employed in producing (*a*) necessities and (*b*) luxuries. The main item of necessities is food—solids and beverages. 672,000 seems thus to us a small number to be employed in satisfying the thirst of the nation. The number employed in satisfying the nation's hunger must be vastly greater. Secondly, we would remark that there is no economic difference between the labour employed on alcoholic drinks, and the labour employed on other necessities or luxuries. On the one hand, corn is delivered to the maltster, by him to the brewer, the beverage is then sent to the retailer, who vends it for consumption. On the other hand, corn is delivered to the miller, who sends the flour to the baker, by whom the bread is sold for consumption; and can J. W. point out wherein the second class of labour more than the first "contributes one iota to the wealth of the nation"? Truly it may be stated that if we drank water, a less expensive beverage, so much labour would be saved. But this involves miserly nonsense. It tells with equal force against tea as against alcohol. Such a principle would involve the abolition of all pleasant foods; all alike, rich and poor, should live on oatcake and water, and clothe themselves in sackcloth.

But why, asks W. J., if we restrict do we not suppress? Are we not thereby admitting the principle? No: as we have shown in our first paper, we restrict with the view of preventing drunk-

eness, which does legitimately call for legislative interference, and of preserving the right of moderate drinking, which does not.

W. J.'s final effort is the erection and destruction of a man of straw. He says, "The antiquity of the traffic may be urged in favour of its retention." And then he proceeds, "If these are the most cogent reasons, &c., &c., and with exclamations and interrogations knocks antiquity down. There let it rest, for no one except W. J. would dream of setting it up.

We have now to consider the article by S., and will first examine the affirmative portion. So attacks on the liquor traffic involve the following abstract principle:—

That everything must be suppressed, unless one of three things can be proved:—

1. That it is not socially pernicious.
2. That it is separable from mischievous action.
3. That the benefits equal or more than equal the disadvantages.

And none of these, he says, can be proved of the liquor traffic.

This is an ingenious form of an old fallacy. However well the principle might work in some impossible Utopia, the laws of a free country never can be founded on it. Practically, the test is left with the third condition, for is there anything mundane not more or less socially pernicious, or from which mischievous action is completely separable? Thus S.'s principle means this,—that everything must be suppressed unless "the benefits equal or more than equal the disadvantages," which in its solitariness he would hesitate to affirm. It is unworkable, for who is to arbitrate between the benefits and evils? Are the majority? If so, it is simply tyranny; it means that the community in all things shall conform to the views of the majority. Would a Catholic community thus except Protestantism (or *vice versa*) from prohibition?

Thus we should be led back to the intolerance of the Middle Ages.

S.'s principle is therefore specious. It is of the past, not of the free present or freer future. If he will read Mill again, we think he will conclude with us that prohibition must only issue against specific things which trespass on the general conserved rights. No other principle is logical or safe.

We now turn to S.'s observations on our first article. He first falls foul of us for adducing the question of religion against the rights of majorities. "Religion," he says, "is free, and the liquor traffic is not, for A. H. G. is willing to see wise restrictions on

the liquor traffic." A. H. G. therefore, he says, recognises a radical difference. Our illustration was, we still think, apposite. We did not say there is a perfect analogy between the liquor traffic and religion; we only used the latter to illustrate the principle by which we limited the rights of majorities, which principle S. admits, while he picks a needless quarrel with our illustration.

But religious profession does compare farther with the liquor traffic than we have carried it. Religion is not altogether free.

It is only free to the limits in which we wish to bind the liquor traffic, —i.e., while it does not trespass on the general conserved rights. S. will believe us that, if Juggernauts and suttees were here established, we "would gladly see all parties co-operating to draw up wise restrictions on" the exercise of religion, though we should not wish it suppressed altogether.

S.'s meaning as to the minority coercing the majority we cannot fathom. While the liquor traffic is simply free, where is the coercion? The coercion begins when a section (A) is debarred it because another section (B) does not want it; and the corresponding coercion would be to compel section B to partake in it.

The statement that the Permissive Bill simply transfers the licensing power from the justices to the people is extremely specious. The former have the power to regulate, not to suppress. They have to consider chiefly whether the wants of a district are sufficiently supplied; they have not to determine whether the traffic shall be carried on at all. This is a wholly different power from that sought to be conferred on the two-thirds majority, and we think the argument unworthy of a well-meant cause.

In reply to our statement that drunkenness, not the liquor traffic, is chargeable with the evils calling for redress, S. says, firstly, "Drunkenness is one of the evils, and cannot be its own cause;" and secondly, "Pauperism, &c., arise from the waste of money in moderate drinking as well as from drunkenness." The first reply is an enigma worthy of the schoolmen. The second proves too much, for pauperism, &c., flow equally from the waste of money in expensive meats, clothing, &c., as from moderate drinking, which of course call equally for prohibitory law.

S., in conclusion, challenges our statement that vegetarians trace equal evils from meat diet to what teetotallers trace from alcohol. The following quotations will therefore be instructive:—"But no one can deny the fact that . . . animalism in various other forms

does its work of moral degradation; that men fall victims to depraved appetites and passions; . . . disputes, quarrels, and human bloodshed individually and nationally prevailed to a frightful extent. . . . I believe it will not be going to far to declare that the most virulent and noisome diseases to which 'the human race is heir' are the results of the pernicious habit . . . of devouring the flesh of animals in which those diseases are first developed. . . . The germs thus imbibed and nourished by continual additions silently spread, till effects are produced in the constitution entailing consequences upon future generations *of a much more deadly character than those of drink.*" The italics in this last sentence are ours. The two quotations are from a debate in a former number of this journal. We therefore ask again, why have not those who follow these two writers claims for similar legislative aid for their views to what S. asks for his? Is there a grievance to be named by the one which cannot be claimed by the other? We take leave of S. with this, which he may consider either as a *reductio ad absurdum*, or as a call to him to take up his cudgel for the vegetarians.

R. L. O.'s paper is refreshing. The Alliance is the school of illogical thought, and he is a king among them. Short work he makes of all the inconsistencies, inequalities, and errors his view involves; he simply is oblivious to them—ignores them.

"Total prohibition is the true method of dealing with criminal indulgences," he says, and this he proves by showing it is the divine mode,—*"Thou shalt not kill,"* &c. ; and then with scorn he throws back the charge of folly respecting prohibition. Are not all these things prohibited? May we steal a little? May we kill to a moderate extent? May we slightly infringe the matrimonial law? Argal, the liquor traffic should be totally suppressed.

The syllogism lacks but one thing—a minor premias: few will dispute his attack on all criminal indulgences, but where has he shown—which is a main point of the discussion—that the liquor traffic is a criminal indulgence? And if it be, R. L. O. must prepare for an awful conclusion. Further on (p. 178) he points me with idactic finger to the text, *"The law of the Lord is perfect."* And yet I cannot find it said anywhere, *Thou shalt have no liquor traffic.* Such is the danger of squeezing and twisting Scripture.

With all that Paul has written and R. L. O. quoted against *drunkenness* we fully agree. But Paul has fallen into the error of the author of the decalogue; he has nowhere prohibited the liquor traffic.

Further on R. L. O. quotes from our paper, "Not the liquor traffic, but drunkenness, is chargeable with the evils." "But what," says R. L. O., "makes the drunkenness? Abolish the liquor traffic, and where would the drunkenness be? Can we have drunkenness without the drink?" Now all this we reply to by anticipation on the same page from which R. L. O. quotes. We showed that the abuse of anything must not be urged against its use, and that the immediate evils calling for redress must be attacked, not their ultimate or accessory causes. Has R. L. O. any reply to this? If so, he should have enlightened us; if not, he had better have omitted reference to the point altogether.

The writer in the October number confines himself to replying to C., whose line of argument is wholly different from ours.

C. R. carefully perpetuates the old error of failing to discriminate between drunkenness and the liquor traffic. This runs through and nullifies the first three or four pages of his article. His reply to the writer in the September number is curious. That writer says, "Prohibition can only justify itself when it can prove that it is the issue of unerring wisdom." C. R. agrees to this, but says, "In this case it has not been shown that it is not the issue of unerring wisdom," which would cause one to think that the Permissive Bill had been drawn up by the Pope. C. R., like W. J., holds that all legislation on the subject except suppression must fail; and his reason is because "legislation upon an evil is wrong—morally wrong,"—which, or its connection with the subject, we cannot understand.

We have seen S.'s justification for prohibition; C. R.'s is that the traffic "retards our social and moral prosperity." So does everything more or less. Commerce, marriage, religion, all things mundane, like the liquor traffic, result in some amount of evil, and so "retard our social and moral prosperity." C. R. meets the question of use and abuse by quoting a Scripture text. He might have found others more apposite, but he forgets that our laws are not—nor intended to be—founded on New Testament ethics. The latter are for individual guidance, irrespective of human laws. The laws of societies must be made in the interests mainly of freedom, and then individuals will be free to act up to their own interpretation of or belief in the moral law. The hardships of the drunkard's family, which he next refers to, we have ourselves written about; and it gives a right of legislative interference with

the drunkard, but it gives no right whatever of suppressing the moderate use of alcohol. The statement that the moderate use ought to be avoided because it is a "tampering with temptation and all men are liable to fall," involves manifest absurdities. There is no walk in life, no action, no recreation, no desire, which is not in this sense a "tampering with temptation," and so ought to be avoided. If C. R. has such particular dread of the liquor traffic over all other forms of temptation, he is right in his own home to enforce his view; but he has, on such grounds, no claim to universal prohibition.

Our space will not allow us to enter upon the remedies we should wish to see in lieu of this ill-considered suppression. We look with great favour upon the proposal of Dr. Dalrymple, M.P., to found asylums for drunkards. With some well-matured scheme of that kind to meet acute cases, and with the spread of education to remove slowly but surely the chronic tendency to hard drinking, we shall hope to see the Alliance ere very long deprived of its grievance, and its funds applied to teaching its members the first principles of logic and political economy.

A. H. G.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

THE use of the stimulation produced by the inhibition of alcoholic liquors is almost as widely diffused as the human family is. In one form or other men have found it requisite to have an exhilarant. The tear and wear, the labour and care of life, are found to be too sudden and depressing to be endured unless mitigated by some mode or other of escape for a while from their grasp or pressure. The common experience of man is in favour of the beneficial effect of the moderate use of alcoholic liquors, and any argument drawn from the abuse of this universally accepted condiment of existence is as ineffective as an argument against the propriety and beneficiality of marriage would be which should be based on the evils of indiscriminate sexuality, on the occasional operation of incompatibility of temper, or the errors, terrors, and horrors of the Divorce Court. An argument for celibacy, drawn from such premises, would not be considered as exceedingly logical. It could be pointed out, of course, that one of the chief arguments employed was altogether beyond the question, seeing that the very object of marriage is to destroy indiscriminate intercourse, to

moderate both the passion and the indulgence ; while another was altogether inapplicable to marriage, as being due to something altogether foreign to it. In the same manner, as has been often pointed out before, if the abuse of a thing were to be considered as a justification of its abolition, there would really be nothing that would be free from an agitation for abolition.

What has been more subject to abuse than Christianity ? Persecution, heresy, schism, sectarianism, nay, religious madness are words which hint at these abuses. But who, because of these, advocates the suppression of Christianity ? Poetry ! oh, how hast thou been abused ! And are we to suppress Shakspeare and prohibit Milton because there have been villains who perpetrated rhymes that are a disgrace, not to the Muse only, but to humanity ? Law is a useful commodity, but it has been and may be much abused. Ought we then to abolish law because its abuses are such that as lawyers multiply lawsuits seem to abound ? Or shall we correct the abuse of one thing by calling in another abused article as a counterfoil ? By the legal abolition of the liquor traffic we shall, I suppose, proceed homœopathically — *similis similibus curantur*,—like is cured by like ; one abuse is corrected by another ; Satan casteth out Satan ; and hence the strong man of the liquor traffic is to be bound by the strong arm of the law. Is there not as great an evil done by the multiplication of unreasonable and unworkable laws as there is by the multiplication of public-houses ? Crimes invented by Act of Parliament are sure to be lightly thought of, and so the moral sense is depraved, and what power of moral distinction is left to fallen man is vitiated so as to confound law-made crimes with God-established moral distinctions ; and people get to think that one set may be broken just as harmlessly as the other.

All sin is bad, whatever its source ; but all sin even cannot be made amenable to law. In a perfect community every sin would be crime, and there would be no juggling between law and morals. In our stupid zeal for legislating on hobbies, and employing on our side the pseudo-omnipotence of an Act of Parliament, we erect contrariety to our opinion into a crime, with penalties attached ; and so give rise to the idea that crime is merely being in a minority, or rather, not being connected with the majority. The greater the number of items written down on the statute-book as crimes which are not sins, the greater the evil results to the moral sense of a

nation. People begin to think not only that all that law does not or cannot punish is right and proper, and therefore permitted, but also that all law is but the expressed will of the majority, and has no moral sanction other than the power majority wields. Hence evasion and contravention of the law is regarded as justifiable, if not clever, and the whole morals of the nation are depraved. We are suffering from an excess of legislation—legislation on points, not on principles. Let our legislation set forth great principles to be observed, let it be the duty of the proper judges to determine upon the morality or the immorality of specific acts according to these principles, and we would uphold law and morality together. Thus we might secure at once the observance of moral principle,—

“Apaise the cause in Justice’ equal scales,

Whose beam stands sure, whose rightful cause prevails.”

But the adage that “Justice is blind” may surely be held to be true when that which the majority holds as an opinion—prompted often by party ends—is promoted to be the law of the land. If we give opinion such weight, we traduce true morality just as far as we upraise opinion. The production of alcohol cannot be a sin, for it is often a product of nature, and it is therefore one of the elements which God has presented to man to discover its use. The production by means of art of a product of nature cannot *per se* be a sin, for therein we are imitating the Deity. Besides, if that were a sin, what would become of all those manufactures of which it may be said “the art itself is nature”? The vending of liquor so manufactured cannot be a sin if the selling be conducted so as to place it in the hands only of persons who know the powers and purposes of the article, and are able to undertake the responsibilities implied in its use. The using of it cannot be a sin; for being a product of God having use, it is right that it should be employed. The only point where sin arises is in the drunkenness wherein is excess. That is a sin which attaches to the improper use of any of God’s gifts. But that is a sin which is committable only by the partaker. The trafficker may indeed aid and abet, either knowingly or unknowingly; and if he do so knowingly, he is partaker in the transgression. To make a crime of the production of alcohol, or of its vending, would be to disturb the sense of responsibility, and shift the sense of sin from the true transgressor, the drunkard, to the injury of his moral nature, already depraved enough, by causing him to lay the blame in self-excusing on the trafficker.

These reasons seem to me to justify a pause before we adopt the short and easy way of the advocates of the Permissive Bill—destroy the traffic. We do not propose to do the same with the other temptations to sin. We know that “the love of money is the root of all evil,” but who agitates for an abolition of coinage, a razure of banks, a closing of exchanges, a suppression of commerce?

To all the emotions, passions, and senses of man a responsibility attaches that they should be used properly, that is, in harmony with the higher purposes of human life. It is an established fact in creation that all that creatures have an appetency for is more or less wholesome under proper regulations for that creature. Of old it was the nostrum in sickness to withhold all that was craved for, instead of giving it under regulation. Now it is the received practice in medicine to accept of the cravings of the body as the voice of nature, instinctively showing what the body requires, and supplies are accordingly granted. The Permissive Bill advocates are anxious, it would appear, to resort to the old nostrum in regard to the liquor traffic; and that would most probably be as effectual as a general ukase for the observance of celibacy would be in procuring the abolition of sexual sins. The system of repression and of suppression is in reality wrong in principle: it makes safeguards for man by externals, whereas the true safeguards of man are self-control, educated habits, watchfulness, and moderation.

We are not advocates of licence or of liquorishness; we are not apologists for drunkenness and rioting; we are not supporters of the right to get intoxicated; but we are bound to oppose flagrant errors in moral philosophy and jurisprudence when they threaten to involve the whole country in an anarchy resulting from legislation contrary to the very principles of nature. Civilized man has always required stimulants and narcotics. These may either be natural or artificial; but had they must be. The requirements of civilization are such that these must be had and be available at the moment of need, and hence they soon occasion an artificial supply. This supply being attainable may be over-indulged in; just as clothing, which is a requirement of civilization, is made an article of luxury as well as of necessity.

The argument which W. J. uses regarding the invasion of the country (p. 22) would be equally valid as to cholera, small-pox, the plague, &c.; but even the dread infections of these and many

other diseases, brought upon us by the commercial enterprise of the country, are all risked, and nobody cries out, Abolish commerce because it involves us in such dangers. Similarly, the manufacture of gunpowder, dynamite, or fireworks, is neither suppressed nor abolished, although the dangers of explosion, &c., are terrific. In the same way, despite of the numerous accidents arising from the working of coal, our collieries are not suppressed or prohibited. Danger cannot roll back the wheels of civilisation. We may exercise care, caution, and restraint, but not suppression.

If the failure of legislation to restrain were a good plea for suppression or abolition, smoke would be abolished; the use of machinery would be put an end to; the sale of poison, even when most requisite as medicine, would be suppressed; and the excise and inland revenue would require to be numbered among the things that were. Legislation is seldom competent to suppression, and is hardly tasked to secure and accomplish repression. We have not yet been able to suppress theft, murder, or perjury, although we have legislated a good deal to bring that about, and society has so large an interest in managing that. Does W. J. and his compeers think that if suppression has failed in these cases—as well as in false coining and forgery—any laws that could be framed would succeed in suppressing the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors? If it is true that men peril their soul's safety by drunkenness, is it at all probable that any means could be found by which men could be brought to enforced abstinence?

The perversion of food argument (p. 23) is almost equally futile. Man is a creature of intense desires. For the mere trappings of his frame he will involve many creatures' lives, and he is not much likely to be moved by the destruction of food argument. The people who in the very presence of a cattle plague will not abstain from the use of veal are not likely to submit to legal restraint upon their thirst complaints.

S. seems to argue that because legal restraint is allowed, provided for, and submitted to (p. 98), prohibition might be so as well, and on the same principle; but many people can yield assent to a partial conclusion—"some use of alcoholic liquors ought to be prohibited," who will not agree to a universal one—"all use of alcoholic liquor ought to be prohibited; exactly as people will agree that, 'some men should be celibates,' who would not assent to the affirmation, "all men should be celibates." The tri-lemma of S.

is not exhaustive (p. 99) of all the possibilities. It is held by many that "the action of the liquor traffic is *not so* socially pernicious" as to warrant suppression; that "the traffic is (to a large extent) separable from the mischievous action;" and that the total amount of "the benefits" conferred not only "more than equal," but greatly exceed "the injury," just as the benefits of railway traffic—notwithstanding the injury arising from accidents—greatly exceeds the injury occasioned by it. The evils are seen and able to be reduced to statistics; the benefits are not.

S. has not seen a law which is capable of stopping the public nuisance of garotting, of theft, of murder, &c., though that the law and the public have a right to do; how does he expect to make a law for the suppression of a traffic, against which public opinion is not in force, effective and successful? Law ought not to attempt improbabilities, still less impossibilities.

On a review of the question as put in the preceding papers, I think we may assert that the case of the Alliance has not been made out sufficiently to maintain a "should." "*Should*" is expressive of bounden moral duty, and implies that moral law is incontrovertibly on the side of the view expressed. "*Should*," in fact, expresses being under an obligation to do what is advanced in the proposition in which it appears. We think that the liquor traffic *should* not be suppressed, because men's consciences and hearts do not acknowledge a moral obligation to abstinence; because their desires are powerfully in favour of the matter exposed for sale; and because, while we can see the evil that the liquor works, we cannot estimate the good it does. Storms have beneficial effects in creation; comets perturb the skies probably for good ends; even diseases are not altogether without utility in the universe. We must not rashly conclude that because a seen evil could be prevented, a larger unseen good might not be taken away by the means employed to accomplish that. States cannot, any more than bodies, have all their outward evils cleansed from the surface without risk of internal disadvantage. We commend moderation to our permissive compulsionists, and advise that the liquor traffic should be restrained, but not suppressed.

S. H. R.

Education.

OUGHT THE READING OF THE BIBLE TO BE PROHIBITED IN RATE-AIDED SCHOOLS?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

To one good effect of the present debate we think it honest to bear our testimony. On our first reading the proposal to adopt the question, "Ought the reading of the Bible to be prohibited in rate-aided schools?" as one to be discussed in the pages of this magazine, we certainly thought that no adequate defence of an opposite opinion could be made, but we also thought that even a good show of argument on the negative side could not be made. In this latter portion of our thinking we have been mistaken, and we confess that we have been pleased to think that so much estimable sentiment and good sense has been laid before the reader by the advocates of Bible-reading.

These sentiments and that sense, however, have not convinced me of the propriety of the allowance of Bible-teaching in rate-aided schools, but rather the reverse.

Observe that we do not deny the utility or even the supreme importance of Bible-teaching, oppose the employment of all moral influence on the children of the poor which the Bible is calculated to effect, or heretically declaim against the Bible as a book improperly used in the training of the young. Our opponents have for the most part written as if we were all atheists, infidels, and secular worldlings, who took the view adverse to theirs, and they have neither been chary of nor charitable in the use of innuendoes to this effect in their articles and criticisms.

One of the old good maxims we learned in other days was "A place for everything and everything in its place." This is what we want. Keep religion in its own place among the high and holy verities; do not let it be dwindled down to primer level, and make it only one of the drudge-tasks of a child's school life. We want to lift.

not to level; to raise, not to depreciate the Bible. We want the Bible taught—taught to children even, if you choose; but taught as Jesus Christ taught the truths He gave for common guidance, when parents brought their children to Him that he might bless them, and He said, “Suffer the little children to come unto Me, and forbid them not.” They were not to be compelled. Jesus knew that compulsory religion was an impossibility. He addressed the same terms to children as to adults—“Come.” He did not say, “Send,” “bring.” The only compulsion possible in the kingdom of Christ is the irresistible compulsion of persuasion; in rate-aided schools compulsion of a far other sort must be resorted to, and hence we believe that the reading of the Bible in them is quite alien to the spirit of the gospel. Give the Bible its own high sphere, its own holy, rightful place, so that not the compulsion of the State or of the School Board may “constrain” the little children to “the love of Christ,” but persuading kindness, loving, thoughtful, and earnest teaching, founded on Scripture, but having its source in the love of the Saviour.

This is what is meant when we say that the Bible is “a book beyond the province of the State.” The State has no just right to compel the inculcation of any religion in public schools—no right to compel the receiving of the gospel of Jesus Christ into the heart.

We have objected besides that it is “a book on which all are not agreed,” and therefore a book, the teaching of which, as things now are, which would lead to the development of sectarianism under the fostering of the State. The more ardent the sectarianism, the larger the bribe that would be obtainable by the State; and churches would be in reality endowed, while nominally only schools were rate-aided. The school rate would in truth be a rate in aid of sectarian strife, contention, and virulence.

C. R. unfortunately thinks (p. 33) that the same reasons which gain favour of *secular* education ought to gain favour as well of *religious* education. But his mistake lies in supposing that religious education is able to be given or taken by compulsion. Sectarianism may be cultured easily by compulsion, and a sophist may call that religious education; but a compulsory religion has been made impossible by the Most High himself, who does not force men to be religious, but says rather, “My son, *give Me thine heart*,”—making it a matter of will, of consent, of persuasion, and of love.

We would reply to the argument of C. R., on p. 34, that a Chris-

tian spirit, purpose, and manner may not only rule in, but prevail in a school where there is no doctrinal or dogmatic teaching of religion at all; and that is what ought to be, just as a general Christian consensus of mind has leavened society with courtesy and affability, politeness and suavity, till even those who feel none of the spirit of it know its fascination and practise its rules.

R. G. S. speaks as if we were going to destroy the Bible and all the holy influences of its precepts, because we wanted it kept out of the schoolroom where the State rates are employed to secure instruction. This is an arrant mistake. All the churches, sabbath schools, children's magazines, &c., still exist. The Bible is still existent. Anybody is at liberty to offer religious instruction, nay, even to press it on acceptance. The Bible is appointed to be read in churches, not in schools. It is in the assemblies of the faithful that the word of God is to be read. It is the Church that is to teach all that Jesus Christ has commanded. The State crucified Him, and the State would only crucify Him afresh and put Him to an open shame, if it would enforce religious education (so called) on any who did not voluntarily, freely, and of entire assent of spirit, come to receive it as the gift of God, not as the task of the State.

R. G. S. must remember that the State is entirely a secular engine; it has no religious position. It may encourage anything that will help to make men more easily managed. But surely he would not debase God's word to make it a tool of State, and put into the power of the State the immense bribery influence which a million or two per annum, to distribute among those who would teach what it liked, would give the State. We must have no tampering with the pure creed of Jesus, which has suffered enough, as was foretold in the divine word, through "filthy lucre." The soul is already too much led astray by the love of money, and Britain will not sell its birthright of religious freedom for the base bribes of the State; but to save itself from the possibility or suspicion of that will keep the State in its own place, and retain the Bible as the heritage of the Church.

The task of the Church is to ameliorate the condition of the spirit of the people, and to impress into their minds those principles which are to be brought forward as laws; hence the argument (p. 121) that the laws being based on religion, the education of the school should be religious, is inept,—1st, because it may be religious

without the reading of the Bible going on in it at all; 2nd, law is only the expression of the moral feeling of the people; and if the moral feeling of the people is religious, then the moral tone of the school will be so too.

W. H. C. complains of the inefficacy of Sunday schools, and makes that one argument for asking that the Bible be read in all schools. How can he imagine that if Sunday school teaching of the Bible is defective or ineffective (p. 187), common School Board reading would mend the matter? Divided responsibility always results in failure in the object. The rate-aided school would trust to the Sunday school for much of the religious teaching, and the Sunday School would trust to the day school. Each would claim any credit that could be had, and each would disclaim the discredit. Let us know precisely who is to make children understand the Scriptures, and in case of failure we can "saddle the right horse," in case of success give "honour to whom honour is due."

We presume that the popular moral philosophy of the age will rule in the schools of the future, and that conduct in school will be guided very much, as it always has been, by the influence of opinion on pupil and teacher. W. H. C. may keep his anxieties as to school management quite at zero, for no school board will ever, on pain of the loss of his situation (p. 189), command a teacher to abstain from giving proper moral instruction, and such chastisement as may be necessary to enforce it.

The State will do all that "Samuel" insists (p. 276) on when it gives the several religious bodies in the country freedom to teach the Scriptures as the source of the faith they proclaim and uphold; and protects them in the right to teach from it the tenets they deduce from its pages, so long as these are not inimical to the welfare of the State, as the glory and safeguard of the inhabitants of the land.

The State will leave to the churches the teaching of Scriptural morality, and will incorporate into its laws the moral desires of the community so soon as the churches have succeeded in making these prevail. In this way, too, the State secures all that "Samuel" argues for. His kindly strictures on our article do not require much notice from us. We do not think that his scheme of reading the Bible exceptionally would be promotive of the ends of true spiritual teaching, "that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works."

The principles on which the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools is advocated do not seem to be such as to demand what is asked; they assert the supreme value of the Bible for man, but they do not show that all the advantages thereof are to be gained by Bible study under proper and better arrangements made by the Church, rather than by, as well as independently of, the State.

If the reading of the Bible is so important as our opponents affirm, why make so great an outcry about its expulsion from rate-aided schools as a task-book? As it is so important in their eyes, and in the eyes of those whose views they represent, they cannot but exert every nerve to get the reading of it properly attended to; besides, this will be all the more easily done, not only because the children will come to its perusal with minds better cultured, but also because rate-aided schools will be there; and the advocates of Bible-reading in schools, instead of leaving the whole expense of education to bear, will only require to provide for the proper perusal of the Bible. If, then, there is found such unanimity among the several sects as to show that the reading and study of the Bible can be carried on in simultaneous classes, all parties uniting together in holy harmony upon the subject, giving pecuniary and personal aid to the Scripture study classes, the State may be taught that it is possible to do it, and so accommodate the churches by granting the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools.

In the meantime the fact has been that the sects have so quarrelled among themselves and wrangled with the State, "which should be greatest among them," that they have kept the State hampered in its desire to give a wide and good education to the children of the land for nearly a century, until, in the interests of education and of the State alike, it was essential that the sects should be shaken off and told to stand aside, that something may be done.

In regard to religion at the present time, it is clear that the sects are not so united as to make it possible to have the Bible read in rate-aided schools at which compulsory education must prevail, and hence the reading of the Bible in rate-aided schools ought to be prohibited, that education may go on and men may learn the joys and the delights of the culture made possible by the Book. When they do so, they will not long or willingly, remain ignorant of the Book of Books.

J. J. H.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE long and fluctuating course of history has furnished us with unquestionable proofs of the eminent utility of the Bible to the welfare of man, individually and collectively. The great truths which glow on every page of this wondrous Book are endorsed, beyond the possibility of doubt, in the rise, progress, and fall of nations. Without its revelations humanity was left to grovel in darkness, unable to experience vitality in morals, and made a prey to error and corruption. But with its blessed truths nations are enabled to rise above the iron power of ignorance. History tells us more. It places before us the dark pictures of the dreadful results which have been brought on those nations which refuse to accept its truths, and give them the position its laws and authority demanded. Look at those nations which, puffed up with empty pride, denied the authority of the Bible. Infidelity became the order of the day. The Sabbath became a gala-day, a day of political strife, amusement, and anything that contributed to an indulgence. In those facts we learn the power of the Bible, and the action we are bound to take in regard to its position in the land. The Bible explains its own laws and principles, so to its testimony we can only go in search of instruction relating to the manner of the application of its truths. It is God's revelation to man; in it we find the only true principles of man's relation to God, and the responsibilities attached to his temporal condition. Where God's authority is recognised, there His word must be held as supreme in importance. All men are under its authority, and therefore none can dictate regarding its use apart from its own precepts. Human law must be permeated with Scripture truth, otherwise its statutes can only be counterfeit. "If they speak not according to *this* word, it is because there is no light in them."

Secular knowledge is well worthy the keenest pursuit, and doubtless its acquisitions shed a brilliancy over the intellectual history of man; but to be truly serviceable such knowledge must be acquired in conjunction with that nobler education presented in the revelation of God. To educate in purely secular knowledge would be to give a worldly knowledge—a knowledge only half fitted to accomplish the purpose of life. We hold, therefore, that the State cannot organize, without violating her constitution, a system of education on purely secular principles. The God of nature is the God of

the Bible. In both His voice is heard, and through both we are obliged to learn His will. It seems clear, then, that secular and religious knowledge are bound up together by principles which render the union inalienable.

It is admitted by all that the establishment of a national system of education is an obligation which the State has a right to recognise. Secularists and religionists are at one on this point. It is a duty which has been too long neglected by the State. But now the State must educate. Such a course is essential to the protection of its freedom, and the well-being and progress of its subjects. The fact that thousands upon thousands of British subjects are enveloped in the enslaving folds of ignorance is a painful proof of the utter inefficiency of voluntarism. Our land from one end to the other is studded with churches and schools which exert a mighty influence over the people by the instruction in knowledge, secular and religious. But still these agents of education cannot effect one-half of the purpose aimed at—*education to every subject in the kingdom*. This is the primary reason why the State ought to supplement the voluntary efforts of the people by establishing national schools. In doing so it appears to me that the State cannot, without infringing upon the rights of the people, prohibit any part of that "use and wont" which has accompanied our system of education for so many years. The State ought to adopt the system which has practical proofs to bear witness of its power, and not to be guided by the whims of sects that have done scarcely anything in behalf of education.

We argued in our opening paper that since it is an established fact that there is an absolute necessity for a national system of education, the fact is equally for *religious* as for *secular* instruction. There are thousands wholly illiterate, but there are legions more that are *godless*. An entirely delusive argument is advanced in reference to the duty of the parent and the Church as a reason for Bible expulsion from our schools. Duty of parents! How many parents require to be *taught* their duty? How many parents are mentally incapacitated to *perform* their duty? How many parents *care* about their duty, and endeavour to act in accordance with their responsibilities? If these questions are fairly answered, we feel that the argument as to the duty of parents does not stand valid as a reason for the prohibition of the reading of the Bible in schools. As to religious education being the duty of the Church, we do not

dispute that, but we maintain that the work cannot be effectually done by the Church, because such instruction is left to *voluntary* effort. The facts are established beyond doubt, and it seems unreasonably obtuse to make so strenuous objections to Bible-reading on such a plea. Did not the question of national education arise from this fact, that education was *neglected*? How then can it be even plausibly reasoned that a duty incumbent upon certain individuals cannot be supplemented by, or, in cases of neglect, transferred to others? To our mind the objection is unreasonable, because its theory could not be practically applied without the most disastrous consequences. Indeed, if we examine the merits of this objection we shall find that there is little in it pertaining to common sense. For the *motive* of our opponents objection is to *attain* a *secular* object. But if religious education is an obligation on the part of certain persons in an individual capacity, why not in a national capacity? Certainly, if this duty were performed by all, the question of a national system of education would never have been raised. It is because this duty is *neglected*, and that too by the greater portion of the community, that we argue that religious as well as secular education *becomes* an obligation on the part of the State. The fact of there being so great a diversity in religious opinion does not in the slightest degree affect our position. We do not advocate *doctrinal* instruction but Bible-reading in the school. At this advanced stage in religious progress we deny that the State has any right to listen to the upstart assumptions of paltry sects that do not believe in the plain truths of the Scriptures. If the Bible is for *all*, then there is no call for the adoption of that wild idea of placing all religious sects on a common footing.

The Bible ought to be read in rate-aided schools, because of its eminent suitability to the capacities of youth, and its universal applicability to man. No person or particular section of society can possibly free themselves from the responsibilities the Bible shows that they lie under, by simply denying or doubting its truths. Liberty of conscience and toleration in religious thought are at the present day much abused. It is difficult to comprehend why some religious sects that deny the truths of the Bible as a whole are tolerated and evidently placed on an equal footing with religious bodies widely differing in their views. The Bible is the word of God, and as such it ought not to be driven hither and thither by the variations of religious dogmatisms, and the mere disputes between

sects at variance. The Bible must have free course. We agree with our opponents as to the duty of certain members and sections of society in regard to the inculcation of its truths, but we cannot agree that such a duty is *restricted* to any particular class. There is no such authority for such an argument. The divine command to instruct the young is unlimited: "Train up a child in the way he should go;" not, as our opponents' theory would seem to make it read,—*"Train up your child in the way he should go."* By the reading of the Bible in the school no particular religious doctrine is inculcated. It is only the simple truths and historical facts which are brought before the mind of the scholar; the imparting of such important instruction cannot be otherwise than beneficial.

J. J. H. says, "Man, in his earthly interests and practices, the State has a right and a duty to rule and regulate. Man, in his faith and in his relations to God, transcends the compulsory power of the State." J. J. H., in the foregoing quotation, endeavours to distinguish between man in his relations to God and in his relations to man. It is quite obvious that what man's relations to man are solely depends on what his relations are to God. We hold that these relations are indivisible. They run into one another. The exercise of man's duty to man is just the issue of his relations and responsibilities to God. We do not maintain that a State has a right to interfere with "man in his faith." The point we maintain is that the State's duty is to further its "earthly interests;" and these interests cannot be furthered except by a recognition of the Bible. For what are man's earthly interests?

- Are they not the interests antecedent to his interests *eternal*? It is true, as J. J. H. remarks, that "the Bible came into the world without the aid or care of the State;" but he is incorrect in saying "it has another *aim and duty altogether* than the State has." The Bible came into the world by the power of Him who *governs* the world. Its truths have been weaved into our constitution by Him whose authority is supreme. Its aim is to enlighten man in the truth—to teach him his duty in all capacities. What it says to the individual it says also to the community. On the other hand, what are the aims of the State?—to protect and further the temporal interests of its subjects, to govern justly. Can a State govern *justly* unaided by divine truth? Let J. J. H. compare the laws of our country with, for example, the laws of the ancient Grecian and

Roman empires, and endeavour to separate the aims of the State from those of the Bible. The Bible teaches the State its *duty*, so it follows that the duty of the State must have relation to the Bible. J. J. H.'s assertion that "the Bible has another *duty* altogether than the State has;" is utterly meaningless, because we never speak of God's *duty* to man, but of man's *duty* to God. The fact that the Bible came into the world *without* the aid of the State proves nothing. The real point that affects the question is, not *how* the Bible came into the world, but how it stands in *relation* to the world. It is because of its relation to the world that we maintain the right of the State to enforce the reading of the Bible in the school.

The argument that the State would be violating its constitution to enforce the reading of the Bible in its schools because "Jews, Catholics, and Secularists would be compelled to pay for the reading of a book which they do not approve of" is most unreasonable. If the State were to enforce nothing but what all "approve of," I am curious to learn what aims and laws it could institute. J. J. H. would have the Bible withdrawn from the school, not because the State considers the book *wrong*, but simply on account of "Jews, Catholics and Secularists not approving of it." Is this a sufficient reason for the expulsion of the Bible from the school? Surely not. Protestantism is the religion of our country so until our country changes her constitution, the opinions of Jews, Catholics, and Secularists on the matter of religious education cannot be listened to.

G. E. M. objects to the reading of the Bible in the school because such a system would weaken "the force of family responsibility" (p. 106, 107). Parents who have *learned* the "force of family responsibility," are not likely to neglect their duty because it is *aided* by others. The Bible imparts not only a knowledge of the duty of man, but also the *power* to perform it. Therefore it can only be those parents who never felt the force of family responsibility that could dare to excuse themselves for the non-performance of their duty on such a lame reason. Further, G. E. M. says the reading of the Bible is "a home duty and cannot be performed by deputy." It is a home duty, but it is also a duty which is incumbent upon all in every circumstance. If this duty be performed in the home, it will not confine itself there. Let us ask G. E. M. if he is prepared to shut the Bible from the school on such a plea?

Consider the "homes" of our country; consider the "parents" of our country; consider the "children" of our country. If these are considered, we shall be furnished with statistics that the next consideration which shall be forced upon us will be, not whose duty religious education is, but on whom *must* it devolve. Ignorant, careless, avaricious parents are all against religious instruction. Such duty, therefore, becomes incumbent on the State. Members of society who *neglect* their duty implant immorality, crime, and social vice, and the State's action towards these results is *compulsory*. Then we maintain that if the State has a right to exercise *compulsion* in regard to the *commission* of evils effected by the neglect of duty, she has an equal right to exercise the same in regard to the *prevention* of those evils.

E. G. R.'s reference to Shakspere and Milton is not applicable to the question. The language of Scripture is plain and simple—especially those portions of it more suitable to youth. The reading of the Bible degrading? This idea of E. G. R.'s might be entertained if such reading was accompanied with no beneficial effect. But, on the contrary, the reading of the Bible has sweetened bitter lives, gladdened sorrowing hearts, inspired with hope despairing souls, rescued from crime, and dispelled the terror of death. The power of the Bible is peculiar—"making wise the simple." E. G. R. makes a gross mistake when he says, "Of all processes of instruction the most disastrous would be that which led children to read the Bible *only as words to be pronounced*—not truths to be apprehended and applied." Scholars that are so far advanced as to be able to *read* the Bible shall experience little difficulty in comprehending its language. The history of the creation, the patriarchs, the children of Israel, our Lord and His apostles, are all told in the most simple language, and capable of being understood by the meanest mind. "Processes of instruction which lead children to *read* words to be pronounced" merely have no existence except in the mind of E. G. R.; so therefore we cannot accept an imaginary system of education as a reason for the expulsion of the Bible from the school.

Experience does not favour S. S. T.'s views regarding voluntarism. Let the Bible be expelled from the school, and S. S. T. prophesies great accomplishments in religious instruction. "Bible classes suited to all conditions will be readily opened;" "they shall be free from the irksomeness of the present Sunday school;"

in short, all the old methods of "scholastic Scripturalism" shall pass away, and a new system of Bible instruction established that shall "astonish all." There are fields in our land wide enough where this system of S. S. T.'s might have been put on its trial. If this system has such wonderful merits, why not establish it? What prevents its advocates from making a practical effort? Why cannot you give us a sample of the efficacy of your instruction before making such loud cries for the demolition of our present system? We are inclined to believe that a system which has no further proof of its vitality except what it possesses in the imagination, has indeed very little claim upon our attention. S. S. T. writes about the "irksomeness of the present system of religious instruction;" but this is not, as he thinks, owing to any fault in the system, but to the *lifelessness* of the *instructors*.

It appears to me that if our opponents consider the *position* of the Bible, they cannot hold the expediency of its expulsion from the school. If they hold its divine authority, they cannot place the opinions of those who differ from them on an equal footing. Education is the training of the moral as well as the intellectual faculties. The whole being of the scholar must be educated—all his interests, spiritual and temporal; and such an education cannot be imparted if the reading of the Bible is prohibited in the school. The teacher would be unable to instil the principles of its truths with that force which the subject demands. Its presence in the school has proved beyond doubt its absolute necessity to the completion of the plan of education. The idea of the Bible in the national schools becoming the cause of religious wranglings is a myth of the imagination. The nature of the Bible tends to the stifling of all adverse feelings. It is the light that warns the mariner of the breakers in the sea of life, the mirror of truth, the pioneer of a true and lasting success.

"A glory gilds the sacred page,
Majestic like the sun;
It gives a light to every age,
It gives but borrows none."

Such being the qualifications of the Bible, we hold that the reading of it ought to form a portion of the instruction given in the national schools.

C. R.

Politics.

OUGHT THE CHURCH TO BE DISESTABLISHED AND DISENDOWED?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE length to which this debate has extended shows the interest felt in it by the contributors; and the fulness with which the question has been discussed leaves little now to be said.

The State is a secular institution whose duty it is to provide justly and fairly for all. The Church is a religious institution, and has remitted to it as a duty to preach the gospel to all men. This demarcation of institutional life and of duty shows plainly that the two things—Church and State—should be held separate and apart. He who said, "My kingdom is not of this world," could not have meant that the prosperity, the stability, and the perpetuity of His Church should depend upon the Government of any country. To give the right to any legislative body to extinguish the Church was not intended by Jesus Christ. But if we allow the State's power to establish, we must admit its power to disannul, and then we place the Church at the mercy of the State—nay, far worse, we bring the Church into jeopardy should the State become unpopular. Hence, as we averred in April last (p. 270), the sooner it is disestablished the better it will be, not only on the principles of equity and justice, but for the cause of religion itself. E. C. M. thinks otherwise. I. He thinks it is the duty of a State to uphold a church (p. 273). He does not seem to care *which* church. But would he hold the same opinion if the State were to attempt to establish, endow, and maintain the Romish church, a Mormon church, a Mohammedan mosque in each parish, or a Jewish temple as the Church of Christ? If either, then the other, which is also an Established Church, is not the Church of Christ; if both, then two churches, differing in doctrine, discipline, and devotion, are alike the Church of Christ. Is then Christ divided, or the

elect of Christ divided? or is that the truth of God beyond the Tweed which is not the truth of God on this side the Tweed? Such inconsistencies arise when we seek to establish and endow churches; and churches so endowed have a great tendency to gather around themselves an atmosphere of distrust, as if they were but departments of the State, got up as buttresses of the State, and not as the means of making the soul conscious of sin and anxious for salvation. Not only is this the case, but inasmuch as the customs connected with religion are stronger than most others, and the hatreds that occur between sects lead to greater strifes than any other sort of disaffection, any State which establishes and endows a church, or contrives to abide by an established and endowed church, when other sects have risen that dissent from the tenets and worship of that which possesses the favour of the State, runs the risk of the *odium theologicum* felt against the State Church being felt as if against the State as well, and so of having rebellion seemingly sanctified in the eyes of earnest religious men as involving questions about the glory of God, the purity of worship, and the rights of the Church.

If he would, our readers assuredly would not.

II. Theocracy is, in E. C. M.'s opinion, the best government, and that involves not only the divine right of kings, but the divine right of premiers and the divine righteousness of parliaments. Is England a theocracy? If it is, all that has been done in the past, all that goes on in the present, and all that will go on in the future is right and holy, for all has occurred under the government of the all-wise and all-holy Father and King. But if it has not been so, E. C. M.'s argument is untenable, and we have nothing more to do with it. If England is not a theocracy, then there is no relevancy in his reasoning.

III. "Disestablishment would be the national disowning of God" (p. 273). The same argument would have held against the Reformation. If you seek to alter the Church,—which is the bride of God, what a responsibility do you incur! The Church is established, and it is joined to the State. "What God has joined let not man put asunder." But God is not to be glorified by a lie, nor served by a mockery and a snare. The Church as established is not a body of believers in Christ—still less is it *the* body of believers in Christ. Hence it cannot be *the* Church of Christ. *That* is established on the earth, and cannot be disestablished, for

Jesus is himself its head ; and it cannot be proved that the Established Church of England is the Christian Church, or that the Established Church of Scotland is the Church of Christ—that either or both.

IV. The success of Puritanism under the Commonwealth was not long enough to enable the discussion of great principles to be carried on as they ought, so that the argument drawn from the failure of Puritanism to attain a unity of Church government do not apply here, even though it were granted that Puritanism sought a unity in Church forms. This, however, it does not ; it merely seeks "the unity of the Spirit in the bonds of peace, in righteousness of life."

V. The influence and power of Christian truth over men's minds has now developed into a power which would amply suffice to make it a great and blessed ministering missionary agent in all places where hearts are open to receive the truth in the love of it, or listen to it when preached in sincerity.

VI. The Bible is the standard of Christianity. It needs no State standard, no Governmental Weights and Measures Act. The workman is worthy of his hire is the decision of Scripture as to the revenues of the clergy, and the law of giving in the Church is "as God hath prospered any one." E. C. M.'s arguments are thus shown to be untenable against those who advocate the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church. They touch the question, if at all, on accidents, not on essentials. The State has been long striving to get free from the trammels of the Church, and now the Church ought to agitate to get free from the trammels of the State, by dissolving their ill-omened marriage.

C. H. thinks that a proclamation of the failure of voluntarism in many things implies the likelihood of failure in all. He forgot that there are many things, for the successful management of which voluntarism is quite unsuitable. Of no institution is it possible to maintain the suitability of voluntarism, to extend and maintain it as of the Church. Christ himself has ordained that His Church shall be a voluntary one in membership and in maintenance: "Freely ye have received, freely give." Christianity originated in the voluntary love of our Saviour ; Christianity rose as a voluntary scheme preached by volunteers in Christ's cause, and accepted willingly by believers. The Church is, in fact, a body of voluntary adherents to the faith as it is in Jesus, holding commu-

nion willingly with each other. The very essence of Christianity is its voluntariness. On this ground we think it is plain that C. H. is quite wrong in his argument that the Church must fail if the support, if made compulsory by the State, is withdrawn from it. The Church is the messenger of the peace of God, of salvation, and of grace; and as it carries a divine mission, it carries also a divine influence with it. It cannot fail; and to claim for the Church State support, because that if it were not so supported it would fail, is not merely to express a doubt of the faithfulness of men to their convictions, but of God to His cause. It does not depend for its stability on any earthly prince or power, but on God, who disposeth the heart.

It would be needless to pass in review in detail the arguments of the various articles, for they have been closely followed each by rejoinder and replication. A careful perusal of the entire series will soon reveal on whose side the arguments have been advanced which are deepest in principle, soundest in reasoning, most thoroughly consonant with the best interests of both Church and State.

Luckily, the conductors have communicated a hint that brevity in reply would be desirable. I gladly assent to their admonition. I believe that the readers of the magazine owe them much thanks for the full and varied views of the question they have sought out and brought before us. It is encouraging to think that they found allies ready to help them in discussing the topic with zeal, earnestness, and kindliness. When men do so meet, there is certain to be a greater feeling of respect for advocates of both opinions. We see that much may be said and thought on the other side of the matter, and while we must press on to make the truth triumphant, we are likely to do so with less party rancour or personal animosity than if we had not heard the other party in its defence. Looking at the whole drift of the debate, I hope it will tend to impress men's minds with the desire to see to it soon that, politically, the Church should be disestablished. Long may it triumph as Christ's church, but may it be thoroughly disendowed of State, in which in this case is "the mammon of unrighteousness."

A. K. D.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

CHANGE for the mere sake of change is not political wisdom; neither is it in accordance with Christian principle. The establish-

ment of the Church as the national is historical, and has its foundations deep in the past. It has not been established by a violent and forcible act, or by any sudden and premature enactment of the legislature. Christianity entered this country not only as an institution teaching a creed, but as a beneficial introducer of civilization. Its priests and governors gave such advice in the statesmanly conduct of affairs as greatly promoted the welfare of the state and largely blessed the people. They would accept of little or no reward for these valuable services. They had wedded themselves to the Church, and her they did endow with all their worldly goods. Whatever gift the sovereign chose to bestow, or the people delighted to assent to, though given in recognition of political service, was countersigned by them or transferred on their account and at their desire to the Church; and it is not too much to say that there is not a noble in the entire peerage of England whose lands have been bestowed or acquired by any means that can at all compare in value to the country with the services rendered by the members of the Church towards the State, in recognition of which the land or privileges of the Church were granted. Even as heritable property and privilege the Church has a good right to all she has.

The rights of the Church are heritable, and so also are its dignities and properties—heritable in and to the Church, though not heritable through the persons who hold them. To interfere with the heritable rights of the Church—which inherits as a continuous and abiding trustee, whose duty in regard to the spiritual condition is fixed by law as well as its rights—would be to break down the fundamental principle of property. Church property, Church dignities, &c., are administered by the State for the Church, and it would be entirely a violation of the first principles of justice to give the administering trustee in an estate a beneficial interest in the malversation of its funds, the loss of its rights, or the injury of the cause for which it exists. On this ground, therefore, we maintain that the patrimonial interests of the Church are indefeasible, unless by the dishonest and traitorous conduct of the State. Every estate inherited, every property bought, has been inherited or bought with the allocation to the Church as a permanent burden or lien on it; and it would be as just to repudiate the liability thus due as it would be to repudiate an annuity laid on the land, or the interest of money had in mortgage on it. The right of the Church is

inalienable so long as she continues to fulfil her share of the contract which the law has sanctioned: her position as having patrimonial interests and rights is impregnable by right reason, and must be defended by honest law.

Observe, in reply to A. K. D.'s argument about "the small proportion of the entire population" specifically, according to his account of the matter, adhering to the Church, that this does not necessarily imply that the Church is wrong. The Church must hold its creed and exercise its government according to law. Some of the opponents of the Church dissent from the creed of the Church, some from its government. That is not the fault of the Church. It may be the fault of the law which controls the Church; it may be the fault of those who dissent from the Church. It may be, even, that these very Dissenters, by their refusal to sanction such changes in the creed or government of the Church as change of circumstances demand, may actually encourage Dissent still farther, and influence opposition to the Church, and that not because of its fault, but of theirs. Look, as instances, at the action taken by Dissenting representatives on the patronage question in regard to the Scottish Establishment, the revision of the Bible and Prayer-book, &c., in reference to the Church of England. The Dissenters of the country, through their representatives in Parliament, have pinioned the Church, as it were, and then call upon the country to disestablish and disavow it because it is pinioned. They not only create several of the evils against which they declaim, but they also withhold the power of accommodation to circumstances which they taunt her with not possessing or not exercising.

A. K. D.'s argument that disestablishment would ameliorate the temper of the churches (p. 271) is, we fear, fallacious. At present the sects are somewhat brought to an outward unity, because they have something to attack. When the spoil was all before them, would they be likely to lose their voracity and keep from contention regarding their shares? Even as an exemplar church in polity, in dignity of clergy, in sedateness of worship, and decorum of form, the Church serves many good purposes.

A. K. D. speaks of "the establishment and endowment of one sect over and at the expense of the rest" (p. 271), but this is quite an inversion of the historic fact. The various sects have, in fact, separated themselves from, risen up against, and maintained themselves at the expense of the Church. They ought to have remained

in the Church, and used their efforts to reform the Church; or, when they felt themselves forced to come out of the Church, they should have used all their efforts to get the law changed by which the Church was bound, that they might not only regain connection with the Church, but extend liberty to the Church within the Church. If the Church had been selected from among competing sects, perhaps S. S.'s notion of "unfair supremacy" might have had some force; but the Church grew up in the state to its present position, while the sects were but like ivy growing round her, taking nourishment from her and flourishing by her decay.

S. S. makes a profound mistake regarding the argument employed in our opening paper, regarding membership of Church and membership of State. He looks at it from the sect side. E. M. G. takes the political view. My view is, that as the Church is established by law, and almost every member of any church, numerically, is a member of the state, actually the obnoxiousness of the Church to the criticism of Church members can only arise from their fault, in not seeing that the proper sanctions of law are given to the Church in regard to the reforms required in it; and I contend, that did the members of the state, remembering their duties as members also of the Church of Christ, definitely set their minds to put the Church, as established and endowed, in its true and proper position, there would be no ground for agitation against the Church. I was speaking of political coincidence numerically; S. S. tries to make my remark mean, or be meant to mean, coincident spiritually.

I am sorry that the idea that "the powers that be are ordained of God" should be novel to S. S. The very terms are quoted for the guide of all churches from the Scriptures. (See Rom. xiii. 1.) Does "Johannes" remember the Scriptural admonition, "Judge righteous judgment"? or has he attended to the query, "Who art thou, O man, that condemnest another"? when he wrote about the "deadness of the Church"? (p. 445).

I apprehend that the Church has been looked on by the writers of the affirmative as a usurping rival; and they have misjudged her so. She is not; she is hereditary possessor of her dignities, properties, and responsibilities. The State is not her master, but only the trustee of her property, and the overseer of the will of the generations of the past as to the office-bearers she should have and the duties she should perform. The present agitation is one in which are antagonists. The Dissenters, who constitute, as they even

the majority in the state, advocate in their interest the confiscation of the funds and the dispensing with the rights of their foes. They claim to be, in plenitude of power, the State; they allege that the Church is held in bondage by the State, *i. e.*, themselves; therefore they hold that the State, *i. e.*, themselves, the guardians of the patrimony of the Church, should take over the revenues of the Church for their own purposes, and so far the State, *i. e.*, themselves, at once, from the embarrassing claims of the Church, and bring it to the level of other sects, *i. e.*, themselves, who have no share in the Church's funds—unless they manage, under the guise of the State, to get hold of some.

Let the sects—and the State—look to it that justice is done, and there is no danger that the Church shall either be disestablished or disendowed.

E. M. G.

The Essayist.

UGLY TRUTHS.

"You have made an enemy," said my other self to me just now.

I must reflect, and see whether this is possible, or probable. An old friend has just gone out of the room. His leaving was the signal for the utterance of the words above written.

Let me consider : His faults, such as they are, have been fostered, if not engendered, by success. He suddenly grew well to do, and as suddenly, self-denial forsook him, and indulgence in what we call small sins occupied the place of the vanished virtues.

For some months past I have been as a jar which is being charged with electricity, and which, at last, surcharged, discharges the whole electric volume violently into the body of the unwary operator. I have watched, waited, thought, and now unintentionally, or rather, without premeditation, have shocked, and indeed, thoroughly electrified my friend the operator, by telling him of all the things that ever he did.

The form of expression into which these last few words have run reminds me of a certain prince who travelled in disguise ; that is, he did not dress in gorgeous clothing, like a prince, or swear oaths without any meaning, like one, or carry off rich princesses like one, or live in a splendid palace, or wear diamonds as though they were as common as daisies, or fuss and fume, and have gentlemen to take off his boots and put on his coat, and altogether to make pretence that he was the most fearful, wonderful, beautiful, and yet useful bit of flesh and blood that ever condescended to assume the shape of a man, and teach us poor inferior animals of creation to tremble at and to fear him. No, he did not. As regards all these matters, he certainly travelled in what we call disguise ; we, who are accustomed to the booming of cannon, the sounding of trumpets, the flying of flags, the shooting of enemies, and beheading of traitors, and many other curious but rather uncomfortable customs, whenever and wherever kings and princes have, in this world's history, been heard of. He only said, "I am the king," and went about doing all the good and gentle and merciful deeds that some time afterwards were written down about him. That, you know, was not enough. If he had said, "I am your king," and had raised an army, and with his army had killed hundreds of thousands

of men, women, and children, then people would not have wanted any further proof. Only he did not. And so, one day he met a woman. Well, she of course ought to have been a princess, before ever he could condescend to speak to her, but somehow, this was not thought of, she was after all only a woman. And this prince told her "all the things that ever she did." Not very nice things, some of them, you may be sure, yet he told her them all. He wanted a cup of water, after a hot, dusty, weary journey on foot, and she might have refused him, nevertheless he told her, a cup full of diamonds would have been useless then, water, a cup of water was the one want above all others, and she might in pride or passion, or shame, have refused. He knew this, yet he told her ugly truths, stinging, wounding deep her false pride, and all its unhandsome belongings, but, in this instance, arousing the honour that still slumbered in that woman's heart, and that urged her to go and tell her friends that she had found a man who had told her all the things that ever she did. You know who that prince was, and who that woman was; he spoke, she listened. He speaks still, and we either do or ought to listen, and, as our teacher, we may in like manner follow his instructions, and speak frankly and boldly, and withal courteously and lovingly, whenever and wherever there is a chance of friendly counsel being of some avail.

Well, let me see if I have made an enemy. I have told him the truth, and it only. I have done so disinterestedly,—I have done so, knowing from experience that I ran great risk of losing the companionship, if not the esteem, of a much valued friend.

I have done so solely for the purpose, and with the hope of saving him from further folly, and the penalties attached thereto.

I have done so knowing that; if his heart is as true as I have always believed it to be, the truth, ugly though it be to him now, will make him truer. Truer to his own body and soul, to his own present and future.

Why should he become my enemy? or, to put it as mildly as I can, why should he henceforth avoid me, and let the world know that we are no longer companions? Let me see: He may be moved by,—Disbelief in the assertion that he has been doing wrong.

Or, by wounded pride.

Or, by shame.

He may not believe yet that he has been doing any wrong. Small sins, when they take possession of a man, always do so in the shape of *necessary* evils. We find a place for them in our life, with the plea to our own protesting souls that they save us from worse things, and thus they become easy stepping-stones down to the

abyss of reckless sin. Shut your eyes when in a train at full speed and you cannot tell whether you are going backward or forwards into the tunnel yonder, where is darkness that can be felt, or out on the pleasant plain there, skirting the limitless ocean, in the very heart of sunshine, health, and loveliness. Shut your eyes to the sins that prosperity brings on its rapid wheels, and, take, not my word, but the word of all history and experience for it, the sensation is so deceptive that you may be gulphed deep in unfathomable waves before your delicious dream is more than half dreamed.

Then, wounded pride steps forth. Let us dismiss the braggart all cap and bells, but without even the wisdom of the fool ; let us dismiss this pretty semblance of a virtue without any comment. Pride is among the noblest of the virtues, and never yet was wounded. It is invulnerable. Our vanity may be exposed, our folly reprimanded. As regards our self-laudation and self-approval, our wings may be once and for ever clipped, but pride, the passion of a pure soul for all that is purest, pride can never suffer by mortal hand or weapon. Shame may keep my friend away. Shame that is only half ashamed ; because true shame is so nearly allied to true pride that, although it be the child of sin, and the sister of sorrow, it follows only that which is good, and often, with its sister, sorrow is admitted to the arcana of purity. True shame is a virtue. The shame of a false pride is a deception. So that I think, if my friend is what I deem a true man, he will see that he has been doing wrong, and resolve to amend his life. He will not exhibit any false pride, and the flush of false shamefacedness will not rob him of his manliness. In fact, I consider my case proven. A true man is, although he has fallen so as to be grievously hurt, never ashamed of a helping hand, never afraid to compare the counsels of a friend with the warning voices of his own conscience, and, in honour, faith, and truth, will abide by the result of their teaching.

Truth, to us poor yearning children whose souls as yet are sightless, is the very light of life. Why do we so dearly prize the few truths that belong to our present state ? Why are ten thousand temples dedicated by the tens of millions of us who come and go, to the King whose name is Truth. Why ? Because we have tasted the divine elixir : we already have touched the hem of God's robe in this our deep darkness, and we feel, we know, yes, we know, that soon we shall see. See, after our probation of blindness : see, after our long acquaintance with the gloom of the fear of death. See, after our long dream in this land of shadows. Yes, see and live. Truth, if it is anything, is all in all. If it is the hope of our life, the aim of all life, how can we, how dare we shun its voice,

calling to us as it does every time we touch forbidden fruit. Love commands, honour beseeches, that we should advise and admonish one another, and, although the wound may be deep, and hurt sorely for a moment, the true soul will always thank lovingly the true brother who dares our foolish resentment, and trusting in our uprightness of heart tells us of our faults.

And so, a long amen to all our fears, a long and fearless life to all true friends, and a happy issue to all ugly truths.

F. GAVIN.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

990. The origin of the art of printing lies far back indeed, and it must have been known imperfectly at a very early period in the history of the human race. For, as De Quincey has pointed out, it is ridiculous to speak of printing as a modern art, since those who, thousands of years ago, engraved words on coins, &c., were to all intents and purposes printers; and if the art did not become more general, it was for the want of a cheap and convenient material for printing upon, which delayed the production of books until paper was made. It is conceded, however, as a fact, if it be not much to the credit of Western nations, that the Chinese did practise printing, as we now understand it, as early (or earlier) as the date of the Christian era; still, that early printing, which need not be described, was of little utility, and it is Europe that claims the palm for having been the first to employ movable types. The early printers on the Continent used wooden blocks, in which letters were cut, much in the Chinese fashion; they took impressions only on one side of the paper, and then pasted two leaves together. An enormous amount of ink has been expended in the controversy, as to place and date; the probabilities favour Laurentins of Haarlem, who first employed these wooden types about 1480. It was fifteen or twenty years after that when Gutenberg, Faust, and Schœffer seem to have contemporaneously brought metal types into use at Mentz. Caxton, a Kentish man, whose name is well known, introduced the art into England about 1470; it did not reach Scotland until 1500, and Ireland, it is said, fifty years later.

991. There are so many good grammars that one can hardly be singled out and placed in a position of pre-eminence; and those, whether professed *littérateurs* or not, who desire to be thoroughly acquainted with their own

tongue, will avail themselves if possible of several works. The student of English composition should no more confine himself to one or two grammarians than the student of history to one or two historians. Lindley Murray's work upon the English language is a standard one, and there are several modernized editions, amending him in some particulars, and cutting down his verbiage, often redundant. Cobbett's grammar, though full of the crotchets of the man, is a capital one so far as it goes; high praise must also be given to Lennie's, McCulloch's and Cornwell's grammars. Then, again, no student should be without such a volume as Angus's Hand-book of the English Tongue, which is a grammar, and more than a grammar. Fowler's compact little volume of the English language, published by Cassell, is useful, if not very original.—J. R. S. O.

992. The querist can scarcely be aware of the number of newspapers published in these islands; a list such as he asks would occupy several pages of the *Controversialist*. Very full and correct information on the subject may be got from Mitchell's Newspaper Press Directory, published annually one time in February, at two shillings.

The Reviewer.

A Companion to the Authorized Version of the New Testament.

By the Rev. H. B. HALL, B.C.L. London: Bell and Daldy.

The Origin and History of the New Testament. By JAMES MARTIN, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

THESE two works we class together because of their community of serviceableness as helps to the intelligent study of the Scriptures of sacred truth. They are both good books for the thoughtful reader of the Bible: the former as an aid to the comprehension of many passages in which specialities of translation occur in which the light of the original is only faintly, perhaps imperfectly, sometimes erroneously presented in the Authorized Version; the latter as giving a fair amount of trustworthy information on the external history of the word of life—its origin, authorship (divine and human), and transmission. They are to a certain extent complementary of each other.

Mr. Hall desires to conserve our present version of the Scriptures with the least possible alteration, and suggests the correction of so

much, and the arrangement of the rest in notes. He signalizes nine sources of difficulty in our authorized translation, viz.,—

1. Misapprehensions of the original.
2. Translations of one Greek word by different English ones, and *vice versa*.
3. Incomplete or exaggerated translations.
4. Obsolete words and phrases.
5. An irresolute usage of "shall" and "will."
6. Neglect of the force of the Greek article.
7. The use of scholastic Latin terms.
8. Unwarranted insertions, ungrammatical language, and misprints.
9. The artificial division of the Bible into chapters and verses.

His introduction gives specimens of each, and discusses the advisability of the production of a new version, with a negative bias. The body of the work consists of critical Greek versions in the common order of the New Testament (with due references) of every verse, in his opinion, admitting beneficial re-translation from Matthew to John's epistles—omitting the Apocalypse; with explanatory notes, either on the error in the old version, or the grounds of the change in that proposed. The following are the verses in the Gospel of St. Mark which he thinks require change. We quote them as a specimen of the mode in which the work is done, and as a help to those who are studying this Gospel for examination. For brevity of quotation we omit the citation of the Authorized version, because each reader can easily refer to the passages pointed out in his own copy of the Scriptures:—

"Mark I. 24. Let us alone; what hast Thou to do with us, Thou Jesus of Nazareth? 26. And when the unclean spirit had convulsed (*Εκράδζαν* shook violently) him and cried with a loud voice, he came out of him.

"II. And the disciples of John and of the Pharisees were fasting; and they came and say unto Him, &c. 21. No man also seweth a piece of new cloth on an old garment: else the fitting up takes away from it, the new from the old, and the rent becomes worse.

"IV. 36. And having sent away the multitude, they take Him. When He was in the ship, and other little ships with Him, 37, there arose also a great storm of wind, and the waves beat into the ship, so that it was filling.

"V. 7. And cried with a loud voice and said, What hast Thou to do with me, Jesus, Thou Son of the most high God? 12. And all the devils, &c. And all the *demons*, &c. (*Diabolus* has no plural; *Daimonia*, evil, or lost spirits).

"VI. 20. For Herod, &c. . . . and *preserved* him. 25. I will that thou give me *immediately* in a dish, &c. 33. And the people ran by *land* thither, &c. 40. And they sat down in *companies*, &c. (*πρᾶσι*, squares). 50. Be of good cheer: I AM: be not afraid. [Compare 'Thy ways in the sea, and Thy path in the great waters,' *Psa. lxxix. 19.*]

"VII. 3. For the Pharisees and all the Jews, except they pour a little water over their hands, &c. 4. And when they come from the market, except they immerse them in water, &c.

"VIII. 24. And He looked up and said, I see men, for I see them walking as it were trees. 27 and 29. Whom should be *who*. 34 and 35. Whosoever *desires to*, instead of whosoever will. 36. Lose his own *life* (as in the preceding and succeeding verses *Ψυχή* is translated).

"IX. 24. Help Thou my *want of faith*.

"X. 51. What wilt thou that I should do *for* thee?

"XI. 17. My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations; but ye have made it a den of robbers.

"XIV. 24. For new testament, read new covenant (as an allusion to *Exod. xxiv. 3.*) 30. This night before a cock crow, &c.; also in ver. 68 and 72. 40. But this is done [the words being said by Jesus, not being written as a comment by the evangelist] that the Scriptures *may* be fulfilled.

"XV. 5. But Jesus answered *no more*. 27. For *thieves*, read *robbers* (as above).

On XI. 13. Mr. B. H. Hall gives the following note:—"This passage has been a great difficulty to commentators; and our version is liable to produce the opinion that our Lord was unreasonable in expecting fruit on the tree. All the obscurity arises from the elliptical use of *for* (*γάρ*), which is common in Scripture. When the elliptical idiom is expanded as it ought to be, the passage will read thus:—'When He came to it He found nothing but leaves [and this was not what He had reason to expect], for the time of figs [*i. e.*, the fig harvest, after which all the figs would have been gathered] was not yet.' This makes us understand clearly *why* the tree was blasted. Another mode of obviating the difficulty of the passage is by taking the words before the 'for' as a parenthesis. The verse will then read as follows:—'And seeing a fig tree afar off, having leaves, He came if haply He might find anything thereon [and when he came to it he found nothing but

leaves], for the time of figs [fig harvest] was not yet." By a similar use of the parenthesis he suggests that xvi. 4 would be made plainer. He proposes to read it, "And when they looked thus they saw that the stone was rolled away;] for it was great;" and adds this note: "Taking ver. 3 and 4 together, the words seem to imply that the reason of the stone's being rolled away was its exceeding bigness. But ver. 3 as far as the word 'for' is a parenthesis, the sense being that they were at a loss to roll away the stone on account of its size, but on looking saw that it was already rolled away."

Mr. Martin's book is in its way equally good and helpful. Our readers will get a better idea of the staple of the work from an extract than from any description of ours. We select for quotation the notice of the Gospel of St. Mark, which is as follows:—

"The author of the third Gospel was, no doubt, the 'sister's son to Barnabas,' whom we read of so frequently in both the Acts and Epistles. His full name was John Mark, though he is sometimes mentioned by his first name, John, and more frequently by his second, Mark or Marcus. He was living with his mother at Jerusalem when Paul and Barnabas came thither from Antioch, and he accompanied them on their return. He started with them on their first missionary tour, but soon lost heart in the work; and when they landed on the coast of Asia Minor, he returned to Jerusalem, where they probably found him on their second visit. Barnabas persuaded him to go back with them to Antioch once more, as he was anxious to give him another trial. But when he proposed that Mark should be allowed to accompany them on their second missionary tour, Paul strongly objected, and parted from Barnabas rather than take Mark a second time. The firmness of Paul had, no doubt, a good effect upon the mind of Mark, for he appears from that time forth to have settled down with steadfastness to the work he relinquished before. He went first of all with Barnabas to Cyprus; but at a later period he joined Paul, and was with him during his imprisonment in Rome. When the latter wrote to the Colossians, Mark was about to visit Asia Minor, and would probably take Colosse on his way. It was most likely on this occasion that he extended his journey so far as to spend some time with Peter in Babylon. Thence he returned to Ephesus, and was there with Timothy when the Second Epistle to Timothy was written by Paul. According to the statement of some of the fathers he went to Rome as Paul desired, and remained there till Peter's death. After this he is said to have gone to Egypt, and to have founded several churches there, including one in Alexandria. According to Jerome, he died at Alexandria in the eighth year of Nero's reign. Others represent him as having suffered martyrdom

"We have no means of ascertaining in what relation he stood to the disciples during the life of Christ; though some conjecture that he was the young man mentioned in Mark xiv. 51, 52, who narrowly escaped arrest when Christ was taken prisoner in the garden of Gethsemane. This does not indeed prove that he was a disciple at that time, but simply that he was supposed to be one. He is generally represented as having written his Gospel under the immediate superintendence of the Apostle Peter. The foundation for such an opinion is very slight, and the tradition itself no doubt originated, like that concerning the Gospel of Luke, in the idea that a canonical book ought to emanate directly or indirectly from one of the twelve. The long-continued intercourse of Mark with those who had been with the Lord from the very first would qualify him in an eminent degree to commit to writing a life of Jesus; and whatever truth there may be in the tradition that he spent some time with Peter at Rome, it is by no means necessary to assume that Peter superintended the writing of the Gospel, either to establish the author's inspiration or as a guarantee of the credibility of the Gospel itself."

"The Gospel of Mark was not written for Jewish Christians. This is evident from the explanations which he so frequently gives of Jewish customs. Compare, for example, chap. vii. 1—4, 'The Pharisees, and all the Jews, except they wash *their* hands oft, eat not;' chap. xii. 18, 'Then come unto him the Sadducees, which say there is no resurrection;' chap. xiv. 12, 'The first day of unleavened bread, when they killed the pass-over;' chap. xv. 42, 'The preparation, that is, the day before the sabbath.' There is nothing, however, to show for what church his Gospel was especially designed. The general opinion is that it was written at Rome.

"The Gospel covers, to a great extent, the same ground as those of Matthew and Luke, describing the same journeys, relating the same miracles, and reciting the same parables and discourses. But it is not a compilation made from the two, nor is there anything to prove that Mark himself had seen either of the others. But even where he gives the same, he contributes much that is peculiarly his own. 'His descriptions are lively, vivid, and graphic. They are adapted to impress the mind by their freshness of colouring, and he throws in slight details, which give sharpness to the outline of the scene depicted.' It is he, for example, who tells us 'that there was no more room, no, *not so much as about the door*' (chap. ii. 2); that Jesus was '*in the hinder part of the ship, asleep on a pillow*' (chap. iv. 38); that the blind man '*cast away his garment, and leaped up*' (chap. x. 50); and that when they were on the way to Jerusalem, '*they were amazed, and as they followed they were afraid*' (chap. x. 32). It is Mark who has preserved to us in their original form the very words that Christ

employed on more than one occasion : *e. g.*, *Boanerges*, *Corban*, *Talitha cumi*, *Ephphatha*, &c. It would be wearisome to quote the numerous instances in which he throws in graphic details which the other evangelists have passed over. It is he who tells us that Jesus was a *carpenter*, that He *loved* the man who came to inquire about eternal life, that the woman whose daughter He cured was a Syrophenician, and that Bartimæus was the name of the blind man who called to Jesus for help. But the most striking instance of all is his account of the demoniac in the country of the Gadarenes.

"Each of the synoptic evangelists has selected his own peculiar starting-point. Matthew, by his genealogy, introduces Jesus as the promised Messiah, the Son of Abraham. Luke gives the most minute account of the annunciation both of John the Baptist and of Jesus ; though it is not till the ministry of Jesus commences that he introduces the genealogy, in which he sets Jesus forth as the Son of Adam, the true Son of man. Mark gives no genealogy, but contents himself with introducing the Saviour as 'Jesus Christ, the Son of God.' The contents of the Gospel have been well described as confined within the limits laid down by Peter in Acts i. 22, "Beginning from the baptism of John, unto the same day that He (Jesus) was taken up from us." And with regard to the subject-matter of the Gospel, Lange has equally well observed that a fitting motto for the whole might be found in the words of Peter in Acts x. 38, "How God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power : who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil ; for God was with Him."

Our Private Tutor.

ON THE METHOD OF STUDYING "WHATELY'S INTRODUCTORY LESSONS ON CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES."

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S "Introductory Lessons on Christian Evidences" is also to be had, in a slightly altered form, as *Lessons on the truth of Christianity*. The small edition, at sixpence, issued by Parker, will suit best the majority of those who are about to prepare themselves for the examination of the *Evidences on Christianity*, to which the Sunday School Teachers of the country are asked to submit themselves. The work is divided into sixteen chapters, and the contents of each chapter, as they average about seven small pages, may very easily be managed in a night's study of about an hour-and-a-half if the following course is pursued:—

I. Read each chapter carefully over three times.

II. Note the step taken in each paragraph (which is duly numbered).

III. Observe how the argument in each advances towards the exposition of the special matter of proof in each chapter, and mark the result of the whole reasoning.

IV. Fix in the mind this result in the tersest terms you can find to them.

V. Write out this as a topic to be proved, and place below it the several reasons for believing it to be true as suggested in the paragraphs of the chapter.

VI. Study, especially after having gone through this course, "The Summary of Evidence" given in chap. IX., and commit to memory its most striking passages.

BIBLE PAGES.

HINTS OF A MNEMONIC SYSTEM FOR STUDYING ANY OF THE BOOKS IN THE BIBLE.

I. Read carefully one by one the chapters of the book selected: and at the close of the perusal of each chapter, fix upon some word

or phrase around which you can group the entire facts of the chapter.

II. Arrange these key-words or mnemonic holdfasts with the numerals of the chapters from which they are selected or to which they refer before them; then commit to memory numerals and words.

III. Question yourself, with the book before you first, from this central word outwards to the whole contents of the chapter.

IV. Write out a concise outline of the substance of the book read, inserting in this the key-words selected, written in large letters or doubly underlined.

To exemplify this, take the first chapter of I. Samuel, and fix on the word PRAYER as the holdfast for the subject of the chapter. We can now question ourselves after this fashion. Whose prayer is spoken of? What was it for? How was it altered? Where? In what manner? What reason was there for this prayer? Who was the prayer? Who was her husband? What was his character? Her's? Why was she sad? Who misunderstood her? Was her prayer heard? How did she show gratitude for God's goodness? Did her husband rejoice with her?

For chapter ii. take SONS. Whose sons are mentioned in this chapter? Whose joy for her son broke forth into song? What was the character and office of her son? What was the character of the other sons named? Give instances of their misdoings? What evil fate was prophesied for them? By whom? Did these sons take warning? On whom did they bring sorrow? How went it with the good son's mother?

The word SERVANT may be chosen for chap. iii. Who professed himself a servant of God? By whose instructions? Under what circumstances? On his acknowledgment of himself as God's servant what revelation was made to him? What was to be done to the impious servants? What was known of this good servant?

For chap. iv. we may take ARK. Where was the ark kept? Where was it taken thence? On what account? With what results? What happened to the ark? What occurred to its guardians? Who were they? How was the story of the ark told? What were the effects of the telling of the tale? What memorial of the event was made? What prophesy was fulfilled in the ark being taken?

Our Collegiate Course.

"SAMSON AGONISTES."

(Continued from page 390.)

- 333. *Uncouth*, literally unknown, but here strange and wild.
- 334. *Once-gloried*, formerly renowned.
- 335. *Informed*, turned, given form to the path.
- 337. *Lagging*, slowly, disjointedly.
- 338. *Signal*, conspicuous, well-known.
- 339. *Erst*, is the superlative of *ere before ever*, and is equivalent to "ever he was."
- 344. "Single combatant duelled." Notice here the excessive contrastive hyperbole. The meaning is that he, "single," "himself an army," set himself as the opponent in a duel or fight between two in which "their armies, ranked in proud array," formed the antagonist he braved.
- 347. *Coward*, sometimes explained as derived from cowhard, a loutish and timid good-for-nothing, who drives the cows to pasture, but really a person who turns his back to the enemy, and so, as the proverb has it, turns tail (Latin, cauda, a tail; Italian, codardo; and French, couard). Some derive it from cow-hearted, easily frightened.
- 359. Shakspeare similarly says: Antony and Cleopatra II., i. "We ignorant of ourselves beg often our own harms."
- 264. *Miracle*, admiration, wonder, most remarkable.
- 373. Appoint &c., assume not to thyself the arrangement of events which justly belong to Heaven.
- 394. Capital, chief, choicest, but with a punning reference to the hair of his head (*Caput*).
- 403. *Parlies*, speeches generally specious and diplomatic, enticing and deceitful.
- 433. *Score*, reckoning, sum marked down as owing.
- 441. Isa. xlv. 6. "Beside me there is no God." 8. "Is there a God beside me, yea, there is no God; I know not any."

453. *Idolists*, for idolaters, worshippers of false gods; *atheists* disbelievers in God.
454. *Diffidence*, distrust, want of faith.
455. *Propense*, aforethought, fully inclined.
464. Comparing ought to have been followed by the preposition *with*.
469. *Discomfit*[ure], complete defeat.
471. *Blank*, entirely destroy, leave no sign of appal, as in Shakspeare,—

" Each opposite, that blanks the face of joy,
Meet what I would have well, and it destroy."

" *Hamlet*," iii., 2.

480. *Plight*, condition, involvement. See in "*Winter's Tale*," II., i,—
- " Beseech your Highness my women may be with me; for you see
My plight requires it."

It differs from *plight*, a pledge, or to pledge.

489. *On* is an adverb here, and signifies continuously.
500. Tantalus was condemned to the Tartarean regions for betraying the secrets of the gods.
528. The sons of Anak, now become proverbial as a race of giants. The *Anakim* were the sons of Arba, and dwelt in Hebron till Joshua drove them out, and then settled among the Philistines.
531. *Affront*, opposition, coming face to face with,—*ad* and *frons* and equal to meet in fight.
532. *Fallacious*, deceptive. *Venereal*, relating to Venus, the goddess of love, and equal to amorously exciting "*trains*," stratagems; as,—

" Now to my charms
And to my wily trains I shall ere long
Be well stocked with as fair a herd as grazed
About my mother Circe."—" *Comus*," 131.

537. Shore requires "from off" after it, to govern "me;" the grammatical object is "all my precious fleece."
545. Judg. ix., 13,—"*Wine*, which cheereth God and man."
565. The double accusative brought here by the conjunction *and* will not make sense with the verb *serve*, hence we must understand some such word as *do*, *perform*, *accomplish*; before "the work."

569. *Robustious*, probably a suggestive term from Shakspeare's "robustious, periwig-pated fellow" ("Hamlet," iii., 3), and meaning coarsely strong.
571. *Crage*, enfeeble, Fr. *écrase*, to crush.
574. *Druff*, worthless; refuse, husks that the swine did eat.
381. Judg. xv. 19, probably a rock bearing the appearance of the jawbone of an ass; as, "The White Horse in Berkshire, or the Wild Deer in Cardigan, in the Valley of the Rheidol.
624. *Apprehensive*, sensitive, used here in the logical sense, as possessing the capacity of apprehending, feeling, perceiving.
628. *Alp*, the particular for the general used to indicate any high snow-clad mountain.
645. Repeated [ly], unless written by the *amannensis* of the poet, misled by the sound for re-pitied.
657. *Consolatories*, equal to "Consolations" as thence of Boethius, and generally vain as the Philosophers' fine-spun theories in *Rasselas*.
658. *Sought*, I interpret, not as Keightley does as meaning sought (out) or looked after, diligently desired, but as *sought* in the sense of gained by research, and not got spontaneously; hence far-fetched.
659. *Lenient*, emolument, softening, ameliorative, assuaging; not *tender to*.
662. *Harsh*, &c. "Like sweet bells," jangled out of tune and harsh" ("Hamlet," iii., 1).
694. "To dogs and fowls a prey" ("Homer's Iliad," i., 5),—

"And left their mangled limbs a prey
To dogs and vultures."—*Blackie's Translation*.

700. *Crude*, which commonly means raw, unripe, signifies premature, brought on before its time.
715. *Tarsus*, probably Tarshish, Tartessus, in the south of Spain, to which Jonah sought to flee. It may be Tarsus in Cilicia, the birthplace of St. Paul; especially as Javan, the Ionian Isles, are next mentioned, and Gadire, Cadiz, in the south-west of Spain.

717. *Bravery*. See Isa. iii. 18. Finery, splendid attire; as in Shakspeare's—

“With scarfs and fans and double change of bravery.”

“*Taming of a Shrew*,” iv., 3.

Tackle, ropes, rigging, *trim*, in goodly array.

721. *Harbinger*, forerunner, announcer.

729. *Addressed*, attempted to be spoken.

775. *Importune*, importunate to gain a knowledge.

785. *Parle*, considerate speech, with the design of coming to terms; parley.

820. Upbraid me [with] mine.

826. Adder's sense. Psa. lviii. 4,—“Like the deaf adder, that stoppeth her ear.”

990. Judg. iv., 9—22.

1020. Paranymp: Jud. xiv., 20, bride's man.

1025. Compare Burns,—

“O woman, lovely woman fair,
An angel form's fallen to thy share,
It would have been too mickle t' have
given thee mair,
I mean an angel's mind.”

1035. Demure, *des mœurs*, according to good manners; modest.

1045. “Youth at the prow and pleasure at the helm.”—“*Gray's Bard*.”

1065. Female; as in French *femme*, woman or wife; one given *in fee* to a male.

1075. *Fraught*, load, burden, what he carries or brings; *freight*.

1081. Compare—“Not to know me argues thyself unknown.”

1092. Single [me out as a combatant and give a challenge].

1109. *Assassinated*, taken by wiles like those of an assassin, and to the same end, death.

1124. Beaten, battered, dented, and noisy.

1130. Ornament and safety, Horace's *decus et tutamen*.

1138. “Like quills upon the fretful porcupine.”

The Societies' Section.

EDINBURGH LITERARY INSTITUTE.

ON SELF-CULTURE. BY PRINCIPAL TULLOCH.

THE winter course of lectures under the auspices of the Edinburgh Literary Institute, South Clerk Street, was opened, November 6th, with an address by the Rev. Principal Tulloch, of St. Andrew's, in the presence of a numerous audience.

Principal Tulloch, who was cordially received, said the subject on which he was to speak was one which concerned every human being, but which might be said to have this advantage, when a person was addressing the members of a literary institute, that it was the special object for which such an institute existed. Their association and arrangements there had for their main purpose the self-culture of those who felt that, having more or less commenced the duties of life, they had still a great deal to learn. It might be said it was only after they had entered upon life, and commenced to realize its duties and responsibilities, that they began to feel how little they really knew—how much they needed to know. The young took education at first very much as a sort of necessity, which interfered, in a somewhat harsh manner, with amusement, and from which they would fain be rid if they could. They felt its restraints more than its advantages. It was the instinct of a boy or girl—of all boys or girls who were healthy, and, what they should be, happy—in the fulness of their natural young life, to love dis-

traction, or "play," as they said. A disposition to learn in the first years of life, save in rare instances, had no chance with the instinct of amusement. But when years of reflection came, and the impulses of curiosity were awakened, still more when the idea of life as not a pastime but a labour—a duty—began to stir, and when knowledge was seen to hold the key of success, and life was found to be richer, better, and more powerful, the more informed, experienced, wise, and skilful it was, then men began to wish ardently for knowledge, and strive for it, if they ever did so—then they entered upon that secondary education which was, after all, the true education of every man, the education which a man gave himself. They formed some definite ideas of their own capacities—of the line of reading or acquirement which they liked best, or for which they were most fitted—all the better if it was, in the main, a line of reading or study connected with their work in life, and not without advantage if it were directly contrasted with that work, so as to enlarge their mind beyond some mere speciality. They brought, in short, the vague thoughts of youth to a point, and would fain do something, if not to make their name to live, yet to make themselves wiser and better human creatures for the benefit of their fellow-men and the glory of God. Now that was the

idea of self-culture; and it was his object, on the present occasion, to help any one there who had that idea to give some effect to it—to point out the instruments or agencies with which he must work, and the true character of the object or the ideal at which he must aim.

Passing on to speak of books as the chief element of self-culture, the Principal impressed upon his audience the necessity of reading at once with discrimination and with earnestness. It was not right to follow exclusively a special bias, which always produced one-sided culture, but still it was by obeying the main impulse of our mind towards a definite line of study that we would most thoroughly awaken and strengthen our intellectual life. There was no form of intellectual taste that was more widely diffused than the taste for poetry, and none so capable of stirring the intellectual blood, and rousing it into vigorous, healthy, and fruitful action. But for this purpose it must be studied, and not merely dipped into or taken up to spend a leisure hour. Not only so, but the study must be localized, and the student must fix himself down to some definite period or to some great poet. Let him take, for instance, Robert Burns. So much had been said of Burns, and his name had been so much a name of contention, especially in Edinburgh, that he was almost reluctant to make it prominent. And yet the reluctance was foolish, because there was no name at once more familiar or more significantly illustrative of what he had been saying. To explain Burns' poetry in its full meaning and interest, in all its connection with his own life and experience, and with the social, religious, and intellectual habits of his time, was a task that would well repay the attention of the student, as it was one that would call forth all his powers. Rightly and thoroughly pursued, it would not

only enrich him with a living experience as fresh as ever came from human heart that glowed with the fire of genius, but open up new lights in the history of the time and the whole state of Scottish mind and feeling, and social and religious civilization, at the end of the last century. There were few things in all the world so intensely pathetic as the life of Burns—so noble and grand in its impulses, lighted up with such brilliancy of passion and of feeling, lavishing itself in such tender and exquisite sensibilities, and in forms of poetic power and beauty unapproachable, which the world would never let die, and yet so tragic in its sordid cares and miseries, in its lapse from what was good and right—a lapse which none felt more than the poet himself in his better moments,—such a vision of the Divine he had, and yet into what depths of the undivine did he fall! As he made his own native Muse deplore,—

"I've seen thy pulse's maddening play
Wild send thee passion's devious way,

Misled by fancy's meteor ray,

By passion driven;

And yet the light that led astray
Was light from heaven."

The study of such a genius in all the fulness of its development, in all its roundings, in all its significance, personal, intellectual, social, historical, was a study of wide and ennobling extent, and would be found to make something of a real education for any man undertaking it thoroughly and so as to get from it real lessons, moral as well as intellectual. (Applause.)

The Principal went on to speak of the study of history, than which he said there was nothing better for training and disciplining the mind, and for lifting a man above the petty social distractions and contests pro-

fessedly of principle, but really of vulgar prejudice, in which so many spent their lives, and giving to his views an elevation, a truthfulness, and a forbearance, the lack of which in our public relations he did not need here to deplore. And of all departments of history the most fitted for this purpose was one which he was sorry to say was that we had most neglected in Scotland—the history of religious opinion. There was no subject as to which it was more important that men should be well-informed, and should have clearer, more intelligent, and better reasoned convictions; and yet it was undeniable that there was hardly any subject upon which men expressed themselves at once so confidently and so ignorantly, or in regard to which the passions and prejudices mixed more strongly with higher thoughts. It was not easy perhaps to find any complete remedy for this. Whatever stirred men deeply must always rouse the lower as well as the higher elements of their nature; but one corrective of this undoubtedly would be the study of the history of religious opinion—in other words, the attempt to understand how religious opinion, like all other parts of human knowledge, had developed from stage to stage, what mingled influences affected it and changed its course and character from time to time. Such a study enabled us to estimate more correctly the nature of the religious forces working around us and in ourselves. It helped us to be more tolerant of opinion different from our own, and to see how all the truth was not on one side in such a matter any more than in other matters; how there might be some measure of good even where we seemed to see only evil, how human life and human society were built up of very complex elements—elements none of which we could stifle or forcibly thrust aside without injury. It brought

before us more strongly than any other study that great lesson which it might be said all history had been teaching man from the beginning, that we could not compel religious belief, or any form of belief, that men would not be constrained into this or that order of religious ideas, but only educated in them, and that the only hope for higher views prevailing over lower here and elsewhere was education—the clear perception of the questions discussed, the clear apprehension of the difficulties involved and of the ends aimed at. Undoubtedly, not a few of the subjects which now agitated society and divided men—God knows how bitterly!—and lessened the influence of religion, might be, if not cleared up and settled, at least raised into a higher atmosphere and brought nearer to a fair and righteous settlement, if men would only be at the pains to understand the questions fully, to study the historical conditions of those questions which they affected to dispose of so glibly and so peremptorily. (Applause.)

In conclusion, the Principal urged on his hearers the importance of spiritual no less than of intellectual culture. Of all the misfortunes that could overtake a young man this was the worst, that under the influence of a perverted intellectual bias his whole moral nature became so warped that good ceased to inspire him and evil ceased to trouble him—that the sanctities of life and death around him, the great realities of human emotion, the heroism of the battle of life, ceased to effect him. An education which left a man in this state was an education which he had better never known. The discipline of science and literature alike failed of their highest influences when they did not lead the student beyond himself to the infinite source of wisdom whence they came. He did not intend to trespass on the province of

the pulpit, or take up any aspect of controversy regarding the general subject of education, but it was necessary and useful to remember that all real knowledge had a religious bearing. There was no aspect of nature, there was no fact or law of life, there was no truth of science, that led an earnest man away from God, but all led to Him. It was very true there were those who might say differently, who would say that science led anywhere or nowhere beyond its own final generalizations, and that nature and life had no divine meaning beyond their own ever-varying beauty and movement. But views of this kind were really as unphilosophical as they were unchristian. They were at variance directly with our religious aspirations. They would measure the universe of spirit by the conclusions of sense, and they destroyed the very foundations of science themselves in seeking to exalt it to the heavens. It was a poor and shallow theory which would hide God from our view, instead of helping us to realize Him as not far from any one of us, and an education terminating in such a philosophy was an education which left our higher powers untrained, and really hid from us the highest knowledge. It was easy enough in a time like this to pick up a little scepticism, and it was one of the dangers of superficial and ill-directed reading that it sometimes destroyed the whole faith of a man without giving him any new or higher faith; but they would find

it hard to get on without some faith in spiritual realities, in a higher world, and a God and Christ as the source and centre of it. It was a poor compliment to religion to bid a young man shut his eyes to difficulties and perplexities. What were their eyes given to them for—their spiritual as well as their external eyes—but to open them as widely as possible, and to take in as much as they could? Here, as everywhere, all he would impress upon them—and he had no fear of the result, if they only took the lesson—was that they must look patiently, that they must inquire reverently, comprehensively, and perseveringly. They should remember—some young men did not seem sometimes to remember; that there was wisdom in the world before they came to it (laughter); and that the highest modern wisdom was not likely to consist in a mere opposition to the ancient wisdom which had come down to them, but rather in its further expansion—its higher development. The new thought was not to be rejected—he would never say that to any one, because he did not believe it; but, depend upon it, one of the best signs and seals of its truth would be, not that it reserved the old thought, but that it developed and enlarged it—that it was some new light of the eternal day which never grew pale, some new form of the eternal substance which never changed, but was “without variableness or shadow of turning.”

C. M. INGLEBY, LL.D., has in the press and nearly ready for publication, an important and valuable work, to be entitled “Shakspeare's Prayer”; a collection of the words spoken of the immortal dramatist by the poets of a century, shewing the appreciation he awakened in the minds of those who could best estimate his wondrous wealth of worth. It will have as a frontispiece an engraving of the Hunt Portrait, at the birth-place, Stratford-on-Avon.

Literary Notes.

ART-STUDENTS will rejoice at the prospect held out to them by Messrs. Bell & Daldy, of having Photographs of "The Works of Corregio at Parma," taken from Paul Toschi's engravings, with a Biography and Art notices of a descriptive nature, from the pen of Louis Fagan of the British Museum.

As a supplement to her magnificent Life of Wedgewood, Miss Eliza Meteyard has in preparation a quarto reproduction in Photography of the designs by Flaxman and others of the distinguished artist in plastic materials. It is to be entitled "Wedgewood and his Works."

Mrs. Charles Heaton has nearly ready "A Concise History of Painting for Students and General Readers."

The Bishop of Natal has at the press 26 popular lectures on the Pentateuch and the Moabite stone, with appendices containing—1st, The Elohist Narrative in Genesis; 2d, The Original Story of the Exodus; 3d, The pre-Christian Cross. The work will appear about the 1st of January.

It may not be generally known, says the *Astronomical Register*, that amongst other works translated of late years into the Chinese language are the following:—Herschel's "Outlines of Astronomy," by Wylie, 3 vols., sm. folio, China, 1859; De Morgan's "Algebra," by the same, 8vo., 1859; MacGowan's "Law of Storms," China, 1853; Milner's "History of England," abridged by Muirhead, Shanghai, 1856. There is also a Treatise on Arithmetic, in Chinese, by Wylie, 1853.

The Commonplace Book of the late Miss Susan Ferrier, with selections from her correspondence, which

is in course of preparation for the press, will present a lively picture of literary life in Edinburgh; and not the least interesting part of the work will be several unpublished letters of Robert Burns.

The Countess de Paliga is engaged upon a work of much interest, it will be called "Madame de Sevigne—Her Correspondents and Contemporaries."

The subject of Dr. George M' Donald's lectures in the United States are Burns, Shakspeare, Tennyson, Wordsworth, Milton, and Hood.

Thomas Keightley, editor of Shakspeare and Milton, Horace and Ovid, Virgil and Sallust; author of histories of Greece, Rome, England, &c.; died November 4th, aged 84.

"The History of Gregory VII.," a voluminous work upon which the late M. Villemain had been engaged for 20 years, has reached the hands of the printers.

A work is announced as ready for publication, with the title, "A Book about William Smith and the Somersetshire Coal Canal; being an Account of the Commencement of Stratigraphical Geology in England." The book which is we presume brought out by his nephew Professor Phillips, of Oxford, is illustrated by a series of consecutive photographs of the districts along the north side of the Canal valley, and each photograph is accompanied by a geologically coloured key, which shows at a glance the outcrop of the various strata. This method is, as far as we know, quite original, and serves to show clearly the data with which Smith born at Churchhill in Oxfordshire, 23rd March, 1769, died 28th August, 1839, dealt in arriving at his discoveries.

INDEX.

	PAGE		PAGE
LEADING ARTICLES.		THE REVIEWER:—	
EXAMINATIONS:—		Balfour's, J. H., Outlines of Botany	216
I. How to Prepare for and How to Succeed at them	1	Cockran's, J. F., Concise History	302
II. For Sunday School Teachers, &c.	161	Collier's, F. D., British Empire	302
III. What they may, can, and ought to do for Culture	252	Cooper's, E., The Truth in its own Light	377
MANY-SIDED MINDS:—		Curtis's, J., School and College History	302
Samuel Taylor Coleridge	81	Donne's, W. B., Euripides	137
MODERN METAPHYSICIANS:—		E. D.'s Outlines of English History	302
Shadworth H. Hodgson	401	England, Synoptical History of	302
William Paley, D.D.	241, 321	Gillespie's, W. H., A Priori Argument	50
Shadworth Holway Hodgson, Esq.	401	Grindon's, L., Little Things of Nature	216
DEBATES.		Grindon's, L., Pathway to Botany	216
EDUCATION:—		Hall's Companion to the Authorized Version of the New Testament	456
Ought the Reading of the Bible to be Prohibited in Rate-aided Schools?		Jerrold's, W. B., Day with Diasoli	381
Affirmative	27, 106, 183, 274, 438	Jerrold's, W. B., Day with Lord Lytton	381
Negative	31, 109, 187, 278, 437	Johns' O. A., First Steps to Botany	216
POLITICS:—		Martin's Origin and History of the New Testament	456
Ought the Church to be Disestablished and Disendowed?		Neil's, S., Handbook of Modern History	302
Affirmative	113, 192, 262, 285, 444	Pembridge's J., Chronological Table	302
Negative	36, 119, 267, 361, 447	Ross's, B., Manual of English History	302
SCIENCE:—		Sandar's, S. J. W., Structural Botany	216
Is Creation or Evolution the Better Interpretation of Nature?		Shell Flower Maker, The	306
Creation	200, 342	Smith's, Samuel, Credibility of Christian Religion	306
Evolution	41, 349	Usberweg's, F., History of Philosophy	383
SOCIAL ECONOMY:—		Wate's, Geo., Hints on Public Speaking	305
Ought the Liquor Traffic to be Suppressed?		OUR PRIVATE TUTOR:—	
Affirmative	22, 97, 176, 269, 353, 417	BIBLE PAGES:—	
Negative	16, 101, 179, 266, 358, 419, 426	No. I. On 2 Samuel	63
THE ESSAYIST:—		II. The Book of Ruth	142
Pride's Purge and its Precursors	46, 368	III. Gospel of St. Matthew	147
The Principles and Art of Teaching	123, 207	IV. The Book of Judges	326
Ugly Truths	452	V. Gospel of St. Mark	313
THE STUDY OF HISTORY:—		Self-tests on the Study of 2 Samuel	385
III. Outline of a Philosophy of History	134, 291	Hints of a Mnemonic System for studying any of the Books of the Bible	462
(Note.—The latter part of this Essay has by inadvertence been headed "Principles and Art of Teaching.")		On the Method of studying "Whately's Introductory Lessons on Christian Evidences"	462
Sympathy	296	AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE:—	
Our Magazine Literature	371	PLAIN ENGLISH:—	
Ugly Truths		Introductory Lesson 1	65
		Lesson 2	151
		Lesson 3	311

AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE, continued:—

Precis-Writing, and How to Manage it	68
On Reading Aloud	150
Articulation 2	232
Accentuation 3	311
How to Paraphrase	386
Geography, England: a Mnemonic Hint	70
The Olynthiac Orations	153
Science Studies, Botany	216
Historic Studies	302

OUR COLLEGIATE COURSE:—

Samson Agonistes: a Dramatic Poem, by John Milton	71
Lexicographic Notes	76, 154
Literary Notes and Illustrations	78, 155, 133, 388
Hints on Logical Study	156, 235

THE SOCIETIES' SECTION:—

Kelso Debating and Literary Society	158
AMHERST COLLEGE:—Emerson on "Greatness, Individuality, and Self-respect"	233
BIRMINGHAM MIDLAND INSTITUTE:—Canon Kingsley on "Health"	391
Edinburgh Literary Institute	468

THE INQUIRER:—

	Q.	A.
Botany	225	
Census	376	
Classics for Examination	62	61
English Composition	225	456
Grammar	376	
Heraldry	225	
Lecky, W. E. H.	225	225

THE INQUIRER, continued:—

	Q.	A.
Lincoln, Dean of	14	140
Monmouthshire, History of ..	6	
Newspapers	376	456
Printing, The Art of	376	455
Royal Historical Society	225	376
Royal Society of Literature ..	225	
Shakspeare, The School of ..	317	
Skeats, H. S.	62	225
St. Paul, Epistle of	217	
Tappan, H. P.	225	
Windsor, A. L.	225	
Working Men's Own Public-house		400

LACONICS:—

Accident and Consequence	373
Belgian Day Schools	376
Book-borrowing	175
Cheerfulness	35
Cramming	376
Duty v. Impulse	384
Fame, Love, and Self-love	390
Happiness, The Secret of	112
Health	348, 390
Hereditary Transmission of Qualities ..	159
Irish Hedge Schools	39
Oxford University Prizes	26
Persistence and Success	122
Polyglot English Classics	265
Shakspeare as a Geologist	380
Speech	380
Studying English	318
The Great Poet, when Comes he	381
The Hoped for and the Unseen	191
Victoria, The Reign of	189

LITERARY NOTES 70, 158, 239, 319, 385, 472

